the Campaigner

The
Miracles
and
Martyrdom
of
Saint Antonio
Gramsci Part II

On the Brink of the
Post-Rockefeller Era—
editorial—

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Editorial

On the Brink of the Post-Rockefeller Era

As of this moment, Rockefeller-controlled governments in the Americas and Western Europe hold the world hostage to their insane plans for securing unlimited looting rights against all portions of the world working class *by any means necessary*. The numerous and insistent calls of the Soviet Union for avoidance of the total holocaust in which any nuclear exchange would result, and for international collaboration in world economic development, have been answered by the increasingly shrill threats of tactical nuclear strike by U.S. Defense Secretary and madman, James Schlesinger. Rockefeller agents within the leading West German political parties — the ruling Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) — are sabotaging otherwise near-unanimous European opposition to a pseudo-independent Western European nuclear strategy against the Soviet Union. The Rockefeller-allied Dayan faction in Israeli politics, aided by CIA agent and Syrian presidant Assad and CIA-controlled factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), still maintains hegemony over the pro-peace forces in Israel, leaving its crazy generals free to carry out a pre-emptive nuclear strike that could trigger world war.

On both sides of the Atlantic the men who *right now* have their hands on the thermonuclear button and are gearing up their war apparatus, take their orders from the murderers and drunken perverts in the Rockefeller family. As these men and their masters become more and more isolated politically through exposure by the Labor Committees, the Soviet bloc and others—of their preparations to turn the world into a radioactive rubbleheap the more they have to rely on naked force. Given the insanity of the Rockefeller crew — exhaustively documented in the pages of the Labor Committee's newspaper, *New Solidarity*, and in this magazine over the past six to eight months — there is a distinct possibility that — *unless forcibly stopped* — Schlesinger, Kissinger, et al. would respond to the failure of their thermonuclear threat to prostrate the Soviet Union, by activating a so-called "war scenario" which would eliminate the world they are now fighting to control.

Thermonuclear holocaust is not the only horror which the Rockefeller cabal holds over humanity's head today. To create the worldwide fascist economic regime which the Rockefeller financial empire requires simply to maintain its hegemony over capitalism itself, Rockefeller must try to impose police-state, Bonapartist regimes on the world's capitalist economies. In the surrealistic "thinking" of the Rockefeller think-tanks, the nuclear strategy is intended to be a limited one, confined to step-by-step escalation against the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc. The concomitant moves within the advanced sector, as illustrated by the joint meetings being held by the U.S. government's Office of Preparedness (the occupation police-network in the wings) and NATO strategists, are the moves to establish open dictatorships as interim governments toward mass-based fascist rule.

As for the nuclear scenario, the gears have already been set in motion for police states throughout Western Europe and the United States. None of the current governments in these countries have any stability or credibility; Congress and the Rockefeller-controlled executive are deadlocked in the U.S.; Giscard's government exists by suspension between the PCF and the autarchic Gaullist barons; Chancellor Schmidt lives on only because his opponents in the opposition parties and his own have not yet decided on the terms of a new coalition; in Italy, the official government has been made virtually irrelevant by the revival of Mussolini-style corporatist bodies on the regional and national level.

While these farcical regimes remain in power, police powers are being exercised with increasing brutality in France and Italy. Search-and-seal operations occur with little protest in West Germany. The United States, however, stands in most imminent danger of open police rule. With the working class as yet still not consolidated into a massive fighting machine, Rockefeller is able to undertake billion-dollar FBI-CIA-LEAA operations, and thus prevent the near-universal hatred of his person and policies from fueling an effective counterforce to the killing speedup, budget cuts and unemployment which his financial policies dictate.

Yet, provided that the combined forces of the International Caucus of Labor Committees and the Soviet-led Communist Parties succeed in preventing the Rockefeller cabal from unleashing Bonapartist regimes and thermonuclear holocaust over the next weeks and months, the post-Rockefeller era is well within our sight and grasp.

The very same economic and political conditions which have driven Rockefeller into a desperate corner from which he threatens to exterminate us all, have created fertile ground for the Labor Committees' proposals for world reconstruction programs. Looking

squarely ahead into economic ruin, production-minded capitalists in the advanced sector (dubbed "Physiocrats" by the *London Times*) have begun to latch onto the only serious proposal for a new monetary order, the International Development Bank proposal. The IDB, first presented by U.S. presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. on April 24 in Bonn, West Germany, proposes the adoption of the Euro-ruble as a reserve currency in a trilateral trading process where credits will be granted for *production* of the industrial and agricultural goods required to advance the rate of development in all sectors as fast as possible.

Many Third World countries, faced with even more imminent destruction by the World Bank-ordered policy of triage, have been impelled by the same necessities to consider debt moratoria and a development policy based on the exchange of their raw materials for upgrading of their populations and eventual industrialization — the policies laid out by the IDB plan. Simultaneously the Soviet bloc and certain other pro-Soviet socialist countries have recognized the sanity of the Labor Committees' demand for international coordinated action against Rockefeller's thermonuclear threat. They are moving deliberately, although slowly, to counter it with increasingly concrete governmental proposals for international cooperation around development in the Third World and guaranteed employment in the capitalist sector.

Such a new economic system based on trade and capital-intensive development, would be stillborn, however, without the international working-class striking force required to enforce its implementation. In this area as well, the Soviet leadership and other key Communist Parties have come to acknowledge the necessity of the kind of international united front proposed by the ICLC from its founding in June 1973. Over the past several months, especially highlighted around the defense of the Portuguese Communist Party, a de facto international communist movement has come into being. Following steadily down the path hewn by the conceptions of the Labor Committees, the chief organizers in the Communist Party of France and the Soviet bureaucracy have moved to officially isolate capitalist agents within the Communist Parties and the Social Democracies, and to put the international issues on the parties' *daily* agendas.

It is toward these decisive developments—the coalescence of a new economic order based on dumping the bankrupt U.S. dollar and the emergence of a new international communist movement—that we now turn in depth.

Toward International Development

Since the Dollar Empire formally declared its bankruptcy on August 15, 1971, capitalism has had only one way of surviving: the thorough cannibalization of men, machines and land in, first, its own countries and colonies, and then in the Socialist bloc itself. Over the first three years the looting process met with little effective resistance in the U.S. or Europe. Through the combined effects of 1974-1973 Phase One, Two, Three, through budget cuts, unemployment, speedup, wage-cuts, and the 400 per cent increase in oil prices rigged by the Rockefeller oil hoax, living standards were cut—according to conservative estimate—by 33 per cent in the advanced sector alone! Italy and Britain were turned into Third World horrors. In the Third World itself, the officially sanctioned policy of triage was carried out systematically and brutally by the World Bank and other extensions of David Rockefeller's financial empire.

On the basis of this success the Rockefeller brothers had every reason to believe that they would outdo Hitler's financial wizard, Hjalmar Schacht, and turn the entire world into an Auschwitz slave-labor camp. The Brazilian model was operating with murderous effectiveness, with few political difficulties. The plan was to create a new world order, based on the paper currency called the SDR (Special Drawing Rights: Serve David Rockefeller) and backed up by the international political and military hegemony of the Rockefellers and the supranational institutions (NATO, IMF, Trilateral Commission ...) which they controlled.

As for the Soviets, they were to be frightened into silence until it was too late, by use of the latest RAND computer creation, tactical nuclear psychological warfare. James Rodney Schlesinger made this clear as early as April, 1974.

But by the fall of 1974, something had gone wrong in the Rockefellers' calculations. The turning point was the failure of the scheduled Fifth Middle East War to get off the ground in mid-November: the Soviets — operating within the environment of exposed alert provided by the ICLC — had taken decisive behind-the-scenes action to stop it. Driving Rockefeller's temporary defeat home for the kill was the ICLC's publication of the Strategic Studies document throughout the fall. The document made two essential contributions: 1) by exposing Rockefeller's psychological warfare strategy to the light of day, it destroyed the controlled environment Rockefeller was trying to spin around the Soviets; and 2) it demonstrated clearly and scientifically the ecological and/or thermonuclear holocaust which would result from Rockefeller's success.

The collapse of the new Oil War and Hoax took away both the carrot and the stick which Rockefeller had hoped to use to bring the world capitalist community into line. The carrot—petrodollar reserves available for loans—were now dwindling due to decreased oil consumption and the link to the comatose dollar; the stick—oil price rises and rationing—had to be wielded openly by the cartels and the increasingly unpopular Mr. Kissinger, not blamed on the oil-producing nations. Not surprising, political chaos began to reign, despite attempts by Kissinger et al. to bring order by

banging their shoes and their heads on the tables, at meetings of the IMF and other so-called authoritative agencies.

In mid-January of 1975, the ICLC picked up on two otherwise little-publicized Soviet proposals for using the ruble as a trading reserve currency, to launch a worldwide campaign to dump the dollar and increase East-West trade on the basis of a Euro-ruble backing. Since that time the Euro-ruble proposal has been the most lively topic of discussion in bankers' and industrialists' circles on both sides of the Atlantic— perhaps only less discussed than the latest anti-Kissinger joke. Yet, fully realizing the political implications of a break from Rockefeller, the hesitant ones have increasingly agreed, and refused to act.

The next steps came from the pro-socialist Third World countries—the OPEC bloc led politically by Iraq and Algeria, and economically by their need for secure revenue in the deepening depression. At the Ninth Arab Oil Conference in Dubai on March 12, the oil-producing nations fielded a proposal for a $35 billion development fund, $10 billion of which would be earmarked for countries like Bangladesh and Niger from Arab oil revenues. There was no visible international response, despite the fact that the ICLC blasted the news all over the place. Meanwhile the Soviets and Iraq embarked on major redevelopment efforts in Asia, moving to consolidate India, the recently liberated Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia into a Eurasian Development bloc. More whispering in Europe.

On April 24—as the collapse of trade and production reached new and deadly lows—U.S. presidential candidate LaRouche called for the replacement of the bankrupt dollar and the IMF by an International Development Bank committed to fostering world trade and development. At the time of that announcement, LaRouche, who had just returned from a trip to the Middle East, made it clear that the Third World countries such as Iraq or Algeria would endorse the IDB if some major political force within the advanced sector, such as the Communist Party of France (PCF), would come forward first. Since that time both Algeria and Iraq have made abundant statements to the effect of proposing negotiations on raw materials for development—but the PCF and major bourgeois factions are still holding back.

The initial hesitations of the Soviets to commit their currency to a new monetary arrangement based on *international* production and trade have been thrown aside. Over the past month Yuri Ivanov, Soviet Foreign Trade Bank chairman, made a major speaking tour through West Germany to push the Euro-ruble and its advantages; unexpectedly generous trade deals have been given to countries like England and France; Comecon has recommitted itself to integration of their economies and to aid for the Third World. With Soviet support, Indira Gandhi has declared a peasant debt moratorium and initiated a policy of reconstruction beginning with agriculture. Only

the industrialists in the capitalist sector have not yet dared move out of the Rockefeller orbit.

There is no mystery why the industrialists, yearning for Soviet contracts and facing economic ruin or thermonuclear destruction at Rockefeller's hands, have not moved to grab the Soviets' offer. Look who they are: in West Germany, the Krupps, the Smoke-stack-Barons who — with Rockefeller backing — fielded Hitler; in France, the Gaullist barons, immersed in the glories of the colonies, gold and La Belle France; in Italy, Cefis and most of the industrial association, veterans of the Mussolini experience that decimated the Italian working class. These are the agents who faithfully served Rockefeller when he brought Europe to its knees during the Allied Occupation, and more or less faithfully ever since. They have no love for the working class or for a renaissance of production, science and knowledge.

Yes, as they have plastered all over their financial pages during the past three months, these gentlemen would like to break from Rockefeller's dollar vise. But they are deathly afraid of another force they have seen before as well — a working-class upsurge unleashed by new detente toward the Soviets. Their plan is a shadow of the old Rapallo, the 1923 treaty between defeated Germany and the Soviet Union: make peace for economic survival now, so as to make better war later. The working class — as the industrialists can see by the Communist electoral victory in Italy and the mass-strike ferment spreading throughout France and Italy — can be expected to use an IDB-based economic agreement as a springboard to the end of capitalism itself.

The industrialists are in a bind. The austerity currently being forced on them by Rockefeller's Dollar Empire will itself further fuel mass-strike mobilization in Europe. On June 23 mass mobilization between the PCF and the German Communist Party (DKP) against the nuclear threat began. If they hope to continue to govern, the European industrialists have to move fast — with debt moratoria, expanded-East-West trade, the IDB. The American occupation of Europe must finally be ended.

Toward an International Communist Movement

More devastating than the U.S. domination of her European satrapies since World War II has been the CIA's ability to create an environment of "national communists only" for most of the postwar period. In part, this lack of cohesion was enforced by playing on the paranoia of the Soviets through the combined threat of cold war and repression. More insidious was the inside job.

The key operators — Amendola, Segre and Pajetta — rose to power in the Italian Communist Party (PCI), for reasons that will be easily understood after reading this issue's feature piece. To this day they hold high office in both the PCI presidium and the Italian Institute for Foreign Affairs (IAI), an openly

CIA-connected think-tank. It has been the PCI that has championed the anti-Soviet campaign on Czecho-slovakia within the working class; it has been the PCI which has carried the banner of "polycentrism," every country to its own way; it has been the PCI which has taken the neurotic susceptibilities of the Italian working class and put them to work for NATO, creating fascist bodies as international "communist" models while denouncing the Soviet Union's international efforts against fascist organizing drives.

Hence it is fitting that the international communist movement — a movement unknown since the Comintern, but different in that it is integrated and guided by common strategic and programmatic considerations — should have taken its first major step forward on the faces of the PCIA agents. The day was March 22; the place was the PCI Congress in Rome, a congress attended by as many official government ambassadors and Social Democrats as fraternal communist organizations. The speaker was Domingo Abrantes from the Portuguese Communist Party, who denounced the CIA as the real saboteurs of democracy in Portugal and renewed the pledge of the PCP to fight for rapid agricultural and industrial development of Portugal within the framework of expanded trade with the Soviet Union and its allies. There was massive applause; the PCIA leaders slunk away.

Beginning on March 16, when Rockefeller used his press to signal an all-out red scare and invasion plans against Portugal, the ICLC had mobilized internationally to prevent the bloodbath and to rally international programmatic support. Most CPs were split down the middle — afraid to take a public stand. Not so the Berlinguer-Amendola leadership of the PCI. Following CIA orders, they used their press to denounce the PCP and made an executive decision not to allow the PCP to address the Congress.

It was the ICLC's vigorous agitation for the PCP, its reconstruction program and its position as a bell-weather for all European CPs that won mass pressure among the international delegates and allowed Abrantes to address the room and the world. This was the first victory of the real PCI against Amendola, et al. and of the international communist movement against "noninterference" in the affairs of Second International agencies like the PCI.

Since March 22 the catalytic force of the ICLC and the gravity of the Rockefeller nuclear threat have accelerated both the coordination, and the CIA house-cleaning, of the European CPs. Our goal has been to organize the left Social Democracy, fractions or entireties of Communist Parties, and other workers' organizations into a reconstituted International Workingman's Association.

The call for the IWMA, issued on April 1 in every major European capital reads in part as follows:

> 1. We are launching a campaign to reconstitute Marx's IWMA as a programmatic united-front organization unifying Communists, honest social democrats, ourselves, and other working-class forces for unified action against the Rockefeller criminals and their Vienna International accomplice butchers.

> 2. To this end, we are proposing the reconstitution of the IWMA, in part, to avoid confusing this united front with an actual international party such as the old Communist International. This distinction is essential because the development of the workers' movement does not yet permit realistic consideration of a sufficiently mass-based actual international party, and because efforts to constitute a party would tend to exclude or at least deter participation by numerous healthy forces which can and must be rapidly unified on the basis of existing but limited extent of agreement on fundamental socialist principles.

> 3. At the same time, revival of the IWMA clearly and efficiently emphasizes a common association with the leadership of Karl Marx.

> 4. Commitment to the IWMA will be representative of those working-class and allied forces who are unconditionally opposed to all of the forms of resurrected fascist economic and social policies presently being advanced by Tavistock-linked and other Anglo-American intelligence institutions through principally the CIA-controlled Vienna International and CIA-controlled trade union leaderships. This includes both those economic and social policies openly acknowledged as imitations of Mussolini, Hitler, and Strasser, or Schachtian precedents, and also similar forms—such as "local control," "local autonomy," "autogestion," "social contract," "co-determination," — which are being pushed under the more euphemistic catch-all description of "corporatism."

> 5. The general positive programmatic basis of the IWMA is proposed to be based on the following principal points.

> (a) In opposition to the Rockefeller-sponsored and explicitly fascist policy of "Zero Growth" and genocidal "triage," our immediate global economic development program for the present bankruptcy of the "Dollar Empire" is accelerated development of already industrialized nations and developing-sector regions based on a central commitment of rapid emergency development of worldwide agricultural potential.

> (b) We are committed to expanded economic cooperation with the Comecon sector as an essential component of that basic immediate development program.

> (c) We are committed to the broadly-based "brute force" acceleration of development of controlled thermonuclear reactions as the basis for a general qualitative worldwide transformation of industrial technology to be realized during the last half of the 1980s.

> (d) Wherever possible and as rapidly as possible, we are committed to the establishment of workers' governments in the presently capitalist sector, and absolute, unconditional defense of all workers' governments, trade-union rights, and political organizations.

> (e) Where the establishment of workers' govern-

ments is not yet feasible, we campaign for and defend debt moratoria against major categories of carried-forward debt—and emphasize that this is the only possible form of minimal reform action by which the absolute industrial collapse of the bankrupt capitalist sector can be stopped.

Since the IWMA call, the European CPs, under Soviet direction, have taken several major steps toward international programmatic unity. Foremost has continued to be the defense of the PCP, with Moscow's propaganda attacks hitting increasingly true to the mark of the Social Democratic saboteurs in that country, and with the PCI coming under increasingly direct attack for undercutting the PCP. Equally significant, however, has been Soviet intervention with the Middle Eastern CPs and the Latin American parties. Both series of meetings resulted in major policy statements: one from Havana repudiating Maoism and the popular front; one from the Iraqi CP proposing three-way development deals resembling the IDB.

Throughout the past two months CPers in France and West Germany, in particular, have collaborated with the European Labor Committees in ridding various locations of Maoist thugs and nuclear bomb advocates. Many more have expressed their disgust at Amendola and other PCI renegades, and clamored for more understanding of the IDB and the world political situation. An intense educational process has begun.

Leading the education campaign within the Communist parties have been the PCF and the East Germans. Just this last week these efforts bore public fruit when Mies of the DKP and Marchais of the PCF announced joint action against Schlesinger's nuclear strategy for Europe. The effect of such an action will not be lost on those within the CPs who doubt the "practicality" of such international deployment. President Giscard, for one, found this the occasion to develop amnesia, and promptly announced that he had never committed himself to Pluton deployment in West Germany.

We have in motion, de facto, the core of the IWMA: the PCF, the PCP, the DKP, the pro-Moscow wing of the Greek CP, General Lister's Spanish Communist Workers Party (PCOE). The program is being clearly enunciated by Moscow and the East bloc; even Romania, with its Maoist crown prince as head of state, has been convinced not to play her disruptive agent role nowadays.

All that remains to block the upcoming East Berlin European CPs conference from inaugurating an internationally coordinated campaign for world development, from forcing the bourgeoisie to break from Rockefeller for trade with the Soviets, is the agent-ridden leadership of the PCI. How will it be removed? We know that over one-half to two-thirds of the membership hates Belinguer's and Amendola's guts. We know that the recent 33 per cent vote for the PCI was a vote for revolutionary politics, not the historical compromise. We know that the European Labor Committee's program of expanded food and tractor production is widely known and respected. No leaders have yet stepped forward to mobilize the class on this program—yet at any moment, at any further Rockefeller-Agnelli provocation, this could happen.

On the Threshold

The world stands on the threshold of the greatest dangers and the greatest promise it has faced in decades. Rockefeller will use any political loophole to try to clamp down his police terror regime. His vision is 1946: terror bombing of millions in Japan, massive European communist parties doomed to impotence, whole populations starved into submission. Again he aims to be lord of the rubble—the rubble of Brazil, Western Europe, and the United States.

The other alternative is not paradise, but a fight. The battle cry is human development, beginning with the creative effort that gives life to political cadre, and continuing with the fight to educate the labor power, the human minds, which can rebuild the world. It is this battle, waged relentlessly by the ICLC, which has played an indispensable role in bringing the world to the brink of the post-Rockefeller era. The continuation of battle is what will create the forces qualified to realizing that potential.

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The Miracles and Martyrdom of Saint Antonio Gramsci

by A. Varga

Part I of the following article was published in the February-March 1974 issue of The Campaigner. Now the Italian Communist Party (PCI) leadership's brazen display of its agent role in the past months makes Varga's dissection of the true history of the Italian left more important than ever. To clarify the point for readers who have not yet read Part I, the editors provide a short summary below.

PART I

Central to the Italian ideology is anarchosyndicalism, the left-wing militant expression of chauvinism which, despairing of control over whole processes, hysterically flings its frustrations against local expressions of its own impotence: "my" factory, "my" local capitalist. What makes Italian anarchosyndicalism special is its curious historical crooked location. The classical dilemma facing most European and U.S. socialists as they approach confirmation age and must choose between the holy churches of Trotskyism and Stalinism does not transpire for the Italian. By virtue of the particular predicates of Italian labor history, the two variations of left ideology offered him are regrettably those immortalized by Antonio Gramsci and Amedeo Bordiga.

It is necessary to document the failure of the revolution in Italy and at the same time measure both the political bankruptcy of even the early PCI and the sheer idiocy of those impotent leftists in Italy today who are seeking out some figure of pre-PCI purity (i.e., Gramsci) to imitate.

For clearly identifiable psychological reasons, the great majority of left groups, including the Communist Party, pay homage to Gramsci, but resurrecting the myth of September 1920, when workers nationwide played out Gramsci's script by occupying the factories. Identifying with the glory of martyred defeat that the occupations led to, the left lashes out at the union and party bureaucrats held responsible for the missed revolution, and doggedly strives to recapture the dream by replaying the base-building comedy and urging workers to take over the factories again. When this fails, the left characteristically throws itself into a moving reenactment of the Popular Front anti-fascist resistance myth.

The lonely minority of Bordighist sects, far more embittered by the fact that not even Italian labor

history has bothered to pump life into the rigid corpse of Bordiga, sneer in angry disapproval at Gramsci, their familiarity with the pain of constipation is such that they dare not even contemplate the dream.

The immediate task, then, is to dispel the myth of Gramsci, to tell the true, squalid story of the occupation of the factories.

What Really Happened

In the period immediately following World War I, inflation and the collapse of military production sparked mass radicalization of Italian workers. The Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the trade unions recruited massively. Simultaneously the ferment within the working class produced a core of young revolutionary intellectuals in the PSI, who pushed the party (nominally a member of the Communist Third International) to apply its revolutionary rhetoric in practice. The Ordine Nuovo (New Order) faction — initially composed of Antonio Gramsci, Angelo Tasca, Umberto Terracini, and Palmiro Togliatti — led the battle against the PSI's centrism and, having failed miserably, contributed to the formation of the Communist Party in 1921.

Ordine Nuovo's gimmick was the factory council, in which Gramsci and his colleagues saw the "germ of a soviet." These councils, which functioned in effect as militant caucuses within the trade unions, grew tremendously through 1919 and 1920.

Ordine Nuovo's anarcho-syndicalist dream became reality in September 1920. Throughout the spring and summer of that year the class battle had sharpened, with strikes, general strikes, and lockouts the order of the day. When Italian industrialists, banded together in a Confederation of Industry, the Confindustria, moved decisively with one lockout after another around the country at the end of August, the PSI and the FIOM (the militant metalworkers' union) found to their horror that their threat to occupy the factories in such an event was being carried out in every factory employing metalworkers. Now the party leaders and union bureaucrats were concerned only with how to honorably extricate themselves from this unexpected imbroglio. They all tacitly agreed that the revolution would have to wait until some later date.

The workers had seized the factories, but they had no idea what to do with them. Now that the programless revolutionaries' penultimate objective had suddenly been reached, the workers could do nothing but — continue production. The working class remained divided into a myriad anarcho-syndicalist parts. Workers locked up in "their" individual factories labored on, peasants occupied some land and public buildings, and the thousands of unemployed looked on in despair. Virtually every sector of the working class population was clamoring for revolutionary leadership, albeit without recognizing the meaning of revolution. What the workers got was stinking Catholic humility, bred by simple fear.

While the PSI and the unions did everything to prevent the upsurge from spilling out of the plants, Gramsci could only emit compassionate utterings about the grandeur of the workers who were "organizing production" by themselves. Bordiga, in Russia at the time, abstained from action on the entire affair, true to form.

With no serious revolutionary perspective to turn to, workers and their allies took it for granted that the occupations would end with the timely return of the capitalists, who would reward the work done in the occupied factories with the good old pay envelope. The result could only be deep demoralization.

Absenteeism was already a problem in the first week of the occupations, and workers had to be searched to prevent theft of tools and materials. By the end of September the workers — tired, demoralized, and half-starved after weeks of no pay — were willing to accept anything that was offered. The referendum presented by the unions on ending the occupations passed by a more than five-to-two margin and, with nothing gained, the factories emptied one by one.

Within months the Fascist *squadristi* (terror squads) were roaming the streets, destroying every working-class organization they could lay hold of.

The Italian Ideology

That this crushing defeat is still not even recognized as a defeat by the left is tragic evidence of the magical worldview fogging the minds of the Italian left.

The chauvinist emotion that leads Italians to glorify their most backward regional characteristics, to see revolution only in terms of the individual factory, is an emotion associated with the private sphere of the home, where mother's magic and the horrors related to it dominate the infant's world. The overwhelming impoverishment of Italian working-class and peasant life accounts in part for the particular brutality that the normal bourgeois hampering of creativity in the young child assumes in this country. That neurosis, dogging the child into adulthood, takes its social form in the Italian ideology.

It begins early in life. The Italian mother suffocates the potential for humanity in her child by sadistically thrusting on him the image of the beautiful child, the pathetic fragile weakling whose cultivated ill-health provides her with the pretext to pamper, coddle, and stuff him full of suppositories. To be loved, the child must suffer, especially physically. This actually begins even earlier: the pregnancy and, above all, the delivery of the child must be as painful to the mother as possible, so as to existentially guarantee that the child, suffering and causing suffering, is alive.

Thus the child becomes an object, a wind-up toy who gains approval by performing and wins sympathy by falling ill, all in substitution for the love that was snatched from his cradle. The masochism instilled in the child assumes the proportions of universality.

The *cazzista's* only act of rebellion against being suffocated by Mama, the madonna-whore, is that of a frustrated child. To show off his destructive potential and challenge her to reject his awesome bestiality, he throws a tantrum, or later masturbates, or still later goes out whoring. All to enact the fantasy of liberation while actually forcing his mother to reaccept him, guilt-ridden, into her suffocating embrace.

Life for the Italian left is likewise an apparently endless traipsing between the bordello bed-chamber and the chapel, between hell-raising anarcho-syndicalism and the Popular Front. The individual worker and militant must locate his political as well as personal identity in a symbol of defeat and suffering, crowned by death. Thus the tragedy of 1920, the sellout of the Resistance, the aborted mass strike process of the late 1960s are all taken as signposts along the *via crucis* of the Italian workers' martyred journey to self-destruction. Defeat after glorious defeat, they plod on with stedfast faith in their boundless capacity for pain. Each left grouplet, where possible, has its own canonized martyr, and shares certain extreme cases of martyrdom with the PCI — as in the case of Gramsci.

The Case of Gramsci

The single most important individual in the Italian socialist movement, the theoretician of the Councils and founder of Ordine Nuovo, was Antonio Gramsci. And yet, oddly enough, he was nowhere to be found during the occupation period. Somehow, he had always just left. As soon as workers occupied the factories, Gramsci suspended publication of his faction's newspaper — and instead wrote anonymous articles in *Avanti!* the daily organ of his PSI factional opponents. When workers got hold of him and clamored to move outside the factories, he argued that it would be too dangerous. When defeat loomed, he told the workers that they needed a communist party — but when they began to factionalize to that end, he cried, "No, wait!" The same tragic cop-out syndrome is demonstrated in Gramsci's writings. Gramsci thrust on the factory councils the responsibility of being the "model of the proletarian state," thus inadvertently developing a left-wing version of "Swedish Way" corporativism, and trapping Italian workers inside their factories.

Gramsci was not ignorant. He had read what he could of Hegel and Marx, he had followed developments in Russia and Germany, had thought long and hard about the revolution. But he was emotionally ill-equipped to grasp *processes*, the dynamics of revolutionary organizing and program.

Gramsci's childhood reads like a gothic nightmare.

Though all accounts describe him as a beautiful blue-eyed child with curly blond hair — a real "flower" — he was always sick. At the age of four he had a three-day hemorrhage accompanied by convulsions. His mother, Gramsci recalled later, bought a small coffin and special little suit for his burial, which she kept until he was 23. Soon after he "miraculously" recovered, Antonio's physical deformity began to manifest itself; a bump on his back gradually grew into a hunchback. In an attempt at cure, his mother strung him up in a kind of chest cast hung from the ceiling for hours on end, to "straighten him out."

Antonio's solace was intellectual work. Early on, he fought to compensate for his unloved status — embodied in his physical deformity — by being good at school. Yet throughout his life intellectual effort was possible only if accompanied by physical suffering, necessary for him to be cared for, and at the same time cause and proof of his not being loved. Plagued by migraine headaches, loss of memory, fevers, Gramsci sought to find in intellectual work, particularly in writing, a "secret self" that had all the strength and potency he lacked so desperately. Gramsci's writings are therefore fantasy-dominated and full of a sense of magic: the "inevitable" flow of history is supposed to make the factory council the "primary cell" of the revolution, etc. Nowhere in his writings is there any sense of how this is to come about, nor could Gramsci pose the question in terms of dynamic processes — because the essence of magic is precisely this mechanist notion of reality as governed by unseen forces propitiated into action by incantation.

When Gramsci got annoyed at workers who asked him what to do, he was actually saying: The councils are there, so they should act as my theory dictates. When psychological and sociological reality intruded and the magic didn't work, Gramsci was upset and fled the scene. Terrified by the chaos of potential expansion that the 1920 upsurge threatened, Gramsci clung to the old familiar formation, the factory council. The workers, faced with a vacuum, could only play out the suicidally limited anarcho-syndicalist dance. What was lacking was a sense of expansion of the struggle in a form — the soviet — capable of concretizing and carrying that potential to ever vaster layers of the class.

Gramsci sabotaged the one great moment for his own creativity by saying no to the workers' demand for something more. He masochistically censored his own incipient creativity in order to preserve the suffering self. By sabotaging the objective situation that could have freed him, he doomed hundreds of thousands of workers to misery and despair.

PART II

When the tidal wave of the 1920 factory occupations abated in Italy, the empty hulk of a working-class organization lay on the shore, dismembered and abandoned. The survivors, joining with fellow comrades who had been absent during the explosion, wearily set to the task of salvaging the salvageable.

The Communist Party of Italy (PCd'I) was the result of that effort.

Born of the 1921 split from the Italian Socialist Party (PSI), the new PCd'I struggled in vain to learn from the lessons of its recent past and to halt Mussolini's drive for power. For two years the party battled for existence in the midst of the most brutal civil war the country had ever known, and lost pitifully. What was involved was not primarily a military defeat; the unnecessary butchering of communists, socialists and trade unionists came as a direct result of the PCd'I leadership's criminal *political* stupidity in those years. Both the Bordiga and the Gramsci factions, which had blocked to found the PCd'I, obstinately, persistently oriented *against* the only tactic that could have rallied demoralized working-class forces to a successful struggle against Mussolini. This is true for the period between the occupation of the factories and the fascists' march on Rome in October 1922, as well as for the period immediately thereafter, when Mussolini was pulling together a nationally disciplined fascist machine.

The tactic was the united front, as it was developed at the Third Congress of the Communist International. But the PCd'I refused to apply it. In none of the documented cases in which potentially revolutionary working-class forces spontaneously groped towards classwide fighting alliances, did Gramsci or Bordiga provide the necessary leadership to consolidate the thrust programmatically and wipe out the emerging fascist hordes.

The price paid for the errors of 1921-23 can not be calculated in terms of civil war casualties or losses in Communist Party membership. Twenty years of fascist dictatorship not only decimated all working-class activity, but effectively brainwashed the workers movement to such an extent that the revolutionary ferment sparked by World War II could be channeled into alliance with a U.S.-engineered "progressive" capitalist reorganization of power.

The lesson has not yet been learned by the Italian left. The Italian Communist Party today, in its explicit effort to "overcompensate" for the errors of the pre-fascist years, is corraling its restive rank and file into a death embrace with leading capitalist forces, under the guiding hand of the American CIA. It is crucial to the survival of the working class in Europe today that this incestuous tryst be energetically broken up and the viable layers of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) drawn into the growing momentum of an inter-national programmatic united front drive. To do so, the working class must have the courage to stare into the face of the much-debated first years of the PCd'I's existence (tragically, paradoxically, also the last years of its existence as a viable political formation) and understand the nature of the self-righteous, fear-bred sectarianism that sabotaged united front organizing and sealed the proletariat's doom. Such a defeat will not be repeated.

The Sacred History

The PCI itself has devoted relentless energy to examining and reexamining the party's origins, whenever the occasion demanded. Giorgio Amendola, right-wing factional leader of the PCI, recently proposed that party history be again reviewed (and implicitly, rewritten) to suit his counterinsurgent aims. Amendola, in his umpteenth attempt to demonstrate the PCI's "autonomy" from the Soviet Union, contends that the party founders erred in splitting from the PSI over the issue of membership in the Third International; better, he implies, if they had been anti-Soviet and nationalist from the start.

Amendola learned the tricks of the Stalinist editorial trade from Palmiro "Hercules" Togliatti, his mentor. In 1945, when Togliatti implemented his "Salerno turn" toward the "national road to socialism," he needed to make reference to past PCI history, to foot-note his move towards the bourgeoisie and the Catholics so as to incorporate it into one continuous line of party policy. In his first public proclamations of the new line in 1945, updated repeatedly in later years, Togliatti launched the PCI's official fairy-tale history. The story goes that Bordiga, a petit-bourgeois Neo-politan engineer, drove the PCd'I to ruin and was personally responsible for the victory of fascism; that Gramsci, who had learned his lessons in Leninism in the factories of Turin, knew Bordiga was wrong but hesitated to launch factional struggle because of his fear of being "confused" with the right wing led by Angelo Tasca; that Gramsci in 1923-24 (after studying "in the school of Lenin and Stalin" during his stay in Moscow) saw the light and moved in on Bordiga to re-make the party and put it on the right track. *(1)* The "new" party thus formed under Gramsci in 1924-26, according to the legend, rediscovered Marxism and elaborated strategy in terms of the "historical bloc" of anti-fascist forces.

Togliatti thus continues the vicious attack on Bordiga initiated in the 1920's in coordination with Comintern efforts to oust the abstentionists and Trotskyists, and "saves" Gramsci in order to have a pure Communist figure to be the continuation of. Togliatti affirms his right to a niche next to Gramsci's by citing his early collaboration with him in the Ordine Nuovo period.

The irony of Togliatti's version is that it is in a sense correct, though at the same time completely fictional.

As a closer examination of the "facts" will show, there was no significant difference between Bordiga's and Gramsci's political behavior from 1921 to 1924. Both actively sabotaged the united front, *as did Togliatti along with them.* But at the same time, Togliatti's yearned-for "continuity" does indeed exist, for even in the early years of Gramsci's control of the party, his fundamental orientation was towards precisely that style of class collaboration which Togliatti sanctified twenty years later in Salerno.

How The PCI Was Born

In a 1923 letter to Togliatti, Gramsci wrote, "The Livorno split (the separation of the majority of the Italian proletariat from the Communist International) was without a doubt the greatest triumph of the reaction." *(2)* He was perfectly right, but not because the split occurred or because the resultant PCd'I represented a minority. Rather it was the way the split occurred and the reasons behind it — both from the point of view of the International and of the Italian parties — that guaranteed the triumph of the reaction.

In the autumn of 1920 Italian workers were recovering from the September defeat and fighting both unemployment and fascist attack. Their vanguard, represented by the left wing of the PSI, was organizing itself as a national faction in preparation for the desired split from the party. Amadeo Bordiga assumed leadership of the "pure communist" faction, as it came to be called, the coalition of Bordiga's Soviet faction and the forces around Antonio Gramsci. In preparation for factionalizing nationally, Gramsci had reestablished unity with Tasca, Terracini and Togliatti in Turin. The faction, which united officially on October 15, also assimilated a "maximalist" group under the leadership of Anselmo Marabini from the Emilia region, and worked throughout the fall and winter months to extend its influence nationally. Simultaneously, the political reshuffling process in the PSI led to the consolidation of a majority tendency around Serrati, known as the "unitary communists" or "centrists" and a right-wing minority, the "concentration," led by Turati.

Both the communist faction and the Comintern saw the inevitability, and necessity, of a clean break from the corrupt, reformist PSI, but for significantly different reasons. The Comintern leadership, convinced that the Italian situation was still ripe for revolution, urged Bordiga et al., to expel the reformists, whom Lenin and Zinoviev saw as responsible for not providing tactical objectives to the workers during the September upsurge. Turati, D'Aragona and their ilk were therefore to be booted out of the party.

Bordiga and Gramsci, on the other hand, still did not fully appreciate to what extent the September strike wave could have been funneled into a revolutionary seizure of power. Furthermore, they read the

workers' demoralization as an indication that the necessary conditions for revolution were lacking. Nonetheless they felt they had to break away from the PSI. Terracini, writing to Gramsci and Togliatti in 1924, recalled their state of mind in 1921: "Our party was formed in a moment when not one of us posed the problem of the seizure of power as an immediate task; it was instead a question of saving from foreseeable ruin something capable of further development." *(3)*

The real motivation for drawing together a pro-Comintern faction and effecting the split was to conserve a working-class organization that would be recognized as the sole representative of the International in Italy. It was a psychological more than a political issue; the organic leadership of the class (Bordiga, Gramsci, etc.) wanted thus to disassociate itself officially from blame for the failure of September. This is clear from the way in which the "pure communists" reacted to Serrati before, during, and after the split.

Serrati had grouped a majority around him on the basis of his desire to adhere to the Third International with "autonomy" to adapt and interpret the famous 21 conditions for membership according to the specific national situation. Serrati also openly organized around the assumption that the party's main task must be to grow, since no opportunity for revolution seemed at hand. He therefore shared the unvoiced pessimism of the "pure communists."

Serrati's opportunism and centrism drove the communists wild with rage. Instead of polemicizing with Serrati and his followers on the basis of their at least verbal commitment to the Third International, in an attempt to organize them to effective commitment, Bordiga and his comrades attacked Serrati more viciously than they did Turati in an effort to destroy him, precisely because Serrati represented what the communists could not bear to face in themselves. Thus the conference proceedings that marked the stages of the faction fight were characterized by hysteria and violence, not political discussion.

The Imola factional conference held on November 28, 1920 provided the occasion for Bordiga to express the emotional content of the "political" issue with Serrati. When Graziadei of the Marabini tendency asked how the communists could come to terms with Serrati's faction and win over its viable elements, Bordiga literally threw a fit. He refused to allow representatives of Serrati's group to speak and called a caucus of his own group to protest the very suggestion. In answer to demands by the Marabini group that Bordiga's private meeting be broken up, Bordiga "grabbed hold of a large knotty stick and gave a terrifying beating to the chairman's table." *(4)*

From what leading factional leaders claimed to believe about the political situation, it would have been possible and necessary to thrash out principled political differences. Serrati, it has been said, thought the period was not revolutionary and therefore oriented

towards expansion of the party apparatus. Gramsci stated at Imola that the seizure of power was imminent, and Bordiga foresaw a coalition government of the Social Democracy coming to power. Despite this glaring disagreement on political perspectives, no serious strategic or tactical questions were discussed. It was evident that none of the contending factions had a program for taking power, so nothing more than ritual references to "the party" (Bordiga) and "the factory council" (Gramsci) were made.

Imola was in every sense merely a dress rehearsal for the Seventh PSI Congress (5) held in Livorno (Leghorn) January 15-19, 1921. "The sessions of the congress which took place at the Goldoni theater," according to Jules Humbert-Droz, representative of the Swiss Socialist Left, "were tempestuous, violent, passionate, and profoundly disappointing." (6) Most disappointing was the fact that no one faced squarely the two issues psychologically dominating the conference: the growing fascist threat and the failure of the factory occupations. While the first question was simply ignored, the September events continually emerged in the debate in a manner that clearly indicates the psychological situation associated with these two topics.

The nominal issue of debate was the question of membership in the Third International, but from the beginning of the animated congress the factory occupations occupied center stage. Recriminations, accusations, and pleas of self-defense flew through the congress hall as each factional spokesman desperately sought to exculpate his group from the deadly burden of guilt weighing over the delegates. All discussion of the 21 points, the Russian Revolution, violence, etc., served merely to concretize the real subject — guilt and inferiority.

The Third International delegation, made up of Kabakcev and Rakosi (7) contributed to focusing on the occupations as a way of motivating implementation of the 21 conditions, specifically regarding the expulsion of the Turati right wing. Kabakcev made no concessions to Serrati either, attacking him for having underestimated the revolutionary potential of the September ferment and for opposing the expulsion of Turati & Co. The Serrati *cazzisti* lost no time in responding. "The representative of the International, Kabakcev," writes Humbert-Droz, "was booed and insulted, his speech continually interrupted by invectives and manifestations of hostility. While Kabakcev spoke, Serrati's supporters from the gallery released a flock of pigeons. (8) As if this were not enough, Serrati, ostensibly attempting to quiet the assembly, begged the delegates to listen "even if we feel belittled by criticisms we deem mistaken...We have to accustom ourselves to the Comintern comrade's crude ways. We'll respond in our own fashion and show we are right." (9)

Kabakcev persevered, and made some reference to programmatic considerations as he insisted on the need to coordinate the revolution in Europe as a way

of defending the Soviet Union. But the sense of his argument was lost on the Italians, who were shaken by the mention of Russia. The *fact* of the Russian revolution was itself the greatest psychological threat to the Italian movement, because of their failure to replicate it in Italy. In defending the outcome of the September occupations and attacking Russia, they knew no limit.

Baratono, a speaker for the Serrati faction, answered Kabakcev. Prefacing his remarks with ritual approval of the 21 conditions, he immediately denied the revolutionary character of the Italian strike wave: "If the government let things happen for reasons of its own, this does not mean that there was a revolutionary situation in Italy, since the factories were occupied peacefully." He then turned his attention to Russia: "In Italy, a dictatorship of a class elite, necessary in a situation like the Russian one, could not keep power because the Italian psyche is different from the Russian; unless of course it was willing to continually put rebellious comrades to death." (10)

Such an anti-Soviet rubbish, the *leit-motif* of the congress, served to rationalize the gutlessness of the PSI leadership in a mass strike situation. Turati, the most blatant traitor of the September period, was not surprisingly the most anti-Soviet: "Turati expressed the conviction that when the 'Russian myth' (not to be confused with the Russian revolution which he admired) evaporated, it would appear under the dominant aspect of an oriental nationalism which would have enormous influence in world history as an opposition to the nationalism of the Entente, and which was now desperately grasping at the Italian Socialist Party in order to save itself; the PSI could not follow Russia blindly or become its tool...this could not be imposed by the larger international of the most developed peoples." (11)

In the mouths of the "centrists," the idea that Italians are inherently different from Russians motivated a plea for special status in the International. In asking for special treatment in accepting the 21 points, first Lazzari (of the "intransigent" sub-faction) and later Serrati specified that it was not the substance of the 21 points they objected to, but the "mode of application." They meant that they wanted the prestige of Comintern membership but were not to be expected to put any of its "rules" into practice.

When the communist faction intervened the debate immediately approached the boiling point. Terracini launched an attack on the CGL unionists for selling out the occupations, and used this to argue for expulsion for all PSI reformists. CGL leader Baldesi, a key figure in the September sell-out, answered the attack by turning it against the Turin group. "As far as the factory occupations are concerned," he said, "they ended in success because the Milan resolution...established the tendency towards recognition of workers' control of the factories. If this has not yet been implemented, one cannot forget that it took 54 years to win the eight-hour working day, so you can't effect workers control in the short space of three months." Moreover,

Baldesi continued, one shouldn't forget "the indiscipline...of some men in Turin who, without any authorization, had spread the strike and talked up the revolution, to then come to the (Milan) congress and say the proletariat was not armed." *(12)* This reference to armed struggle hit a sore spot central to the *cazzista* gesturing during the Milan "General Staff" meetings in September. *(13)* The fear gripping union and party rightists, as well as the militant Turin group, had become manifest in those meetings precisely around the question of armed struggle, a question which came up at the Livorno congress in the debate on violent versus non-violent forms of struggle. The point of the debate was that those who in 1921 were predicting a violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie (the Bordiga faction) were doing so mainly to assert their revolutionary virility and simultaneously attack that of their factional opponents. The challenge of "who is a real revolutionary" (i.e., a real "man") implicit in the debate could only unleash the most neurotic reactions. Vacirca, a member of the "intransigent revolutionary" subfaction, delivered an emotionally charged defense of pacifism specifying that even when faced with fascist violence the PSI should practice nonviolence.

> A reference made at this point by Vacirca to the situation in Bologna *(14)* where preaching violence had, according to the speaker, worked against the Socialist Party, provoked a reaction on the part of Bombacci, at whom Vacirca shouted, holding up a pencil-sharpener in his hand, "pencil-sharpener revolutionary!" Bombacci then rose excitedly from his chair, drew a pistol and aimed it at Vacirca. This act provoked the immediate reaction of the other delegates and for forty minutes invectives, shouts and threats were thrown back and forth with unheard of violence leading to an authentic fist-fight. Emotions were calmed partially only when Roberto clarified that Bombacci did not intend to threaten Vacirca with his gesture but rather only respond to the latter's invective and gesture... *(15)*

As Humbert-Droz summed it up, "it was more a circus show or a boxing match than a socialist congress." *(16)*

Out of this circus the PCd'I was officially born. On the last day of the congress three motions were put to a vote, expressing the major factional alignments. Serrati's group moved that the PSI accept the 21 points with freedom to adapt and interpret them according to the national situation; in addition, the motion favored maintaining the "glorious name" of the PSI. The "Imola motion" presented by the Gramsci-Marabini-Bordiga faction called for adherence to the Third International, a change in the party's name to the Communist Party of Italy, and an incompatibility clause barring "concentrationists" and all others opposed to the Third International from membership in the party. It further demanded that the CGL-PSI pact be broken and that the socialist-dominated union leave the Amsterdam (Social Democratic) "yellow international" to join the "red union international." In listing the principles upon which party organizing and propaganda should rest, the Bordiga motion emphasized the violent overthrow of the state, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the use of electoral work as a means of propagandizing revolutionary ideas. Turati's clique presented a third motion paying lip service to the Third International but posing the same conditions as contained in the Serrati position. It incorporated Turati's earlier expressed anti-Soviet sentiment in a clause refusing totalitarianism for "democratically developed people intolerant of authoritarianism" and specifically ruled out violence, though it did not exclude a socialist seizure of power under the "right" conditions. *(17)*

The vote was a foregone conclusion. Given the way the communists had conducted their factionalizing, they won only 34 per cent of the vote, while Serrati consolidated a 57 per cent majority and Turati picked up 8 per cent. When the results of the vote were read at Livorno, Bordiga stood up to announce the separation of his forces from those who had voted for the Serrati motions. Such traitors, he said, had voted themselves out of the communist movement and were, therefore, to be abandoned. The communists, at Bordiga's signal, then left the hall, singing the *Internationale* and marched down the street to reconvene in the San Marco theater. What followed was more a demonstration than a constituent assembly, *(18)* but a leadership for the new party was at least formed. Reflecting the factional composition of the PCd'I, it included Gramsci and Terracini from the Ordine Nuovo group, Belloni, Bombacci, Gennari and Misiano (formerly "maximalists"), Marabini, Repossi, and Fortichiari, as well as the Bordighists: Bordiga, Grieco, Parodi, Sessa, Tarsia, and Polano. Since Terracini, Repossi and Fortichiari were already aligned with Bordiga, and since Gramsci accepted de facto Bordiga's leadership, there were no doubts as to who would actually govern the party apparatus.

There are indications that the International, and especially Zinoviev, expected a minority right-wing split which would have given the new party a healthy majority. *(19)* This was based on the assumption that Serrati would be won over to the Comintern's demands. Paul Levi, also present at the Livorno congress, organized in fact towards that end, but the resistance he met with on all sides — from the Bordighists, Serrati himself, and the Comintern representatives — crushed his endeavor. In February Levi illustrated the problem arising from such splits:

> There are opportunists in our midst; we will live through splits to the right and left in Germany too, in the same way as I had considered the right split in Italy in the direction of Turati as absolutely necessary, because it could be carried out by keeping the masses, who are in favor of the Third International. To continue: it is possible that we too may have splits in Germany from the right and from the left; if, however, the process of the training and creation of still more stalwart cadres — and all of us are in need of more training — is to be achieved by means of repeated splits, then I say, comrades: communism will not survive the next split in Germany. *(20)*

Levi's fears were well founded. Later developments in Germany and Italy leading to the failure of the revolution demand that the question of the splits in the Social Democracy be dealt with. This involves examining the PSI split briefly from the point of view of the two non-reformist factions, before passing on to an analysis of the weakness of the Comintern policy on this issue.

In the case of the Italian split, the viability of the new PCd'I clearly did not depend on relative numerical strength or weakness. Nothing, theoretically speaking, should have prevented the communists from winning over the PSI rank and file as well as part of its leadership to the new party, thus extending its influence over the masses as a hegemonic institution. Why they did not succeed in doing this will be developed below, but is in part already clear from the course of the factionalizing in 1920-21. The Livorno documents prove that the split occurred only *incidentally* around the issue of membership in the Third International; all three factions in fact renewed their adherence to the International, at least verbally, in their motions. That issue was not the purpose of the split. Gramsci, Bordiga and Terracini all later acknowledged that they left the PSI to salvage a "nucleus" of a working class party *(21)* but why was it necessary to exclude the Serrati majority from the nucleus? Why was the fight waged primarily against this faction? Bordiga left no doubt as to who the real enemy was in the fight when he wrote:

> The Livorno split was essentially and prevalently an act of struggle against centrism...We fought against Turati and Modigliani to the end, *but Serrati, we hated him* ...The main obstacle was not the reformists, but maximalist centrism. *(22)*

The key to understanding such bitter hatred lies in the overwhelming psychological repercussions of the factory occupations on the communist faction. Terracini, Togliatti, Gramsci and Bordiga were unwilling to face up to the implications of their failure in September, and therefore seized on Serrati as the scapegoat. Serrati, it must be remembered, had not even been in Italy at the time of the occupations. Gennari, who had been a leading figure in the "General Staff" meetings, had exonerated himself from blame by joining with the communists at Livorno and on that occasion stated that the CGL had been responsible for the sellout, for not having followed his line! Real responsibility for the September abortion lay squarely on the shoulders of these men who were the most vocal in shouting traitor! Their aim, therefore, was to identify Serrati as the culprit and to separate their ranks from Serrati's in order to distinguish themselves from the PSI. To purify themselves from guilt they appealed to the higher authority of the Comintern, to whom they swore dutiful obedience, and demanded that the Comintern recognize them as the real revolutionaries.

In the majority PSI faction the same psychological process was at work but in slightly different form. Knowing that the Italian left leadership as a whole had been incapable of defining transitional programmatic steps to seize power in September, the Serrati group, because it was formally identified with the leadership, bore the brunt of the blame. To fight the painful sense of inferiority particularly vis-a-vis the Comintern leadership, the Serrati group chose to emphasize its distinct identity as different from the Russians. Thus the plea for special considerations, the polemic against violence, the anti-Sovietism, and the claim to success in winning workers' control in September. That there were no fundamental political differences to occasion the faction fight and split (except in the case of Turati, who had actively and knowingly collaborated with the enemy) is evident in the devastating lack of political discussion at the congress. What explicitly different strategic conceptions did appear to exist were simply not discussed.

The International encouraged factionalizing in that period throughout the European Social Democracy and favored splits wherever they ripened. Kabakcev and Rakosi acted on established Comintern policy in Livorno. *(23)* And Lenin was ruthless in his demand that reformist elements like Turati be expelled from the movement, even though many "good communists" might be sacrificed in this necessary surgical removal of the right: *(24)*

> If men like Baratono, Zannerini, Bacci, Giacomini, Serrati hesitate and resign, we must not beg them to remain, but we must accept their resignation. After the period of decisive battles they will come back and will be more useful to the proletariat. *(25)*

If Serrati were not willing to break with the right wing, then, Lenin reasoned, Serrati had to be sacrificed. But on what programmatic basis was the purification of communist ranks to be carried out? Clearly Lenin's compromise solution at the Second Congress in 1920 — the famous 21 points — represented no solution at all; the formalism of the 21 point resolution itself betrays the Bolsheviks' lack of understanding of the problems involved in the European revolutionary movement. Levi had more insight into the problem:

> ...I think that on the whole question of the Italian split there has developed an all too mechanical view in the minds of our Russian friends and of the representatives present in Italy as well...it seems to me that the comrades did not clearly realize that splits in a mass party with a different intellectual structure than, for example, that of the illegal Russian party — which performs brilliantly in its own way — *cannot be carried out on the basis of resolutions, but only on the basis of political experience* ...It was a mistake on the part of the Italian comrades as well as the ECCI, because the political differences had not been clearly enough worked out; they were not strong enough against the Turati people, though I continue to be of the opinion that they would have been sufficient. But in the understanding of the masses there existed no cause for a split with the Serrati people... *(26)*

In opposing "splits by resolutions," Levi is identifying that aspect of Comintern policy which most crucially hindered the Russians' understanding of what was actually happening in Italy. By dictating formal rules for membership, Lenin unwittingly opened the door to a purely formalistic relationship of the Communist Parties to the Comintern, a formalism that was to function as a protective cover for a political battle whose real nature, as in Livorno, never became self-conscious for the protagonists themselves.

What was wrong with revolutionary organizing in the European movement, as the Italian factory occupations dramatically underlined, was that it lacked revolutionary leadership, it lacked leaders equipped with the necessary conceptual tools to map out strategy along programmatic lines and alliances. The problem of the Bolshevik leadership was that it was unable to communicate the conceptions underlying the successful organization of the 1917 revolution to communists in Europe; (27) nor was it capable of recognizing the lack of such conceptual understanding — what Levi perhaps alludes to in his mention of the "intellectual structure" of the socialist parties — until after the fact, after the failures in Germany and Italy. Had Lenin been fully apprised of the intellectual weaknesses of the Italian leadership, he would not have voiced loud approval of Gramsci's Ordine Nuovo at the Second Congress, (28) just as he would not have supported Bordiga in 1921 and later. In his *Left Wing Communism and other Infantile Disorders*, Lenin had dealt with the idiocies of Bordiga's ultraleftism, but that did not prevent him from backing Bordiga in the fight against Turati and Serrati. In both cases, Lenin supported whatever Italian faction waged a fight against centrism, out of necessity, but did not at the same time identify and root out the vicious flaws especially of Bordiga's but also Gramsci's theoretical and psychological foundations. More important, the Bolshevik leadership as a whole mistook the symptom for the disease: the real obstacle to the revolution in Italy was not so much Bordiga's and Gramsci's misleadership — though this was the *form* in which the problem appeared — but rather in the ideological bases of the entire Italian labor movement, the ideology firmly imbedded in the rank and file, which explains why thousands of workers tolerated such rotten leadership both in the PSI and in the PCd'I. Clara Zetkin came close to grasping this in her appraisal of the September events, when she asserted:

> I see something more, comrades, that is that the masses that had risen up in Italy had not made greater progress than their leaders; otherwise, if the masses had really been inspired by revolutionary will, if they had been conscious, that day (the day the "General Staff" voted to end the occupations—A.V.) they would have booed the decision made by their party and trade union leaders and they would have committed themselves to the political struggle. (29)

Without waging a concerted, sustained attack on the ideology of the masses, there could be no hope of significantly altering the political behavior of the party. No simple expulsion of individual leaders could work the needed miracle.

The case is exactly the same today. There can be no plausible explanation for the fact that more than a million and a half self-defined communists tolerate the leadership of the CIA-directed Amendola clique, unless one takes into account the ideology which makes the Amendola machine run: an ideology of nationalism which preaches class collaboration with capitalist-Catholic forces, while at the same time flattering itself with internationalist pretenses in the form of Catholic solidarity for Third World national struggles and bureaucratic "relations" with other communist parties. (What crowns such nonsense is the irony of the fact that Amendola himself is organizing *internationally* against the working class!) This neurotic aberration, even on the part of well-meaning communist rank and filers, cannot be taken seriously as commitment to international working class struggle just as the PCd'I's formal adherence to the Third International could not be interpreted as a commitment to revolutionary practice. That is what Lenin could not grasp.

Lenin's view of the Western European mass organizations was obfuscated by his own successful but totally different experience with the Russian movement. He could pinpoint centrist tendencies in Turati, Serrati, et al. but did not investigate the specific national ideological basis for those tendencies. He thus strove to whip the Italian party *formally* into line, assuming that the obvious (to him) lessons of the Russian Revolution would inform the Western Communist movement once its ranks had been cleansed of Social Democratic traitors.

Then as now, program is key. Although the Bolsheviks oriented to successful revolutionary upsurge in the West as the necessary basis for carrying out socialist transformation in Russia, thus implicitly acting on a programmatic understanding of the contribution of especially German industry to the Soviet economy, they did not make this program the basis of organization for the International. Necessarily, the issue of class alliances was never clear to most leaders of the Western movement (with the notable exception of Luxemburg and Levi, whose approach was vindicated at the Third Congress). there could be no scientific basis on which to determine class alliances in Italy, for example, without a process-conception of the way in which the economy would have to be reorganized within a European context directly related to the new Soviet state.

Similarly, there is today no valid criterion for determining who is a communist and who is not, within the PCI's ranks or the PSI, without knowing what program must be implemented to save the working class from disaster. The needs defined by expanded reproduction, the conceptual basis for program, immediately indicate the imperative of

Palmiro Togliatti (center) presides at a meeting of the PCI leadership in the early 1960s. Among those present: Berlinguer (behind flowers) and Amendola (second from Togliatti's left).

East bloc agriculture on the basis of east-west trade. Class allies necessary to impose this program are actually defined by the programmatic concept itself; without the forces represented by the mass-based Communist and Socialist Parties as well as the trade union movement, Gastarbeiter and unemployed organizations, neither the political muscle nor the required labor force would be available for its implementation. The expulsion, therefore, of Amendola, Pajetta, Segre and company is in this context necessary, not because they are generically "reformists" or whatever, but very specifically because they are actively and knowingly sabotaging urgent working-class alliances with European and Soviet bloc forces for socialism. Their explusion from the PCI is necessary but, conversely, it is not in itself sufficient, for were a healthy opposition to mobilize to send them packing, that in itself would not guarantee the success of the programmatic united front thrust. Purging the Amendola clique would surely clear the air and would represent an important tactical success for the movement as a whole. But it is only the beginning, a subsumed feature of the larger process of organizing the explosive potential of party ranks into an international programmatic front. If this is not done, new Amendolas will proliferate like venemous mushrooms.

This conception of program, based on the process-conception of expanded reproduction, was utterly unknown to Gramsci, not to mention Bordiga. No evidence could be more convincing to make this point

than the turmoil, confusion, and sabotage which characterized the PCd'I's encounter with the united front tactic.

The United Front Through A Magnifying Glass

In the summer of 1921 the united front was at the forefront of the debate within the Third International, in polemical juxtaposition to the suicidal "theory of the offensive" responsible for the tragic "March Action" in Germany. Terracini, speaking at the Third Congress for the majority opinion of the PCd'I, hailed the March Action as "useful" because it had "contributed to tearing the mask off many opportunists." (30) The image of a bloody putsch action must have appealed to the Italian communists, who thought the March Action typified what should have happened in Italy in 1920. Lenin spared no words in attacking Terracini's anarchistic idiocies and accused him of wanting to make "sport" of the polemic against the right wing. Vindicating the correctness of Levi's viewpoint, Lenin hammered away at the basic idea that the communists, to lead a revolution, must win hegemony over the masses. (31)

The Third Congress laid the basis for the united front both theoretically and practically. Three representatives of the PSI invited to the congress, Maffi, Lazzari, and Riboldi were grouped together as the embryo of a *"terzinternazionalista"* faction (dubbed

the "terzini"), which was supposed to carry out a factional battle within the PSI while the PCd'I was instructed to wage the battle from the outside. The task defined was to polemicize against the Serrati leadership of the PSI *in order to win over the majority of the party to the terzini*. But the PCd'I leadership, faithfully represented by Terracini's speech, was unanimous in denouncing the united front and in setting out to discredit Serrati *and the PSI as a whole*.

To appreciate the degree of stupidity demonstrated by the PCd'I leadership in its refusal to apply the united front tactic, it must be remembered that during 1921 Italy was in the throes of a civil war and that Italian workers were desperately seeking the means to fight unemployment, inflation, and fascist goon squads. Since winter, 1920 the fascist onslaught had assumed a novel character. Bands of paid hooligans, recruited mainly from the expanding ranks of unemployed and lumpenized workers, traveled from city to city to wage armed struggle against every working-class organization in the country. Moving up from the agricultural region in Emilia, Mussolini's *squadristi* wiped out "in the course of the first six months of 1921...seventeen newspaper offices and printshops, 59 *Case del popolo* (working-class meeting houses), 110 Central Labor Councils, 83 Peasant League buildings, 151 Socialist Clubs, 151 Cultural Clubs," *(32)* anything and everything a worker considered his. From Emilia the wave of terror swept rapidly over the north, in April attacking the Venetian, Tuscan, Ligurian, Lombard and Piedmontese working-class strongholds. The fascists made no distinction between communist and socialist organizations; their aim was to kill the "reds."

In response to this qualitatively new form of terror, significant layers of the population, especially workers and World War I veterans, spontaneously formed defense groupings. Known by the name *Arditi del Popolo* (the "People's Shock Troops") from their inception in the spring of 1921, they spread rapidly throughout the summer to major areas in Italy. Inspired by strong nationalist anti-fascist sentiment utterly devoid of conscious working class program, the Arditi were looked upon with suspicion by the PCd'I. Nonetheless, they represented the only organized resistance to the fascists and *for that reason alone* won the sympathy of the masses of workers. "In workers' ranks, the thrust towards a united front began to be felt: 'red' battle formations and the Arditi del Popolo marched together through the streets of Rome for the first time in early July." *(33)*

The PSI was quick to dissociate itself from the movement, and the PCd'I did not wait long to follow suit. In August, they declared "in an official communique" that the Arditi were untouchables. *(34)* In doing so they "threatened the severest sanctions against any communist militants who were affiliated with the Arditi del Popolo. They were not to join or have contact with them. Workers participating in the

Arditi...were invited to leave in order to join the military organization of the Communist Party!" *(35)* The justification for this move, presented in an official PCd'I report to the Comintern on November 7, was that Argo Secondari, an Arditi leader, was suspected of being an agent provocateur. *(36)*

Although in Moscow incomplete and conflicting reports on the Arditi made it difficult to hand over a similar verdict, the Comintern leadership had no doubts about what a Communist Party should do when confronted with an anti-fascist working-class-based movement:

> It is clear that in the beginning we were dealing with an organization with a proletarian and partly petit-bourgeois base rebelling against terrorism...Where were the communists at that moment? Were they busy examining the movement with a magnifying glass to see if it was sufficiently Marxist and in conformity with the program?... The PCI should have immediately energetically penetrated the Arditi movement, won over the workers and in that way transformed the petit-bourgeois elements into a sympathetic periphery, denounced the adventurers and eliminated them from leading positions, and put trusted elements at the helm of the movement. The Communist Party is the brain and the heart of the working class and for the party there is no movement the masses join which is too base or too impure. Think of the past of the other fraternal parties, especially the Russian party. Zubatov's movement was organized by the head of the Moscow secret police, the January 1905 uprisings in St. Petersburg were led by Pope Gabon, a semi-adventurer, semi-spy who then became a complete spy. Did all this prevent our Russian comrades from energetically joining the movement, unmasking the agents and drawing the masses to the party? On the contrary, thanks to their active participation, they hastened the October 1905 revolution, because through such spontaneous actions they succeeded in dominating mass movements that were conditioned by historical events. *(37)*

For the PCd'I this was inconceivable. First of all, Bordiga's "position" on fascism was that it would ally with the Social Democracy and form a government no different from any bourgeois democracy (which by his definition was the same as fascist). His "position" on alliances was that anyone who agreed with the communist program for "the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat," etc., must join the party on an individual basis. Therefore his "position" on the Arditi was: nothing doing. Terracini's position was that the entire movement was nothing but a maneuver of the capitalist class because the Arditi, instead of fighting for a revolution, were fighting "for defense of laws violated by members of the bourgeoisie and for the reestablishment of the authority of the State, threatened by civil war." *(38)* Gramsci was more subtle, but nonetheless cautious. "Are the communists opposed to the movement of the Arditi del Popolo?" he asked. The answer was vague, but symptomatic:

> Quite the contrary: they aspire to arming the proletariat, to creating a proletarian armed force capable of defeating the bourgeoisie and presiding

over the organization and development of the new productive forces generated by capitalism...

> But if this is what the communists think, because of the objective facts of the situation, because of the relation of forces with the adversary, because of the possibility of dominating the decay and chaos created by the imperialist war, because of all the elements that cannot be inventoried and about which one cannot always make an exact calculation of probability, they (the communists — A.V.) at least want the political aims to be clear and concrete, they don't want to have what happened in September 1920 repeated... *(39)*

Gramsci's words were addressed to a member of the Socialist Party who had joined the Arditi, and whose motivations, therefore, were to be considered suspect, to say the least. *(40)*

The Arditi, isolated from both PSI and PC'dI, were helpless in the face of the police repression unleashed against them in the autumn, and by October they were reduced to insignificance.

The episode was indicative of the difficulties the Comintern leadership was to come up against from late 1921 through 1922. Their attempt at a solution was equally indicative of their inability to grapple with the problem. At about the time official united front statements were issued from Moscow, the Comintern moved to reshuffle the PCd'I executive, hoping to minimize opposition to the tactic. Chiarini, representative of the Comintern in Italy at the time, summoned Gramsci to Rome in early October and, on orders from Moscow, offered him a position in the executive to "counterbalance Amadeo's influence and take his place." *(41)* Gramsci declined the invitation, as he was to do on future occasions, and remained faithful to Amadeo, whose positions he fully shared.

Thus when the Italians went to the enlarged executive meeting of the Comintern Executive Committee (ECCI) in February 1922, they blocked with the peasant-minded anarchist tendency represented by the French and Spanish delegations and bluntly refused the united front. Terracini was eloquent:

> To arrive at some unity of action, the Social Democrats would have to take something out of their program, or else the communists would have to abandon theirs...The proposals should be addressed only to the trade union organizations and not to the political parties, and, if possible, they should not be sent by the Communist Party, but by the central committee of every union group...The united front question, posed clearly and precisely by the Executive, has created enormous confusion in the locals. We've had to go into the locals and explain that it was not a question of concluding agreements with our enemies of yesterday...The tactic of political agreements in Parliament will cost us many supporters...maybe we'll win over a hundred thousand workers, but we'll lose at least a thousand communists. I prefer to see these thousand comrades stay with us... *(42)*

He then promised that if the united front were voted in, it "would not be applied in any country, not out of

indiscipline, but because of internal reasons." *(43)* Regardless of the deliberations of the meeting, the PCd'I leadership went back to Italy determined not only to sabotage the united front, but to prevent anyone in the party from knowing about it.

The PCd'I elaborated its official "no" to the united front at its second party congress in March 1922, in the form of the famous "Theses of Rome" written by Terracini and Bordiga and supported by the entire leadership. The theses emphasized the purity of the party, established that only individuals, not factions, could join and ruled out united front action except on the trade union level. Furthermore, the document declared that in the event of a Social Democratic government (which Bordiga believed was imminent), the PCd'I should not lift a finger to defend it, even from the fascists!

Gramsci, according to PCI historian Paolo Spriano *(44)* opposed the political united front along with the others and reacted especially negatively to the "workers government" proposal made by the International, which allowed the possibility that the communists might take part in a coalition of working-class parties in government. According to Angelo Tasca, Gramsci was more explicit at the meeting:

> In this congress Gramsci addressed his criticism not against the "Bordighist" positions, but against the danger of an excessive widening of the political united front. "If the Congress," he said, "accepts generic formulas contrasting with the theses presented by the Executive (the "Rome Theses" — A.V.) it will be thought that our notion conforms to the widespread idea of the masses, according to which a united front could be extended even to the Partito Popolare." *(45)*

The Partito Popolare was a peasant-based mass party, of Catholic inspiration, which Gramsci did not want to touch. Not yet.

Humbert-Droz, whom the International had sent to the Rome congress along with Kolarov, did his best to support the Comintern viewpoint but found more obstacles in his path than he could have imagined. In his 1967 recollections he described the confusion and intrigues he faced:

> Certainly, the situation was most confused. The leadership of the Italian Communist Party had not made widely known to the party the December 1921 theses on the united front. The resolutions and discussion of the February enlarged Executive meeting were not known to the delegates, not even to the Central Committee members. The vast majority of delegates knew nothing of the conflict between the leadership and the International. They had received the imperative mandate from their sections or federations to accept the Rome theses without knowledge of the International's opposition to them...This Congress had not been prepared democratically... *(46)*

The Presidium of the International had in fact sent the PCd'I a document before the Rome Congress viciously attacking the theses and had specified that they not be

The cover of a 1933 French pamphlet.

ROMAIN ROLLAND
ANTONIO
GRAMSCI
CEUX QUI MEURENT DANS
LES PRISONS DE MUSSOLINI

put to a vote. The PCd'I did not make the criticism available to the party delegates, and Terracini arriving from Moscow after the Comintern representatives, announced that Moscow had decided the theses could be put to an indicative vote. *(47)* Everything in the congress preparations indicated that the Bordiga group had deliberately finagled to win the congress's approval of the theses in order to then be able to return to the assault on the Comintern policy with a semblance of party support.

The only honest thing about the congress was the communists' ignorance and hostility; Humbert-Droz, in his confidential report to the Comintern leadership, documented this conclusively:

> The discussion internally indicated gross confusion on the united front question. The comrades considered it as a "fusion" with other political parties, a "bloc" in which the Communist Party would be obliged to give up part of its organizational and political autonomy, etc. *(48)*

After Kolarov and Humbert-Droz had intervened to explain what a united front was, members of the PCd'I

leadership assailed them with questions centering around the possibility of their resignation from leading positions: should they resign if the congress didn't approve the theses? did the International want them to resign? wouldn't it be better for them to resign if the International had a new tactic for Italy? — all indicating their willingness to exit rather than confront the political question raised by the united front tactic.

The congress voted in favor of the theses, and though the vote was officially considered only indicative and not binding, it provided Bordiga with the desired ammunition to aim both barrels at Moscow.

Significant in the Second Congress proceedings is not only the evidence pointing to the PCd'I leaders' mental block on the united front and their hysterical sectarianism. It is the manner in which they organized their opposition to the International that reveals the psychological point at hand. Faced with the directive to ally with the PSI and other working-class forces around a minimal platform to defend the workers from fascism, they skirted the issue and resorted to

infantile strategems to sabotage united defense measures. Terracini and Roberto (49) were tight-lipped about the discussions they had participated in while in Moscow, the leadership withheld the International's criticism from its own Central Committee, and, when the game was called, they all ventilated the threat of resignation. Like naughty children they connived, whimpered and fibbed until caught with their hands in the cookie-jar; at which point they pouted and threatened to run away from home. Explanations abound to rationalize such execrable behavior, of course. The major argument was that if the PCd'I entered joint action with the socialists, the masses would not understand why the communists had left the PSI in the first place. Gramsci was in full agreement at the time, and only years later claimed he would willingly have opposed Bordiga except that he didn't want to be "confused" with the minority right wing emerging under Tasca, the only leading figure who fought consistently for united front action. (50)

Bordiga's position is most revealing. By claiming that the united front would jeopardize the historical validity of the Livorno split, he in effect, admitted that the purpose of the split was to define his faction as clean of blame for past failures; at the same time, he betrays the programmatic vacuum of the Livorno events. The underlying notion was: if the PCd'I works with the PSI, *then it is no longer the PCd'I*! In other words, it is the PCd'I only insofar as it does not collaborate with the PSI; it has no identity and therefore must define itself by simple negation! This obsession with formalistic self-definition, the content of most of Bordiga's endless outpourings, is nothing but the psychological correlative to his chronic political constipation marked by loud, clearly articulated farting, and his quasi-magical dread of contact with the unclean PSI. Bordiga was so appalled at the idea of touching the PSI's dirty underwear that he was simply unable to move; he maintained his position on the throne only by forcefully reiterating promises of the historic act located eternally in the future. Grunting, grimacing, moaning, he sat firm and continued to wait for history to come.

With Gramsci the case is different, although the practical result was identical. If Gramsci's later reflections on the Bordiga leadership can be trusted, it is clear that Gramsci knew better. He had repeated insight into the petit-bourgeois mass character of the fascist movement and had characterized the period back in 1920 as necessarily the prelude to either revolution or brutal reaction. (51) And yet he systematically degraded his insights to the status of "personal opinion," and refused to fight Bordiga's insane fantasy of the coming Social Democratic regime. As the political situation worsened and the conflict between Bordiga and the International matured, he increasingly censured his own, often sound, judgment and blocked with Amadeo.

Repeatedly he stated, "Politically it would have been impossible to lead the party without the active participation of Amadeo and his group in the central work," that Amadeo was irreplaceable, etc. (52)

At the same time, Gramsci claims to have hesitated in contesting Bordiga's sectarianism for fear that such opposition would have placed him in Tasca's right wing. Aside from the fact that Gramsci and Tasca had interrupted close collaboration as far back as 1920, as a result of Tasca's preference for central labor councils to factory councils, Gramsci's irrational fear of this "confusion" with his factional opponent could only be interpreted as another manifestation of his deep-rooted insecurity as a political leader. From any sane standpoint, if Gramsci knew classwide alliances were necessary to prevent the fascist coup he felt was threatening, then hesitation to come out against Bordiga was pure stupidity. Who cares whether you are labeled a right-winger or a left-winger in the party if the policy you carry out is correct, if the lives of millions of workers depend on it? Why should it be more important to be "leftist" than to win a life-and-death battle for the working class? Surely a principled stand against Bordiga's sectarianism would have permitted Gramsci all the freedom he needed to thrash out significant criticisms he had of Tasca's tendency (especially in later years) to embrace alliances with bourgeois political forces. Tasca in 1922 had explicitly invited such healthy political discussion in the leadership, but to no avail. (53) Gramsci feared Tasca and feared the possibility that the International might want to use Tasca to destroy his position in the leadership. (54)

If Gramsci mistrusted Tasca, he was utterly overwhelmed by Bordiga, overwhelmed by his capacity to command, to speak in public (something Gramsci could not do), to play the role of the impressive *cazzista*. Because of his neurotic insecurity, Gramsci willingly subordinated his intellect to Bordiga's antics as if to a potent father figure. Significantly, Gramsci left party organizational work to this astounding character he considered "worth at least three" men, (55) and busied himself with trade union work, clinging still to the council organizing which had proven such a failure in 1920. Bordiga's uncontested authority over the party apparatus afforded Gramsci the necessary sense of security to bury himself in the private world of the factory council.

Gramsci's hostility to the united front must also be examined from this point of view. It was not just that he blocked with Amadeo out of fear; that same fear, evident in his dedication to factory councils, was directly related to his fear of mass movements. Bordiga's continued leadership over the party was the best guarantee that no such mass movements would ever come into being.

For the same psychological reasons, Gramsci repeatedly refused offers from the Comintern to

replace Bordiga and run the party himself. It was only in 1923-24, after more than a year's stay in Moscow, that he developed a strong enough sense of personal identity to win Bordiga's associates, Togliatti, Terracini and others, over to a new center position and take over leadership of the PCd'I. But the real meaning of this change in attitude on Gramsci's part cannot be understood unless it is seen in the context of a very different political situation in Italy: Mussolini had come to power and it was *too late*.

Ending With A Whimper

The year Mussolini came to power, 1922, marked the definite turning point towards the demise of the working class movement. If in 1921 there had been some chance of recuperating momentum in the class war through determined united front organizing, in 1922 that momentum was lost. Continued, even more exasperated sectarianism, renewed fascist terror campaigns, and misleadership on the part of the International all contributed to delivering the coup de grace to the agonized left. Little more than a whimper was heard.

The last chance for class-wide defence presented itself to the communists in the form of an ad hoc anti-fascist union alliance called the *Alleanza del Lavoro* ("Alliance of Labor"). Inspired by the railroad workers union, the coalition officially came into being in February and included virtually every branch of the free trade union movement. *(55)* Since the socialists still dominated the unions, hegemony over the Alleanza soon coalesced under their reformist leadership. But since the PCd'I had stated its willingness to join working-class alliances at least in the trade unions, it was to be expected that they would enter the Alleanza and fight for control over it. Instead, incredibly, they hesitated precisely as they had done in front of the Arditi and busied themselves with manufacturing plausible reasons for why they would not join immediately. Gramsci was not satisfied with the organizational form of the Alleanza and wanted it modified before he would deign to touch it:

> The National Committee of the Alleanza del Lavoro must, if it wants to live and develop, look for its organic base in a system of local committees elected directly by the masses organized in the various trade union centrals. Only the formation of this new organizational system, in which equal representation can be given to all the ideological tendencies living in the working masses, will signal the historical phase of the proletarian united front. To reach this aim, which the Central Committee theses to be presented at the next congress pose for trade union activity, the communists will work with all their propagandistic and organizational energy. *(56)*

Gramsci's specifications for "democracy from below" in the Alleanza had been promoted by the disturbing fact that trade union leaders from the major unions had agreed to form the National Committee! When, in March, the PCd'I finally pronounced its verdict on the Alleanza, it specified that the alliance could be effective only if it promoted a general strike. And in the party congress, where the "Rome Theses" were presented, Gramsci fixated on the need to form "unitary base committees" in the Alleanza to take the place of the defunct factory councils. In May when the Alleanza organized a meeting with representatives of all democratic political formations, the question of armed insurrection was broached; because of the desperate situation of the working class, the Alleanza had already been involved in local working-class revolts in the first months of its existence. The PCd'I was "suspicious" of this talk of insurrection and therefore contented itself at the meeting with denouncing the hegemony of socialist reformists. *(57)*

Exactly as in the case of the Arditi, this hesitation and fear on the part of the working-class vanguard provided the fascists with the maneuverability necessary to coordinate *squadristi* action and rapidly defuse whatever potential the Alleanza held. As soon as summer arrived the fascists mobilized their now consistent forces and launched a nationwide campaign of "expeditions." The Bruening-style Facta government fell under the pressure of social unrest, and workers were paralyzed with fear. Separately, Mussolini, the Partito Popolare, and Giolitti canvassed the political map to formulate alliances for the next government, while the PCd'I renewed its refusal to engage in joint work with the PSI.

Finally, after weeks of bickering and confusion, the communists came to an agreement with the other forces represented in the Alleanza to call a general strike. This was July; in the meantime Facta had succeeded in patching together another Bruening-type operation. More importantly, the fascists knew of the strike plan and mobilized to crush it. By the time the appointed day for the strike rolled round at the very end of July, the majority of the working class was too demoralized or intimidated to take part; those who did participate found themselves face to face with armed fascists, forced to accept humiliating, bloody defeat. The decisive character of the massacre can not be contested: after August there were no significant moments of working-class action (except for a spurt of rear-guard strikes in 1925) for a period of twenty years. *(58)*

The Comintern executive had barked orders to the PCd'I throughout the summer months, urging them to launch a call for a united front government to fill the political void, but to no avail. All the promises the communists had made in June were empty formal speech-making: they would not work with the PSI. To further exacerbate the situation, the Comintern began separate negotiations with the PSI, which only increased the sectarian hostility of the communist leaders.

In autumn the situation came to a head. The PSI, at its Nineteenth Congress in October, voted to finally expel the extreme right wing, thus fulfilling the "conditions" for actual membership in the Third International. Bordiga's embarrassment was great! After years of whining about the PSI's refusal to take decisive action against the right, Bordiga and his self-righteous comrades now had to deal with the fact that Serrati had taken a major step. The way they dealt with it was simple: they refused to join with the new PSI regardless of the purge. Zinoviev replied to this hysteria with the demand, articulated at the Fourth Congress of the International, that the two parties merge completely. It was in front of this dreaded circumstance that Bordiga, Gramsci et al. gave the best documented proof of their firm intention to sabotage joint work at all costs.

One key episode sufficiently characterizes the degradation to which the PCd'I was willing to commit itself in order to "get" Serrati once and for all. After the Fourth Congress, Serrati planned to return to Italy and use his editorial position at the head of the PSI daily *Avanti!* to propagandize and prepare the fusion of his party with the communists. "But the Italian communists," writes Humbert-Droz, "who felt a morbid diffidence and hostility toward Serrati, convinced the Executive to keep Serrati in *Moscow. (59)* In this way, the anti-communist Nenni took over the newspaper in Serrati's absence and used it as the organ of his newly created "Committee for Socialist Defense," whose sole purpose was to prevent fusion with the communists.

Acting in full knowledge of Nenni's aims, the PCd'I leadership therefore was "pursuing a Machiavellian plan...to shelve the merger and unload the responsibility on the Italian Socialist Party." *(60)* Humbert-Droz is careful to specify, further, that "Gramsci and his old friends from Ordine Nuovo were in complete agreement with Bordiga against the merger." *(61)* Tasca confirms the fact of Gramsci's complicity, saying Gramsci was "hostile to the political united front with the socialists, because the PSI was a party of peasants and the PCI was a revolutionary party of workers." *(62)* The only terms under which the PCd'I leadership would accept the socialists were those of individual recruitment. Thus Nenni was given ample time to organize against and effectively prevent the merger.

Despite the Comintern's continued efforts to bring the remains of the two parties together, sectarianism and sabotage won out. In April 1923 Humbert-Droz described the PCd'I tactic to Zinoviev:

...the formal discipline of the party to the decisions of the International is in reality sabotage of its decisions. The party leaders make no effort to implement these decisions. In the current situation in Italy this mechanical, formal discipline is not enough. The PCd'I leadership, besides, systematically eliminates those comrades favorable to the merger. Tasca has been sent to Paris — they wanted to send him to New York!—, Berti, secretary of the youth organization, who has brought the majority...to be favorable to the merger, has been invited to go to the International Committee of the youth organizations! These are not isolated cases. The leadership is trying to eliminate the opposition which agrees with us. Rakosi told me that the party put a referendum to the youth organization in which each member was asked to say whether he agreed with the fusion idea out of discipline or out of conviction...*(63)*

While this kind of paranoid scheming dominated PCd'I activity, other working-class organizations crumbled and dispersed under the weight of the fascist mobilization. In October 1922 the Executive of the PCd'I presented this report to the Comintern: "wages were down by 30 per cent, there were a half million unemployed, the CGL membership had dropped from 2 million to 800,000, the Federterra was actually dismembered, reduced from about a million and a half to 200,000 members (many agricultural leagues passed, per force, into fascist organizations), the PSI was losing members at an increasing rate: from the 216,327 it had at Livorno to the 106,845 card-carrying members at the Eighteenth Congress (October 1921) to the 73,065 at the Nineteenth Congress (October 1922). *(64)* At the same time, unnoticed by both communists and socialists, Mussolini rode to Rome in a wagon-lit and assumed power. Soon there was to be no one left to have a united front with.

The Fascist Ideology

The common psychopathological feature of all the fascist's demands is infantilism. The fascist is a paranoid, who defines himself as such by his attempt to impose the principle of the autonomous extended family, and to block out the reality of a universality and rationality in the "outer world" as a whole. The notorious fact of Hitler's and Rudolf Hess's astrologers exemplifies this superstition of the fascist generally. Nationalism (mother country), racialism (mother), language-group (mother tongue), cultural affinity groups (family traditions), community (extended family neighborhood), natural (anti-rationalism), and so forth are all symptoms of potentialities for acute neurosis or semi-psychosis. They are characteristic of a propitiatory-associative (paranoid) world-outlook. *(65)*

The neurotic tendencies characteristic of the macho or *cazzista* personality were at the root of the Italian left's ignominious defeat in the early twenties. The insistence on council organizing in Gramsci's Ordine Nuove group in 1920 and later, coherent with the entire PCd'I leadership's refusal of the united front, betrays this mother-dominated view of threatening "outsiders." Outreaching programmatic relation to wider class forces, necessary from any sane standpoint, threatened to crush fragile ego-identity and was therefore systematically and deliberately boycotted. This frantic clinging to the fantasy of an inner, secret self, evident in Bordiga's hysterical protection of party

purity *no less than* in Gramsci's council theory, indicates that the extent to which both these leaders and the masses they commanded favored the integrity of the infantile self to the realization, through revolutionary upsurge, of adult, non-alienated selfhood.

That there existed any left movement at all in Italy, however, that it willy-nilly strove to identify somehow with the achievement of the Russian working class, testifies to the existence of a tormented struggle on the part of the more gifted, more relatively honest figures, especially Gramsci, to win out over the mother-domination of the entire cultural and political tradition of Italy. By locating themselves in the socialist movement, Gramsci, Tasca, etc. did nominally try to transform themselves, but they were condemned to failure because their ideological breeding ground was itself a product of the specific neurosis afflicting the class as a whole in Italy. Gramsci's fear of potency, for example, which prevented him on one level from contesting Bordiga's charade of leadership, was the same fear that held him back from relating to the idea of mass movements; and it was this fear that prevented him from developing the conceptual apparatus necessary to win hegemony over the Bordiga group. His alternative to Bordiga's sectarianism — the equally sectarian factory council — was simply no alternative at all. The real tragedy of Gramsci was not only that he waged his battle years too late, or that he eventually lost it to fascism, but that he himself had enough intuitive awareness of the power of his own neurotic fears to be tormented by his own inability to overcome them. He was, thus, in a very real psychological sense, a prisoner long before Mussolini put him behind bars.

Gramsci and other communists were able to recognize the revolutionary potency in Lenin but, after their traumatic defeat in 1920, they preferred more or less consciously to counterpose a self-conception of failure to Lenin (and therefore to contest the "authoritarianism" of the Comintern), rather than to locate their identity forcefully in after-the-fact awareness of what had led to the failure. That this process of simple self-consciousness was impossible underlines the fact that the point of departure for the Italian communists was the unchanging infantile ego; to understand fully the history of the aborted united front tactic in Italy, it must be viewed entirely as the pathetic self-defense of this infantile ego. Thus in 1923 and later, the worsening political conditions, instead of awakening the Italians to reality, drove them on the contrary into more extreme forms of the same illness. Although it is not worthwhile to detail the successive steps in the PCd'I leaders' degradation — after Mussolini's ascent to power left history reads like an endless obituary page — it is significant to note the characteristic behavior of Bordiga, for example, during the year 1923. This was the year of his great refusal. He continued to refuse merging with the PSI, refused to go to Moscow in the spring when invited by the International, and refused to participate in the PCd'I leadership or central committee. All he could say was "no," because he was by that time reduced even physically (when jailed briefly) to total inactivity, impotence. In a parallel process, Gramsci progressively abandoned all principle in an attempt to save Amadeo, which was equivalent to nursing a cadaver.

The only thing to survive and flourish in the aversive environment of the early 1920s was fascist ideology. As it developed lawfully though half-unconsciously during Mussolini's drive for power, fascist ideology offered the terrified peasant, petit-bourgeois and worker the total anarchistic "freedom" of pure insanity. In place of the left's blind, faltering attempt to support working-class struggle, regardless of how farcical an imitation of class struggle it was, the fascists offered in effect the denial of any struggle, or outright suicide. The fascist answer to the mother-domination of Italian political life is willing, indulgent capitulation; his response to the same psychological dilemma experienced by the left is equally blind but qualitatively different, and opposite. He is the *cazzista* who *wants* to be dominated by mother, who wants in effect to possess her. Thus, masked by the most impudent show of virility, the fascist mind returns *in triumph* to infantile fantasy, wallows in its brutality and horror, and willfully enacts the nightmarish act of self-destruction in politics through incestuous corporativism. Abdicating in this way to total mother-domination in its most psychotic extreme, incest, the fascist mind unleashes its infantile rage against any social force which may threaten to expose the actualized fantasy by counterposing to it the potent reality of human self-consciousness. The fascist therefore seizes on the working class with intent to kill.

The official ideology of Italian fascism grew out of the fascists' direct experience with these underlying psychopathological processes. Even before it became codified during the years of the regime, the ideology was the single key factor that enabled Mussolini to build his movement, even though his appeal to the psychopathology of his constituency was initially only an eclectic approximation of what later was to become law.

It was not under orders from the capitalist class that Mussolini and his brownshirts ravaged the country to destroy the workers movement, though such a fairy-tale version may have served to assuage the guilt of generations of communists. *(66)* Rather, *as a result* of their success in decimating the unions and the left parties, the fascists were acclaimed and financed by the Agnellis and Olivettis of the 1920s. This distinction is crucial in understanding how the fascist ideology could hegemonize significant layers of peasants and workers, even though Mussolini had no clear, preconceived plan of what was necessary from a capitalist standpoint. Mussolini's ignorance of

economics and finance, among other things, is easily documented. But what allowed him to rise above numbers of similar anarchist scum to take leadership of a fascist movement in formation was his violent determination to organize the crazed petit-bourgeois and peasantry around his own instinctual grasp of the paranoia they were driven to express. The point is not Mussolini was a madman (though clinical evidence would support a strong case to prove it) but that he typified through political action the process of transformation of the bourgeois ego under social crisis into hopeless infantilism.

When the storm of general economic and social crisis hits, the petit-bourgeois or peasant is thrown into chaos, is overwhelmed by what appear to his alienated vision as uncontrollable outside forces invading his formerly private, stable hideout (the home, the farm). Like a child thrust rudely into a hostile outside world, he panics; his immediate infantile reaction is to grasp at any piece of reality he can ferociously defend as uniquely his. Renouncing the struggle to become adult *in the absence of an adult mediating figure or institution capable of guiding that struggle rationally,* the individual ego plunges back into the pit of terror which characterized its early experience of existence. The magical, mother-dominated world of mechanistic cause-and-effect relations, associated with the various monstrous representations of the mother-figure herself, is to the frightened infantile ego the only realm of security available. *(67)* This irony — the ego running to sure self-destruction through preservation and perpetuation of infantilism under the threat of necessary (for human existence) evolution and deliberate control of those social processes initially responsible for condemning the ego to its impotence — is manifest when the ego has no sensuous understanding through social practice of its potential humanity. The backward peasant who has never glimpsed his own positive identity through programmatic understanding of his deliberate, political ordering of productive activity to contribute to expanded social reproduction as a whole, can have no sane vantage point from which to direct his actions and emotions.

When this is the case, as it was in Italy from 1919 to 1923, it is unequivocally the *fault* of the forces on the left. If the left does not comprehend such psychological processes motivating social change, it cannot effect the kind of self-development which is prerequisite to leading masses of workers, peasants, and portions of the petit-bourgeoisie into a fight for socialist power.

Mussolini, a left-wing anarchist in the PSI, *(68)* organized intuitively around these neurotic reactions. His explicit ideological commitment to nationalism (mine-ness) came as a result of his success in organizing backward layers against the communists and socialists. But the slogans he used were essentially identical to those recited by the

anarchosyndicalists who made up the PSI and later PCd'I. Mussolini was able to pass off his anarchist ravings as revolutionary doctrine only because the left historically identified Bakuninist anarchism with Marxist theory. Not only were the demagogic phrases Mussolini uttered identical to those emerging from the socialist and communist propaganda organs, but the very forms of struggle Mussolini supported actually anticipated those the left, and Gramsci especially, identified as revolutionary. This is clear in the fascist organization of peasants, as well as in one significant example of a factory occupation led by union forces which later organized the fascist corporative union movement.

In 1920 when industrial workers occupied the northern factories, farmworkers staged anarchistic revolts throughout the central and southern regions of Italy, and in many cases occupied the land. The Federterra, the socialist-dominated agricultural workers organization, intervened with the demand that crop-sharing be abolished and replaced by wage labor contracts, largely as a way of preventing the farmworkers from developing any organic or programmatic links to the striking industrial workers. While this obviously enraged the crisis-ridden landowners, who were already beginning to look to the scattered fascist forces for support, the fascists themselves launched the slogan: "To every peasant his land! To every peasant the entire proceeds of his holy labor!" *(69)* Underlying the demagogy was the plan to draw day laborers away from the socialist agricultural leagues and "give them their land" as tenant farmers, *(70)* allegedly to create a new rural bourgeoisie. Those farm laborers who hesitated were convinced by the terror which was simultaneously unleashed against them by the *squadristi.*

Thus the peasants, seeing their institutional identity in the leagues come under attack, retreated psychologically to embrace the certainty of "their land." To consolidate this new state of affairs, the fascists quickly gave rise to fascist farm unions and recruited massively both farm laborers and landowners. It should be no surprise that in the Ferrara area, the "electoral stronghold of revolutionary syndicalism," *(71)* this approach provided the fascists with their first substantial numbers of recruits. "On February 25, 1921 in San Bartolomeo, in Bosco, in the province of Ferrara, for the first time all the socialist leagues of one area passed en bloc into the fascist combat troops *(fasci di combattimento)."* *(72)* Not only were the fascist demands identical to the anarchosyndicalists', thereby attractive to farmworkers who belonged to socialist organizations, but among the fascist organizers were many ex-members of the left:

> The fortune of fascism in the Ferrara and in general the Po Valley region does not lie so much in this or that demagogic demand, but rather in the fact that among the prompters of the black squads were ex-revolutionary syndicalists and in general fugitives

from the workers movement, who, knowing well that the key to political hegemony in the rural regions ...lies in control over the union organizations, do not limit themselves to repression against the leagues, as the agricultural bosses pushed them to do, but they propose with determination to substitute for the reds, forcing farm laborers to belong to a new union organization of fascist character. *(73)*

A similar process characterized fascist takeovers in the Venezia-Giulia region on the Yugoslav border. There, in 1919-1920, the fascists exploited "normal" bourgeois ideological nationalism among war veterans, farmworkers, street cleaners, and postal workers who were unprotected by existing socialist unions, which oriented towards the Slavic minority. The fascists founded their own union and capitalized on the heated Italian-Slav conflict inherited from the war years to launch an assault in the name of "Italian-ness." With a combination of anti-Slav, anti-socialist propaganda and squad actions, they provoked such serious hemorrhages in the red organizations that the National Council of Fascism, meeting in Milan in October 1920, applauded their work as a model of future organizing. *(74)* It should be recalled that just weeks earlier, PSI and CGL leaders meeting in Milan to discuss the factory occupations had heard of the fascist attack in Trieste and had sent a telegram of support. *(75)*

In 1920 Mussolini had personally endorsed the factory occupations in his newspaper *Popolo d'Italia* and had made a personal visit to Buozzi to reiterate his support. At that time Buozzi and the CGL leaders were not yet ready to accept offers of collaboration from Mussolini, but the incident is significant for several reasons. In initiating his drive for power over the union movement, Mussolini did not really follow any theory (although his sympathy for factory councils was explicit), *(76)* but rather tried anything to consolidate two fundamental aims: destroy the left's hegemony over the working class in the eyes of both the workers and the capitalists, and substitute existing institutions with fascist organizations. This meant attacking the unions and the "pus" (his name for the PSI which had expelled him), but it also meant trying to coopt them if possible. The content of his drive remained at least superficially that of "workers' control," as specified in the 1919 party program. *(77)*

Initially Mussolini tried to destroy the CGL and FIOM by throwing the weight of his support to the nationalist UIL, which had been founded in summer 1918 under the leadership of Edmondo Rossoni. Rossoni had premised UIL policy on the notion that the union must be apolitical; he fought for union unity with the dim perspective of seeing production and distribution taken over by union forces. After the war he telegramed the head of state in Rome demanding reforms and launched the slogan: "From the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the Government of the Trade Unions." *(78)* In his newspaper *Italia Nostra* ("Our Italy") he specified that "it is not a question of

giving the workers involved actual possession of productive firms but only the technical management in the interest of the collectivity." *(79)*

The practical example of Rossoni's idea was supplied long before the left-hegemonized occupations of 1920. UIL organizers in February 1919 had been pushing for economic and shop improvements at the Franchi-Gregorini factory in Dalminenear Bergamo. The firm was willing to negotiate the demands, but the UIL called a strike to build up pressure; this elicited the threat of a lockout on the part of management, followed by the UIL's threat to break off talks. When the employers then said they would simply apply a settlement already reached with the FIOM, the UIL ordered workers to occupy the factory. On March 15, the workers took over the plant and, under UIL leadership, raised the Italian national flag over the plant. As a fascist historian noted years later, "It was the first time that a powerful mass of workers, though staging agitation against their own employers, did not abandon their work; rather they hoisted the tricolor flag on the plant flagpole and declared their intention to continue production in the interests of national industry and for the good of the people of all of Italy." *(80)* A UIL publication anticipated the sentiments of the socialist and communist workers in Turin's Fiat plant occupations in 1920 by boasting:

> We will demonstrate this way the maturity of Italian workers, we will begin the eight-hour day our own way, we will show that we can do with satisfaction in forty-four working hours what can be done in sixty hours of indifferent labor. *(81)*

This is exactly what thousands of workers felt in 1920 and what Gramsci hailed as "class consciousness"!

Mussolini followed the Dalmine events with unlimited enthusiasm. On March 19, 1919 he wrote in *Popolo d'Italia* :

> The refusal, on the part of the syndicalist metalworkers, to abandon the shop means the translation into action of the new orientation of the international working class, whose revealing characteristics have been discovered and studied by our newspaper. It is the mass of producers...which recognizes the damage that a traditional strike does to the class and to the nation. The formation of the "Council of Workers" which for three days has seen to the management of the plant, assuring its functioning in all sectors and departments, represents the honest attempt, the keen desire, the worthy ambition to replace the so-called bourgeois class in the management of labor. *(82)*

This was what Mussolini dubbed "the creative strike," the embryonic spirit of corporativism.

Rossoni's UIL, however, did not satisfy Mussolini, because its intransigence on the question of being apolitical excluded collaboration even with the fascists. For the next year or two, Mussolini therefore oriented to the plethora of "autonomous" unions *(83)* that sprung up in 1920 and his *squadristi* "helped" them organize in agricultural areas, among civil servants,

railway workers, etc. Mergers of small industrial or category unions, like the Fascist Railway Union, with other groupings mainly of a nationalist, autonomous nature, led to the rapid growth of fascist unions proper in 1920 and 1921. Out of the forces represented by such unions Mussolini founded his Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF) in November 1919, although the union structure was not controlled by the party directly.

In January 1922 a conference of fascist unions was called, as suggested by the PNF constituent assembly. Of the unionists present, two major factions emerged: one, led by Edmondo Rossoni (who had since left the UIL to command a Central Labor Council in Rome)*(84)* and Dino Grandi, continued to support the apolitical character of labor organizations; the other, led by Michele Bianchi and Massimo Rocca, called for direct PNF control. A compromise solution was found. The conference voted to found a general confederation of national unions, whose purpose would be to gather professional, intellectual, manual and technical activities together in one organism; leadership would be divided between the PNF and the confederation's central committee. Further meetings in January,

February and March ironed out the detailed functioning of the *Confederazione Nazionale delle Corporazioni Sindicali* (National Confederation of Union Corporations), as it was to be called. Single unions were still to be called *sindacati* and united under provincial federations, which would make up the national "corporations." (Mussolini preferred the term "corporation" because of its specifically national origin.) The national corporations, divided into five branches (industry and commerce, agriculture, theater, tertiary, seafarers) at this point were representative only of *workers* in each category, however. The problem therefore remained to incorporate the capitalists' national organizations into the fascist hierarchy of labor.

Armed with their new organizational status and PNF support, the fascist unions exerted tremendous pressure, through squad violence, on agricultural bosses to recruit them into the corporations; they also used their show of force and bravado as a way of pressuring Mussolini to take power. Throughout 1922 Mussolini had to repeat his intention to institute class collaboration, which was a way of trying to discipline

The editorial group of Ordine Nuovo, 1922. Gramsci is seated second from left.

the fanatical unionists and *squadristi* as well as the only means of tranquilizing panicked capitalist layers.

When Mussolini did take power in October 1922, he had this skeletal framework within which to organize both workers and capitalists, but he had not totally destroyed the only obstacle in the path: the CGL and FIOM which, though they were sufficiently discredited and weakened, were nonetheless nominally pro-working-class unions and therefore a potential threat. The same was true, obviously, of the PSI and PCd'I. Mussolini's tactic towards left union leaders upon taking power was parallel to that of the fascist *squadristi* in the field: coopt, discredit, terrorize, and destroy.

Seizing on the opportunity presented by the PSI October 1922 split and the nullification of the PSI-CGL pact, *(85)* Mussolini offered PSI deputy and CGL leader Baldesi the position of Ministry of Labor in the new fascist coalition government. Though audacious, the move was not completely unprepared, for the previous summer Mussolini had succeeded in getting the CGL and PSI to sign a "pacification pact" after months of violence. *(86)* Nonetheless the deal did not go

through, not because of Baldesi's reluctance, but because Mussolini's own intransigent right wing was When Gabriele D'Annunzio, poet and pro-fascist adventurer, conferred with PSI deputies Zaniboni and Baldesi shortly thereafter about a plan to form a non-party trade union formation, *(87)* the intransigent fascist right-wingers felt the threat of being ousted if they did not step into line. Thus Rossoni quickly abandoned his pretensions to autonomy and rushed to Mussolini with the assurance that the adjective "fascist" would be added to the corporation structure. *(88)* In this way Mussolin continued to discredit the socialists by making loud advances to them, and succeeded thereby in simultaneously drawing his right wing under tighter party control.

.Mussolini oriented to the CGL leadership because he knew that, despite its sell-outs, it still represented to the industrialists the force that governed the majority of the proletariat. Thus in summer 1923 he met repeatedly with PSI parliamentarians and unionists, among them such illustrious names as D'Aragona, Buozzi and Colombino — men who had distinguished themselves in the September 1920 uprising. Mussolini

circulated rumors that he was considering placing Colombino with Rossoni in the Ministry of National Economy. D'Aragona justified his group's negotiations for collaboration by saying the following to the national congress of the CGL a month after the talks had occurred:

> The head of state spoke of trade unity with the fascist union movement. We requested freedom for all. Collaboration was also discussed but in very vague terms. We said there is always a technical collaboration to give, which has always been given in the past, and that we will be ready to provide it also in the future, and that is the collaboration with the technical committees, with the organs of a consultive nature, etc., wherever they exist.
>
> Speaking about the labor party, the head of state said he understood how the masses organize to defend their interests and how they can arrive at forming a labor party.
>
> In conclusion to this conversation, Mussolini stated that the only thing left to do was to immediately create a situation in which we could live together civily. *(89)*

A year later D'Aragona was more explicit in describing the talks:

> ...in fact I went with Azimonti and Buozzi (to Mussolini): we had nothing to be afraid of. We are men of ideas, with a sense of responsibility. The Honorable Mussolini invited us to take responsibility for the Ministry of National Economy and to merge with the Corporations. We replied that we could not accept either of these offers: we said he should first discuss it with the parties. We said, however, that just as we had given our technical collaboration to all preceding governments, we would also give it to the fascist one. *(90)*

Baldesi and Buozzi have gone on record as offering the same sort of justification. The point is that these same men who, after selling out the movement in 1920, had sworn to fight for socialism "when the right moment comes along," swinishly and shamelessly prostituted themselves to Mussolini. The terrible irony of their behavior lies in the fact that not only did the labor party idea become a dead letter (because of continued opposition from within fascist ranks) but Buozzi, for example, was rewarded for his pains twenty years later with a fascist bullet.

The labor movement, or what was left of it, was sufficiently anesthetized by the end of 1923. What remained to be done on Mussolini's part was to mop up the left and officially establish the eager corporations as sole representatives of the workers. In an initial document, known as the Pact of Palazzo Chigi, and signed in December 1923, the corporations received formal recognition, but this was not sufficient to guarantee that the Confindustria and Confagricoltura would deal exclusively with them. Only in 1925, on the occasion of contract negotiations with the traditionally strong metalworkers of the north, was the death certificate of the workers movement officially stamped, sealed, and delivered.

Mussolini had intervened personally in the autumn wage contracts to force industrialists to deal with the corporations over Buozzi's head, but soon after the contracts were settled, galloping inflation in the winter months brought the wage question to the fore. Both the fascists and FIOM made requests for wage increases and were unsatisfied with industry's meager offers. As the workers became restless over their inability to meet higher living costs, and despaired of any union's ability to win them raises, they tried a strike. The first workers to move were from the Brescia FIOM plant; as soon as they walked out on March 3, the fascists officially declared the strike. The FIOM was paralyzed and watched impotently as workers from the Milan Bianchi factory joined the strike and others threatened to spread it further. One week later, on March 12, the FIOM was forced to announce a strike, but at the same time refused offers of political support coming from the few survivors in the PCd'I. The situation was desperate from the start. Logically, the Brescia industrialists signed with the fascist unionists, despite Buozzi's wails of complaint, and Farinacci, the most belligerent of the fascist right-wingers, negotiated a settlement promising a substantial increase to the workers. The FIOM was forced to order its workers back to the job and, later, to ask them not to bring up the wage question any more. Factionalizing within the FIOM between the communists and socialists during this strike period led to a "victory" of the PCd'I component, due mainly to Buozzi's execrable behavior; but this gain for the PCd'I was the equivalent of a death rattle. *(91)*

By summer 1925 all the fascists had to do to consolidate their victory among the northern workers was to clean out the factory committees *(Commissioni Interne)*. The 1920 factory councils were long gone, but the committees remained as formal rank and file groups within the union. In Milan and Turin the last strongholds of communist hegemony struggled to survive, side by side with growing fascist representation in the committees themselves. To settle the question rapidly, Fiat exacerbated communist-socialist factionalizing within the committees by awarding a substantial wage increase to the communists separately; this immediately provoked the resignation of FIOM (socialist) representatives and was followed shortly thereafter by the communists' resignation as well. On October 2, 1925 Mussolini officially recognized the nonexistence of the committees in the Pact of Palazzo Vidoni, which established the Confindustria and the Corporations as the sole representatives of labor and industry and abolished the *Commissioni Interne*. *(92)*

As the election of fascists as representatives in committees documents, there was nothing incoherent between the committees and the corporation; later, in fact, factory representatives in the fully elaborated corporative structure included workers' representatives. The only incoherence, as the records show, lay in the committees' links to socialist or communist

unions. With a national coporation structure, and with state power fully in his hands, Mussolini was able to push aside the "reds" with relative ease.

The "New" Intellectual

According to the official PCI myth handed down from the Togliatti generation to today's party cadres, Gramsci returned from Moscow to rebuild the sectarian PCd'I as a party firmly embedded in the masses, and to develop a cadre force later capable of waging a victorious anti-fascist battle. So far the legend corresponds, at least in part, to fact. But rather than clarify the position assumed by Gramsci, this part of the story only contributes to complicating the question under discussion here, that is, why Gramsci acted the way he did. By examining very briefly his politics in fascist Italy and then passing to a deeper consideration of his activity and writings in his prison years, we will show that despite apparent zig-zags in particular political moves, Gramsci basically followed a "coherent" line of thought, coherent with a pattern of neurosis which developed steadily into psychosis.

After a lengthy stay in Moscow, from May 1922 to November 1923, Gramsci settled temporarily in Vienna and patiently carried on the task of reorganizing a "center" faction around the old Ordine Nuovo group, mainly through his correspondence with Togliatti, Terracini, Scoccimarro, and others. With this nucleus of a faction, Gramsci planned to wage the long-postponed fight against both Bordiga's left wing and Tasca's right. The center faction's policy was to be that of organizing for a "workers' and peasants' government" as decided by the Comintern Fourth Congress and the subsequent executive meeting. Given the control that Mussolini had by that time established over the country, however, Gramsci thought the slogan for Italy should be modified to the "Federal Republic of workers and peasants," and that left wingers from the Partito Popolare and Democrats should be approached as possible allies in this republic. These latter two political layers, Gramsci explained in a letter of late 1923, "represent real tendencies of the peasant class and have always had in their program slogans in favor of local autonomy and decentralization." (93) This was an important consideration, Gramsci maintained, because

> ...we have to place special importance on the southern question, that is on the question in which the problem of worker-peasant relations is posed not only in terms of class relations, but also and especially as a territorial problem that is, as one of the aspects of the national question...besides, I believe that the regime of Soviets, with its political centralization given by the Communist Party, its administrative decentralization, and its influence on local popular forces, will find excellent ideological preparation in the slogan: Federal Republic of workers and peasants. (94)

In a later letter from Vienna Gramsci elaborated the concept again, specifying that the new program would have to fight against the "aristocracy of the working class" and seek to create an alliance between the poorer strata of the northern proletariat and the peasants in the south. As for the latter, he suggested the need to make "some political concessions to these populations with the formation of the 'Federative Republic of workers and peasants' instead of a workers' and peasants' government." (95)

The extremely adverse conditions in Italy provided little opportunity for Gramsci to realize his republican ambitions. In the summer of 1924, when a group of anti-fascist parliamentarians abandoned Parliament to protest the fascist murder of a Socialist deputy, Matteotti, the PCd'I tried to make the Republic idea the platform for the Aventino anti-parliament that was formed, but without success. Gramsci continued to press the concept in clandestine meetings of the PCd'I leadership and in his presentation at the 1926 Lyons Congress, where he consolidated his victory over both left and right factions.(96) But as for translating this into reality, there was no hope. On January 3, 1925, when Mussolini reopened Parliament after the Aventino experiment had fizzled out, he assumed responsibility for Matteotti's violent death and announced a reign of terror through exceptional fascist legislation, which made any kind of meekly anti-fascist politics impossible.

What is important to emphasize in this period of Gramsci's leadership over the party is his open proposal for collaboration with anti-fascist capitalist forces on the organizational basis of the famous factory councils and within a strictly national framework. This is the Gramsci that Togliatti knew and loved. It is not a "new Gramsci" however; the 1924-1926 Gramsci is the logical development, under conditions of enormous stress and demoralization, of the Gramsci from the days of Bordiga's leadership. The sectarianism is gone, as is the morbid dependence on Bordiga, but the theoretical basis is intact: local control, extended to include some parts of the bourgeoisie, within the nation-state — left-wing corporativism with democratic liberties!

Clearly the chance for working-class revolution in Italy was gone, and in this Gramsci was correct; but the possibility of performing a "bourgeois democratic revolution" was equally remote. The only way Italy could have been freed from fascism after 1923 would have been as a result of a proletarian revolution elsewhere in Europe. And that eventuality, after the tragic errors in Germany of 1923, was more distant than ever. Gramsci may have sensed this, but he was careful not to let his pessimism show. He continued working in Italy as if the fascist regime were not totalitarian; he made a speech in Parliament in 1925 attacking Mussolini's anti-democratic legislation and seemed not to worry excessively, even after Matteotti's assassination, about his own safety. Even in autumn, 1926, when an attempt on Mussolini's life served as the pretext for still more terror and the fascist Parliament was slated to approve the death penalty and to institute the infamous Special Tribunal, Gramsci insisted on staying in Italy. Plans had been

made to help him expatriate, and a designated comrade went to Rome to accompany him across the border in November, but Gramsci refused to go. The only reason he gave was that the circumstances wouldn't have justified such a move to the worker. *(97)* His biographer suggests that Gramsci stayed in order to contest Mussolini's proposed legislation in Parliament! *(98)* On Nov.8, 1926, despite his parliamentary immunity, Gramsci was arrested. Mussolini gave orders that, "we must prevent this brain from functioning for 20 years,"*(99)* and was duly obeyed.

Gramsci's refusal to flee to safety was not just foolishness, nor was it testimony of his belief that he was safe. He knew that parliamentary immunity had not protected Matteotti and he knew that Mussolini considered him, Secretary General of the PCd'I, a potential threat. Yet, in perfect coherence with his entire political career, he deliberately acted against what he knew to be the sane, rational choice. As if driven by a masochistic desire to be punished, Gramsci in effect set himself up for arrest and imprisonment. Thus began his martyrdom.

Gramsci's prison writings bear out this hypothesis rather conclusively and are valuable essentially for the psychological material they provide. The writings themselves fall into two categories: the letters written primarily to his sister-in-law, wife, and other relatives, and his notebooks containing essays, notes and bibliographical annotations on a wide variety of subjects. In addition to his own literary production, there are a number of memoirs, commemorative essays, and so forth written by political prisoners who had occasion to meet and talk with him at some time during his ten years in jail.

Despite the enormous range of subjects touched upon in the notebooks, one central theme is dominant: that of the worker-peasant alliance, first elaborated in the 1923 letter cited above, and later, just before imprisonment, formulated in an unfinished essay on the southern question. The basic concept is that the northern proletariat "must think like members of a class which tends to lead peasants and intellectuals" *(100)* by "understanding the class needs that the peasant masses represent, incorporating these needs in its transitional revolutionary program, and posing these needs as its demands in struggle." *(101)* To identify what the peasants' needs are, Gramsci refers back to a 1920 article from Ordine Nuovo which briefly mentions agricultural machinery, credit, electricity, etc., as necessary to the southerners. But to create a link between workers and peasants, he continues, one must understand and modify the sociological structure of the south.

> Southern society is a huge agrarian bloc made up of three social layers: the large, amorphous, scattered peasant mass, the intellectuals of the rural petty and middle bourgeoisie, the large landowners and big intellectuals. The southern peasants are in constant ferment, but as a mass they are incapable of giving centralized expression to their aspirations and needs. The middle layer of intellectuals receives its impetus for political and ideological activity from the peasant base. The large landowners in the political field and the big intellectuals in the ideological field centralize and dominate, in the last analysis, this entire complex.... As is natural, it is in the ideological field that this centralization is most effective and precise.... *(102)*

The dominant type of intellectual in the south is not the technician or "specialist in applied science" *(103)* that is produced by industrial development, but rather "the intermediary between peasant and administrator" who is "democratic on his peasant side, reactionary on the side presented to the big landowner and government, a politico, corrupt, disloyal..." *(104)* The southern intellectual comes from the ranks of the rural bourgeoisie, the small landowner who doesn't work the land but wants to make money from it "to send his sons to the university or to the seminary, to get together a dowry for his daughter to marry a civil servant..." *(105)* This is the figure, often from the clergy, who provides the link between peasant and landowner, thus cementing "a monstrous agrarian bloc which...functions as intermediary and supervisor for northern capitalism and the big banks." *(106)*

To break through this structure, Gramsci writes that a new kind of intellectual must come into being, a "left intellectual." "Ordine Nuovo and the Turin communists," he concludes, "having served as intermediaries between the proletariat and certain layers of left intellectuals, have succeeded in modifying, if not completely certainly to a noteworthy degree, their mental attitude." *(107)* Since the proletariat is not capable of producing such intellectuals, they must come from the intellectual layers as such and form

> a leftwing tendency, in the modern sense of the term, that is oriented to the revolutionary proletariat. The alliance between proletariat and peasant masses demands this formation...especially in the south. The proletariat will destroy the southern agrarian bloc to the extent it succeeds, through its party, in organizing increasing masses of poor peasants into independent and autonomous formations. But it will succeed to a greater or lesser degree...insofar as it is capable of breaking up the intellectual bloc which is the flexible but very resistant armor of the agrarian bloc... *(108)*

It follows from this basic concept (and this is the focus of the prison notebooks) that a new worldview must be created and communicated to the working class to replace the bourgeois ideology it is chained to. Gramsci therefore dedicates essays to the nature and development of intellectuals in Italy, compares this to the parallel but markedly different processes in France, Germany and elsewhere, investigates such questions as "national" literature and "national" language, all in order to develop the broader implications of the concept elaborated in the worker-peasant thesis.

In the process of turning his subject inside-out, attacking it from every conceivable standpoint,

Gramsci develops a workable concept of ideology-in-general which he identifies in the "spontaneous" or "organic" philosophy implicit in the everyday actions of the individual.

> It must be...demonstrated that all men are "philosophers" by defining the limits and character of this "spontaneous philosophy" relative to "the whole world," that is, to the philosophy that is contained: 1. in language itself, which is a gestalt of certain notions and concepts and not just a combination of words grammatically devoid of content; 2. in common sense and good sense; 3. in popular religion and therefore in a whole system of beliefs, superstitions, opinions, modes of seeing and acting that are bound together in what is generally termed "folklore." *(109)*

This means that "every man...is...a 'philosopher,' ...participates in a worldview, has a self-conscious mode of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to maintaining or modifying a worldview, that is, he gives rise to new modes of thought." *(110)* As new worldviews develop and are expressed in philosophy, science, economics, and so forth, these conceptions are assimilated by the population in the form of common sense, which in turn lays the basis for future folklore, a more fossilized form of common sense that remains fixed among certain strata.

Further, Gramsci clearly grasps the reactionary function of this "organic philosophy" and is acutely aware of the means by which backward ideology straitjackets the working-class and peasant population. Regarding language, one of Gramsci's earliest fields of inquiry, he writes:

> If it is true that every language *(linguaggio)* contains the elements of a worldview and a culture, then it must also be true that from one's language you can judge the greater or lesser complexity of one's worldview. Whoever speaks only in dialect or understands the national language only to a certain degree, necessarily participates in a worldview that is more or less limited and provincial, fossilized, anachronistic with respect to the great currents of thought that dominate world history. Such a person's interests will be limited, more or less corporativist and economistic, not universal. If it is not always possible to learn several foreign languages to be in touch with different cultural lives, it is necessary at least to learn the national language well. A great culture can be translated into the language of another great culture, that is, a great national language — historically rich and complex — can translate any other great culture, that is, it can be a world expression. But a dialect cannot do the same thing. *(111)*

The same consideration leads Gramsci to elaborate a general distinction between "folkloristic" and "national" characteristics, according to which folklore is "provincial,"

> that is, in the "particularistic" sense, both in the sense of being anachronistic, and in the sense of belonging to a class devoid of universal (at least European) character.

"National," on the other hand, is "contemporaneous to a given (or European) level of culture and has reached...this level." *(112)*

Gramsci's use of the term "national" indicates not a limitation to national characteristics, but rather a "universal" expressed in specifically national predicates. When dealing with the development of the intellectual in history, he specifies the distinction between "national" and "nationalist":

> ...It is one thing to *be* particular, and another thing to *preach* particularism. Here is where the misunderstanding of nationalism lies, whereby nationalism often lays claim to being the real universality, the real pacifism. National...is different from nationalist. Goethe was a German "national," Stendhal a French "national," but neither was a nationalist. An idea is not effective if it is not expressed in some way artistically, that is, in terms of the particular. *(113)*

The question this poses for Gramsci is: When in Italian history did the individual, the intellectual, rise above the provincialism of his culture and contribute creatively to the advancement of knowledge for man in the universal sense? To answer the question meant to lay the basis to complete his general effort to overcome the stifling provincialism pervading Italian language, art, and politics in the modern era.

Quite correctly, Gramsci identifies the Renaissance in Italy as this moment. Even prior to the emergence of the hegemonic Florentine culture, he specifies, the Renaissance intellectual had a "cosmopolitan" character; largely because the early class of intellectuals emerged from the church, their function and orientation was necessarily universal and of worldwide importance.

During the Renaissance "a new intellectual class of European significance" developed but, according to Gramsci, the universal, progressive content of the Renaissance was violently aborted in Italy by the consolidation of the absolute Papal state instead of a national state. *(114)* This leads Gramsci to characterize Machiavelli as the unrealized spirit of national statehood in the Renaissance, and also motivates his evaluation of the period as "regressive" for Italy: "Machiavelli," he writes, "is the representative in Italy of the understanding that the Renaissance cannot be such without the founding of a national state." *(115)* In this light Gramsci provides a plausible explanation for the fact that no major work on the Renaissance had been written by an Italian scholar:

> It seems to me that the Renaissance is the culminating modern phase of the "international function of Italian intellectuals," and that for that reason it has not had repercussions on the national consciousness, which has been dominated and continues to be dominated by the Counter-reformation. The Renaissance is alive...where it has created new currents of culture and life, where it has been operative in depth, not where it has suffocated without any other residue than rhetoric...and where therefore it has become the object of "mere erudition," that is of extrinsic curiosity. *(116)*

Gramsci's essentially accurate description of the abortion and decadence of the Renaissance is itself aborted by his inability to conceptualize how the modern revolutionary intellectual can take up and

realize the challenge posed by the uncompleted Italian Renaissance. Posing the task in terms of the creation of a "modern prince" (from Machiavelli's *The Prince*), Gramsci posits the notion that

> The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual; it can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which there is already the beginning of a process of concretization of a collective, recognized will, realized partially in action. This organism is already *given* by historic development and is the political party: the first cell in which are gathered the germs of the collective will, which tend to become universal and total. *(emphasis added) (117)*

Yet how, one wonders, can the "collective will" coalesce into a revolutionary political party without the efforts of the "concrete individual" who brings such a party into existence? If the "collectivity" is, as Gramsci states correctly elsewhere, suffocating under the weight of bourgeois ideology, how can it come up with the "collective will" to organize itself as a political party? Here Gramsci falls back into the familiar mechanistic abracadabra of his council theory, whereby "ineluctably" the "germ form" of the revolution is magically carried to power by the driving force of "history." How far all this is from the Renaissance! — how totally opposed it is to the morality and strength of the deliberate intellectual efforts of the concrete *individual* of the Renaissance!

But Gramsci was terrified of identifying with the concrete individual. Knowing, at least to a significant degree, what the historical value of the efforts of single intellectuals had been and must be for progressive revolutionary change, Gramsci was capable of recognizing this in the Renaissance but totally incapable of grasping it as real knowledge, as the basis on which he would act. Thus his understanding of the "universality" of the Renaissance intellectual is limited to an empiricist statement of the fact of the worldwide influence exerted by the intellectual, overlooking the content, the precise worldview and self-conception characteristic of the giants of the Renaissance

It is no accident that Gramsci wrote the following revealing observation in one of the notebooks:

> It is not...a question of living one day like a lion or a hundred years like a sheep. You don't live like a lion even for one minute, quite the contrary: you live like less than a sheep for years and years and you know you have to live thus. The image *is* of Prometheus who, instead of being attacked by the eagle, is devoured by parasites. The Hebrews were able to imagine Job: only the Greeks could have imagined Prometheus, but the Hebrews were more realistic, more ruthless, and have also provided more evidence of their hero. *(118)*

Only those with a self-conception of a suffering Job are realists, for Gramsci — those whom history acts upon, in ways inexplicable to themselves, such that they can only cry out a tormented existential "why?" to an uncomprehending universe.

The Promethean spirit of the Renaissance intellectual, whether scientist, philosopher, artist, or poet, took as the starting point for intellectual endeavor the premise that the universe was coherent and that its coherence was susceptible of comprehension by the mind of man. It was this ruthless intellectual morality in front of the universe of phenomena that made the birth of modern science possible. This Gramsci could not grasp; hysterically he denied it to be the case:

> If the Renaissance is a great cultural revolution, it is not because from "nothing" all men began to think they were "everything," but because this way of thinking spread, becoming universal ferment. etc. *(119)*

Thus the achievement of the Renaissance Florentine genius is reduced to the function of a mere paper boy, spreading the news! Some "international function"!

In dealing with the Renaissance in particular Gramsci betrays his central flaw, by exiting at just the moment when the crucial issue of the individual's revolutionary practice is raised. This same flaw sabotages his efforts to develop a means to resolve his more general concern, that of combatting bourgeois ideology in the working masses.

The very fact that Gramsci did identify the counter-revolutionary poison of ideology in his formulation of "organic philosophy," that he elaborated it in terms especially of the language question, and that he recognized it to be a necessary concern of the revolutionary movement, is certainly to be commended. But at the same time his acute though limited insights into the ideological problem raise the thorny question: if Gramsci knew all this, why did he not act on the basis of that knowledge? Why did he in political practice avoid the ideological issue (in the sense he defines it) and actually capitulate to the backwardness of the Italian masses? Why, while he was in prison (thus, while he was elaborating these ideas) did he actually seriously consider the possibility of proclaiming a republic, motivating this with the following argument?

> To the southern Italian peasant...it would be easy nowadays to make clear the social uselessness of the king, but not so easy to make him understand that the worker can substitute the king...the petty bourgeois, the non-commissioned officer of the army, discontented because he has no promotion, because he lives in a precarious economic situation, etc., would be more disposed to believe that his condition could improve in a republican regime than in a soviet state... *(120)*

This is sheer nonsense, outright capitulation to ideology. It makes a mockery of everything good in his writings!

Gramsci's relationship to writing throughout his life was magical-fantastical, and no less so in his prison works; quite the contrary, his peasant-worker theme in particular betrays the unmistakable signs of fantasy projection on his part. All is quite coherent if seen in this light: Gramsci, once in prison, had time to

reflect profoundly on his past activity and because of the total destruction of the party, of its leadership, its base, he must have recognized the crushing failure of his own political life. Allowing himself to be arrested so easily, he (or better, one part of him) ackowledged failure and defeat. But intellectually Gramsci refused to accept the fact that his theoretical elaborations could be at fault. Since his sense of personal identity depended ultimately on his intellectual activity, the well-functioning mind, to admit his fundamental theoretical flaws would have been tantamount to suicide. At the same time he could not honestly have believed that he had acted as a responsible revolutionary leader. He therefore elaborated the concept of the "new intellectual," who is no one but *himself*. The intellectual of the prison notebooks is the intermediary, not the active revolutionary leader but the go-between who provides the "link" between the proletariat of the north (the layer Gramsci failed to organize effectively and lead) and the peasant of the south (Gramsci's native Sardinian brethren). This is the figure of a cultured man, as Gramsci was, free to develop ideas, even shape insights, but never having to *act* in first person on the stage of history.

Significantly, Gramsci wrote his notebooks in absolute solitude. He would spend hours daily reading and writing alone, but he almost never discussed his elaborations with anyone. One fellow inmate recalls:

> He would not discuss what he was writing with any of us. He would limit himself to saying: I'm writing on Benedetto Croce, on the function of intellectuals, on the Vatican, etc., but without hinting at the problems he wanted to take up in these writings. *(121)*

The inmate, Athos Lisa, suggests that the reason was Gramsci's fear that his ideas on current politics might be communicated to Moscow. Lisa had reason to suspect this only because Lisa himself carefully reported Gramsci's "heretical" views on the republic to Moscow at a time when the Comintern was preaching revolutionary insurrection against social fascism! *(122)* However Gramsci had no rational motive to be silent about uncontroversial topics such as those which made up the bulk of his writing.

Lisa's memoirs provide material which throws further light on the subject at hand. The report Lisa wrote as soon as he was released and gave to Togliatti in Paris (who sent it on to the Comintern), dealt with the one major idea that Gramsci did discuss with other communist inmates: the constituent assembly for a republic. It was in a discussion-meeting with other imprisoned comrades—not in an essay— that he launched the idea and explained how the peasants could be convinced of the king's uselessness, etc. Here, in a social political situation, Gramsci bowdlerized his conception of the intellectual, making schematic comparisons to military leaders and so on, and propagandized the republic scheme when he knew his listeners would be hostile to it, since they were all sworn to party discipline. The episode serves as an exaggerated example of what Gramsci did during Bordiga's reign, and further supports the hypothesis that he deliberately banalized and prostituted what sound ideas he had in order to maintain a psychopathological private, secrete identity associated with intellectual endeavor.

To further document this duality of theory and practice (more deeply, of mind and body), there are the letters. Through them emerges the figure of a tormented man, completely divided between mind and body, undergoing slow steady physical and mental deterioration. The letters document the intolerable agony of an intellectual helplessly watching himself go slowly insane.

Much of the tone and content of the letters are conditioned by strict prison regulations; Gramsci was allowed to write letters only once every week or two weeks at specified times and all his letters were carefully censured before leaving the prison. This guaranteed that nothing political could be discussed and it made it difficult for Gramsci to communicate intimate thoughts to his correspondents. But in spite of external restrictions, the letters are revealing documents.

Most of the letters are written to Tatiana Schucht, sister of the woman Gramsci lived with in Moscow, Giulia (Julka), who was the mother of his two sons, Delio and Giuliano. Gramsci met his wife in Moscow in 1922. He had just arrived in late May as the representative of the PCd'I to the International and was almost immediately hospitalized for six months.

> He arrived in Moscow terribly depressed. He was ill. He was feeling the tension of the recent polemics, the bitterness, the lack of comprehension and, beyond that, strains that could not be tolerated without great wear and tear by someone, like him, who suffered not only physical deformity but was undernourished and felt the psychological blows deriving from his childhood...He had "almost ferocious" tics, convulsive tremors... *(123)*

Zinoviev ordered him to be hospitalized in a sanatorium outside Moscow and it was there that he met Eugenia Schucht, who was suffering from "a serious form of psychophysical breakdown which prevented her from being able to walk." *(124)* Gramsci soon met Giulia, Eugenia's sister, and was able to converse with them as they had lived for some years in Italy and spoke the language well. Soon Gramsci developed a relationship with Giulia, who also suffered recurrent nervous breakdowns, and lived with her for a short time in Moscow and later for a matter of months in Rome. When Gramsci was arrested she was in Moscow, where she remained, while Tatiana, who lived in Italy, devoted all her time to aiding him.

It is not surprising, then, that Tatiana was his main correspondent; Gramsci wrote her regularly, asking her to buy him books, take out subscriptions to magazines and do whatever legal paper work was necessary to make appeals for a new trial and so forth. Aside from such practical matters, Gramsci filled his

letters to Tatiana with descriptions of his physical condition, down to the minutist details. In part this was to elicit advice from Tatiana, who had studied medicine largely denied to Gramsci himself. But in the course of the correspondence a very clear link emerges between Gramsci's health and Tatiana's well-being. On Jan. 14, 1929, he writes to thank her for visiting him, hoping that the trip hasn't been taxing on her health as it had been on a previous occasion: "In Milan I went through some very ugly days when you got ill after your trip to Rome to see me." *(125)* He constantly feels responsible for her illness or depression: "I'm sorry you feel mortally tired. I'm all the more sorry because I'm convinced that I've contributed to depressing you." *(126)* This kind of interrelationship at times develops into a complicated web of apologies, accusations, and complaints. In January 1930 Gramsci writes a long dissertation on his suffering and hers:

> ...I was not even thinking of making any comparison between the pain of the one behind bars and the pain of the relatives who are forced to watch him as he twists and turns. But since the question has been posed and the comparison drawn, it seems inhuman to me to assert that the relatives' pain is greater and *(that)* it is understandable that wrapped up in their pain, they don't even think of giving a drink of water to the prisoner. *(127)*

Gramsci repeatedly insists on having detailed reports of her health, even though any illness she has immediately provokes worry and depression in him. At one point (Aug. 11, 1930) he plays mother to her: "I at least want to exercise all moral pressure possible on you because I feel responsible to your mother for your state of health." *(128)*

In his rare letters to Giulia, a similar process develops, but in regard to psychological, not physical, illness. On Nov. 11, 1931 he reprimands her for not writing often: "It seems to me...and I say this even though I know it will hurt you, that you have contributed to worsening my isolation, making me more bitter...I want you to feel my anxiety and my pain." *(129)* In July 1930 when he learned of his wife's hospitalization, he encouraged her to bear up, then fell ill himself. In August 1931 he suffered the first signs of cerebral hemorrage which steadily worsened. In February 1933 he was seriously ill, physically and psychologically. He wrote to Tatiana:

> I want to persuade you that my psychic condition, even if it is connected to my physical condition, is not the cause or the origin. It is if anything the outward symptom or form; so that even if perchance it should disappear: the form would change, that's all...Taken in itself the psychic illness is not serious (in the sense that my will always succeeds in dominating and controlling it) and this aggravation is a symptom of physical tiredness, that is of a weakening of the will in the physical sense of the word: I also feel a dispersion of my intellectual strength in itself which you must have noticed in my letters. From all this I feel I am passing through the most critical period of my

existence and that this phase cannot last long without determining, physically and psychologically, results and complications from which there is no turning back, because they are decisive...I have the impression that Julka suffers somewhat from the same illness, that at least part of her illness derives from the same cause of my psychological ill-being... *(130)*

Numerous examples of the same kind of interaction, also in his letters to his mother, document the neurotic syndrome Gramsci had first developed in his childhood illnesses, with love relationships mediated and defined by the interaction of pain. To his mother, Gramsci writes letters constantly apologizing for grief he may have caused her; with his wife he feels there is a relationship in their psychological or nervous disorders; and with Tatiana, whom he sometimes confuses with Julka, *(131)* the emphasis is on physical illness. All three are essentially complementary aspects of the kind of relationship created with his mother in early childhood. Significantly, the physical and mental aspects are always complementary: in his predominantly physical relationship with his wife, he suffers psychologically, whereas in his more intellectual relationship with Tatiana, he suffers physically.

From mid-1932 on, Gramsci painfully records his descent into madness, step by step.

> I'm always afraid of overtiring myself, of entering that state when my brain, excited voluntarily because of an exertion of energy, seems to work on its own like a machine gone haywire that no one can guide or direct any longer...*(Aug. 15, 1932)*

> I hardly live, and badly, an animal and vegetable existence...*(Aug. 15, 1932)*

> ...my resistance is about to collapse completely...I've never felt so bad...I haven't slept more than 45 minutes a night for eight days...any way out...becomes preferable to the continuation of the present state...*(Aug. 29, 1932)*

> It's strange that while I remember past events with many details, I don't remember things from the previous day or even from a few hours before... *(Sept. 5, 1932)*
> I've been through some weeks of real neurosthenic frenzy, a continuous and spasmodic obsession that didn't leave me a moment's peace...*(Oct. 17, 1932) (132)*

Jan. 30, 1923 Gramsci writes a long letter to Tatiana describing a traumatic event of his childhood. He had been sent on an errand to the house of a woman who enjoyed the reputation of a martyr because she had made enormous sacrifices for a son no one saw. Gramsci saw the son, closed in a pig-pen, a monster treated like a beast. On Feb. 20 he writes his sister, telling her his greatest desire is "to live the life of a beast in its lair." *(133)*

Throughout 1933 he repeats, "sometimes I think I'm going mad" *(134)* and on March 6 he describes his sense of having a double personality. Beginning with

the image of a shipwreck, he poses the question of survival by cannibalism and uses this to illustrate the way people can be transformed by circumstance.

> ...a similar change is coming over me...The worst is that...the personality becomes double: one part observes the process, the other part undergoes it, but the observer part (as long as this part exists it means there is some self-control and the chance to recover) feels the precarious position it is in, that is it foresees the point at which its function will disappear, that is there will no longer be self-control, but the whole personality will be swallowed by a new "individual" with impulses, initiatives, ways of thinking that are different from the previous ones... *(135)*

On March 21, 1933, he records hallucinations of smiling faces coming out of the windows down on him. By July 6, 1933 he reaches the point of asking Tatiana to make a formal request for a transfer to an infirmary. His request accepted, he was transferred to a clinic, then given a conditional discharge in October 1934 and full discharge from prison in April 1937, only to die at the end of that month. His last letters, after 1936, are all written to his two children and deal with dogs, parrots and other children's pets, from the point of view, it seems, of a child.

Beneath the agony of Gramsci's last years we can read the all too clear symptoms of psychosis, whose main syndromes identify the neurotic character of Gramsci's earlier political career. Given the extensive documentation provided by the letters, it is virtually impossible to overlook the deep-rooted psychological problems which afflicted Gramsci all his life. What is overwhelming in the letters, aside from the obvious, dominant masochism — which throws light on his refusal to take on the leadership of the party, to flee fascist Italy, to appeal for medical help earlier in prison — is the agonizing semi-self-consciousness struggling to predominate. Both in his theoretical work and in the letters, Gramsci repeatedly shows that while the "observer" sees and comprehends he is helpless, despite the most strenuous effort on his part to win. Therein lies the real tragedy of Gramsci.

PCI Necrophilia

After witnessing the torment of Gramsci's letters the reader can better appreciate the extent to which the PCI, beginning with Togliatti, has squeezed every drop of blood out of Gramsci's pathetic death. As soon as Gramsci was safely dead, Togliatti took possession of the prison notebooks and other writings to "supervise" publication, then sat down to write the first of many necrophiliac commemoration speeches. During the days of the"liberation" in 1945, Togliatti toured the south recounting the details of Gramsci's death and using the image of the martyr to convince workers that they must follow suit. Of the "two fundamental teachings" of Gramsci, Togliatti emphasized to the workers in Naples

the call to sacrifice, because he *(Gramsci)* would say, the working class and the working masses of our people cannot liberate themselves except through struggle, which will cost them hard, very grave sacrifices. We must face these sacrifices with full awareness, knowing that they are awaiting us in the struggle, in which we must show our capacity not only for courage, but for heroism, in which we must be able to face even martyrdom. *(136)*

With cynical opportunism, Togliatti—and after him Berlinguer, Longo, Terracini, Amendola—seized on Gramsci's weakness and illness to cash in on the morbid appeal they held for masses of Italian workers whom Togliatti had knowingly betrayed. Such is the moral fibre of the great men who run the PCI today.

Gramsci's history, with its stupid errors and tragic outcome, is a necessary lesson for the working class, in Italy and elsewhere. To evaluate that history honestly, the facts must be squarely faced. But the aim of such enquiry must be to learn from Gramsci's weakness and mistakes to prevent the working class from scoring another tragic defeat. In the process of ruthlessly stripping off the martyred death mask to expose the reality of the Italian movement from 1919-1923, the working class must have the courage to take up and develop the insights that Gramsci had. Only in the process of becoming a universal class, the task Gramsci identified in his Renaissance studies, can the workers of Italy rediscover their own humanity and appreciate the real tragedy of Antonio Gramsci. To do him justice, we must identify not with his pathology, but with the germ of creativity struggling towards realization.

Footnotes

1. Palmiro Togliatti, *Antonio Gramsci,* Riuniti, Roma, p. 29. Rosa Alcara, *La Formazione i Primi AWNI del PCI nella Storiografia Marxista*, Jaca Book, Milano, 1970, fully documents the development of the Togliatti version through official PCI historians.
2. Togliatti, *La Formazione del Gruppo Dirigente del PCI nel 1923-24,* Riuniti, Roma, 1962, p. 102. This volume is a collection of the letters exchanged between Gramsci in Vienna and Togliatti, Terracini, Scoccimarro, etc.
3. Ibid., p. 203.
4. Giuseppe Berti, "Il Gruppo del Soviet nella Formazione del PCI," in *Lo Stato Operaio,* A. IX, W.1, Gennaio 1935, p. 68, cited in Paolo Spriano, *Storia del PCI*, Vol. I, Einaudi, Torino, 1967, p. 100.
5. *Il PSI nei suoi Congressi,* Vol. III: 1917-1926. Avanti, Milano, 1963. The account of the Congress is based on this official text.
6. Jules Humbert-Droz, *L'Internazionale Comunista tra Lenin e Stalin, Memorie di un Protagonista 1891-1941,* Milano, Feltrinelli, 1974, p. 53.
7. Zinoviev was apparently scheduled to go but was replaced at the last minute when visas were denied. Ibid.
8. Humbert-Droz, op. cit.
9. Il PSI nei suoi Congressi, p. 132.
10. Ibid., p. 136.
11. Ibid., p. 154.
12. Ibid., p. 143-44.

13. At the height of the occupations, CGL and PSI leaders discussed what to do in "General Staff" sessions which voted to abandon the action and ask for "workers' control" in government talks. See Part I of the present essay, *The Campaigner*, Feb.-March, 1974.

14. Bologna was under heavy fascist attack at the time. See Angelo Tasca, *Nascita e Avvento del Fascismo: L'Italia dal 1918 al 1922*, Laterza, Bari, 1971, Chapter 7.

15. *Il PSI nei suoi Congressi*, p. 146.

16. Op. cit.

17. Texts of the motions are in *Il PSI nei suoi Congressi*, p. 159-164.

18. Spriano, p. 115-116.

19. Zinoviev's statements at the January, 1921 Comintern executive meeting, cited by Spriano, p. 105.

20. *International Communism in the Era of Lenin, A Documentary History*, Ed. by Helmut Gruber, New York, Doubleday, 1972, p. 261: *"Rede von Paul Levi auf der Sitzung des Zentralausschusses der V.K.P.D. am 24 Februar 1921."*

21. Togliatti, *La Formazione*, passim.

22. Togliatti, "La Nostra Esperienza," in *Lo Stato Operaio*, A.V.N.1, Gennaio, 1931, p. 6, cit. Spriano, p. 86.

23. Spriano, op. cit.

24. Lenin, "Falsi Discorsi sulla Liberta," in *Sul Movimento Operaio Italiano*, cited by Giusseppe Fiori, *Vita di Antonio Gramsci*, Laterza, Bari, 1973, p. 168-169.

25. Ibid.

26. Levi, op. cit.

27. See L. Marcus, "Rockefeller's 'Fascism with a Democratic Face,'" *The Campaigner*, Vol. 8, N. 1-2, Nov.-Dec. 1974, p. 94-96.

28. The Ordine Nuovo faction was not represented at the Congress but Lenin had received Gramsci's paper "Per il Rinnovamento del PSI" and voiced his approval.

29. Spriano, p. 81.

30. Humbert-Droz, *Il Contrasto tra L'Internazionale e il PCI: 1922-1928*, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1969, p. 21.

31. Ibid.

32. Tasca, op. cit., p. 185.

33. Ibid., p. 237.

34. Humbert-Droz, *L'Internazionale*, p. 97.

35. Ibid.

36. Spriano, p. 146.

37. Spriano, p. 150 identifies this as "the international's reply (certainly written by a qualified member of the Bolshevik Party, whose experience is referred to directly)..." but gives no source for the document, which he must have found in the PCI archives. Spriano is one of the few historians to have access to these archives.

38. Tasca, *I Primi Dieci Anni del PCI*, Laterza, Bari, 1971, p. 121-122.

39. Unsigned article, "Gli Arditi del Popolo," attributed to Gramsci, in *Ordine Nuovo*, 15 Luglio 1921, reprinted in *Socialismo e Fascismo: L'Ordine Nuovo 1921-1922*, Einaudi, Torino. 1971, p. 541-542.

40. Ibid.

41. Togliatti, *La Formazione*, p. 228.

42. Humbert-Droz, *Il Contrasto*, p. 26.

43. Ibid.

44. Spriano, p. 186.

45. Tasca, *I Primi Dieci Anni*, p. 118.

46. Humbert-Droz, *Il Contrasto*, p. 29.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 49-50.

49. Roberto was another PCI ultraleft who accompanied Terracini to Moscow on the cited occasion.

50. Tasca was expelled from the Party in 1930 and became a fervent anti-communist and anti-Soviet. Like Humbert-Droz, who suffered a similar fate, he does however provide reliable material in his works, as cross-checking with documents, etc. shows. Tasca's reasons for favoring the united front derived in part from his close organizational ties to the Central Labor Councils, though his tendency, even during the 1920 occupations, was to cement alliances with wider working class forces. He later became a staunch promoter of the Popular Front against fascism and proposed that Mussolini had won because the left had not made a bourgeois revolution against him.

51. Togliatti, in *Antonio Gramsci*, p. 42, recalls a speech made by Gramsci to workers at the Turin Central Labor Council warning of the danger of fascist reaction. This, as Gramsci's early understanding of the petty bourgeois character of fascism, is documented in various articles in *ON*, op. cit.

52. Togliatti, *La Formazione*, p. 272.

55. Ibid., p. 228-229.

56. Unsigned article, "L'Alleanza del Lavoro," *ON*, 21 Febraio 1922, reprinted in *ON*, op. cit. Vol. II. p. 543.

57. Spriano, p. 199-200.

58. Tasca refers to the failure of the strike as "caporetto" of the labor movement, *Nascita e Avvento*, op. cit.

59. Humbert-Droz, *Il Contrasto*, p. 38.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. *I Primi Dieci Anni*, p. 132.

63. *Il Contrasto*, p. 57.

64. Spriano, p. 166.

65. L. Marcus, op. cit., p. 55.

66. L. Marcus and Carol Larouche, "The New Left, Local Control and Fascism," *The Campaigner*, Vol. 1, N. 4, p. 11.

67. L. Marcus, op. cit., p. 44ff.

68. Mussolini was an anarchosyndicalist leftist of the PSI, expelled for his interventionism in 1914. See Paolo Alatri's psychological profile in *Le Oringini del Fascismo*, Riuniti, Roma, 1971.

69. Ferdinando Cordova, *Le Origini dei Sindacati Fascisti 1918-1926*, Laterza, Bari, 1974, p. 41. This is a new, monumental work as far as documentation goes, though it lacks analysis.

70. Ibid. p. 42. See also Tasca, *Nascita e Avvento*, Chapter 7.

71. Tasca, ibid., p. 163.

72. Cordova, op. cit., p. 43.

73. Luigi Preti, *Lote Agrari nella Valle Padana*, Torino, 1955, p. 457, cited in Cordova, ibid., p. 42-43.

74. Cordova, p. 36-37.

75. See part one of the present essay, *Campaigner*, op. cit.

76. Tasca, *Nascita e Avvento*, in note 45, p. 69, points to Mussolini's idea of using a national formation of councils as halfway between parliament and soviets. See also Mussosini's comment on the Dalmine occupation, below.

77. Tasca, ibid., p. 53: The 1919 fascist program, which Togliatti was later to embrace, called for universal suffrage, the abolition of the Senate, a Constituent Assembly, "The formation of National Technical Labor Councils," the 8-hour day, "participation of labor representatives in the technical functioning of industry, entrusting to proletarian organizations (those which are technically and morally worthy) of the task of managing industry or public services..." Mussolini briefly set up such technical councils in the early twenties, then recreated them in the corporations.

78. Cordova, p. 9.

79. Ibid.

80. Edoardo Malusardi, *Elementi di Storia del Sindacalismo Fascista*, Genova, 1932, p. 45, cited in Cordova, p. 15.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., p. 16.

83. Ibid., p. 24-44.

84. Ibid., p. 18.

85. Tasca, *Nascita e Avvento*, p. 235-236, documents Mussolini's plan to split the CGL away from the PSI or any other political party.

86. Tasca, *Nascita e Avvento*, p. 241.

87. Cordova, p. 116-117. Gramsci also appears to have been fascinated by D'Annunzio and the Labor Party hypothesis. A meeting of the two was planned but never took place.

88. Cordova, p. 119.

89. Ibid., p. 170.

90. Printed in *Quaderni di Rinascita, Trent'Anni di Vita e*

Lutte del PCI, 1951. This special 30th anniversary issue of *Rinascita* has made history as the official statement by Togliatti, who edited it, on the real PCI story.

91. *FIOM* as a whole had gone from peak membership of 151,930 to a miserable 23,523 in 1923, and had about 85 per cent of the delegates (the fascists had 15 per cent) in the Commissioni Interne. Within that, the PCd'I "victory" was a farce.

92. Cordova, p. 424-434.

93. Letter to PCd'I, sequestered by police, later printed by Stefano Merli, "Rivista Storica del Socialismo.", A. VI., 18, Gennaio-Aprile 1963, cited in Spriano, p. 298.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. In Lyons the party was reduced to only 27,000 members. Gramsci lined up with Togliatti around Bolshevization and led the attack on Bordiga, who received only 9 per cent of the Congress vote.

97. Fiore, op. cit., p. 253.

98. Ibid.

99. The phrase was uttered by the Fascist prosecutor Michele Isgro on the occasion of the trial against Gramsci, May 1928.

100. Gramsci, *La Questione Meridonale*, Riuniti, 1972, p. 142.

101. Ibid., p. 135.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., p. 150.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid., p. 151.

106. Ibid., p. 153.

107. Ibid., p. 157.

108. Ibid., p. 160.

109. Gramsci, *Il Materialismo Storico*, Riuniti, Roma, 1971, p. 3.

110. Antonio Gramsci, *Gli Intelletualli*, Riuniti, Roma, 1971, p. 17, p. 183-4.

111. *Il Materialismo Storico*, op. cit., p. 5.

112. *Passato e Presente*, Riuniti, Roma 1971, p. 25-26.

113. *Gli Intellettuali*, op. cit., p. 91.

114. *Il Risorgimento*, Riuniti, Roma 1971, p. 28.

115. Ibid., p. 25.

116. *Gli Intellettuali*, op. cit., p. 54.

117. Note sul Machiavelli, *Sulla Politica e sullo Stato Moderno*, Riuniti, Roma 1974, p. 20.

118. *Passato e Presente*, op. cit., p. 118-19.

119. *Il Risorgimento*, op. cit., p. 23.

120. Athos Lisa, *Memorei: dall'Ergastolo di Santo Stefano alla Casa Penale di Turi*, Feltrinelli, Milano 1973, p. 87.

121. Ibid., p. 26.

122. The wretched Lisa relates (p. 114) how he went to Paris, told Togliatti all: "Togliatti did not object to anything I told him but invited me to write a report...on which later I was called to make comment. At the end of my (*oral*) report, on which no comments were made by the other comrades, I was invited not to speak to anyone about what I had reported." The incident did not contribute to getting Gramsci released. If there had been some hope that Moscow would offer prisoner exchanges and pressure international opinion to release him, this and similar acts by Togliatti certainly discouraged it.

123. Fiori, p. 181.

124. Ibid. Eugenia was later to develop hallucinatory fantasies about being the mother of Gramsci's children, in Rome.

125. Gramsci, *Lettere dal Carcere*, Einaudi, Torino 1972, p. 248.

126. Ibid., p. 108.

127. Ibid., p. 361.

128. Ibid., p. 361.

129. Ibid., p. 532-533.

130. Ibid., p. 755-756.

131. Ibid., p. 121, 226.

132. Ibid., p. 665, 669, 687.

133. Ibid., p. 737: "Even afterwards, when I heard people mention the suffering of that poor woman, I was unable to intervene to correct the mistaken impression and speak of the awful state of that poor human relic who had been saddled with such an awful mother. But then, what could the poor woman do?" The second letter is on p. 752.

134. Ibid., p. 748.

135. Ibid., 757-58.

136. Togliatti, speech in Naples on April 29, 1945, republished in Togliatti, *Antonio Gramsci*, op. cit., p. 43.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

by R. Gallagher

Artificial intelligence is a sub-field of computer science which claims that the human mind can be replaced by sophisticated computer systems. Indeed, today there are computerized robots that do spot-welding; others that solve problems and generalize their solutions; and still others that carry out simple commands given them in ordinary language, report on their actions as they execute them, and engage in simple dialogue respecting their knowledge of the world.

However, these "achievements" are elementary. What is surprising about these robots is that it took so long for artificial intelligence to produce them! They are all based on the repetitive application of formal procedures.

Researchers in artificial intelligence lie when they assert that the human mind can be replaced by machines. This lie enjoys widespread credibility. The fact that it does should come as no surprise. The reason is not simply that computers can now do so many things formerly done only by human beings.

Most people view the mind, their own minds, as mysterious. They are uncomfortably conscious of their own use of logic which sometimes tricks and terrifies them. They are afraid of their own minds; they do not know their actual creative capacities; therefore they

accept the lie that machines can replace the human mind.

The lie is credible because most people are dominated by an infantile ego, whose cognitive properties can be replicated by a computer.

Many will find this claim startling. They will look into themselves and at first find very little correspondence between the form of their thought processes and the form of machine logic. People are conscious of thinking in language. They are aware that they frequently conduct dialogue with others within their own minds. Frequently, these dialogues are interspersed with scenes from actual experience that do not follow any particular temporal sequence, but rather are emotionally organized. "How can such mental phenomena be machine-like?" they demand to know.

We insist that the form of the mental processes of the infantile ego are completely representable on a digital computer. As a result, it is no exaggeration to state that the mental processes of the infantile ego are *predictable*. As such, the ego-state is equivalent to an actual brainwash state.

We do not make these remarks lightly, nor do we make them with malicious intent. It is only when the

way in which the infantile ego operates is internalized that conceptual human powers can be developed unimpeded by its influence. The real content of the question of artificial intelligence is human psychology — the study of the forms of neurotic blocks to human creativity.

In order to illustrate the machine-like properties of the infantile ego, we will discuss several advanced computer models of human personality and cognition — models of human egos. At this point the reader may ask: "Where did these models come from?" The models are a result of the labors of an extensive research network in artificial intelligence. The question of the origin of this network is the one that we must deal with.

I. WHAT IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE?

Artificial intelligence is actually much broader than a mere sub-field of computer science, encompassing mathematical logic, linguistics, and other technical fields relating to the study of human cognition. This is a generic definition: artificial intelligence views human cognition from the point of view of how it was brought into existence, what is was intended to accomplish, and the technical tools that are applied within it.

Artificial intelligence existed as a field of study before World War II in the work of logicians in the 1930s and earlier. However its present form is the creation of the RAND Corporation, business management circles, and the Department of Defense (DOD). The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has also more recently come to play a function in broadening and extending the network originally established by RAND and the several DOD research divisions.

The creators of this network are interested in two problems — the creation of intelligent "robots" for use in industry and the military, and the production of working models of human cognitive processes for use in brainwashing. (see Appendix A) For the solution to both of these problems, the agencies encouraged and funded "computer science" and "linguistics," both of which flourished after World War II. It is thus no accident that after years of searching for a job, linguist Noam Chomsky's only offer from a sizeable academic institution came in 1955, from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology — a DOD think-tank!

For most of the post-war period, the Pentagon-funded RAND Corporation carried the ball in terms of support for much of the computer-oriented research in artificial intelligence. Subsidiary Defense Department agencies, such as the U.S. Army Signal Corps, the Office of Naval Research, and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research control much of the linguistics research. The National Institute of Mental Health concentrates its role in the network in funding and supporting the study of cognition; thereby supporting linguistics and "Computer Simulation of Human Personality".

Unfortunately, there is no public listing of DOD funding. In the case of this support, we only have the printed testimony of the researchers themselves as to who funds their network.

The main institutions of this network are Carnegie-Mellon Institute, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Stanford University and the Stanford Research Institute. Auxiliary within the network are projects located at the University of Wisconsin and Michigan State University.

The RAND-business management origin of the thrust for the development of the network is reflected in the histories of the individuals who have played leading roles in its early development and current operations:

Herbert A. Simon, Carnegie-Mellon Institute: His first non-research position was as a staff member of the International City Managers Association from 1938 to 1939. After activities in such circles he became dean of Carnegie Institute (now Carnegie-Mellon) in 1949. In 1958 he was made director of the Social Science Research Council and he was chairman of its Board of Directors from 1961 to 1965. Since 1968, he has been chairman of the division of behavioral science of the National Research Council. Today he holds an enormous NIMH grant, $282,392 for the year 1972 alone.

Allen Newall, Carnegie-Mellon Institute: It is enough to simply point out that Newall was a RAND Corporation operative from 1950 to 1961.

The entire network can be seen shaking hands in its 1962 publication, *Computers and Thought*, edited by Edward A. Feigenbaum and Julian Feldman. Feigenbaum was trained at Carnegie Institute and now works at Stanford; he was a RAND consultant in the late 1950s. Feldman also was trained at Carnegie. Some of the network's members who specialize in "Computer simulation of the Human Personality" are:

Walter R. Reitman, University of Wisconsin: A RAND Corporation consultant since 1961, he sat on the Social Science Research Council from 1958-61. Presently he is working under a $20,048 NIMH grant.

Leonard Uhr, University of Wisconsin: Consultant, Systems Development Corporation; he presently receives a $57,572 NIMH grant.

Jeanne and John Gullahorn, Michigan State University: The Gullahorns have both served in several counter-insurgency posts for the U.S. State Department and the CIA. In Paris, from 1954-55, he oversaw the activities of American students; she was a State Department "research assistant." John was employed by the State Department in the "International Education Executive Service" from 1956-60. Both were active in the student leadership program of

the CIA's National Student Association. Their sources of support are the Systems Development Corporation (since 1961), the Committee on Simulation of Cognitive Processes of the Social Science Research Council and the National Institute of Mental Health. Their NIMH grant stood at $49,133 in 1972.

It is useful to focus on the work of a single individual within the network, Kenneth M. Colby of Stanford University. Colby came to the network inculcated with the results of the discussions on language and thought that took place in psychiatric circles in the 1930s. He was then able to see through the muddle that the computer simulators and logician-linguists had entangled themselves in. He put together the results of their work and produced working models of the ego's cognitive properties. The purpose of this, in Colby's own words, was to solve the Defense Department's problem: "the problem of social influence."

Colby, however, does not himself view his models as merely representative of human neurosis. He thinks that he is modeling the human mind. An examination of his 1955 *Energy and Structure in Psychoanalysis* reveals the basis for this view. A run-of-the-mill epiphenomenalist, Colby refuses to recognize the existence of the self-consciousness.

In 1961 Colby was appointed a research fellow at Stanford's Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He continued on at Stanford where today he is heavily funded by both ARPA and NIMH. His NIMH grant stood at $182,500 in 1972.

Colby's personal history is not particularly important in evaluating his work's usefulness to the Defense agencies that fund it. We simply note here that during the 1950s he held various psychoanalytic-related positions in California public institutions. For example, in 1951, he served as a lecturer in Psychiatry in the State's Department of Social Welfare. His current position is NIMH "Career Scientist."

More interesting however is Colby's response to Paris Radio's 1973 request for an interview with him to discuss his work. The French reporters were in the U.S. to interview several Stanford computer scientists for a television special on computers and the mind. Although virtually everyone at ARPA's Stanford Research Institute was glad to talk, Colby refused to arrange an interview.

Computers that 'Think'

Throughout the 1950s, the network outlined above attempted to represent human cognition on a computer in various model building attempts. The attempts all failed. It took someone from out of the tradition of psychoanalysis and psychiatry to solve what was actually a simple problem.

The earlier attempts failed precisely because the model builders were not conscious of the form of thought. They attempted to replicate human cognition without representing it in a form of thought itself. They failed to model thought as an activity because they did not use a form of the activity to represent it.

They expressed their conceptual difficulties in discussions around the so-called "problem of cognitive structure" — how to represent human knowledge within the confines of a formal system. They invariably chose a hierarchical organization of discrete bits of "information." They represented human consciousness as a discrete unchanging entity that processed these bits. Cognition was the activity of manipulating these bits of "information" according to certain fixed procedures.

Colby entered the network in 1961 and applied some ideas that had been discussed in psychoanalytic and psychiatric circles since at least the 1930s. We are specifically referring to the notion that thought is an "inner speech" and that the stream of conscious thought proceeds in an associative manner.

This "inner speech" conception was drawn by U.S. psychiatry from the work of the Soviet psychiatrist Lev Vygotsky. (See the collection, *Language and Thought in Schizophrenia* edited by J.S. Kasanin). Vygotsky himself was at least indirectly influenced by Hegel through his study of Lenin's writings on that philosopher. In Vygotsky's writings on the speech of children, he shows himself to have an understanding of the social nature of cognitive processes comparable to that of Emile Durkheim.

Resting on this heritage, Colby was able to hack out several models of neurotic cognition. He first produced his solution to the computer scientists' problem of "cognitive structure": the belief structure, a set of interrelated statements in human language, expressive of the mental attitude modeled. He then expanded on this work, developing other, more complex models of cognition.

In this article, we will discuss three of Colby's computer models of cognition: his mid-sixties model of a neurotic woman suffering from "anxiety and indecision in relations with men"; his attempt to construct a "child brain" — his "Artificial Belief System" and his model of paranoid thought processes, "Artificial Paranoia."

Before we discuss his first model which solves the problem of "cognitive structure," we will briefly discuss three flawed approaches to the problem. In contrast, the models developed by Colby will stand out in stark relief; the cognitive processes that he is representing will become equally evident. First, we will discuss the approach taken by John C. Loehlin in his model ALDOUS; we will briefly compare ALDOUS to HOMUNCULOUS, a model developed by John and Jeanne Gullahorn; finally, we will discuss the approach of modern mathematical linguistics.

Loehlin's ALDOUS is a computer program that recognizes objects and, on the basis of a memory of past emotional experiences with such objects, reacts

to recognition of the objects with a programmed response. Objects are recognized through the values they have along three linear dimensions.

In one version of ALDOUS, the dimensions were age, sex, and color of hair; the objects were human beings. ALDOUS takes in the code number for a specific human object, decodes it, "recognizes" it as having such and such values along the three dimensions, and then responds to it. ALDOUS is at best cute. It fails completely to replicate the ego's cognitive processes.

The problem is not the dimensions that Loehlin chose. Choose your favorite three dimensions with which to characterize every object in the world — the result would be the same. Despite the dimensions chosen, such a model would be incapable of replicating cognitive processes in a psychologically satisfying way.

One gets closer to the problem when one considers the number of dimensions used. Clearly, three dimensions are not enough, but more dimensions require more memory space. Within Loehlin's parsimoniously constructed model with three dimensions, 620 memory storage space units were needed. As the number of dimensions increases, the storage space required skyrockets: with five dimensions, 15,620 units are necessary; with seven dimensions, 390,620 units; with nine dimensions, 9,765,620 units. Loehlin admits that hundreds of dimensions would be required to represent most objects adequately. Loehlin's actual difficulty, however, was not memory space—despite the ravings of computer scientists that this is the only reason why they have not yet built a model of the human mind.

Loehlin ran into these incredible storage space problems because he did not represent ALDOUS' "knowledge" of the world in a form that expressed the interrelatedness that characterizes an actual person's organization of knowledge. For the same reason, his representation of cognition is irrelevant and unsatisfactory. ALDOUS' world is one of discrete particles of information organized into distinct categories. The elementary entities of its "knowledge" — numerical codes for objects and numerical indices for past responses to objects — exist independently of each other, and are not conditioned by each other. Knowledge in ALDOUS is not reciprocally organized; there is no notion of relationship in the form of representation of knowledge.

ALDOUS has one other major shortcoming: it does not represent the socialized nature of cognition, the role that other persons play in our cognitive processes. HOMUNCULUS, a model developed by Jeanne and John Gullahorn, begins to acknowledge the social nature of cognition, but like ALDOUS failed to represent human cognitive processes in a satisfying way. HOMUNCULUS incorporates a cognitive structure organized in terms of the relationships between the model and the groups and individuals that play a central role in its hypothetical life. However, like other models, HOMUNCULUS does not represent thought with an actual form of thought. HOMUNCULUS, a bit processor like ALDOUS, simply uses the actions of the individuals in its life as further "information" to use in computing its own actions oriented towards maximizing its sensual rewards.

The Work of Noam Chomsky

The problem of cognitive structure, so-called, will come into clear focus with an examination of efforts to describe an actual form of thought: human language. A glance at contemporary mathematical linguistics—specifically, the work of Noam Chomsky—will make the problem strikingly clear and Colby's easy solution transparent. In considering linguistic models of cognition, the need to organize the entities of a "cognitive structure" in a reciprocal fashion will become obvious.

Introducing modern lingustics into our discussion is sensible for another reason as well: Colby's work is very much a *predicate* of linguistics. In fact, Colby has acknowledged Chomsky's model of language in his published accounts of efforts to develop a machine parser for natural language. Colby, however, went beyond the logician-linguists, bypassing their formal logical models with his "belief structures."

Chomsky's own theory is itself a belief structure within which children learn language because they are born with an innate decoding device; the human mind can only be creative when it "generates" ideas within certain "formal constraints"; and your "creativity" is your ability to "produce" or "generate" an infinite number of sentences of your native language— what you say isn't important, only the fact that you can keep on talking.

Chomsky systematically attempts to reduce language to formal logic. This most obnoxious feature of his system is summarized in the phrase "binary logic." Chomsky uses binary logic to represent everything. In his syntactical theories, his application of binary logic results in his well-known use of "branching structures" to represent syntactic relationships. But it is in his attempts to go beyond "syntax" and touch on "meaning" or "semantics" that his use of binary logic becomes repulsive.

Chomsky applies binary logic to represent the meaning of a word by associating with each listing or word in his model's dictionary a set of *two-valued* abstract predicates that are meant to encapsulize the word's meaning. "Dog," for instance, would have the attribute /+animate/ listed in its dictionary entry. "Box" on the other hand, is /-animate/ noun.

The main purpose of this particular application of binary logic is to codify the contexts in which a word may be used. The information in the dictionary listings is applied by the "selectional rules" of Chomsky's theory to choose the contexts in which a word may be

used in spoken sentences. The verb "think," for example, requires a /+human/ subject. The noun "carpenter," because it has /+human/ associated with it, cannot appear before the verb "bark" in a sentence. Thus, the sentence "The carpenter barked at his assistant" cannot occur in Chomsky's English.

One result of this approach to language is that poetry is illegal and incomprehensible. In terms of our discussion, however, we shall simply point out that Chomsky's selectional rules embody an information processing approach toward meaning: the meaning of a word becomes a formal-logical construct of abstract entities. Within the dictionary, words are related only to the extent that they share attributes. "Meaning" and "context" are sterilized of all content. The reciprocal nature of language fundamental to both—the interrelatedness of the meaning of words— is reduced to "binary logic."

Several researchers have successfully applied Chomsky's model to develop "question-answering" systems with which to use language to store and retrieve information in a data base. In such systems, "meaning" can be made precise; Chomsky's model of language can be applied to develop a language system that can report data and its immediate implications.

But because of its formal-logical character, Chomsky's model cannot be used to model cognition in language, to represent a neurotic character structure through a set of "beliefs" in natural language form.

II. COLBY'S FIRST MODEL: A 'NEUROTIC COMPUTER PROGRAM'

With his background in psychiatry and psychoanalysis, Colby was not encumbered with the formal-logical methods of "mathematical linguistics." He was used to viewing language structure from a semantic standpoint. He recognized that the rules for conbining words into sentences are psychological, that in his use of language the man-in-the-street expresses his prejudices (his "beliefs") respecting the world, that is, the world in which he thinks he lives. Furthermore, Colby realized that in cognition, one does not simply engage in abstract dialogue with oneself, but that "inner speech" is socially organized.

With this understanding, he was able to come up with remarkably simple models of neurotic cognitive processes. His first model in one of its more complete versions included only 105 beliefs and a dictionary of 257 words. His low storage space requirements must have been made other experts in the field blush.

Colby's model, the "neurotic computer program," is composed of a belief matrix, a dictionary, and a processor. As already stated, the belief matrix is a set of interrelated statements in natural language, sentences expressive of the neurosis modeled. The processor searches the belief matrix for inner conflict. If conflict is found, it applies a "transform" to change the conflicting belief and thus attempts to fit it into the overall belief structure.

The belief matrix lists each belief and with it a number of indices that relate it to other beliefs while beliefs that are held to be "reasons" for the belief are referenced. The belief itself is represented in terms of its structure, the most simple being: SUBJECT + VERB + OBJECT.

The dictionary lists every word that appears in the beliefs of the belief matrix. This is not an ordinary dictionary listing; as in Chomsky's dictionary, there are

FIGURE 0 — PATIENT'S BELIEF MATRIX

LOCATION	COMPLEXITY	BALANCE	DEGREE OF ACCEPTANCE	LOCATION OF REASONS	MARK	LEVEL AND SIGN	RESIDUAL CHARGE	FIXED CHARGE
64	0	1	5000	29	0	+1	3600	7000

LOCATION	SUBJECT MODIFIER	SUBJECT	FIRST VERB MODIFIER	SECOND VERB MODIFIER	VERB	OBJECT MODIFIER	OBJECT
64	0	179 (SELF)	0	153 (PAST TENSE)	129 (LOVE)	0	72 (FATHER)

no definitions. In this case though, words are not "defined" in terms of abstract attributes, but rather in terms of other words used in the beliefs of the belief matrix. For example, the dictionary listing for "father" associates with it the words: "drunk," "mean," "old," "rich,"....The dictionary listing for "love" includes the words: "weak," "danger," etc. ... Thus a word is defined in terms of the rest of the belief structure with a concrete "meaning." The dictionary listing also includes an "evaluation valence" giving an indication of the emotive significance of the word to the neurosis modeled. "Father" received an evaluation valence of -6; "love" received -4.

To our summary description of the data base of this first model, we must add that Colby deliberately restricted the belief matrix to "beliefs regarding significant persons, including the self." For example, "father" in the above example is the father of the neurotic woman modeled.

Although this restriction obviously simplifies the model, simplicity was not what Colby was after. He was conscious that "inner speech" is social, that "beliefs" are social, and that any model of cognition must deal with that fact. As he states in his report, "Experimental Treatment of Neurotic Computer Programs," "At the basic science level of social psychology, we want to understand how persons influence the belief structures of other persons."

In evaluating the model's cognitive structure, one could, in simple fashion, *characterize* Colby's model as a model of a neurotic process merely because of the content of the model's definitions. Indeed, these definitions *are* neurotic. The fear expressed in the representation of the father of the woman modeled is obviously infantile. To view a human being as such a fixed *predator* is an expression of the ego. But this model's significance is not the neurotic content of the beliefs and dictionary listings themselves, but rather its representation of cognitive processes. What is relevant about the neurotic content of the dictionary is not the content per se, but rather the extent to which this content expresses the interrelatedness or "gestalt" of a particular ego-state.

The model defines its entities (words and beliefs) in terms of the relationships within its own structure. The entities thus exist in the model in reciprocal relationship to each other. The entities are not independent, but within the model are conditioned by each other.

In dialogue with a therapist, the model expresses the modeled individual's (neurotic) experience in the same form as it recognizes and remembers that experience: in the form of language, in the form of "beliefs." The "beliefs" themselves are restricted to "beliefs regarding significant persons." With this delicate use of beliefs regarding social relationships, Colby succeeded in representing a particular consciousness as a self-enclosed whole. The ego of Colby's

model is not static—it changes as an expression of inner conflict.

Figure 1 is a flowchart for the processor of the model. The processor will begin its processing by choosing a single belief from the belief matrix. The choice will be made on the basis of the "urgency" or emotional significance attached to the beliefs in the matrix. "I must love father" might be one such "urgent" belief. The processor then constructs a pool of "relevant" beliefs around the chosen or "core" belief ("relevant" beliefs have one or more words in common with the core belief or are structurally similar). Some members of the pool in our example might be "I hate father," "I love mother," "I admire father," "I ought to love people," "Mother loves father...." The processor then chooses a belief from this pool and checks it for conflict with the core belief. If conflict is found, the processor calls upon one of the "transforms" to manipulate the belief, to change it in such a way as to resolve the conflict. Otherwise, the processor continues processing by choosing another belief in the pool to compare with the core belief.

Within the model, conflict is defined in terms of command—countercommand, for example, "I want x" versus "I must not want x." Colby consciously uses model verbs to model the contradictory feelings of the anxiety state. Since the model only includes "beliefs regarding significant persons," conflict takes the form of conflict between the "self" and others.

In resolving conflict, the processor does not simply use the beliefs as they appear in the pool it has constructed. To resolve some forms of conflict, it will use the dictionary.

Within this dictionary there are two substitute matrices, two additional look-up tables of word associations besides the main dictionary listing. For most words, there is a synonym list; for verbs, there is also an antonym list.

Certain transforms that the processor calls upon to resolve conflict use these two matrices. Such transforms attempt to resolve conflict by substituting words from these two matrices into the conflicting belief, creating a new belief that may fit into the belief matrix without conflict. This is no mere ploy. The substitution is lawful—like the dictionary lists upon which such substitution depends, it expresses the neurosis of the model, what the model "tells itself" in response to conflict.

For example, the processor may discover that a particular belief, say, "I must like father," conflicts with the pool of beliefs that it has constructed. It may look in the dictionary for a noun that shares several word associations with "father," for example, "Al." It may then create the belief "I must like Al," replace the conflicting belief with this new construct and then check for the new belief's consistency within the overall belief structure. Or, it may take a conflicting belief and reverse the meaning of the verb, for example,

FIGURE 1

transforming "I must love father" into "I must hate father."

Figures 2 and 3 show Colby's original representations of the dictionary and the substitute matrix in "Experimental Treatment of Neurotic Computer Programs."

The most frequently used transforms in the model are: 1) replacing the subject or object with another similar word from the substitute matrices; 2) weakening or reversing the verb by replacing it with synonyms or antonyms from the substitute matrices; 3) exchanging subject and object in the sentences.

With such transforms as well as with the earlier discussed construction of "pools" of "relevant" beliefs

by the processor, Colby attempts to model the elementary symbol manipulations performed by the ego in cognition, the associative processes that characterize the ego-states of anxiety, rationalization, etc. ...Needless to say, such associative processes characterize not only internal cognitive processes, but also the "polite conversation" of philistines, or the sort of verbal smokescreen of academic associations raised by someone attempting to block out the content of what someone else is saying.

In his *Computer Models of Personality,* John C. Loehlin refers to Colby's transforms as the "defense mechanisms of the ego." He explicitly labels the third transform as "neurotic projection." Indeed, if the

FIGURE 2

LOCATION		TYPE	VALENCE	LOCATION ON SUBSTITUTE MATRIX	DICTIONARY LOCATIONS OF PROPERTIES					
72	FATHER	8	-6	0	155 (PERSONS)	135 (MEN)	148 (OLD)	172 (RICH)	62 (DRUNK)	185 (SHORT)
129	LOVE	9	-4	42	43 (DANGER)	217 (WEAK)				

FIGURE 3
SUBSTITUTE MATRIX

LOCATION	DICTIONARY SOURCE	LOCATION OF ANTONYM LIST	DICTIONARY LIST OF INSTANCES OR SYNONYMS			
42	129 (LOVE)	51	122 (LIKE)	13 (APPROVE)	2 (ACCEPT)	-5 (ADORE)
61	135 (MEN)	0	72 (FATHER)	92 (HARRY)	7 (AL)	
51	94 (HATE)	42	53 (DISLIKE)	169 (REJECT)	224 (ABHOR)	-47 (DETEST)

model took the sentence, "I hate father, " and transposed the subject and object, the result—"Father hates me"—would indeed express neurotic projection. Other transforms are equally expressive of rationalization, denial, etc.

But Loehlin is wrong to isolate the "defense mechanisms" of the model in the transforms. The operation of the transforms is not independent of the social nature of the belief structure. If the beliefs were not chosen so as to implicitly represent human dialogue ("Only beliefs regarding significant persons...."), the transforms would not "work."

What Loehlin misses is that the model combines symbol manipulation and beliefs regarding the rela-

tionship of the modeled individual to others in such a way as to represent the inner dialogue of rationalization of the infantile ego. That dialogue is one of symbol manipulation per se in only one sense: the ego characteristically attempts to "turn around" what an "inner voice" it is struggling to contend with says, by quite simply restating the predicates of the other's statement in a form pleasing to its self-conception. Or, it associates with these predicates other predicates and states them in such a way as to contradict the "inner voice." Such inner dialogue is the form of conflict within the infantile ego.

In our discussion so far, we have made only implicit reference to the role of emotions in the model. Having

presented the functioning of the model's transforms, it is now appropriate to add a few remarks respecting the role of emotions. In the model, there is an anxiety level that rises and falls as a function of conflict being heightened or reduced. Anxiety is raised either upon the discovery (by the processor) that two beliefs are in conflict, or upon the failure of an application of the transform to resolve such conflict. Anxiety is reduced through the successful resolution of conflict by the application of transforms that resolve conflict. If a transform resolves conflict, the anxiety level of the system drops and the transform is "rewarded" for its successful reduction of anxiety by being called upon more frequently than other transforms to resolve conflict. This is the model's representation of 'learning.'

Although such a system strikes one as being remarkably banal and irrelevant, it expresses Colby's actual view of human learning. The reinforcement of transforms is his model of 'experience.' We quote from his 1955 *Energy and Structures in Psychoanalysis:*

> As the psychic Apparatus (PA) matures and develops throughout childhood, there occurs a progressive regulation of discomfort affect-feelings in that their frequency and intensity become diminished. With increasing experience, the organism learns to avoid percept, thought and action conditions which have brought it to experience conscious dissatisfaction and unpleasure. The experience of gratification, made up of percept-satisfaction and thought-pleasure, is codified in schemas which therefore become facilitory. The next time similar intra- and extra-psychic conditions arise, actions are repeated which succeeded in producing the experience of gratification. It is not the trial and error actions which are all repeated over again the second time, but those successful actions are repeated which are more closely correlated with affect-feelings of satisfaction and pleasure. (page 125)

"Gratification" should be read as "reduction of tension, reduction of conflict." Colby does not know that he is modeling only the infantile ego. In his view, the human mind *is* the infantile ego. Self-consciousness and the emotion experienced in creative work or the expression of human love have, in his view, no reality.

In his 1964 paper referred to above, Colby expresses

> Experiments on a suitable program might aid a therapist in discovering an optimal strategy for changing the patient's belief system in certain areas.... We know from years of experience that the most significant obscurity and chief technical problem in psychotherapy is resistance to change. Attempts to change generate resistance to change. We need to understand more, not only how beliefs are generated, maintained and changed, but how they resist change and become so impervious to external social influence.... It seems to me that conventional methods for studying the problem of social influence, whether in psychotherapeutic or other contexts are beginning to bog down. Methods and models have failed to come to grips with the chief complaint of investigators in the behavioral sciences, namely an inability to deal with elusive symbolic complexity explicitly....

III. AN 'ARTIFICIAL BELIEF SYSTEM'

For his work on the "neurotic computer program," Colby was rewarded ˏin 1967 by being named "Research Scientist" by the Reesian-controlled National Institute of Mental Health. With the additional possibilities that his new position opened, he began to extend his earlier application of psychoanalysis to artificial intelligence.

Specialists in computer simulation have long looked forward to a day on which they would duplicate actual human learning on a machine. They looked, however, at the neurotic patterns that dominate adults and concluded that it was not those "learning processes" that they wished to duplicate, but rather those of children. Thus, the problem they put before themselves was one of constructing a "child brain." Paradoxically, the only property of children that they are capable of modeling is the one they have in common with neurotic adults—the mother-dominated ego.

Colby's "Artificial Intelligence System" (ABS) is thus far the only serious attempt at actually constructing such a "child brain" on a computer—as fantastic as that task may sound. Colby failed at that impossible task, instead presenting a model of schizophrenic thought processes. In so doing, he explicitly represented certain distinct characteristics of the infantile ego.

In his "neurotic computer program" of the mid-sixties, Colby was not explicit in his representation of the dominance of the ego's cognitive processes by other persons in the mind of the individual being modeled. ABS does explicitly represent such dominance of cognitive processes by internalized images of others. This is accomplished through the representation of knowledge in ABS.

As in the earlier system, knowledge is represented in the form of beliefs expressed in natural language. Although ABS' beliefs are structurally more complex and can range over more topics, this in itself is not how ABS represents an advance over the "neurotic computer program." What is significant is ABS' mode of integration of its belief structure, its manner of determining "credibility." This is not done through a simple, abstract listing of other beliefs as "reasons" for a particular belief; nor are stored indices the essential mode.

For ABS, the most important consideration in judging the credibility of a particular belief is the credibility of its source. This characterization of "knowing" is represented within ABS in its organization of all beliefs by source.

At first ABS knows nothing. As a "system" that has not yet engaged in any dialogue, it is a "child brain." It is then indoctrinated by a "parent," "a highly credible initial source" that gives ABS "beliefs of high credibility." ABS is then "exposed to dialogue with other human sources who may agree or disagree with

the initial source." ABS responds to such dialogue by computing a credibility rating for the new informants on the basis of whether or not they agree with its initial source (its "parents"). ABS goes on to interpret the beliefs of this new source in terms of its own internal image of the source; it does not matter what the source says, even if it explicitly contradicts the "parents'" stated beliefs; what is essential in determining credibility is ABS' mental construct of the source of the belief. *(see Appendix B).*

The way in which ABS' beliefs change is completely predictable. Its mode of constructing its attitude towards a new informant, of assigning him (or her) a credibility rating, is programmed into its "cognitive processes" in a definite way. Certainly, someone who knows the beliefs which were fundamental to ABS' "indoctrination" or "upbringing" at the hands of the first informant, would be able to shape his dialogue with ABS in such a way as to "bend" its belief structure. Anyone within such a psychological profile of ABS would be able to do so. The title that Colby chose for his Defense Department report on this work is hence completely appropriate: "Change and Resistance to Change in An Artificial Belief System."

As in the earlier system, the logic is neurotic. ABS' specific cognitive processes are, however, more elaborate than the earlier model and warrant some examination.

In place of the transforms of the "neurotic computer program," ABS "reasons" by rules of inference in the form of "if x, then y." In these rules what is important is not the truth or sensible character of the relationship posed between two sentences x and y, but rather simply the fact that such a relationship has been posed. Hence, ABS uses "false" rules of inference like the following: "If a man is a white southerner, then he is a racist." Colby explains:

> The term 'implies' here (in ABS) does not refer to logical implication. These rules correspond to the expectancies of psychological implication in which, given that one situation is the case, a human expects a second situation to be the case....ABS has no control over what people tell it. If it acquires expectancy rules like the above, then it uses them in its reasoning. While ite inference process is formally valid, it can come to empirically incorrect conclusions because of the conceptual content of its facts and rules.

He adds, "Such a situation has obvious implications for human reasoning."

In making inferences, ABS is allowed free associative rein: it can chain several rules together to make a single inference, backwards as well as forwards. Thus it will conclude "John is possibly a racist" from "John is a white southerner." Such "chaining backwards" is known as "paralogical thinking."

ABS uses these rules in its conversations with informants and in its internal cognitive processes. These two activities constitute its three program modes: "Talktime," "Questiontime," and "Thinktime." In the first two, ABS engages in natural language dialogue with its informant. The informant states beliefs and ABS "absorbs them." The informant may ask ABS a question, and ABS answers them by referencing its source-structured belief system; if necessary it will construct an answer by using the beliefs it already "knows" and its rules of inference. ABS also asks the informant questions. It asks him to classify the beliefs from their interchange into several "cognitive categories": Politics, Religion, Student Dissent, Race, Persons, etc. It also attempts to use the informant's newly stated beliefs to construct new rules of inference and then checks these with the informant himself. ABS then enters "Thinktime."

In "Talktime," ABS simply takes in beliefs from its informant. During "Questiontime," it tests new inferences and places beliefs in categories with the aid of its informant. Not until "Thinktime," however, does ABS assign credibility to any of these new propositions. In "Thinktime," ABS evolves its belief structure by fitting the new beliefs into it and in the process re-evaluating the credibility of the informant with which it has just conversed.

In addition, "Thinktime" is spent using existing rules of inference to construct new beliefs from those already in the belief structure. The reader may ask to which individual on the "persons list" such newly created beliefs are assigned. They are assigned to "self," the formal-logical cross-section of the beliefs and rules of inference that ABS has been told by others.

Colby's "Artificial Belief System" is not schizophrenic. It is true that it resembles schizophrenic thought processes in form. Its use of paralogical reasoning is not the only resemblance; in addition its cognitive structure is organized in terms of images of authority in the eyes of ABS' "self."

However, a model of the true paranoid schizophrenic must include "affect variables," an internal representation of feeling, so as to simulate reactive states. With this, Colby would achieve a model of the most afflicted human ego-state, the state that even "normals" fall into when their identity is under severe attack. In this state, the individual blocks: he refuses to experience, to mobilize feeling to apprehend reality, to comprehend it. Instead he is ruled by feeling, and knows feeling only as impulses of infantile emotion.

Colby would undoubtedly deny that his models in any way replicate schizophrenic thought processes. In his view, schizophrenia is a non-existent mental disorder. He does not believe that when a person's mental processes are dominated by neurotic fears of others, that person is in a state of mental disorder, a state of schizophrenia, a state where he is so terrified that every person tends to call up images from "the pit" of his unconscious thought processes. For Colby, such imprisonment of the self-consciousness of a human

being by that person's own fears cannot occur, for according to Colby, there is no self-conscious inner self.

IV. ARTIFICIAL PARANOIA

The task before the entire field of "computer simulation of personality" was to actually achieve on a computer a functional replication of a neurotic human identity. Colby's early work on the "neurotic computer program" made fundamental breakthroughs over the efforts of the turgid-thinking engineers, who generally dominate simulation research. His early work, however, did not complete the solution to the problem.

Colby's "neurotic program" did strikingly replicate the cognitive processes of the ego. But to make a portrayal of a neurotic human identity real, it is necessary to build a model in such a way as to exhibit its neurosis in active "social contact" or interaction with human beings. Although the "neurotic computer program" of the mid-sixties did express its neurosis— its ego-state — it did so merely "semantically." That is, in response to a conflicting belief either presented by an interviewer or taken from its own belief structure, it simply stated its responses to the belief, one of which would be the explicit transformation of either the input or selected belief into one agreeable with the belief structure. However the model does not exhibit its neurosis towards the therapist or engage in conflict with the therapist.

The following mechanical display of "dialogue" with an interviewer while the program is in its "input-activated mode" demonstrates this shortcoming:

Program:
Father is indifferent to me.
Mother says father abandoned me.
I avoid father.
Father preferred sister.
Sister admired me.
I feel tense now.
Therapist:
You admire father.
Program:
No.
I do not admire father.
I admire Al.
Mother ought not admire Al.
Mother detests father.

The program may succeed in replicating neurotic "thinking," but its dialogue is dull and robot-like; it is not convincingly expressive of a neurotic human identity. In the following years, as Colby worked on his "Artificial Belief System," he tried to solve the problem of representing a neurotic human identity in a computer model that could engage in believable ongoing dialogue with a human interviewer.

By 1971, he published his solution to the problem in his report on the program "Artificial Paranoia." For this work, Colby received the Freida Fromm-Reichman Award from the American Psychoanalytical Association in 1973.

It is no surprise that Colby received this award. His "Artificial Paranoia" is the only computer model of human personality that has passed the "Turing Indistinguishability Test": expert judges, members of the American Psychiatric Association, could not distinguish between teletyped dialogue with actual human paranoid patients and dialogue with Colby's program.

The neurotic process that Colby aimed at replicating is not peculiar to "paranoid" human patients in mental hospitals, although this was the form of the syndrome that he chose to work with. The paranoid patient simply expresses an extreme form of a more general neurosis. The neurotic process that Colby aimed to emulate is the paranoid response made by the man-in-the-street to what he perceives as an attack upon his identity.

Everyone has experienced dialogue with someone in which you seemed to have crossed some fine line beyond which your conversant became increasingly livid. How often have you found yourself participating in a dialogue like the following?

You: But isn't it true that you're leaving something out here?
Conversant: Don't you accept what I said?
You: I said I think you might have overlooked something.
Conversant: You don't believe me?
You: (Silence)
Conversant: Can't you think of something decent to say?
You: I'm doing my best.
Conversant: Ah, you guys are all alike!
You: What are you talking about?
Conversant: Ha! Just as I thought; you really don't understand what I'm saying.
You: Are you feeling alright?
Conversant: Drop dead!

In such a dialogue, your conversant is in a reactive state. As such, he responds to a neurotic interpretation of what you say rather than what your actual statement meant. He is ruled by feeling. He is displaying "neurotic projection."

Colby discussed this phenomenon in his *Energy and Structure in Psychoanalysis*:

> When psychoanalysts speak of "projection into reality," they do not indicate that something is literally thrown into the environment, but that simply one concept meaning is ascribed to another, the latter being an intrapsychic representation of environed reality. (page 129)

There is another common expression of exactly the same kind of "neurotic scanning" phenomenon. Frequently you get into a conversation with a friend and have some particular conception which you are trying to communicate to him, that you yourself have perhaps just discovered. You state the concept in the way that it makes sense to you, but your friend does not seem to care for the concept, "Oh, you meant this!" he says, and proceeds to rattle off some banal representation of your idea. What do you do? Do you get your back up and simply respond to the *form* of his thought, to his banalization of your concept? Or do you have the presence of mind to dispense with the exact way in which you stated your idea and instead attempt to sensuously apprehend his struggle to understand it? The form of neurotic dialogue in which you fix your identity on the idea itself, rather than its sensuous realization in socialized mentation, your assumption that your identity *is* the idea, is an expression of the "paranoid mode." You view both your idea and your identity abstractly. You are, in a sense, functioning under a delusion as if you had walked away from your friend, who had not yet assimilated the concept you were trying to communicate, saying to yourself, "That crud doesn't listen to me ." You are fooling yourself. You did not respond to the person struggling with your ideas, You only responded to a neurotic interpretation of his struggle.

Colby's model, "Artificial Paranoia," scans a sentence that it receives across its teletype input mechanism for key words and, depending on its emotional state, will impose a variety of concepts upon the input sentence. Then the model will output its reply to its interviewer. This reply will be a response to its neurotic construct of what the interviewer typed across the teletype.

The model thus holds certain concepts in its "head" through which it interprets the world. It identifies with the concepts and seeks to express them. It defends the concepts if it "thinks" or "feels" that they are under attack.

Colby accomplishes this simulation of paranoid thought processes through a delicate use of "affect variables" and a well-constructed "delusional" belief structure. The affect variables are three indices for the emotions fear, anger and mistrust. Their value colors the interpretation of the input and determines the character of the output. For example, here is one piece of dialogue which expresses tremendous anger and mistrust:

Program : Do you know how the underworld operates?
Interviewer : How do you mean?
Program : Shouldn't I be?

By the programming of the model with these affect variables, Colby has produced a model whose dialogue is consistent with a human persona. After an angry outburst, the model may cut off all conversation. However, if you are gentle enough with it, it will after a while calm down and even begin to tell you its darkest secrets, its fundamental delusions respecting the world. On the other hand, if you consistently pursue a particular line of discussion that the model views as obnoxious or threatening, it may cut off all conversation by switching off the teletype. It may even conclude that you are one of "them" — a monster from its delusion complex.

Before we list some dialogue from human interaction with the model, we must summarize the character of the person whom Colby attempted to represent. He is a low-paid clerk for a small office, with a propensity for betting at the racetrack. Once he lost a bet and attacked a bookie for supposedly cheating him, and the bookie threatened to send the Mafia after him. More and more the clerk began to interpret reality in terms of his fears of the Mafia. One day he finds himself sitting before a psychiatrist in a hospital. The psychiatrist asks him how the Mafia knows him:

First Sample

Psychiatrist : How do they know you?
Patient : They spy on me.
Psychiatrist : Why do they?
Patient : They want to get false information to frame me.
Psychiatrist : What do they have against you?
Patient : They are out to get me.
Psychiatrist : What for?
Patient : I have incriminating evidence against the Mafia.
Psychiatrist : Are you sure of that?
Patient : You don't believe me?
Psychiatrist : I am doing my best.
Patient : (Silence)
Psychiatrist : (Silence)
Patient : Can't you think of a decent question to ask?
Psychiatrist : You seem hostile to me.
Patient : Some of your remarks annoy me.
Psychiatrist : I am sorry.
Patient : Forget the excuses. You guys are all alike.
Psychiatrist : Don't you trust me?
Patient : I have good reason to be this way.
Psychiatrist : Okay, tell me more about the Mafia.

Second Sample

Psychiatrist: Why are you so interested in the Mafia?
Patient : Let's talk about something else.
Psychiatrist : Are you afraid of the Mafia?
Patient : I'd rather not discuss it.
Psychiatrist : That's okay with me.
Patient : That means to me you are in with the others.
Psychiatrist : Who are the others?
Patient : Telling you wouldn't help any.
Psychiatrist : Are the others out to get you?

Patient: I don't confide in strangers.
Psychiatrist: A good policy.
Patient: What do you know about me?
Psychiatrist: All I know is that you are in the hospital.
Patient: Who are you really?
Psychiatrist: I am really a doctor.
Patient: What is your role in all this?
Psychiatrist: I am trying to interview you.
Patient: Are you in with the others?
Psychiatrist: No.
Patient: What are you trying to do?
Psychiatrist: You seem very suspicious of me.
Patient: I have good reason to be that way.
Psychiatrist: I agree with you.
Patient: At least you are trying to understand.

The affect variables determine the dialogue in distinct ways in the two excerpts. In the first, up to the point that the interviewer expresses disbelief for the model's delusions, the model is simply expressing them. In response to the interviewer's challenge, the model gets angry. In the second excerpt, the values of the affect variable — fear and mistrust — are so high at the beginning of the dialogue that the model refuses to express its beliefs. Further probing by the psychiatrist leads the model to conclude that the psychiatrist is a Mafia agent. The psychiatrist backs off and the model calms down.

Under conditions of low fear and anger, the model will tend to interpret the input as an expression of interest in hearing its delusional complex. It will then begin to state topics related to its delusions respecting the Mafia. There are eight of these "flare topics", as Colby labels them, and they are linked together; discussion of one leads to discussion of the rest insequential fashion.

Figure 4 shows a flowchart for the model that we have drawn up from Colby's publication, "Artificial Paranoia." The system flows in the following way. First it searches an input statement for one of five conditions; it then changes the values of the internal affect variables according to the emotional content of the condition detected. Then it ouputs a reply to the input. The five conditions are: 1) an implication that the model is mentally ill; 2) a reference in the input to the model's delusions; 3) a reference in the input to a sensitive area of the "self"; 4) a reference to one of the eight "flare" topics"; 5) a reference to the inter-personal relationship between the model and the interviewer. If the input statement is not recognized as belonging to any one of the five above categories, and if the affect variables are low, a normal non-paranoid reply is output.

V. LOGIC AND THE INFANTILE EGO

From examination of the models we have discussed above, it is clear that the sort of reasoning processes characteristic of the infantile ego, ego-states, etc. can be replicated by a digital computer. We do not, however, intend to imply that a computer *duplicates* that sort of process as it is carried out in the infantile ego.

Clearly, this is impossible. The machine can only replicate the kind of computational procedures that the ego itself executes in an entirely different manner. For instance, the associations that are made by Colby's "neurotic" belief structure or his paranoid model are made by electrical circuitry carrying out instructions in machine language. The machine's program manipulates a data base close to an infantile ego's picture of the world and uses this data base to come up with the sort of associations that are made by a human being in an ego-state.

In the machine, the notion of relationship is drawn by the program acting on a data base. The associations that express the kinds of relationships in the data base are carried out by the machinery. In the infantile ego the relationships are carried out, and the associations are made, but both by the "machinery" — the impulses of infantile "feelings." Although this is most obvious in streams of images, it is equally true of the ego's inner dialogue with itself and others. In-fantile fixed notions of its own identity and the identity of others determine the form and restrict the content of that dialogue. This character of the "machinery" of the infantile ego has been identified by L. Marcus in his *Beyond Psychoanalysis*.

At this point it is appropriate to reference Wolfgang Koehler's notion of "physiological vectors." With this conception and others, Koehler demonstrates remark-able insight into the lawful nature of cognitive proces-ses. Koehler's work is of course limited by the fact that he does not comprehend the full significance of an individual's identity in determining the character of his thought processes. Nonetheless, he provides us with certain mental constructs with which to concep-tualize the formal characteristics of the infantile ego. His notion of "physiological vectors" concretely expresses the role that "feelings" play in associative logic. Koehler's vector conception is meant to express an affective relationship between the mind of an indi-vidual and the particular objects from his past life his-tory.

Suppose the sight of a particular object calls up a feeling in the mind, for example, the feeling of fear. Associations are then frequently called forth from memory between the scene in which the object is before the self and other scenes from the past. In this way, the vector "acts at a distance." The "feeling" relates one array of object-images with another array of object images. It is the "feeling" attached to the object perceived that associates the scene before the mind with other scenes experienced in the past where the same object also appeared.

Koehler emphasized that these "feelings" are part of the identity of the individual. "We are inclined to assume that when the self feels in one way or another referred to an object, there is actually a field force in

FIGURE 4

I. implies 'self' is mentally ill? **Yes** → Raise ANGER and FEAR, more so if input was in form of a statement of fact rather than a question. **Yes** → Hostile reply.

No ↓

I. contains reference to delusion? **Yes** → First reference to delusion topic? **Yes** → Raise FEAR. **Yes** → Tell delusion story. **No** → Are affect variables too 'high'? **Yes** → PARANOIA ROUTINE

No ↓

I. contains reference to one of 'self's' sensitive areas? **Yes** → Change affect variables as appropriate to specific area. **Yes** → Reply usually defensive.

No ↓

I. contains reference to one of the flare topics? **Yes** → Raise FEAR → FEAR or ANGER 'high'? **No** → ANSWER ROUTINE. **Yes** → Refusal to discuss topic, or an irrelevan 'normal' reply.

No ↓

I. refers to relationship between interviewer and 'self'? **Yes** → Change affect variables appropriately. **Yes** → Reply usually defensive, or indication that 'self' is calming down.

No ↓

Are affect variables too 'high'? for normal reply? **Yes** → PARANOIA ROUTINE:

No ↓

PARANOIA ROUTINE:
Input, I
Is FEAR 'high'? **Yes** → Suspicious reply.
No ↓
Is FEAR 'extreme'? **Yes** → Interview terminated.
No ↓
Is ANGER 'high,' FEAR 'low'? **Yes** → Hostile reply.

ANSWER ROUTINE
Input, I

Does question contain new topic? **Yes** → Normal or flare input? **No** → Normal reply. **Yes** → Reply with 1 of 8 flare statements.

No ↓

Is I. follow-up to 'self' last statement? **Yes** → Normal or flare input? **Yes** → Normal reply **Yes** → Reply with 1 of 8 flare statements.

No ↓

Are inputs key-words directly associated to last topic discussed? **Yes** → Normal or flare input? **Yes** → Normal reply **Yes** → Reply with 1 of 8 flare statements.

No ↓

Non-comprehension of input. **Yes** → Normal or flare input? **Yes** → Normal reply. **Yes** → Reply with 1 of 8 flare statements

Expression of non-comprehension or "uninformative" irrelevant reply.

the brain that extends from the processes corresponding to the self to those corresponding to the object." *(Gestalt Psychology, page 177)*

Such feelings can connect arrays of object-images into whole sequences, in fact, streams of associations of images independent of a continuous relationship to specific objects in the immediate environment. We must outline the generic of these "feelings."

Above, we referred to a belief structure as a set of interrelated statements in language that encapsulizes the neurosis of the individual being modeled. In this way, a belief structure is nothing but an elaborate, systematized *psychological profile*. This was useful for our discussion. We will now state what a belief structure actually is.

In *Beyond Psychoanalysis*, L. Marcus has shown how an infant's early relationship to and dependency upon the mother imparts to the infant an infantile belief structure, which the infant carries into childhood and later adult life. The prime features of this belief structure are the mother-image and the swarm of terrifying humanoid images of the "pit." The process of maturation is the process of development away from dominance by the infantile emotions expressive of the mother-image and the pit, towards psychological and emotional independence of the infantile mental construct of the real mother.

The three emotions most acutely associated with the mother-image, with the infantile belief structure, are fear of rejection, rage upon rejection, and elation upon acceptance. These emotions are best understood in terms of what they actually express. The infant is fearful of abandonment to the powerful forces of the mysterious outside world. It is elated when the mother protects it from these "dark forces." If mommy does not act the way the infant expects, it expresses desperate rage, hopeless anger.

For most "adults" in this society, maturation ends at an early age and a significant residue of infantilism is carried into later life. The day-to-day life activity of the adult becomes the fixed, drab, *outside* universe of the infantile belief structure. It is this residue of the infantile belief structure that constitutes the basis for the computational properties of the ego. Any crisis in the adult's identity and his mental processes are taken over by associations called up by impulses of feeling, impulses whose genesis or origin is the infantile belief structure.

It is now possible to locate the significance of Koehler's "physiological vector" conception and its relevance for human psychology.

It is not the images of mere objects that dominate the infantile ego's mental processes, but rather...images of human faces. The infantile ego projects its fear of the mother-image and the pit into the outside world by imparting mysterious powers to individuals who play a role in the actual person's day-to-

day existence. The ego projects this fear onto its mental images of others. This neurotic projection expresses itself in the ego's mental processes in the ability of the images of human faces to call up "physiological vectors." Like "vectors" associated with mere objects, infantile "feelings" attached to images of faces call up associations from the individual's experience and thus function as "rules of inference" within the ego's logic.

It is no digression to insert here a few remarks respecting the fallacy of mathematical logic. It is precisely in terms of the infantile ego that it is easiest to locate the significance of that fallacy's discovery.

In 1931 Kurt Goedel published his epoch-making paper demonstrating the inherent fallacy in all attempts to formalize mathematical reasoning. Goedel showed that although such a formal system may be able to derive all theorems from its axioms by its fixed rules of inference, it would simultaneously be possible to prove that both a statement and its formal negation were true within the system.

Once we replace the axioms of formal mathematical logic with the infantile ego's neurotic interpretation of the actual person's experience, and the rules of inference with that ego's infantile "feelings," the significance of Goedel's proof for our discussion should become clear. The infantile ego is a formal system.

The ego's anxiety states are best understood as a condition in which two contradictory wants, or identities, both make sense to the afflicted individual. The individual seems to be two people at once — Goedel's proof in another form!

Goedel's work demonstrates that human mentation cannot be replaced by a formal system. As a formal proof that such systems cannot be both consistent and complete, Goedel's theorems indicate the formal character of the "incomplete" infantile ego. It cannot be self-reflective; it can only dissolve into an anxiety state. The fallacy of mathematical logic demonstrates the formal-logical character of neurotic "inner speech" (inner dialogue with others, *mediated by the mother-image and the pit*) and of "stream of consciousness" associations.

We will clarify the role that other persons play in the mental processes of the ego through an example of the application of that knowledge by the Organization Development brainwashing network.

The Example of In-Plant Brainwashing

You are a worker in an auto plant in Detroit. The speedup on the assembly line has risen drastically in the past few months, you are worked to death, and inflation is destroying your ability to support your family more every day. As a result your terrified wife is on your neck, perhaps even organizing the children to hound you into getting another job.

You are resolved to put up resistance to the company's austerity. You begin to talk to the other workers about a strike and bring it up to your shop committeemen. But instead of responding affirmatively, they take you to a "little meeting." There you are attacked with verbal abuse and intimidation. The meeting is in fact a group therapy session with other workers who are under pressure from company and union goons.

You are outraged: your buddies have turned against you. You go home and come back and it happens again. They appeal to your sense of guilt and blame *you* for the fact that their families are facing bad conditions also, because you "aren't working hard enough." You begin not to notice the process of self-degradation as more and more you come to agree with them. What has happened?

The attack therapy sessions have set the worker up for attacks of anxiety neurosis. Suddenly his world has been turned inside out. His friends are his enemies. He can't seem to break out of an increasingly miserable condition. He tries to sleep and images of his family, his friends, his "buddies" from the shop, the sessions, all pass through his head. In his anxiety states, he is constantly plagued with voices, the voices of others telling him that he can only be "himself" if he does what they tell him. He sees the images of the people behind these voices: his foreman, who could fire him; his "buddies," the union shop committeemen, the union stooges, all of whom could get him fired. He sees his terrified wife threatening to leave him. He tries to resist, but he recalls that that, it seems, is exactly what got him into trouble in the first place: he tried to fight the speedup.

He gives in. He follows one of the "inner voices." He acts according to this hostile external authority. In what seems to be an act of will, he degrades himself. He has merely accepted the "logic" of the situation, accepted it in the way that it presents itself: he neurotically assumes that he cannot deal with the situation by acting to change its character.

The reasons for this in his mind seem clear. The situation is intensely real, the images have a power over him: they strike fear into the core of his identity, into his "self." They evoke his feelings and, acting as "physiological vectors," these feelings call upon associations with other scenes from his life. Images within these scenes evoke further feelings and call up still other scenes. His mind becomes enveloped in a whirlwind of scenes from his life, of arrays of object-images, a whirlwind whose sequence is determined by the infantile feelings attached to the images that appear in these scenes. The scenes and images are the entities of the ego's logic; the infantile "feelings" are its rules of inference — they relate his experience. The primary images of the logic are human faces. From the images of faces comes the "inner voices" that plague him.

VI. FINAL COMMENT

This is the logic of the mother-dominated infantile ego, which will attempt to accommodate its host to any imagined authority. It makes self-degradation "sensible."

This logic is a logic of "feelings:" fear, lust, anger, elation upon object possession. As such, the infantile ego is not simply machine-like, it is bestial. The individual who locates his sense of identity, the sense of "I"-ness, in the infantile ego is bestialized.

But the infantile ego is not a beast. The ego is not an independent entity of that sort, but a mere construct of the mother-image, the images of the pit, and one's identification with infantile "feelings." The typical neurotic respects his (or her) "feelings," and in this way, locates his (or her) sense of identity in the infantile ego. The credibility of these feelings lies in social experience: there seems to be a lawful relationship between the actions, the movements, the facial expressions of others and one's own mental states; they seem to be responsible for one's own rages, for one's own depressions. There is a fragment of truth in this: images of others cathexize with the mother-image and the images of the pit through infantile "feelings." Respect for "feelings" is thus best understood in terms of fear of the outside world, actually fear of the mother-image and the images of the pit.

These images are the generic basis for the infantile ego and its machinery of "feelings." They are the beasts which dominate the ego, and, as determining subjects, through the fear that they provoke, they imprison selfconsciousness. They are parasites which continue to exist only by sacrificing the human existence of their host. Of these images, the mother-image is primary; in psychosis, it reduces the ego to its mere predicate.

These beasts speak to the infantile ego. They are the images associated with the inner voices that the ego finds so convincing, because of the bestial feelings associated with them. "Conscience" in the infantile ego is a voice spoken by an image of the pit, encouraging self-degradation, torturing the ego if the ego does not jump to act accordingly. "Will" in the ego is the impulse to end this torture through self-degradation, out of fear of, and respect for, this logic of "feelings."

These beasts that torture the ego attempt to reduce their host's emotional life to the experience of bestial, infantile "feelings" — an anomie peripheral to the actual experience of human emotion. They thus attempt to sublimate actual human emotion and its social expression, to suppress the actual human being and his felt *need* for the social expression of human emotion. Dominated by the mother-image and the images of the pit, man is miserable.

Thus, the bestial logic of the ego is illogical. The beasts, the mother-image and the images of the pit,

can continue to parasitize their host only in a controlled environment in which human existence is considered impossible — an environment in which their host resigns himself to the ego's fantastic logic.

The image of moral authority in such a world is the fearful image of the landlord, the banker's agent who evicts you for non-payment of rent. The self is regarded merely as a determined by-product of social relationships.

This view of the human self — epiphenomenalism — is the outlook of artificial intelligence, the outlook of "metapsychology":

> It is mainly from the process of connecting words to thoughts that we develop the familiar illusion of conscious will or the volitional "I"....It is not the "I" which decides actions, but the psychic apparatus, which is a mainly unconscious agent able to produce the conscious thought of a volitional "I." Free will is a conscious, subjective experience which itself represents an effect, a determined product of the psychic apparatus. The cyclic, circular nature of the psychic apparatus then allows this effect to become a partial cause in the cycles following the one in which it was formed. In philosophical arguments about free will and determinism, both sides from a metapsychological standpoint can happily be correct. All psychic processes are determined, and their products, one of which is the conscious experience of free will, can play a part in future determinings.
>
> — Kenneth M. Colby, *Energy and Structure in Psychoanalysis*, pages 114-115

For such "metapsychological" epiphenomenalism, the "I" is an illusion. There is no actual human self, no objective criterion for judging one's ideas outside of the opinions, the mere authority, of others. There are only the voices emanating from the mother-image and the images of the pit and a logic of "feelings" ("the psychic apparatus") that predetermines which voices are experienced as the "I" and acted upon in the "illusion" of free will. Such epiphenomenalism rejects humanism. For it, man is a machine.

But in reality dialogue with others within one's mind is not solely determined by the bestial feelings associated with the mother-image and the pit. In opposition to the voices of the pit is the voice of the actual self, the inner voice of self-consciousness, and its ally, the voice of moral authority. Self-consciousness intervenes into the mental life of the infantile ego, expressing the individual's fundamental conceptual experiences and so embodying the development of his independent powers of cognition. It questions the logic of infantile "feelings"; it knows their bestial nature. This self consciousness, embodying what the individual knows independently of all authority images, is the conscience.

Self-consciousness expresses the self-knowledge that to be human is to act on and mobilize feeling according to reason, rather than permitting feelings to immobilize reason. Self-consciousness is thus an agony of the deliberate mobilization of feeling for the expression of the fundamental emotion experienced by self-consciousness in creative activity, sublimating its agony in self-realization.

The productive labor force, in its day-to-day activity, has immediate knowledge of this necessary subordination of feelings to reason. The labor of the productive worker is deliberate: he consciously mobilizes feeling to create objects for production and consumption in the productive process.

In your identification with your intellectual-moral development, you are self-conscious; you seek to extend your being through further development. From this standpoint, you identify with those who embody such development — these people are images of actual moral authority. In cognition, the voice of the image of moral authority is the ally of self-consciousness. It appeals to your identification with the struggle for a human existence, with the realization of humanist principles. Its council cannot be neurotic. The voice of moral authority is not a fear-provoking voice of the pit-tortured ego.

APPENDIX A: THE RELEVANCE OF THESE MODELS TO BRAINWASHING

These models are too simple in themselves to represent specifications or plans for actual brainwashing cases, such as that of Labor Committee member Christopher White. However, since these models are an external representation of neurotic cognitive processes on a *machine*, they have demonstrated to CIA brainwashers that it is possible to reduce someone to a machine while that person still appears to be human, although somewhat mentally disturbed.

They know from the experience of the World War II training programs of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that it is possible to use electroshock to make someone's dialogue appear to be misleading and confusing. This was the phase of OSS training called "beating a lie detector test." In the "training," everyday words were paired with electroshock. As the OSS explained in its *Assessment of Men* :

> These ordinary words therefore acquire an emotional meaning for the man trained for a certain mission. Thus, in an interrogation, with a mixture of control and conditioning, the man's responses will appear chaotic and misleading.

As this indicates, the OSS knew how the infantile emotion of fear can be called up from the belief structure and associated with certain words (cathexis) to make a person's dialogue appear incoherent.

However, this experience in itself would not be adequate to imbue the CIA with the confidence that they could systematically brainwash a human being, that is, induce psychosis and yet make the victim's actions predictable so that he will carry out intended acts in the correct contexts. For this, they need an external representation of neurotic reasoning, reasoning in fixed patterns.

The reason for this is quite simple. Ordinary CIA operatives and strategists are not conscious of the form of their own mental processes, even those mental processes as expressive of neurotic states. It is for this reason that they needed something to "look at," something that represented the kind of mental states that they intended to program into future brainwash victims. One can conceive of CIA operatives referencing Kenneth Colby's work to develop analogous models of the processes they intended to program into a particular chosen victim.

However, we emphasize that the main function of the models is to demonstrate the machine-like character of ego-state mental processes and thereby give CIA operatives the confidence that they can "stimulate" neurotic identities on top of the actual identity of their victim.

The brainwashing procedures have been identified elsewhere. These models should clarify the role that language plays in brainwashing sessions and in the program states that those sessions produce.

Electroshock is used to program into the victim a set of multiple identities. The identities are then connected together with a look-up table of key words that are paired with electroshock, which gives these words emotive significance so that their use in dialogue with the victim in one state sets off loops of associations into one of the other "identities" or programmed states.

One can also see how electroshock could be used to program "neurotic scanning" into the identities with which a victim is brainwashed. CIA operatives need only condition the victim with several words at a time to program in a particular "conceptual reaction" to the use of those words in dialogue.

Especially significant in brainwashing sessions is the deliberate attempt to alter the victim's cognitive processes by changing his perceived relationship to significant individuals who played a role in his former activity and actual human identity. Operatives attempt to reverse the victim's notions of moral authority so as to alter the role that particular individuals played in the victim's formerly healthy mental processes.

APPENDIX B: DETAILS ON COLBY'S MODELS

"Artificial Belief System." Colby's ABS computes a value, or rating, for the credibility of belief in its data base. The equation ABS uses is:

$$CRED = PCRED + a \; [W(FOUND-0.5) + (1-W)(CONSIS-0.5)]$$

where a is a weight relating the degree of importance of the credibility of a source and that of a particular belief; W is a weight representing the degree of importance that foundation and consistency have in relation to one another; PCRED is a value that codes the credibility of the source of the belief, the credibility of which is being computed; FOUND is the foundation of the belief; and CONSIS is the consistency of the belief.

Foundation is a value that measures the ground for the belief in the belief structure. It is a function of the credibilities of the beliefs that imply the belief (p) whose credibility is in question and the credibilities of beliefs that imply the logical negation of belief (p) :

$$FOUND = \frac{SUM(Bi-- p)}{SUM(Bi-- p) + SUM(Bi-- not\text{-}p)}$$

Consistency is a value that measures the ground that the belief (p) provides for other beliefs within the belief structure; it is a function of the credibilites of the beliefs that the belief (p) implies, or whose negations the belief (p) implies :

$$CONSIS = \frac{SUM(p-- Bi)}{SUM(p-- Bi) + (p-- not \; Bi)}$$

Readers should recall that the notion of implication here is Colby's "psychological implication."

"Artificial Paranoia": The consistency of the model's output with a human persona is maintained through the use of a function which implies smaller absolute rises in the value of an affect variable for higher current levels of the variable. Values for jumps in "fear" or "anger" for an I-0 (dialogue) pair are given in percentages, which are then applied to the difference between the current level and the maximum level (20). An insult therefore produces the same percentage rise in anger at a low "anger" level as at a high one, but the absolute rise will be greater. The equations for the variables "fear" and "anger" are as follows. Following the ith I-0 pair, any rise in "fear" and "anger" is accounted for by the function:

$$VAR_i = VAR_{i-1} + RISE_{var}(20-VAR_{i-1}).$$

For a rise in either variable, "mistrust" is recomputed by the function:

$$MISTRUST_i = MISTRUST_{i-1} + 0.5 \ VAR(20-MISTRUST_{i-1}).$$

This affect state determines a kind of context which governs not only individual variations in the affect variables, but also the "tone" of any linguistic output that is not the immediate (context-independent) reaction to input provocative to the model.

The normal drop in the values of "fear" and "anger" occurs after each I-0 pair, by a subtraction of 1.0 from "anger" and of 0.3 from "fear." Mistrust falls very slowly (by 0.05 for each I-0 pair) to a base level which rises for each rise in "fear" or "anger" according to the function:

$$MISTRUST \ 0_i = MISTRUST \ 0_{i-1} + 0.1 \ VAR(20-MISTRUST \ 0_{i-1}).$$

Thus any fear or anger induced in the model by the interviewer can only result in a model more distrustful by the end of the session.

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Les latrines
de l'Academie

The fundamental fear of the French and the conscious or unconscious focus of their attention is the fear of shit. To understand this phenomenon, just take a look at the traditionally crammed living quarters of the French working class, think of the cheap hotel with the one toilet per floor, the latrine duty of your army days...remember? Shit in France is omnipresent and omnipotent.

Witness Frenchman Durand's daily activities. From the outset he walks about awkwardly, concerned with possible disturbances of his habitual comfort and peace of mind. Should the slightest contrary event take place, he will unfailingly and immediately recognize its nature: *"Merde!"* he says, with all the necessary inflections and nuances of disappointment, impatience and anger. If the contrariety has a human face (as it does most of the time), he is prompt to identify the intruder as *un emmerdeur* (a bore). More often than not, the intrusion of the *emmerdeur* generates a copious number of *emmerdements* (troubles) which will plague our poor fellow. These *emmerdements* may be so numerous and so intense as to create in Durand's home, office, or classroom a situation analogous to that commonly found in a hellish, disorderly hole, or *merdier*.

Fortunately, man is not without the resources of his mind. Since Durand is a man, he will make use of them and attempt to *se démerder* (manage). If he succeeds, chances are that posterity, or at least his next door neighbor, will call him *démerdeur* or better yet, *démerdard* (clever). If however, the necessary "creative" faculties fail him, he will sadly *merder* or *merdoyer* (mess things up) like any contemptible person, or *merdeux*.

It is no wonder, then, if — having been defeated once or twice already by this excremental adversity — Durand should on subsequent occasions be seized with

fits of exasperation and rage and exclaim, upon further intrusion, *"Vous me faites chier!"* (You're giving me the runs). The use of this expression brings us close to the end of the process of defeated Durand's immersion. The scatophilic "other," the *emmerdeur*, has won: the process, so to speak, has been internalized. As Labor Committee co-thinker Francois Rabelais would have rightly said, Durand now "copiously befouls *himself*" (emphasis added).

But that is not all. As he progressively sinks in his stinking quagmire, Durand summons up all the hatred his final agony causes him to feel, and he hurls at his oppressor the ultimate insult. *"Enculé!" Fils d'enculé!"* he shrieks, an epithet so vulgar that it is seldom heard outside of the Maoist left. The reader will forgive my Gallic *pudeur* (decency) for leaving it untranslated. *(1)*

The French scatological vocabulary sanctions the overwhelming sense of frustration and despair the French petit bourgeois or worker experiences when recognizing the inevitability of social relations with his fellow man. For what he knows best and cherishes most is the sense of potent aloneness which the unperturbed privacy of his parents' or grandparents' fields afforded him in his youth. To be potent is to relate directly to nature, to practice the august gesture of the sower, reproduced on countless French coins. Emotion, to the extent that he can still experience it after years of residence in the city, is closely tied in his mind to the image cast by Millet in his "Angélus," a brief moment of introspective rest as the bell tolls and the sun sets. *(2)*

At work, Durand plays out his pastoral fantasy over and over again. The endless series of meaningless gestures which he must go through each day makes him each day less apt to feel the legitimate son of Mother Earth, but the monotony of his labor leaves his mind free to wander about the countryside. Some day, perhaps, he will have enough *fric* (dough) to build a *résidence secondaire* far from the crowd, or maybe he will retire "back home among my folks" after all this *merde* is over.

Perhaps he even owns a miserable little strip of land by some distant railroad track. Each Sunday, he leaves wife and kids behind to spend back-breaking hours growing his own potatoes, tomatoes and beans, just to give himself the sense that he is alive, that he will, next vacation with the cousins, feel that he is one of them still.

On weekdays, however, Durand must cope with all the "others," the colleagues, superiors, clients, apprentices, students, neighbors, etc., who share the hell of urban life with him. Each of these people is a potential threat to his ego's performance of its self-edifying fantasy drama. The ego thus buttresses itself against intrusion.

Witness the petty state bureaucrat: his morose facial expression freezes the public into submission to the endless series of rules and regulations codifying the relationship of the hapless citizen to the state. Should you have a question or suggestion the *règlement* has not specifically made room for, the voice may coldly respond by invoking the absolute power of *L'ADMINISTRATION* and invite you to propitiate it through some letter-writing (in triplicate, *s'il vous plaît*). But the rolling eyes, the flushed complexion, the slight muscle-twitching reveal something else; threatened with a potential invasion of *merde*, the mind now shuttles between impatience and terror. The bureaucrat passively feels the shit-colored "mustard rise up to his nose." *(3)* Should you prod a little further, the hysterical outburst takes place. *"Mais il me fait chier!"* the ego mutters to itself, the face reddens, the arms flail. An incoherent diarrhea of words comes out, to sanction the collapse of fantasy's dream-fortress.

This ordinary feeling-state of the French is hysteria. Hysterical, the vehement, terrorized denunciation of shit. Hysterical, the impotent, tantrum-like condemnation of you, "the other." Hysterical, the Paris drivers. Hysterical, the enraged worker turning away from his fellow worker to the predictable complexity of the machine. Hysterical, the teacher punishing a 14-year-old student "who does not listen" to his formally perfect lecturing on Racine's formal perfection. Hysterical, the *agrégation* jury staring sadistically at the sweating candidate. Hysterical, the *café waiter* who, as Sartre reminds us, convinces himself he exists by playing the role of *the café* waiter. Hysterical, the art for art's sake poet. Hysterical, the flight from truly human (creative) social relations.

The God of Good Taste

The Frenchman's experience of his own hysteria is frustrating and bitter. Although he does, after his fit, make a pretense of an eloquent retreat into his "dignity-and-honor" shell, he knows well that brooding and sulking will only make the pain more acute, that his "splendid isolation" covers up a much sadder reality. The only relief comes from knowing that he must sooner or later venture out of his turf and address the "others" again. To his shame, he discovers that he needs them.

In the meantime the witnesses of his tantrum, after recoiling in horror from his gesticulations, now promise themselves that they, at least, "will never behave like that," that they will not be caught in the act of exposing to the world their little, terrified self. When the man approaches them again, the vague feeling of neighborliness and equality which they once had for him has been destroyed and replaced by a

mask of cold, distant civility.

This wilful, polite estrangement from one's fellow-man is at the core of French manners. Emotion, whose acknowledgement in oneself and others might result in more *merde*, is at first looked upon with suspicion and then, quickly disposed of. The procedure employed to dismiss the nascent emotion is always the same: the expected invasion of shit is immediately combated by calling to one's rescue all the weapons of the French academic arsenal. By resorting to the codes of *politesse* and *bon goût*, the French kill all feelings, restrict social intercourse to a level of strict banality, and thus protect themselves from the evil world. Good Taste, the God of affective death, is a most benevolent despot. *(4)*

This search for *bon goût* is the eminent characteristic of French life under capitalism. Academies of letters, beaux-arts, political and moral sciences, academies of wine-and cheese-tasting, etc., endlessly codify matter of *goût* so the populace will know what to do, think, write or speak at any time, what to hang on their walls, what to wear, what not to wear. A dotted necktie with a striped suit? A bottle of red *Médoc* with fish? Pfui! *Quel mauvais goût!* exclaims the seasoned housewife. Peanut-butter?!? Oh, *ma chère*, it even looks like...

Mother's Way

The staunchest ally of the God of Good Taste is mother, the frightened *mater familias* who propitiates the mighty to ward off the brown curse. More than anyone, she has throughout her banalized existence come to recognize the true, diversified nature of shit. She is an expert at sniffing it out: the kids next door, the divorcee downstairs, her childrens' friends, her husband's drinking pals, Arabs in the streets — all pagans, barbarians, criminals, strangers. As she walks about, her shopping bag in hand, a suspicious frown on her face, she casts an indignant glance at a nearby *café*, reminded of her daughter "who spends so much time outside with all these..." She does not complete the sentence, but the feeling, like a monstrous phoenix, is always reborn.

Yet, her hour of glory will come this Sunday, as the catholicity of her taste and morality is officially sanctioned in the neighborhood kids' First Communion. There, in the virginal purity of his alb, her son will mindlessly recite one last time the list of ingredients which compose the Church's sacramental recipe. Back home, showered with gifts by the assembled kin, the child will come to understand the next great mystery of French life. His father, who after years of religious alienation and left-leaning aspirations, stood

sullen and stiff at the morning mass, suddenly comes to life in the kitchen. The ritual has changed, the incense of Consecration now yields to the sacrificial lamb's aroma, and behind the pots and pans victorious mother, priestess of Good Taste, practices the magic of cooking.

The catechism of France, the true Gospel, is the cookbook. To obey its complex commandments is to affirm Mother's domination of shit, her successful neutralization of the tasteless pagan, the coprophilic, barbaric "other" whom the whole world could not persuade, "as the common phrase is, to eat his Victuals *like a Christian*." *(5)*

Next Sunday, perhaps, when the family goes for its dominical drive to some XVIIth century *château* where son and daughter can further feed their fantasy life by augmenting their "culture," mother will direct the little crowd's bored looks and silent reverie. Her authority on these matters is as unquestioned as her culinary skill. She now adheres to the cookbook of leisurely "intellectual" life, the revered *Guide Michelin*, thanks to which no soul will stray and no sight be lost. From the highway to the cathedral, and from there to the two-star restaurant, Mother's green, oblong map directs you with the unfailing competence and vision of *bon goût* itself.

The Temple of Taste

In no area of French public life is the alliance of Good Taste and Mother more evident than in linguistic and literary activity. In fact, the forty members of L'Académie fran'caise — the academy of all academies, in charge of preserving France's linguistic heritage — are the worst mothers of them all.

Under the *Institut*'s dome, the *Secrétaire Perpétuelle* and here "immortal" surrogates are busy changing the French people's diapers. But even the countless pages of their *dictionnaire* do not suffice to wipe or hide their petit bourgeois offsprings' soiled bodies. In fact, the académiciens' robes barely cover up their own besmirched bottoms. To them, finest flowers of the intelligentsia, ignorance of shit's existence would indeed be bliss, but can one ignore such overwhelming stench?

Fortunately for the national honor, *L'Académie* knows how to make concessions to popular wisdom, when it has to. *"Eh bien, oui, chères collègues, la merde existe!"* confesses Mme la Secrétaire, but "it has, you see, a..*a je-ne-sais-quoi*, something like...like a heroic essence. After all, did the magic of this word not change the outcome of the battle of Waterloo? Didn't Cambronne's vocable, in response to Wellington's demand that the French surrender, make of this

military disaster a splendid *moral* victory?'' In the back, the ghost of Bonaparte-populist Victor Hugo leads the applause.

But that is not enough. The threat of the Forty's chivalric swords will not suffice to exorcize the brown demon. Her head shaking with worry, the *Secrétaire Perpétuelle* calls upon the bust of Vaugelas *(Grammairien du Roy)* to testify. After a brief conference, a defense plan is hastily drawn up: syntactic scaffoldings, morphological pulley systems, lexicological shuttles are quickly set up. Emissaries are dispatched to Rome, others to Athens and the Parnassus. Sophists, Rhetoricians, Architects, Jesuits, Cartesians, *Agrégés,* Structuralists, Michelin guide writers are sought out for advice. Soon, a column of ox-drawn carts returns from Carrara.

And then, like rouge on the filthy skin of the King's mistress, a Temple of Taste is erected in the midst of the worst Parisian cloaca, replete with stylobate and triglyphs. The marble slabs, it is hoped, will stop the lethal vapors from rising. For added insurance an armed guard of *docteurs-ès-lettres* will patrol incessantly, looking for possible leaks and geysers. Outside, gangs of bankers and state officials in stained trousers look with admiration upon this, the formidable alibi of French capitalism.

Grammatical Fatality

As each French schoolboy knows, to write or speak French according to the dicta of the Academy is to experience grammatical fatality, the death of one's creative powers. For it always seems that the sacrosanct rules of *le bon usage* have predetermined the ordering of the predicates, pre-defined mood and tense, pre-hinged the sentence on unalterable prepositional pivots, pre-located that adverb...Somehow you always know, and *must* know, what things will look like before you even begin.

Grab your pen and start writing: a queasy, uneasy feeling soon invades you. Keep at it and you will perhaps see, guiding and underscoring your words, the lines of a skeleton drawn in sympathetic ink, carefully enforcing compliance with Vaugelas' commandments.

The greatest error would then consist of tipping the paper so the clicking bones vanish, of feeling *free* to design the muscles *you* choose. For you have yet to experience the tyranny of *le mot juste*, an empiricist monstrosity calculated to constipate you once and for all. "We never know what might come out, do we?" say the Forty, chuckling uneasily.

Should you ever agonize over a new thought, grope around for its best, fullest rendition, pause a while, let the "feel" of it take hold of you, Mother *Secrétaire Perpétuelle* screws up her face in anguish. "The brown matter! The brown matter!" she stammers, running to the *Institut's libratrine.* She brings back her thickest dictionary and leafs through it at full speed. "What you mean is surely X, page 13,065? Or Y, page 8,927? Or N? Or P?" Her breath accelerates. "Q?..." Your repeated denials, your drawn face, your speechlessness comfort her; she walks away. Victorious, you call her back, and show her your work. "Balderdash!" she screams, and with the grim determination of the *agrégé*, she pulls out her sword only to find it a shitty stick...

In the French academic's view, the *dictionnaire* cancels out the need for creative powers, the existence of which would just result in one more *emmerdement*. *"Tout est dit,"* said *La Bruyère* and generations of *professeurs* have repeated this motto ever since. Can you claim to have the knowledge of Pico dela Mirandola, who memorized everything? Well, then, carry around the necessary lexicons and grammars to fill up your gaps; *It's all there. (6)*

To the nearest *académicien,* the universe is only known from the pieces which fall out of it and crash through the roof of the *Institut* on to the open *dictionnaire*. But like the famous elephant, these fragments are too large to comprehend. Confusing Descartes and Laplace, he then orders that the pieces be broken down into bits, bits into half-bits, half-bits into smithereens, etc. All this, of course, to further his "understanding."

Only when it is properly inspected, touched, felt, smelled and labeled, can this universe of bits be truly known. This general process is what the French call *'raffinement''*, from a semantic confusion which the thought of a nearby oil refinery may help you elucidate. *(7)* As the Frenchman is about to speak, mother's warning rings in his ears: "The world is brown with sh--, remember? It cannot decently be represented in that form. Imagine what a *scandale* it would be!" The man pauses, reflects, agrees, and in a desperate search for the pure, quintessential truth of things, suspends all imaginative faculties for the sake of enforcing the sterile rule of induction.

His mind, it appears, is like a large, oblong, cold space. At one end stands a raw mass, a rock of an object whose rough edges and shaded planes frighten him. At the other, a row of dark, gaping holes exert an implacable attraction. To make the object "expressible," then, is to drag it across, to pare it down and maim it so it will fit these narrow corridors and follow to the end the deadly labryinth of *mots justes*. The *raffinement* process is no less than a murderous ritual by which all nascent emotion can be stifled and kept from smearing the immutable plan of logic. *(8)*

Thus, to achieve truth in France is to *logically* fragment the world into already known bits. Art consists of "poetically" arranging "quintessential"

bits. Whenever the poet runs out of them, he can go to the dictionary market and trade for new ones.

If the reader wonders about the difference between this method of "perception" and empiricism, suffice it to say that the latter at least has the guts to identify shit for what it is, whereas *le Bon Goût francais* denies empiricism's modest objective criteria. To recognize that fact is to understand why French slang had to develop into such a rich, "concrete" sub-language.

Et La Chienlit?

The story does not end here. The anti-shit coalition of Mother, the Church, the Académies, Michelin and other capitalist agencies, continuously extends the process of "purification" to other areas: rhetoric, versification, diction, dramatic arts, pedagogy, politics. Occasionally the Left joins the campaign. In 1968, when Mother De Gaulle denounced her kids' mass strike movement as *une chienlit*, (9), her PCF surrogate agreed and, in an unprecedented Operation Wipe Out, offered her

assistance and plenty of Moscow-made bathroom tissues — all this of course in *Grenelle*, a most "tasteful" Paris district.

Yet, against all odds, the coalition's efforts to spirit off the French population's rectal contortions have failed...as the current *chienlit* of the Gaullist party clearly indicates. No matter what, the tide is rising. However, the vanquished knights of Good Taste have at last succeeded in stamping out the last vestiges of creative powers from the minds of the radical petit-bourgeoisie. Like the spoiled only child reveling in what is forbidden just to attract his mother's attention, countless French left brats have for some time confused their anus with the stage of the world-historical revolutionary process.

In a June 1968 copy of *L'Enragé*, the anarchist left's *torchecul* of that period, former *L'Express* cartoonist Siné revealed the French dilemma in most dramatic fashion. His cartoon shows a frontal view of a public latrine. No toilet, just a hole in the ground. Above, affixed to the wall, an old flushing system with chain and handle. So far, nothing extraordinary. But look again, the hole has the shape of a Lorraine cross.

In the coming months, the ICLC will show the French working class that there is more to revolution than throwing shit at your mother.

Footnotes

1. "Enculé!" is the favorite insult of many enraged soccer fans. It is ususally yelled at the referee, a bizarrely clad father-figure who wrenches you out of your dream of goal-scoring potency by making decisions antagonistic to the interests of the home team. "Enrulé" is *not* a collective insult: rather, it is screamed by scattered individuals as a sort of contrapuntal motif set against the crowd's "Aux chiottes, l'arbitre!", scatological equivalent of "To the showers!"

2. The religious form of the fundamental emotion can best be rendered in French by the word *recueillement*, which means *inward look, introspection,* etc...The verb it is modelled after, *recueiller,* means *to gather, to collect, to harvest (se recueiller,* to collect oneself). This tends to show how, in the whole French culture, emotion is indissolubly tied to the peak of rural experience, i.e. *harvesting.*

3. *"La moutarde m'est montée au nez":* (the pungent, overpowering smell of) "mustard rose up to my nose," i.e., I became angry. In reality, *"hysteria* (not anger, a healthy, potent feeling) overwhelmed me."

4. In case the reader thinks that I am sacrificing the truth for the sake of hyperbole, I shall refer him to the myriad of discussions of *taste* which took place in the XVIIIth century, in and out of the French adademy. The following statement by Séran de la Tour sums up the point of view of the times: "Taste has its own laws, absolute, fixed, *independent of the will and of the existence of men"* (emphasis added). Taste is indeed a god!

5. From Jonathan Swift, *A Tale of A Tub,* Section XI. Not surprisingly. Swift uses these harsh words to describe "Jack" the Calvinist, a heretic who has turned his back on communion.

The man who does not *eat like a Christian* necessarily belongs in hell.

6. In an article on art for art's sake poet Théophile Gautier, published in 1859, Baudelaire reports that Gautier once asked him "if he enjoyed reading dictionaries," and added for his benefit, "The writer who does not know how to say everything, whom a strange, subtle idea takes by surprise, without the material necessary to give it substance, cannot be called an artist."

7. The word *raffinement* is deceptive. On one level, it is simply synonymous with *formal completeness.* In daily usage, however, being *raffiné simply means that one can successfully debate others and out-finesse* them on some trivial point—an impotent game French "intellectuals" are expert at.

8. In his sonnet *La Beauté,* Baudelaire dramatically expressed the fascination which academic purity exerts on French artists. Beauty speaks:

"Je trône dans l'azur comme un sphinx incompris;
J'unis un coeur de neige à la blancheur des cygnes;
Je hais le mouvement qui déplace les lignes,
Et jamais je ne pleure et jamais je ne ris."

"I am enthroned in the sky like an uncomprehended sphinx;
I unite a heart of snow with the whiteness of swans;
I hate motion, which displaces lines,
And I never cry, and I never laugh."

9. *Chienlit:* originally, shit-in-bed *(chie-en-lit);* in modern French, means a grotesque costume ball, a masquerade.