THE QUESTION OF STALINISM TODAY

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

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Developments manifest since the summer of 1973 have more recently brought to a close the long period of domination by the Comintern dynasty of Palmiro Togliatti over Communist parties of the capitalist sector, as, concurrently, the Comecon has freed itself from the interpretation of "detente" peddled to it through "Atlanticist" agents Leo Bauer, Sergio Segre, and others. In the capitalist sector, leadership among Communist parties has been shifted afresh from the Rome offices of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) to the Leninist currents within the Communist Party of France (PCF). Although some formal features of earlier "detente" policies have been continued, the Comecon content of such policies has been shifted from a self-imposed political "containment" posture, to a Leninist tactic of economic cooperation for a transitional period of general capitalist breakdown crisis.

As these and related developments are viewed from the vantage-point of persons standing within the industrialized capitalist sector, the recent developments within Communist parties suffice to demolish most of the popularized connotations of "Stalinism" which became generally accepted in the aftermath of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Josef Stalin's faults and outright crimes are facts. The cruel circumstances of the Moscow Trials and the Stalin era penetrate the vellum of the influential preoccupation of Heydrich in the Tukachevsky affair, (2) was the outcome of the preceding mercantilist order. For this mission Henry VIII — like Stalin for Soviet history — was a contradictory, tragic character, half-leader, half-monster. Yet, the great figures of the Tudor period — Thomas More, Spenser, Gilbert, Gresham, Marlowe, Napier, Shakespeare, et al. — epitomize the great political and cultural heritage of that struggle. Just as the Tudors must be studied in respect of the positive outcome of Tudor policy and Tudor-period achievements, so Stalin.

The key facts wilfully concealed or ignorantly overlooked in most "Western" appreciations of Stalin include massive operations of Anglo-American intelligence. The internal problems of the Comintern were chiefly the direct outcome of massive penetrations by those intelligence services. (1) In the critical Paul Levi affair, which in broader aspects sealed off the possibility for a viable Comintern for a generation, even Lenin was misled by massive Anglo-American operations involving such figures as Fabian-trained Karl Korsch, the dubious, Parvus-linked Karl Radek, and the credulous, bungling G. Zinoviev. Much of the Soviet terror of the 1930s, exemplified by British agent Canaris' supervision of Heydrich in the Tukachevsky affair, (2) was the outcome of Anglo-American-directed operations.
explicitly focused on Stalin's increasing paranoia of the post-January 1933 period.

Although Stalin was preoccupied with the threat from British operations, he plainly misread relevant cases, and his writings are filled with blindness concerning the U.S. financiers' direct participation in British-linked operations and policies. This bias afflicted him and ostensibly other Soviet spokesmen even after acquisition of relevant German files at the end of World War II, including an apparent refusal to accept the broader implications of Canaris' position as a British agent.

The same problem continued into the post-war period. Through 1920s and 1930s operations largely based in Germany at first, Anglo-American intelligence controlled the German and Dutch ultra-lefts (and certain allied scoundrels within the CPUSA) and captured the Right Opposition forces virtually intact. All aspects of the Spanish Civil War, including British backing for Franco and British intelligence control of most of the Republican — and even right-wing Communist — forces, involved hideous manipulations. Meanwhile, a massive operation was conducted against the Paris Comintern apparatus, with resulting effective takeovers of key sections up to a very high level. Allen Dulles pulled such Anglo-American strings together with Anglo-American fascist networks from his Swiss wartime base. The cases of Leo Bauer, Giorgio Amendola, Santiago Carrillo and many others are exemplary. (3) (It is notable to read the post-war Trotskyist and other literature identifying the Communist Party of Italy as the ultimate in Stalinist parties — a party whose leadership was in effective control of Anglo-American intelligence services' agents!)

The consolidated takeover of the CPUSA since the mid-1960s is quantitatively a trivial episode (although of some strategic importance) by contrast with operations in larger Communist organizations. The post-1963 manipulations — by way of Italy — of the question of legalization of a Communist Party in West Germany, an affair chiefly handled by CIA-affiliated agents in Rome and the Atlanticists of the SPD, is a more significant case of combined containment and Pajetta-coordinated penetration. The most notable and strategically significant Anglo-American caper of this sort is the successive steps of takeover of the Peking leadership. That latter has been a long-term project, dating from the early-to-middle 1920s, with the Chou En Lai of early Canton already targeted as a susceptible figure and massive operations targeting Mao Ze Dong during the 1930s and war years.

From approximately the early 1930s visits to Stalin by top British intelligence agent Sidney Webb and other Anglo-American agents, the Soviet "self-containment" policies of the "Popular Front" period and the post-war, Togliatti-linked "conciliationist" CP policies have been the combined outcome of aversive Anglo-American containment from the outside, and subversion by right-wing "nationalist" currents from inside the CPs.

These overall circumstances have facilitated the persistence of proportionately large right-wing and centrist factions or currents, usually significantly more numerous and more broadly based than a hard-core of Leninist forces. The acceptance of varying degrees of "conciliationist" political self-containment by these parties as a whole has indeed favored the right-wing and centrist currents, whereas shifts to the left have usually favored growth in influence by the Leninist currents. However, the general outward character of Communist parties' policies has seldom been specifically right-wing, centrist or Leninist. Rather, the extremes have represented dominance by alliances of the centrist currents with either the right-wing or the Leninists, and the varied ostensible overall political character of each of these parties has reflected variations in mass base and political composition of the organizations and their interreacting respective factions and proto-factions.

The well-meaning outside observer has seen key parts of this process, usually without recognizing the significance of the facts involved. The most notable category of such events is the periodic splitting-away of disaffected right-wing chunks of the membership, such as the Gates grouping in the U.S.A. The credulous general public, including most socialists outside and even inside the CPUSA generally, believed that the Gates group split away principally in reaction to the CPSU 20th Congress and the Hungarian insurrection. In fact, documents now in the public domain demonstrate that the Gates CPUSA current was already collaborating with CIA circles (significantly through social-democratic links) in the earliest part of the 1950s, and numerous among that circle have not accidentally turned up as "lace curtain" Maoists during the recent period, as well as providing an "independent progressives" cover for some very, very nasty little operations inbetween. The Althusser-Foucault group in France and its co-thinkers remaining within the PCF is another gang of Anglo-American agents connected to some very nasty activities. The same is true, with special emphasis, of the case of Il Manifesto (created by PCI Amendolite Ingrao), which is linked to some of the nastiest activities of NATO intelligence in Italy. (4) Like the Karl Korsch group in Germany, or various anarcho-syndicalist groupings, many of these right-wing currents are built up of core-groups which entered the CP as agents from the start.

On the basis of such varieties of critical evidence, all
of the popularized “factual” representations of the Stalin era and its aftermath are mostly rubbish. The standard sort of effort to attribute a politically homogenous character to “Stalinism” on the basis of popular accounts is clearly a galloping fallacy of composition. The truth is, as the Anglo-American leaders have understood since the early Fabian activities of the Webbs, that the front line of the political class struggle has always been within the socialists’ parties themselves. The popular accounts of “Stalinism” are not representations of a political tendency, but a muddled description of a battlefield.

1. The Stalin Era

The key to the specifically tragic character of Stalin is the included recognition of his relatively positive historic role. Despite his grave errors of the 1920s and later, the Stalin of the 1923-1929 period has the critical distinction of being the only leading Bolshevik who did not vacillate on the question of power, did not vacillate in order to evade the actual, awful responsibilities of leadership of the Soviet party and state.

The contrast between the tragic actual Stalin of that period and the myths associated, for example, with Trotskyist authorship is most relevant. Although Trotsky correctly coopted the kernel of Preobrazhensky’s industrialization policy, with some essential political amplifications, it is otherwise adolescent fantasy to imagine that therefore Trotsky was in some way cheated of his rightful place as principal Soviet leader. Trotsky’s characteristic psychoneurotic flaw — the same flaw determining his continuing profound political differences with Lenin — prompted him to flinch repeatedly whenever he was confronted with actual leading responsibilities. (5) From the time of Lenin’s last illness forward, including Trotsky’s sterile approach to the “socialism in one country debate,” Trotsky’s political conduct was characterized by impotence of a type Lenin had repeatedly characterized as Oblomovism. Trotsky’s shameless reading of French novels during mid-1920s meetings of Soviet leading agencies is exemplary.

Later, we shall get to the heart of the key issue involved in the various Stalin-Trotsky debates of the 1923-1929 period. We identify the broad point here.

Trotsky was unquestionably correct on the industrialization issue. The key thing to note in the present context is that industrialization was an issue of Soviet internal policy which affected CPSU foreign affairs mainly only in respect of the Soviet Union as the economy of a state. On the other issues, the nexus was more emphatically Comintern policy and Soviet policy as determined in the context of a corresponding Comintern perspective. On these issues, Trotsky’s proposed policies and perspectives had the literary advantage of conforming to strategic doctrines adopted during the Second and Third Comintern Congresses; however, in reality, the quality of Comintern needed to implement such policies did not exist, a deficiency for which Trotsky had in fact only an amelioration, but neither a remedy nor the personal commitment wanted to assume active responsibility for the Comintern’s political development.

The more exact significance of this we shall develop in a subsequent portion of this article. At this point it is sufficient to note the existence of such a point to be developed.

With Zinoviev and others the overall performance of leading Bolsheviks on matters of accepting responsibility was far worse than Trotsky’s. Consequently, despite his personal, political and other relevant shortcomings for that position, Stalin was for better or worse the only leading Bolshevik to undertake the awful responsibilities leadership implied. While others evaded issues through various ruses of protocol or, like Trotsky, approached power with the posturing of a coy virgin, Stalin doggedly pre-empted positions of responsibility (and power) wherever others’ trembling hands let a useful bit of the state or party machinery slip away. For those persons who have insight into the implications of such an arrangement, there is no mystery respecting the awe and enormous personal power Stalin acquired among those immediately around him.

This may not be clear to ordinary observers. The conventional, mistaken view of political leadership is that appointment of such positions is gained by the institutionalized acclaim ordered according to this or that sort of protocol. On the contrary, real leadership is accrued inch-by-inch, usually through unflagging drive in that direction over years. The image of the “popular hero” suddenly handed positions of responsibility by this or that sort of acclaim is variously a myth (insofar as this fictional account is circulated concerning actual leaders), or a portrait of a foolish figurehead. The real leaders, as distinct from figureheads, are those who have created a machine inch-by-inch. This can not be accomplished by a commitment to power-seeking as such. Machines are built by those to whom the power of political leadership is a means to a different end, who act promptly, even relatively preemptively in response to imperatives of some broader social interest arising from real developments. There must always be a guiding, dominating purpose independent of any personal ambitions, a purpose which defines the tasks to be solved day-by-day, inch-by-inch. Only such a leader,
who builds a machine in that way, who acquires what gradually appears to be power in that sort of process, knows what power means on that day on which the accrued machine-building of years institutionalizes his position as a principal figure.

In the case of Stalin, the issue is not that at some one critical occasion he did not flinch from issues or moved to take power. It was a day-by-day process; it can not be but that tens of thousands of times Stalin made little decisions which shaped him as much as it simultaneously placed him in leadership of a growing machine. The acquisition of power is the consequence, not the onset of a position of potent leadership.

The other principal fact of the Stalin tragedy is Stalin’s paranoid degeneration during the post-January 1933 period. Two complementary points are to be considered. We must note the immediate causes for the paranoid deterioration. Once that aspect of the problem is identified, we must focus on those of his political inadequacies which made him susceptible to breaking under the pressures acting upon him. The latter leads us directly toward the major point to be developed in this article: the essential distinctions of Lenin and Lenin’s method.

Most narrowly stated, the position of principal responsibility for the Soviet party and state during the 1923-1953 period incurred increasingly the most extreme psychological pressures of the genre: “The buck stops here.” Any significant strategic or tactical error (including omissions) by Stalin imperiled the very existence of both the Soviet state and the socialist movement as a whole. Every other Soviet leader could evade such awful responsibilities, essentially bypassing the responsibility to Stalin.

The nature of Stalin’s position goes beyond the cited modest relevant insight into power by the late Harry Truman. No ordinary head of state, no leader of ordinary socialist organizations, trade-unions or even military combat commanders experiences circumstances even approaching the special quality and intensity of Stalin’s situation.

The form of Soviet power generally is the aspect of the matter most easily understood. For those who understand Clausewitz’s ABCs of warfare, the form of the Soviet state apparatus has always been determined by the principal feature of Soviet life: from its birth the Soviet state has been a besieged entity, threatened with obliteration at any point the Anglo-Americans had the correlation of forces needed to accomplish that result. Every aspect of international developments affecting the Soviet state has involved pre-war or actual warfare strategic deployments by those Anglo-American forces. Every feature of Soviet foreign policy has been dominated by concern to neutralize or delay such threats. Every feature of internal Soviet life has been dominated by corresponding strategic considerations. Hence, the form of Soviet state power has been that suited to a “besieged fortress, hence to varying degrees that of a “garrison state.”

This did not, of course, cause the Bolsheviks to adopt centralized political forms of party and state organization. On the contrary, it was only the centralist conceptions developed previously under Lenin’s influence which enabled the post-October Bolsheviks to mobilize effectively against Anglo-American military intrusions of the post-1917 period, to neutralize the CIA-type operations of British-controlled Russian anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists (e.g., Kronstadt), to win the civil wars launched by Anglo-Americans, to conduct urgent industrialization, and so forth. It is important to emphasize that Lenin’s conception of centralism always had a twofold aspect, and rightly so. Centralist self-organization of political working-class forces is intrinsic to Marx’s method, to the effect that socialist democracy focuses on the individual worker’s conscious direct participation in the formulation of “total economic” and related policies. At the same time, it is necessary to exploit that aspect of Marxist forms of organization to the fullest to enable the working-class forces to deal with the strategic and tactical imperatives of the class struggle. Thus, the combat conditions imposed upon the Soviet party and state appropriately seized upon that centralist feature to determine the garrison forms of political life imposed by, to date, 58 years of Anglo-American initiated attacks and Cold Wars.

It was the awful responsibilities of principal leadership of such a “garrison state” apparatus under hideously aversive circumstances which continually, immediately impinged upon Stalin to a degree not approximated by other Soviet leaders. The individual placed in such extraordinary circumstances virtually loses psychological privacy of his person, in the sense that every aspect of the pressures acting upon the apparatus externally and internally seize upon the affected individual’s psychological apparatus of personal survival as the instrumentality for electing strategies and tactics for preserving the state itself from threatened obliteration. This, furthermore, overwhelms his ordinary conceptions of survival as an individual to the effect that rather than the state becoming an extension of his person (as foolish observers might suggest) his person becomes subordinated to the duty of a personification of the state. The needs of the state become the controlling criteria of his personal impulses and psychological devices for survival.

If, under such circumstances, the state becomes subject to circumstances of “psychological warfare”
analogous to those causing "shell shock" or "combat fatigue" in the individual combat soldier, the effect of such circumstances will be to tend to effect an analogous form of paranoid disorders in the person on whom all the relevant pressures ultimately converge. Although other leaders are affected by such pressures, their more prominent role is that of transmitter of the distilled, most-acute expression of those pressures to the person occupying the principal position of ultimate responsibility.

Otherwise, no simple comparision with the individual "shell shock" case is permissible. Ordinary paranoid deterioration of the individual, under what are for him extremely aversive circumstances, involves a withdrawal of the individual from mature forms of social identity to a pathetic, propitiatory outlook comparable to that of the infantile or early post-infancy state. He becomes the existentialist. He escapes social criteria of personal responsibility by rejecting them in favor of obsessive, infantile focus upon "my personal psychological needs." In contrast to such cases, Stalin's psychological situation is that of "God weakened by metaphysical mononucleosis," seeking to fend off the insurgent Satan until such time as the wasting effects of the sickness are overcome. That is no atheist's irreverent insolence. Stalin took into himself enormous social responsibilities, thus inclusively assuming the duties the religious man ordinarily imputes to the deity, such that Stalin's paranoia does not correspond to that of the ordinary deranged individual but of a "God driven mad," an image otherwise approximated by the Shakespearean tragedy of great kings.

It is productive and more or less necessary to take this opportunity to unleash long-standing contempt for the lipzing academic Shakespearean scholarship on this account. As Marlowe's dramas properly emphasize, the principal concern of the leading intellectual figures of the Tudor period was the Renaissance humanist's conception of the great man. Although there is a systematic connection between those subjects and the intellectual and moral life of the more obscure individual — in the specific sense Ficino, Pico and other neo-Platonics convey — the great dramatic or poetic figure of Renaissance and Tudor artistic and philosophical works is no metaphor, no mere dramatist's ruse for apotheosizing the ordinary case. The immediate subject is the issue of human perfection as Ficino, Pico, More, da Vinci, Erasmus, Marlowe, and Machiavelli express this conception of the historic moral significance of men shaping human destiny from positions of great power. Marlowe's Dr. Faustus thus affords a fruitful vantage-point from which to view the achievements of Shakespearean tragedies as actually key political documents of the period. The great-man subject-matter of that period is the focus of the struggle for human perfection as Ficino understood that process, a concern focused especially on the great men in whose person the relevant conflicts of societies as a whole are concentrated. Shakespearean tragedy is best viewed for comprehension as the tragedy of Hegel's hero-figure.

It is useful to contrast Shakespeare's best work as a whole to the 19th century's interest in it. Boito-Verdi's setting of "Falstaff" is exemplary of the characteristic 19th century romantic's and post-romantic's effort to impose his own characteristic point of view upon the interpretation of the Renaissance and its immediate aftermath. In general, the dominant bourgeois outlooks of the 19th century represented a loss of the intellectual capacity to understand a da Vinci, Erasmus, Ficino, Shakespeare, Rabelais or Milton, and a loss of the power to understand a Bach, Shelley, or Beethoven as well. The mid-19th century romantic shifts to the heteronomic, semi-existentialist standpoint of the heteronomic individual. The well-known Shakespearean criticisms by even the gifted Coleridge and Bradley are exemplary of this problem. The 19th century misunderstood Shakespeare's actual artistic achievements as the allegorical blind men variously admire the massive individual organs of the elephant. It is relevant that the Shakespearean-tragic quality of a Stalin should be also beyond such persons' comprehension.

Once that indispensable qualification is registered, the question of Stalin's paranoid deterioration can be located with respect to Stalin as an individual person. The form of the issue is identified as the proposition: What personal qualities can be mustered within the individual leader to bring him into appropriate correspondence with the great-man role he has assumed? Stalin the person is significantly augmented as a person by the position he has assumed, but ultimately the suitability of his person as raw material for that office determines the breaking points at which Stalin the leader undergoes psychological fracture. In broad terms, the same personal weaknesses which would otherwise contribute to ordinary individual paranoid deterioration become the germ of a parallel form of paranoid deterioration of the personified state.

There are two clinical features of Stalin as a Soviet leader which most directly expose the relevant weaknesses. The first is the impotence of Stalin's unquestionably sincere efforts to explicate the dialectical method. These conclusively demonstrate that Stalin was informed concerning the dialectical method and determined to master it, but never able to achieve that self-conscious comprehension of its content which would have otherwise tended to prevent his paranoid deterioration. The second is Stalin's
political lying, the practice of knowing one thing and asserting the contrary for sake of perceived expediency. This dichotomy of reality, a subordination of a scientific outlook to the expediency-motivated propitiatory adaptation to the "reality" of perceived "outer world" circumstances, is directly a paranoid trait which became increasingly characteristic of the Stalin regime. In fact, this latter practice, although in a less virulent form, is the principal, centrist-tending flaw pro-Leninist Communist circles have inherited from the Stalin era.

Formally, Trotsky's writings on the dialectical method compare favorably to Stalin's efforts of this sort. It is useful to compare the writings of both Stalin and Trotsky on dialectical method with crucial features of the collection published as Lenin's "Philosophical Notebooks." *In form*, Trotsky's groping for a process-conception is much closer to Lenin's understanding; as a publicist and historian, Trotsky's powers for sometimes brilliant, creative insight correspond to his limited achievements in recognition of the process-conception. In contrast, Stalin never gets beyond a false start in understanding the empirical implications of process as *primary*. Stalin reduces the dialectical method to an aggregation of *logical forms*, which he attempts to interpret from an actually mechanistic form of axiomatic epistemological world-outlook. Hence, Stalin's writings have the overall quality of scholastical edification, plausible glosses on phrases and so forth. Yet, on the most critical issues, Trotsky's comprehension of the dialectical method is closer to Stalin's than to Lenin's. This feature of Trotsky is most clearly underlined by his pre-war fundamental methodological differences with Lenin, a gulf between Trotsky and Lenin which persisted in fact to the end of Trotsky's life.

1933-1953

The Stalin era is most efficiently assorted into three principal periods. The first period extends from Lenin's last illness through the accession of Adolf Hitler to the German Chancellorship; the critical features of this for Comintern policy we shall examine in its principal features for our study here in the next section on the Stalin-Trotsky debates. The second period extends from January 1933 through approximately the Stalingrad battles; this is the period of world history which is most profoundly misunderstood even by better-informed circles today and is correspondingly most significant in exploring the popularized image of Stalin today. The third period extends from the Stalingrad and subsequent decisive follow-up Red Army victories through Soviet priority in developing the first operational fusion bomb, a point coinciding with the period of Stalin's death. The latter period can be simply summed up in light of the background provided by the earlier.

The popular myth is that the liberal and social-democratic forces of the industrialized capitalist sector underestimated the danger of Nazi Germany, and then bungled the war preparations and initial months of the war before belatedly getting down to a serious, all-out war-effort against the Nazi plague. Any person who believes any of the varieties of such mythology is consequently ignorant of the most basic realities of 20th century history down to the present day.

The immediate, narrowly focused facts of World War II can be summed up as follows. The Nazi regime of Germany came to power on the basis of decisions reached among powerful Anglo-American financier forces, notably including the Rockefeller family interests. The Nazi regime's military drive toward the East was facilitated by the same Anglo-American interests which had put Hitler into power. The French decision on the Rhineland occupation of 1936, the Munich pact, the post-Munich London decision not to prevent the occupation of Czechoslovakia, London's intervention to prevent a German Army overthrow of Hitler prior to the War, and the "phony war" in the West of late 1939 and early 1940 are exemplary of major interventions in support of a Nazi successful conquest of the Soviet Union. Rudolf Hess's flight to Britain is a reflection of the foggy perception of such an "understanding" prevailing among high levels of the Nazi party itself.

Hess's brainwashing in Britain can be broadly described as chiefly a result of the delay in his flight. During the first year of the war, it became clear to British and other relevant circles that their restive and rebellious "marcher lord," Adolf Hitler, was out of their control and had become an immediate and principal danger of unexpected vigor to them and their policies. Consequently, the policy of the relevant Anglo-American ruling circles was shifted. The original commitment to a mutually wasting Nazi-Soviet war remained the included general basis for war policy, with the difference that a *wasted Soviet Union* was now preferred to win that Eastern warfare (to be therefore dealt with more easily during the post-war period). The crushing of the Nazi machine was shifted to first priority, and the crushing of the Soviet Union to second priority.

It is clear that Stalin himself either lacked or blocked out relevant information concerning the Anglo-American pre-1941 policies. Despite that, the perceived reality confronting the Soviet Union reflected the situation as we have summarized it. The January 1933 accession of Hitler, taken in light of subsequent months' consolidation of the Nazi regime,
meant a potential, concerted imperialist deployment for crushing of the Soviet Union itself, using the Nazi-
fied German war machine as the spearhead of that war effort. This was the circumstance of Stalin's
"Popular Front" policies and the subsequent, last-
resort Hitler-Stalin pact. Division among the imperial-
list forces between fascists and anti-fascists was in fact
the principal feature of Stalin's policies from the after-
math of January 1933 almost up to the gates of Moscow
during the war itself.

The Tukachevsky affair offers the most efficient factual case for exposing the actual Soviet situation. In the wake of the proferring of the Tukachevsky plan to London and Paris, and in the circumstance of impending Nazi crushing of Czechoslovakia, etc., British agent Admiral Canaris, on the basis of communications from London, resurrected the Heydrich project for forging evidence to be leaked to Stalin against the general staff of the Red Army. The information known to be forgeries was then leaked to Stalin through Anglo-American agencies in France (French intelligence) and Czechoslovakia (President Eduard Beneš). The same operation was deployed by an established network task-oriented to propagating and circulating such Moscow-Trial forgeries, a network whose fascist aspects were under control of the top British agent in Germany. The relevant British circles were, in short, up to their ears in operations aimed at wrecking the Soviet Union's morale and leadership internally at the same time that they were otherwise pursuing policies (Rhineland 1936, Munich, etc.) whose only effect was to facilitate otherwise impossible Nazi warfare against the Soviet Union.

Canaris' earlier involvements in the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and the death of Paul Levi are part of the relevant background to the Anglo-American Nazi policies.

From the 1870s under Bismarck, a number of key German financier interests took up residency in London. The Bismarckian tax policies were certainly of collateral relevance in this development, as were continued close ties between Britain and various of the former quasi-autonomous states of Germany and their ruling aristocratic houses. More significant were the specific opportunities represented by the growth of British imperialism and the consequent advantages of a London merchant banking house for the appropriate German financier interests. This must be emphasized in respect of the role of the City of London in facilitating British intelligence connections in Germany immediately prior to and during the First World War, for which (later Admiral) Canaris and Karl Korsch of World War I German staff intelligence are relevant cases.

The role of British intelligence and associated British agencies in facilitating Canaris' return to Germany early during World War I is (at present) our earliest documented evidence of Canaris' direct links to British intelligence. Canaris' next prominent activities coming to our notice from documentary sources is his indictment in connection with the Rosa Luxemburg murder at the end of World War I, his later identification by the Reichstag as the principal accomplice in that murder, and the death of Paul Levi (and disappearance of Levi's dossier on Canaris) on the eve of Canaris' prosecution for that crime: for which British intelligence networks are the implicated parties.

From 1898-1899, and more emphatically from 1907 onwards, Rosa Luxemburg was identified by Anglo-American intelligence as the principal Marxist danger to be eliminated. This continued until the Bolshevik Revolution (when the U.S. Ambassador to Petrograd put Lenin and Trotsky first on the assassination lists, and British-controlled anarchists and anarcho-
syndicalists were deployed for such operations as attempted assassinations of Lenin, the Kronstadt affair, and so forth). The main covert thrust against Luxemburg was the same later deployed against the Paul Levi leadership of the Communist Party of Germany, the British-infiltrated, anarchosyndicalist ultra-lefts of the "council communist" tendencies in Germany, Holland, et al. The function of these ultra-
lefts was to serve as provocateurs and to keep Luxem-
burg's dangerous influence politically contained. It was in their function as provocateurs that these British-infiltrated fools from Hamburg and Branden-
burg frustrated adoption of Luxemburg's strategic policies at the founding congress of the KPD and launched the ultra-left adventure used by German Anglo-American protégés as a pretext for murdering her and attempting to obliterate her political tendency.

In connection with 1918-1920 events in Germany it is essential to recognize that the Anglo-American policy was shaped in reaction to the Bolshevik revolution, with the continuing Anglo-American policy throughout the 1920s and 1930s (within the limits tolerated by a distinct French policy) that of developing Germany as a "marcher lord" bulwark against the Communist threat to the east. The formation of the Freikorps in the Baltic regions (prototype of the later Waffen SS) was a German Army project at the direction of Anglo-
American forces. The real post-war government of Germany, the Army regime of General Gröner, and the use of the Ebert government as a political front for Gröner's dictatorship were, at every significant turn and step, activities under direction and veto-control of the relevant Anglo-American agencies.

Apart from the fact of Anglo-American top-down control of the later KAPD and allied "left" strata
within the KPD, the Fabian-linked British intelligence agencies understood that anarchosyndicalist currents, even nominally Marxist such currents, represented an advantage, rather than a threat to their anti-Communist policies. Although the Amsterdam project of Bruce Lockhart, Hamilton Fish Armstrong and others failed in its immediate, ostensible purpose of creating a preemptive counterforce to a Petrograd-oriented Communist International, the anarchosyndicalist, nationalistic currents sometimes styled “national bolshevist,” participating in the Amsterdam affair continued to serve as a major resource for various Anglo-American anti-Communist political intelligence projects (including initial penetrations of the various factions of the early CPUSA) thereafter, most notably in pre-Hitler Germany and in the German political refugee operations of the 1920s and OSS period.

Lenin himself was broadly misinformed and deceived in part by these covert operations of the post-war period, and Stalin remained relatively more susceptible to such manipulations through the period of the “Troika” and his own bloc with right-winger Bukharin. However, Stalin was proceeding from broadly correct assumptions (although not effective strategies) in his “Third Period” left turn and denunciation of social-democratic leaders of the future “Swedish Way” varieties as “social fascists.”

Meanwhile, paralleling Anglo-American operations through anarchosyndicalist “lefts” and outrightly right-wing Comintern and social-democratic leading strata, the development of the German fascist movements in Germany (and fascists elsewhere, including Eastern Europe) was a variously direct or indirect product of Anglo-American policies and activities. In fact, in crucial respects, the situation of the 1968-1975 period is at many points almost a plagiarism of 1928-1933 developments.

The Freikorps was released from critical circumstances in the Baltic region for Anglo-American needs in Germany itself. It was the German Army’s Anglo-American protégés who initially deployed Adolf Hitler as a kind of early “CIA agent” in Bavaria, which protégés developed the fascist movements in Germany through appropriate financial backing, and so forth.

Because of its heteronomic character, a mass-based fascist movement can not develop into a major force without the centralization afforded to it through backing by capitalist financiers. Even the pathetic American Nazi Party would have not existed in its tiny dimensions without heavy financial backing conducted through a well-known right-wing economist closely tied to the circles of the current U.S. Attorney-General and the Rockefeller machine. The Minutemen organization was a CIA gun-running cover. Since the middle 1960s approximately 70 per cent of leading members of the Ku Klux Klan have been agents of the FBI or sister Federal agencies. It was the same in Germany, where the leading position of Adolf Hitler (over the Strasser brothers) was entirely secured and maintained by the relevant financier interests.

This is paralleled in other countries of that same period. In the U.S.A., the Fabian-allied pre-World War I nominally socialist circles around Gompers’ AFL, Victor Berger’s Bernsteinist “sewer socialists,” Walter Lippman, John Dewey, the Christian socialists, the anarchosyndicalists of the I.W.W., and sometimes styled “national bolshevist,” participating Victor Berger’s Bernsteinist “sewer socialists,” with his own political refugee operations of the 1920s and OSS period.

Lenin himself was broadly misinformed and deceived in part by these covert operations of the post-war period, and Stalin remained relatively more susceptible to such manipulations through the period of the “Troika” and his own bloc with right-winger Bukharin. However, Stalin was proceeding from broadly correct assumptions (although not effective strategies) in his “Third Period” left turn and denunciation of social-democratic leaders of the future “Swedish Way” varieties as “social fascists.”

Meanwhile, paralleling Anglo-American operations through anarchosyndicalist “lefts” and outrightly right-wing Comintern and social-democratic leading strata, the development of the German fascist movements in Germany (and fascists elsewhere, including Eastern Europe) was a variously direct or indirect product of Anglo-American policies and activities. In fact, in crucial respects, the situation of the 1968-1975 period is at many points almost a plagiarism of 1928-1933 developments.

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As the Comintern rightly insisted, the Mueller leadership of the SPD during 1928-1929 openly acted as the proponent of fascist-type austerity and social policies in Germany. They were, in fact, nothing but “social-fascists.” Only an hysterical muddlehead could attempt to deny that fact today. The figure of Hjalmar Schacht is central to that and subsequent developments.

It was Schacht’s austerity program and associated outrightly social-fascist programs pushed by the social-democracy (and also the Nazis themselves, especially the Strasser-oriented “leftwing” Nazis) which represent the exact parallel for the stated policies of Atlanticist “Swedish Way” social-democrats today as well as the Atlanticist polycentrist, “left-fascism”-oriented Giorgio Amendola of the PCI.
As the SPD failed to serve as an effective associated leading instrument for enforcement of Schacht's austerity policies, the Brüning, “bonapartist” variant emerged, imposing fascist forms of Schachtian austerity but failing to secure political stability for the continued implementation of those programs. The obvious impotence of von Papen and other available arrangements of that sort resulted in Schacht’s project for bringing Hitler into the Chancellorship. This project was cleared with the Anglo-Americans (including the Rockefellers), and then pushed forward among German financier circles, with the funding conducted through a Rockefeller-linked bank.

It is notable that the social-democratic and polycratic support for fascist austerity and corporatist programs today directly echoes the 1928-1933 period of Germany. The argument of those pro-austerity “left-wing” Atlanticists is that only the implementation of fascist policies by the “left-wing” NATO agents and their dupes precludes a recurrence of the fascist implementation of the same fascist policies. The Maoist, NATO-created countergang, Lotta Continua, was the first nominally socialist group in Italy (apart from the notorious Rome cult of self-styled Nazi Maoists) to insist on this perspective. In the U.S., as early as late 1971, social-democrat Abba Lerner, a long-time Rockefeller protegé, conceded (in a public debate with this writer) that his proposed Brazil-modeled policies were indeed identical with those advanced by Hjalmar Schacht as Nazi financial czar, but that it was nonetheless slanderous to term his policies fascist. Lerner argued that the implementation of such Schachtian policies by social-democrats and liberals was imperative to prevent, as in Germany, a recurrence of fascism. He insisted that Hitler would not have occurred had the 1928-1933 German social-democrats and liberals not vacillated in implementation of Schacht’s fascist austerity policies.

Although Stalin was fuzzy on some critical features of this background, the reality which confronted the Soviet leadership after January 1933 was otherwise clearly reflected to this general effect.

Stalin’s policy in the Spanish Civil War must also be understood in those same general terms. Immediately, in respect of the internal forces within Spain, both sides of the Civil War were effectively controlled by Anglo-American intelligence. Franco’s insurgency was an Anglo-American project, directly facilitated, even overtly, by France and Great Britain in particular. On the Republican side, most of the key figures, including Santiago Carrillo of the PCE, were British agents. British agents (e.g., George Orwell, James Larkin “Jack” Jones) operating under an Independent Labour Party “left” cover are merely representative of the breadth and varieties of penetrations of the Spanish “left.” Meanwhile, penetrations of the Paris Comintern apparatus facilitated such pranks as mass executions of Spanish Communists killed at the direction of British agents on the basis of forged evidence concocted by Anglo-American intelligence services.

In these post-1933 circumstances, it was not difficult for the Webbs and other key Anglo-American agents to draw Stalin into a “Popular Front” policy of “not provoking the democratic imperialists” to ally directly with the Nazis against the Soviet Union. Nor, in the same general connections, is it difficult to comprehend either the circumstances aggravating Stalin’s growing paranoia of that period, or the way in which relevant aspects of Soviet and Comintern policies were influenced by Anglo-American-coordinated interventions. As for those who prove their case against Stalin by the fact of the Hitler-Stalin pact, they are obviously either simply liars or ignorant hysterics.

From the last phase of the European war-time operations, following the consolidation of the Normandy beachhead, there was a growing emphasis on a project to make a separate peace with Nazi Germany (under its generals, à la 1918-1919) and settle accounts immediately with the Soviet Union. This resolute element among Anglo-American military and other leading circles is most readily understood in light of the earlier shift in Anglo-American policy. The decision to crush Hitler first had been merely a shift in priorities. The earlier order of priorities had been: Nazis crush the Soviet Union, allies (allied with German generals) get rid of Hitler, et al., and the U.S. imposes the “American Century” upon the war-depleted allies. The shift had amounted to no more than a shift in decision to crushing Hitler first, putting the Soviets’ destruction into Phase II.

Immediate implementation of Phase II was impossible. The political situation in continental Europe (e.g., the resistance), combined with the political situation in the U.S. and Britain, and the capabilities of the Red Army made a Phase II a monstrously risky adventure while the U.S. had only a handful of operational nuclear bombs. Rather, movements toward Phase II implementation were emplaced. In general, the Anglo-Americans borrowed the Emanuel Lasker chess maxim, “The threat is always more dangerous than the attack,” to create an aversive environment in which Stalin’s concessions would demoralize pro-Communist forces, and in which direct counterinsurgency “roll back” operations such as those launched under the UNRRA cover would set up a favorable strategic balance pending the build-up of the Anglo-American nuclear arsenal. The Cold War
and insistent chatter concerning “preventive war” were the themes, complemented by the “captive nations” fascist-based show-case “movements,” for the late 1940s.

Soviet development of nuclear weapons and the critical Soviet priority in making an operational thermonuclear bomb put an end to the implementation of Phase II for at least a protracted period. It is that point of strategic developments which corresponds with the end of the Stalin era, both internationally and with respect to Soviet internal policies.

At approximately the same point as the death of Stalin the most extreme dangers besetting Soviet existence had been significantly ameliorated...as well as the conditions demanding Eastern Establishment loose-leashed toleration of McCarthyite terror within the U.S. itself. The unfortunate fraudulently tried Rosenbergs became a burnt offering in consolation of insulted Anglo-American underestimation of a workers’ economy, and a new period was launched in both the capitalist sector and the present Comecon sector.

2. The Stalin-Trotsky Issue

Contrary to most professed Trotskyists and Anglo-American Sovietologists, the initial shaping of the Stalin era can not be competently defined in terms of any lesser period than 1923-1933 taken as a unified whole. The crucial fact of that specific period, the fact which defines every other development, is Stalin’s break with Bukharin to launch collectivization and the First Five Year Plan of Soviet industrialization. To all informed leading pro-Soviet Communists, that is exactly the way the positive kernel of Stalin’s leadership is correctly defined. N. Khrushchev, despite the included contrary features of the dubious memoir attributed to him, properly emphasized that fact during the period of his General Secretaryship of the CPSU; but for Stalin’s repudiation of Bukharin the Soviet Union would not have survived the 1930s and the war.

It must be emphasized that whatever the ultimate findings on Bukharin may be, it is the Stalin-Bukharin dispute rather than the Stalin-Trotsky dispute which defines the life-and-death political struggles within the Communist organizations down to the present day. If Bukharin was not in fact a knowing agent of Anglo-American intelligence services — and every relevant piece of circumstantial evidence says that he was such an agent in fact — his relative innocence of such knowledge can only be attributed to his stupidity. In practice — in political outlook, in the internal epistemological features of his thinking on leading subjects, and in terms of his actions at certain critical points of Anglo-American political intelligence services’ operations against variously the Soviet republic and Comintern — Bukharin was in fact the most important political agent the imperialists ever recruited from or planted within such circles. It is Stalin as the leader of the struggle against Bukharinism which in fact epitomizes the positive view of Stalinism within Communist circles down to the present day.

On the condition that the preeminence of the Stalin-Bukharin disputes is recognized as the primary political fact of the 1923-1933 period, a close study of the relatively secondary Stalin-Trotsky disputes of the 1923-1928 period is the most profitable clinical case for adducing the deeper implications of the Stalin Question.

Such a study would be misdirected and ultimately nonsensical unless we proceed from the overall fact that both Trotsky and Stalin were leaders of anti-Bukharin forces during the 1923-1933 period as a whole. In that sense —that very delineated, particular sense — the “de-Stalinizing” N. Khrushchev effectively identified the modern Soviet leadership as in a certain broad sense simultaneously Stalinist and Trotskyist. In contrast to such “Trotskyist” CPSU leaders, the knowing NATO intelligence services’ agent heading the so-called Fourth International, Ernest Mandel (alias Ernest Germain, Ernst Mandelbaum), is a raving pro-Bukharinite. (7)

Bukharin

Consequently, to understand the Stalin-Trotsky disputes competitively, one must begin with a thumbnail assessment of Bukharin (at least a thumbnail assessment).

Bukharin came into contact with the Bolshevik faction during the first decade of this century, at the time Bukharin was a local Moscow leader of a left-wing university student formation. At that time, and for the rest of his political life, Bukharin was epistemologically a pro-anarchosyndicalist, and closely aligned with the “left wing” anarchosyndicalists of the Russian Social-Revolutionary Party up through the Kronstadt period. This same petty-bourgeois radical’s sort of mechanistic internal world outlook (reductionist world outlook), which impelled Bukharin toward the anarchosyndicalists, brought him into association with the Anglo-American-influenced pro-Machian Bolshevik faction of the first decade, made him a faithful student of the philosophical method and economic nostrums of the Vienna circles of Ludwig von Mises, Böhm-Bawerk, et al. His
association with the "left" SRs gave Bukharin a prominent position in an early "destabilization" project of the Anglo-Americans (Bruce Lockhardt, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Reilly, et al.) against the Bolshevik leadership during the disputes between Lenin and Trotsky over Brest-Litovsk negotiations. Bukharin was the leader of the ultra-left faction prompted by Lockhardt, et al. to attempt to exacerbate the dispute between Lenin and Trotsky, in an allies' effort to thereby weaken the Soviet leadership internally. Bukharin was also a defender of the Anglo-American intelligence agents and dupes who carried out the Kronstadt caper; although his formal role in this affair seems merely a routine matter of affording the accused an effective defense, when that event is taken out of isolation, no such commendable civil-libertarian concern accounts for the incident. Bukharin's work in the Comintern apparatus and, specifically, the Anglo-Russian committee affair is of the same, consistently wretched political quality.

In view of the lying version of the Kronstadt affair popularized by Sovietologists and their anarchist-syndicalist errand-boys, it is required to clarify the essential features of this incident. First, it must be stressed that the Kronstadt rebels were not the Kronstadt sailors of 1917 Petrograd. Those heroes of 1917 had been assigned as cadres to numerous Soviet fighting fronts, and their place in the naval fortress garrison taken by conscripts whose political and related fighting qualities did not recommend them relatively speaking for more serious military duties. The immediate issue of the Kronstadt rebellion was the refusal of the garrison and its officers to permit the citizens of Petrograd access to the Petrograd city food stores which had been placed in the fortress for reasons of physical security considerations. The anarchist swine of the fortress proposed to starve the citizens of Petrograd, keeping the precious grain of the city for themselves, unless the Soviet republic conceded to their demands. Unwilling to permit the starving of the Petrograd population, the local garrison braved the heavy artillery of the fortress and reduced the anarchist forces before the rebels' Anglo-American masters could bring military forces to their aid.

A number of Soviet leaders not only acknowledged but emphasized the objective conditions which had made the Kronstadt garrison susceptible to becoming agents and dupes of the Anglo-American forces. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was instituted in an effort to provide an ameliorative for the conditions which had caused a number of internal manifestations of the same objective problem within the war-and-invasion-depleted Soviet republic. Although, by all accepted military codes for conduct of troops under conditions of warfare, every member of the Kronstadt garrison deserved to be shot without hesitation, socialist morality frequently and properly cuts through capitalist military codes with special forms of compassionate social justice — and not without profit to the socialist military cause where this is properly applied. To the extent that discipline is not impaired, a defeated opponent is to be given mercy and even rehabilitated to full rights wherever it is possible to safely restore him or her to a useful social role. In the world circumstances of the Kronstadt case, the clear-cut strategic need was to execute all the ring-leaders, the agents, and to attempt to salvage the mere pathetic dupes. However, any effort to justify the rebellion as a whole is clearly inadmissible.

During the period following Kronstadt, Bukharin underwent a kind of transformation from CPSU ultra-left to right-winger of a form which was in no way contradictory to his essential world outlook under the circumstances. The same anarchist outlook of left-wing student-leader Bukharin which had made him an ally of the left-SRs and an anarchoid-tinged CPSU ultra-left spokesman during the earlier period defined his right-wing, pro-Kulak, pro-NEPman mentality of the later period.

In the Comintern, the same peculiar sociological logic governed the connections between the Anglo-American ultra-lefts of the "council communist," KAPD, and "left" KPD varieties and the Comintern Right-Opposition and Anglo-American-created "Third Camp" groupings also controlled by the Anglo-American political intelligence agencies. Apart from Bukharin's connections to and political softness toward Fabianism and Fabian political intelligence circles, it was not otherwise accidental that the Bukharin of the Soviet right-wing factions should have been the principal international spokesman of the Anglo-American intelligence services' Comintern Right-Opposition organizations.

Stalin's Fears

Although appropriate detailed personal memoirs of Stalin from that period are generally lacking, there is a consistent trait of Stalin's character which adequately accounts for his softness toward both Bukharin and the German "lefts" during the middle 1920s: fear. A few highlights of the 1917-1933 period — and later — suffice to exemplify the sort of crucial evidence which is available.

The most interesting feature of the first six months of 1917 is the circumstances under which both Lenin and Trotsky (among others) were ultimately permitted passage back to Russia. The key figure during that period is the exotic Anglo-German double agent
and war-time sponsor of Bukharin, Parvus-Gelphand.

During the latter phases of the First World War, there was a most active behind-the-scenes negotiation of the British and German representatives concerning possible "arrangements." The British of that period might have preferred to do otherwise than actually occurred, but their French allies would not tolerate and their U.S. accomplices were dubious of the political feasibility of such sophisticated post-war arrangements. Without taking such negotiations and their by-products into account, none of the critical developments of early 1917 can be competently understood. Into this complex set of negotiations and associated skullduggery enters the remarkable Parvus, a significant, if presently obscured figure who has a history of sorts.

Parvus-Gelphand's association with Eduard Bernstein begins during 1893, under circumstances which prompted F. Engels to voice his active suspicions to Plekhanov in 1894. Thereafter, Parvus became a nominal voice of the SPD left while otherwise supporting the practices of Bernstein and Bernstein's Bavarian ally, Vollmar. Prior to the Petrograd 1905 revolution, Parvus struck up an association with Trotsky, co-authored Results and Prospects with Trotsky, and mysteriously escaped without notable inconvenience — and with appropriate documents and funds — while Parvus's friends of the Petrograd Soviet chiefly continued their route to exile and unhappier fates. In the subsequent period, Parvus became an advisor to the Sultan of Turkey and a picaresque millionaire speculator in grain and (chiefly) British armaments sales (augmenting his Russia under the leadership of Kamenev and Stalin.

Parvus-Gelphand's profile on the 1905 Petrograd Revolution was the scenario employed with the intent of bringing such prospects into being.

The notable point immediately to be emphasized involves study of events relevant to the timing of Lenin's and Trotsky's arrival in Russia. Immediately on learning of the February Revolution, both Lenin and Trotsky, among many other Russian exiled revolutionaries, began proceedings for obtaining return. Trotsky was detained by the British in the Canadian Maritimes, while Lenin continued negotiations for passage — at first fruitlessly. Then, Trotsky was permitted to proceed en route, and Lenin and others secured from the German military the sealed box-car arrangement — set up through Parvus.

The relevant immediately preceding event was the resolution just previously adopted by the Bolsheviks in Russia under the leadership of Kamenev and Stalin. The Bolshevik resolution to support the policy of the Mensheviks, who were, in turn, attempting to support the ambitions of the Cadets, assured the allies that the return of a number of additional leading Marxists was both a safe and probably fruitful project for them to further.

Anyone who suggests that the British or German military circles involved in these events had the slightest fear that either Lenin or Trotsky could lead a Bolshevik Revolution during that same year is clearly out of his head. The actual internal "dynamics" of a socialist transformation is utterly outside the universe as defined by the axioms of the capitalist world outlook. Moreover, Lenin resorted to tactical measures of a sort which might be seen as implicit in his earlier writings and actions but for which there was no explicit forewarning: certain of Lenin's essential measures represented a tactical tour-de-force. Whatever the leading Anglo-Americans may have retrospectively thought after October 1917 (the U.S. Ambassador, in fact, demanded the immediate assassination of both Lenin and Trotsky), the transit
of the parties of Lenin and Trotsky must be understood from the standpoint of the Anglo-American and German outlook of the first months of that year.

The relevant point is that Stalin and Kamenev had led the tiny Bolshevik organization in Russia to adopt a policy and perspective which was essentially acceptable to the Anglo-Americans. It is notable that Stalin temporarily withdrew from prominence in the wake of Lenin’s onslaught overthrowing the decision of the Bolshevik leadership and pushing the adoption of the “April Theses” Policy and perspective. Later, during the Autumn of 1917, Stalin, together with Zinoviev and Kamenev, acting visibly out of fear, attempted to publicly block the October Revolution itself.

Fear also governed Stalin’s temporary bloc with Bukharin, as outright fear governed his submission to the popular-front tactic during the 1935-1939 period, and the same fear reached paranoid extremes during the Moscow Trials and other developments of the 1933-1953 period.

Stalin’s fear is properly characterized as of the special type we in the United States or other parts of the capitalist sector normally and rightfully associate with the general character-formation of the “jock.” On the football field or in the person-to-person encounter generally, the “jock” or “macho” type shows what appears to be — and often is, in fact — extraordinarily personal courage. This may be either real personal courage, or more frequently is either entirely or substantially an artificed sort of boldness summoned up by the same psychological ruses employed in karate training. Such courage is akin to that shown by the ordinary trained infantry soldier under combat conditions. A study of the role of various forms of psychological inoculation — such as bayonet practice or the use of combat simulation of the “infiltration course” type — affords a useful point of clinical reference in comparison with proven methods of athletic competitions training. In connection with psychological studies of such jocks, we know that it is commonplace to discover a special kind of aggravated fear associated with and actually worsened by such training experiences or their more-or-less spontaneous equivalent in everyday life. The emphasis on the combative prowess of the individual or small unit in such training procedures tends to heighten the existentialist tendencies, and involves an emphasis on ego-stripping techniques which aggravate paranoid tendencies.

In consequence of this, the model of the effective football hero or trained infantryman is associated with acute paranoid fear of the outside world generally — however such jocks may define that notion of “outside” for themselves. In military formations, this paranoia is controlled by discipline and by associated training and other reinforcement procedures which induce in the individual soldier a faith in the propitiatory effectiveness of the procedures associated with such discipline. The paranoid of this sort finds what is for him the “outside world” effectively unsusceptible of rational comprehension, and substitutes for such omitted comprehension a body of wiseacre’s pseudo-knowledge of the sort typified by the posturing aphorisms of the “barracks lawyer.” “The way they . . .” is the general formulation of his pragmatic (i.e., paranoid) professed insights into the “magical principles” ordering the larger world.

Once we have first taken into account the primary fact that Stalin was a committed Bolshevik, the most appropriate political characterization of him is that of a Bolshevik jock. His positive political qualities, including his sensuous appreciation of the realities of leading positions of power in the party and state apparatuses, are partially determined and partially deformed by Stalin’s jock mentality. In the former respect, Stalin’s positive role was accidental, in the sense that it was relatively positive in effect but did not derive from his political development as a committed Bolshevik. In the latter respect, the jock mentality of Stalin’s approach to Bolshevik tasks of leadership caused his positive role to be crippled by a corresponding taint of narrow realpolitik, a tendency to envisage the correlations of forces in terms more appropriate to the football field and straightforward deductive logic of military deployments rather than the creative terms of the Leninist method or the more limited creativity of such military leaders as a Tukachevsky or a political strategist such as Trotsky.

This same point is corroborated not only by Stalin’s obsession with his physical appearance, but by a study of Stalin’s political writings from the standpoint of epistemology, and most emphatically by study of Stalin’s sincere but pathetic efforts to explicate a dialectical method. Stalin’s conception of the class struggle was essentially mechanical, as his single left turn, the Comintern “Third Period,” attests. Stalin correctly assessed the oncoming crisis of the 1928-1929 period as one of strategic weakness of the capitalist forces, and found courage in such facts to launch the urgent assault on the potential and actual counter-revolutionary forces in the Soviet Union as well as to foster an aggressive policy internationally. In both aspects of the crucial “Third Period,” the style employed is entirely that of the football or soccer field or of the routine sort of capitalist professional conception of ordinary infantry deployments, lacking in any perception of the political processes which properly determine socialist work.
The positive outcome of the "Third Period" and other features of the Stalin period is that this initial left turn fostered the self-development of some leading cadre-strata to a point beyond Stalin's crude methodological grasp. The "Third Period" and war-time resistance (in particular) represented a kind of political license for socialist self-development by various sections of the Communist movement, just as the industrial development of the Soviet Union fostered the objective and related subjective preconditions for developing Leninist and proto-Leninist currents within and around the CPSU.

Stalin's publicized conversations with the U.S. semi-official representative, Colonel Robins, and his ostensibly credulous toleration of the 1930s "pro-Bolshevik" charades of Sidney and Beatrice Webb are ironically exemplary cases. As we have noted earlier in this paper, factually Stalin knew that British political intelligence was the spearhead of anti-Soviet and anti-Comintern "dirty tricks." The Bruce Lockhart and Hamilton Fish Armstrong operations run under the auspices of the Red Cross, the case of Konni Zilliacus' intelligence operations against the pre-war Bolshevik organization, and so forth and so on were exemplary of Stalin's knowledge. A report on British intelligence operations published during the late 1940s sets forth what Stalin variously knew and professed to know at that approximate date, and is useful in assessing how much of that picture was known to him at various earlier points. In general, Stalin had knowledge of numerous relevant sets of facts and also had "shrewd suspicions" of the deeper meaning of those facts. He did not — and could not have — developed an actual overview of a scientific quality into the actual character and controlling deeper modus operandi of the Anglo-American political intelligence establishment.

To restate the point within the specific context of Stalin's jock mentality, Stalin in general parallels the "barracks lawyer" one otherwise expects to encounter among veteran non-commissioned military cadres. On all matters beyond his direct, deductive comprehension of organized forces Stalin's character as a whole is permeated by shrewd suspicions. There is a fruitful analogy between Stalin and the proverbial simple soldier who is "shrewdly" skeptical of every fact and judgment which does not correspond to his "old wives' wisdom" concerning the propitiatory principles he presumes to govern the "outside world." This analogy and the reality to which it refers is most appropriate because of the garrison conditions of life imposed upon the Soviet republic and its leadership during the Stalin era as a whole.

In a word, the essential features of Stalin's character correspond to the traits of Oblomov. In practical terms, Stalin's Oblomovism is not of the same variety as Trotsky's. Trotsky is more clearly a parallel to the fictional character Oblomov, the Oblomovism of one whose standpoint is an educated member of an agrarian elite. Stalin does not immediately suggest the character of Oblomov in such outer features, but the same general pathology expressed as the mental disorders of a jock.

Unless we were addressing Soviet phenomena we would not, admittedly, use the term Oblomov in respect to Stalin; we would not require such an allusion in the course of making the relevant psychoanalytical observations. However, there are two reasons we are obliged to define Stalin's character as a variety of the Oblomovist type. Immediately, and positively, this metaphor assists us in directly and simultaneously contrasting Stalin and Trotsky as respectively distinct deviations from Lenin's essential method and world outlook. More broadly, since the Tavistock-RAND group of Sovietologists, from Henry V. Dicks onward, have emphasized Oblomovism as a Russian "national susceptibility" toward which anti-Soviet psychological warfare techniques are specifically directed, the significant vulnerabilities of Soviet leaders and secondary leading and intellectual strata are most emphatically those which conform to the defined Oblomov syndrome.

Stalin's paranoid tendencies cause his conception of Bolshevism to converge upon the metaphorical forms which key NATO political intelligence psychological warfare specialists currently describe as a "belief system." In genuine scientific terms, Stalin's misconception of Bolshevism is a classic form of ideology — in exactly the sense Marx employs the term ideology to identify a specific form of mental pathology. Although Stalin himself is by no means responsible for introducing such misconceptions, the authority his regime gave to such a methodology is a preponderant feature of the process by which certain doctrines of "Marxist-Leninist ideology" achieved hegemony among Communist circles.

The problem is analogous to that which continues to perplex thoughtful modern mathematical physicists in respect of the implications of the unignorable Maxwell formulations. It is otherwise the same problem one confronts in tracing the direct connections between Descartes and Spinoza. Discrete phenomena exist. Yet, as Maxwell's brilliant tour de force in summarizing the evidence of Ampere, Faraday and others exemplifies, it is impossible to realize a scientific comprehension of a lawful ordering of discrete phenomena without making continuity the primary axiomatic assumption (e.g., the field). Yet, the simplistic, linear (affine) notion of the curvature of a manifold corresponding to a physical plenum fails
into the trap of Joseph Schelling and others, the trap Hegel ridiculed as a "night in which all cows are black." Without proceeding to high-order Riemannian manifolds, even to manifolds of a type merely implicit in Riemann's and Cantor's juxtaposed definitions, in which singularities in "curvature" define non-linear relationships, it is impossible to define continuity in such a fashion as to determine the existence of discrete phenomena. Our own original demonstration of this point for Marxist economics merely demonstrates the proper direction of a search for solutions within the domain of physics qua physics, but is nonetheless a crucial demonstration that is uniquely the heurism for the required solution to leading problems of physics today. (§) Two aspects of this general problem are directly relevant to the problem of "Marxist-Leninist ideology."

Firstly, the failure to account for the determination of discrete phenomena from the standpoint of simplified notions of field continuity results in a regression toward the mechanistic or reductionist standpoint in physics practice. The reductionist, elementaristic viewpoint is then taken as the axiomatic standpoint. It is analogous in political work. Every fact of political life demonstrates that anything but the standpoint of lawful continuity as primary is absurd. Yet, simplistic conceptions of a primary continuity must fail to account for discrete social and political phenomena, and thus the notion of continuity, or coherent lawfulness is caused to appear to be "merely theoretical," and a more efficient, or so-called "practical," mechanistic approach to discrete phenomena as such is preferred for actual practice.

This is blatantly obvious from Stalin's writings and corroborating circumstantial evidence respecting his policies. Stalin knows that somewhere, somehow there are principles of continuity which lawfully determine discrete social and political phenomena. His otherwise pathetic essays in attempted explication of dialectical method are most exemplary of this essentially impotent conviction. In sum, he attempts to discover such continuity as a matter of abstracted glosses which explain the efficacy of mechanistically ordered practice to his satisfaction. In sum, those principles are for him of the order of epiphenomena of mechanistic rules of practice.

The fact that physics is beset by problems of that sort does not warrant Stalin's (and others') blundering in that fashion. This present writer's original work in solving critical carried-forward problems of Marxist economics was essentially no more than a continuation of Marx's established conceptual solution to the same problems. (§) Marx's achievement in that respect is no mere contingency, no miracle. From the Renaissance neo-Platonics through Descartes, Spinoza, and Hegel, there is a developing continuity of a science which takes the fact of human creative practice as primary, as a direct expression of the primary characteristics of the universe as a whole. Hegel's formal achievement was to solve, although only in a formal way, the psychological problem of conceptualizing a non-linear form of continuity, to thus anticipate the leading accomplishments to be derived from the work of Riemann and Cantor. Specifically, in respect to the application of such a non-linear conception of continuity to political phenomena, Hegel actually solved the formal problem of the determination of discrete phenomena as integral, subsumed, necessary features of singularity of a continuous manifold. That, of course, is the gist of the dialectical method. Marx mastered that formal conception and discovered its empirical political actuality in connection with the process of economic development. Despite Marx's own formal problems in attempting to arrive at such conceptions from the standpoint of extending heuristic models of simple reproduction (the problem this present writer comprehensively solved), his solution to the problem was otherwise direct and comprehensive. Moreover, this aspect of Marx's achievement was fully mastered by Rosa Luxemburg for economics and for critical features of the social process, and was, in a slightly different specific frame of reference, the essence of Lenin's characteristic political method. Thus, Stalin's method was unnecessarily crude and backward relative to the leading achievements of the Bolsheviks themselves. The problem is not that Stalin failed to achieve some remarkable, appropriate scientific discovery; the problem is that Stalin's method and influence embodied a qualitative step downward from Lenin's method, and moreover a step downward from the level of practice proven indispensable to effective socialist leadership.

Hence, the tradition of "Marxist-Leninist ideology" associated with Stalin is of a paranoid reductionist's form. The conception of such an ideology is that of an array of specific beliefs whose logical interconnections are rationalized by an associated set of explications sometimes termed "principles," these explications being of the epistemological order of eiphenomena appropriate to the apparent contradictions among the constituent particular beliefs.

Ironically, none of the relatively more effective Communist leaders actually governs his or her judgment by such an ideology. He or she usually employs a different set of criteria in reaching conclusions; then, having attained such conclusions, he or she thinks (and often says) "but, the party ranks and masses will never understand the problem as I do; it is now essentially to motivate their acceptance of this
policy of ‘general line’ in more ‘practical’ terms of short-term, narrowed reference.’ It is such more “practical” terms of short-term, narrowed social reference which generally represent the postulational assumptions of “Marxist-Leninist ideology.” “Marxist-Leninist ideology” is effectively defined as a plenum of individual attitudes which, when accepted by the party ranks and masses, represent the immediate subjective criteria by which those ranks and masses will presumably respond to the policy proposals of the leaderships in a positive way.

This same ideology is not entirely limited to the uses of party ranks and masses. Whether or not a policy judgment readily conforms to the practical implementation of policy in terms of the ideology is a reflexive consideration for the inner processes of leading circles, to the effect that the cultivation of such ideology for party ranks and masses has a reciprocal banalizing influence among party leaders.

Otherwise, for the complex reasons we have identified, Stalin found himself assuming increasing portions of party and state leadership power. This was partly an outcome of the positive aspects of his contradictory personal and political character, but most emphatically a result of the relevant political vacuum created by the profound shortcomings of his principal leading competitors. For this reason, as part of the Zinoviev apparatus and later in alliance with Bukharin, Stalin cumulatively did more than any other single person to wreck the viability of the Comintern and thus to aggravate the garrison conditions of life consequently imposed upon the Soviet republic. Yet, to the extent his paranoia and related fears did not prevent this, Stalin—the-committed-Bolshevik functioned to the extent of his psychological limitations as a jock-mentality to preserve and develop the Soviet republic — in a garrison manner.

3. Trotsky’s Three Fallacies

The efficient approach to the Stalin-Trotsky disputes is a focus upon the three principal fallacies of Trotsky’s version of the matter. Without clarifying the critical incompetences shown by those regarded — after the fact — as Stalin’s leading contenders, every analysis of the Stalin question would be a failure. The incompetences of leading Bolsheviks not only impelled Stalin step-by-step into a dominant position, but those incompetences substantially molded Stalin’s further political development and world outlook in that same process. The cases of G. Zinoviev and L. Trotsky provide the models for more general inquiries along such lines, but the case of Trotsky is crucial and provides all the significant indications required.

After acknowledging the specific (and psychoanalytically, contradictory) complex of qualities which afforded Stalin the impulsion to accumulate and hold power, there is no other aspect of Stalin which could have justified his selection on his own independent merit as a principal leader of the Soviet party and state. Worse, on key points Stalin’s independent political qualifications of that period were downright negative. After Lenin himself, Trotsky was the leading international figure among the Bolsheviks. Next in international stature, with the most important working-class base in the post-war Soviet republic, was Zinoviev, after whom Kamenev had outstanding relative importance as a party figure. E. Preobrazhensky stands out as the most gifted Bolshevik thinker of that period, the only leading Bolshevik with an active comprehension of Marxist economics. Politically, by contrast, Stalin — up to the time of Lenin’s last illness was the “first sergeant” of the Bolshevik organization, a position to which he had succeeded as a kind of second-choice replacement for his gifted predecessor. Furthermore, as Trotsky justly complained after the fact, Stalin’s broader social base in the party and state apparatus was put together largely (if not entirely) with relatively backward political elements by contrast with the immediate political support of such other leading figures as we have named here. When such a “first sergeant” takes over firm-handed direction of the army’s general staff, one must begin study of that process by examining the incompetences of the former leading figures.

The first fallacy of Trotsky’s version of the disputes is his attempt to explain away those crucial features of his own conduct through which he successfully evaded the awful responsibilities of actual leadership. Lenin’s last illness and death immediately exposed the paradoxical features of Trotsky’s earlier achievements as a Bolshevik leader. With the masses visibly approving his policies, or with the authority of a living Lenin acting as a kind of psychological substitute for the working masses, Trotsky was able to mobilize his extraordinary developed political talent to effect such accomplishments of leadership as those which caused the world and much of the Bolshevik party itself to pair “Lenin and Trotsky” as the real leadership of the Bolsheviks during the 1917-1923 period. Lenin’s last illness and death exposed the reality of Trotsky’s profoundly flawed character as a political leader, the same decisive flaw which had prompted and sustained Trotsky’s break from Lenin during the pre-war period. With Lenin’s last illness, Trotsky’s Oblomovist flaws begin to stand out: he becomes the “Hamlet of
Oblomov, a tragic personality contemplating the rationalizations he had concocted to justify inaction at critical moments.

The second fallacy of Trotsky's version of the disputes is also a correlative of Oblomovism. The issue of "socialism in one country" deserves to be regarded as a kind of archetype for the circumstances in which a metaphorical disguise for a real issue is hotly debated in order to divert passion away from the real issue being avoided by all the disputants. The real issue was the deterioration of the leadership and combat-qualities of the German party of the Comintern, the KPD. That deterioration, which the Bolshevik leadership (including Lenin himself) had failed to correct during 1921, had become overwhelmingly clear by the Autumn of 1923. The lack of short-term perspective for a viable KPD, taken in respect to the general strategic situation and Comintern development generally, signified that the Soviet republic was effectively isolated as a besieged garrison subsisting on already depleted supplies. Stalin and his factional allies simply accepted that as the unhappy accomplished fact, and attempted to transform the proverbial sow's ear into a silk purse by the magic words, "socialism in one country." Trotsky refused to accept such facts; he was willing to acknowledge defects in the leadership of the KPD and so forth, but he absolutely refused to acknowledge the profound political demoralization and general disorientation to which the KPD as a whole had been subjected as a result of Comintern support for the antics of the British intelligence-controlled "left" KPD faction. Trotsky's arguments throughout the period took it as almost axiomatic that the mere adoption of a Leninist strategic Comintern policy and certain adjustments in KPD leadership would more or less automatically correct the situation. Hence, like Oblomov quixotically dreaming in his bed, Trotsky chose to win a verbal battle against the metaphor, "socialism in one country," thereby to avoid getting out of bed to confront the real issue directly. Hence, Trotsky's debates on that and related issues stand today as a record of impotent, self-righteous literary posturing, and his own and his followers' basing their political authority on a formal analysis of Trotsky's winning argument against the metaphor is exposed as pathetic.

The third fallacy is Trotsky's doubtlessly sincere but groundless effort to represent himself as a "Leninist." In this instance, also, the ultimate root of the error is Trotsky's Oblomovist flaw. The debates over "socialism in one country" and related discussions of "permanent revolution" became the immediate references for Trotsky's posturing on this account. He based his case on showing a preponderant consistency between his arguments in those debates and both Lenin's "April Theses" and the strategic resolutions of the second and third congresses of the Comintern. He coupled that with a grossly exaggerated argument to the effect that Lenin's "April Theses" showed that Lenin had been won over to Trotsky's conception of "permanent revolution." In brief, by narrowing his definition of Leninism to those and allied premises, Trotsky performed an act of political sleight-of-hand; he contrived to delude himself and his followers (among others) into ignoring those most-essential aspects of Lenin with which Trotsky strongly disagreed. Not accidentally, Trotsky rejected Lenin's characteristic political method, the method which Lenin repeatedly explicitly counterposed to the danger of Oblomovism in the Russian revolutionary movement.

The self-appointed defenders of Trotsky will inevitably stress the incontestable facts of his demonstrated personal courage and his extraordinary contributions to the Bolshevik leadership during, most emphatically, the 1917-1921 period. A few more facts should be added at this point, emphasizing Trotsky's extraordinary achievements and positive personal qualities, thereby to conceptualize the real nature of the tragedy caused by his contrasting Oblomovist flaws.

The most important single fact concerning Trotsky is that without his assistance to Lenin's effort, the October 1917 transformation would not have occurred. Trotsky agreed with Lenin in understanding — as Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin clearly did not — that a failure to effect Soviet power during the Autumn of 1917 would probably preclude the establishment of a workers' government in Russia for an indefinite future period. Trotsky's representation of the argument for Lenin's judgment in his History of the Russian Revolution is essentially correct on that specific point. Had Trotsky not been actively on the scene during the Summer and Fall of 1917, the resulting changes in modern history would have produced a situation in which the possible survival of the human race itself would have been jeopardized beyond probable remedy. Without Lenin, and also without Trotsky's support for Lenin during 1917, there would have been no Soviet Union, and therefore fascism and its integral Schachtian holocaust would almost certainly have wiped out most of the world's population before the present time. The human race, virtually every person living today, owes directly more to Lenin and also to Trotsky than might ordinarily be imagined to be the case.

The critics of that assessment would correctly say that the development of Nazism was in direct response to the existence of the Soviet Union and the Comintern.
Therefore, such fools might continue their argument, without the Soviet Union and Comintern... The fact that such nonsense might be tolerated in various academic and other circles essentially reflects the broad acceptance of a nonsensical official interpretation of 20th century history on two levels. On the first level, the official and generally accepted versions of the causes and conduct of the two world wars is predominantly nonsense or, more exactly, deliberate fictions propagated to distract the attention of the credulous away from the actual policies and ongoing negotiations which governed the principal features. On the second level, there is a prevailing ignorance of the causes for and nature of fascism, a delusion institutionalized in associated usages of the term "reaction." Fascism and regressive forms of political conservatism generally are conventionally termed "reactionary" to emphasize the point that such phenomena are usually explained as countervailing "reactions" against the aggressive innovative thrusts of reforming liberalism and socialism. Contrary to such myths, fascism is an intrinsic compulsion of finance-capital and nourishes its ambitions most vigorously precisely under the circumstances represented by a non-existent or passive socialist movement. Certain factions of finance-capital fight for fascism not because of the existence of socialist threats, but because they are determined to institute fascism to the point of being willing to fight for that result against all opposition.

It is true that the fascist movement in Germany and the Hitler regime itself were imposed upon Germany by chiefly British and U.S. financier interests. These financiers were committed to using fascism as a "marcher lord" force and (later) regime in Germany to act as a bastion against the threat of the Comintern. Moreover, contrary to the official mythical version of World War II, Hitler's military assault against Austria, and Czechoslovakia, like his earlier military occupation of the Rhineland, were acts fostered by certain key influential forces of the British financier political establishment — just as the initial 1939-1940 period of the so-called "phony war" in the Western sector corroborates. It was the Third Reich's understandable exploitation of the fact that the French army was a fat sitting duck almost demanding to be caught and plucked, and the marginal losses incurred by the Wehrmacht in that expedition which prompted Churchill and others to reverse their former priorities. Before June 1940, the Anglo-American intelligence establishment was committed to a Nazi exhaustion in conquering the Soviet Union, to be followed by Anglo-American foreclosure on the Nazi regime, exhausting the French for this purpose, and a U.S. establishment of the "American Century" at the relative expense of a partially exhausted Britain. From the Summer of 1940, the British policy was for the exhaustion of the Soviet Union in its victory over the Nazi invaders, followed by Anglo-American foreclosure on the weakened Soviet Union. In short, the Nazi "marcher lord," initially the restive creature of the Anglo-Americans, had transformed itself into a potentially greater immediate danger to the Anglo-American forces, a danger that they were therefore determined to crush by any means, including a temporary alliance with the Soviet Union. Hence, Churchill's very real anxieties respecting Stalin's stubborn refusal to prepare for imminent Nazi attack during the Winter and Spring of 1941.

Those prominent features of the 1920s, 1930s and early 1940s seem to concur with the suggestion that Nazism was an Anglo-American sponsored "reaction" to the Soviet Union and Comintern. However, the British efforts to come to an agreement with Germany on the Russian question during the latter part of World War I warn us off the "reaction" doctrine. The French Vichy regime has a similar import. More significant is the internal economic features of Nazism; it was not Hitler or any leading Nazi bonze who created the forced-labor, genocidal, and related practices. The immediate author of those economic policies of slave labor and genocide was Hjalmar Schacht, who, together with Schacht's Anglo-American sponsors had appointed Hitler to the Chancellorship for the principle purpose of regimenting Germany into acceptance of Schachtian anti-labor austerity measures. The role of the French and British in financing Mussolini from 1915 onwards, and the direct role of the British (with the aid of such agents as Giovanni Amendola, father of the NATO agent currently controlling the PCI) in backing the Mussolini regime during the 1920s, is also exemplary of the same point.

Once such facts are properly taken into account, we are forced to recognize the massive debt humanity owes to the collaboration of Lenin and Trotsky during 1917. Without the October Revolution, all history would have obviously taken a different course — a direct descent into the general imposition of Schachtian austerity measures in behalf of finance-capital.

Trotsky also deserves credit for his support of the industrialization theses developed by the founder of the Left Opposition, E. Preobrazhensky. However, Trotsky's Obkomovism in connection with his initial support of such theses is of a high order of relevance in comprehensive assessment of his role in this connection.

Trotsky's greatest demonstration of personal courage occurred during his exile. Rejected by the
Soviet Union and Comintern he had helped to create, cast out into a “world without visas,” he was subjected to a massive “Mutt-and-Jeff” treatment by the Anglo-American establishment. During the two periods of his exile, at the beginning and during his last period in Mexico, Trotsky was subjected to a constant parade of various Anglo-American political agents, ranging from the top level, the Webbs, down to such pathetic non-entities as Abba Lerner. Although the Comintern was directly implicated in the killing of legions of his former comrades, and even members of his family, even after the Siquieros-led assassination effort, Trotsky refused to break, refused every solicitation to renounce the Soviet Union, to degrade himself as Issac Deutscher did, or to tolerate the Anglo-American political intelligence efforts to seduce his followers into following British imperialism’s concoction known as the “Third Camp” doctrine.

The tragic irony of Trotsky’s exile period is most succinctly expressed toward the last weeks of his life. During June 1940, Trotsky conducted a two-day factional struggle against the leadership of the SWP. Although his opponents, James P. Cannon, Farrell Dobbs, and others had just earlier supported Trotsky against the agent-controlled disruptors around the Sidney Hook-corrupted renegade Max Schachtman in repudiating the British intelligence services’ “Third Camp” doctrine, Cannon, et al. exposed themselves as the most wretched opportunistic, centrist, Stalinophobic swine. Trotsky refused to tolerate the Cannonite’s opportunistic slanders against the Communist party cadres, but the Cannonites represented the only significant body of nominal followers Trotsky had at that point. It is saddening to contemplate the deep misery and bitterness Trotsky certainly experienced in contemplating the wretched crew who seemed fated to carry his tradition beyond what he knew to be his imminent death. Still, even then, faced with that cruel failure of his efforts to build a viable cadre-formation, Trotsky refused to break.

**Trotsky Versus Lenin**

If the devil were not regularly re-invented in some new form, how then would mediocrity admire its own professed self-righteousness? Mediocrity refuses to act at critical junctures; mediocrity professes not to be convinced that such an obligation exists; mediocrity professes itself not yet convinced that the obvious action will be fruitful. Mediocrity blunders obsessively in the service of its own banal prejudices; it professes “healthy skepticism” against even the overwhelming evidence which might properly deter it from such follies. Who, then, is to be blamed for the consequences of mediocrity? Unless there were a devil to be blamed for the miserable outcome of such smug ignorance, how could mediocrity stroll through life confident of its own unimpeachable virtue?

Hence, the various doctrines of “devil-Stalin” concocted for the purpose of terrifying credulous small children — into toleration of mediocrity. For each real or imagined misery or calamity within any part of the Comecon, Cuba, or Vietnam, or for each real or merely alleged idiocy occurring proximate to any Communist party, the Sovietologist insists, all the while with an accompanying special, maniacal glea: “See what Stalinism leads to!” In fact the only germinal flaws of the Stalin regime and Communist parties are variously the extent to which they are corrupted by Anglo-American political intelligence services’ penetrations or simply affected by some of that same mediocrity which is so much admired among Sovietologists.

This issue is frankly emphasized among the best-informed Sovietologists, notably those directly influenced by some leading Mensheviks. To such Mensheviks and their colleagues, the proverbial root of all evil in Bolshevism is Lenin’s *voluntarism*. According to common versions of that argument, Lenin’s essential methodological distinction was an “unscientific,” “non-deterministic,” “non-Marxian” infection of some dark, “Asiatic” influence transmitted to Lenin by Chernyshevsky. British agent Eduard Bernstein is reported to have concurred with the “Asiatic” hypothesis, but adds that there was, to his knowledge, a “streak of Bolshevism” in Karl Marx. Such wretches are all correct in fact in insisting that Lenin’s *voluntarism* was the essential distinction of his political method, and the remarks attributed to Bernstein concerning Karl Marx’s “Bolshevik streak” are also relevant.

The essential common distinction of Marx and Lenin is that they *accepted personal responsibility for the future condition of the human race*. To both of them, it was their personal responsibility to discover whichever emerging problems of human development required, and to find ways of actively intervening in the course of global developments to make that innovation effective. Both rejected the more modest, humble role of putting forth new ideas *passively* for acceptance and active use by hoped-for majorities or other controlling agencies of existing institutions. If existing institutions were not disposed to act with adequate promptness to implement appropriate innovations, then those institutions must be altered or superseded accordingly. Both were, in the form of their method, hubristic, promethean, and otherwise generally embodied the qualities which are
anathema to persons who make a profession of mediocrity.

On condition that certain secondary qualifications are taken into account, Trotsky's pre-war association with Menshevism was entirely premised on his rejection of Lenin's political method. That fact is underlined by the otherwise "objectively" unprincipled character of that pre-war association; on no significant distinction of political policy did Trotsky agree with any Menshevik current, but was always closest to either or both Lenin and Luxemburg in the gist of their various policies and perspectives. It was for just that latter reason that Lenin, with absolute integrity are reduced to the heroic qualities of that pre-war association; on no Oblomovist traits, those are the circumstances, in underlined by the otherwise "objectively" unprincipled character of that pre-war association; on no Oblomovist traits, those are the circumstances, in

Trotsky compromised the affair with Kamenev, primarily because Lenin had recovered! That sort of Oblomovist mediocrity permeates Trotsky's conduct at every crucial point thereafter.

There are only two circumstances, throughout Trotsky's adult life, in which he is capable of decisive action contrary to his otherwise prevailing Oblomovist traits. Those are the circumstances, in which the masses are visibly insurgent or in which Lenin is actively present to appropriately correct or support Trotsky's judgment. Under other circumstances, Trotsky's extraordinary gifts and moral integrity are reduced to the heroic qualities of an isolated individual, an impotent Christ-figure.

As some leading Menshevik Sovietologists have correctly emphasized in matter of fact, the Chernyshevsky-Oblomov opposition was the dominant metaphor of Lenin's initial political maturation. Not only does such relevant biographical background information underline the pointed irony of the choice of title for Lenin's What Is To Be Done?, but it also leaves no margin for any contrary interpretation of Lenin's Two Tactics .... — the two seminal writings which present us with the matured Lenin, and thus with the political method and outlook characteristic of all his subsequent added political development. The gist of the Menshevik use of such facts is alternately to show that Lenin's voluntarism was an Asiatic extravagance imported upon the contrary body of Marxian determinism or, to the extent that this voluntarism might tend to coincide with Marx's tendencies, simply downright "unscientific" and morally wrong.

Trotsky and the Mensheviks to the contrary, not only is there no extravagance in Lenin's insight into Chernyshevsky's theme, but any person who rejects Lenin's political method thereby rejects the kernel of the Marxian dialectical method. We restate here the point we have summarized in another recent location.

Marx's method begins with the interconnected and interdependent world-economy as a primary totality. This is an extension of the key political observation earlier made by G.W.F. Hegel, to the effect that the accomplishment of then-current (i.e., capitalist) world development was the process of bringing into immediate deliberate actuality the holistic primariness of the economic totality. We are not suggesting that Marx carried forward such an Hegelian point as a kind of doctrinal matter; Marx was never compelled by the mere fact that Hegel had concluded this or that. The point is that such conceptions of the primitive (axiomatic) reality of the totality as a self-developing whole is a primary feature of the dialectical method shared thus by Hegel and Marx. For Marx, the demonstrable interdependence of the whole...
and particular within a world economy undergoing integration was sufficient crucial empirical proof of the dialectical method. That is to emphasize that the conception of a self-developing primary totality was not a doctrinal hypothesis imposed upon the empirical evidence, but a rigorous epistemological insight, initially — of course — an hypothesis, which was demonstrated to be fact by the empirical historical evidence.

Marx also discovered, also on empirical grounds, that the characteristic feature of total economies (or their equivalent in earlier forms of society) is that they depended upon certain aspects of man-altered nature which a prevailing technology and order of social organization defined as ostensible resources. Since any such resources were intrinsically relatively finite in extent (e.g., associated with the notion of marginal resources of that type), the mere perpetuation of any society even on a limited scale in a fixed mode of technology and social organization depleted the relatively finite form of resources upon which continued human existence in that mode depended. Consequently, the development of technology and social organization represented the continuing preconditions for human existence.

The emergence of capitalism had made that principle of development the immediate, deliberate principle of society, thus making relatively conscious (or, "preconscious") the essential active feature of successful human existence. In the form of a slogan, capitalist development accomplished the lifting of mankind out of the "idiocy of rural life," out of those states in which a relatively fixed order of human productive behavior caused the human mental and moral condition to converge upon the relative idiocy of lower forms of animal life, like beasts whose collective practice of reproducing their own species-kind was ostensibly fixed as if in a genetic mode. The shadowy consciousness of the essential quality of humanity which had emerged with capitalist development was the "Idea of Progress."

This notion, the Idea of Progress, had had a special internal history since the 15th century period of the Renaissance. The development of the associated epistemological conceptions had approached a point at which hypotheses emerged which were susceptible of crucial demonstration by the gross evidence of political economy taken as a whole.

There are four critical phases of development of that conception, otherwise properly known as the modern dialectical method, which are of importance to those who wish a comprehensive understanding of Marx and Lenin. The first phase is typified by the Florentine, Marsilio Ficino, as complemented by such Renaissance utopians as Sir Thomas More. The second phase is typified by the convergent features of Descartes and Spinoza, in which the beginnings of a positive dialectical principle are encountered. The third phase is represented by Hegel's formal solution to the problem as posed by Immanuel Kant. The last phase is represented by Engels' brilliant insight into the fallacy of the Malthusian doctrine and Marx's comprehensive solution to the problem respecting social processes as such. The arguments against Lenin's voluntarism by the Mensheviks and also the narrower objections of Trotsky are exposed as pathetic fallacies most readily in that historical approach to the question.

The essential principle of the dialectical method first emerges as the neo-Platonic rejection of the notion of axiomatic discrete elementarity. Working backward from Spinoza and Descartes to Ficino makes this clearer. In Descartes' notion of perfection, the empirical ground of investigations is the experience of human progress in developing validated new scientific conceptions for social (technological) practice. The crucial empirical fact of that study is that progress is internally ordered, such that preceding discoveries provide the basis for more advanced, more correct comprehension of the order of nature. Hence, on the basis of that evidence it is obvious folly merely to compare successive specific discoveries as if they were discrete phenomena perse; the primary fact of human progress in knowledge is the continuity of progress itself. The primary empirical fact of progress (perfection) is the process of creative discovery which determines and is mediated by its own successive specific discoveries. Hence, a principle of continuous self-development is the primary reality of (implicitly) the universe.

The problem this confronts is the presumption that the universe is coherent in terms of a fixed set of primary, interconnected laws governing causation. If that presumption is accepted, then human perfection (discovery) can be no more than a convergence in the form of diminishing error toward one-for-one agreement with such fixed laws, and the human problem is defined as the countervailing calamities which are derived from ignorant deviations from such fixed laws. Hence, we have the essential approach of Ficino and a not-unrelated feature of Immanuel Kant's Critiques. Although Ficino proceeded (thus paralleling Descartes and Spinoza) from the notion of the primary actuality of a continuous self-development principle, he defined that process as convergent upon its condition of ultimate "rest" at the point it arrives at concurrence with perfected notions of universal laws.

Thus, the geometric heurisms for self-developing continuity in Descartes-Spinoza represent a
qualitative advance over the utopianism of Ficino, More, et al. Both Descartes and Spinoza, especially the latter, imply that the characteristic form of primary displacement in causal relations is not linear, but of the ontological content of self-development (e.g., exponential), but without accounting for the explicit implications of that point. The attempt to reconcile primary or characteristic displacement with the notion of a scalar primary magnitude is the form of the difficulty in that.

The same problem as successively approached from Ficino to Descartes-Spinoza is freshly attacked by Kant, who attempts to reconcile the empirical fact of self-developing whole. The ability of mankind to reconcile primary or characteristic displacement for positive supersession of that mode through further innovations. The metric of that progress is an increase in man's power to reproduce his species in much higher modes. This is measurable in terms of the total economy taken as a primary and self-developing whole. The ability of mankind to provide itself with productive modes of increasing negentropy in the mode itself and with a rising social-surplus potential is the crucial empirical material of all scientific knowledge, from which evidence the primary quality of the creative process itself is necessarily demonstrated. The human creative process develops itself further through the mediation of those distinct materialized advances in social-reproductive relations which are determined by the actualization of creative innovations. That is the kernel of Marx's — and Lenin's — method.

Since Lenin's explicit comprehension of Marx's economics is poor, it is extremely relevant to examine Chernyshevky's work in the light of the foregoing summary of the development of the Marxist method. Furthermore, every relevant writing of Lenin in that connection — including Two Tactics... and What Is To Be Done? — absolutely demonstrates that this was exactly the positive influence which Lenin attributed to Chernyshevky. Hence, Lenin's hubristic, promethean "voluntarism" represents nothing but a fundamental commitment to the kernel of Marx's own method, and furthermore represents the only approach to political work which can be termed scientific from the standpoint of knowledge of the intrinsic fallacies of a "deterministic" misconception of physical science.

By contrast, Trotsky's understanding of the dialectical method for political practice was relatively idealistic. Trotsky accepted the validity of the dialectical method — insofar as he actually understood it — as a guide to his own interpretation of the historical process, and Trotsky did in fact view the historical development as broadly a true process. His approach was not entirely contemplative. On the condition that the insurgency of the masses or some other authority outside himself was moving in a pattern of acceptance of Trotsky's dialectical insights, Trotsky would interpret such circumstances as a special authority for his initiating role in pushing events further in that direction. What defines Trotsky as relatively a petit-bourgeois idealist in contrast to
Lenin’s own method is that critical dependence upon external authority, an authority standing outside scientific knowledge. Trotsky did not accept scientific certainty as a sufficient basis for independent action.

That tragic, idealistic flaw in Trotsky is the entirety of his factional alignment with the Mensheviks against Lenin during the pre-war period. Trotsky bowed to the institutionalized authority, the apparent hegemony of the “relevant” broader-based Mensheviks in the movement. During his early Bolshevik period up to Lenin’s last illness, the father-figure of Lenin served Trotsky as an institutionalized authority for so long as Lenin was actively able to function as a controlling authority for Trotsky. With Lenin’s last illness and death, without an evident mass upsurge, and without Lenin’s active authority as a surrogate for such mass movement, Trotsky again regressed toward the idealistic humility of his earlier Menshevik period. Instead of seizing responsibility by the nose, he presented arguments and then blamed the Bolshevik (CPSU) majority, the Comintern leadership, Comintern parties for failing to heed his wisdom. Although the late Isaac Deutscher was scarcely morally qualified to criticize Trotsky, we must regrettably therefore concede that Deutscher was devastatingly correct in applying to the impotent Trotsky of the Mensheviks and post-1923 periods the deprecating term of “prophet” — Jeremiah-Trotsky!

The Mensheviks and others have attempted to show that Lenin’s voluntaristic method was intrinsically a totalitarian political method, a commitment to the establishment of dictatorship of leading individuals through the subterfuges of conspiracy. In this moral offense the Mensheviks enjoy the extenuating condition of their own ignorance. They are ignorant of the essential interconnections between the consciousness of masses and the Lenin method.

The nominally Marxist Menshevik version of the matter treats the Marxian economic analysis essentially as one of several possibly admissible informed professional interpretations of the world. In their view, the best of the Mensheviks (typified by Martov) were willing to permit the Marxian world view to be applied to social policy in general on the condition that the masses more or less spontaneously come to prefer the Marxists’ professed views and policies over alternative views. The Mensheviks rejected the notion that the Marxian view is a uniquely appropriate form of scientific knowledge respecting policies in the interest of humanity.

Yet, their question appears to persist, even after the unique scientific appropriateness of the Marxian view is accepted, that the imposition of such informed scientific views upon the ostensibly uninformed masses must involve some sort of deception and dictatorial procedures. Fortunately, the masses of working people are not stupid in the sense that Mensheviks and other outgrowths of social-democratic “conciliatism” insist them to be.

Under conditions of capitalist breakdown, whether in the form of mere depressions or actual general breakdown crisis, there is first of all a widespread disaffection with capitalist institutions and world outlooks. No longer does submission to the terms demanded by employers suffice to provide the implicitly promised rewards: no longer do the capitalists appear to be the all-knowing lords of the universe — or even masters of their own affairs. The possibility of acceptable alternatives is considered among workers with a degree of receptivity uncharacteristic of the so-called “normal” conditions of capitalist life. What psychoanalysts would appropriately identify as the “reality principle” intervenes under crisis-circumstances to effect alterations of prevailing world outlooks.

The way in which masses actually react to such crises is not determined as if society were a mass of individuals. The actual response of the masses to crises is determined in respect of institutions. In one type of case, if mass-based Communist parties have prepared the masses for the crisis, the very onset of the deepening phases of a depression will tend to correlate with the epidemic spread of socialist attitudes and commitments for action among the majority of working people. Otherwise, if such mass institutions either do not exist or have not adequately prepared the masses for conjunctural developments, working people will either not develop actually socialist responses or will develop them only at a later phase. This may be boiled down to a single characteristic point. The individual in society does not act as an abstractable axiomatic individual, but he acts in a social way according to his perception of the institutionalized instrumentalities for credibly effective mass action.

Incidentally, Trotsky is principally responsible for a profound error of assessment on just that point. Trotsky advanced the thesis that the masses would not act politically on the basis of an economic crisis as such, but would tend to move politically on the initial upswing from a depression. Trotsky’s argument might appear to be corroborated by the Russian labor movement experience of the period immediately preceding World War I and by the industrial organization upsurge of the 1933-1935 period in the U.S. Such patterns are a special case, appropriate to the circumstances in which there is want of an effective mass-based socialist organization which has adequately prepared the masses for the economic
crisis, a want of an institution which is established as a credible vehicle of effective mass political action. Under such special circumstances of want, the beginning of a rise from a depression-bottom has the effect of motivating masses to seek a recovery of their pre-depression material conditions of life — i.e., the "economic" struggle. Such upsurges do have a pronounced political content precisely because any generalized economic struggle represents a credible force for political mass action. The dangerous error within Trotsky's thesis is that it overlooks and deprecates those institutions and measures which ought to be the preferred norm brought into being by wilful socialists' activity to that effect.

The same conditions and institutional developments which foster the masses’ disposition for mass political action during conjunctural periods determine a correlated tendency to accept an internationalist outlook. This internationalist outlook is, in its first approximation, not only a social form of conceptualizing a global total economy, but of defining a cohering general and particular self-interest in terms of that same total economy. In the second approximation, since there is no competent active expression of effective general and particular self-interest except through programs of investment of capital (social surplus) which increase the productive powers of the total economy, the masses develop a receptivity to such forms of conjuncturally situated international economic-development programs. The assimilation of such programs defines an essential coincidence between the world outlook of the Marxist professional and the vanguard of the broader masses, through which institutionalized form the majority of the society becomes receptive to the Marxist program of international economic development as a uniquely credible political alternative to the crisis-wrecked capitalist system.

This process broadly identifies the scientific social basis for realization of Lenin's "voluntaristic" method. Yet, what we have stated so far leaves the point in too general a form to immediately locate the practical way in which the profound methodological differences between Lenin and Trotsky (for example) arose. As Lenin's What Is To Be Done? is properly seen to imply, the kernel of the difference is immediately located in the conception of the leading and initiating role of a professional Marxist revolutionary intelligentsia.

There can be no toleration of "pluralist democracy" in the development of an initiating Marxist cadreformation. At first approximation, no person is qualified to perform a deliberate function in determining the program or other policies of such an organization unless he or she has first assimilated the Marxian method and economic conceptions as a working whole. This states the gist of the case, but leaves the most crucial feature of the cadres' qualifications for a deliberative influence over policy merely implied.

The Marxist method is not of the sort which admits of a merely deductive approach to a fixed body of knowledge. No one can possibly know the dialectical method until he or she has become self-conscious of his or her own successful creative activities. Without direct, conscious observation of successful creative activities there is no empirical referent for the conception to which the term dialectical method corresponds. Hence, to know the dialectical method, one must have the objective empirical referent of successful creative mental activity among persons in the immediate associations with which one is involved, and must gauge the process by which such achievements were developed against one's own internal mental processes.

That is the absolute requirement for members of the leading executive agencies of such an initiating organization and must otherwise be the process of self-development identified by members as the standard of membership within such an organization. That is, the member is defined as one engaged in the process of successfully assimilating Marx's dialectical method and economic theory and applying that creative method to the daily practice of a professional political organizer.

For purposes of description, one can identify the need for such a rigorously defined initiating organization in respect of three interdependent functions such a body must perform in bringing into being broader vanguard bodies of the masses. First, without a professionally qualified such body, there could be no competent strategic assessment and no effective program. The masses may have, under appropriate social circumstances, the competence to assimilate a strategic assessment and program into their own independent knowledge, but they lack the competence to discover such assessments and program. Second, only the professional whose inner sense of authority for action is essentially scientific, rather than catalyzed by conjunctural developments, is capable of providing rigorous deliberative standards of leadership. Third, the masses will look to the professional Marxists for guidance on all critical programmatic, strategic and major tactical issues of the emerging mass movement struggles; on that account, the professional Marxist organization must maintain absolutely/ruthless internal standards of creative competence.

We have admittedly gone beyond Lenin in respect of the detailed specifications we have made. Yet,
looking at Lenin and his *What Is To Be Done?* from the standpoint we have just summarized there is no doubt of the essential coincidence between Lenin's views and our own. The Bolshevik organization unquestionably fell far short of the standard prescribed either by Lenin or ourselves; aspects of the Labor Committee vanguard are inevitably conditioned by circumstances to be somewhat poorer than the leadership's strict standards of initiating professional cadre-formation prescribe. Whatever the shortcomings of the Bolshevik organization's secondary leadership after Lenin, and so forth, Lenin's method is clear and essentially correct.

Mediocrity's use of devil-theories is, at best, premised on the assumption that the proper ordering of events can be reduced to a set of fixed universal laws. Thus, calamities in human experience must be the consequence of some corresponding violation of those fixed sets of laws of proper behavior. Since — Heaven Forbid! — no mediocrity could be responsible for the dismal result considered, there is a devil afoot somewhere to be sought out and blamed.

Mediocrity overlooks the fact that the essential human calamity is of the form of entropy, the inevitable consequence of rigid adherence (at least in effect) to a fixed ordering of human practice according to prevailing assumptions of "right conduct," law, and so forth. In short, the general run of calamities befalling the human species are caused principally by mediocrity itself. If there have been, indeed, some actual devils afoot in the world — Genghis Khan, the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs, and the Rockefeller brothers being appropriate illustrations — it is mediocrity which provides the moral climate indispensable to such malefactors.

The essential quality for successful continued human existence is that creative process which yields realized advances in productive technology and forms of social organization. The absence of creativity of that sort is the general precondition for every principal sort of calamity which mankind might incur. The greatest threat to human existence is mediocrity.

So, in contrast to the aromas of the graveyard characteristic of the apostles of mediocrity, the characteristic method of Marx and Lenin is the principle of life itself.

**The Farce of "Objective" Politics**

In contrast to Lenin's method, Trotsky slipped by default into an alternative method which can be rightly identified as the farce of "objective" politics. In the strict application of Marx's dialectical method to politics the deliberative process by which a policy is adopted is not only integral to the adopted policy, but relatively paramount in assessing the policy itself. That is, if a person or social formation reaches a policy which seems to coincide with one's own, that in itself does not justify the assumption that there is any *principled political agreement* between the two agencies, except in the assumption we identify as the farce of "objective" politics.

We are not suggesting that Trotsky was blind to the process by which various political currents came into concurrence or divergence on key policy issues. On the contrary, Trotsky was, relatively speaking, quite gifted in his powers of social insight into certain aspects of such determining process. Rather, we are pointing out that Trotsky's Oblomovist tendencies caused him to violate the principles to which such insights ought to have guided him.

The clearest demonstration of that case against Trotsky is a study of the professedly Trotskyist groups with which he was associated during his exile, notably the Cannon faction. The Cannon faction's initiating kernel was drawn from the Foster-Cannon faction of the CPUSA. That CPUSA faction was characterized by its opportunist politics toward the Anglo-American political intelligence agents of the Gompers-Green leadership of the American Federation of Labor. The Foster-Cannon faction was notorious for its misuse of the "boring from within" tactical thesis as a Lenin-like opportunists' veto-authority over the political policies of the CPUSA as a whole. Whatever commendable qualities Cannon and his immediate associates may have had, they were miserable centrists of that sort from their role in the CPUSA to the demise of Cannonism during the middle-to-late 1950s' further degeneration of the Socialist Workers' Party (U.S.A.).

The issue being emphasized here is not the miserable centrism of Cannon, et al., but Trotsky's conduct toward such followers. The essential political connection between Trotsky and the Cannonites was that of a united front between a revolutionary and a band of centrists. The basis for that tactical alliance was a limited coincidence in "objective" policies between Trotsky and Cannon, et al. In effect, there never was a Trotskyist cadre-formation, but essentially only Trotsky himself and the pathetic tactical alliances he had managed to aggregate during the "hard times" of his exile. *Most relevant, Trotsky did effectively nothing to improve that circumstance.*

It is true that he repeatedly emphasized the importance of the SWP's learning the dialectical method, of which the SWP leadership was entirely innocent in point of knowledge and to which that leadership was absolutely hostile by centrist conviction. Yet, that limited effort of Trotsky's admitted, nowhere did he undertake those measures which would have been pursued by any qualified revolutionary leader con-
fronted with the sort of circumstances in which Trotsky was fixed. Nowhere does Trotsky undertake to set forth the axiomatic preconditions for developing a viable cadre-formation from proverbial "scratch."

In general, Trotsky concentrated on seeking agreement for his "objective" policies, as if this was worth much unless it involved the determination of such agreement through an agreement in method. Trotsky's writings against Sidney Hook's Schachtmanite renegades may appear to some persons to contradict our report: in fact, such writings merely prove our case forcefully. Trotsky, confronted by a wretched published writing of Hook-agent James Burnham and dupe Max Schachtman, attacked Burnham, Hook, and parts of the SWP leadership itself, warning against any indifferentist policy concerning the dialectical method. He pursued that issue with some emphasis during the ensuing factional furor. Yet, thus demonstrating his awareness of the importance of that method in fact, he nonetheless failed to directly attack the fact that the method of the Cannonites had never had any concurrence with the dialectical method — and that, therefore, Schachtman's susceptibility to manipulation by Hook-coordinated political intelligence agents was a direct product of Cannonism.

Trotsky's deprecation of Lenin's conception of the revolutionary intelligentsia as "exaggerated" is directly relevant to the fact that Trotsky not-accidentally failed to develop a viable cadre-formation among his followers. That fact is merely exemplary, otherwise, of the pathetic self-posturing dominating his conduct of the "socialism in one country" disputes of the 1920s.

4. "Socialism In One Country"

From the beginning of the debate over "socialism in one country," Stalin and his factional allies had three tactical advantages which would have been aggre-
gately most difficult to overcome at that time, even had not Trotsky himself contributed a fourth — and fifth — decisive folly of his own making to the proceedings.

First, as we have noted before this point, the Troika of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin accepted the impotence of the KPD and Comintern generally as an accomplished fact. This attitude was not perhaps different to the reality that it had been Zinoviev, sometimes aided by Stalin, whose blundering had contributed the most to accomplishing the wrecking of the KPD and weakening of other Comintern parties. By accepting the accomplished fact, the Troika placed itself in alliance with entropy; it did not incur the difficulty of premising its policies on the precondition of a positive transformation of the KPD in particular.

Second, the effects of the demonstrated impotence of the KPD and Comintern generally upon leading strata of the Soviet republic (inside and outside the CPSU itself) included a general pessimism toward internationalist perspectives. This pessimism coincided with the Troika's proposed policies of relative "benign neglect." For the moment, the Civil Wars and foreign invasions had ended, and the New Economic Policy was still associated with a climate of relative political stability and social peace inside the Republic. Even the majority of hardened Bolshevik cadres simply did not wish to face the facts concerning any fresh hard tasks, or unpleasant realities like those of the "War Communism" period developing underneath the surface of the momentary temporary relief from the deadly-crisis-upon-deadly-crisis of the preceding years.

It is relevant to the debate that Trotsky himself later ably describes that state of mind, in the opening pages of the chapter entitled "Lenin's Death" in his autobiography.

Third, Trotsky's earlier Oblomovist episodes, from the period of Lenin's last illness onwards, had facilitated such a shift in both the outlook and social composition of the CPSU itself.

It is relevant to that point to note Stalin's contradictory attitude toward Trotsky during that period. Although Stalin's pathological personal hatred of Trotsky was colored by a fearful awe for Trotsky's intellect, Stalin had well-founded contempt for Trotsky's abilities as a consistent factional fighter. If one considers the corroborating evidence for the latter aspect of Stalin's judgment, especially from the period of Lenin's last illness, the fact must be accepted that the prevailing CPSU attitude toward Trotsky of the middle-to-late 1920s was by no means the image more narrowly associated with the Trotsky of October 1917. Those Bolsheviks who recalled the pre-war factional affairs (notably including Stalin, who had worked closely abroad with Lenin during part of that period), the general image must have been — and should have been — that of Trotsky's reversion to that sort of political impotence which had characterized his earlier association with the Mensheviks.

Trotsky emphasizes the supporting evidence for such a judgment in his own writings. The inclusion of the Joffe testament in full in Trotsky's autobiography is most exemplary and relevant. Joffe, a collaborator of Trotsky's from the Leningrad "Metropolitan" period, was among those factional allies who, best typified by E. Preobrazhensky, had been profoundly
shaken in their confidence of Trotsky's leadership qualities. This certainly affected those Bolsheviks who vacillated at one time or another in choosing the Stalin-linked factions over the Left Opposition, and was clearly an important point for Trotsky's CPSU factional opponents and the Soviet state apparatus.

From Stalin's standpoint, Trotsky was ordinarily an impotent factional opponent, but also capable of becoming abruptly extremely dangerous for brief, potentially decisive periods. From the vantage-point of Stalin's delimited political-intellectual powers, such dangerous eruptions by Trotsky must have appeared to be in part unpredictable, and this consideration would have contributed to the obsessive irrationality of Stalin's conduct toward Trotsky.

With the death of Lenin, what the Bolshevik cadres and Soviet state apparatus wanted was a leadership in which they could place confidence. The alternatives among which those strata might choose were principally either a creative leadership, like Lenin's, which could be relied upon to act decisively in seeing through a commitment, or an intellectually conservative leadership which limited itself to "holding things together." Trotsky, who attempted to cut himself in the image of Lenin, had repeatedly proven himself a vacillator of the sort who would put the party and state into a hazardous (if otherwise sound) policy and then abruptly be seized by inaction at some critical point in the elaboration of that policy. The failure of Trotsky to act to pull together the CPSU leading strata during the period of Lenin's last illness and death had led inevitably to the outlook leading into the "Lenin levy" and a qualitative shift in the social composition of the party.

To these three principal difficulties, Trotsky added the fourth, his own pathetic belief of every feature of Lenin's method in the conduct of the "socialism in one country" disputes.

Formally, in denouncing the demagogic slogan of "socialism in one country," Trotsky was entirely correct. Otherwise, although his writings on that issue had meritious features of the sort which might be acceptable in the abstracted environment of the political science classroom lecture, the premises of Trotsky's factional arguments were false and his polemic consequently worse than irrelevant to the real issues confronting the Bolshevik leadership at that juncture.

Among Immanuel Kant's numerous services as a provocative thinker, his Critique of Pure Reason re-emphasizes the fact that foolish paralogisms must arise from the effort to supply elaborated answers on the terms demanded by incompetent questions (creating a spectacle like that in which one man attempts to milk a he-goat while another holds the sieve). It was happily characteristic of Lenin's factional practice that he usually required no fresh reminder from Kant on that account. He rudely tore up adopted agendas, shifting the discussion directly to real issues.

As we have noted earlier, "socialism in one country" was a bit of demagoguery devised by the Troika as a matter of reifying the pervasive pessimism developing under the combined cumulative impact of the New Economic Policy and the accepted judgment on the KPD from the 1923 Germany events. It is directly relevant to that point to emphasize that every qualified psychoanalyst knows the folly of that would-be analyst who engages directly in an effort to extricate by argument the neurotic fantasies a patient produces in the reaction-formation of a fearful semi-disassociated state. It is uncontestably necessary to make no compromise with the reaction-formation itself, but to simply discredit it as a neurotic symptom and to shift the patient's attention to the real problem underlying the original disassociation. This approach will usually not succeed in effecting relief of grave problems of that sort unless the analyst is able to provide the patient with a positive alternative to the problem. In sum, what is required is a ruthless rejection of the symptom, combined with an insightful support for the positive resources which are available to the patient to deal with the underlying real problem. Although Lenin was not known to have knowledge of psychoanalysis, his characteristic approach to factional problems of that psychoanalytical form was that which would be recommended by the best qualified analysts.

How would Lenin have acted in Trotsky's place? Lenin would not have worked himself into the mess Trotsky helped to create, and would not have fallen prey to the romantic's fantasy-permeated dependence upon remedies of mere oratory. With such qualifications taken duly into account, the following fragment of an hypothetical factional statement by Lenin serves to express his tactical approach.

This is not the first time that our comrades of the Troika had fled from hard facts into the consoling phrases of the self-intoxicated orator. We would prefer not to have to remind those comrades of the weeks preceding the October Revolution; indeed, we offer them an agreement to this effect: we shall not mention that affair on the condition that they refrain henceforth from political behavior which reminds us of it....

The German events of 1923 have taught us that the Comrade Zinoviev's former "left" allies of the KPD have failed to accept the lessons of the "March Action," and as a result the KPD is by no means yet on the road to becoming an effective revolutionary force....

Since the 1923 Germany events, the Soviet republic is faced with the prospect of protracted isolation at a time when Mr. Churchill and his friends are eagerly
waiting to resume their efforts to destroy us. A few years ago, perhaps even a year ago, we would have said that our survival under such circumstances would be unthinkable. We would have been mistaken; we are isolated, but we are determined that the Soviet Republic and Communist International shall survive nonetheless. We shall survive much better if we do not deceive ourselves and the masses with silly demagogic slogans like 'socialism in one country'...

There was an additional contributing problem to the same effect which Trotsky largely imposed upon himself. By basing his profession of being a Leninist upon the precedents of the April Theses and Second and Third Congresses of the Comintern, thus to avoid Lenin's method, Trotsky precluded any systematic consideration of the critical issues actually at stake. The blunders, in which Lenin participated, were at this center of any such effective discussions. A Lenin could have, and undoubtedly would have, corrected such errors: Trotsky, so long as he deprecated Lenin's characteristic political method, could not.

The problem confronting the Soviet leadership during the middle 1920s was the isolation caused principally by the political backwardness of the Comintern. The French party had not been sorted out. The Italian party leadership was totally unacceptable, and with the exception of the pathetically impotent Antonio Gramsci, lacking even in a figure of promising personal political stature. The British party was infected with Tom Mann's disease of Fabian-sponsored anarcho-syndicalism — among other difficulties. The U.S. party was infected with Anglo-American agents at high levels and otherwise less acceptable as a political force than several of the constituents out of which it had been formed. Otherwise, in general, the Comintern parties were promissory notes led, at best, by immatured leading figures. Only the KPD of Germany had represented an immediate potential as a national force and as a decisive complement to the Bolsheviks and remnants of the Polish party of Rosa Luxemburg in the effort to create an effective Comintern organization.

Speaking in broad terms, the possibility of immediately establishing a viable Communist International had been centered upon the prospect of a direct collaboration between Lenin and Luxemburg. There were no other Marxist leaders of developed genuine world-historic effectiveness in existence at the time of the October Revolution. Moreover, Lenin and Luxemburg were exactly complementary in the sense that together, although not separately, they added up to a single continuation of the quality of Karl Marx's leadership.

As we have emphasized earlier, the British intelligence services understood that fact most clearly — albeit in their own terms of reference. Until the October Revolution, Luxemburg had ranked for them as the chief danger of an actual Marxian influence in the political labor movement. It is not accidental that she was murdered under the immediate supervision of a leading British agent (Canaris), under a government formed by German military collaborators of the British (General Gröner, et al.) a government supplied by the factional heirs of a former British spy of Germany's 1905-1913 period, August Bebel.

Into the vacuum created by her assassination was drawn her executor and epigone, Paul Levi. Levi was neither a Luxemburg nor Lenin, but, short of such excellence, immediately proved himself as the only qualified Comintern section leader outside the ranks of the Bolshevik leadership itself. Levi pursued Luxemburg's conjunctural perspective for preparing for socialist transformation in Germany with broadly brilliant effectiveness up to the eve of the infamous "March Action" adventure of Zinoviev's cronies. In fact, Levi's achievements are all the more notable because they were constantly being sabotaged by the Comintern executive's connivance with the British intelligence services' "council communists" (KAPD forces) and the "council communists" such internal KPD allies as the Korsch, Maslow, Fischer "left" KPD. This sabotage by Zinoviev and other Comintern executive agents was aggravated by Zinoviev's successful efforts to block direct communications between Levi and Lenin, and thus to assist the gross falsification of fact which Lenin received (predominantly) through the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International) organization.

In fact, Levi did ultimately assist in bringing about his own tactical downfall by playing into the hands of Zinoviev and Zinoviev's allies of the British-controlled anarcho-syndicalist KPD factions. He resigned from the KPD executive committee (en bloc with his supporters) rather than staging the sort of "dirty" bureaucratic manipulations to which a Lenin would have properly resorted under similar circumstances to chop up a temporary majority of his opposition. (However, overall Levi conducted himself far better than Trotsky was to have done in the Left Opposition.)

The result was that Lenin responded to the "March Action" by coopting the gist of Levi's (Luxemburgist) analysis and policy while blocking with Zinoviev to support Levi's expulsion from the KPD and Comintern in favor of the anarcho-syndicalist agents and idiots responsible for the adventure! There are, of course, powerful extenuating conditions to be considered in assessing Lenin's blunder, but there are no admissible extenuating circumstances for such errors in real politics.
The issue of whether Levi remained in the KPD executive or not was in itself of secondary importance. There were two, interconnected other issues which required Levi's backing by the Comintern at that juncture as a precondition for developing a viable KPD and Comintern generally. The expulsion of Levi had the direct effect of supporting the faction to which Lenin himself was politically opposed. It also made possible the correlated development through which the viability of the KPD as a force was utterly destroyed — the British intelligence services' campaign against the "virus of Luxemburgism" conducted through the dubious Karl Radek and executed with the assistance of Zinoviev's apparatus and Bukharin.

Granting that the Troika was absolutely wrong in its resort to the reaction-formation slogan of "socialism in one country" and dangerously wrong in connection with the "scissors crisis" and Soviet industrialization issues, Trotsky was a pathetic ObloMOVist in assuming that a general internationalist orientation for Soviet policy itself could be premised on anything but a systematic correction of the 1921 errors in connection with the KPD. Trotsky was not absolutely insensible of the fact that the KPD's political quality had to be dramatically improved as an integral feature of a profound shift in Soviet policy. However, Trotsky's wretched misconception of party-building methods coincided exactly with his pathetic "objective" politics posture generally. Trotsky's approach was to assume that Soviet adoption of a policy in agreement with the Second and Third Congress of the Comintern's strategic outlook would more or less sympathetically effect a kind of "trickle-down" transformation of the ranks of the affected Comintern parties.

The would-be defenders of Trotsky will doubtless point out that a wrong-headed Soviet policy did have a "trickle-down" effect in worsening the internal political development of Comintern parties generally. Therefore, they would argue, a correct policy would have a positive effect. Such an argument is pure non-sequitur. Entropy and negentropy are not simple opposites. Life is not "un-death," except in an adolescent's fantasies. It was necessary for the CPSU to support an effective cadre-building effort within Comintern parties with an appropriate CPSU policy, but an abstractly appropriate CPSU Comintern strategy policy by itself would not create the cadre-building process required; only Lenin's method could do that, the method which Trotsky deprecated as "exaggerated."

The central issue of cadre-party always was and remains today one of the essential initiating and leading roles of a professional Marxist revolutionary intelligentsia. The insurgent masses, the ranks of a mass-based party, and so forth represent the potential for assimilation of the Marxist world outlook — in the fashion we have previously stated that to be the case. Translated into the terms of key European parties of the period immediately following World War I, there were major ideological problems in the ranks of the German, Italian and French parties. In Germany, there was the problem of anarchosyndicalist influences combined with the centrist traditions of the SPD trade-unionists. In Italy, the problem of campanilismo and anarchosyndicalism was vicious among the workers themselves. Yet, as the documents of that period show, it was not the Italian socialist party and trade-union members who made possible the British creation of the Mussolini regime in that country, but the hideous lack of competence or even simple nerve among the socialist and trade-union leaders (including all of the future PCI leaders). The same problem was demonstrated in Germany. It is the programmatic and tactical leadership which the revolutionary intelligentsia is uniquely qualified to supply which transforms the potential Marxist world outlook of the masses into an actuality.

In Germany, it was "Luxemburgism" — and only Luxemburgism — which exemplified the Marxist world outlook. Exterminate the authority of "Luxemburgism" from the KPD leadership and the residue was essentially an anarchosyndicalist sickness of "leftism" which could only vacillate between ultra-left adventurism or provocations and retreat into a centrist opportunism.

It is not a clear-cut issue of either-or. The study of Marx by individual cadres and groups of cadres who otherwise express the potential for a Marxist world outlook tends to produce viable currents which may rise toward leading positions in such parties. That, in fact, has been the general history of the pro-Leninist currents' development within Communist parties. This is especially fostered as a by-product of factional and proto-factional internal developments and analogous confrontations with anti-Communist currents outside those parties in the labor movement. In political short-hand, the reference to Marx for assistance in the "course of the class struggle" generally is one way of ultimately producing a qualified leading stratum. It is not the direct approach to solving that problem of need. Nor can such a method be recommended as a plausible alternative. Under conditions of crisis, it is invariably urgent to produce mass-based vanguards committed to the Marxist world outlook in short periods of development: to wait for the endemic evolution of leading cadres "through struggle" to produce a qualified
leadership would be a policy of offering near-certainty of political victory to the capitalist forces during the crucial period of confrontations.

What Stalin Believed

It is simply groundless to argue that Stalin had a "sincerely mistaken" belief in a doctrine of "socialism in one country." Stalin had significant short-comings in theoretical understanding, but not in matters of such ABCs. "Socialism in one country" was for him an expediency.

In reporting that Stalin himself knew "socialism in one country" to be a nonsense-thesis, we are taking into account and discounting the fact that at certain moments Stalin might have reached the point of almost believing his own rhetoric. In cases of reaction-formation, the victim sometimes shows what the layman-observer would be deceived into judging as evidence of impassioned sincerity of belief in such fictions. On the basis of known features of Stalin's neurotic profile, it is probable that he experienced such periods of hysterical belief in "socialism in one country." Nonetheless, it would be an inadmissible blunder to insist that he therefore believed in that doctrine in the sense that such belief is relevant to the circumstances of the factional debate in question.

It is commonplace clinical experience in cases of reaction-formation that the victim begins the cycle with a fear that a certain sort of practice by himself or others associated with him will provoke devastating ruin at the hands of specified or vaguely sensed powers. His concern is to prevent that "provocative" behavior, a concern which proceeds normally to a state of skepticism respecting those facts which he views as tending to promote such behavior. If this fear is intensified further, it leads into a kind of Schwärmerie and virtual or actual disassociation phenomena. Commonly, in the next phase of that cycle we are confronted with an individual who — from the insensitive layman-observer's standpoint — has apparently freed himself from the anxiety-state, and who is now "securely" committed to the reaction-formation belief. The telling "objective" feature of that belief, from the standpoint of the psychoanalyst, is that its implicit wilful result is to prevent the victim and (hopefully) others from venturing into those practices which might provoke the feared hostile reaction by the relevant powers.

Clinically and "ontologically" such hysterical beliefs are identical with those encountered in the victim of religious manias or the homicidal paranoid. They are not real beliefs in the historical clinical sense of individual beliefs evolved as a matter of knowledge. They are identical in inner dynamic and social reference aspects with the hysterical obsessions of belief in magic. They are of the same class as "step on a crack, break your mother's back," "she loves me, she loves me not," ruses against the evils of malocchio, and so forth. They have no actual knowledge-content, but can be tested to show that they are of a characteristically propitiatory content and function. The essential function of the reaction-formation belief is either to directly demonstrate the believer's impotence to the view of some aversive agency or to compel other persons to act in such a way as to cause the same aversive agencies to look kindly upon the perpetrator of such beliefs and actions.

It is usually also characteristic of the expression of such reaction-formation beliefs that they are not argued from the standpoint of knowledge, but are justified by allusions to the authority of folk-homilies, popular aphorisms of that period, or other ignorant prejudices. Clinically, the use of folk-homilies, popular aphorisms and prevailing prejudices is a means by which the unconscious infantile "person" of one self attempts to communicate directly with similar states within other persons. Mark Twain's well-known description of swaggerers spoiling for a fight, with preliminary "cockadoodledos" asserting the unearthly prowess of the speaker or the speaker's champion and the dismal fate awaiting the contenders, is exemplary of the same paranoid qualities.

In such cases of hysterical belief, the victim is never truly unaware of the contrary knowledge within him. We have immediately demonstrated that for a mixed array of cases of "brainwashing" victims and ordinary stress-caused disassociation of an appropriate clinical type. Although limited, the experimental evidence is of a crucial quality. By adducing what represents the victim's perception of the relevant "controlling environment" for his disorder, and also probing for the real social self being repressed and imprisoned by the persona of the reaction-formation, it is arduous but not technically difficult to bring forth the real person "underneath," who will at least briefly break free of the disassociation phenomena and begin to state the simple facts of the matter.

The same applies to political discussions within socialist organizations and among socialist organizers and workers generally. An insightful identification of the real issues underlying the workers' "self-protective" layer of propitiatory beliefs is frequently sufficient to produce what might seem to some an instantaneous personality transformation from a neurotically posturing wisacree into a serious, thinking person of the sort who typically halts, turns around, and says: "If you can really prove that, I'm interested."
It is not at all speculative to conclude that there were occasions on which Stalin must have given convincing evidence of appearing to sincerely believe in the nonsense-doctrine of “socialism in one country.” We also know what his knowledge of the matter was during Lenin’s lifetime and following his break with the Right bloc of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. We know his psychopathological profile generally — as we have indicated. We also have abundant political biographical information showing the special importance to Stalin of those fears which converge upon the “socialism in one country” reaction-formation.

In general, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin represented a “conciliationist” Troika from Spring of 1917 through the 1925 dissolution of their bloc. It is necessary to stipulate “in general” because the orator Zinoviev was notorious for momentary impulses of demagogic self-intoxication (e.g., the “July days”), and a corresponding tendency for wild ultra-left outbursts (typified by the after-the-fact concoction of the French plagiarism, “the theory of the offensive” in the Comintern factional affair of the KPD “March Action” of 1921). During mid-March 1917, from his return from Siberian exile, until he slunk into obscurity for a while under Lenin’s April 1917 factional attack, Stalin together with Kamenev, was the leading “conciliationist” of the Mensheviks among the “Old Bolsheviks” hard core. On the eve of October, it was Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin who Lenin proposed to expel from the party for their public display of fear-permeated conciliationism. This was the consistent secular tendency of the Troika from that time until 1925, and was Stalin’s continued policy until his “Trotskyist” break with the right-wing faction of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky.

It is inconceivable that Stalin did not understand the Anglo-Russian Committee. It is notable that Stalin defended that Committee entirely on grounds of fear. It is inconceivable that Stalin did not understand the tragedy of the Bukharinite “bloc of four classes” policy of 1924-1927 China. Again, fear. The “Lenin levy” of 1924 reflected a Troika fear-reaction, a transparent extension of the ongoing “conciliationist” policies of the 1917 period. The alliance with NEPman and kulak during the middle 1920s were fear-reaction policies of conciliationism. In Stalin’s darkest moments, it was imperative for him that the party and Comintern absolutely believe in “socialism in one country,” and consequently that he himself reflect such belief. Any Bolshevik who did not manifest such belief had to represent to Stalin — during his such paranoid episodes — a major danger to the Soviet state, perhaps even an “adventurer,” “provocateur.” (Stalin’s behavior during the days immediately preceding and following the launching of the Nazi invasion is comparable.)

Even apart from the most relevant evidence of the “Third Period” and First Five Year Plan, there were aspects of the Stalin-Trotsky disputes themselves which indicate that Stalin was by no means as theoretically ignorant as the Trotskyist version of that period suggests. Notable is the reference to Rosa Luxemburg’s actual authorship of “permanent revolution” and “combined and uneven development.”

That allusion had two implications in CPSU and Comintern circles during that period. The Comintern collaborators of Anglo-American intelligence services had pursued their pogrom against the “virus of Luxemburgism” into the late 1920s. During the 1925-1926 period this continuing filthy business came under the immediate supervision of the renegade Bukharin — whose otherwise timid nature fostered rather than diminished his sneak’s propensity for slimy slanders. This continued up through approximately 1931, as an aftermath of the Right Opposition’s criminalities within the CPSU and Comintern. It can not be overlooked that the influential earlier efforts of Karl Korsch to couple Luxemburg and Trotsky were relevant to the charging of Trotsky with “Luxemburgism” during the late 1920s. At the same time, the point certainly gave Stalin voluptuous pleasure of a more personal sort at the expense of Trotsky’s intellectual self-esteem.

Although Stalin’s lack of political development caused him to be notoriously detached from the political issues in which Lenin was generally involved during the pre-war period, Stalin’s short term of residence in collaboration with Lenin during that period had brought him into direct contact with Rosa Luxemburg, and into some familiarity with her theoretical work. Whoever may have suggested to Stalin such an in-passing tactic of accusing Trotsky of “Luxemburgism,” Stalin already had appropriate independent knowledge of the grounds for such a comparison. The incident can not have been uncolored by Stalin’s neurotic satisfaction from the opportunity to discredit Trotsky’s theoretician’s credentials rather significantly.

It was specifically and correctly charged that the thesis of “permanent revolution” was due to Rosa Luxemburg (not Trotsky). Not only that, but a comparison of Trotsky’s co-authorship of “Results and Prospects” with Luxemburg’s earlier and then-contemporary work on the subject is devastating disproof of Trotsky’s later claims to some significant degree of originality. Under circumstances in which the Communist International was not committed to an
anti-Luxemburgist policy, Stalin would have been pleased to state publicly: "What a clown you make of yourself, Comrade Trotsky, to base your claims to originality as a theoretician on your 1905-1906 discovery of a small corner of a thesis for which Rosa Luxemburg was already making herself internationally known during the last half of the 1890s."

The immediate relevance of such incidental features of the period is that such items show that Stalin was still conscious of the knowledge which showed "socialism in one country" to be nothing but a fiction defensible only as a matter of expediency.

The case of the Anglo-Russian Committee (a project with which Bukharin was associated) is relevant. From the Bolshevik leadership's standpoint, the Anglo-Russian Committee, a precedent for the Webb-linked popular front policies of the middle 1930s, was a bit of political horse-trading with British imperialism, an agreement which was (from the Bolshevik side) intended to act as a buffer against continued threats of British-led military adventures against the Soviet Republic. In sum, all the gross aspects of the Stalin policy up through the break with Bukharin represent a continuation of the Stalin "conciliator" policy-tendency from mid-March 1917 onwards. Although the character of Stalin's psychological profile, the circumstances of the period, and features of the disputes show that Stalin lapsed partially into reaction-formations respecting "socialism in one country" during the 1920s (so anticipating the more aggravated developments of the 1930s), "socialism in one country" was essentially an expedient falsehood consciously adopted as such.

The glaring impotence of Trotsky's conduct of the debates respecting "socialism in one country" and "permanent revolution" ought then to be obvious.

The "socialism in one country" debate itself was a synthesized rationalization for a reaction-formation, a product of the anxiety caused by the isolation of the depleted Soviet internal economy manifest in the wretched performance of the KPD during 1923. Only fools imagine that matters of "domestic" and "foreign" policies of nations or major political organizations can be analyzed separately in fact. The internal policy of the Soviet Union down to the present time has always been principally (and rightly so) subsumed by the strategic perspectives of the CPSU leadership. Thus, any effort to radically alter Soviet internal policy during the middle 1920s depended upon the establishment of a real basis for a strategic perspective alternative to that adopted by the Stalin-linked factions.

Trotsky reacted to this debate-issue by proposing a strategic policy in formal conformity with the policies of the Second and Third Congresses of the Comintern, and took for granted that the promulgation of such policies, plus some adjustments in Comintern executive roles, would be sufficient to develop the Comintern parties rapidly into an effective force. Trotsky thus repeated the very error which Lenin had dramatically repudiated in a general way in "Left-Wing Communism" and in connection with the Second Congress debates and policies: Trotsky over-estimated the possibilities of working-class effective mass action without the essential process of developing a left-hégemonic, institutionalized Marxist leadership for the working-class forces.

By virtue of that critical omission in Trotsky's strategic considerations, it was impossible for him to effectively address the real issues of the factional debates within the CPSU itself. He could not say: The conciliators are again making de facto blocs with pro-capitalist forces, this time out of the fears caused by the Germany events of 1923: provided we now correct the blunders committed under Zinoviev's ECCI direction in Germany and elsewhere, the present strategic political isolation in fact of the Soviet republic can be eliminated over the intermediate term immediately ahead. To have said so would have required recognizing those blunders from the vantage-point of Lenin's method — a method which Trotsky continued to depurate. Consequently, lacking a real solution to the Comintern problem, Trotsky was incapable of providing a strategic alternative to the real issues underlying the conciliators' reaction-formation.

In such psychological problems of politics, it must be admitted that effective approaches are not guaranteed of success; however, nothing but an effective approach can succeed. In the politics of entropy, in the adaptation to the accomplished fact, all sorts of swindles may prevail. Yet, in the politics of negentropy, the politics of mobilizing forces to create a new reality, nothing can succeed unless the approach taken awakens a social sense of the individual's creative mental processes. By catalyzing confidence for the self associated with such mental creative activity, that self is empowered to throw off the shackles of reaction-formation (e.g., ideology).

This method is rigorously specific. Mere exhortation or deductive argument will inevitably fail, since creative mental activity is neither sentimental nor deductive. There are two principal features to be considered. The immediate, relatively more obvious objective of creative approaches to such problems is to provide valid concepts which directly (immediately) correspond to an empirical actuality, to the effect that mastering the concept involves directly seeing the fallacy of the old fears and seeing positive, practical alternative methods directly. Less im-
mediately, but integral and decisive, the evoking of such concept-synthesizing activity for solution to a critical problem is a means for directly exciting the creative processes within affected persons.

What the Bolsheviks (and others) profoundly wanted during the early-through-middle 1920s was a conceptual insight of the effect: "Now, I see clearly how we contributed to the present mess by our blundering, and also how we must proceed to correct that." One can not competently deny that a collateral fluenced the hard core around Stalin and Stalin himself, but no amount of arguing back-and-forth concerning "Leninist doctrine" could — by itself — have any other effect than to demoralize those involved by virtue of the manifest impotence of such circumscribed activities.

What the Bolsheviks (and others) urgently required during the 1920s was an effective conceptualization of "How to create viable cadre-formations," an elaboration which made explicit the principled features of Lenin's conception of the role of the professional Marxist revolutionary intelligentsia — as in What Is To Be Done? Short of meeting that positive requirement, the only procedure which would have ameliorated the dismal circumstances of the Comintern during that period would have been a painful reassessment of the blunders made by Zinoviev and the dubious Karl Radek (among others) in (principally) KPD policy. Rejecting Lenin's method and refusing to examine the real problems of the KPD (in particular), Trotsky was left to produce doctrinal exercises and fine-sounding, but empty strategic orientations.

The Misleading Feature

If we simply acknowledge the fact that the Left Opposition was consistently correct and Stalin's mid-1920s factions consistently, opportunistically wrong on the issues of "scissors crisis" and industrialization, it would be a grave error to place too much emphasis on the issue of whether the Left Opposition might have succeeded by some better course during the 1924-1927 period. We have treated the issues of the Stalin-Trotsky disputes almost as if a different Trotsky might have prevailed by means of a Lenin method. It has been necessary to proceed so for the purpose of exploring the implications of the debate itself. In fact, the critical factional power-alignments had been completed and effectively consolidated before the Stalin-Trotsky disputes came into the open.

The Troika had moved directly to isolate and cut down Trotsky as early as 1922, and by the time of Lenin's last illness Stalin himself had consolidated vast powers into his own hands. In fact, the fight Trotsky refused to undertake — the course Lenin had dictated from his deathbed — was probably the last opportunity for pulling together an alternative Bolshevik leadership to prevent Stalin's successful later consolidation of power. For better or worse, within weeks following Lenin's death the future of the Soviet Republic was implicitly in Stalin's hands.

Although the Left Opposition struggles were thus largely pro forma and impotent (except as they influenced the hard core around Stalin and Stalin himself), they have the clinical importance of elaborating openly those tendencies which had been more covertly effective in determining the course of developments during the preceding 1921-1924 period. This sort of pattern is not uncommon in history, although Hegel exaggerated the relevant point; it is often after critical developments have been completed or even begun to ebb that the playing-out of that development is explicitly reflected in intellectual life. That is the essential point to be made to those who analyze the Stalin-Trotsky disputes: they are an elaboration of tendencies whose relevant work had already been accomplished before the debate began.

Should the Bolsheviks have realized that the incredible Parvus (like Karl Legien, Eduard Bernstein, August Bebel, et al.) had not merely been a factional opponent, but an agent, a British agent first and the critical Anglo-German double-agent during the war? Should Lenin have followed up the bad smells a bit further and recognized that agent Parvus had made the dubious Karl Radek a sub-agent, and had corrupted Bukharin, Riazanov and many others? Should the Bolsheviks have understood how, with the leading role of agent Radek and (probable agent and certain dupe) Bukharin, the muddled Zinoviev destroyed the potential of the KPD and Comintern generally during the first years after the war? Did Stalin (by the middle 1920s) not already realize that Radek was an agent of Armstrong, Lockhardt, Reilly, et al., and that Bukharin was either a knowing agent or as good as one? Did not Zinoviev and others realize the significance of the presence of both British agents (Branting) and German foreign service intelligence agents in Switzerland negotiating the five million Reichsmarks and the sealed box-cars as an Anglo-German working agreement on the Russian question, in which design Parvus was crucial for both the British and Germans? We only know that Lenin and other leading Bolsheviks smelled some very strong aromas of that implication without adequately pursuing the questions which could have been so fruitfully explored at that time.

Obviously, if Lenin had known the relevant facts, the affair of Paul Levi would not have occurred, Lenin would not have blundered so critically on the Levi is-
Sue at the second Comintern congress, and history would have been profoundly altered for the better.

Yet, although Stalin's leadership of the CPSU was significantly a product of the wretched circumstances such Bolshevik naivety helped to produce, and although Stalin's recurring conciliationist ventures aggravated such wretched conditions and even threatened until the late 1920s to bring about the liquidation of the Soviet republic, once with the power in his hands, Stalin acted clumsily but effectively against the renegade Bukharin, et al., to take those actions needed to save the Soviet republic and, in consequence, to perpetuate the Soviet Union as the critical strategic fixed base of a Communist movement which has — with all its afflictions and internal faults — been decisive in preventing the decimation of humanity through Schachtian forms of fascist economic holocaust even years before this date. Given Trotsky's impotence and the inadequacies and outright treacheries of other leading Bolshevik figures, humanity itself has a curious, contradictory but nonetheless real and substantial debt to Joseph Stalin...analogous, but more significant than that we owe to the Tudors of England.

Given Stalin's paranoia and the hideous consequences that paranoia involves, it will be most difficult for humanity generally to hold its very real debt to Stalin down within the stomach (so to speak). On the condition that Stalin's private writings and other relevant source-materials from the 1905-1953 period are brought forward and into order, we require a modern Shakespeare through whose efforts the historical personality of Stalin can be conceptualized to the effect of coherently capturing both the positive and the wretched of this new Ivan-the-Terrible in a single conception. Stalin is a major fact of all human history to date, a figure so critical to the course of developments that the entire reality of his paradoxical role must be faced if we wish to even acknowledge the reality of our own present existence. Our massive debt to Stalin is an ugly fact, but such debts are those we must incur whenever we leave the general determination of history to mediocrity.

In conclusion, this following must be emphasized concerning the renewed attacks on Stalinism by leading police-agents within the Communist organizations. We mean to emphasize such planted police-agents as Giorgio Amendola and the murderous sub-agent of del Vayo, Santiago Carrillo. These miserable creatures and their duped followers insist that they prefer the "gentle" Bukharin (or perhaps renegade Chou En Lai's captive vegetable, the senile Mao Ze Dong). In that connection, two principal points must be emphasized.

The most immediate point is the fact that Amendola, allied with such Atlanticists as Willy Brandt and Olof Palme, is advocating a convergence of "national Communism" with "left" fascism. Giorgio Amendola has in fact insisted upon that most explicitly even in the pages of the PCI daily l'Unità as well as in his literary contributions to Italian capitalists' journals. Amendola's political base is not the worker-cadres of the PCI; rather Amendola as well as his police-agent cronies in the Botteghe Oscure publicizes the declaration that his immediate political base is centered around the fascist University of Trento of the vile NATO agent Piero Bassetti of the DC "Base" faction — the same Trento which produced such sterling examples of gentle democratic life as the "Red Brigades" and which serves as a bastion of Lotta Continua. Il Manifesto and the fascist "left" groupuscules generally. The "pluralist democrat" Amendola is otherwise not only openly but vigorously proposing the immediate reinstitution of Mussolini fascism to Italy in overt collaboration with former Mussolini supporter and SS-man and Rockefeller ally Gianni Agnelli. We must not overlook what police-agent Amendola prefers to Stalinism: fascist methods of genocide. In fact, from the slobbering mouths of Amendola, Carrillo, Willy Brandt, Olof Palme and others, the slogan of "pluralism" is nothing but a code-word for such fascist genocidal policies.

The second point to be made is that Stalin's actual crimes were either a simple outcome of his own "conciliationist" errors toward agent Radek, Bukharin, the KPD "lefts" and the Webbs and their cronies more generally, or the operations of Anglo-American intelligence in collaboration with Heydrich's SD in playing upon the aggravation of Stalin's paranoia by Anglo-American and Nazi encirclement of the Soviet Union.

When these polycentrist police-agents submit their noisy protests against Stalinism, we must not overlook the fact that it is the polycentrists who are demanding to be hanged.
FOOTNOTES:


2. Canaris, whose presently documented connections to British intelligence date no later than 1914 in Chile and Argentina, came under a Russell Sage Foundation proposal affecting postwar German military intelligence, and functioned as an extremely important British agent thereafter until his death. Canaris was identified in the 1920s Reichstag proceedings as the principal directly involved accomplice in the murder of Rosa Luxemburg. It was Admiral Canaris, acting on information received from London, who directed Nazi SD chief Heydrich to proceed with forging evidence against Tukachevsky, et al., to be planted with the Soviet chekists. This forged evidence was made credible through assistance of French intelligence and "laundereing" into Stalin's hand through Benes. This particular operation was one such Moscow Trial-related activity of a Nazi special unit functioning under control of British agent Canaris. It must be understood that until the second year of the war, the continuing pre-war and "phony war" policy of certain influential Anglo-American circles had been to foster Hitler's successful but depleting conquest of the Soviet Union for the general purposes otherwise identified by the Parvus (Gelphand) draft policy of both certain British circles and German intelligence during World War I. Hence, fostering the decapitation of the Soviet military and political leadership in Hitler's favor had been those British circles' policy up to the point that the war priorities were shifted to an immediate target of destruction of the Nazi machine. (Cf. infra.)

3. In the cases of both Santiago Carrillo and Giorgio Amendola, the evidence is conclusive that they were introduced into the Communist organizations as planted sub-agents of British intelligence. Carrillo was a sub-agent of the notorious del Vayo from the beginning of his Communist career. It is well known that Amendola's father, Giovanni, was a major British agent in Italy and one of the principal agents involved in putting the Anglo-French-paid agent Mussolini into power. (Later, Giovanni was expedited to his Heavenly Reward when Mussolini got wind of Giovanni's proposing that Mussolini's usefulness to the British was outlived.) The evidence is that Giorgio followed the family profession from the outset of his career as a Communist.

4. Ingrao, a member of the Amendola clique of knowing NATO agents within the PCI leadership, as early as 1963 proposed that the PCI align with Peking in the Sino-Soviet factional split. This suggestion was amially rejected as tactically unwise at that time. However, Ingrao proceeded to form the clique which later formed Il Manifesto on the pretext of the 1968 Czech events. Although most of the leaders of the Il Manifesto clique were expelled, Ingrao, the ringleader, was not, but remained within the PCI to assist Amendola, et al., in purging PCI cadre who had led the expulsion-effort against Il Manifesto. Ingrao's operations as a NATO agent within the PCI are among those directly connected to the University of Trento, a bastion of the Bassetti "Base" or "plumbers" unit of the Christian Democracy, which gave Italy such works of CIA art as Lotta Continua and the "Red Brigades." It is PDUP-Manifesto-Lotta Continua which in fact represents Berlinguer-Amendola's immediate political base of support against the worker-members of the PCI and CGIL.


6. See reference to the case of Anglo-German double-agent Parvus (Gelphand) below: note that among Bolsheviks, Riazanov was receiving funds from Parvus, Bukharin's career with Parvus was hampered by Lenin's intervention, while Karl Radek was Parvus' key operative within Bolshevik leading circles—and, later, the tool of Hamilton Fish Armstrong, et al.

7. Although we have relevant background information dating from Mandelbaum's adolescence in post-Anschluss Austria, at present our hard information proving that Mandelbaum has been a knowing agent dates from 1952, involving his associations with Richard Loewenthal, Peter von Oertzen and others at that time.


10. Cf. note 1. In that and related Labor Committee writings of the late 1972 and 1973 period on psychoanalytical (psychogenic) political problems of the socialist movement, the most immediate objective was to extirpate the last residue of what we termed the "Trotsky syndrome" from the Labor Committee cadres themselves. This was termed the "Trotsky syndrome" chiefly because that specific case was the clearest example of the type of Oblomovist pathologies otherwise commonplace among professedly Marxist cadres. Thus, in undertaking an analysis of the clinical case of Trotsky at that time, the issues of Bolshevik history were treated only as essential background for understanding Trotsky's pathology; here, the reference is shifted, such that we are considering Trotsky only as an essential background feature of Bolshevik history.
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