



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Managing Editors: Carol LaRosa and Ed Spannaus

Editorial Staff: C. Berl, P. Brand, R. Dillon, L. Marcus,
R. Rose, T. Perlman

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Our Tendency's Perspectives for Growth

The present resurgence of the "irrationalist" methods of CP gangsterism in the U.S.A., at a critical point in the capitalist world economic situation, ironically demonstrates afresh that all history is rational — in the Marxian sense of an underlying lawfulness of social processes.

Moscow being what it is, the various Communist parties around the world have responded lawfully to the reemergence of a potentially revolutionary economic-social conjuncture, by attempting to placate the capitalist ruling strata being enraged toward a potential fascist frenzy by these new developments.

Just as the potential for building mass-based vanguard movements begins to emerge, the various CPs carry out Moscow's foreign policy in much the same fashion as during the 1935-1947 period of threatened attacks on the U.S.S.R. These parties demonstrate Moscow's sincerity in honoring its anti-revolutionary deals with Nixon et al., by mobilizing their ranks as a force of rage against all those socialist organizations which represent a potential threat to Moscow's deals with selected capitalist factions.

As the first act of its services as left-border goons for the Senator McGovern forces, the CPUSA — with echoes from Moscow — has singled out the Labor Committees as the "test case" and dress-rehearsal victim for the U.S. campaign of hooliganism — and, ultimately, political assassinations. This attack it will soon generalize to include its sycophant, the Workers' League, and also the SWP-YSA, as well as all other "left dangers" to the Senator McGovern Moscow is momentarily wooing.

By singling out the Labor Committees, which the CP leadership has previously identified as the principal "left danger" of the moment, the CP forces

every other socialist group in the U.S.A. — and, soon enough, Western Europe — to align itself in its own defense with or against the Labor Committees over the issues of the present showdown.

At the moment of writing, we do not know what exact actions the SWP leadership will take in response to the gangsterism which all the older members (especially) know must inevitably be extended to their own organization. The Spartacists and I.S. have instinctually responded more or less immediately in the correct way, and the Militant's scrupulous coverage of two instances of CP gangsterism strongly suggests the general direction SWP and YSA will tend to take.

So far, "only the Workers League" has crawled into alliance with the CP gangster leadership, for which services it will be repaid with kicks and other blows by CP goon-squads soon enough.

THE RESULT

As if to justify the old saw, "It's an ill wind that blows nobody good," CP gangsterism in the U.S.A. will make an important unintentional, factitious contribution to the health and strength of its socialist opponents in both the U.S.A. and Western Europe.

On both continents, the large "Trotskyist" and "Maoist" organizations which flourished during the 1960s are being shattered, and the split groups are now undergoing a further, accelerated fissioning. The shattering of the "Maoists," already in progress, has been exacerbated by the recently obvious right turn of the Chinese leadership. Over last Summer, the second largest of the "world Trotskyist" organizations, the Healyite "International Committee," exploded, and has continued the fissioning-process since then. It is an

open secret among European sections of the other "Fourth International," that a brewing split between the pro-Mandel and pro-SWP factions of that organized tendency (the "Unified Secretariat") only awaits an appropriate circumstance for a triggering incident to take effect.

CP attacks on the Labor Committee, obviously an open threat to attack every "Trotskyist" and "Maoist" grouping in the near future, force all serious socialist opponents of the CP to form actual or de facto "minimal basis" united fronts against this revival of Stalinist gangsterism. At the same time, the attacks will shock these group's members into greater seriousness about their professed socialist commitments than has generally been seen during the 1960s. CP hooliganism epitomizes the useful point that the struggle for socialism is "for keeps," rather than being a student's harmless recreation at a certain stage of his life.

This will force the groups thus thrust together to consider their own and one another's programmatic perspectives in more serious terms than has been seen in generally shallow factional exchanges up to this time. The most serious potential revolutionary cadres from these groups, thrust together under circumstances of such serious self-defense, will tend to demand that the united front progress from a minimal mutual-defense basis to common POSITIVE action on some degree of shared programmatic agreements.

THE SWP CASE

For example, the SWP's present presidential campaign. The combination of the nomination of McGovern and the rampages of CP volunteer goons-for-McGovern, as the latter must attempt to disrupt SWP presidential campaign work, will force the latter to define its electoral campaign far more seriously than it has to this point.

It is merely moot at this juncture, but nonetheless a very real potentiality in the present situation, that the SWP would feel impelled to shift its present presidential and other 1972 electoral campaigns, to serve as a rallying-point for a serious propagandistic "independent working-class political action" effort uniting larger sections of the socialist movement in the remaining months of this year. Granted, most of the socialist opponents of the SWP could not uncritically support Jenness-Pulley in that campaign's present form. The SWP could be more easily induced, under the present, emerging circumstances of rampant CP hooliganism for McGovern, to make "adjustments" to assist its socialist opponents in giving a certain kind of serious critical support to that campaign.

In any case, the Labor Committees have always been open since our public declaration to this effect

during the July 1971 NPAC conference, to seriously negotiate with the SWP (and other socialist groups) the terms under which we could seriously give critical support to (for example) an SWP slate.

It is useful to review the way in which such an agreement among the SWP, ourselves, and certain other socialist groups might be reached. Examining this matter helps one to understand more concretely how united front work against CP hooliganism can lead to contradictory but positive results for the movement as a whole.

Obviously, because of the very profound political differences with the SWP, we — for example — could not simply endorse that campaign in its present form. However, with certain changes in the Jenness-Pulley campaign, we could — obviously — support SWP campaign efforts in various locations, in rallies in which the SWP's and our own spokesman presented our different programs and perspectives, and in which we stated why, despite these sharp differences, we considered it necessary to mobilize as many as possible to make an electoral demonstration for a campaign based on the principle of "independent working-class political action" — just as Trotsky, in 1940, unsuccessfully demanded that the SWP negotiate support of Browder.

This would not be possible given the kind of campaign Jenness and Pulley have run to date, since the effect of their campaigning is to reenforce exactly those "populist" conceptions of "multi-constituencyism" which are the essential ideology of the McGovern campaign — despite SWP exposures of McGovern himself. As the CP goons-for-McGovern confront the SWP with the implications of the McGovern platform, SWP candidates at least tend to be forced by the aftermath of the Democratic Convention to shift sharply away from all imitations of McGovern populism toward some approximation of working-class politics.

At least, these circumstances are making such a shift a serious possibility.

To round out this point.

The Democratic Convention has given the SWP two possible alternatives for the remainder of its 1972 Jenness-Pulley campaign. Either it will respond to McGovern's "sell-outs" on the abortion question, the "\$6500 now" demand, and so forth, exactly as the CP will do, by merely criticizing McGovern for abandoning the "left," or the SWP can elect to shift its campaign qualitatively, to counterpose its formerly traditional "independent working-class political action" policies to the CP's virtual takeover of the prevailing Jenness-Pulley platform.

CP hooliganism for McGovern, especially as this

must be directed soon against the Jenness-Pulley campaign, will at least tend to force the SWP into a more positive policy.

MORE GENERALLY

The SWP case merely exemplifies the pressures which are now beginning to act throughout the non-CP left, and also act upon viable strata of potential cadres within the YWLL itself. As the CP attaches a fist to its blatantly counterrevolutionary policies, all serious socialists are forced to either cave into the CP, or to begin offering a serious alternative to the kind of politics behind the CP's resurgent gangsterism.

As a result, all of the non-CP socialist groups trapped into such a situation by resurgent Stalinist gangsterism will be forced to sort themselves out into two main organized tendencies.

As a result of the "minimal basis" united front mutual-defense policies forced upon them, a reluctant and divided non-CP left in the U.S.A. will be willy-nilly subjected to an intensified and accelerated process of splits and fusions. The entire U.S. socialist movement, including the CP, will tend to be reassorted into three principal socialist organizations.

The largest organization — for the immediate months ahead — will be the CP-YWLL and the groups and factions which collapse into the peripheries of the CP, on the way to being totally absorbed.

The main contender of the CP will be the third largest of these three organizations, either the Labor Committees, or the continuation of the NCLC in the enlarged form of some new organization resulting from fusions.

The least important and second-largest organization of the three will be a group which most closely resembles the New York-based faction of the International Socialists grouping, creating a more or less classical left-Menshevik socialist party. This will be either a fusion-transformed SWP-YSA or will be formed mainly as the result of a ragged migration of various groups of dissident SWPers into the present I.S.

As we indicated, the latter two organizations will emerge out of the forced congregation of the non-CP left in various approximations of, and attempts to evade, de facto "minimal basis" united fronts. It is between the two socialist organizations, the enlarged NCLC and the left-Mensheviks, emerging as relatively hegemonic from this process, that the present non-CP left will be sorted out in the main.

THE PROCESS

The basis for the division between the NCLC

tendency and the left-Mensheviks will be the factional alignment within the non-CP left over the "class-for-itself" versus "class-in-itself" conceptions of socialist strategy and tactics toward the working-class movement generally. In numbers, the left-Menshevik, or class-in-itself organization will seem to win that struggle.

This "victory" means nothing in the longer run — as the case of the Russian Revolution of 1917 properly epitomizes.

Under present conditions, the kind of semi-populist to populist petit-bourgeois perspectives offered by the majority faction of the SWP-YSA can not stand the pressures of the deadly serious situation on the U.S. left. Among all SWPers who take their political identification with Trotsky's name more or less seriously, the resurgence of Stalinism in its most naked form will elevate their literary interest in Trotsky's writings to something to be taken more seriously than cramming for the equivalent of an internal phrase-mongering spelling-bee. Confronted with that, SWP-YSA recruits will either proceed toward dropping out of politics, or will begin to demand some significant reorientation toward what they regard as a Trotskyist working-class perspective.

This will mean an end to the present form of the SWP-YSA in one way or another. Either the SWP will be qualitatively transformed from what it has become by assimilating the left-Menshevik faction of the I.S. (and other groups) in fusions, or the SWP-YSA will accelerate present peripheral erosion into actual organizational decline, with the majority of the more serious members moving in clusters into the I.S. — with perhaps fifty or more of the present total SWP-YSA membership moving toward the NCLC.

The reasons for such general tendencies should be obvious.

The general effect of a more serious political mood within SWP-YSA groups will naturally be a tendency to revert toward the left-centrist working-class orientation they adduce from the SWP's "traditions." This shift permits them to make the least effort away from the multi-constituency "traditions" of the SWP of the late 1960s. As the example of the former SWP minority, the CT group, shows, it is only necessary for an SWP member of today to shift his views to give qualitative

preeminence to the trade-union struggle over that of other "constituencies," for him or her to adopt essentially the same political outlook as the New York-based faction within I.S.

The probability is that either the SWP soon opens the door to fusion with that I.S. tendency and similarly oriented "Maoist" and "Trotskyist" sectlets afoot

today, or, by default, the more serious strata of SWP members will migrate in ragged little caravans toward the Schachtmanite I.S. during 1973.

It should not be imagined that the SWP can escape this trap by abstaining from the united-front process initiated by CP gangsterism. If the SWP were to refuse to participate in this process, that refusal itself would destroy the last vestige of the SWP's credibility in the eyes of many of its own members — precipitating them more quickly toward either the NCLC or I.S.

THE PARADOX

The relevance of such inevitable developments to the general world situation is revealed by examining the dynamics of the relative growth of the NCLC and the future left-Menshevik organization.

The left-Menshevik organization must tend to grow more rapidly than the NCLC or its successor organization, at least once the resolution of the unstable present separate existence of the SWP and I.S. begins during 1973.

This more rapid organizational growth will be the result of two interconnected features exemplified by the British co-thinker group of the present I.S. group in the U.S.A. British I.S. has two distinguishing social-political qualities: a general political amorphousness appropriately combined with an opportunist adaptation to the political backwardness among most "left" British trade-union militants.

An organization like the NCLC limits its membership by maintaining a higher standard of theoretical competence and programmatic firmness for all members. The left-Menshevik organization has the shopkeeper's advantage of offering few such "ultimatistic" obstacles to membership, admitting any pro-working-class individual who has merely the vaguest sort of literary affiliation to the general idea of socialism. In principle, these distinctions resemble the basis for numerical discrepancies between the infinitesimal Bolshevik organization and relatively burgeoning Menshevik organization at the beginning of 1917.

WHY?

This is no mere marketing evaluation of the potential immediate-future assortment and size of U.S. socialist organizations. The relative sizes and varieties of socialist organizations which can achieve noticeable influence during a period of intensified capitalist crises is lawfully determined.

For the near future, in any country of North America and Western Europe, sociological laws permit only the existence of three main socialist or-

ganizations. Under the pressure of deepening conjunctural crises, all the main bodies of the growing European and North American left must proceed to find themselves sorted out among three such lawful organizations.

In general, the CPs and left-Menshevik organizations represent two varieties of the centrist tendency which lawfully tends to dominate the socialist movement's left up to the verge of decisive working-class upsurges. However, it is virtually impossible for these two closely allied varieties of centrism to fuse into a stable single organized formation — a lawful sociological fact merely certified by CP goons' boots and fists soon to be directed against the left-Mensheviks.

The distinction is located in Trotsky's correct appreciation of the special distinctions of Stalinist from other forms of centrism. The special, watertight character of CP centrism is fixed by identification with and adaptation to the opportunist interests of the Soviet state bureaucracy. Other forms of left-Menshevism generally distinguish themselves from Stalinism by adapting to the kind of political backwardness among militant workers which opposes the subordination of "the general tactical line" to Moscow's interests.

The CP and left-Menshevism represent the only possible varieties of centrist tendencies which can credibly maintain a significant, separate organized existence in the eyes of workers and others being attracted to the socialist movement generally. In a certain sense, it is proper to say that the virtual elimination of all but these two kinds of centrist organization occurs because the growing number of potential recruits to centrism refuses to tolerate the proliferation of additional organized expressions of centrism.

What we have attributed to the immediate future of the U.S. socialist movement also implies that the present mess called the European non-CP socialist movement must similarly proceed to assort itself among two dominant professedly revolutionary organizations. That is what the recent years' wave of splits among European "Trotskyist" and "Maoist" groups is really all about: a necessary preliminary phase of the lawful process of reassertment under pressures of deepening capitalist crisis.

OUR PERSPECTIVE

Considering such predictions of the relative size of the three kinds of groups we foresee in all these countries, how do we find, in this perspective of our tendency's inferior size, a prospect of our future leading role in the mass upsurges of this decade?

The analytical approach is exemplified by considering (hypothetical) panel debates between our spokesmen and SWP representatives in the course of the SWP's electoral campaign this fall. If the SWP spokesmen offered left-centrist pro-labor perspectives of independent working-class political action, the SWP spokesman would win over the majority of members of most of those audiences.

This problem was discussed first by Karl Marx; later Marx's views on the subject were examined by Leon Trotsky.

Short of circumstances of mass working-class upsurge, the left-centrist or class-in-itself outlook on possibly effective forms of agitation seems to be far more sensible than the "ultimatistic" class-for-itself perspective. The key term is "possible," which is a cognate for a political category called "opportunism."

Only the exceptional radicalized worker or student brings to the movement those exceptional leadership qualities of temperament and intellectual vision needed to see beyond the evanescent but nonetheless more tangible realities of the most immediate narrow tactical situation. Given an average assortment of potential socialists, under all but the most extraordinary circumstances the left-centrist arguments tend to be more "credible," to agree more with "common sense" prejudices, than the revolutionary outlook.

However, in a revolutionary mass-upsurge, the relative general credibilities of the left-centrist and revolutionary are suddenly reversed, in exactly the fashion exemplified by Plekhanov's, Martynov's, and other Mensheviks' disorientation in the face of both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions.

Just as we see in the example of the moral defeat of the potentially victorious 1926 British General Strike, under conditions of great mass upsurges, the most immediate and most urgent demands of the working class can not possibly be realized short of the establishment of working-class political power. This power, in turn, can not be obtained — especially in an advanced capitalist sector — unless the class forces are not only unified in common organizations under common class-interest programs, but unless those programs credibly correspond to the immediate concrete tasks of taking over and reorganizing the capitalist productive forces in the necessary way.

Under such circumstances, left-centrist groups, with their disdain of "strike-support organizing committee" methods, and of programs like our "Emergency Reconstruction Program," are utterly disoriented, and are incapable of answering the demands of the working class forces, for a ruthless leadership basing itself on clear and credible programs of work-

ing-class political and economic power. It is in precisely such situations — as merely exemplified by Lenin's victory over the Mensheviks in 1917 — that the tiny band of revolutionaries cuts through the previous relative hegemonies of left-centrists and reformists like a hot knife through rancid butter.

This is what Trotsky otherwise stated as his conception of "Permanent Revolution."

It is not possible to establish such a qualified vanguard by suddenly ordering left-centrist cadres to begin pushing actually revolutionary tactics and programs at the last minute. The qualities of revolutionary mass leadership are not acquired by a sudden, belated effort of the centrist will. These personal qualifications and habits of leadership collaboration can only be developed over a period of years of education and of experiences of work in preliminary expressions of the political class struggle. Nor can a group which has been telling larger numbers of workers one thing for years suddenly convince those same workers that it stands for that which it has denounced during that same preceding period.

Assuming, for sake of illustration, that our tendency still has the name, "Labor Committees," at the outset of the most critical juncture, the transition to socialism will begin as tens of thousands of workers will turn to us for leadership on the premise, "The Labor Committees have been right all along." Those same workers who have mainly rejected our ideas for years and months up to that time, will turn to our leadership, which has been demonstrated by life's experience to have been correct all along.

AT SUCH MOMENTS, EVERY ONE OF OUR OP-
PONENT'S APPARENT VICTORIES OVER US IN EAR-
LIER DEBATES BEFORE THE CLASS FORCES BE-
COMES THE IMMEDIATE BASIS FOR OUR UNIQUE
HEGEMONY OVER THOSE SAME WORKERS UNDER
CONDITIONS OF ACUTE CRISIS. At that juncture,
with such credentials, a tiny revolutionary vanguard
organization, of a few thousands or tens of thousands
at most, is suddenly accredited by mass forces as
their chosen "general staff" and officer corps for the
establishment of socialism.

HOW IT WORKS

What is necessary, for this to occur, is that as the crisis develops, even at a stage of that crisis many months or several years before the crucial time, the modern socialist movement itself must be sorted out by events into three clearly distinguishable contending organized tendencies. As a result, the working people who think about socialism at all — as they begin to do in increasing numbers — think in terms of such three organized alternatives to their continuing pro-capitalist commitments.

They do not immediately decide to be socialists. They view the three alternative organizations with the following sort of thought: "If I were a socialist, instead of continuing my firm adherence to the Democratic Party, I would be supporting this organization." The workers begin to decide which of these organized tendencies represents the credible socialist alternative to their own present non-socialist or even anti-socialist convictions and affiliations.

When, much later, they decide to try the socialist alternative seriously, they reflect this by automatically associating with that organization they saw as the mere credible moot alternative months before.

The effective relationship of the socialist organization to the workers is absolutely not properly measured by numbers of recruits or even subscribers to socialist publications. The relationship which, in the longer run, wins over masses of working people, is a process of circulating institutionalized socialist conceptions and proposals among a large population which must necessarily (and, deceptively) appear to have a predominantly inert or even hostile response to those ideas. As the crisis deepens, the longer-term, simmering effects of this process break through the surface of events in the form of a mass migration toward socialist leadership, a development which must surely astonish the "common sense" observer.

As this process begins, as it is beginning to occur in a token fashion right now, the majority of those token working-class and pro-working-class strata already moving toward socialism openly, will inevitably tend to migrate to the professedly revolutionary groupings which best approximate the political backwardness and related opportunistic inclinations of all militant workers. The CP-YWLL and whatever new left-Menshevik organization soon emerges will secure the largest number of new recruits and apparent greater influence.

Contrary to these short-term trends, at the same time, the process of making this temporary choice will be a process of assimilating awareness of the alternative organization and ideas represented by our own tendency. As the crisis deepens, and the classwide quality of workers' struggles emerges more clearly, the underlying contradictory feature of the apparent centrist organizational successes will be revealed. Tens of thousands of pro-socialist workers, previously attached to the peripheries of the centrists, will swing over en masse to the organization representing our

own tendency.

THEN WE WIN

In general, during the next year or so, the very qualities of our tendency which cause both Moscow and the CPUSA leaders to regard us the potential or actual "main left-danger" to their politics will produce a rapid coalescence of our considerable organizational-growth potential to the point that our tendency represents in substance, as well as implicit qualities, the most vigorous revolutionary international cadre-tendency throughout North America and Western Europe (especially).

This will be the immediate outcome of the present process of massive organizational realignments of the socialist movement on those two continents. It will also be to a large degree the effect of the deepening economic-social crisis, in convincing our recruits that we have been absolutely correct in perspective when everyone of our socialist and pro-capitalist opponents and critics have been absolutely wrong.

Despite this virtually certain explosive growth of our political tendency, we will remain for some time the smallest in membership of the three principal professedly revolutionary tendencies on each of these continents. Most probably, at least, we will seem even tiny by comparison with the CPs, and significantly smaller than whatever left-Menshevik organizations emerge as relatively hegemonic from the chaos of the present North American and European "Trotskyist" and "Maoist" groups.

Meanwhile, some portent of the subsequent future will be seen in the far greater specific impact of our ideas than those of the CPs and left-Menshevik groups. Our socialist opponents and capitalist circles alike will soon begin to regard the task of "finally" stamping out the influence of our ideas as a very large part of their effort — which will, inevitably, only increase the influence of those very ideas.

As this process progresses to the indicated critical point, we move forward toward leadership — and capitalism will then soon be eradicated on a world scale.

July 12, 1972

The United States of Europe:

Their Program and Ours

by L. Marcus

It is most instructive to trace the manic-depressive responses of most academic economists to the bouncing ball motion of the international monetary system as it alternately falls into a new liquidity crisis, then rebounds for a brief "recovery," and then descends still lower into its next collapse. Each moment the economy has thus plunged into some new ominous threat, beginning with the British panic of November 1967, they themselves are precipitated for the moment into dark despair. The instant the short-lived rebound occurs, the same economists are rocketed into the giddiest of psychedelic euphorias. Such well-deserved tortures are the suitable purgatory-existence of those who have insisted that the "built-in stabilizers" assured it could never happen again.

Meanwhile, no such disorientation exists among the leading financiers. Unlike the academic babblers, these well-placed officials are annoyed but not profoundly shaken by the fact they are prepared to accept: that the capitalist system is moving into a Second Great Depression. That this is indeed their state of mind is manifest by the fact that the leading circles are already debating the program for a new capitalist order to emerge, after the collapse, in the late 1970s. Leaving the petit-bourgeois academic economists and minor parliamentary figures to man the built-in stabilizer pumps of the sinking Bretton Woods system, the leading bankers and selected top-most officials have already taken to the life-boats, so to speak, and are paddling vigorously toward a new fascist world order visible on the other side of the present economic squalls.

Sicco Mansholt, chief executive officer of the European Common Market, is one of the paddlers, as befits

his rank among the privileged strata of the big bourgeoisie. Mansholt, like his peers, John D. Rockefeller 3rd of the U.S. Commission on Population Growth,⁽¹⁾ and Dr. Aurelio Peccei of the notorious "Club of Rome,"⁽²⁾ has abandoned the capitalist world of the past quarter-century for the resurrected order of Krupp, Speer, and Himmler to be founded during the late 1970s, the new world of "Zero Population Growth."⁽³⁾

Exactly what Messers Mansholt, Rockefeller, and Peccei intend is exemplified by two widely circulated, and widely endorsed, documents put into currency during the early months of the present year. The first of these two is a draft entitled "Blueprint for Survival," published in the January edition of the British periodical, *The Ecologist*, and boisterously endorsed by the editorial columns of the Feb. 4 *New York Times*, under the sponsorship of the "Club of Rome" by a group of wretched MIT professors, entitled *The Limits of Growth*.

In practice, both of the proposals may be fairly described as the equivalent of President Nixon's "Phase Four" attack on labor, extended to the capitalist world as a whole. Both propose to extend the recent and present U.S. and European programs of wage-gouging and unemployment to major and permanent reductions in the consumption levels of all wage-earners. It is absolutely no exaggeration to report that the recommended reductions in wage-levels proposed by the *Limits of Growth* are comparable only to the reductions of workers' incomes imposed upon the French and other workers by Hitler during the 1943-45 period! If one attributes consistency to the intent of the authors of this proposal, then its calculations

would justify "remedies" like those of the Nazi 1943-45 "final solution to the Slavic question."

We have dealt with the reasons for such programs elsewhere, as we have demonstrated why the next and final stage of capitalism can only be an imitation of the Nazi economy on a world-scale. (4) The point here is to emphasize that the big bourgeoisie are rapidly developing and propagating their program for the world to follow the presently developing new depression, whereas, the leading organizations of the socialist movement have, in practice, no program at all!

THE ITALIAN MODEL

The situation about to confront all Europe in the years just ahead (and North America, as well) is being previewed in the rapid growth of the Italian Social Movement (MSI) in Italy.

We would not dispute the fact that the condition of the European working class has significantly improved over that of the 1943-48 period, and perhaps over that of the employed workers of the 1930s. However, as Nikos Syvriotis illustrates in his article in May-June 1972 Campaigner (5), the condition of that class as a whole has relatively stagnated or even deteriorated (if we account for new needs) over that of the best years of the 1920s and the pre-1914 period. In addition to the poor quality of mere nourishment and housing of German workers, the deterioration of French workers' life which has accelerated since the "heavy franc" fell on their backs, and, above all, in no sector of industrialized Europe is the reality of post-war capitalists' prosperity more clearly exposed than in the Italian Messogiorno. It is a permissible hyperbole to report that the ruined condition of Southern Italy seems to represent all of the decay accumulated since the collapse of the Roman Empire.

During the period of industrial expansion of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the social explosive charge of the Messogiorno was kept from expressing itself in a general detonation in two interrelated ways. Although economic miracles never reached much below the level of the pulpit in those regions, employment opportunities elsewhere, created by industrial expansion in the north and in West Germany bled off some of the sharpest impulses for manifestly organized discontent. At the same time, the capitalists' prosperity of Europe permitted the Italian capitalists to increase the amount of hand-to-mouth-existence employment in the notoriously large and complex Italian governmental apparatus. In these and related ways, the unrelieved misery of the lumpenized Messogiorno (and other impoverished regions) was more veiled and pacified than actually ameliorated.

By 1969, the slowing rate of general European capitalist expansion of industrial employment, and pres-

sure on the lira, forced a cutback in the rate of expansion of safety-valve programs, turning the lumpenized regions of Italy into a virtual pressure-cooker of neo-fascist "populist" ferment, a development celebrated by the notorious Calabrian riots — over government jobs.

Meanwhile, during this same recent period, the Communist Party of Italy reacted, not by proposing a socialist alternative, but by seeking "peaceful coexistence" with the doomed parliamentary system, thus committing itself to a common destiny with a virtual corpse. To the extent that the CPI occasionally took to the streets in pursuit of its followers, it merely participated in the growing chaos and despair, without proposing a remedy to the growing anarchy and demoralization. By now, that party has certainly convinced the majority of the Italian workers that it has absolutely no intention of offering a working-class government alternative, so, in due course, the Italian workers will either flock to or tolerate the one party which is willing to seize power from a faltering parliamentary corpse, the MSI.

This is inevitable, unless a new revolutionary leadership quickly emerges on the Italian scene. Parliamentary regimes — and, thus, the circumstances for continuing socialists' parliamentary opportunist games — depend upon relative capitalists' prosperity. Under those special conditions, the various bourgeois parliamentary parties can maintain the affiliation of fragmented working-class and petit-bourgeois populations through doled token concessions to each small, parochialist interest-group formation rallied around the party's neighborhood offices. Such concessions not only secure the continued sheep-like attachment of the small constituency groups to bourgeois parliamentary rations, but the perpetuation of this rations-system institutionalizes the fragmentation of the masses as an impotent herd of petty "self-interest" groups... thus preventing the masses from being mobilized into a mass, class-interest-force. This latter condition is of inestimable cash value to the bourgeoisie, wherefore the capitalists' impassioned attachment to democracy UNDER CONDITIONS OF PROSPERITY.

Remove the material basis for this system of parliamentary rationing of "goodies," and the very material basis of the parliamentary system itself promptly collapses. At that juncture, when the sheep-like neighborhood "constituencies" are denied their accustomed parliamentary rations, they may become most un-sheep-like, provided there exists a vanguard leadership to mobilize them into a mass force around their class interests. Lacking a working-class party of those qualities (or, the same thing, possessing the leadership of a CPI!), the soon-demoralized and fragmented population becomes the easy prey for whatever radical-populist dealer in enraged sheep — e.g., fascist

demagogues — appear to herd them into the directions of bonapartism and fascism.

Thus, it is possible — and necessary — to draw two curves for Italy. One curve, descending at an accelerating rate, represents the combined progress of the economic situation, the parliamentary system, and the PCI's credibility. The other curve, ascending at an accelerating rate, represents the fascist and proto-fascist ferment typified by the MSI. At the juncture of these two curves, Italy will receive from its capitalist masters either a temporary "Bruning" regime, or be turned over immediately to the supervision of a new Mussolini.

Although the economic and social deterioration of the German "economic miracle" has by no means reached the state of decay being pioneered in Italy, we need merely examine the conditions underlying the recent parliamentary crises of Herr Brandt to trace the movement of Germany into an Italian direction — a development foreseen with considerable delight by the fascist split-off from the NDP. In Britain, we are confronted with the emergence of a Northern, English-speaking Messogiorno in the Midlands, Scotland, Ulster and Wales, with British workers advised to pack their bags to join the Gastarbeiter. In France, we are nauseated by the hideous posture of the PCF, now joining the chauvinistic chorus against those malignant "foreign workers" occupying good Frenchmen's jobs. Unless a new force of working-class leadership intervenes throughout Europe, the present situation and impulses seen in today's Italy are the immediate future working-class history of all Europe, the conditions for the emergence of the fascist regimes suitable to implement Sicco Mansholt's "Zero Population Growth" program.

THE STATE OF THE LEFT

In face of such developments, the leading socialist organizations of Europe, the Communist and Unified Secretariat(6) parties, are to be regarded as a comi-tragic imitation of the old Second International. In a period in which the U.S.-led and U.S.-dominated European capitalists are uniting their resources in the emerging enlargements of the Common Market, in which NATO exists as a supra-national counter-revolutionary force poised against the workers' movement in each nation, and in which all European basic industry is immediately interdependent, these "socialist" parties represent a contemptible, programless agglomeration of loosely-confederated autonomous, national organizations.

From the standpoint of the simplest facts of basic European industrial development today, only a cretin in political economy could suggest that workers' economies could possibly be established, even as a viable temporary institution, in any single European nation.

Only a cretin in tactics would suggest defeating NATO counterrevolutionary forces in his own national sector without the concerted support of the working-class forces of every European nation. Only a political imbecile, indeed, would consider himself a revolutionary socialist unless he were practically engaged in constructing an international party committed to establishing a United Socialist States of Europe — an international party which qualifies as such by a supra-national standard of individual membership. Yet, as we have indicated, none of these relatively left-hegemonic "socialist" parties today proposes such a form of centralized, international organization, nor a serious program for such a United Socialist States of Europe.

In short, with the entire capitalist economy bouncing into general collapse, with the leading bourgeoisie already beginning to propagandize for a fascist program for the late 1970s, and with one nation of Europe already tottering in the direction of early fascist takeover, none of the left-hegemonic socialist parties of Europe seriously proposes the form of organization, program, strategy, or propaganda work absolutely essential to prevent fascist takeovers during the present decade!

It is, of course, a truism, that many years, perhaps even more than a decade, is required to build a left-hegemonic socialist organization. That would be true now if it were actually necessary to start from "zero." Happily, our situation is more analogous to that of the Luxemburg faction in the Germany of 1918.

From the end of 1918 to 1923, despite Zinoviev's repeated interventions and recurring ultra-left disorders like those of the KAPD, the KPD was built to an organization which was fully qualified IN NUMBERS AND HEGEMONY to have made a successful German socialist revolution in 1923. Unfortunately, Zinoviev and Stalin developed "cold feet" at the very instant the German workers could have seized power, and called off what would have been a victorious German socialist revolution. Had Trotsky, for example, been directly in charge of the Communist International Executive Committee during the 1920-23 period, instead of a centrist such as Zinoviev, KPD recruitment from the SPD and USPD had created a sufficient vanguard force to seize victory.

Throughout Europe today, in addition to the invaluable young potential cadres who have yet to be recruited to any socialist organization, there are large and decisive strata of viable cadres within the various Communist and Trotskyist groups, who need only to be won over to building a new international party to put the United Socialist States of Europe within our grasp. That is the only perspective worth considering by anyone who considers himself a serious revolutionary;

any other perspective is crap.

There is little latitude, considering the precious few years available and the essential steps of preparatory development of organization and peripheries, for major blunders or procrastination. We can afford no Zinovievs, nor "March Actions." We can not permit the luxury of again, yet again, testing from within the viability of a Communist party which has proven itself incapable of improvement during the better part of a half-century! Every action must be undertaken and gauged with scientific precision and Lenin-like organizational ruthlessness. Those qualities assumed, we have the potential for establishing a United Socialist States of Europe during the 1970s — just barely the margin within which to seize that victory before the alternative fascist ruin of humanity eliminates any "second chance."

THE SCIENCE OF PROGRAM

Those prefatory observations now provide the setting for the kind of scientific treatment of the conception of PROGRAM which is the principal topic of this writing. This or that long-standing "tradition," this or that organization's or individual's prejudices, or "need to be given time to think it through," are unfortunately not luxuries we can afford. Since we must start from an absolutely correct conception of program, and have no time to wait for slow thinkers to catch up, we — the initiating revolutionary intelligentsia — must get the matter right, with scientific precision, at once, and proceed. In certain tactical matters, we can and will compromise; in the matter of programmatic CONCEPTION, once that has been settled for us from the standpoint of science, absolutely no compromises can be permitted.

The way in which we present the following summary of our argument for a distinct notion of program is admittedly not addressed to the "average militant worker," whoever that worker may prove to be. At this instant, as we have said before, (7) everything else depends upon organization of the revolutionary intelligentsia as an initiating cadre-force. It is to the revolutionary intelligentsia that these remarks are addressed. After we have assembled our own forces, or in propaganda publications addressed to the working-class vanguard itself, we shall restate these same ideas more slowly, more step-by-step, in the forms of pedagogy agreeable to working people generally. At this moment, we have certain business to settle — and quickly — with the revolutionary intelligentsia. It is from that standpoint that this is written.

As for the "esoteric" cast our writing may therefore seem to acquire — notably in the eyes of academic imbeciles and Unified Secretariat or DKP centrists — no matter. Marx, too, had to suffer the

criticisms of such KNOTEN. As he stated his irritation on this subject to Engels, in a letter of July 18, 1877:

"It would certainly be very pleasant if a really scientific specialist journal were to be published. It would provide an opportunity for criticisms or counter-criticisms in which we could discuss theoretical points, expose the utter ignorance of professors and lecturers and at the same time enlighten the minds of the general public — working-class or bourgeois. But Weide's periodical CANNOT possibly be anything but sham-scientific; the same half-educated KNOTEN and dilettante literary men who make Neue Welt, Vorwaerts, etc., unsafe, necessarily form the majority of his collaborators. Ruthlessness — the first condition of all criticism — is impossible in such company; besides which constant attention has to be paid to making things easily comprehensible, i.e., exposition for the ignorant. Imagine a journal of chemistry where the reader's ignorance of chemistry is constantly assumed as the fundamental presupposition..."

The scientific issue to which we address particular emphasis here, has been sharply pointed up by growing and increasingly embittered debate between our own political tendency and a half-a-dozen "socialist" tendencies rooted variously in Europe and North America. We have insisted that socialist program must be addressed principally to the concrete historic tasks of socialist expanded reproduction which will confront us in the developing conjunctural crisis, and that day-to-day economic and other programmatic proposals should be the approximation of those "maximum" demands which advances the current struggle toward the tasks of socialist power.

For example, our U.S. organization, the National Caucus of Labor Committees, has circulated since the Summer of 1970 a draft program entitled "Emergency Reconstruction Program," which proposes an interconnected set of economic and organizational proposals to the working-class movement. The organizational proposals represent concrete measures appropriate to the U.S.A. today, to advance the class from its particular forms of trade-union and other extant organization to a class-for-itself form of self-organization of the type otherwise described as the "soviet" or "united class front" form, identifying this as the political form of class organization for workers' state power. We merely identify that aspect of the program so that no reader will imagine that the draft involves only economic proposals.

The economic section of the draft program takes as its starting-point two general premises. Firstly, that the material standard of living necessary for all U.S. working-class families, necessary to produce a working-class of sufficient technological potential for

modern forms of productive technology, lies between \$7,500 and \$15,000 per year in respect to existing U.S. forms of working-class needs, tax structures, prices, etc. Production to meet those consumption needs for the entire class (employed and unemployed) is the first premise of economic reconstruction.

The second premise is the fact that at between \$70 and \$90 billions of annual gross domestic public and private investment in plant and equipment during the last part of the 1960s, the rate of obsolescence of existing plant and equipment has increased. Thus, in addition to accelerating material decay of the U.S. cities and towns, the basic productive capacity of the U.S. is also decaying — in net, although by no means as hideously or profoundly as that of Great Britain. Since a major portion of the productive capacity devoted to military-aerospace production, up to approximately \$80 billions, represents Department I, or means of production-creating-type capacity, the conversion of this present massive waste to production of capital goods is the key to passing over from decay to actual net expanded production in the U.S.A. — and is actually the key margin of extant capitalist world productive capacity which must be salvaged to turn the entire world economy around and put it on the basis of net expanded reproduction — REVERSING A HALF-CENTURY OF IMPERIALIST DECAY.

In addition to detailing the administrative procedures by which the workers' soviets take over the banking and other financial institutions as the means of directly nationalizing all means of production, etc., the program details a number of major priorities for socialist accumulation over and above the immediate consumption needs of the working-class population. These include, of course, immediate emphasis on thermo-nuclear fusion technology, a technology which must be mastered as quickly as possible to provide sufficient raw energy sources to meet the urgent needs of the world population as a whole.

There are other priority prescriptions which need not be listed in detail here, priorities which are immediately obvious enough to anyone familiar with the U.S. However, there is one further specification of priorities which is of notable importance for Europeans: the importance of extension of computer applications to what is called "optical page reading," the use of computer systems to eliminate the COPYING of typewritten and handwritten forms by human beings, which could reduce the number of necessary clerical and related administrative jobs in the U.S.A. by about 10 millions.

The importance of this particular priority is located both in the enormous amount of social waste produced by capitalist administrative practices, and, more important, the fact that these millions of "paper-

pushers," now engaged in useless and even parasitical employments, represent one of the world's largest available reservoirs of educated labor-power. If we can rapidly augment the available productive labor-force in the U.S. itself by up to ten millions beyond the productive employment of about 8 millions of so-called "under-employed," (8) we can obtain, for the world's socialist economy, the most efficient utilization of available potential labor-power for generating the greatest net rate of output of capital goods for development of Europe and the sector below the Tropic of Cancer.

From a socialist standpoint, the world we propose to take over from the capitalists suffers from a terrifying shortage of capital goods. There is, for example, no conceivable solution, with existing power-production technology alone, to ever raising the standard of existence of the entire world's population even to the level of a miserable Italian worker. Without fusion technology, the situation of the world's population would be hopeless. Even with fusion-power technology, there are other massive capital-goods shortages, which must be solved as a precondition for lifting the majority of the world's proletarians out of their present misery. The most critical concentrations of the productive potential for this capital accumulation are in, obviously, the advanced capitalist sector, and most emphatically in the U.S.A. itself. Since the U.S.A. has the largest mass of most advanced potential labor-power in the world, because of the much-higher than European general standard of U.S. working-class education, etc., the most rapid rate of accumulation in the U.S.A. under socialism is the fundamental responsibility of the U.S. working class not only to its own needs, but to the needs of the human race generally.

It is this emphasis on the class-for-itself and socialist accumulation which has drawn special rage from the centrists and gauchistes.

The most consistent form of criticism to this effect is obtained from an anarcho-syndicalist sect in the U.S.A. which calls itself the International Socialists—a name probably chosen because the group involved is neither internationalist nor socialist. (9) Because the group wishes to profess itself "Marxist," it has abandoned its earlier ridicule of the term, "class for itself," since it discovered, to its embarrassment, that Karl Marx and others actually used that "offensive" terminology; now, they relegate the existence of a class-for-itself to the Greek Kalends, and declare its advocacy in the real world an "elitist," probably "Stalinist" affront to the chauvinistic sentimentalities of pro-capitalist militant trade-unionists. Their attacks on the economic features of the program are a real howler; they argue: the Labor Committees proposed to continue accumulation under socialism; ac-

cumulation is exploitation; the Labor Committee is proposing "state capitalism," the exploitative society based on accumulation of the Soviet Union! The I.S. demands for each local group of employed workers, the "undiminished proceeds of its own labor." (10) Whence the unemployed obtain the capital for their productive employment, the I.S. does not indicate.

The I.S. view more or less puts the gauchiste view into articulate language, which is perhaps the principal usefulness of the I.S.'s existence.

For the moment, the U.S. Socialist Workers Party is nominally the co-thinker branch of the Unified Secretariat tendency in that country. This organization, which has recently rejected the conception of a working class almost entirely, in favor of a Populist multi-constituency (women, blacks, Hispanics, Indians, Chinese, homosexuals, etc., each with its own "national" aspirations and demands) makes no observations on the economic aspects of the program, but denounces Marx's notion of the "class for itself" as "racist" and "sexist." In the December 1970 issue of the SWP's monthly journal, the International Socialist Review, the chief spokesman for the Unified Secretariat, Ernest Mandel, published several criticisms of the draft program of the Labor Committee, including the charge that Marx's espousal of the "class for itself" was one of Marx's childish aberrations abandoned by the "mature Marx," thus obviously asserting that the "mature Marx," like Mandel himself, had joined the faction of Proudhon. (11)

The Communist Party limits its attacks to the program's emphasis on independent working-class political action (in favor of the CP's old Menshevik retreat program of the "Peoples' Anti-Monopoly Coalition"), and refers to the economic features of the program only by occasionally paying it the compliment of plagiarizing bits and pieces of economic demands.

In general, this opposition reflects the fag-end of worn-out "Leninist" traditions from the 1930s and 1940s, traditions of collections of more or less static demands, laundry lists of various social demands supplemented by casual references to "nationalization" and static re-distribution demands. What they vigorously — even violently — denounce is the notion that socialist program must be based on dynamic demands, based on a combination of specifications of a working-class incomes policy and policies of socialist accumulation, policies of socialist expanded reproduction.

This difference over programmatic conceptions within the socialist movement can be argued effectively on two levels. We shall merely outline the first sort of argument, and then turn to concentrate our attention on the more theoretically challenging issues posed by the second line of argument.

We know that a certain level of education, other socially-necessary leisure forms, and material consumption is necessary to raise the level of potential labor-power of a working-class population to that demanded by the general application of the most modern technology. There are systematic reasons why this is the case, which we shall not explore here, but reserve for other locations. For the moment, it is sufficient to emphasize that mere statistical study of this problem tends to prove the case. What we know in even this mere empirical fashion is that a working-class population living below a certain standard of education and consumption is incapable, as a whole, of generally competently performing certain technologically advanced kinds of productive jobs. Capitalist students of the matter locate this problem within the realm of "infra-structure."

For example, in the ghetto populations in the U.S.A., approximately fifteen per cent (for sake of discussion) of Black oppressed working-class strata do rise out of the immediate conditions of educational and consumption deprivation to be assimilated into the main bodies of skilled and semi-skilled wage-earners; the overwhelming majority do not. Although a small fraction of such oppressed populations do — amazingly — rise above their immediate circumstances to seize the level of working-class culture around them in the less-oppressed strata, the brutal fact remains that the overwhelming majority do not. If we wish to transform the overwhelming majority of ghetto-oppression victims into modern labor-power, we must first provide them with the quality of education and general working-class household consumption characteristic of the quality of labor-power we wish them to become.

A similar observation applies in Europe, not only to the most oppressed strata of Gastarbeiter, etc., but also to the native young "apprentices" of, for example, Germany and England. Since modern technology requires more advanced labor-power, the level of material culture (education, consumption) of the families of apprentices and the apprentices themselves represents a de facto cannibalization of that section of the working-class forces. Without lifting their income and education-levels to those of modern labor-power, these apprentices and their children are being pre-condemned to tomorrow's human technological scrap-heap.

On such premises, working-class program must begin from the starting-point of the quality of general education and standards of material consumption needed for the quality of labor-power modern productive technology will confront us with TOMORROW.

It is very fine to argue against this: Well, we will simply make wage-income a maximum. That is a nonsense-argument. The possibility of tomorrow's existence depends upon the maximum possible rate of general accumulation — otherwise the industrial

and ecological decay of Great Britain today becomes the image of your future "socialist paradise" of undiminished gluttonies. Using capitalist language, the level of material consumption of the working-class is a quantity which must be simultaneously minimized and maximized. It must be minimized for the most rapid development of the productive forces — a development upon which the possibility of higher rates of leisure tomorrow depends. Yet, the level of consumption and education must not fail to rise to that necessary to produce the quality of improved labor-power tomorrow's technology will demand.

(We turn to Marx's statement on the general problem in due course.)

We know, in general, to be concrete, that the equivalent of two years technical university education is the minimum prerequisite, beneath which young workers are not qualified for employment in modern technology. A "Paleozoic" policy of specific-skills apprenticeship is criminal idiocy in a period in which imminent rapid successions of changes in specific technologies demand a labor-force which is "modularly" pre-qualified to shift rapidly from one skill to another several times during a working life-time immediately ahead. This demands not only formal education, but conditions of child-rearing in the home (such as a personal room for the child's own private play and study activities) which foster the child's developing powers of protracted intellectual problem-solving attention-span, etc., as opposed to the stultifying obedience-training which is the condition of the young working-class child's upbringing under conditions of home life of the most low-waged workers.

(It is only infantile petit-bourgeois "socialists" who rhapsodize on the simple proletarian virtues of the poorer worker's bestialized existence and home-life.)

We agree only so far with the prophets of the "ecology crisis." There is an "ecology crisis" threatening humanity for two interconnected CAPITALIST reasons. Firstly, as the capitalists generally obtain higher profits by polluting than by not polluting, and higher profits by looting nature than improving nature for future production and existence, the perpetuation of capitalism does threaten to destroy humanity in filth and impoverishment of resources.

Yet, as Engels was the first to point out, in refutation of Malthus,(12) by this standard, the world was already over-populated when only one man existed. Engels exaggerates, of course, but the point is nonetheless valid. Every mode of "technology" represented by each stage of human cultural evolution involves "technologies" addressed to specific kinds of natural resources. These are relatively finite, relative to both

the extent of such AVAILABLE resources, and to the particular technology involving their use. Thus, the longer a society persists in any one mode, and the more successfully it expands, the more rapidly and thoroughly it exhausts that finite potential. Humanity has solved this potential ecological crisis repeatedly, by developing new technologies, through which new kinds of resources become resources, and through which old resources became transformed in form of exploitation — as by development of agricultural revolutions.

In general, any society which does not accumulate to the end of transforming its technology, etc., is doomed to an "ecological crisis" begging the extinction, not of man, but of that outlived mode of human society.

To the extent that a potential ecological crisis does exist, the problems to be enumerated under that heading each correspond to a failure of capitalism to respond to this by developing and applying an appropriate new technology. The outstanding, most fundamental example of this today is capitalism's failure to proceed with the development and application of thermonuclear fusion technology, without whose development life on earth would, indeed, soon become most precarious. For just that reason, it becomes the historic alternative to capitalist stagnation, not only in general, but in respect to very concrete forms of new technologies.

Therefore, the socialist program that does not address itself immediately to the dynamic problems of working-class consumption and general accumulation epitomized in these remarks, is no socialist program at all.

THEIR "SOCIALIST" PROGRAM

The kinds of "socialist" programs generally offered by other socialist tendencies are, at best, imitations of those one would reasonably expect for revolutionary groups in some semi-colonial sector. This, despite the leading Bolsheviks' repeated warnings that the Russian program of 1917 was absolutely not a suitable model in these respects for the advanced capitalist sector.

In the semi-colonial sector, the question of expanded reproduction can not be posed as a national or regional task, since the mass of tangible capital goods on which such programs must depend can be obtained only from the advanced capitalist sector. The colonial revolution properly focusses, as a colonial socialist revolution, on immediate amelioration of the material suffering of the population, through stopping the outflow of wealth to imperialist debt-service payments and other forms of foreign capitalist looting.

A LIMITED, in itself progressive development of the liberated colonial nation's economy can of course occur, and absolutely should occur, but this depends principally upon either imported capital from the advanced capitalist sector — for which the liberated nation must pay a painful premium — or from the limited resources for aid of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

Socialist revolutions in such colonial countries are socialist revolutions in their institution of workers' economy forms of class relations, etc., but, otherwise, they are not economically socialist revolutions in themselves. They are socialist revolutions in the sense that they represent, properly speaking, a gaining of strategic ground in a worldwide, on-going class war between the proletariat and the capitalists. It is sheer idiocy, bordering on criminal idiocy, to speak of "socialism in one country" in such connections, a mere foolish fable with which old Mensheviks frighten their credulous grandchildren. The development of the productive forces to modern forms within any national sector of the world depends immediately and inescapably on the international division of labor established by the dominant capitalist sector today.

This applies to the Soviet Union most clearly, when we consider how immediately and extensively the rate of growth within the U.S.S.R. depends upon the terms of trade with the imperialist sector for Soviet exports with which to purchase essential capital imports. The burden of imperialist debt-service on Yugoslavia, and the Soviet looting of Eastern Europe to offset the pressures of imperialist encirclement of the U.S.S.R. itself, are the most obvious manifestations of this brutal economic reality.

This is, incidentally but not so incidentally, one of the important facts of life overlooked by revolutionary Cuba's fair-weather admirers.

In the advanced sector, we face the concentration of the productive capacities on which the entire world's successful expanded reproduction depends. The absolute criminality of ignoring this distinction is highlighted the instant we consider how much of the wealth ostensibly produced in the advanced sector depends upon cheaply-bought looted resources from the underdeveloped sector for these commodities? The old imperialist prices? Or prices which permit the working-class involved in their production to reproduce itself as a modern working-class labor-power? If so, the prices of those commodities will seem to become very dear. We can compensate for such costliness of such essential imports either by tightening the belts of the working-class in Europe, or by advancing the colonial sector sufficient capital to rapidly increase productivity and thus cheapen its social cost of producing those exports.

To make short of further treatment of this argument, when we shift our focus from the immediate struggles within the underdeveloped sector to the advanced sector, the role of socialist accumulation, socialist expanded reproduction on a world scale, immediately becomes the paramount, practical programmatic consideration.

THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL" IMPORTANCE

In addition to such obvious, practical reasons for emphasizing socialist expanded reproduction in our program for a United Socialist States of Europe, there is an equally powerful and important "psychological" reason. So far, we have been arguing from the standpoint of the expert economic planner — perhaps, one might accuse us, the standpoint of an extraordinarily enlightened Soviet bureaucrat. Our critics might argue that our notion of program consists of our moral superiority to most would-be bureaucrats, on the count that we intend to reveal to the working-class how fine a management we represent for their economy, etc. That bureaucratic viewpoint is not our conception of socialist society.

Although experts will be needed, especially at the beginning, socialist society signifies to us that the collective working-class, a class-for-itself, actively, deliberately FORMULATES its economic policies. Indeed, the program of economic development we submit to the working-class is submitted to them for their discussion, debate, and modifications in particular policies, not as an unchangeable fait accompli. Thus, if we now confess that we "permit" the working-class to change each specific feature of our draft program in that way, what remains of the program but its conception? Here, the real, political significance of the program emerges — or must be searched out.

Here, we are compelled to turn our attention to the absolute fundamentals of the Marxian method, as first summarized — as a finished view — in *The German Ideology*, and later reiterated in the concluding section of Volume III of *Capital*.⁽¹³⁾ The point to be made here is that a certain form of program submitted as propaganda and agitation by a vanguard, is a complementary essential subjective ingredient, together with the objective task of creating UNITED CLASS FRONT, or SOVIET forms of class organization, for transforming the working class from a mere, bourgeoisified class-in-itself to a class-for-itself.⁽¹⁴⁾

We now summarize the theoretical basis for both Marx's notion of the class for itself and the notion of program as an indispensable aspect of the class for itself. It is upon the rock of these two, inter-related conceptions that the entire science of revolution depends.

Marx's most electrifying accomplishment in the opening pages of *The German Ideology*, at least so to the serious thinker who had previously mastered Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach, is that at last humanity, through Marx's efforts, has achieved a lasting definition of the two most essential conceptions of all humanknowledge: of MAN and HUMAN KNOWLEDGE itself.

For sake of brevity, we shall not do more than footnote the references from *The German Ideology* here, as we develop Marx's discoveries in our own choice of pedagogy.

It is useful to begin this point by noting those conceptions of Man and Science which prevail in educated bourgeois circles. Virtually no tendency in educated bourgeois thought, most cultural anthropology included, offers a definition of man which is anything more than a collection of mere descriptive phrases. The most notorious of these is the old saw, "Man is a tool-making animal," or some such childish prattling. The attempts to define the notion of Science are similarly afflicted.

Marx solves both by situating their common definition on a single premise: HUMAN HISTORICAL EXISTENCE. We shall now reproduce his proof of those definitions here. The relevance of this to our general topic will be clear soon enough.

Man is absolutely distinguished from all of the lower beasts by his historical existence. (15) Precisely, Man appears in a rudimentary form of himself in the early Pleistocene, a point at which his ecological population-potential was certainly no greater than the order of a few million individuals, the culture and population-potential of a gifted baboon. Over the succeeding period, especially over the most recent 12,000-15,000 years, Man's ecological population-potential has grown, at a generally accelerating rate, to the point of a present population-potential of several billions.

Part of the initial progress may prove to be creditable to gradual genetic advances in proto-hominids during the earliest Pleistocene; we are not concerned here to consider that one way or another, except to acknowledge some indications of that possibility. Such speculations — or facts — as may be appropriate to judge, are irrelevant to the point directly at hand. It is as his modern biological type that man has secured his most spectacular advances, not through biological variation, but through deliberate (if not necessarily conscious) improvements in his mode of organized social practice and subsumed technologies.

This is in absolute contrast to the development of dominant forms among the lower beasts, in which the successful superceding of ecological limits by the

dominant species occurs only through biological variations. Thus, whereas, in the lower beasts, the mode of species-reproduction is more or less fixed in range of variations by biological inheritance, in man the most sweeping changes in his characteristic species-reproductive behavior have occurred by deliberation. It is such supercession of previous, lower forms of human species-evolution by human noetic deliberation which absolutely distinguishes man from the lower beasts.

This same process of deliberate alteration of the mode of human species-reproduction is the sole basis for what we may rightly distinguish as HUMAN knowledge or science. As man deliberately alters his mode of species-reproduction, he thus directly tests all the laws of the material universe as those laws are implicitly embodied in his relationship to nature. If the alteration in mode results in an increased population at a higher quality of reproductive powers, then that result itself conclusively demonstrates that the deliberative process corresponds appropriately to the fundamental laws of the universe. This historical fact becomes the basis for human knowledge as man begins to reflect on the historical relationship between his NOETIC deliberative powers and the results of those evolution-determining processes on his potential for species-existence. SCIENCE, thus defined, is historical self-consciousness of the noetic deliberative processes by which man has accomplished what we rightly identify as his historical progress from lower to higher levels of species-reproductive potential.

Putting temporarily to one side the fascinating basis for Ionian and Hellenic scientific accomplishments, the stagnation of that science indicates special problems which put the subject of ancient systematic knowledge beyond our immediate concern of inquiry. It is sufficient to insist here that it is no accident that the general, if generally vague idea of science should have emerged in the form it has developed under capitalism, since capitalism is the first form of society in which rapid advances in the technology of social reproduction are directly subsumed within the mode of production itself. (16)

This phenomenon is not accidentally reflected in the internal life of the mathematical sciences, in the guise of the paradoxes treated comprehensively by Georg Cantor, and only less comprehensively by Russell and Goedel. (17) Russell's "barber" and Cantor's noetic "metaphysic" are the same Being. The attempt to account for the creative concept-formation which actually connects one fixed set of formal conceptions of science to another invariably compels the most reflective modern thinker to confront just such seeming paradoxes. From the standpoint of formal logic, mathematical or otherwise, these paradoxes are quite real and insoluble. This is the case since

the actually mechanistic ontological assumptions embedded in the axiomatic assumptions of any formal logic can recognize only fixed constructs, and not the non-particulate noetic processes in which new constructs are synthesized. This "barber," this apparent "metaphysic," inescapably leering out between the interstices of any formal-logical schema, is no mystery if the problem is properly considered. Our "barber" is the noetic process which is the unifying SUBJECT for the particular PREDICATES of human social evolution, the same noetic distinguishing quality of humanity as humanity which subsumes all creative synthesis.

The "metaphysical" predicament of formal mathematical schema is no actual metaphysic. It is essentially a demonstration that no possible digital computer could simulate human intelligence.

It is in just such a connection that the unique historical importance of Immanuel Kant emerges, Kant as the necessary forerunner of Karl Marx.

The development of modern science begins with Kepler, who discovered the concept of a rational physical universe in a higher conceptual form than his useful bowdlerizer, Newton, expressing a point-of-view that was not to clearly re-emerge in physical science until Einstein (although, to a lesser degree in Kant). By reducing Kepler's magnificent equations to their most alienated form, Newton contributed one branch of the development from Kepler and Descartes leading into the near-perfection of the mechanistic world-view in Lagrange and others of the Kantian period. However, by the very fact of this perfection of the ideal of a celeste mecanique, the mechanistic view demonstrated its devastating fallacies.

For, if the universe is fundamentally ordered as the various dynamical and probabilistic interpretations of a mechanistic physics demand, then how do we account for the fact that the real world of our immediate experience is also directly, efficiently altered by actions directed by an agency outside simple dynamics or probability, the human "Free Will"? Either man's "Free Will" is entirely a chimera, or the classical view of the universe is fundamentally flawed.

As for Kepler, the rationality of the astronomical realm of inclusive universality, so, for Marx, the necessary rationality appropriate to the universality of human history, is decisive in settling this perplexing question. The fact that human progress, measurable in increased orders of human ecological population-potential, a progress not dependent upon bestial modifications in biological types, suffices to demonstrate that the noetic processes of human deliberation, man's evolving actions on nature in his own behalf, is no illusion. This itself demonstrates that there does indeed exist some reality which Kant MISTOOK for "Free Will."

Although Kant failed to free himself from the capitalist, i.e., anarchist, conceptions perpetuated by his DEGENERATE EPIGONOI (Fichte, Fries, Stirner, the existentialists), he recognized what modern pragmatists and empiricists have forgotten: the fatal antinomy of attempting to directly reconcile the particularity of the individual (anarchist) will or the pathological particularity of individualized experience with the real universality (infinity) of anthropology-ecology. (18) He recognized that the point of view of the modern pragmatist, empiricist, and (ugh!) positivist, is, in his precise terminology for such disorders, PATHOLOGICAL. (19) Truth could exist only in respect to the UNIVERSAL outcome of the individual act. Indeed, despite his contrary aims, Kant's attempt to make anarchist man sensible of the universal consequences of the act for man as a whole (the categorical imperative) through the ruse of the "negation of the negation," leads to results as pathological as also occur in Hegel's degeneration to the viewpoint of the "negation of the negation." (20) Yet, Kant did an invaluable service to man, through the mediation of his successors, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx, by correctly posing the terms of the problem to be solved by those successors.

Marx actually solves the Kantian predicament of Praxis by locating "Free Will" of man in historic material necessity. That is, the noetic or free aspect of the human will is not one of freedom from natural law, not "freedom" in the pathological or anarchist sense. Human freedom is nothing but that historical fact of noetic deliberation which has subsumed advances in technology and socialized practice, in bringing man from a baboon-like hominid beginning to capitalism and to the objective potential for human society, socialism. Freedom is man's power to master the fundamental laws of the universe by practically comprehending them. Man is Maxwell's Demon, who knows his demoniacal powers as his ability to generate negative entropy as the material basis for creating not only more Demons like himself, but Demons of greater such demoniacal powers than his own. (22)

BESTIAL IDEOLOGIES

It is instructive at this point to contrast such conceptions of HUMAN NATURE with the notions exhibited by certain academics, such as the behaviorists, or the bestialized quacks who drafted the "Blueprint for Survival" and Limits of Growth.

Whenever some unfortunate student of psychology is subjected to the nonsensical behaviorist's assertion that human behavior is that of a more sophisticated laboratory rat or pigeon, we confront a "psychological science" which has hysterically denied everything that fundamentally distinguishes man from the lower beasts. Worse, a conception of psychology, or of any aspect of human behavior, which tolerates such hysterical

assumptions necessarily reflects a literally bestial conception of man.

In particular, the behaviorist psychologist thereby denies the very existence of the subject, the HUMAN Mind, which he has purported to investigate, and has thereby degraded the members of his classroom to the students of Herr Doktor Eisenbart.

The same bestial ideology permeates the Limits of Growth.

Although the two reactionary professors from MIT responsible for this document, Dennis Meadows and Jay Forrester, are celebrated faculty members at one of the world's most prestigious educational institutions, the fact remains that any competent industrial engineering student could readily expose them as frauds. The use of linear equations for describing existing technologies to project human consumption and production for a century ahead would rightly earn a flunking grade in any self-respecting bourgeois engineering course! The great show of using computers for such exercises (no doubt, to overawe credulous children) adds precisely nothing to the merit of such enterprises.

This sophomoric folly of the two MIT professors is not simply an obvious bit of professional incompetence; like the more exotic symptoms of neurotic disturbances, this blunder has an ideological root. The notion of human behavior as fixed represents the application of the notion of bestial behavior to man. Thus, the bestial outcome for man of the Limits of Growth proposals represents not simply a professional imbecility, but the consistent outcome of applying the two professors' bestial ideology to a human problem.

It is not accidental that professors Meadows and Forrester, with the support of the Volkswagen proprietors, should be agreed on their bestial ideology. The most immediate expression of alienation under capitalism is the degradation of the human individual, notably the manual laborer and assembly-line worker to the bestialization of routinized wage-labor. The workers' Mind, his noetic potential, all his human qualities that distinguish him from a clever mere beast, have been destroyed insofar as his foreman, his public school education, his favorite newspapers, etc., can accomplish this bestialization. He is not a human being, but only a plumber, only a metal-worker, only an apprentice, etc. He is, for the capitalist employer, a trained beast. It is not surprising that the intellectual "Kapos" of the Volkswagen firm, MIT professors Meadows and Forrester, should treat these same workers as mere beasts in their computer programs.

What bestializes the worker? Is it the fact that he

performs rather routinized forms of labor? No, that, as productive labor, however routine, is a necessary part of his HUMAN existence, however passionately we socialists are determined to radically change production to eliminate all mindless routine from it. The bestialization of labor-power is located in the fact that capitalism denies the worker any other basis than a LEARNED skill for his social identity. What is essentially human in the development of the necessary productive process, science, the determination of policies regulating the application of technology, etc., are "none of his business." He is bestialized because he is conditioned to esteem himself as almost a mere un-intellectual beast, as a mere "practical man," who leaves intellectual questions to the professors and administrators.

Then, having thus discovered that the worker is bestialized by being denied participation in the affairs of science and technological productive policy-making, we encounter some wretched professed "socialist," who insists that it is "petit-bourgeois, anti-proletarian" thinking to propose to take up policy-questions of science and technology with "practical" workers. It is the denial to the worker of his human right to locate his social identity in his positive contribution to formulating the policies of expanded reproduction, of new technology, etc., which bestialize the worker — which make him an anti-socialist, an "anti-intellectual" mere trade-union militant, etc. A billion silly words of chattering by a million petit-bourgeois "socialist" and gauchiste scribblers will not change the actual meaning of the term, alienation, to mean anything but the workers' denial of direct control, through his centralized class policy-making processes, over applied scientific policy.

It is regrettable that perhaps a generation under socialism will probably be required before even a substantial proportion of workers develop conceptual grasp of the internal life of scientific work. In the meantime, the worker can secure immediate access to control over the application of science, in terms of programs of expanded socialist reproduction which reflect science in terms of the predicates of its socialized realization in this way. The worker can at least choose to demand of the physicists how many years and how much funding they require to make thermonuclear fusion technology applicable, can choose to realize that need, etc.

MARX'S "MATURE" VIEW

What does the "mature Marx" say to refute Ernest Mandel's lying representation of his view? From the last section of Vol. III of Capital, we extract:

"... the realm of freedom does not commence until

the point is passed where labor under the compulsion of necessity and of external utility is required. In the very nature of things, it lies beyond the sphere of material production in the strict meaning of the term. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature, in order to satisfy his wants, in order to maintain his life and reproduce it, so civilized man has to do it, and he must do it in all forms of society and under all possible modes of production. With his development the realm of natural necessity expands, because his wants increase; but at the same time the forces of production increase, by which these wants are satisfied. THE FREEDOM IN THIS FIELD CAN NOT CONSIST OF ANYTHING ELSE BUT OF THE FACT THAT SOCIALIZED MAN, THE ASSOCIATED PRODUCERS, REGULATE THEIR INTERCHANGE WITH NATURE RATIONALLY, BRING IT UNDER THEIR COMMON CONTROL, INSTEAD OF BEING RULED BY IT AS BY SOME BLIND POWER; THAT THEY ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASK WITH THE LEAST EXPENDITURE OF ENERGY AND UNDER CONDITIONS MOST ADEQUATE TO THEIR HUMAN NATURE AND MOST WORTHY OF IT. But it always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise." (23)

Or, referring to our development of the notion of self-expanding use-value elsewhere, (24) the increased value of the exponential-tendency expression for $S'/(C \text{ plus } V)$ is the epitome of human freedom, when that expression corresponds to a deliberately, planned expanded reproduction.

Socialist program under capitalism necessarily includes several features. In addition to the principal, central feature of such program, it must include appropriate policies of self-defense of the material rights and conditions of life of the working class and its potential allies; it must also emphasize the concrete policies and perspectives for fusing a fragmented working class (class in itself) into a class for itself (i.e., united class front). Its central feature remains that of the initial program of expanded reproduction to be launched by the united class front at the next, explicitly identified opportunity for the establishment of workers' state power.

Such a program could not be a "laundry list" of vague generalities and timeless tactical recipes handed down from generation to generation within the socialist organizations and literature of capitalist society. Program must be different in all its main concrete features for each new emerging conjunctural crisis. Each new period of capitalist development,

and failure to develop, confronts the working class as a whole with new concrete problems of economic development, new technologies, a new arrangement of existing productive forces. In each new period, the socialist movement defines itself as posing a concrete set of policies of working-class planned expanded reproduction to the policies of development and non-development of the productive forces inherent in the present and imminent forms of capitalist rule.

For example, today, there can be no international party which does not place the development and application of thermonuclear fusion technology at the center and foundation of its socialist program. For, on no other basis but this new technology will it be possible to raise the material conditions of life and reproductive powers of the proletarians below the Tropic of Cancer to even the level of Western Europe. Thus, thermonuclear fusion policies are presently a leading, concrete feature of socialist program — if it is, actually, socialist program and not some dusty heirloom — where this would not have been the case during the last period (pre-1944) of preparations for a new opportunity to establish workers' power in the advanced capitalist sector.

Socialist program can be developed in varying degrees of specificity and detail, according to the resources of the organized socialist movement for accomplishing this. It can be, like the NCLC's "Emergency Reconstruction Program" of 1970, a statement of basic policies and developmental priorities, or, with a larger organization, etc., these same policies might be elaborated in greater statistical detail. That is significant, but not fundamental. It is merely essential that the socialist program be oriented to the impending opportunity for the establishment of working-class power, and that it specify the operating policies for expanded reproduction which the united class front will apply at the moment of assuming such power.

Once that feature of socialist program is settled for each new period of struggle, the program must, of course, be amplified in other respects. In order to institute the socialist program of expanded reproduction, which is the core of program in each such period, it is, of course, indispensable to first assume state power. Thus, starting backward, so to speak, from the moment of assumption of power, the socialist program of expanded reproduction must be amplified to provide policies and perspectives for the process of mobilizing the working class and its allies as a conscious united class front for the assumption of power on the basis of expanded-reproduction policies.

Program, thus developed, provides three indispensable things for the movement. In its policies for the workers' government, program identifies the spe-

cial historic tasks of workers power, thus presenting such power as the alternative to capitalist oppression and decay. It answers the question, Why Socialism Must Be Established, in terms of the leading concrete problems of life confronting the working class in that specific period of capitalist development. Its second principal feature is, of course, to provide a guide to action for the movement as a whole, not only policies governing the conduct of socialist organizations, but policies recommended to working-class forces not yet committed to the socialist struggle as such. Thirdly, and most important, socialist program provides the class fighters with their indispensable historic human identity, by locating the historic importance of their mental and practical contributions to the struggle. Socialist program lifts individual man from the mental condition of bestialized (alienated) man, the isolated individual, the member of the parochialized (bestialized) small "interest-group," and locates his existence as a positive contribution to the future historic existence of the human race as a whole.

DIALECTICS VERSUS LOGIC

This feature of program is the solution to the otherwise "metaphysical" appearance of the notion of dialectical method to alienated individuals under capitalism.

When we locate the PRIMITIVE substance of humanity in the NOETIC processes of human mentation and practice, the formal logician, etc., shrieks "metaphysics," "vitalism," or, perhaps, "idealistic Hegelianizing." Yet, contrary to all his shrieks of protest on this account, the empirical fact of historical human existence, man's emergence from the Pleistocene, etc., all demonstrate absolutely that the noetic element is the primitive substance of human nature.

This source of perplexity for the logician is not limited to the disputes between the Marxian and empiricist world-views. The proof of the existence of an apparent "metaphysical" determination of human knowledge, given by Georg Cantor, (25) Bertrand Russell's "barber," etc., are simply proofs that whenever the most impassioned and consistent logical minds attempt to explain human knowledge in terms of a logic, those investigators, if they are honest, must acknowledge that nowhere in the logical interpretation of human knowledge can the fact, the origin of knowledge itself be located. Knowledge, the creation of the construct of thought, is not logically determined or determinable.

The fault of logic lies not in some insuperable flaw in man's capacity for rational understanding of himself or his universe, but in the prejudice inherent in alienated forms of social relations, the

prejudice which impels the logicians, for example to hysterically insist on locating the primitive form of materiality, reality, in "elementary particles" of one sort or another. The alienation of self by capitalist social relations, in particular, expresses itself as alienation in the neurotic prejudice that the human self is a self-evident particularity within a world of fixed (bestialized) relations to fixed (bestialized) objects. The idea, the simple truth, that the primitive form of reality, of materiality, is locatable only in PROCESSES (not things), escapes them. As we have said, and say now again, the source of this neurotic difficulty of bourgeois thinkers (in particular) is not the subject of their inquiries, but the effects of alienation upon the functioning of their mental apparatus of inquiry.

That is also to say that ordinary workers, as well as bourgeois thinkers, are similarly afflicted. Workers also can not comprehend process immediately as process. Program provides the bridge from alienated, bestialized views of a fixed and particularate false-reality, by expressing the notion of process in terms of reality as it appears to them. In Socialist program of expanded reproduction, we are obviously describing a succession of discrete states, a process of getting from A (capitalism today) to B to C. That the increasing values of the expression, $S'/(C \text{ plus } V)$, are in fact obtainable, is explicitly demonstrated by the facts of available technology. Thus, the programmatic application of existing technology to transforming the social-productive relations in this (negentropic) fashion is comprehensible to the workers.

This is much the same ruse — albeit a legitimate ruse — employed by the creative scientist. The great thinker, such as a Cantor, Riemann, Einstein, et al., finds it impossible to represent THE ACTUAL PROCESS of creative mentation by which he achieves new concretized conceptions; he is compelled to implicitly identify his creative mentation by counterposing the concretized view of subject-matters both before and after the process of creative mentation has occurred.

What program accomplishes, thus, is the deliberate locating of the noetic process of human development, by "measuring" human behavior collectively in terms of those criteria (the negentropy of human social-reproductive relations) which must immediately express the fruitful outcome of such mentation and practice. If the direct comprehension of the noetic process remains inaccessible, we have nonetheless concretely situated human existence on the basis of that which distinguishes man from the lower beasts — for the first time!

THE CLASS FOR ITSELF

The "Maoist" gauchiste repeatedly reveals the

unwashed secret of his own petit-bourgeois ideology when he imagines himself being most deferential toward the workers. He reveals himself a badly disguised Stalinist, as he opposes discussing anything more intellectual than sports events, local shop problems, or simple-minded political slogans with the worker — or, indeed, permitting anyone else to do so. For, if concrete workers are not to master the intellectual business of comprehending theoretical economics, only a non-working-class bureaucracy is left to perform such tasks for management of the workers' economy! In the same vein, the gauchiste assumes that it is "petit-bourgeois" or "elitist" to attempt to teach the workers anything, program included, since the workers will, in his view, spontaneously create their own program, since the proletarians have "proletarian consciousness," know what is good for themselves, etc. Yet, on the basis of what the worker knows, he usually votes for his enemy's political parties and candidates. If the worker rises slightly above such crass stupidity toward his obvious class interest, we find him marching faithfully for decades in the train of such "socialist" parties as the PCF, which has repeatedly sold him out (e.g., 1934-37, 1944-45, 1968) at every testing. The gauchiste proposes to leave such native WISDOM of the workers uncorrupted by outside interference from a revolutionary intelligentsia!

The gauchiste thus exhibits himself as the bearer of the same bourgeois ideology as the Communist party bureaucrat or trade-union bureaucrat, who are, after all, only cynical gauchistes. The gauchiste makes a virtue of the worker's ignorance, bestialization, self-betrays, etc. The cynical Communist or trade-union bureaucrat also admires and wishes to preserve the same wretched qualities in workers, thereby to keep the workers in their useful mental condition as a certain sort of political commodity.

Nor is there really such a gulf between the gauchiste and Monsignor Ernest Mandel, the famous Proudhonist priest of the Unified Secretariat. Mandel, denouncing Marx's conception of the CLASS FOR ITSELF, (25) steals from Herbert Marcuse the explanation that the apparatus of propagation of bourgeois ideology merely imposes alien consciousness upon the working class. Mandel, after plagiarizing Marcuse, resorts to the usual protective arguments of the eclectic thief; he insists that he has not really stolen Marcuse's ideas, because Mandel's view is "dialectical" and "dynamic," where Marcuse's is "static." (26) He agrees with Marcuse in insisting that the bourgeois idealization of the workers is merely a lid pressed down on the workers' consciousnesses through bourgeois control of the press, schools, etc., but, he, Mandel, foresees the "dynamic" solution, that the workers becoming angered in large numbers, summon the energy to suddenly throw off the weight of this man-hole cover of bourgeois ideology, etc., and thus reveal and assert

the "proletarian consciousness" simmering underneath all the time.

Having stated that view, Mandel denounces Karl Marx for Marx's attack on Proudhon and Proudhon-like conceptions such as Mandel's own. (27)

Marx, correcting both Kant and Hegel on this point, but recognizing the germ of essential truth in their views, located the bourgeois ideology of the workers not in some bourgeois manhole cover pressing down upon their "proletarian brains." Marx recognized that the fragmented working class, divided into narrow, localized, self-interest groups, naturally "secreted" a PATHOLOGICAL world-view, a reactionary anti-working-class ideology. This pathological view, intrinsic to such workers, does not arise from bourgeois control of the press, radio, TV, etc., but from the fact that the working class, as a mere class in itself, not only does not know the existence of a universal class interest, a universal class PRAXIS, but rather that each local group of workers sets itself in HETERONOMIC (28) antagonism to the interests of the class as a whole.

Thus, trade unions, as narrow self-interest groups, set themselves and their own notion of immediate self-interest, in opposition to the immediate interests of the unorganized, the unemployed. The leadership of the PCF, for example, blocks with the French bourgeoisie against the nasty, foreign competition of workers in other countries. The leadership of the PCF attempts to rally French workers to throw "foreign workers" employed in France out of their jobs. Etc., etc.

Mandel, whether because of stupidity or hysteria, lies about Marx's notion of the distinctions between the class in itself and class for itself. Mandel writes: "The category of 'the class in itself' is linked to the objective class concept in the sociology of Marx, where a social layer is determined by its objective position in the process of production INDEPENDENT of its state of consciousness." (29) On the contrary, for Marx, it is fundamental dialectical sociology that Being DETERMINES consciousness, that the class in itself, or fragmented, HETERONOMIC praxis and social organization of the working class determines a corresponding ideology, or false consciousness, corresponding to the pathological conception of parochialist self-interest. Indeed, all the important figures of German Critical Philosophy, Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx situate that conception of ideology, of Being determining consciousness, at the very kernel of their entire world-view.

Mandel continues his lying: "It is well known that the young Marx — in the Communist Manifesto and in his political writings of 1850-52, for instance — had

put forward a subjective concept of the class according to which the working class becomes a class only through its struggle, i.e., by reaching a minimum degree of class consciousness. Bukharin, in connection with a formula from *The Poverty of Philosophy*, calls this concept the concept of the 'class for itself,' as opposed to the concept of the 'class in itself.' (30) On the contrary, as we have noted, the distinction between Being-for-itself and Being-in-itself is not some chance formulation to be picked up out of Marx's 1847 attack on Proudhon's class-in-itself ideology; that distinction is the summation of the entire Hegelian, Feuerbachian, and Marxian dialectical methods, respectively. In Hegel, it is always Being-for-itself; in Feuerbach, "species-consciousness," the Being-for-itself opposed to the false consciousness of heteronomic parochialism, such as religious belief; in Marx, who replaces "the dumb generality" of Feuerbach's all-inclusive, undifferentiated "species" with the CLASS FOR ITSELF, the premise of the class for itself persists as the fundamental of Marx's views from the 1843 attack on Hegel's *Science of Logic and Philosophy of Right*, through to such passages from Volume III of *Capital* as we have cited above! (31)

Mandel, then associates his own wretched views with the traditions of the socialist movement: "This objective concept of the class" (Mandel's enthusiasm for the class in itself) "remains fundamental for Lenin's ideas on organization, as it did for Engels and the German Social Democracy under the influence of Engels, Bebel and Kautsky." (32) Mandel makes a factional amalgam of himself, Lenin, Engels, Bebel, and Kautsky! Here, indeed, is a fine homogeneous collection of predicates of a Marxian viewpoint! And, to add actual criminal slander to muddling of that sort, in passing Mandel attributes the ideology of the primeval centrist faction (Bebel, Ebert, Kautsky) to the beneficent influence of Engels!

It happens that Lenin, contrary to Mandel's views, recognized from the 1905-06 Russian experience that the Bolshevik faction had been mistaken, and the left-Mensheviks, headed by L. Trotsky, correct, on the decisive role of the Russian Soviets. Indeed, the following year, Lenin blocked with Luxemburg to put forth a joint resolution in the proceedings of the Second International on the basis of this concurrence. Nor are Lenin's writings on the Russian Soviets throughout his later life the limit of the evidence on this point. The concept of the "united class front," Luxemburg's own (1918-19) concrete development of her "soviet" conception (*The Mass Strike*), and carried out under Paul Levi's leadership to establish the VKPD from the beginning of the tiny Spartakusbund of 1919, was enthusiastically appropriated by Lenin during the Second, Third Congresses of the Communist International. For the edification of the miserable Monsignor Mandel, who professes to be the last word

on Trotsky's contributions, this same conception of the identity of the three terms, Soviet, United Class front, CLASS-FOR-ITSELF, was not only repeatedly underlined by Trotsky in his 1929-33 writings on Germany (especially), but as a result of Trotsky's direct influence on the International Left Opposition, the specific term, CLASS-FOR-ITSELF, not-accidentally receives large attention in the pages of such leading Trotskyist publications of the early 1930s as the *U.S. Militant*!

The division in the struggle between the reformist-centrist and revolutionary factions in the pre-1914 SPD was over the same issue. Luxemburg, leader of the revolutionary faction, insisted that the workers in the trade-union organizations could be transformed to a state of class consciousness only by uniting themselves (in "soviet" or "class for itself" forms) with the unorganized, unemployed, most oppressed, etc. The centrists, led by the Bebel-Ebert-Legien bloc, and given a "theoretical" defense by Kautsky, counterposed the centrist conception of "constructivism," which Mandel has appropriated from Kautsky et al. in a more vulgar form in the Unified Secretariat's strategy of "local workers control." Indeed, the entire left-wing leadership of the newly formed Communist International, Luxemburg, Lenin, Trotsky representing the three principal merging tendencies involved, distinguished themselves absolutely from the reformists and centrists of the Second International and USPD on exactly that point, as they also distinguished themselves sharply and bitterly from the ultra-left version of the same centrist conceptions offered by Bordiga, Pannekok, the KAPD, etc.

To transform the bourgeoisified working class, which is obviously to include those Communists who support such leaders as the spokesmen for the PCF, from a mere collection of enraged sheep to a class with class consciousness, it is first indispensable for us today, as it was for the founders of the Communist International, and for Marx himself, to found the uniting fragmented class forces, across national boundaries, across divisions between employed and unemployed, between organized and unorganized, into united workers' fronts, or sometimes called united class fronts, we radically change the state of Being of the working class, we reorder social relations within the class, dissolving the exclusivity of parochialized formations in favor of the conscious interdependency of social relations within the class on the broadest scale. In this way, the pathological consciousness, the heteronomic ideologies, of the class in itself are POTENTIALLY overcome by situating the social basis of the workers' material self-interest in the broadest formations of his entire class. The heteronomic and parochial has been objectively superseded by that which converges upon a universal class self-interest, a universal class self-organization.

This changed form of class social relations does not in itself produce active class consciousness; it creates an active potential for class consciousness. To become the basis for actual class consciousness socialist program of expanded reproduction is required. From the crude empirical overview of what occurs during mass upheavals, the revolutionary socialist suddenly finds that those same ideas, program, which the majority of the working class ridiculed only weeks or so before are now being taken up and embraced by rapidly increased numbers of workers. This amiable change in the situation does not occur because the program has suddenly been improved, because skilled orators have suddenly appeared, etc., but because the Being of the class forces is undergoing a qualitative change from that of a class in itself toward that of a class for itself. The program was rejected yesterday because it did not coincide with what appeared sensible, reasonable to the worker's notion of his self-interest, the self-interest of the class in itself. He enthusiastically embraces those same programs today, because his nature has changed, his Being is tending to become that of the class for itself, so that he now assimilates socialist program as something suddenly appropriate to his emerging new human nature.

Mandel, in opposition to this Marxian view, proposes that "local workers control" is the focus of emerging class consciousness, just as Proudhon opposed Marx in a similar fashion a century and a quarter earlier. Or, to be exact, Mandel joins the faction of Proudhon not merely because of the influence of Proudhon, Andre Gorz, or the unimournable Renard, but because he shares Proudhon's, Gorz's, Renard's miserable petit-bourgeois world-outlook.

This distinction between class in itself and class for itself has a precise economic correlative. The class-in-itself view in economic theory is expressed by the gauchistes, anarcho-syndicalists generally, and the "Third Camp" groups most emphatically. For these wretched anarchists and pseudo-socialists, the class struggle is defined as the effort of the local producers in each firm, etc., to establish control over "the undiminished proceeds" of their locally-created value-production. The "Third Camper" — and anarchist — for this reason regard any society based on socialized accumulation as an exploitative society, and use precisely that argument to justify their lie that the U.S.S.R. is "state capitalist." All pseudo-socialists who share that petit-bourgeois outlook to one degree or another inevitably regard the economic demands of socialist program as properly restricted to local economic demands morally premised on the presumed autarky of localized value-creation by the workers gathered around some local "point of production."

The economic-programmatic view which corresponds to the social form of the class for itself (soviets, united class fronts) can be deduced even, to a certain preliminary extent, from the standpoint of bourgeois economist and industrial engineering.

Bourgeois analysis of production employs three principal statistical devices: the PROCESS SHEET, which analyzes the different qualities of labor-power and means of production required, as various points of production of a commodity in a particular kind of manufacturing facility; the BILL OF MATERIALS, which lists the required proportions of materials, semi-finished parts, supplies, for the production of that commodity; and, the BILL OF CONSUMPTION, which analyzes wage-earners' (for example) consumption into proportionalities, each corresponding either to categories of commodities required or particular commodities.

If we then start from the bill of consumption for any group of workers in any sector of Europe, and attempt to determine the actual content of the production of the material basis for such individual existence, we have the following type of result. For each commodity in the bill of consumption we locate a typical manufacturing facility. In addition to the specific labor-power involved in the detailed process-sheet, that same process-sheet identifies various machinery, equipment, etc., which are the material prerequisites, as Fixed Capital, of that production. Each of these machines, etc., is produced by another manufacturing unit, often in another national sector. The bill of materials, similarly, traces the contents of production to other manufacturing units, mines, plantations, etc., in various parts of the world. Each of these plants supplying capital goods, materials, etc., in turn has its own process-sheet and bills of materials, which must be traced out to additional plants, mines, plantations, etc. Before we have made more than a few successive steps behind the workers' consumption (his individual material existence) we have gone several times around the world, have touched upon the activities of a large part of the world's proletarians, and the populations which produce those proletarians from working-class households, peasant families, etc.

Thus, the reality of the individual workers' material self-interest in any local part of the world is located in the universality of the activities of the world's proletarians and their potential allies as a whole.

This is not merely a static interest. We can not maintain this material self-interest of the particular worker in France, Germany, Italy, etc., either by fixing the technology of production (ecological prob-

lems, power shortages, etc.), or by attempting to create national autarkies. The more advanced production becomes, thus cheapening the cost of production in terms of average required labor time, the more complex become the process sheets, especially in respect to Fixed Capital. It would be impossible to obtain production in terms of modern technology on the population scale of even a large capitalist nation, such as the U.S.A., or an integrated Common Market; the historic achievement of capitalist development in this respect is that it has utilized the scale of the world's proletarian population, as well as natural resources of differing qualities of richness around the world, etc., to enlarge the scale of the world division of labor, thus making modern technology possible — which is why, for example, "socialism in one country," such as the U.S.S.R. is impossible! To attempt to constrict the scale of production to large national or regional subsectors of present production would mean to turn back the clock of technology to a large degree, driving down the material standard of living of workers in every country.

Therefore, the universal interest expressed by a network of bills of consumption, process sheets, and bills of material is an active interest. The possibility of improving, or even maintaining the existing standard of living for workers in any sector demands further expansion of production, to include modern production by the present unemployed and "underemployed." It demands raising the standard of education and level of consumption of workers around the world, in order to create the material conditions for their employment in modern technology. Only by increasing the efficiency of production through such universalized expanded reproduction can we actually reduce the general size of the working day and achieve the qualities of increased freedom for workers — as the cited passage from Marx's *Capital* emphasizes. (33)

The worker is thus able to comprehend his class interest, which is his interest in socialist expanded reproduction, only to the extent that his socially determined consciousness raises him above the class-in-itself heteronomy of nationalism, trade-union narrowness, etc., and provides him with a Being (Being for itself) which corresponds to the practical expression (international socialism) of his universalized class interest.

As the person of Karl Marx epitomizes for the socialist movement as a whole, and as Lenin was essentially correct on this point in his "What Is To Be Done?," where he opposed the "economist" or class-in-itself point of view, socialism and actual class consciousness is not spontaneously generated by the working class "in struggle." Socialism begins, as it began with Marx, as the development of theory and program by a revolutionary intelligentsia. This initiating cadre creates the beginning of an international working-class party by concentrating on every possible opportunity to broaden the form of self-organization of every working-class struggle to include united-front alliances of employed with unemployed, organized with unorganized. As these fortunate tendencies toward a class-for-itself form of Being are realized, even sometimes in the smallest, most fragile and momentary alliances within the class forces, a certain section of the class forces — a tiny vanguard stratum, to begin with — undergoes a change in its consciousness, developing a potential for class consciousness. It is socialist program, especially the socialist programmatic perspective of expanded socialist production, which transforms potential class consciousness into actual class consciousness.

What we must do, as we seek to establish the rudiments of a new international party, is to go beyond the preliminary specifications of such a program, beyond the quality of precision of the NCLC's July 1970 "Emergency Reconstruction Program," for all Europe, emphasizing immediately the leading capitalist regions of Europe. Knowing that the historic tasks of the movement must be realized during the 1970s, with the development of the productive forces in more or less their present state, we must develop and present our program of expanded reproduction for a socialist Common Market, a United Socialist States of Europe.

Such a program, even our present commitment to produce it, absolutely distinguishes our tendency as an historic alternative to the imminently fascist program of the big bourgeoisie ("Zero Population Growth") and the wretched centrism of the Communist and Unified Secretariat parties. It is by rallying the best cadres of all Europe to such a programmatic orientation that we shall proceed — with barely enough time to accomplish this — to establish a new, hegemonic international party.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, established by Act of Congress, March 1970.
2. The "Club of Rome" is an international capitalists' research foundation, funded by the Volkswagen firm and assorted Italian financiers, among others. It is headed by Dr. Peccei, otherwise noted for his position at the head of Italconsult, Europe's largest industrial management consulting firm.
3. Mansholt's endorsement of the "Zero Population Growth" campaign, while partially a demagogic cover for present European capitalist unemployment and wage-austerity programs, identifies his programmatic views with those elaborated in the "Blueprint for Survival," Limits of Growth, and assorted related documents. Stripped of their pseudo-scientific "ecology" demagogy, the programs thus endorsed by Mansholt correspond exactly to the step-by-step development of the Nazi regime, from Schacht's wage-austerity of 1933-37 into the slave-labor-extermination-camp programs of profitable depopulation of Slavic and Jewish-settled regions during the 1943-45 period.
4. Cf. Socialism or Fascism, National Caucus of Labor Committees, New York, N.Y., Nov. 1971.
5. European Auto-Cannibalism.
6. The "Unified Secretariat" refers to the gaggle of centrist groups associated with the leadership of Ernest Mandel, most notably the Ligue Communiste of France, and a "co-thinker" group, the Socialist Workers Party of the U.S.A. It is rumored that a split is brewing between Mandel and the SWP. The SWP is opposed to the support of "guerrillaism" by Livio Maitan and other European Mandelian spokesmen, as it is also opposed to Mandel's repeated efforts to establish a programmatic unity binding upon all member-parties. The SWP violently rejects giving significant financial assistance to Mandel, Krivine, etc., and also rejects Mandel's securing rights to intervene in the program policies of the SWP. In turn, the European leadership of the Unified Secretariat is more than annoyed at the embarrassment the SWP could create for the Ligue Communiste and other parties in Europe. It is reported that observers from the Ligue Communiste came close to vomiting publicly while attending the recent conference of the Young Socialist Alliance (SWP youth group) in Houston. Despite the petit-bourgeois centrist tendency dominating the Secretariat parties in Europe, in Europe it is necessary to make at least a serious pretense of having a working-class orientation. This point is accented by the fact that the SWP modifies Mandel's "local workers' control" to a mere "local control," and backs this change by frequently mobilizing scabbing and other strikebreaking activities against unions on strike. That noted, the fact remains that the Unified Secretariat, including the SWP, is the numerically largest centrist tendency after the Communist parties themselves.
7. "The End of the Dollar Empire," Internationales Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 1, passim.
8. As a result of long-standing falsification of unemployment statistics in the U.S.A. by the U.S. government and pro-capitalist academics, the highly visible growth of actual unemployment to more than double the reported figure has caused even bourgeois circles to create a new statistic, called "under-employment."
9. The I.S. (U.S.A.) is technically presumed to have very loose solidarity with the I.S. (G.B.). The similarities are essentially located in the nominal posture by both groups, that the U.S.S.R. is "state capitalist," and the fact that both are an unprincipled amalgam of opportunists of quite different political views huddled together for bodily warmth. The I.S. (U.S.A.) rejects socialism in any sense that that term has been used in the socialist movement, denying most emphatically the possible existence of programs expressing a common class interest unifying employed, unemployed, organized, unorganized. This anarchist opposition to program compels the group to reject, on the same grounds, any actual internationalist practices.
10. See Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme."
11. See discussion of Mandel's attack on Marx, below.
12. 1844.
13. N. B., "The Trinitarian Formula, III" passim; see below for excerpt from this.
14. Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy: "Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a political struggle." p. 173, Moscow English-language edition.

15. The German Ideology, "Feuerbach," passim.
16. Ibid.
17. G. Cantor, Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre (Leipzig, 1833), in Georg Cantor, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Hildesheim, 1962. Another approach to the same problem is developed out of Christian Ehrenfels by Wolfgang Kohler and Max Wertheimer in the notion of the noetic function of insight in human concept-creation. Ehrenfels' (and Kohler's and Wertheimer's) approach is explicitly Kantian, of course — classical, actual Kantianism, not the bowdlerized nonsense of the neo-Kantian epigoni of Fries which flourishes in certain German intellectual circles. Of course, it is most unsatisfactory to leave matters with Cantor's "metaphysic," etc.; the point is to recognize the ways in which the fact of the noetic character of actual human mentation is empirically manifest within mathematical science, empirical psychology, etc.
18. Compare Kant's and Feuerbach's usage of the notion of anthropology, with special reference to Kant on this in his Critique of Practical Reason.
19. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, passim.
20. This point is systematically treated in L. Marcus, Dialectical Economics, New York, 1972. Hegel's inability to locate progress in man's practical advances in the "negative entropy" of nature (i.e., in the Phenomenology) compels him to set the evolutionary process of human mentation apart from the material basis, resulting in the pathological "double negation" to which Marx refers at length in the concluding chapter of the 1844 Manuscripts. Lacking a positive basis in praxis for determining the objectivity of human knowledge from the standpoint of changes in material universality, Hegel could not develop a true "hylozoic monism." Thus, attempting to resolve the heteronomy of Being-in-itself within the subjective realm alone, Hegel situated himself in a predicament analogous to that of Kant's attempt to resolve a similar problem in the Critique of Practical Reason. This, the "negation of the negation" becomes the hallmark of the later Hegel, expressing its inevitable implications in the attribution of historical necessity to every parasite of the Prussian state.
21. That man's positive (negentropic) changes in nature for higher material reproductive powers of man determines the existence of man the practical thinker, man who arrives at practice through thought-noetic thought. Thus, the higher negentropy of the human social-reproductive process AS A WHOLE, resulting from the universalized consequences of attempted negentropic changes in nature by man, closes the "loop," providing a positive rather than an Hegelian or Kantian "negation of the negation" means of determining the "reality, the this-sidedness" of the processes of noetic mentation involved.
22. Cf. Ludwig Boltzmann, Vorlesungen uber Gastheorie; Max Planck, A Survey of Physics.
23. From the first section, "Feuerbach," of The German Ideology, the following excerpts emphasize the absolute consistency of views of the "young" and "mature" Marx on the associated points.

On the class-for-itself principles underlined in the excerpt from Vol. III of Capital, we extract the essence of the treatment with the following on the material-social basis for the notion of alienation:

"... This development of the productive forces (which itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their WORLD-HISTORICAL instead of local being)... finally has put WORLD-HISTORICAL empirically universal individuals in place of local ones." (p. 46 Moscow English edition)

"... the real intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the wealth of his real connections. Only then will the separate individuals be liberated from the various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with the material and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth (the creations of man). ALL-ROUND dependence, this natural form of the WORLD-HISTORICAL cooperation of individuals, will be transformed by this communist revolution into the control and conscious mastery of these powers, which, born of the action of man on one another, have till now over-awed and governed men as powers completely alien to them." (p. 49, *ibid.*)

"Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all.

"This appropriation is further determined by the manner in which it must be effected. It can be effected only through a union, which by the character of the proletariat itself can again only be a universal one..."

"Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life... The transformation of labor into self-activity corresponds to the transformation of the earlier limited intercourse into the inter-

(Please turn to page 68)

The Sociology of 'Strength Through Joy'

A Strategy Against Labor

by Richard Cohen

More striking than the rebellion sweeping academic sociology today are the terms of surrender which insurgent factions are proposing. Ironically, they contend that sociology cannot be considered a distinct discipline because its subject matter, society, is contingent on a more original factor — the "individual."

Sociologist George C. Homans, one of the leading figures among these reductionist tendencies, divulges the source of this contention, "In the course of an essentially literary education, I had absorbed one of the unstated assumptions of Western intellectual tradition, the notion that the nature of society is determined by the individual... Both *Suicide and Rules* (of *Sociological Method*, by Durkheim) implied that society might determine the nature of the individual. As for *Elementary Forms*... it suggested... that the purpose or function of human institutions was not... the satisfaction of human needs but the maintenance of society.... His was a revelation, but a revelation I was never quite comfortable with." (1)

Unwittingly, Homans captures the fundamental antagonism between the concept of "society" and standard bourgeois method. While this reveals the basis of the contemporary dismissal of even the pretense of society from sociology, it does not disclose the reason why sociologists should be suddenly recognizing this elementary truth and that other disciplines in the social sciences should be following suit.

Thus, the question arises: what is the source of this migration back to the authority of the unmediated individual manifested as either pure instinct or will?

Without a competent theoretical orientation and

without a complete history of their own profession, it's little wonder that contemporary sociologists are unaware of the vital social ramifications of these developments.

A preliminary understanding of the current status of sociology only begins to emerge when we investigate the last historical period in which the "supremacy of the individual" gripped the profession. In general, it coincided with the years of spreading depression conditions between World War I and World War II when the unraveling of the capitalist social structure was clearly visible. Emerging from this recognition, came the projections of no less a social scientist than Adolf Hitler who keynoted, what a few years later, would be the practical orientation of sociologists, "A change in education is needed: today we suffer from an over education... What is needed is instinct and will." (2) These urgings foretold the development of a social strategy and apparatus capable of extracting from the individual by exhorting his will and directing his instinct, a firm commitment to a bourgeois identity, no matter his social class. What is shocking is that a sociology infatuated with the supremacy of the individual had already discovered and proposed the organizational principles of fascism.

This suggestion that sociology was somehow in complicity with fascist regimes is bound to startle sociologists who religiously believe the nonsense that sociology exists in the realm of mythological objectivity. The typical account of sociology's activities and functions during the period in question is reported by G. Duncan Mitchell, "Although in Germany under Weber's influence, sociology might have followed the impressive lead he gave, the fact is that it was ruthlessly suppressed by the National Socialist German

Worker's Party...In Germany folklore replaced sociology during Hitler's regime." (3)

The tragedy of this collective amnesia is that it suppresses a wealth of information which on its own reveals that an "austerity sociology" had presented both a strategy for looting the German working class and an ideology around which pro-capitalist forces could be organized for the purposes of administering the austerity technology.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF STRENGTH THROUGH JOY

For instance, unmentioned in the standard sociological texts, C. Arnhold, organizer of the Nazi Labor Front and simultaneous discoverer of the principles of industrial sociology, acknowledged that all this would have been impossible were it not for the sociologies of Weber and Sombart which created the basis for his conclusion that the capacity for human productivity (Strength) is determined by the ability of the employer class to "reawaken 'Joy' in labor" among the working class. And in the midst of depression he contends that the function of this sociology, "is to take in hand leadership of all from earliest childhood to the oldest man not for social purposes but from the point of view of productivity." (4)

Although the case of Arnhold and the Labor Front is important in itself, it becomes even more pertinent when we learn that it was representative of a general phenomenon. For the most part, unknown is that Strength Through Joy sociology spread with the spiraling depression conditions. In fact, this sociology dominated continental Europe and was ultimately imported into the U.S. where it was nurtured at Harvard. In the early thirties, the founders of contemporary sociology, Parsons, Homans, Merton and Mayo, huddled together for the purpose of becoming briefed in the thoroughly anti-working class perspectives of the Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto.

Homan's own infatuation with this ideology highlights the gut reason why "austerity" sociology gripped the attention of these academics, "I felt during the thirties I was under a personal attack from the Marxists... But in showing some of Marx, like the famous theory of surplus value, was certainly a rationalization, Pareto provided a kind of an answer to him. At least the proletariat had no intellectual justification in demanding my money or my life." (5)

With this background in mind, the contemporary search for the individual presents an extremely crucial question to the working-class and academics alike. Does this revival, which emerges on the eve of a new world depression, portend a coalescence of currents within sociology and the austerity requirements of the capitalist class to form a strategy against labor?

Essential to an adequate answer will be an attempt to demonstrate that austerity sociology is latent in all bourgeois sociologies, that its manifestation between World War I and World War II was systematic not accidental, and that its future expression will be enhanced by the scandalous interchange between sociology and the capitalist class after World War II.

FROM "ANOMIE" TO "AUSTERITY"

From its inception bourgeois social thought has involved itself in one lone project. That is to isolate, depict, and combat a particular social disease which, from its perspective, is responsible for weakening the foundations of society. The most advanced bourgeois conception of this disorder resides in the early works of Emile Durkheim where he focuses on the concept of "anomie," a disturbance which breaks the bonds of social solidarity. Under these conditions, the rights, privileges and obligations prescribed by the ruling moral order are hurled into a state of regulatory breakdown (dis-integration). Since these moral directives are the only elements which bring coherence into human affairs, their dissolution can only reflect social chaos. (6)

Immediately, certain experts who restrict the concept of anomie to Durkheim and a contemporary band of misinformed followers will balk at the central station we attribute to it in bourgeois social thought. These doubts have been reinforced by the growing ignorance in matters of elementary bourgeois method which has infested academia, especially after World War I. As a result, bourgeois sociologists have completely overlooked the following two points.

Firstly, anomie has been the featured social problem of both the positivist-utilitarian and Kantian models of society. Secondly, and more importantly, these two social conceptions which remain the only bourgeois social models, had run their creative course in the early 19th century and by the mid 19th century had unveiled their final solution to the problem of anomie — austerity sociology.

THE HIPPIE AND THE PRIEST

The earliest forerunners of today's cult of the individual were produced by the wave of economic crises and subsequent anomie that struck Europe in the early part of the 19th century. Thus, emerged the first practitioners of applied sociology, Charles Fourier and Arthur Schopenhauer, who each from apparently opposite directions devised the same solution: Strength Through Joy. Unlike the massive austerity machines that had begun to be manufactured immediately after World War I, the first practitioners of austerity sociology were involved in the formation of communal cults. Fourier along with other utili-

tarians such as Owen and Godwin preached that individuals should take leave of crumbling society and establish hippie communes where one could experience the Joy of complete instinctual satisfaction (hedonism).(7) Schopenhauer, while recognizing the violent urgings of natural instinct, could only see a lasting solution in the practice of the compassionate Will which strives for the Joy of Buddhist Nirvana (total abstinence).(8) The essential unifying element in what appear to be opposing perspectives (complete indulgence vs. total abstinence) is that they both present an embryonic practical solution to the problem of anomie.

The root of this paradox is reducible to the fact that neither positivist-utilitarianism nor Kantian sociology can be considered sciences of society. Both social models are nothing but projections from specific Ethical Principles which when applied by the individual are said to reduce the occurrence of anomie (as anomie manifests itself in either paradigm).

THE SOLUTION TO THE UTILITARIAN DILEMMA: NO GROWTH

The earliest and least sophisticated ethical system is utilitarianism, whose tradition includes Hobbes, Locke, Hume and classical bourgeois economics. It conceives of the proscriptional content of Durkheim's moral order as secretions or senses of mechanistic nature usually referred to as Instinct. Hence, in utilitarian terms anomie appears in its narrowest and most ignorant translation — the individual experience of instinctual pain (in fact the failure to secure a moral proscription). On this basis the ethical nature of man is drawn in Jeremy Bentham's principle of utility whereby one "approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency which it appears to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question."(9)

Out of this suggestion that human "swinishness" is the solution to anomie a particular social model develops. Abstracted from its ethical base, it appears in its purest form where society is portrayed as a process of "exchange" in which the only social act is "trade" and the only social artifact is the "social contract" or "social convention." The primary fact about "trade" or the "social contract" is that they are constructed on the basis of individuals employing the "principle of utility," and beyond the mystical devices employed to save them by some theorists, they are destructable on the basis of the same principle.

Thus, when one employs the swinish "principle of utility" during periods of economic depression, all contracts and all trade threaten to quickly dissipate. This means that the cloak of sociability which covers today's exchange theories of Homans and Blau, Moreno's

Sociometry and sections of conflict theory, must remove itself and reveal two equally undesirable solutions which mean austerity. In order to maintain one's pleasures, one must either retreat from the exchange process (society), or remove a portion of useless contractors. On this point of difference the parochial communalism of Fourier and the anarchists was attacked by ZPger Parson Malthus who favored a joint solution that would allow the exchange process to proceed. Simply, leave nature to eliminate the over-supply of human beings thereby restoring social equilibrium.

THE KANTIAN SOLUTION TO HETERONOMY: NIRVANA

Kant bases his moral philosophy on an attack upon the swinish conception of man proposed by the utilitarians. While engaged in this polemic, Kant invokes the use of a moral imperative which, if followed, would rid society of anomie, "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time an end."(10) By accepting the ends of the array of others, ego negates his own socially negative heteronomy (negation of the negation). Hence, Kant, in an attempt to accept society, negates the ego and thus internalizes through the aegis of a mystical "good will" the same social content (the Durkheimian moral order) that the utilitarians externalized through natural instinct. From this perspective, anomie emerges as a disintegration of the "idealized world of ends."

The social element which surfaces from the Kantian ethic is this "world of idealized ends." Abstracted from its origins, it reemerges in the latter half of the 19th century as Weber's "Weltanschauung" (world view) and "ideal type." However, the transition in Kantian social thought after World War I indicates that these formal paradigms can in no way deal with anomie. By applying the Kantian Moral Imperative in a period of depression such as Schopenhauer and his cults did, one obtains a complete negation of the ego as today's rebirth of mysticism and religion suggest. From the sane perspective, anomic disruption can only be the result of the individual's will succumbing to heteronomy. Hence, the only remedy to de-moralization is a combination of self-inflicted austerity and the suppression of heteronomy.

Thus, as the entire scope of bourgeois social thought reduces itself to these two ethical systems, the entire arsenal of anti-anomie solutions surface in the austerity sociology of Strength Through Joy.

DURKHEIM'S WAY OUT

An avenue out of this dilemma is provided by Durkheim in his final work *The Elementary Forms*

of Religious Life, "It is common action that takes consciousness of itself and realizes its position, it is before all else an active co-operation... That it is action which dominates the religious life, because of the mere fact that it is society which is its source." (12) Durkheim's treatise implies that what is generally taken for society by the utilitarians (instinctual exchange), the Kantians (the world of idealized ends) and the more enlightened Durkheim (conscience collective) is not society at all, but what Durkheim refers to as the religious life (moral order). In this radically altered social model Durkheim makes the religious life responsible to a parallel world which he terms the "active-co-operation."

In this context, the problem of anomie becomes a false social problem. No longer is the moral order required to maintain itself. It must, now, maintain the requirements of the body of "active-co-operation." Durkheim, however, was unable to furnish any substantive account of the requirements of this body.

The same advanced predicament was faced some seventy years earlier by Ludwig Feuerbach in his comparable notion of the self-subsisting positive. Its solution only appears in Marx's concept of "social reproduction" which radically redefines the problem of society as alienation.

ALIENATION VS. ANOMIE

Predictably, bourgeois experts and official Marxist scholars alike have been involved in the anti-working class task of reducing Marx's notion of the "alienation of labor" to either a Kantian or utilitarian portrayal of the "anomic" laborer. This misconception has resulted in the absurd but traditional bifurcation of Marx's single system into two warring interpretations. On the one hand, the young Marx appears as an existential sociologist, while on the other the older Marx appears as a utilitarian political economist. (13) Both contentions are unalterably incorrect.

Particularly fashionable among academic sociologists and New Leftists is the suggestion that alienation is the feeling experienced by the autonomous laborer who is out of communion with his work-relationships (estrangement). Not only is this the definition of Kantian heteronomic anomie, but it was exactly the problem to which the Nazi Labor Front was administered as a solution.

Most idiot Marxist scholars accept the utilitarian exchange model of society in which autonomous workers are seen as being cheated out of their due by exploitive, greedy monopolists (power elites). This absurd contention along with the help of its misinformed practitioners has been responsible for limiting the perspective of workers' identity in capitalist society. Recently, a core of neo-utilitarian industrial sociologists have acted

on the same principles to duplicate the effective Kantian solutions in the area of labor.

In distinction to these two bourgeois conceptions of alienation, Marx proposes that a laborer is alienated only because he is an expression of "alienated labor in general." This proposition can only be conceived within Durkheimian parameters where "labor" emerges as the creative expression of the body of "active co-operation." Labor's unique expressive quality is its ability to alter nature in such a way as to create the conditions for its own reproduction on an expanded scale, and this is only possible because human exertion is innovative — possessed of a consciousness as opposed to animal reaction. Hence, the alienation of labor occurs when the behavioral proscriptions of the ruling consciousness systematically orders labor in directions alien to the requirements of expanded reproduction.

In *Capital*, Marx methodically examines the processes and consequences of the alienation of labor under the dictatorship of capital. (14) The result appears in two mutually antagonistic social problems. The first problem is the false problem of anomie as it is experienced by the hegemonic capitalism. The traditional bourgeois science which has devised methods for rectifying this problem is economics. As an adjunct to the first form of anomie, the bulk of the bourgeoisie — the petit-bourgeoisie — experiences the anomie of the crumbling moral order built up to co-ordinate and administrate the fundamental demands of capital. Ethics and later sociology have appeared as attempts to solve this form of anomie (it should be noted that at its beginning both ethics and economics were virtually the same, classical economics). Both the solutions of economics and of sociology (Strength Through Joy) to Anomie have and must demand austerity which means the depletion of the required categories of reproduction and an attack upon labor. Thus, objectively the laborer is placed in circumstances whereby a solution to the problem of his own existence requires a solution to the problem of labor in general — alienation.

As a result, the sociologies of ALIENATION AND ANOMIE are no more than the strategies of class war. Therefore, a documentary examination of Strength Through Joy will reveal that it is simply a Strategy Against Labor.

THE FORMATION OF A STRATEGY AGAINST LABOR

The first encompassing Strength Through Joy sociology arose in the economically dislocated sectors of central and southern Europe after World War I. By the early 'thirties sociologists had so perfected it, that it served as the blueprint for the Nazi two-pronged attack on their own labor force.

Initially in Germany and later in the United States austerity sociology developed in a twofold manner. Because the immense research centers for applied sociology which prevail today had not yet come into existence, the expression of Strength Through Joy sociology began on a highly theoretical plane within the German centered Neo-Kantian movement. It was there that the foundation for the reconstruction of the entire social structure which would have dismantled the cities and relocated the working-class on local oriented communes (company towns) was formulated.

The second significant event was marked by the birth of research centers for applied sociology in the leading capitalist states. At the behest of capitalist proto-foundations, research teams were organized for the purposes of devising social mechanisms that would lead to higher labor productivity. It culminated in the simultaneous discovery of the principles of industrial sociology in the U.S. and Germany and as we have already suggested these principles formed the basis for the Nazi reorganization of internal factory life under the auspices of the Labor Front. Combined, these programs meshed in both theory and practice to form the Nazi strategy against labor.

THE DECLINE OF THE WEST

In 1918 and the period immediately following, Germany was in a state of classic anomie. It had just lost the war and was now experiencing depression-like conditions and the threats of real socialist rebellions. In the wake of these conditions, the hegemonic pre-war sociologies of Kantian formal sociology had given way in one fell swoop to what became the most widely read and influential historico-theoretical document of the period — Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*. Spengler, who later advised the Nazis and other fascist groupings, had announced in a scholarly fashion the age of heteronomy and demoralization. Referring to the systematic degradation of all moral orders, Spengler contends: "The aims once attained — the idea, the entire content of inner possibilities, fulfilled and made externally actual — the Culture suddenly hardens, it mortifies, its blood congeals, its (creative) force breaks down and it becomes Civilization..."(15) Thus, Spengler had arrived at an accurate description of the anomic period facing the bourgeoisie, but he had added a pessimistic note of Hegelian determinism which tended to undermine his own fascistic solutions.

In part on their own initiative and in part as a response to Spengler, strict Kantians began developing a viable Strength Through Joy model. This work took place in both social theory and in its more abstract expression as philosophy where the existentialism of Jaspers and Heidegger was paving the way.(16)

The most authoritative sociological account appeared in 1922 in Jose Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the Masses*. He restates the Kantian ethic as such, "The primordial reality, the fact of all facts, that which is given to me...is myself...and myself is primarily a finding of myself in the world."(17) Ortega's central thesis proclaims that the world (of idealized ends) which is essential for the continued life of the individual is becoming formless and turning into a mass in this period.

The entirety of the Kantian Strength Through Joy movement focuses on the "mass man" (the man who is like everyone else) and his degenerate "sensate" ("materialist") culture. P.A. Sorokin, former secretary to Kerensky, who was deported from the Soviet Union in 1922 only to be made chairman of Harvard's new sociology department, centered his attack on the materialist sensate culture which encourages the Will into self-concern and heteronomy.(18) For this sociology the massive wave of post-war anomie can be attributed to the failing Will and its decadent culture.

THE HETERONOMY OF THE CITIES AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT

However, unlike the simple solutions of Schopenhauer, the advent of a mediating complication demanded a broader and more sophisticated cure. Official Nazi sociologist J. W. Ludowici conceptualizes the concrete stumbling-block: "The city is bad. Its growth has brought in its train a series of disastrous consequences...In the cities families sink in a few generations from their high levels of efficiency and decline into an everwidening, degenerating and directionless mass." Ludowici then projects the ultimate plight of the masses: "In the face of any proper limitation upon their ever growing demands, this socially and culturally rootless people embrace the degrading philosophy of the Jew Marx — the doctrine of the mass man."(19) Thus, the cities are not only depicted as the promoter and center of heteronomy, they also present the arena in which the masses organize themselves into what was synonymous with the term Marxism in Germany, the trade unions.

The problem of urban heteronomy had been given attention in pre-war Kantian sociology and the diagnosis was offered by G. Simmel who saw the metropolis as a pressure-cooker where there is: "such an over-whelming fulness of chrysalized and impersonalized spirit that the personality so to speak cannot maintain itself under the pressure."(20) This theme of urban estrangement is an extremely popular one in contemporary sociology. From its initial articulation in D. Reisman's *The Lonely Crowd*, it now forms the basis for the research foundation-devised neighborhood "community control" (decentralization) programs which, parenthetically, the pathetic socialist

left (CP and SWP) actually support.(21)

Also, in pre-war sociology Max Weber had devoted a good portion of his career to attacking the materialist suppositions of the trade union movement. This triggered his attempt at undermining what he believed to be Marx's position by positing the silly notion that one idea — the Protestant ethic — had mothered another idea — capitalism. (The Protestant Ethic and the Rise of Capitalism)

THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES

But in the face of post-war anomie these literary attacks on labor shriveled up and gave way. They had no means of allaying the revulsion of a man like Spengler who upon witnessing the "revolt of the masses" in early 1919 at Munich reported, "nothing but hunger, looting, filth, danger and rascality without parallel." (22) In the midst of economic depression, the austerity sociologist can only see the cities and labor as does the Nazi Ludowici: "Labor sheds its rural heritage of communal feeling, its manifold loyalties to the gods of hearth and home, its piety and its sense of duty degenerates into the undifferentiated proletarian mass. The mass is dominated by the same values as those held by the rich, to get, to gain, to hold property, to acquire riches, comforts and material plenty. The laborer wants higher wages, shorter hours, better working conditions, leisure time, more goods, higher standard of living. These values of Mammonism involve the poor in an endless life destroying hunger after vanities which can never satisfy, which always and ever lead to a demand for more, regardless of how much was had before." (23) With this explicit anti-labor perspective, the definition of the organized mass becomes the "rebel mass." For Ortega this rebel mass cannot be dealt with rationally because it has had its "soul obliterated and is hermetically closed." (24) This is the austerity sociologists' conception of the organized labor movement.

A RELIGIOUS SOLUTION: DISMANTLE THE ORGANIZATIONS OF HETERONOMY

Hence, a working solution to the anomic crisis must entail that the Will of the individual be re-awakened out of this mass heteronomy in order that he rejoin and be firmly lodged in the teetering bourgeois moral order. To that end, both the organizations of heteronomy (the labor movement) and the centers of heteronomy (the cities) must be dismantled.

The first notion of a scheme that would secure these objectives was offered by the pessimist Spengler. In an attempt to overcome his own projections, Spengler had stipulated the inevitability of a "second religiosity" in which the, "proud blood of the beast or prey (Western Faustian Kultur)" would revolt

against, "the tyranny of pure thought (degenerate urban liberalism)." (25) This religiosity would be led by the old Prussian element who would split-off, "the respectable part of the working population" to fight against the, "anarchism in which the Spartacus group has a remarkable relationship with the left liberalism of the Jewish newspapers, pot-house pamphlets, jobbers and doctrinaires." (26)

The emerging popularity of religion and mysticism was already a part of the German Youth Movement and could also be seen in a return to Christianity to which many Nazi apologists later migrated after the SA purges. As opposed to the materially-oriented mass-man, the religious man is austere, and thus willing to restrict himself, as in the Buddhist concept of Nirvana, in order to experience the "Joy" of self-realization in the strict Kantian sense.

On this basis, P. A. Sorokin supplies a more encompassing and realistic description of what would be necessary to resolve the anomic "Crisis of Our Age": "Our remedy demands a complete change of the contemporary mentality, a fundamental transformation of our system of values, and the profoundest modification of our conduct towards other men, cultural values and the world at large." (27) According to Sorokin, an unalterable requirement for this change from a "sensate" material culture to an idealist-religious culture must be, "A transformation of the forms of social relationship, by replacing the present compulsory and contractual relationships with purer and more godly familistic relationships..." (28) Thus, the removal of urban commercial society and its replacement with a familial rural structure is deemed necessary.

DECENTRALIZATION AND DEPROLETARIANIZATION

Echoing Sorokin's theme, Nazi sociologists such as Ludowici developed a comprehensive program for the renewal of the familial Volk structure and the permanent destruction of Mass-Man and his organizations. In both theory and practice it involved little more than the full expression of the local-control urban decentralization schemes which are popular today.

The orientation of the program is discussed by Ludowici: "The point of view and the life values of the peasantry are those which the Nazi government finds preeminently worthwhile... In proportion as the city is reconquered by the peasant state will the people realize the Nazi promised land." In conjunction with dismantling the cities, "the solution for all internal unrest centered around the emerging class struggle is to be found in returning all labor to the land." (29) As a consequence of this program, the Nazis enacted the most encompassing social reorganization for the

express purposes of instituting a permanent apparatus for looting the working class.

Hence under the banner of "blood and soil," German capital attempted to march the urban labor mass along two separate roads into a national rural resettlement. Road one involved the socialization of the most qualified and trusted workers and youth into a solid pro-bourgeois "world view" by transforming them directly into peasants either on a permanent or temporary basis. The second and ultimately more critical road attempted to approximate the sociological results of the first by moving the work place — the factory out of the urban mass into suburban communal settlements (company towns).

TOWARDS A RURAL RESETTLEMENT: SAVING THE JUNKERS

One of the overriding contingencies calling for a renewal of the peasantry involved the great indebtedness of the Junkers (large estate holders) which was threatening the foundations of German agriculture. In order to alleviate this economic crunch, the Nazi government bought up several of the estates and then parceled it out in much smaller sections to peasants and urban workers. Then through the newly created Land Service and Labor Service urban youths were organized to go out to the farms for extended periods to give free-labor for the state. (30)

While reducing the financial pressure on agriculture, the program also went a long way to constructing a new peasant petit-bourgeoisie firmly committed to Nazism and the bourgeois moral order. M. Heidegger, existentialist philosopher and organizer for the Land and Labor Service among university youth, spotlights the spiritual consequences of this reversed proletarianization: "The service provides a deep experience of clarity and confirmation of the continuity of tradition that is subject to daily trial and decision and experience of responsibility of the individual towards the people to which he belongs." (31)

LOCAL CONTROL COMMUNALISM: A PROGRAM FOR PERMANENT LOOTING

The more disarming plan, however, involved the construction of isolated company-run communes in the suburban areas. The purpose of these settlements were given expression by none other than the elder Krupp in the 1870's: "Who knows but that when, after years and days, a general revolt will go through the land, when there will be a general uprising of all laborers against their employers, but that we shall be the only ones passed by if we are to do what is required in time?" (32) In fact, the labor resettlement program had been standard practice at the Krupp iron works for decades. There the program had been instituted on

the basis that, "The command of the establishment shall not be lost, the sympathy of the people shall not be forfeited, there shall be no strikes." (33)

Through this mechanism the organized urban mass and its potential for revival are crushed, while the individual worker is placed in "increasing attachment to the plant, the working place, the profession" by having the commune care for all facets of his and his family's life. Thus, he is perfectly integrated into a coherent community of ends (the company town). (34)

The worker is also encouraged to become part of the reverse proletarianization process by his required purchasing of a small plot of land upon entering the commune. In order to obtain it he must incur a debt from the company. Along with this fact the minimal means of subsistence the worker obtains from farming creates further conditions for unabated wage gouging. (35)

This unique strategy against labor might have served as an institution for permanent looting were it not that the total cost of industrial resettlement was too great. Through it the working class would have been transformed into nothing more than human cattle. Each offspring of a commune worker would have been indoctrinated into an austerity structure and consciousness thereby completing the projection of Strength Through Joy sociology.

AUSTERITY SOCIOLOGY — AMERICAN STYLE

Completely unknown to sociologists, this model which served as a paradigm for the enslavement of European labor, also functioned as the foundation upon which contemporary sociology was constructed. The central position of this model in the growth of post World War II sociology can only be made sense of when we learn why it was imported into the U.S. during the early part of the Great Depression.

At Harvard in the early thirties, L. J. Henderson, a chemist, organized a study group for the purposes of briefing those conservative faculty members who had gathered around him in the sociological works of Vilfredo Pareto. Pareto had gained notoriety by authoring what was considered by many to be the first systematic sociology (Treatise on General Sociology) and by functioning at one point as Mussolini's tutor and adviser. (36)

Pareto had devised a methodological gimmick whereby the Kantian austerity model could be translated into a positivist terminology. The central theoretical concept which Pareto developed to that end was the "residue." (37) In fact, the residue is equivalent to the content of the Kantian supersensory notion of the Will, however it is obtained out of a critique of what posi-

tivism cannot explain (the residual). Henderson, who was the real organizing talent behind American sociology, had accepted this methodology in full, and he wasted no time in introducing the crucial role that the "residues" play in combating anomie.

In Pareto's famed circulation of elites, two different residues which express different governing strengths alternate as governing elites over the mass (workers). Pareto describes the process: "In periods of rapid increase in economic prosperity the speculators grow rich and win places in the governing elite... Effects are just the opposite in times of economic depression," then "the courageous and virile spirit" of those who possess the faith takes power. (38)

Thus, Pareto not only makes fascism a cyclical matter as did the Kantians, particularly Sorokin, he recognizes and articulates the economic basis behind it. In these periods of depression he draws a replica of Ludowici's familial-spiritual structure required for governing the masses. This is so because Pareto's residues "speculator" (fox) vs. "rentier" (lion) are a repeat of Kant's "heteronomic will" vs. the "Good Will."

THE PARETO CIRCLE: THE ACADEMIC LIONS OF HARVARD

Around this paradigm, Henderson was able to attract the core of contemporary sociology — Parsons, Homans, Merton and Mayo plus historian C. Brinton, economist J. Schumpeter and philosopher A. N. Whitehead. (39) On the basis of Pareto's austerity paradigm, it would have only required a ripe social context for these intellectual "lions" to repeat an approximation of the Nazi "reversed proletarianization" program.

That this was Henderson's design is revealed in his awkward defense of Pareto: "I hope that it will be clear that the prevalent description of Pareto as the Karl Marx of the bourgeoisie or of fascism is nothing but a derivation (a myth). It is a fact that Signor Mussolini has attributed his abandonment of socialism to the teachings of Pareto. It is also true that among Nazis and Fascists, Pareto's work is much esteemed, though perhaps not always understood. But his writings are no less applicable to France, England and the United States and Russia than to Italy and Germany..." (40)

This contention is further enhanced by the fact that in the early phases of the Depression, Henderson, his collaborator Elton Mayo and the most ignorant of their underlings, Homans, were running about making public proclamations that what was needed was a circulation of elites. In Mayo's treatise, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, which is vis-

ibly a program and proposal for fascism, he asserts: "Developing anomie has changed the nature of virtually every administrative problem... the chief difficulty of our time is a breakdown in social codes that formerly disciplined us as to effective working conditions.... The situation is as if Pareto's circulation of elites had been totally interrupted — the consequence — social disequilibrium." (41)

FIRST OWN, THEN KRUPP THEN MAYO — INDUSTRIAL COMMUNALISM

The pleas of Mayo and Henderson come into focus only upon closer inspection of Mayo's treatise. What had motivated Mayo's demands for a "circulation of elites," which occurs only in the last few chapters, is a prior description of Mayo's revolutionary discoveries about human labor while conducting the famed Hawthorne Experiments. Mayo cites his discovery: "There is one important aspect of the employer-employee problem which has persisted through a century of change in industrial organization in wages and in working conditions. It may be briefly expressed in a claim that at no time has there been, except sporadically here and there, anything of the nature of effective and wholehearted collaboration between the administrative and working groups in industry." (42)

Mayo had stumbled, quite by accident, upon the same suggestions for internal factory reorganization as had the old utilitarian anarchists such as Owen, and as had the Krupp family in their settlements. It is exactly the content of this finding which Robert Brady, author of *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* refers to: "The Hawthorne Experiments carried out in one of the largest plants of Western Electric, for example, provide the experimental results and arguments for a position with respect to organized labor identical to those held by the leader of the German Labor Front." (43)

THE NECESSITY OF PARETO'S FASCISM: AN ATTACK ON ORGANIZED LABOR

Mayo's interest in Pareto becomes even clearer here. Mayo lacked exactly what the Labor Front possessed, namely a political organization in the form of National Socialism. C. Arnhold, who simultaneously discovered the notion of industrial communalism, testified: "DINTA (Arnhold's research team) was unable to put its program across without the backing of National Socialism, without National Socialism and without its high labor idea, realization of its plans would have not been possible." Therefore without a fascist political formation there is no program for the restructuralization of the society, no ideology to endorse it, and no muscle to put it across. In short without fascism, there is no machine for dismantling the trade unions (the organized urban mass) and the cities (the centers of heteronomy).

This unalterable fact is what both Mayo and Henderson sensed. Thus, Pareto presented the ideology around which to begin to organize dissatisfied intellectuals for an attack on the trade unions. The case of that intellectual doodler Homans documents the point. In recalling those trying years with the labor movement which he claims encouraged him to enter the Pareto Circle, Homans offers, "If we could only meet as honest men — or honest rationalizers — we might divide up the take without fighting. It was the intellectual guff talked by the alleged leaders of the proletariat that put one's back up and got in the way of a settlement. Whatever one did, one was not going to yield to men like that." (44)

THE "YOUNG LIONS" AND THE CAPITALIST CLASS

The absolutely scandalous portion of this history, which is the history of the real beginning of American sociology, is that both Mayo and Henderson were directly under the employ of the capitalist class through an agency which later emerged as the Rockefeller Foundation. (45) In 1926, Henderson was engaged to organize the biologically-oriented Harvard Fatigue Laboratory while Mayo helped christen a co-ordinate body, the Harvard Department of Industrial Research, for the express purpose of devising a permanent mechanism for the alleviation of the bourgeois problem of labor productivity. (46)

The search for a cure to this disease began after World War I in Great Britain, the U.S. and Germany, and after myriads of experiments focusing on worker fatigue and monotony, Mayo and his Nazi correlate Arnhold discovered what stands today as the principles of industrial sociology. These principles are readily available to anyone who has been afflicted with the problem of having been drawn into a mystical Buddhist sect, a Jesus revival or a hippie commune. That is, never treat work relationships as a means to a commercial end, but always as an end in themselves (a la Kant). As Brady reports, the secret to unabated wage gouging and speedup hinge on the discovery, "That significant as hours, wages and other conditions of employment may be, they do not of themselves call out the highest levels of productivity. Given the minimum of these grounds, non-commercial (incentives) are far more potent...." (47)

The entire theoretical focus of this industrial sociology is to organize the work place (the factory) in such a way that the worker sees his foremost affiliation to the firm, because he feels that he belongs to an integrated set of ends.

THE NAZI LABOR FRONT AND REQUIREMENTS OF CAPITAL

The devastating effect of this policy, when all

labor defenses have been liquidated, is documented by the Labor Front. The central organ, Strength Through Joy promotes a feeling of tribal togetherness by organizing all leisure time on a communal basis (sports, trips etc.), while all education develops the idea of beauty in labor by lodging labor in the traditional, occupational and national community of values (Volklore). (48) When intermeshed with the rural resettlement program, Brady comments, "This ideology fused to the tradition of the German Youth Movement required no more than systematic organization and state backing in order to be painlessly transformed into the new structure of the Labor Front." (49)

The young workers manufactured through this process had even caught the fancy of the bourgeois Shirer: "The young in the Third Reich were growing up to have strong and healthy bodies, faith in the future of their country and in themselves and a sense of fellowship and comradeship that shattered all class and economic and social barriers." (50)

However, in a moment of candor, Ley, the Minister of the Labor Front, revealed the purpose behind this hippy, tribal celebration of the renewal of the commune and the nation: "We could not offer the working masses any material benefits, for Germany was poor and in a state of confusion and misery. New rates of wages and similar things were out of the question." Hence, it was necessary to, "suppress the materialism," of the workers, "and instead divert the gaze of the workers to the spiritual values of the nation.... Yes, truly we may be poor, we may have no money, we may lack foreign exchange and everything else. But we have a glorious people, and that is our return on our capital." (51)

Thus, once the worker has been shredded of all his defenses through the "deproletarianization program," he is firmly lodged into a bourgeois identity. He becomes what industrial sociologist William F. Whyte Jr. would later call the Organization Man. And in accordance with the criteria Ley puts forth, the worker will give the optimum of his effort while receiving the minimal in sustenance. Under the sociology of Strength Through Joy this is all that the worker is raised to do and this is all the worker is permitted to do.

POST WORLD WAR II SOCIOLOGY: THE TREND TOWARDS STRENGTH THROUGH JOY

It is on the basis of Pareto's teaching and its refinement at the hands of "productivity experts" Henderson and Mayo that both the theoretical and practical orientation of contemporary sociology stands. From a tiny group of anti-working class academics huddled together within the Pareto circle, sociology has emerged as a major discipline in the postwar bourgeois university.

Of central significance in its growth, has been the scandalous boom in research centers for applied sociology which are funded directly by the capitalist class through the aegis of their foundations. Capitalists have not only been able to funnel the Strength Through Joy — Strategy Against Labor models into these vaults where they are guarded and perfected, but through the lure of their funding agencies, they have been able to direct the vision of the bulk of the profession towards devising technologies for the solution of isolated problems in the bourgeois moral order.

The transformation of a good part of the profession into official strategists for the bourgeoisie has recently been boosted by an ideological shift in the academic-theoretical sphere. The recent ebb in the world capitalist economy has reflected itself in the accelerated unraveling of the moral order. This process has challenged the hegemonic "equilibrium" models of "functionalism" and has opened the door for a more general acceptance of Strength Through Joy within the profession.

When combined with an overwhelming Americanization-empiricization of the Paretoan Kantian Strength Through Joy model, the lure of the "foundation" and the crumbling of the integrated moral order have resulted in the following. In both, the research centers and in the classroom radical utilitarianism Strength Through Joy models are becoming the vogue. This is of special importance in the classroom where Strength Through Joy had previously occupied a moral order.

FUNCTIONALISM OR FASCISM?

The unchallenged patriarch of postwar classroom sociology is Talcott Parsons, a key figure in the old Pareto Circle. Any understanding of the proto-fascist proclivities of contemporary sociology must clear up the confusion radicals possess about Parsons' second major work, *The Social System*, where he elaborates the principles of conservative "functionalism."

Recently, misinformed radicals have attempted to paint Parsons as the ultimate reactionary force for the same reasons that the CP pictures Nixon in that light. As Alvin Gouldner's *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology* clinically demonstrates, any major attack which focuses on Parsons' Cold War sociology is going to dangerously miss the significance of emerging Strength Through Joy sociologies. (52)

Most texts and professors present Parsons as a Moses who climbed the mountain, spoke to Weber, Durkheim and Pareto and then descended with the principles of "functionalism" engraved on his mind. However, a sober inspection of Parsonian functionalism indicates that it is traceable to Parsons' first

work, *"The Structure of Social Action,"* save for the unscrupulous abandonment of one concept.

Failure to comprehend the function of this missing concept has resulted in an incompetent political critique of sociology and in a general methodological chaos within the profession.

In Parsons' *"The Structure of Social Action,"* the social model put forth is not "functionalism" but "voluntarism." Voluntarism is manifested as, "effort ... It is necessitated by the fact that norms do not automatically realize themselves." (53) Thus Parsons, as Pareto, had adopted the Kantian austerity model where the only element capable of saving the moral order during economic depression is a "non-logical," "Will-like" entity volunteering effort.

However in 1951, Parsons published *"The Social System,"* in which the all important "residual category," the "Will," is completely dropped. This bit of methodological treachery left the old Paretoan notion of the "social system" without an "elite" to maintain equilibrium. The result is that the normative order, now, realizes itself — the "self-equilibrizing society." (54) Parsons had simply manufactured the equivalent rationalization which bourgeois economists were busy spreading, the renowned built-in stabilizers (pattern maintenance).

Thus, contrary to popular radical myths, it is exactly in his "functionalism" that the unscrupulous political ideologue Parsons had stopped forging the principles of Strength Through Joy. Immediately, this new conservatism led to a state of methodological chaos from which the profession has yet to recover. In his haste to serve capitalism, Parsons had removed the only pedagogical link (the residues) between Kant's world world of idealized ends and empiricist method.

The result was a perceptible split in the activities of those sociologists who called themselves functionalists; on the one hand there appeared the strict theoreticians and on the other the practical technicians. On a massive scale, the weight of interest began to shift in the direction of a re-empiricization of the field.

SOCIOLOGISTS FOLLOW WHERE CAPITAL LEADS

At this point, the second great apostle of functionalism, Robert K. Merton, enters with a call for what in fact was already taking shape. In his masterpiece *"Social Theory and Social Structure,"* Merton seeks to opportunistically take the mantle away from Parsons by proposing that functionalism concern itself with "theories of the middle-range": "The sociological theorist exclusively committed to the exploration of high abstractions runs the risk that, as with modern

decor, the furniture of his mind will be sparse, bare, and uncomfortable." (55)

In fact, what was becoming "sparse, bare, and uncomfortable" for theoretical functionalists was that the capitalist class had no real use for them. The big foundations with big budgets had already sent shock waves through the profession which were turning the eyes of sociology in the direction of devising empirical solutions to isolated problems. Thus, with Parsons' methodological gimmick opening the door, sociologists began flooding the research centers and their peripheries. Theorists with practical orientations who had grown up around these centers, such as the reactionary Homans, became respected classroom lawyers for the more sedate Strength Through Joy intentions of peace-time capitalism. Thus, it was in the late '50's that functionalism made its retreat and Strength Through Joy began to gain a campus following.

MOYNIHAN LEADS THE DEATH PROCESSION

However, the death-knell for functionalism was sounded in the mid-60's with the beginning of the unraveling of the bourgeois moral order. In the midst of the Watts riots, Daniel P. Moynihan, a functionalist, and more recently an adviser to the Nixon regime, issued his report on the degeneration of the Negro family structure. Moynihan's central thesis immediately sent the sociological profession into warring camps. The still hegemonic functionalism had not only failed to predict the Black uprisings, but more importantly, functionalism had no way of explaining the condition. In fact, the problem was not supposed to exist because the general notion of built-in-stabilizers had eliminated the concept of a major social problem. Thus, functionalists were seen to be taking completely opposite positions. Moynihan located the problem as, "the weakness of the family structure. Once, or twice removed, it will be found to be the principle source of most of the aberrant, inadequate or anti-social behavior that did not establish, but now serves to perpetuate, the cycle of poverty and deprivation." (56) To that Andrew Billingsley, a functionalist, according to Moynihan, "concluded quite incorrectly, that the Negro family in this country is falling apart.... Negro-owned, managed, and controlled institutions must be developed and strengthened with the Negro community itself." (57) Functionalism had demonstrated its impotence and incoherence on an issue of national importance. The ensuing period of fragmentation and confusion within the profession resulted in significant layers of younger sociologists and students looking for a coherent solution.

With absolutely no socialist perspective available capable of raising the issue of alienation vs. anomie, the emerging theoretical trend in academic sociology within the past five years has been toward the develop-

ment of a coherent Strength Through Joy model.

THE "PRIMARY GROUP"

This rapid transition into an austerity theme has been mediated by conceptions drawn directly from the practical work of the research foundations. In general, this diverse body of Kantian and utilitarian Strength Through Joy paradigms have been referred to as either "primary" or "small" group analysis. In both its practical origins and present activities as well as in its theoretical reflections, primary group analysis has developed an orientation identical to the Nazi strategy against labor.

This approach grew out of two social experiments conducted in the U.S. during the Great Depression. The first and more crucial discovery for the future development of "primary group" analysis were the results of Mayo's legendary Hawthorne experiments which corresponded to the organizational perspectives of the Nazi Labor Front and which remain the backbone of industrial sociology. The second social finding involved the discovery of an urban form of organization which approximated the effects of the Nazi's rural resettlement program. From the 1934 Chicago Area Project designed by sociologist Clifford Shaw was born the notion of neighborhood or "community control" which today forms the basis of the Ford Foundation's "community development" strategy. (58)

On the basis of these studies and the meriads of others conducted in their mold, small group analyst, M. Olmstead suggests that the ideal form of society for the primary group would be, "primitive or peasant-communal societies." (59) Following this core conception of both Sorokin and Ludowici, primary group theorists universally propose that major social disturbances are reducible to disruptions in local, face-to-face relationships between individuals. These disruptions are, in turn, attributable to the effacement of primary group cohesion at the hands of the impersonal, urban mass-society. (60)

Increasingly, this definition of social crisis in conjunction with its crude solutions such as community control, communalism and sensitivity training have been abstracted from their more technical use in the research center and thrust into the forefront of academic sociology.

Therefore perhaps, sociologists and students who, under the influence of primary group theory, are now entertaining its anti-labor technologies will be startled into reassessment after the short but sordid history of its "foundation" use is laid bare.

Without question, the Ford Foundation's "community development" program has been the most active of these strategies. Its organizing perspectives rest on the notion of self-help, which is geared towards building a sense of community in urban slum areas in order to create either self-policing or voluntary labor institutions. According to Marshall B. Clinard, a sociologist and a community organizer for the Foundation, "with urbanization and urbanism" there "is a decline in effective communication among (primary group) members of urban society and its effect upon the social control of behavior." (61) The solution to this anomie according to Clinard, "involves two fundamental ideas, the development of an effective community feeling within the urban context and the development of self-help citizen participation." (62) Or again, Strength Through Joy.

During the period of war and depression, this tactic was used with some success in creating community councils (vigilante groups) in the Chicago area to police youth gangs. (63) Although many community developers report that the Chicago area was primed for voluntary labor institutions during that period, it was not until the late '50's when the strategy of self-help became the explicit interest of the Ford Foundation that actual voluntary labor organizations were successfully created. Since the early sixties, the notion of community development in conjunction with its broader academic representative "community action" have waged a polemic against the dominant functional techniques of urban renewal, welfare and social work and today have a broad campus following.

The Ford Foundation's initial interest in this remedy was produced by the effects of the 1957-58 recession. The capitalist class was in need of a free labor supply that could begin to construct a viable infrastructure (schools, housing, roads, rails and power sources) in the underdeveloped sector in order to ready it for a mass of capitalist indebtedness in the form of aging plant and equipment.

Thus in the period from 1958-65, the Ford Foundation showered the underdeveloped world with "community organizers." The purpose of the national programs created in India, Pakistan, Columbia, Ethiopia, Venezuela and the Philipines was to build a spiraling pool of unpaid labor in these ravaged slum sectors typified by Clinard's example, "In a Caracas slum Barrio La Linea, with a population of 25,000 people, 199 residents contributed nearly 2,000 hours of voluntary labor on sewer lines, water pipes, pavement of streets and home improvements." (64)

Although in both India and Pakistan, "community developers" were successful in organizing self-help institutions which attempted to reduce the literacy problem, the optimum effect of creating a multi-

national network of Strength Through Joy organs comparable to the Nazi Land or Labor Service did not materialize. (65)

CLASS WAR IN THE GHETTO

Therefore in the early 60's the Ford Foundation began to channel their community organizers in a new direction. On the back of Haryou and the Oakland Interagency Project, the Foundation funneled the idea of self-help into the major U.S. urban ghettos. (66) The urban ghetto presents a circumstance similar to the underdeveloped urban area. The depression-like conditions and the absence of any working-class defense institutions reveals an unorganized urban mass in constant anomie. It is only in this defenselessness, and institutionlessness that a community organizer can hope to build self-help organizations.

Both Mayo and Arnhold would stipulate that before these areas are ready for extensive looting, they must be socialized into a sense of cohesion on a neighborhood basis. The Ford Foundation mechanism for creating this pride in community is popularly known as community control, which has been most frequently expressed in the decentralization of city services into neighborhood branches.

The Foundation's early experience in the Oakland Project informed it that the, "neighborhood school would be the most appropriate and effective place for advancing the objectives of its (self-help) project." (67) The school provides one of the few consistent institutions in the otherwise disorganized slum, and therefore, it is an ideal location for establishing working primary group relations. Through the process of school board participation, not only is a new series of indigenous community leadership developed but the embryonic local board itself holds the potential of being transformed into a new form of hegemonic ghetto institution premised on the principles of Strength Through Joy. Once done, Clinard projects, "Such self help efforts may stimulate the building of roads, schools, and community facilities." (68) In scope, this strategy for organizing urban slave labor institutions surpasses even the relatively puny proscriptions of Rockefeller's brownie-point system.

While the community development approach has been unable to construct a lasting self-help device, it has created two conditions which are prerequisites for its future success. Firstly, it has been able to split off as Spengler would say "the respectable part of the working class" in the form of the Barakas and the Kahanes, and thus, has developed an international network of indigenous community organizers committed to the principles of Strength Through Joy.

Secondly, community development has demonstrated

its ability to loosen the grip of working-class organizations in urban areas by directing budding school boards in naked attacks on labor. This was exemplified in the 1968 New York City teachers' strike where Ford Foundation organizer Rhody McCoy in complicity with the Lindsay administration and the duped Communist Party directed a disoriented crowd of ghetto residents in a confrontation with the United Federation of Teachers.

Thus mimicking Spengler and Krupp, the Ford Foundation had devised a mechanism for breaking the organized urban mass. By creating and pitting urban communes centering around these local school boards against each other, class war could be transformed into communal or race war. Conceivably, a network of these neighborhood communes could virtually liquidate the hegemony of working-class defenses and thereby free urban areas in general for self-help programs.

That this strategy of community control is firmly entrenched in the same principles of the Nazi de-proletarianization program is further demonstrated by the fact that a faction within community development have been complaining that, "community development is not suited to urban areas because economic action on the neighborhood level is a practical impossibility when people work other than where they live," thereby indicating their preference for the Krupp form of company town. (69)

FROM STRIKEBREAKERS TO SUGGESTION TAKERS

Industrial sociology experienced a similar fate as community development immediately after the Second World War. Although Mayo's program for the re-organization of factory life was never instituted during the Depression and the War, his followers were able to launch a series of open attacks on all forms of working-class defense. In Roethlisberger's attack on the informal work-group which slows down productivity, in Warner's complaints about strikes in Yankee City and in Homans' naked attempts to bust wildcat strikes in Detroit near the end of the War, one point was made. (70) All asserted that these forms of working class protest would have never been exhibited were it not for the fact that employers had allowed pro-capitalist primary groups within the factory to dissipate.

Although prohibited from exerting their solution to this problem because of intensified urbanization and the growth of trade unions after the war, the Mayoist concept of industrial communalism remains the most intensely researched. From the school of "human relations" centered at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Mayo's ideas have spread to most major universities and research centers of the advanced capitalist sector. (71) However,

its central concept of a total factory institution which favors the Krupp settlement form of company town in order to effectively put programs for training and leisure-time across, has appeared harsh even to the more conservative faculty.

Thus, postwar shifts within the realm of productivity theory have not been a matter of principle but a question of tactics. Industrial sociologists have been faced with the problem of making their openly cannibalistic techniques acceptable to both academics and the working-class. In this context, the most widely read document to come out of the research center milieu, William H. Whyte Jr.'s *The Organization Man* was a polemic against the Mayoist conception of the worker and the manager, "The Harvard Business School, which almost grew old with human relations, has been using the word administrator less and the word leader more, and lately its best research seems directed at the matter of individual initiative more than group happiness." (72) Whyte's point is strategic. In a period of postwar prosperity and the proliferation of trade unions, the most effective mechanism for conjoling workers into higher productivity is the conception introduced by K. Lewin of increasing his feeling of individual participation and self-esteem. Lewin had simply presented a device for effecting a more sedate form of the Mayoist total integration. Thus, Shostak reports that businesses have, at the advice of productivity experts, added to the participatory device of the suggestion box, "The conscious manipulation of inflated job titles, support of male leadership posts, and maintenance of morale-boosting personnel programs." (73)

However, intensive Strength Through Joy research in the form of human relations and sociometry indicate that the relaxed participatory structures of "group dynamics" are only a matter of expediency. This contention is buoyed by the fact that Whyte and many Lewinites have joined with leading Mayoists and sociometrists for the purpose of solving governmental and industrial administrative problems in a group called the Society for Applied Anthropology. (74)

In the Society and in the Ford Foundation community development program, there exists a braintrust for instituting a strategy against labor far more advanced and comprehensive than that of the Nazi's. It is the very organizing principles of these two technologies that are being endorsed by broader layers of the sociological profession and its peripheries today.

FROM GOFFMAN TO SKINNER TO FOURIER

Of significance to the development of a theoretical justification for community control, communalism, etc. has been the growth in use of the industrial so-

ciological discipline of sociometry. Sociometry, which was designed by J. L. Moreno, the founder of sensitivity training (psychodrama), resurrects, in broad scope, the perspective of the early anarchists, particularly Fourier, for classroom sociologists who are independently moving towards a rediscovery of Fourier's principles.

Moreno restates Fourier's Strength Through Joy notion which calls for a universal Harmony of instincts, "It is important to know whether the construction of a community is possible, in which each of its members is to the utmost degree a free agent in the making of the collectives of which he is a part, and in which the different groups of which it consists are so organized and fitted to each other that an enduring and harmonious commonwealth is the result." (75) The device which aids the sociometrist in constructing his harmonious community is the sociogram. On it, all the instinctual attractions and repulsions detected among workers in a particular factory are mapped out. The sociometrist then manipulates these instinctual relationships in such a way as to form a web of reciprocal satisfactions.

However, sociometry has lacked both a precise determination of the sensuous and social content which are exchangeable among human beings, and an elaboration of the co-ordinative instincts which ultimately determine the nature of harmony.

Indispensable to a fuller sociometric elaboration in the academic sphere has been the popularity of a less severe primary group conception of society. In the late sixties, I. Goffman's pragmatism, which borrowed from Meade's central notion of the "generalized other" and Cooley's comparable concept of the "looking glass self," provided a link between decaying functionalism and radical utilitarian Strength Through Joy models.

Goffman postulates a non-integrated moral order in which the Kantian directive that ego accepts the attitudes of other, and the behaviorist notion that conditioned responses result from a single stimulus-response schema, appear to coalesce. Goffman's mentor Meade attempts to dispel the contentions of behaviorism by asserting, "Mental behavior is not reducible to non-mental behavior." (76) Yet, Meade turns around in the next breathe and challenges the Kantian model, "mental behavior or phenomena can be explained in terms of non-social behavior or phenomena." (77) Thus, the pragmatist social conception rests on a moral order which emerges out of a stimulus-response context and which is reducible to the terms of one-to-one primary relationships. Therefore, sociologists who have travelled through Goffman are either engaged in, or prepared for, attempts at determining the content of moral life by determining the stimuli which gave rise to it.

While the entire field has not yet approached Fourier's nine sensuous and social instincts and three co-ordinative instincts which coalesce in a world Harmony, brought about through the instrumentality of small communes, important steps have been taken in that direction.

Ironically, the leading figure in both the once hegemonic Kantian model of the Pareto Circle and today's radical utilitarianism has been Homans. By the early '60's he had fully adopted the principles of Skinner's behaviorist psychology, "I am convinced that it would turn out to contain the propositions of behaviorial psychology. I hold myself to be an ultimate psychological reductionist." (78) Thus in his exchange theory which is derived from behaviorism, Homans delineates in outline, very much as does sociometry, the precepts of a radical utilitarianism in which the stimulus-response schema determines what in effect is the moral order.

A much more sophisticated and powerful exchange theory was introduced by P. Blau in the early 60's. Besides the quality of instinctual social attraction, Blau incorporates emergent social qualities such as status and power in the pool of exchangeable commodities. The introduction of these two qualities bears importance because it defines a peculiarly petit-bourgeois set of social desires as exchangeable with the material requirements of human existence. The basis of the Nazi Labor Front involved just such a trade, where workers were adorned with communal and Volk status in exchange for higher productivity. This can also be seen in the concept of community control where qualities of power and status are accepted in exchange for unpaid labor.

While Blau's expanded notion of exchange approximates Fourier's conception of the sensual and social passions, and in so doing presents a theoretical justification for the technologies of the research foundations, an even broader collection of sociological literature has been dedicated to defining qualities of leadership and co-ordination. Of significance here has been the work of R. F. Bales at the Harvard Laboratory of Social Relations. Bales resurrects two of Fourier's co-ordinative or guidance functions which must be enforced if the small group is to maintain internal harmony. Leadership requires both task guidance which calculates means to group ends and socio-emotional guidance which organizes the group structure in order to obtain a high morale. (79)

In a period of economic depression, the activation of Bales' and Blau's concepts would legitimate actions duplicating those suggested by Kantian Strength Through Joy theorists. In a context of considerable anomie, Bales would rely on a managerial elite capable of coordinating high worker morale in line with the austerity requirements put forward by the task leader-

ship. This would be accomplished in the exchange of Blau's petit-bourgeois qualities of power and status for the worker's material standard of life.

That this is the practical orientation of utilitarian small group theory has already been demonstrated in the anti-labor exploits of sociometrists. Not only have they performed well as productivity experts but they even have devised an independent replica of the Ford Foundation's Self-Help policy exemplified in the standard study of the Regent Hill Housing Project conducted by Festinger and Kelly. (80)

While the theoretical elements required to form a complete utilitarian Strength Through Joy model remain dispersed when compared with the organized austerity perspectives of the research foundations, they are nevertheless moving towards a convergence as the anomic crisis thickens. Therefore, it should not be surprising to see broad layers of sociologists actively legitimizing austerity programs which sociologists themselves have created and organized. Thus, we should also be prepared to see a Strategy against Labor gaining a voice among academics, which will far outstrip its Nazi ancestor in computerized efficiency and organizational preparation.

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Concerning W. V. O. Quine

by Khushro Gandhi

Willard Van Orman Quine is the dean of the American school of philosophical "Know-Nothingism."

The young college freshman upon first reading Quine's writings, gets the distinct impression that philosophy is without a history, or at least, without a significant history. Aristotle is usually mentioned scornfully in connection with "essentialism." Platonic ideas are discussed, pro and con, but the examples are always drawn from Bertrand Russell. Kant is occasionally referred to in a general way, or else in connection with a pernicious dogma known as the "analytic-synthetic distinction." In fact, the only philosophies which Quine ever seems to mention in a very serious or sympathetic vein are twentieth century logicians, logical positivists, American pragmatists and British Empiricists.

One might reasonably expect that such a philosopher must offer a great freshness and breadth of vision, if he can so easily cut himself loose from the threads which otherwise bind philosophy to its past. One is completely disappointed. Behind the esoteric trimmings, the logical symbolism, the sentential jargon and the self-confident tone, Quine's viewpoint is a sophisticated version of "gutter philosophy." This is no slander, we have it on Quine's own authority: "...we (do not) attain to standards of evidence and reality different in kind from the vague standards of children and laymen. Science is not a substitute for common sense, but an extension of it. The quest for knowledge is properly an effort simply to broaden and deepen the knowledge which the man in the street enjoys..."(1)

So why concern ourselves with this poor professor? Why is it necessary to deal with this character?

Quine is a member of a red-baiting organization known as "The University Center for Rational Alternatives" (UCRA) which, in the name of academic freedom, strives to eliminate socialists and radicals from the campuses, because "such people are a priori incompetent." Perhaps not unrelated to this is Quine's endorsement of Behaviorism(2), an anti-human doctrine being used to justify the "brownie-point" system, planned as part of the New York City program of slave labor for welfare mothers. Behaviorism is also the theory behind a growing number of mentally destructive "reward and punishment" schemes being implemented as cost saving devices in public schools around the country. While educators will probably not be using pocket editions of Quine to support such proposals, people do turn to academic institutions to see what ideas are at least "reasonable." To the extent that doctrines such as Behaviorism are taken seriously and receive support from segments of the academic community, they also receive credibility as serious ideas outside the particular realm of the universities. In a period when austerity is the catchword, hitherto harmless theories such as Behaviorism become imminently dangerous.

So it is necessary to deal with this academic red-hunter. We shall demonstrate that Quine's peculiar kind of "philosophy" is not only wrong (he has a right to be wrong), but that it is not to be taken for serious scholarship of any kind. It could only be in the twentieth century, a century characterized by a wicked sort of philosophical amnesia, that a figure such as Quine could attain such prominence.

We should qualify our remarks to the effect that Quine is not the worst representative of contemporary pseudo-philosophy. He has contributed some creditable refutations of certain of the theories of Carnap and Ayer, two of the leading "Logical Positivists." Quine is a notch above the worst contemporary "logicians"; in the land of the blind, the one-eyed is king.

COMPARED WITH KANTIANISM

In order to place Quine in historical context, we will have to briefly outline certain aspects of Kant's philosophy.

One of the main difficulties in epistemology to which Kant addressed himself, was posed by the British Empiricists. How do we know the truth or reality of our ideas? How do we even know that objects exist? The problem is this: as individuals we do not know objects directly but only as mediated by the data of our senses. Thus, it seems that all we can really be certain of is sensation. The famous problem of induction is similar. The difficulty involved here is that induction, the formulation of generalized conclusions from a finite amount of data, is not apodictic, yet induction is apparently at the very foundations of science. Does this relegate our science to the realm of fantasy?

Kant attempted to solve these problems by positing an active synthesizing faculty in the mind. The content of knowledge was indeed sensation, but the forms of knowledge, such as intuitive notions of cause and effect, were supplied by the mind. The mind synthesized the raw data of sense perception into concepts.

Kant accepted, at least in this regard, an absolute schism between subject and object. Sensation without the categories of mind was raw, undigested content, and the categories of thought, without sensation, were airy constructs of pure form with no real substantiality. One need only interconnect the two, and what we call KNOWLEDGE resulted. Therefore, according to Kant, inductive conclusions about things such as cause and effect were necessary and correct, but only subjectively necessary, and subjectively correct — no objective reality could be accorded to such notions.

The problem posed by this absolute distinction between subject and object, or actually between form and content, was made immediately manifest in a series of paradoxes, or antinomies, which Kant discovered to be inherent in his system. All of the antinomies take the following form: unconditioned universals must exist, as for example the totality of the causal series in our perceptions, and thus must have a real, objective existence; yet, all of our perceptions of the world occur through discrete sense data, and these phenomena are finite, so on the other hand the world must be a conjunction of the limited.

Such contradictions are inherent in any formal approach of the Kantian type.

Quine's view of knowledge, though much less rigorous than Kant's, is in some ways the same. Quine also proceeds from an unbridgeable gulf between subject and object, form and content. For Quine, knowledge is like the field of a circle. On its periphery are sense data, in the center is logic. We adjust our ideas to fit sense data, as well as certain vague pragmatic criteria such as simplicity of the theory, conservatism, etc. The field must be taken as a whole which is composed of statements, which in turn are linked together by statements of logic. The ultimate content of ideas is sense data, but, Quine says, the entire field is "underdetermined" by sense data, meaning that sense data alone are not enough to explain our theories. Hence, Quine views knowledge as a conglomerate of formal superstructures imposed on the data, superstructures whose only criteria are coherence with the data on the one hand, and simplicity and conservatism on the other. Thus scientific theories, our ideas of "object," "time," "space," etc., are really no different from myths; the difference is only a matter of degree.

So far we have noted similarities between Kant and Quine. The differences, however, are much more significant. In almost every major respect, Quine's differences with Kant were first formulated in the early 1800's by the German philosopher Rheinhold. Both Quine and Rheinhold subscribe to Kant's regressive side, the separation of form and content, and then proceed to systematically ignore the problems inherent in this view, displaying a paranoic fear of the truth. Their views are thus a step back from the Kantian philosophy. In their attempt to protect themselves, both Quine and Rheinhold stress the most rudimentary formal side of Kant. Both, for example, pretend that Kant's antinomies do not exist, or if they do exist, that they are not significant (see below).

A singular peculiarity of Kant's work, is that it proceeds as an examination of knowledge, on the premise that we must first grasp the instrument, knowledge, before we can be certain in its application. This implies formalism, since we are studying knowledge as pure form, as it is per se, prior to its concrete content. The obvious fallacy of this approach is that to know about knowledge is itself an act of knowledge. Philosophizing precedes philosophy.

In the face of this difficulty, both Quine and Rheinhold attempt to turn epistemology into empirical psychology. This does not, however, represent an attempt to honestly come to grips with the problem, but rather a retreat from it. One might rightfully ask then, what is the epistemological basis of psychol-

ogy? To this Quine answers that epistemology IS empirical psychology, and that is that! (3)

It is instructive to note what Quine says about the problem of induction. Quine endorses Hume's view that induction has no certainty to it, and that our use of it is primarily a matter of custom. He adds that generalizations, universals, are simpler entities to handle conceptually, and thus have a certain pragmatic value. He can not even ensure the subjective necessity of certain kinds of induction, as did Kant, let alone its objective reality. It is hard to imagine that Quine is doing anything more here than playing the artful dodge.

The complete inadequacy of this solution, especially when it is put forward after Hegel and Marx have written, is best illustrated if we rephrase the problem.

On the one hand it is obviously true that induction is not a certain method: particular theories are always being superseded by new ones historically, and besides, if induction were a certain method it would mean that change would be impossible. But on the other hand, the very fact of human existence proves that in some sense our theories are correct, that they do reflect the laws of the universe, that they do comprehend natural necessity in effect. The very fact that human beings exist, and exist on the basis of practice which is informed by theories about the world, proves this.

About this paradox which is so critical to the very existence of the human species, and the very heart of the "problem of induction," Quine has very little to say.

THE NOTION OF THE SELF

One of Kant's central concerns was the thinking 'I'. We have particular sensations and particular thoughts, and these are real phenomena. But what connects this sensation with that sensation, this thought with that thought? There must be some faculty, some universal, which synthesizes these into a single manifold. For Kant, this was the universal 'I'. All of our thoughts and sensations do not occur just anywhere, but in a single subject, and thus this 'I' is the ultimate synthesis and unity of these distinct thoughts. All thought is implicitly accompanied by the 'I think'.

The 'I' has historically been of central concern to philosophers since Kant: Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, the existentialists, and Freudian and Gestalt psychologists. Even such fanatical indifferentists as Watson and Skinner have at least considered the problem. No matter what one's own outlook may be, one can not ignore the problem. Quine ignores it, and from the standpoint of his own safety, with good reason.

For Quine, universals are arrived at purely formal-

ly, either by a listing of the constituent fragments, or else by a simple process of induction. The only purpose of universals is to simplify the thought process. So how could Quine possibly deal with the universal 'I'? Do I enumerate a concept of 'I'? Or do I form a concept of 'I' in order to make my thought processes simpler? Do I arrive at 'I' by a simple process of induction? It would all become an impossible muddle; Quine would probably have to say, in the end, that the 'I' is an innate metaphysical quality possessed by the newborn infant — an instinct — in much the same way as the Church Fathers might have responded.

Hegel, describing Rheinhold (the foundational tendency), delivers an admirable description of Rheinhold's latter-day echo, Quine:

"The foundational tendency, the philosophizing before philosophy has finally come to express itself completely. It has found exactly what was at issue: it is the conversion of philosophy into the formal side of cognition, into logic.

"While the philosophy as a whole founds itself and the reality of its knowledge, both in terms of its form and its content, upon itself, the foundational tendency in its frenzied scurrying to and fro of the Verifying and Analysing and the Because and the In What Respect and When and In So Far — neither gets out of itself nor into philosophy. To the spineless timidity which in its officiousness constantly builds itself up, all inquiries come too early and every beginning is an anticipation much as every philosophy is a preliminary exercise. Science maintains that it founds itself upon itself by positing each of its parts as absolutes and that in this way it constitutes in the beginning, and in every single point an identity and a knowledge; as objective totality knowledge increasingly provides its own basis in the process of its further development, and its parts are well founded only simultaneously with this whole of (the results of) cognition. Center and circle are related to each other in such a way that the first beginning of the circle is already a relation to the center, and the latter is not a complete center if not all of its relations, the whole circle, have been completed — a whole which is no more in need of a specific handle for founding it than the earth is in need of a specific handle in order to be seized by the force which leads it around the sun, and at the same time holds it in the whole living manifold of its forms." (4)

Quine's shockingly ignorant and irresponsible attitude of indifference towards serious topics of epistemology is most strikingly documented by his careless approach towards the fundamental problems posed in

the realm of mathematical logic, one of his supposed fields of expertise.

MATHEMATICAL LOGIC: PRELIMINARIES

During the last half of the nineteenth century, Georg Cantor developed his theory of infinite aggregates, a theory whose historical importance can not be overestimated. It is indispensable to a great many areas of mathematics, and indirectly to physics.

Generally stated, Cantor showed that there were different orders of infinity, in much the same way as there are different finite numbers, and that, in fact, infinite aggregates do have different cardinal and ordinal numbers, what are called 'transfinite' numbers.

One of his fundamental accomplishments was to actually show two aggregates of different number, and prove that one was of a higher order than the other. The least order of infinity is what is called a 'denumerable' infinity. All of the counting numbers form an aggregate of this type, as do all of the rational numbers. Cantor assigns a higher cardinal number to sets which are isomorphic (formally equivalent) to the real number line, including, most importantly, the geometrical continuum (line, plane, etc.). This is known as a 'non-denumerable' infinity.

If the members of two aggregates can be put into a one to one correspondence they are said to have the same 'power', or to be equivalent. The difference between the two orders of infinity can be put thus: We can define an iterative procedure such that if we had forever we could count ALL of the members of a denumerably infinite set such as the counting numbers; however, even if we had forever, we could NOT define any such simple method of enumeration for a NON-DENUMERABLY INFINITE SET which would not inevitably miss members of that set.

There is no simple iterative counting procedure which can account for all of the members of a non-denumerable aggregate, e.g., all of the real numbers or all of the points on a line. Furthermore, if we try to arrange a one to one correspondence between the two types of infinite aggregates, we will always have members of the non-denumerable infinity left over, and an infinite number at that. Finally it should be noted that the denumerable infinity, the smallest transfinite cardinal number (finite cardinal numbers are numbers such as 1,2,3 etc.) is not the last in a series of finite cardinals, but rather a designation which is applied to the set of ALL counting numbers, ALL rational numbers, etc. (5)

The development of formal set theory in the

twentieth century was in large part motivated by a desire on the part of figures such as Bertrand Russell to render (a version of) Cantor's theorems derivable on the basis of some sort of formal axiom system. This project has led to a number of fundamental and devastating paradoxes (or antinomies) which have irrevocably shaken the very foundations of the endeavor. Unfortunately, many logicians, among whom Guine is prominent, have chosen to completely ignore the implications of these paradoxes, and have blithely continued in the endeavor as if they did not exist.

In fact, the paradoxes are the most significant results of formal logic! Some examples of the kind of paradoxes generated are: "This sentence is false" or "I am a liar." In both cases if the statement is true it is false, and if false, true. Another such paradox is one which Bertrand Russell proposed in 1918 as the kind of paradox which he himself discovered in his formalization of set theory: in a village there is a barber, now this barber shaves all and only those men who do not shave themselves. The question is: does the barber shave himself? The barber can shave himself if and only if he does not shave himself! The parallel between this paradox of the barber and Russell's mathematical paradox is exact. This is a paradox fundamental to the set-theoretic notions of "class" and "membership."

It is in general clear as to whether or not a class is a member of itself. The class of all apples is clearly not an apple. However, Russell found a class where the question can not be answered: is the class of all classes that are not members of themselves a member of itself? It can only be a member of itself if it is not and vice versa. This is similar to a paradox discovered by Cantor: if, for every class, there is a larger class (a theorem which Cantor proved), then what about the class of all classes?

Kurt Godel's incompleteness theorems are based on a similar paradox. Godel proved that no deductive system with axioms however arbitrary, is capable of embracing among its theorems all the truths of the elementary arithmetic of positive integers unless it discredits itself by letting slip some of the falsehoods too. Godel showed how, for any given deductive system, he could construct a "sentence" of elementary number theory that would be true if and only if not provable in that system. Every such system is therefore either incomplete, in that it misses a relevant truth, or else bankrupt, in that it proves a falsehood. (6)

"THE WAYS OF PARADOX"

Any student with a competent education in philosophy and the fundamental problems it has historically concerned itself with, and Cantor was such a person, would be forced into recognition of the close parallels

between the paradoxes of mathematical logic and the antinomies which Kant elaborated in "The Critique of Pure Reason." Furthermore, even just historically, the problems posed by those antinomies were fundamental for the development, out of Kant, of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx.

Kant begins from a basic separation between experience, which occurs in the form of discrete sensory events, on the one hand, and the formal faculty of reason on the other. The job of reason and the understanding is then, as separate and external agencies, to introduce unity and coherence into the chaos of sensation *per se*.

Out of this endeavor arise the antinomies, seemingly unanswerable questions posed by Kant's formal system, such as "FREEDOM" and DETERMINISM, DISCRETENESS and CONTINUITY, etc. What the antinomies prove is the impossibility of any formal or mechanistic consistency between universals and particulars. The paradoxes arise "when attempting to think the unconditioned in a causal series." (7) As we shall see, this is precisely the problem posed by Godel's result and the various paradoxes of formal logic. Kant, taking these results in dead seriousness, as is their due, was compelled to attempt a solution, or else admit the intrinsic weakness of his system.

Quine's procedure when faced with a similar situation, is to recognize that the paradoxes exist, acknowledge that they pose something of a problem, and then ask them to go away.

He exposes his views on the subject of paradoxes in a self-contradictory piece entitled "The Ways of Paradox." (8) In this essay, Quine produces a marvelous display of fancy footwork, which takes him nowhere.

To begin with, he introduces his reader to certain subtle distinctions. There are really three kinds of paradoxes: "veridical" paradoxes, "falsidical" paradoxes, and antinomies.

"Veridical" paradoxes are "truth-telling," and "falsidical" paradoxes are, we are to assume, "falsehood-telling." Antinomies are paradoxes which "produce a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and hence forward be avoided or revised." (9)

Quine then gives examples of these three varieties of paradoxes. An example of a "falsidical" paradox is the classic misproof that 2 equals 1, which is based on the fallacy of dividing by "x-1". He also includes Zeno's famous paradoxes in this category. As an example of a "veridical" paradox we have the afore-

mentioned "Barber paradox," since the solution to this paradox, according to Quine, is that there is no such barber. Therefore this paradox, supposedly, merely establishes the true fact that no village contains such a barber. Godel's incompleteness theorems are also classified as "veridical." "Russell's paradox" is an example of an antinomy.

What should we make of all this? Let us momentarily leave out Zeno's paradoxes, since Quine gives an account of them which is simply false. Let us also leave aside such things as the proof that 2 equals 1, since this is just a trick, and no paradox at all. What do we have left?

Godel's theorems and the "Barber's paradox" are "veridical," and Russell's paradox is an antinomy. Yet Russell (and even Quine) say that the "Barber's paradox" and "Russell's paradox" are EXACTLY parallel paradoxes. Furthermore, Godel's theorems are really in all relevant respects similar to these two paradoxes.

Quine's subtle distinctions are utterly trivial. Quine thinks he knows what Godel proved (it says so in the theorem), and it is an easy matter in everyday life to avoid the troublesome "barber." Quine thinks then, that he can draw true statements from these paradoxes ("veridical"). So why is "Russell's paradox" different? Simply because Quine has no idea what it means (antinomy)! And what are the philosophical lessons Quine would have us draw from these startling paradoxes? "...In a future century...perhaps we can begin to see Russell's paradox as no more than a veridical paradox, showing that there is no such class as that of non-self-members. One man's antinomy can be another man's veridical paradox, and one man's veridical paradox can be another man's platitude." (10)

Of Godel's incompleteness theorems he mutters, a little awe-stricken: "Like any veridical paradox, this one we can get used to, thereby gradually sapping its quality of paradox, But this one takes some sapping. And mathematical logicians are at it, most assiduously." (11)

GODEL AND THE PARADOXES

The formalists wished to develop a consistent formal system within which all of the truths of mathematics could be proven. Godel showed the futility of any such program. We should remark here on two different types of logic. First-order logic is both complete and sound; that is, all of its logically true statements are provable, and whatever is provable is a logical truth. In second-order logic we can talk of ALL numbers or ALL men, and once again we have the problem which resulted in Kant's antinomies,

the problem of the relation of universals to particulars — whose solution necessarily transcends the bounds of any formal system.

In particular, Godel brought out this difficulty in formal arithmetic. If we wish to axiomatize arithmetic in a useful way, we must be able to prove statements about ALL of the subsets of the real numbers (a non-denumerable infinity). This requires a SECOND-ORDER axiom, the axiom of mathematical induction, since we are making use of general terms or universals. Godel showed that while this system could be complete, it was also inconsistent since we could then prove statements of the form "This sentence is not provable" which is contradictory! If, however, we eliminate the troublesome axiom, and replace it with a weaker axiom which does not make use of general terms, and leave ourselves with a first-order arithmetic, then we will always have true statements which we can not prove, such as "This sentence is not provable."

This is really very elementary, when one considers that the real numbers form a non-denumerable infinite, but when we limit ourselves to a first-order system without universal terms, we can at most enumerate a countable infinity of theorems, and would necessarily leave certain theorems out.

The fundamental predicament involved here, a predicament involved in all formal systems, is the use of two contradictory axiomatic assumptions. The first axiom-type assumes the self-evidence of some particular kind of construct. Such constructs subsist in-themselves, apart from any relations to other constructs. The second axiom-type assumes some kind of effective relations between the various constructs. Obviously the two are mutually destructive. (12)

This is the thrust of Kant's antinomies, which Kant recognized. This is also the thrust of Godel's proof and the various paradoxes of formal logic; but to this Quine is blind, making him decidedly pre-Kantian, at best. At best because at least the pre-Kantians, unlike Quine, had not had the advantage of Kant's work.

The fundamental contradiction can be phrased as a distinction between the object-in-itself, and the decision as to the object's truth or falsehood. In logic this is an ABSOLUTE distinction. For this reason paradoxes often take the form of a statement whose self-evident quality is a NEGATIVE statement about its own truth-status. The paradox arises when we attempt to externally determine its truth nature.

The statement "This sentence is false" has the "property" of a NEGATIVE statement about its own truth nature — that it is not truthful. When we then

introduce an external truth relation, we contradict this "essence." Given some form of identity axiom, A equals A (self-evidence), the initial statement must be equivalent to itself, and so should be its truth value.

However, we now see that the identity relation is not a simple unmediated relation, but rather is necessarily mediated through the external truth relation. For, to determine if A equals A, if the subject is self-identical and exists in-itself, we must move through the predicate. That is, we must ask "Is 'This sentence is false' true?" But whether the answer is "yes" or "no," the mediation of the external truth determination has utterly destroyed, and in fact contradicts the self-evidence of the subject sentence. THIS IS A NECESSARY RESULT OF FORMAL LOGIC.

This basic antinomy is made strikingly clear in Cantor's paradox.

On the one hand we are forced to believe that each and every class is conditioned in relation to other classes, the condition being that there is always a class larger than any given class. On the other hand, we take each class to be a self-evident class, and in particular, we take the universal class of ALL classes as UNCONDITIONED or SELF-EVIDENT. There is no larger class. But this contradicts the assumption that each class is conditioned in relation to other classes.

"It (the object or construct) is, however, a thing, a self-existent 'one,' only so far as it does not stand in relation to others. For in this relation, the connection with another is rather the point emphasized, and connection with another means giving up self existence, means ceasing to have a being on its own account. It is precisely through the absolute character and its opposition that the thing relates itself to others, and is essentially this process of relation, and only this. The relation, however, is the negation of its independence and the thing collapses through its own essential property." (13)

Now what was it Quine had to tell us about Godel's theorems? "Like any veridical paradox, this is one we can get used to, thereby sapping its quality of paradox. But this one takes some sapping..." (14)

And indeed it does!

THE AMBIGUITY OF MEMBERSHIP

What Quine has completely glossed over in "The Ways of Paradox," a piece of protective camouflage, is the fundamental problem of the relation of uni-

versal to particular as posed by the paradoxes. Kant recognized this years ago, but Quine, years later, remains oblivious.

The theory of aggregates rightfully makes use of both universals and particulars. (15) Universals in set theory take the form of sets or classes of individuals (either particulars or other sets). The relation of universal to particular is expressed by the notion of 'membership.' "John is a member of the set of all men" and "One is a member of the set of all numbers." The endemic ambiguity of the notion of membership (and also of 'class') is illustrated by the following question: are all eggs, eggs, because they are members of the set of all eggs? Or are they members of the set of all eggs because they are eggs? This dilemma should not be unexpected. What Kant has shown is that the attempt to formalize the relation between universals and particulars must lead to paradoxes, so that from the formal point of view, membership (and class) remain inherently ambiguous notions.

According to the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, every formal system expressed in the first order functional calculus has a denumerable model — can be mapped — onto the integers. This creates certain difficulties, since, in particular, the general theory of sets as axiomatized has a denumerable model; yet in part this theory was designed to formalize Cantor's arguments, one of which is that the continuum is non-denumerably infinite! It would appear, then, that there is a correlation between those sets which form a continuum and the integers. Denumerable models for set theory do exist, having all of the axiomatic properties of membership — but none of these IS class membership (which must have a non-denumerable field). Set theory IS set theory only as long as we have the "intuition" of membership. No first-order formalism can force an interpretation (the "meaning" given to formal symbols) as a relation to a universal, or aggregate, which is not iteratively specifiable. (16)

Let us see what Quine's spiritual father and the founder of formal set theory, Bertrand Russell, has to say:

"CLASS may be defined either extensionally or intensionally. That is to say, we may define the kind of object which is a class, or the kind of concept which denotes a class: this is the precise meaning of the opposition of extension and intension in this connection. But although the general notion can be defined in this manner, particular classes, except when they happen to be finite, can only be defined intensionally, i.e. as the objects denoted by such and such concepts. I believe this distinction to be purely psychological: logically, the extensional definition appears to be equally applicable to infinite classes, but practically, if we were to attempt it, Death would cut short our

laudable endeavor before it had attained its goal." (17)

Further on, he says:

"A class, we agreed, is essentially to be interpreted in extension, it is either a single term, or that kind of combination of terms which is indicated when terms are connected by the word AND. But practically, though not theoretically, this purely extensional method can only be applied to finite classes." (18)

And finally:

"But it is more correct, I think, to infer an ultimate distinction between a class as many and a class as one, to hold that the many are only many, and are not also one." (19)

What Russell neglects here are sets with an uncountable infinity of members. The members of such a set could in no way be accounted for by a process of "pointing out" the members one by one — even if we had forever. What is important about such a set, such a universal, is that neither it nor the things which are its members, are specifiable (even "theoretically") by a formal process of iteration. Rather, these must be given "all at once" or not at all.

Let us now turn to Cantor, who was well aware of the dialectic of Kant and Hegel.

"By a manifold or aggregate I understand generally any multiplicity which can be thought of as one, that is to say, any totality of definite elements which can be bound up into a whole by means of a law." (20)

and:

"An aggregate of elements belonging to any sphere of thought is said to be 'well-defined' when in consequence of its definition and of the logical principal of the excluded middle, it must be considered as intrinsically determined whether an object belonging to this sphere belongs to the aggregate or not, and secondly, whether two objects belonging to the aggregate are equal or not, in spite of formal differences in the manner in which they are given. In fact, we cannot, in general, effect in a sure and precise manner the determinations with the means at our disposal; but here it is only a question of INTRINSIC determinations, from which an actual or extrinsic determination is to be developed by perfecting the auxiliary means." (21)

One of the central concerns of Cantor was the problem of "good" and "bad" infinity (sometimes called ACTUAL and POTENTIAL infinity). The BAD

or POTENTIAL infinity is an infinity which increases or decreases beyond all limits. BADINFINITES (Hegel's term) are infinities of the form "1,2,3..."; that is, we indicate an iterative procedure for specifying certain objects, and then we carry it out, at least "theoretically," forever and forever, and.... The GOOD or ACTUAL infinity is a real existent aggregate.

The difference is expressed by two ways to indicate a line. The way of bad infinity is to begin to list the points, one by one. The way of good infinity is to indicate the entire line all at once. The bad infinity is only potentially infinite, since at any given time we've still only iterated a finity, and do not have an actual infinite.

Most mathematicians and philosophers prior to Cantor felt they had proved the impossibility of actual infinity, but, as Cantor showed, this was possible only because they attributed to actual infinities all of the properties of finite numbers. Two other philosophers, however, did recognize the existence and the importance of actual infinity. These two were Spinoza and Hegel, two key figures in the development of the dialectical method. Cantor's work is in fact, a contribution to the Hegelian dialectic. Cantor took infinity not merely in the form of the infinitely increasing, and in the closely connected form of the convergent series, but he also fixed it mathematically by numbers in the definite form of the completed infinite — of an actual infinite universal.

ZENO'S PARADOXES

We are now ready to handle Zeno's paradoxes. Take the one about Achilles and the tortoise. If the tortoise has the head start, the paradox says that no matter how fast Achilles runs, he will never overtake the tortoise, since every time Achilles has reached the spot where the tortoise was, the tortoise has moved to another spot, and so on forever. This paradox is the same as Kant's antinomy of discreteness and continuity.

Quine calls this a "falsidical" paradox because:

"When we try to make this argument more explicit, the fallacy that emerges is the mistaken notion that any infinite succession of intervals of time has to add up to all eternity. Actually when an infinite succession of intervals of time is so chosen that the succeeding intervals become shorter and shorter, the whole succession may take either a finite or an infinite time. It is a question of a convergent series." (22)

A convergent series is a form of bad infinity. It is an infinite series whose sum, or limit, is a finite number, e.g., the sum of the infinite series $1/2$,

$1/4, 1/8 \dots$ is one. Quine and Russell both think that all that is required is that the times of the various segments of Achilles' run form such a convergent series, and then Achilles will pass the tortoise within a finite amount of time. According to Quine, the trouble with poor Zeno was that he did not know enough mathematics!

In his own incomparable manner, our glib formalist has managed to smugly ignore the thousands of years of history behind this problem, and most astonishingly, he manages to get away with it, thanks to the barren contemporary philosophical atmosphere he has himself done so much to propagate. In fact the real solution is provided in the cohering dialectical developments of Aristotle, Hegel and Cantor — which solution Quine unconsciously presupposes in order to make his convergent series argument hold water!

Aristotle pointed out that time and space are not infinitely divided, but are only potentially so, they are divisible yet not divided. In Hegel's terms this view of divisibility as potentiality is one in which there is continuity, but where the point is preserved as a moment, not in-and-for-itself. The trouble with our naive conception of "half" is that the conception of the "half" when applied to a continuum implies THE INTERRUPTION OF CONTINUITY. It is false to talk about "reaching" a given position when motion is involved, SINCE WHAT IS IMPLIED IS THE REACHING OF THE DISCONTINUOUS.

For Aristotle as well as Hegel, motion implies connection. If we represent space and time to ourselves as infinitely divided, we have an infinitude of points, but continuity is present as the space which comprehends them. Once again we have the distinction between the actual infinite universal, and bad or potential infinity.

In Cantor we have this same notion in the actually infinite aggregate. Such actual universals can in no way be specified by a process of adding the elements one by one but must be taken "all at once." Cantor showed that the bad infinite implied by a function presupposes the actual infinite of the range of variables, in some cases. Zeno's paradox is such a case, though Quine is certainly not aware of it. Quine's convergent series assumes the good infinity of the entire run of Achilles.

Cantor showed that to assert continuity is to assert the existence of good infinity, a non-denumerable universal. While points may be said to exist as the smallest entities, they are quite abstract when taken in-and-for-themselves. In fact, if we do take them singly, as Quine thinks he can do, we have asserted

the negation of good infinity — and hence continuity — since with a collection of individual points, points taken purely in-themselves, one can at most specify a bad infinity, and thus we could never enumerate a continuum. In fact, Cantor showed, a bad infinity of points will always be zero-dimensional!

Aristotle's correct (but incomplete) solution to the "Achilles paradox" is simple: the overtaking of the tortoise must be taken prior to the half. This follows directly from Aristotle's notion of "primary time." As Aristotle says "...the time in which a change has been completed cannot be divisible..." (23) Aristotle is saying that the time taken by a CONTINUOUS change is primary for that change and can not be broken down into separate changes.

If we take Quine at his word and deny him any notion of "primary time" or the actually infinite universal of the entire run, his convergent-series nonsense collapses. Granted, the sum or limit of a convergent series is finite, the problem now becomes "Can Achilles PERFORM this infinite series?"

We can easily show the absurdity of Quine's view if we break down the convergent series of Achilles' run by placing rests between each element of the series, i.e., $1/2$, rest, $1/4$, rest, $1/8$ We thus make the run discontinuous — a real bad infinity. Now, if the rests do not form a convergent series, their sum is infinite, and Zeno was correct! So let us make the rests also form a convergent time series, i.e., run $1/2$, rest $1/2$, run $1/4$, rest $1/4$, run $1/8$ Now Achilles will take twice as long, but he will still pass the tortoise. But wait! If this model is correct, Achilles must constantly change from full speed run to rest, and from rest to full speed run INSTANTANEOUSLY. But this is impossible (see Zeno's "arrow paradox"). So now we must add two more divisions, the time for deceleration and acceleration, i.e., full run, deceleration, rest, acceleration, full run.... Now all of these must also form a convergent series. But wait! Achilles still makes an instantaneous change from full run to deceleration, and from deceleration to rest, etc. If we continue in this manner, we see that the problem will go on and on, ad "bad" infinitum, and Quine, like the lumbering, oafish Herakles, will ax one of the Hydra's heads only to find two more grow in its place.

THE TRAVESTY OF LOGIC

The VERY FIRST WORDS of Kant's 1783 "Critique of Pure Reason" are: "Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer." Contrast Kant's view of antinomy with Quine's. Quine might, at least out of shame or scholarly respect

for his field, refrain from public displays of his sheer quackery.

Quine's belief that mathematics can be reduced to logic is little more than a crude epistemological prejudice as to the fundamental and truthful nature of logic. Quine, cognizant of the difficulties involved in proving such a thesis, asserts that logical truths are really inseparable from all other realms of knowledge. Nevertheless, what is proven by his crude circle analogy is just that: logic is at the center of the circle, and is least likely to change, and furthermore, whatever the particular logic involved, it is fundamental insofar as it provides the basic "connectors" which link the various statements in the field of the circle.

In that same essay, "The Ways of Paradox," the only solution offered, beyond warm assurances that we will get used to these troublesome paradoxes, is Russell's "theory of types" or some version thereof (of which Quine has contributed a few). The fundamental import of the "theory of types," as well as the various axiomatizations of set theory, is to make a certain class of statements illegal (ungrammatical) BY FIAT! Of course, this class of statements includes the paradoxes. Quine tells us that while this may not fit our intuitive notions, we must be prepared to drop our intuitive notions in the INTERESTS OF SCIENCE,

and — he intuits — BESIDES, WE WILL GET USED TO IT. This is little better than demagoguery, since the "theory of types" was concocted to ELIMINATE paradoxes — which are NOT common-sensical — in order to preserve the sanctity of logical consistency, which is nothing but the most abstract version of "common sense" in capitalist society.

Hegel, from his discussion of Rheinhold, serves to peg down Quine for what he is:

"But the foundational activity is concerned to always look for a handle and to make an approach in the direction of the living philosophy; it makes this approach the true work, and by its principles it makes it impossible to arrive at knowledge and philosophy. Logical cognition, if it really proceeds to (the level of) reason, must be led to the result that in reason it destroys itself; it must recognize antinomy as its supreme law. In Rheinhold's theme, the application of thought, thought as the infinite repeatability of A as A in A and A through A also becomes antinomical when A in the application is de facto posited as B. But this antinomy exists in an entirely unconscious and unrecognized state, for thought, its application, and its matter stand peacefully next to each other." (24)

Thought, as abstract unity, is merely formal.

If we have a collection of, say five pennies, it is possible to deal with this collection purely EXTENSIONALLY for two, interrelated reasons: 1) we can enumerate a finite number of distinct members and 2) the process which determines "penny nature" is not significant to the collection. However, when we are concerned with points on a continuum, the continuum is a universal which we must take into account when dealing with points, it is essential to the very meaning of "point," for the determination of point-nature. This is because the continuum, or the antinomy of discreteness and continuity, is nothing but the reflexion into the abstract realm of formal mathematics, of the antinomy of freedom and necessity, an antinomy where the problem of how one moves from particular to universal is vital to the very being of the human species. But the solution to this antinomy, as also with the solution to the paradoxes of formal logic, lies not in the formal realm (since it is that realm, taken in-itself, which generates the paradoxes) but rather in the arena of real processes, in the realm of human practice.

Kant, in his own way, realized this, and after the "Critique of Pure Reason" he turned to an examination of "Practical" reason.

What Quine's hackneyed "philosophy" utterly fails to perceive, is the creative, noetic element. Cantor called the process of proof METAPHYSICAL, meaning thereby that proof is something which lies outside the realm of formal logic. As Marxists, we do not disagree that new knowledge implies new forms of knowledge, but we are not content to merely note and systematize them. The real question is how new knowledge, and with it new forms of knowledge, are CREATED — which is a process which must be examined for coherence, and that they have a CREATOR who must be accounted for. The barber in the "Barber's paradox" DOES EXIST; he is none other than the creative mathematician. The paradoxes prove that nobody could do even logic logically. IF THIS WERE NOT THE CASE, BETTER DISPENSE WITH MATHEMATICIANS — COMPUTERS WOULD DO THE JOB BETTER!

PARROT TALK

Quine does not limit his sterile formalism to the field of logic. He has extended this method to the study of language as well.

Quine's main point about language has come to be known as the "radical intranslatability of language." For Quine, "language" is in most respects equivalent to "theory," so that Quine's principle could be rephrased as "the radical intranslatability of theory." If a linguist were dropped among a newly discovered tribe whose language had no common roots with any

other known language, and there were no known dictionaries for the new language, how would he begin the job of learning it? According to Quine, who clearly has no idea of what such a task is really like, he would have to work on the basis of "behavioral criteria" alone. The insurmountable problem faced is that "behavioral criteria" are not sufficient to determine all of the objects referred to by a language (or the full interpretation of a theory).

Thus, the linguist might translate a certain native word as "rabbit" which might really mean "undetached rabbit parts" for the native speaker, because the two terms cannot be distinguished on the basis of "behavioral criteria," and so the linguist would naturally translate the native word as "rabbit," since that makes the most sense in his own language.

Thus the translation of specific words, sentences and phrases must remain referentially indeterminate. The only criterion for a good translation is such that in every respect it is in agreement with the behavioral responses of native speakers. There is no FORMAL guarantee that the objects and the "meanings" given to specific words and sentences REALLY represent a correct translation of native objects and meanings.

Purely negatively, this is Quine's commendable refutation of the positivist's "verification theory" of meaning. But positively, Quine's method is utterly repugnant, and falls into much the same kinds of dilemmas as we noted earlier in regard to formal logic. Of course there can be no FORMAL guarantee that we have correctly specified the objects of a language or theory — the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem should warn us of that! The only way to really grasp the ultimate hopelessness of Quine's approach is to see where he himself finally arrives. (25)

Quine himself realizes that his theories finally arrive at complete subjectivism. How can I possibly know what someone else thinks? How do I know that what is red for me is red for someone else? Even if that someone speaks my language, this remains apparently the case. Even though our use of language may agree in all formal and behavioral respects, how can I know for sure that the objects our languages or theories refer to are the same? In fact, how do I know what the objects referred to by MY theory are? After all of the scornful comments which Quine flings at the subjectivism of "mentalism" in his earlier book "Word and Object," his own behaviorism leads into the same subjectivist morass.

Quine treats language in the same way he treats mathematical logic. For Quine, if no formal criterion exists there can be no real criterion at all, just various fudges of a pragmatic type. For Quine,

language is just another kind of formal system. Form and content are in both cases absolutely separate.

In a logic we have a series of sentences, theorems, etc. These are taken to be meaningless. We then specify meanings for the various terms of the theory — the objects or content of the theory. Any set of objects we specify which makes all the theorems true is said to be a true interpretation of the formalism — and there are an infinite number of true interpretations for any particular formalism.

Quine applies exactly the same structure and distinctions to human language, a tool of creative human culture. We have various statements in a language which when translated (which implies interpretation) must "behave" in the same way as the original language. If this is in fact the case, we have a correct interpretation or translation of the language. But just as in any axiomatic system there are many interpretations which fit the bill, and there is no way to determine from a formal standpoint, which is Quine's standpoint, whether one is more or less accurate than another.

This should come as no surprise, for form taken purely in-itself, formalism, has no intrinsic connection to anything other, such as content, and cannot tell us about anything but itself as it exists for itself. The mere form of the language, aside from specifying certain broad limits, is indifferent to the objects or the content of its application. Language, like logic, is reduced to a merely formal unity and order — but this can be nothing in-itself. Since its reality lies outside and is distinct from its object, it is purely subjective; it is nothing but pure identity with itself.

In the final analysis, Quine is reduced to his thesis of "ontological relativity." (26)

According to this theory, we can only specify the objects of a theory relative to the objects of a larger theory (language), and the objects of this theory in turn can only be specified relative to the objects of a larger theory, and the objects of this theory, in turn, can only be specified relative to a further, more general theory, and so on ad infinitum. This solution is dictated by Quine's formal notion of language and theory, which does not admit of the possibility of any kind of self-reflexive process conception.

The problem is childishly obvious to anyone who has ever considered any formal axiomatization. We have certain axioms and definitions. How do we justify them? If we get a reason, the reason is based on assumptions, and we then ask how, in turn, these assumptions are justified and so on ad infinitum — or else we just stop asking questions at a certain point and accept the answer as self-evident. (27)

This new theory of Quine's, "ontological relativity," is as old as axiomatization itself. The only difference is that Quine's schizophrenic approach leads him to trip over this ancient stumbling block in regard to the "objects" of a language.

What are the "objects" of a language? They are x , y and z . What are x , y and z ? The only way to formally answer the question is to refer to a larger language (formal theory) in which we can then say that x is A , y is B and z is C . And what are A , B and C ? It is obvious that "Death will cut short our laudable endeavor" before long.

The point is the same as we saw in our examination of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem. It is the creative formulation of the mathematical notions which is of value, and can not proceed from logic. The proof of this is that all of the formal contexts and structures and theorems can be formulated, and yet we have something which is perfectly and completely vacuous, and of no use to anyone. This is the only perfect thing Quine admits in his poor little universe. Once all of the exotic vapors bubble away, Quine's nightmarish delusions boil down to this: "We can not say that we have any idea what others may think, or if they think. We can not say what is right or wrong, real or fictitious, valuable or not, but certainly I'm righter." This is "ontological relativity" as it really is unadorned, naked, shallow, skinny and proud of it.

Because of his view of language and knowledge, Quine cannot begin to explain how people create NEW knowledge. The formal aspects of language and theory operate as an inescapable straightjacket on the human mind. Quine cannot even explain how people LEARN new languages and theories: "Imitation and feedback are what propagates a language." (28) The human mind is the illegitimate child of a parrot and a feedback amplifier. Quine manages to toss off the whole question as he would toss a pinch of salt over his shoulder: "Transition to some such radically new pattern could occur either through a conscious philosophical enterprise or by slow and unreasoned development along lines of least resistance. A combination of both factors is likeliest; and anyway the two differ mainly in degree of deliberateness. Our patterns of thought or language have been evolving, under pressure of inherent inadequacies and changing needs since the dawn of language; and, whether we help guide it or not, we may confidently look forward to more of the same." (29) Quine banally sums up his own vacuity when he says "We may not be able to explain why we arrive at theories which make successful predictions, but we do arrive at such theories." (30) Quine tells us point blank that about the most important questions of epistemology, he has nothing to say!

The simple paradox which Quine does not recognize, let alone solve, is how two speakers can both talk about things and know what each other are talking about, how words have common social meanings, on the one hand; and on the other, how a speaker can use words in a new way, creatively, and still be understood. Quine takes language as an existent formal, fixed entity, like logic. Language, like Quine, is concerned solely with itself. To treat logic or language formally, as pure entities which exist in-themselves, solely on their own account, is really nothing else than to treat our conscious states solely in-themselves — as we are conscious of those conscious states. The real point to be emphasized with respect to logic, language, etc., is that they can only be viewed as the RESULTS, the determinations of a creative process of mind. Any other view leads us into a very sad condition indeed.

Quine's view of the process of infant language acquisition follows the same basic outline as does his view of translation, only that the child has the advantage of having no language at birth. Language, as well as all forms of knowledge, are acquired in a purely behavioristic fashion; Quine does endorse B. F. Skinner's pigeon-muck in this regard. The child is born with a "propensity to find one stimulation more akin to a second stimulation than to a third; otherwise there can never be any selective reinforcement and extinction of responses." (31) Among Quine's parsimonious bag of axioms is the child's innate capacity to "associate" and "respond." Given these principles then, knowledge and language of the parrot type is acquired.

So who am I, and what do I know? "All I am or ever hope to be is due to irritations of my surface, together with such latent tendencies to response as may have been present in my original germ plasm. And all the lore of the ages is due to irritation of the surfaces of a succession of persons, together again with the internal initial conditions of several individuals." (32) That Quine's philosophy is a combination of surface irritations and germ plasm is certainly plausible, but to grant such pseudo-scientific notions any broader significance is purely fatuous. The above process continues, Quine tells us casually, until "We have been beaten into an outward conformity to an outward standard...." (33)

This bestialized view of human learning has been completely discredited as an explanation of language acquisition elsewhere (34); a few points require enumerating here.

Behaviorism, even if we ignore the ugly slanders and blatant falsehoods it levels against children, can not explain even the FORMAL aspects of language.

A corollary to Quine's mechanism of the "conditioned response": the only way various kinds of relations are differentiated is in terms of the different conditioning of sentences as responses to sentences as stimuli. (This is just a purified version of the Humean doctrine.) That lame reductionist explanation falls flat on its "surface" thanks to the significant, creative side of the phenomena of language. Speakers are able to detect conceptual relations between linguistic constructions they have not heard, and which are entirely new to them — something Behaviorism cannot explain. Furthermore language contains the potential for an infinite number of such new constructions, which is a very good thing for the human race, though not for Quine.

It requires a much stronger hypothesis than Behaviorism even to account consistently for the PHENOMENON of the language "output." Quine's behaviorism can not explain why or how the speaker is able to give multiple meanings to ambiguous sentences, nor can it account for syncategorematic words (syncategorematic words are words whose specific meaning varies depending on the word it modifies, such as good — e.g., in the phrase "good man," good has a different meaning than in "good knife"). This is because Quine's Tinker-Toy approach tends to identify meaning with "information content." Neither Quine nor the infant can get out of this difficulty merely by enumerating all of the possible meanings of all words of this type since some of these words, such as "good," have an infinite compositional potential, and consequently have an infinite variety of meanings. Nor will learning by induction do, since certain meanings are not linguistically discernable.

Finally, it is an impossible task to explain how relations such as sameness of meaning, difference of meaning, incompatibility of meaning, etc. can occur simply by varying the strength of association. What two words could be more closely associated than ham and eggs?

Quine is led to behaviorism by his formalism. One follows the other as naturally as the mortician follows the coroner. If one treats concepts in a purely formal manner, one can never grasp the fact of their creation. Quine can only offer a behavioristic pseudo-account of language and concept learning. This not only fails to account for the CREATION of language, it can not even account for the PHENOMENON of language.

If all Quine is or ever will be is the irritation of his blessed surfaces, what distinguishes Quine from a rock? Perhaps nothing, or perhaps it is the inborn associative principle inherent in the original germ plasm? In that case what is to distinguish Quine from a pigeon, a rat, or even a germ

plasm? Nothing, unless perhaps it is a larger memory bank. At least, Quine might tell us, man is more like a pigeon than an amoeba. Quine could, in a self-satisfied way, murmur: "at last, I think I've got it!"

Once we have a theory which does not contradict sensory evidence, we have to look for further principles of knowledge. The "irritations of our surfaces" only partially determine our knowledge of the world; the rest is left to the caprice of certain inner tendencies. According to Quine, scientific method "is a matter of being guided by sensory stimuli, a taste for simplicity in some sense, and a taste for old things." (35) That is the sloppiest kind of empiricist metaphysics. At this point Quine would do well to renounce claims to scientific "objectivity" and moral neutrality, and add the attribute "a taste for the morally good," since this is no worse than the other two axioms epistemologically, and is to be recommended at least for its commitment to human decency.

Rheinhold had two similar kinds of principles: the love of truth, and the belief in truth as truth. (36) Quine's principles may seem more palatable to the contemporary reader, but the doctrines of both Rheinhold and Quine share the same crude metaphysical status. Both posit certain formal principles of ultimate appeal to save their systems. These *dei ex machina* are the reason we do not "know" in terms of sense certainty, but choose to overlay stimuli with a frosting of theoretic forms. Quine's axiom of simplicity is nothing but Occam's razor elevated to a genetic principle, a move at which Russell would have blanched. For both Rheinhold and Quine the principles are through and through whimsical and arbitrary. Quine would no doubt justify his two axioms as being the most simpleminded and conservative available for use!

These are Quine's "pragmatic" criteria. Universals, for example are constructed for purely pragmatic reasons: "...and in particular I grant that one's hypothesis as to what there is, e.g., as to there being universals, is at bottom just as arbitrary or pragmatic a matter as one's adoption of a new brand of set theory or even a new system of bookkeeping." (37) And what about the 'I'? How do I create it? In Quine's bizarre universe the 'I' is impossible, and this is a grievous fault. It is only by grasping the 'I' as a universal process concept, as a practical social ego, that we can begin to make sense of human knowledge. The 'I' seen as a process actually creates our conscious states and particular concepts — as determinations. We examine nothing but amputated limbs if we examine formal logics and particular concepts as self-subsisting entities.

The only way to begin to examine language is as

an aspect of consciousness **CREATIVELY** learned by the infant as a developing social 'I'. The **REAL** difficulty in any translation is not the indeterminacy created by a dearth of behavioral criteria, but the fact that concepts, and language which is about concepts, reflect a certain material culture which is of great practical significance to that society, and hence of significance to the practical social existence of the individual 'I's who are part of that society. The reason a Stone-Age culture can not synthesize a concept of electricity is not because they lack a decent dictionary, but because electricity is of no established practical value within that society's culture. Show those people how to build electric generators and machines which use electricity, and they will still not know why these are different from natural phenomena, and why it isn't nature gods who make them work. But then make these machines of practical value to that society, and they will ask, "how do we make them run?" "You generate **ELECTRICITY**." Only then can they synthesize a concept of electricity — or translate such a concept. This is the real problem involved in translation, but Quine of course knows nothing of it.

When Quine calls his two criteria "pragmatic," he means something radically different from what we mean by "practical." A "practical" activity for a Marxist, one which has value, is one which contributes to the survival and development of the **WHOLE** of **HUMAN** society. The early pragmatists (primarily Peirce) felt, on the other hand, that the meaning of particular statements was "pragmatic" since it was, according to them, determined by the empirical consequences of the particular statement in question. Quine makes a small advance over Peirce and other pragmatists, as well as over the "verifiability" fanatics of the Logical Positivist cults. He recognizes that such a criterion is meaningless when applied only to discrete sentences. But sadly, little more.

What Quine and all other pragmatic empiricists vainly try to deny is that the universals posited by a theory actually affect and change the evidence for those very theories; the creative process of cognition is part of the same universe as that which is thought about. The evidence for a theory is itself based on a theory of evidence. The Heisenberg uncertainty relation demonstrates this in the most obvious fashion, and the more subtle and perceptive findings of Gestalt psychology have proved this beyond doubt.

The Gestalt psychologists have proven that neither cognition **NOR EVEN SIMPLE PERCEPTION** exists purely in-itself. Rather, even simple percepts are perceived only as determinations of mental universals — whose only purpose for Quine is "simplicity," etc. The whole **IS** prior to the part in any kind of

perception which transcends photography. This destroys any semblance of credibility to the BASIC "dogma of empiricism," that the parts precede the whole. Quine, vaguely aware of this, attempts to "save the appearances" by saying that indeed, in some sense the whole is prior to its parts, but only because he recognizes that what is for him the fundamental part — sense data — simply will not suffice. Quine's position becomes a silly "Theories are sense data, and then some."

Pragmatism is an advance at least in so far as it uses some kind of reality principle. The problem with pragmatism, and one of the places where it parts company with historical materialism, is that the 'I' is conceived purely individually, not as a social product (except in the wild Skinnerian sense). Pragmatism sees each individual as following his own criterion, what is pragmatic for 'I'. With no notion of the 'I' as a social product, there can be no real social value, not as a practical reality for the individual, at any rate. The only exception is if the essentially egotistical (heteronomic) individual is "beaten into outward conformity" in a coercive stimulus-response fashion.

Finally, the individual must ask what are the "empirical consequences"? If we act on the basis of our theories, the consequences, as by chain reaction, form an infinite series. How are we to know when we have gone far enough to determine the "empirical consequences"? The individual QUA INDIVIDUAL has no way of telling. He will stop whenever his pragmatic (utilitarian) needs dictate. The only real criterion is the effects of our actions in the realm of the universal — the standpoint of the actual infinite — which is precisely what we have in Marx's law of value. This problem is key to all moral philosophy, and to Kant in particular. It arises directly from the antinomy of freedom and necessity. Quine safely sidesteps the whole problem.

Quine's failure to develop a criterion of value, together with his "ontological relativity" thesis, turns Quine into a moral relativist, all of his objections to that label notwithstanding. "Within our own total evolving doctrine, we can judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be; subject to correction, but that goes without saying" (38) and "In saying this I philosophize from the vantage point of our own provincial conceptual scheme and scientific epoch, true; but I know no better." (39) The provincial conceptual scheme to which Quine is referring is empiricism, and judging from his work, it is certainly plausible that he has discovered nothing better by his methods of inquiry.

Quine's two pragmatic criteria of "simplicity" and "conservatism" do not even measure up to the

pragmatists' crooked standard. Like any pragmatist, Quine reduces truth and meaning to the whims and contingencies of individuals. Unlike the usual form of pragmatic criteria, however, these two are not subject to any reality at all. His system is bounded by "irritations" on the outside, and pragmatic axioms on the inside. Knowledge is merely "so-called knowledge." These two principles have only subjective value. They have no objective significance whatsoever! They are only tools which are "useful" for keeping our minds tidy. And where do these axioms come from? Do we arrive at them by association? Are we born with them? Are they really just pragmatic suggestions which Quine is generously offering us? In that case, are they pragmatic?

Philosophers generally have taken sensation to be merely subjective, and universals, such as causality, time, and space etc., to be the truly objective, even if not always an exact and perfectly correct carbon copy of nature. Kant recognized these universals to be the truth of sensation, though he could only make that truth subjectively true. Quine does not even achieve this standpoint. For him, sensation is the final truth which we can know, the ultimate meaning of theories, the standpoint of "objectivity"; and universals such as space, time, and 'I' are merely subjective fantasies, good only in so far as they simplify mental operations, much as the elimination of steps in a program simplifies computer operations and saves costly computer time. Quine's pragmatism leaves the individual in a swamp of subjectivity; it is Quine who constructs subjective fantasies. At best, a Quinean individual can determine what is "pragmatic" for himself individually, whatever that may mean. What does it mean? That is a question which no crude pragmatism resting complacently upon pure, finite, subjective individuality can answer. The problem that plagues Quine, and all pragmatic empiricists, is that death always wins.

"This useless thrashing of the empty grainless straw of the common logic is termed philosophizing: it is like Issachar the strong ass, which could not be made to move from the spot where it was (Gen. xlix. 14). People of this kind say: We are good for nothing, and because we are good for nothing, we are good for nothing, and wish to be good for nothing. But it is a very false idea of Christian humility and modesty to desire through one's abjectness to attain to excellence; this confession of one's own nothingness is really inward pride and great self conceit." (40)

SOCIAL BASIS FOR QUINE'S VIEWS

We have examined leading features of Quine's published views from the standpoint of both classical philosophy and the achievements of Georg Cantor. As

a result, Quine earns the same scholarly status as some Johnny-come-lately who professes to have trisected the angle with ruler-and-compass methods of construction. In accomplishing this exposure we have done nothing that could not have been done, perhaps much more thoroughly, more devastatingly, by hundreds of scholars before this time. From the standpoint of reasonably available scholarship, Quine stands out obviously as a sterile crank in his chosen field.

Yet, we know in advance that our exposure of him will have little effect on the market-value of his academic credentials... at least, outside socialist circles. This should not be considered an astonishing result of the exposure. The value assigned to his credentials has very little to do with actual scholarly qualifications. However silly Quine's views may actually be from a scientific standpoint, his views remain valued for their POLITICAL effect.

The following summary enables the reader to locate that political significance of Quine's views.

What distinguishes man from other animals is the way in which man has HISTORICALLY, repeatedly overcome the ecological boundaries for reproducing his population. Where other animal species overcome such boundaries only by genetic progress — to become new species, man has successfully altered his mode of social reproduction. By a combination of new technologies and social organizations, man has advanced from the population-potential of a baboon-like food-gathering culture to societies aggregating billions today.

What distinguishes HUMAN nature from the nature of animal species generally is man's freedom from ordinary genetic determination(41) of a virtually FIXED mode of reproductive behavior as a species. It is in that sense that Marx and others identify man's uniqueness among animal species as that of an HISTORICAL being. What distinguishes man as human is the NOETIC power of progressively improving the quality of his mode of social-reproductive behavior. Or, the ability to transform his relationship to nature in a progressive fashion, a progress which we may abstract as the creative impulse connecting the successive qualitative stages of what we term science.

The point demands emphasis for absolute clarity. Man's distinction is NOT his ability to assimilate scientific knowledge and procedures, NOT his ability to LEARN. The distinction is the CREATIVE PROCESS by which man advances away from more primitive to more advanced scientific knowledge. An individual who has learned Newtonian physics, for example, is only — by that mere fact — a sophisticated baboon. It is the process connecting Kepler to Einstein, a process of progressive creative innovation, a process

of overthrowing old science, of REVOLUTIONIZING knowledge, which distinguishes man as human. It is the revolutionizing creative PROCESS of mentation, not any of the created knowledge IN ITSELF, which is the HUMAN distinction of man.

That, we concede, is not the prevailing view of contemporary society, even among most best-educated persons. Indeed, the emphasis on LEARNING which is carried to such a fanatical extreme by behaviorists reflects a dominant effort to discount, even suppress the CREATIVE aspect of human mentation. Perhaps this very emphasis on BESTIALIZATION of the student explains the widespread tendency to misquote Pope ironically to the effect that "A little KNOWLEDGE is a dangerous thing."

That is precisely what is at issue in the credence given to Quine, Skinner, and other representatives of empiricism and behaviorism. Although capitalist society does appropriate some of the products of creative mentation, and even professes to lament a lack of more creative personalities, the characteristic role assigned to most subjects of capitalism is the BESTIALIZED role of FIXED modes of behavior. Man's identity within capitalist society is an ANIMALIZED identity. He is valued by his employers (etc.) for his learning, or ability to learn, FIXED procedures and value-judgments, and his willingness to perform such procedures and value-judgments routinely day after day.

This being the norm, it is not astonishing that the recurrently hegemonic branch of "psychology" should be the behaviorist fugue, in which the characteristic mentality of rats and pigeons, as learners, is regarded as the paradigm for the mind of man. Man is only a more-advanced rat or pigeon, says an academic culture which regards learning-experiments with mere beasts as the foundation of human psychology.

This process of denying man the importance of his creative powers of mentation, in favor of the mere learning parameters "measured" by "intelligence tests," etc., is the actual referent for the term, "alienation." Man is denied the importance of that quality which distinguishes him as HUMAN, and a premium is placed on his capacity to degrade himself into a beast.

That is the SOCIAL content of Quine's empiricism. The formal flaw in Quine's constructs is his low-browed disregard for the problems of "infinity." In his disinterest in the "barber," Quine reveals his contempt for the existence of the real "barber," the creative intellect who synthesizes the new conceptions upon which fundamental human progress depends. These two are the same — different aspects of the same basic phenomenon. The notion of "true infinity," which

Quine ignores, is a notion of the determination of predicates by a universal subject. The predicates are the particular conceptual innovations which represent creative progress; the actual infinity, the subject, is the creative PROCESS which generates those discoveries.

In short, Quine's schema regard the creative — the actually human — aspect of human behavior as trivial or non-existent. What is important for him is a set of established customs, a body of established, customary, FIXED procedures and valuations. The social content, the social world-outlook of Quine and his supporters is THE BESTIALIZATION OF MAN, just as much as B. F. Skinner, Arthur Jensen, Herrnstein, LeRoi Jones, and other reactionaries express the same anti-human

attitudes, by insisting that man is merely an animal with a superior genetically-determined capacity to be drilled in learning fixed procedures. Man for them is a superior rat, a superior pigeon-brain, or a superior parrot.

In sum, then, any serious scholar in the field of epistemology or mathematics could have easily exposed Quine as a foolish crank years before this. It happens that Quine's supporters are not concerned whether he is or is not competent by such scholarly criteria. His wretched theories, however incompetent, are "competent" to the extent that they serve a special purpose — of rationalizing and helping to perpetuate the bestialization of the minds of the future administrators and professionals turned out by U.S. colleges today.

FOOTNOTES

1. Quine, "The Scope and Language of Science," *The Ways of Paradox*, p. 216.
2. See Campaigner, March-April 1972.
3. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," *Ontological Relativity*.
4. Hegel, "Uber Rheinhold," *Theorie Werkausgabe Suhrkamp Verlag*, Vol. II, p. 122.
5. Cantor, *Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers*, Dover edition, translation P. E. B. Jourdain.
6. Quine, "The Ways of Paradox," op. cit., p. 18.
7. Kant, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, Bobbs Merrill, p. 3.
8. Quine, op. cit., Ways.
9. Ibid., p. 7.
10. Ibid., p. 14.
11. Ibid., p. 19.
12. Marcus, *Philosophy of Socialist Education*.
13. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, trans. Baillie, p. 174.
14. See note 11.
15. One way in which logicians have attempted to sidestep the paradoxes is by formulating set theory in first order logic, and thus avoiding certain troublesome universal statements. Lowenheim-Skolem demonstrates the hopelessness of this dodge.
16. See note 15.
17. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, Norton edition, p. 69.
18. Ibid., p. 80.
19. Ibid., p. 76.
20. Op. cit., Cantor, quoted in introduction by Jourdain.
21. See note 20.
22. Quine, op. cit., Ways, p. 5-6.
23. Aristotle, *Physics*, Book VI.
24. Hegel, op. cit., Rheinhold, p. 123.
25. Quine, "Ontological Relativity" in *Ontological Relativity*.
26. Ibid.
27. Carroll, Lewis, "Achilles and the Tortoise."
28. Quine, op. cit., *Onto.*, p. 46.

29. Ibid., "Speaking of Objects," p. 29.
30. Ibid., "Epistemology Naturalized," p. 79.
31. Ibid., *Onto.*, p. 31.
32. Quine, *op. cit.*, *Ways*, "The Scope and Language of Science," p. 216.
33. Quine, *op. cit.*, *Onto.*, "Speaking of Objects," p. 5.
34. See Chomsky's review of Skinner's, "Verbal Behavior," Katz, *The Philosophy of Language*, and *March-April Campaigner* 1972.
35. Quine, *Word and Object*, p. 23.
36. Rheinhold, *Contributions to a Simpler Overview of the State of Philosophy at the Commencement of the 19th Century*.
37. Quine, *op. cit.*, *Ways*, "Carnap and Logical Truth," p. 125.
38. Quine, *Word and Object*, p. 25.
39. Quine, *op. cit.*, *Onto.*, *Speaking of Objects*, p. 25.
40. Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 454-455.
41. It is mooted in some circles that the biological substructure for human psycho-physical parallelism is a transformation of genetic-like biological processes involving the DNA-RNA notion, or something in that direction. Thus, our cautious distinction, "ordinary genetic determination."

Black Nationalism:

The Reality and the Hustler's Myth

by B. W. Greene

PREFACE

This paper was originally conceived approximately eighteen months ago. At that time the nationalist movement was still in its heyday, although decay had begun to set in. The parochialist tendency described here as a reflection of a relatively quiescent labor movement and subsequent isolation of black people within the fragmentation of bourgeois society still was current among militant layers. The hangovers from an earlier period were yet to be swept away by the movement of history. At that point black members of the National Caucus of Labor Committees were faced with the need to confront and debate vestiges of nationalist ideology within the black movement and among guilt-ridden whites — lamb chop radicals. The argument then was WHETHER there should be unity of black and white working people, as against the go-it-alone ideology of the nationalist.

Since that time much has happened, such that the argument over WHETHER black-white unity is now irrelevant. We have now witnessed the final and total collapse of the black nationalist movement into the open and willing arms of the government and corporate (white) bourgeoisie. The legitimacy of nationalism among the mass of black people is totally destroyed. (Although at no point were the majority of black people nationalist-oriented, what was important was that it enjoyed at least passive acceptance among significant layers.)

Concurrent and coherent with this subjective process was the objective condition of the collapse of the capitalist world monetary system, the material basis for bourgeois pluralist forms and ideology. August

15, 1971 posed the objective and absolute necessity for the unity of working people in the face of a UNIFIED band of capitalist thieves, hell bent on destroying the standards of living of black and white ALIKE.

The possibility of "honest" concessions attained through local community or other isolated struggle dried up with the collapse of the nationalist benefactor. If nationalists were to maintain their "identity capital" (and other forms of capital) invested in ideology, it became necessary to be less than honest in striving for the increasingly scarce concessions. The auction block mentality took over and nationalists began overtly acting as middle men — selling the black community to the highest bidder in return for Tammany Hall type patronage.

The question now posed to us is not WHETHER black-white unity of the working class, but what is the subject of that unity — on what basis is unity to be sought. The wrong answer to this question can and has proved to be dangerous for all concerned. Therein lies the necessity of attaining in all its clarity a conception of the content of class unity.

NIXON: "ANTI-RACIST"?

The ongoing and sickening racial battle around the construction trades offers an issue that forces us to positively conceptualize working class, black-white unity in the most concrete form.

Richard "Tricky Dick" Nixon in 1969 through his mouthpiece agent in certain sectors of the black community, Arthur Fletcher, then Assistant Secretary of Labor, defined the construction issue thusly: "The building trades unions are racist, and as your fervent fighter president against all forms of racist oppression,

I say we ought to smash all these racist construction unions." Being equally fervent fighters against all forms of racist oppression, the CP and almost every other "radical" group on the left (and right) jumped on the Nixon bandwagon and shouted "Right on," bro Dick. That small sector of the left (NCLC) who realized that the person who fought for segregation, racism and the southern way of life in every other aspect of American life could not possibly be fighting for the welfare of black people when it comes to the construction issue, predicated their response on an ability to think instead of allowing the built up guilt feelings of white and black radicals to control the actions of their hands and feet in contradiction to their professed Marxist beliefs.

What was the reason that caused Nixon to all of a sudden "turn into his opposite" and become the champion of the oppressed? The unraveling of the world capitalist economy begins to supply us with an answer to this seeming paradox. The construction industry heavily weighted down with the fictitious speculative values associated with an advanced case of capitalist crisis, and because of its critical position in the economy and the potential weak position of the construction unions, became the first testing ground for what was to emerge two years later as Phase One and Phase Two austerity.

Under the pretext of "minority hiring plans" ("Philadelphia Plan") Nixon began his union busting schemes USING black people and the left as a cost-cutting edge, at a time when overall construction jobs were being drastically reduced by the same Nixon administration, representing general capitalist policy.

The need for a united class response presented itself in crying agony. What was the left to do? "Support minority hiring," whines the Daily World — but only as a good way of proving how "anti-racist" they are.

True Marxian revolutionaries are able to honestly deal with construction union racism (and racism, chauvinism and parochialism in general), because



Black nationalists used to be fond of claiming that, in contradistinction to the old line integrationists, they were replacing the white-washed black consciousness with a perspective based on black self-determination. That time has passed. Today we find those who are calling themselves black nationalists are generally found with a perspective based on an enhancement of their local fiefdom by begging crumbs from white capitalist interests.

That particular reality of today only expresses the actual social logic of black nationalism at all

of an understanding of the sociological (as opposed to the formal) basis and method of struggling against these reflections of bourgeois ideology. They are able to see racism as but a particular aspect of bourgeois ideology, whose basis is the PRACTICAL contradictions — within capitalist oppression — between different parts of the working class.

Between black and white construction workers there is a practical contradiction that results from a scarce supply of jobs, giving rise to insecurity among those employed and desperation among those not employed (even during "prosperous" times when the possibility of a slack in the job market is a cause of considerable anxiety).

This insecurity and desperation clash, precisely because of the pluralist social mentality. The white employed construction worker does not identify his "self" interests with those of the black unemployed — and vice versa — because socially (how they engage in their practical life activity) they think they are of a different species.

Human knowledge is a practical social affair. If one's social activity is racist, that will determine consciousness. The problem for revolutionaries is to change the practical social relations of the fragmented working class into a class for itself.

The subject of unity between black and white construction workers as well as between welfare victims and employed working people is CLASS IDENTITY through a program that locates their common interests in the material need for expanded reproduction of society — enabling the provision of jobs for all.

On the basis of that perspective the initial cadre forces are organized who are able to develop the CREDIBLE SOCIAL alternative to bourgeois fragmentation.

That perspective is the only way to smash racism as a social phenomenon.

points. The fundamental howling irony of black nationalism is that it is the "whitewashed" flip side of the integrationist perspective. They both have their roots in the dominant ideology of white bourgeois society — that of Nixon's, Humphrey's, Wallace's, McGovern's pluralism. The pluralist holds that there are a variety of realities facing different social groups in the population. Bourgeois ideology insists that blacks have particular interests based on their reality, while whites have other interests based on their reality. Bourgeois apologists, Baraka, and the SWP argue: based on these fundamentally separate interests there

arise fundamentally separate and antagonistic identities among these various social groups.

Based on this pluralist, or what Marxists call the class-in-itself perspective, and given the relationship of social forces in this society, the one wants to integrate the black particular into the dominant white milieu, the other wants to separate the black particular from the dominant white milieu. Of course, only a formal distinction, for they both are working subordinates to the dominant ideology of society.

To the extent that neither, as such, can be the basis for a class-wide perspective capable of destroying in toto the oppression of bourgeois society and its black/white, master/slave relations, both accept it — the one with a grin, the other with a militant leer.

The tasks we have set for ourselves, are the following: to locate black nationalism within the general category of radical alienation, the militant expression of the individual who still defines himself within the limitations of bourgeois society; to develop the ironies of such a perspective; to situate it within a determining social context; and then account for the "why" of it; finally to pose the alternative — the revolutionary transcendence of bourgeois alienation both theoretically and practically.

SHIRLEY CHISHOLM SPEAKS

In an early issue of the publication, *The Black Scholar*, Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm poses the problem we are faced with. Although offering no solution — except to the extent the petty bourgeois dreams can be considered a solution to the real problems the working class faces — her article can be useful, in a negative way, in helping us to conceptualize the core of the problem.

Speaking of women, she correctly identifies the negatively conceived roles women are subjected to and how these roles are internalized and reflect themselves in the woman's consciousness of herself. Throughout, what is emphatically accepted is the pluralism of bourgeois society, and the necessity of playing the role based on that type of man/woman relationship. What is rejected is only the form of that relationship, that women think negatively of their role.

The solution, then, is a celebration of the problem. "Each black male and black female, white female and white male, must escape from his or her own historical trap before he or she can be truly effective in helping others to free themselves." She proposes the replacement of these roles with "positive values BASED ON FEMALE EXPERIENCE" (emphasis added). Going further, she takes this analogy to the black movement and says: "A few short years ago, if you

called most Negroes black, it was tantamount to calling them niggers. But now black is beautiful and black is proud. Black people have freed themselves from the dead weight of the albatross of blackness that once hung around their neck. They have done it by picking it up in their arms and holding it with pride for all to see." Women similarly "like black people will have to raise our albatross with pride."

Her strategy is to replace the chains on the body with chains on the mind. To celebrate the identity imposed by the limitations of human development within bourgeois society, under the pretext of...I am proud of what I AM instead of what I COULD BE.

By their acceptance of the bourgeois self identity, Congresswoman Chisholm and a number of liberal (and not so liberal) politicians are preparing their populist, popular-front destruction of the working class with black people in the "vanguard." The role of certain leftists in this process will be investigated later.

Shirley Chisholm (along with California Congressman Ron Dellums) is the self-proclaimed populist politician of society's "niggers." Not just blacks, but all the oppressed — individually conceived — strata of society: middle class anti-war activists; students, women, blacks, chicanos, etc. Chisholm claims special ability to lead such a coalition because she is black, a woman (or is it a woman, then black?)...and she speaks Spanish.

Before the Black Political Convention in Gary, a former aide to Dr. Martin Luther King, James Bevel, proposed a Wallace-Chisholm national ticket. This should come as no shock, for he just took the class-in-itself method of organizing to its logical conclusion...southern poor-white racists are "niggers" too. It is no accident that the relationship of forces would put Wallace — a racist — on the top spot. By not attacking the class-in-itself identity of bourgeois society, which is the basis of racism and other social diseases, black people especially are forced to put their neck on the line.

Understanding the risks but wanting to maintain her interests, we find presidential candidate Chisholm in the March Florida primary saying: "We must forget about racism and unite black and white poor." It was an attempt by her on the political market to attract concession capital.

Of course, as we saw at the National Black Political Convention, you don't have to be for coalitions to desire crumbs from white Democratic (and Republican) politicians.

The black nationalism of an Imamu (LeRoi Jones) Baraka, seen in practice at the Gary convention, is

but the identical twin of black (and white) liberalism. This manifests itself by way of the class struggle, which forces them to make a choice, and they both scramble into the Democratic and Republican fold. The one with grin, the other with a militant leer.

In the second century B.C., a Persian by the name of Manes (i.e., Manichaen) taught a system of Zoroastrian dualism and Christian Soteriology. According to it, man's soul springs from the kingdom of light and seeks release from the kingdom of darkness, the body. Release is through wisdom imparted by a savior, a Docetic Jesus, not the historical or false Messiah, and must be attained through ascetical renunciation of everything material or sensual.

Black nationalism today, by its renunciation of "western materialism" for "African humanism," awaits upon its Docetic Jesus to release it from the kingdom of darkness and return it to the mother country — by way of the cosmos.

The scathing irony is that such a task was laid out precisely in and by the kingdom of darkness — bourgeois society — and the black nationalist follows his master's script exactly. Given the imposed bourgeois identity, liberation (or the return to the kingdom of light) can only be conceived within such a mystical framework. True class liberation is "abstract."

The danger is that "pending liberation" the same perspective also defines certain secular goals to be pursued immediately — the minimum program? It is through this day-to-day practice that we see the black nationalism and the black AND white liberal (and not so liberal) converge in one coherent capitalist/anti-working class policy. Imamu joins sister Chisholm at candidate George's (either one) penthouse for a talk on "practical politics."

BLACK NATIONALISM AS WHITE RACISM

To have a competent discussion of nationalism it is necessary first to locate it within a social dynamic. By doing that we dispose of the ignorant, actually racist, notion, that black people are in some way "naturally" nationalist oriented. Such a notion and others like it (such as "black people are inherently revolutionary") deny to black people what is essentially human, that is change in consciousness in response to objective and subjective situations.

It is important to raise this point because of the racist notions rampant among most of the left concerning the "inherent revolutionary potential of the black people." As if black people have no human mentation processes, but are guided by some innate instincts, like animals. Two other examples can be raised in

this regard: the one that blacks are guided by "common sense," are "concrete" in their thinking, while it is the white who is "abstract," the other notion of "natural rhythm" and talent of black people. The former is the basis of many Nazi-type ideologies and other excrescences of bourgeois society; the latter is the lie invented by the slavemasters to deny the possibility of black people to CREATE real music.

Needless to say, black people's consciousness is determined by the same social (i.e. human) processes that determine white people's consciousness. Nationalism, a form of consciousness, is a social judgment — an internalized perspective on reality and one's location within that reality. It is "appropriate" to particular social situations, and is developed pragmatically in response to these situations. It is the ideology of bourgeois society, whose social basis and social necessity is located within the forms of social organization of bourgeois society. In practice it coheres with the necessities imposed by that society.

Since the death of the civil rights era, up to the recent period, the hegemonic conceptions within the black movement have been various forms of explicit parochial ideology, and even among other oppressed minorities we see developing Chicano, Puerto Rican and other "national" liberation movements. In general, they represent the form of the first rumblings of the class struggle, among those working class and declassed strata whose social conditions of super-exploitation leave them most vulnerable to the beginning of the breakdown of capitalist society. Here, the basic problems facing humanity as a whole have been firstly approximated. The trouble though (enter empiricism) is that each particular grouplet has identified these problems as eminently particular, that is as their own unique problem. The result is that although these first stages of radicalization represent a thrust towards a new society, they are yet cloaked in the ideological rags of the old.

The class movement does not emerge fully self-conscious and armed in its beginning phases. Rather, it comes to grips with its historic tasks only after a painful process of repeatedly subjecting its current self conceptions to the iron test of experience in struggle, consistently abandoning backward ideas, program and leadership for more advanced ones, until the movement exhausts its historic course.

The class movement, despite its revolutionary content and aspirations to a DECREASING extent, manifests itself in bourgeois ideological modes of radicalization. The conceptions (i.e., rules and definition) developed and imposed to perpetuate bourgeois society (the parochial self-identity) at first are the tools used to try to overcome the oppression of that society.

The determined bourgeois ideological character of the first stages of radicalization of the awakening class is suggested in Marx's 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte where we quote: "the oppressive hand of past generations rests like a dead hand upon the brain of the living." So Luther garbed the Reformation in Paul's mantle, and the French Revolutionists assumed the aura of the Roman republic. In this way also the Russian working class marched in February to the strains of the Marseillaise, and today's black nationalist espouses the virtues of bourgeois pluralism.

The social phenomenon of parochialism (the subjective basis of nationalism) has generally always been present within the black community, among especially the lower classes. Unlike the so-called "black middle class" they exhibit a general tendency towards "groupism," out of an insecurity, since they have no hope of ever "making it" in this society.

It is the surrounding white society that imposes this parochialism by setting social parameters to the struggle which they are allowed to engage in, forcing a regroupment inward in the face of adversity. Manifestations of these parameters are the racism and hostility of lower class whites, fearful of their little security in an economy that, as presently organized, does not have adequate room for 30 million blacks.

This is the honest basis for the parochialism of the first stage of radicalization. In general, the same dynamic is the cause of nationalism and racism among white ethnics in similar situations.

A dishonest current surfaced when alienated black middle class intellectuals, who by the mid-to-late sixties were looking for a new hustle, seized upon this bourgeois ideological tendency as the basis for their movement. An "intellectual" cover, a developed formal system — of do's and don'ts — was created to give radical legitimacy to a tendency forced upon the mass of black people by capitalism's social fragmentation and oppression. They thereby REIFIED what was for the masses a pragmatic position, capable of being transcended in the struggle for survival as the opportunities for broader struggle became available. They gave this TENDENCY a life of its own, abstracted from the social realities and material necessities of life of the black masses.

To the extent that black nationalism is such a reified notion, it becomes reactionary by virtue of the fact of its implicit rejection of the material needs of black people. It is only that class whose continued existence precludes meeting those material needs, and those who accept and perpetuate their rule — either consciously or not — who can fail to see the need for the most vicious polemical attack on nationalism.

The underlying causes of parochial consciousness

within the masses of oppressed minorities in America must still be addressed — but in a serious way. The real object of these parochial tendencies is the absolutely decaying conditions of life which they face. It is their increasing desire to militantly attack those conditions that is the CONTENT of nationalism — and it is that that is important, not the FORM through which it is expressed.

To address this content is to necessarily reject its pro-bourgeois "black nationalist" form.

THE "LEFT" RESPONDS...

The socialist movement (in particular the CP and the SWP), whose professed historic task it is to lead the masses of people made ignorant by an ignorant society, beyond the idiocy of their particular consciousness and into the reality of their actual (class) interests and potential, has failed because of its own guilty ignorance and fixation in the mire of bourgeois ideology.

Faced with the "fact" of parochialism, only known from the point of view of the immediate "self evident" fact, and given the day to day ego-needs of the petty-bourgeois radical cut off from "normal" means of gratification in bourgeois society, the "left" has responded to the phenomenon in a typically empiricist (opportunist) way.

It is the problem the Labor Committees has identified as the "gate receipts" mentality, and otherwise known as "going to where the people are at." Once they are "where the people are at" suckcess (sic) is gotten by pandering, in a patronizing manner, to "the people's" ignorances, self-conceptions, and to the definitions of the struggle imposed upon them by the social parameters of their position within bourgeois society. To this reflection of bourgeois oppression the "left" typically gives its radical stamp of approval.

The viciousness of such patronizing is suggested by Karl Marx, who based himself on G.F.W. Hegel's treatment of the "master/slave" dialectic. Marx understood that the essence of the oppressed is their internalization of society's consciousness of them in a practical sense, their development of a self-conception appropriate to the practice necessary for existence within the sphere of an oppressive social situation, and therefore necessarily, effectively perpetuating that oppression. And that is "where the people are at." Such a self conception must necessarily persist unless people are offered an effective (i.e., credible) alternative social sphere of reference through which a new self-conception can be mediated.

Before the parochial perspective — which black people have developed as a defensive mechanism against the fragmented, antagonistic pluralist social

situations they face — can be transcended, a social institution through which black people can mediate their individual interests with the class as a whole must be developed. An institution where previously antagonistic sections of the class begin to locate their self-identity through their joint struggle around commonly conceived needs. By this social process it is possible to go beyond the “master/slave” dialectic of bourgeois society, and find one’s self-identity in the class as a whole — the CLASS-FOR-ITSELF. Such a formation concurrently brings white people out of the racist identity and practice against which black parochialism is a defense. Lacking this, the oppressive weight of bourgeois society will rest like a dead hand on the brain of the living.

But our comrades on the “left” are unconcerned with the REAL MATERIAL needs of black people. They are equally unconcerned with a fight against racism. Witness their feeble abstention from the strike-support work the Labor Committee and other working-class groups and individuals are engaged in, when these strike-support coalitions are precisely the forms of working-class organization necessary for a fight for the material needs of the working class. They are the precondition — the social basis — for a serious fight against racism and other forms of bourgeois chauvinism. For the “lefties” the immediate ritual, religious amelioration of their GUILT-consciousness is primary.

Even our black comrades in such organizations can be located within the same process. Given their implicit acceptance of bourgeois society’s conception of the social “role” of black people, which formally conflicts with their “role” in a “white” organization, or their adherence to what bourgeois society has told them is a non-black doctrine (socialism), they must take an “aggressive” stance against racism. They must be the most militant caricatures of black people according to the definition (i.e. stereotype) currently hegemonic in white bourgeois society. And all this in order to PROVE that they are not “selling out.” Material needs of black people? Secondary at best.

REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISTS RESPOND...

Thus actual socialists, do not respond opportunistically to nationalism as a “thing in itself,” but as a reflection of more fundamental underlying processes.

We have as our starting point; what is necessary for continual human existence at an improving level. From that material objective standpoint, we pass judgement on the subjective processes at work in the working class’s mind. Are they such as to enhance the potential for expanded reproduction? If they are not, as is the case with the anarchy of bourgeois fragmentation — nationalism — the question

arises: why do people therefore accept such consciousness? Then, how do we get them OUT of “where they are at,” and provide the basis for the development of real rational human beings.

The general form of the problem is how to get from point ‘A’ to point ‘B’, when point ‘A’ is where we are presently at — a state in which the working class is divided against itself, and which is the basis for racism and other forms of chauvinism — the objective of parochialist sentiment; and where point ‘B’ is where we must arrive at through revolutionary struggle, the class-for-itself consciousness, prepared to coherently determine its destiny as a class (i.e. species) in a material way.

The process of bridging that gap manifests itself phenomenally in the mass strike, where the various sections of the working class are forced through their struggle to accept as part of themselves (their self) previously antagonistic (“outside”) sections of the class for joint battle.

That is the orientation of socialists who then intervene in the class struggle to develop within the working class the concrete self consciousness of what they otherwise know only pragmatically.

APTHEKER’S MYTH OF THE REVOLUTIONARY SLAVE

The problem of identity is similar to that faced by the trade union movement in America today. The modern trade union movement is a product of the McCarthy era. As such, it is organized in response to that period of anti-communist hysteria. Its isolation from, and antagonism to, the broad mass of the unorganized and unemployed working class reflects this. Not only is the working class fragmented by legal and union boundaries but — and this is the key to the “master/slave” relationship — this fragmentation is internalized in the trade unionist’s consciousness. Thus, many unionists who went through the class-wide united struggles of the thirties are generally hard pressed to “remember” what really happened. They live under the absurd belief that the trade union form of struggle as it exists today was the mode of struggle that brought trade unions into existence. The irony of it is that this “forgetfulness” has especially struck those socialists who led the mass struggles of the 1930’s.

This retardation of the workers’ consciousness was capable of bringing him through the relative stability of the fifties and sixties in America, albeit at the expense of the rest of the world’s working population (who are outside of his conception of “self”).

Today, in the seventies, the American worker’s retardation which resulted in his neglect of his brothers

in Europe and the Third World — and the most oppressed strata of the American working class — is now preventing his own further development. Only to the extent that the typically swinish consciousness of bourgeois society can be transcended, by approximations of world-wide class-for-itself organization and consciousness capable of determining the world's destiny, is it possible for the American working class to survive. In the absence of that general perspective, we find the working class in the present crisis, either in a total rout or engaging in isolated and hopeless wildcat strikes or other forms of impotent reaction.

The same situation was faced by the slaves in North America, a problem which was posed by Eugene Genevise in a paper read before the 1966 Socialist Scholars Conference. Genevise in this paper states: "American radicals have long been imprisoned by the pernicious notion that the masses are necessarily both good and revolutionary, and by the more pernicious notion that if they are not they should be. The principal task of radical historians, therefore, has too often been to provide the masses with historical heroes, to make them aware of their glorious tradition of resistance to oppression, and to portray them as having been implacably hostile to the social order in which they have been held."

He goes on to discuss the reasons for the contrary reality: the general widespread accommodation to slavery of North American blacks. He contrasts this to the massive revolts characteristic of the Carribeans, and in the process deals with the ignorant notions of Herbert Aptheker, who digs up documented evidence of hundreds of slave revolts in order to "prove" the "inherently revolutionary potential of black people" (the reader should refer back to our earlier discussion of "inherent black traits").

What Aptheker fails to understand (and Genevise does not fully understand himself) is the difference between reacting, where the slave may strike out at his local master or local community of masters, and world-historical events such as the Haitian revolution. The former is the other side of accommodationism typical of the house-slave, in that isolated from the world historical (or broader outside) forces capable of putting an end to slavery, the slave has no alternative but either acceptance or reaction. This may be good copy for Aptheker's book, but it was pretty limited in terms of putting an end to the slave system.

And this is exactly the bind that the black nationalist movement finds itself in today. Its self-conception isolates it from the working class as a whole, and the forms of struggle capable of actually alleviating the situations black people find themselves in. They therefore, like the trade unionists, have but two

alternatives: 1) Doing nothing, or accepting the situation and rules of the game imposed by the capitalist and working within that framework. This includes becoming part of the black hippie or mystic culture and easing into the Democratic Party, directly or by way of the Black Political Party route — of course, on the terms dictated by white Democrats. 2) The other alternative includes engaging in terrorism or anti-working class, actually proto-fascist actions.

On the other side is the world historical man of which Haitian leader Toussaint L'Overture was an example, who (effectively, if not consciously) appropriates the world-historical human experience as the black experience, enabling him to carry forth the world-historical tasks confronting the particular Haitian black sector. Toussaint was but a reflection of a process, where the Haitian revolution was but the local front of a world-revolutionary period of which the French revolution was the European front.

It is precisely such a self-conception — self-consciously understood — that serious revolutionaries, both black and white, must begin to develop within themselves and the working class as a whole.

But such an alternative cannot be legislated or chanted into existence. The pre-conditions for the supercession of the hegemony of the bourgeois social sphere with working class institutions of power — such as strike support coalitions — enabling the development of a world historical perspective are changes in the economic basis of society, changes that undermine the material existence of people who have built fantastic illusions within society's superstructure predicated on that economic basis. Under such conditions, socialists take the stance of aggressive intelligence, and assuming the intelligence of people, relate, not to "where they are at," but toward where the class struggle is pushing them.

We take our presently few forces and create social institutions predicated on where the class struggle demands they be going, aiming at the most advanced who would be able to transcend the immediacy of the bourgeois perspective and their so-defined existence, and who comprehend the reality of their existence and struggle in its broader class context.

But these few will play a role more valuable than the hundreds or even thousands attracted by the centrist organizations through the opportunist (e.g. "Crow-Jim") method. For, at the point when the crisis has matured and the possibility exists to coalesce masses of people on a class basis around a crucial nucleus transcending their bourgeois particularisms, these few will be the developed cadre capable of playing the revolutionary role cut out for them.

Since approximately 1965, it has been the qualitative changes in the practical circumstances of existence of world capitalist society that has been the determining context within which the class struggle has been waged. But the full potential of the class struggle to burst forth out of the binds of bourgeois society has been limited by still hegemonic bourgeois social relations.

The initial perceptible effects of the present breakdown crisis of capitalism primarily affected the black and third world minority strata of the U.S., due to the special social position they held in the society. Nationalism developed within and because of that social context. We seek to destroy nationalism and other forms of bourgeois parochialism, in order to allow the true radicalization, which it fantastically disguises, to be fully realized.

As the National Caucus of Labor Committees has demonstrated in its many writings (most recently, *Socialism or Fascism?*), we are in a period such that before the end of this decade the U.S. socialist movement must be in a position to institute socialist power, through self-consciously organized revolutionary institutions predicated on the equality and commonality of interests of the now-fragmented political working class, or we can forget about humanity as we know it today. It is an alternative of the supersession of bourgeois parochialism in favor of revolutionary social relations, an alternative to fascism and barbarism.

The necessity to clear away the bourgeois ideological rubbish impeding class-for-itself consciousness and socialist practice is the basis for the present polemic. But even beyond this, the immediate necessity of superseding bourgeois parochialism is the basis, and the only basis, for solving a more fundamental and general problem: that of self-determination.

REVOLUTIONARY SELF-DETERMINATION

We do not speak here of the self-determination of the heteronomic individual of a Hegel in the Philosophy of Right, or the conceptions of Mussolini, or Woodrow Wilson, or of Nixon. Neither do we speak of the conceptions of today's ranters and ravers of "black self-determination" (the black control of the black community, or local control in general, types). Quite ironically, all the above cases share a common heritage. In them, the self-evident (heteronomic) particular is assumed — the fragmentation of "civil" (i.e. bourgeois) society is the first premise. Self-determination there is a battle of the self-evident particulars to get the biggest piece of the action for themselves, from a social context which is outside of their control as individuals.

So in Newark (with Imamu Baraka) as in Hegel's

Philosophy of Right, what emerges to give coherence to this chaos of "civil society" is a separate spirit... of Spirit House? No, the spirit of the rock — Prudential Life Insurance Company. The irony of black nationalism is that its notions of self-determination, predicated on the particular, preclude real determination of one's existence — because of its denial of world-historical activity.

The self-determination we talk of here is that in which the self — self-identity — in question is found outside of the self as defined by bourgeois society, is found in the working class as a whole, because that is the real basis for the existence of the particular self.

The problem is posed by an investigation of what it takes for the individual to materially exist in today's world — no less than 3.5 billion people and their ancestors (represented by the totality of the accumulated knowledge of humanity).

For example, we take the \$75 two-piece dashiki jump suit of bro. Imamu Baraka, with its matching red, black and green leather leash (tailor made by Prudential Life Insurance Company?). We ask bro. Baraka, where did you get that outfit? He will reply, black people gave it to me! In particular that black woman I have slaving over the sewing machine in the back.

Safely out of his turf, we scientifically analyze the situation and arrive at a quite different conclusion. If we were to take the silk embroidery from the middle east, the cotton thread from Egypt, the wool cloth from European sheep, etc., then take the tools used to produce the outfit from these raw materials and then the plant and machinery used to produce them and the labor involved, and the education and maintenance of that labor, etc., etc., none of which can be left out, we would find that not that poor woman sweating over the sewing machine in back, but the entire division of labor is the real producer of "his" dashiki. And that division of labor represents the real basis of man's existence.

Now, for that existence to be determinate, self conscious existence, or guaranteed existence, these 3.5 billions must be self-consciously organized in a coherent way to carry out the tasks at hand.

Until the 18th century, the possibility of such coherence — and world-historical self-conception — did not exist except in the most fantastically disguised form of religious belief. As Ludwig Feuerbach understood, what distinguishes man from the brutes is his potential to conceive of himself as a species — infinitely. Animals cannot conceive of themselves as a species because they don't have the creative

dialectical powers of mentation enabling them to transcend the immediacy of their local tree or barnyard. Thus it is an indication of the ANIMAL nature of bourgeois society that it imposes a perspective on people that limits them to their local tree, or community, or nation or race, and does not allow them to perceive of their identity as a species — as a class, a world-historical person. Thus, their true humanity is disguised under the cover of mystical religious belief.

It took Karl Marx to fully develop this conception, making it precisely applicable to our present study. For Marx, the essence of religion is to be found in "the cleavages and contradictions in the secular world," where man is denied a practical social relationship to the whole of his species, and therefore attributes the predicates of his infinite "species being" to a mystical being beyond himself and his control.

The point to be made is that in the past religion — reflecting social retardation of man's perspective — whether that be Christian dogma or nationalist tripe, although tragic, is nonetheless understandable. Today, safely into the 20th century with modern means of transportation, communication, linking every corner of the working population — self-imposed retardation is a farce.

It is the job of socialists not to pander to this black-nationalist religious nonsense, but to begin the development of the institutions of working-class power, through which the individual can gain a practical social relation to the whole of his class. Where he can thereby attribute the predicates of his infinite "species being" to himself...and emerge out of the dark pre-human ages and into the modern world.

(Continued from page 26)

course of individuals as such. With the appropriation of the total productive forces through united individuals, private property comes to an end." (p. 84, *ibid.*)

"...the individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces, not only to achieve self-activity, but also, merely to safeguard their very existence. This appropriation is first determined by the object to be appropriated, the productive forces, which have been developed to a totality and which only exist within a universal intercourse. From this aspect, therefore, this appropriation must have a universal character corresponding to the productive forces and the intercourse." (p. 83, *ibid.*)

"Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a revolution..." (p. 86, *ibid.*)

These excerpts merely highlight that view permeating the entire "Feuerbach" section. Obviously, comparing the section from which we excerpted the passage from Vol. III of Capital with the "Feuerbach" section, only liars and incurable idiots could identify any opposing view with Marx or sustain the myth of a dichotomy between an "early" and "mature" Marx.

24. Cf. L. Marcus, "Why It Had To Happen," *Internationales Bulletin*, Vol. 1, No. 1.

25. See Note 17.

26. Ernest Mandel, "The Leninist Theory of Organization," *International Socialist Review*, New York, December 1970.

27. *Ibid.*

28. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*. Kant's PATHOLOGICAL and HETERONOMIC correspond to the qualities of mere Being-in-itself or a mere class-in-itself for Hegel and Marx, respectively.

29. Mandel, *op. cit.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. Note 23.

32. Mandel, *op. cit.*

33. Note 23.