

^{the} Campaigner

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
February 1978

Think
Like
Beethoven



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ALSO: THE GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE
AND TERRORISM



Beethoven's sketches for the last movement of Symphony No. 9 in D minor, Op. 125

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He was a participant in last year's "Beethoven '77" scientific symposium on the composer's work held in East Berlin. Most recently he has lectured on "Beethoven and the American Revolution" at the Academy for Humanistic Studies in Wiesbaden.

The European Labor Party was founded in February, 1975 by members of the European Labor Committees, the National Caucus of Labor Committees' European co-thinker organization, as part of their first electoral campaign in the West German state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The party's program for industrial and agricultural expansion based on massive exports of tractors and other technology to the Third World quickly came to be identified in the electorate's minds with the party's official symbol of a tractor and its slogan "Erst kommt das Fressen" (Eating Comes First). Since then the ELP has run numerous regional and federal campaigns in West Germany, as well as campaigns in Italy, Sweden, and most recently in France. Although its membership numbers only in the hundreds, the impact of the Party's programs and recommendations has been felt in every European capital and has served to shape the policies of governments, trade unions, and parties on both the right and left of the traditional political spectrum

On the cover:

Front: 1814 engraving of Beethoven by Blasius Höfel after L. Letronne. Back: sketches for the last movement of the Ninth Symphony. Text reads (left, above) "Presto remains meilleur (right, above) Töchter aus Elysium (twice in the center) Alle Menschen werden Bruder"

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The Campaigner Enters Its Second Decade

The more than pressing business of freeing humanity from Great Britain's assault on the world's industrial potential and very survival inadvertently kept us from observing a significant anniversary this last fall. The occasion was the tenth anniversary of the founding of *Campaigner* magazine, first brought out in October of 1967 by the handful of people who became the founders of the Labor Committees in 1968.

The *Campaigner* was conceived as a means of carrying out a unique sort of campaign — a campaign that would build a cadre force of intellectuals dedicated to achieving expanded social reproduction, and to building the class-for-itself institutions appropriate to the most rapid pace of social, mental, and industrial growth. Since 1967 the concrete political predicates of this campaign have shifted somewhat dramatically, but coherently. From a small group vying to reestablish the world socialist movement on a sound epistemological and programmatic basis, we have expanded to become the center for the revival of an international humanist movement.

Contrary to the pabulum served up by most high school and university teachers, the great humanists of history were always political. This era is no exception. The quality of and response to the *Campaigner's* contributions to scientific humanism will decide how, and whether, humanity solves the challenges of 1978 and beyond.

Redefining Politics

The *Campaigner* began as a political-theoretical weapon against the commonplace notions and practice of politics, socialist or otherwise, as ideological mudslinging and power grabs. The necessity for progress in technology and labor power — as exemplified by the successful survival and increase of the human race — was the scientific reality by which world events and socialist intervention had to be understood. We constantly insisted on the lawful consequences of worldwide economic stagnation and austerity in the imposition of fascist economic policies and the bestial ideologies, ranging from Skinnerism to the counter-culture, that smooth the building of the stormtroopers and the fascist state.

Despite our rightful insistence on the laws of social

reproduction, it was always clear that these were not objective, material laws in the sense that even Marx at his best considered them. By 1973, the Labor Committees' chairman, Lyndon LaRouche, had already asserted and demonstrated crucial flaws in the elaboration of the laws of social reproduction in Marx and Rosa Luxemburg's work, flaws derived — particularly in Marx — from an attempt to apply linear, mathematical models to nonlinear social processes. With the publication of LaRouche's *Beyond Psychoanalysis* in the fall of 1973, however, the standpoint of the *Campaigner* was revolutionized.

In *Beyond Psychoanalysis* LaRouche ripped the laws of social reproduction out of the so-called objective realm in two extremely fruitful ways. First, the lawful development of human society was redefined in terms of *energy throughput*, a standpoint that would later lead to major conceptual leaps in the physical sciences. Second, the sensuous reality of hylozoic monism and progressive evolution was elaborated within the workings of the mind itself. Politics was now revealed to be neither programmatic correctness, nor a change in consciousness in the sense that it usually understood, i.e. the mental equivalent of changing the prescription of one's glasses. Instead, political work was a scientific tool for changing the sense of identity, and the very way the mind goes about knowing itself and the world (epistemology) — the most fundamental and personal kind of transformation. Thus LaRouche destroyed the "iron law" of material social determination of consciousness, replacing it with a practical understanding of creative mentation and its determining role in history.

The spectacular psychological warfare campaigns carried out by British intelligence and its evil Tavistock Institute in early 1974 testify clearly to the fact that LaRouche's contribution came not a moment too soon.

It was the development of the fundamental breakthrough in the science of human mentation — itself made possible through LaRouche's study of the great scientists Bernhard Riemann and Georg Cantor — that prepared the ground for the *Campaigner's* groundbreaking contributions and supercession of the socialist movement within the last three years. The

most broadly acknowledged of these contributions are within the physical sciences themselves, beginning with the publication of Uwe Parpart's translation and essay on Georg Cantor's 1883 *Grundlagen*, and continuing with international collaboration on fusion power and nonlinear plasma effects between Labor Committee scientists and leading members of the international scientific community.

Equally significant have been the *Campaigner's* contributions to political science, most of which have required the rescue of history, art, and even economics itself from the purview of the effete, atrocious "liberal arts." Both the European and Islamic Renaissance have been recaptured as great periods of humanist political struggle. Tudor England, Colbertian France, and the American Republic have been raised again to their proper status as advances in humanist political economy. Instead of serving as soporific drugs for the nation's youth, the study of history, economics, art, and music can play its necessary role in providing scientific concepts for reshaping economic, social, and cultural institutions appropriately.

What these studies have accomplished is the redefinition of human history as a struggle between humanists (scientists of human mentation, and thus all other areas of human knowledge) and nominalists (those who deny the existence of all universal values, including the human mind). Humanism, as it defines itself by its own history, can now be scientifically identified as the policy which subsumes socialism, industrial capitalism, and Neoplatonic Christianity as the determining invariant of human progress. The tracing of this current has left the British pedigree of bestial monetarism over the past three centuries hanging out in the breeze, while opening a crucial pathway for collaboration between labor and industry, socialists and capitalists, toward a humanist policy of expanded social reproduction.

The continuity of that humanist current, as well as the Labor Party's decisive if marginal influence in today's international corridors of power, is developed in the most depth yet in the piece on natural law drafted by LaRouche for the European Labor Party Executive Committee in this *Campaigner*. Hellenbroich's article on Beethoven utilizes the Riemannian geometric approach, applied first by LaRouche in the economic and psychoanalytic spheres, to develop music as a science of the highest epistemological rigor.

So much for Marx's schemas about feudal, capitalist and socialist man, each of whose consciousness is determined by his surrounding "social system." It was in the so-called "Dark Ages" that Avicenna advanced science, philosophy, and statecraft to

hitherto unknown heights, and in the so-called pre-capitalist period that Alexander Hamilton set forth the concept of labor power which the socialist world has claimed as their special contribution. Mankind has chosen to dub the setbacks and comparatively slow progress of humanity as "necessary" historical phases, either out of ignorance or as an excuse for its own laziness in mastering and superceding what has been advanced for more than a millenium. It is time that the humanist potential reserved for geniuses be evoked and realized in broad layers of the population and their institutions; that necessity be redefined not as pure physical survival, but as the continuous need for creative innovations which establish their own necessities for progress in physical, cultural, and mental life.

Humanist Networks

Thus, despite the overriding objective tragedy of having the U.S. White House occupied by a puppet of British nominalism (monetarism) on Nov. 2, 1976, the intellectual breakthroughs disseminated in the *Campaigner* and its allied publications have played a catalytic role in the emergence of a private, but influential international humanist network over 1977.

The education and activation of this network — which is comprised primarily of leading bankers, industrialists, thinktankers and government officials — must be understood on at least two levels. On one level there is the direct briefing and educational discussion with the network individuals themselves. On another more important level, the *Campaigner* saturates the social and political layers to which these individuals are responsive with the necessary political foci and the competent political-theoretical approaches to each.

The most concrete example can be provided by comparing the polemic of the *Campaigner's* early 1977 publications with the political character of the American population and its leaders one year later. Our early 1977 magazines, pamphlets, and books concentrated heavily on three unique points: 1) The American System, as established in the Revolution and Constitution, rests on scientific humanism and its expression in technological progress; 2) Energy development, particularly nuclear energy, is the key rallying point for the defense of the American System; and 3) The divisions of the political spectrum into the "left" and the "right" is a specific British method for obscuring the fundamental question of where a party or individual stands on industrial progress. Not counting the 2 million *New Solidarities* circulated throughout 1977, many of which contained major articles amplifying the above conceptions, the *Campaigner* published at least 100,000 32-page-plus elaborations on

these themes. The effect of this depth of saturation has been to deepen the resolve of workers, farmers, and industrialists to defend the American tradition of progress — as reflected in the defeat of the energy bill, the split in the Carter Administration, and the development of an increasingly visible network of individuals willing to work with the Europeans and the Labor Party to save the U.S. and win worldwide implementation of the American system of industrial progress.

What is demonstrated in the development of these networks is the effect of the *Campaigner's* intellectual hegemony — authority, credibility — over wider and wider layers. This hegemony has had a visible impact on developments in Western Europe over the past year as well, having played a crucial role in the steps toward a labor-industry alliance that have been taken in especially West Germany and Italy, and in the targeting of the British colonialists as the most vicious enemies of mankind.

Humanity's Frontiers

In defining the future role of the *Campaigner*, it is essential that we take into consideration the expansion and specialization which Campaigner Publications has already undergone. Just as the strategic evaluations of the world economic crisis and national sectors, to mention two exemplary areas, were taken over by *New Solidarity* in 1971, so tactical exposés and programmatic interventions have become the purview of Campaigner Special Reports. On the other end, Campaigner's University Editions section has been established, inclusive of both a Physical Science and Political Science Division, in order to make the most major theoretical breakthroughs available to students and worker-intellectuals in lasting book format.

In 1977 this expansion and specialization appeared to act to the minimization of the *Campaigner* magazine itself. While producing 16 Campaigner Special Reports, and three full books, we printed only three *Campaigners*. We have decided that this will not be

the case in 1978. The *Campaigner* will again go monthly.

The accomplishments of the *Campaigner* on a global scale have made an even more visible impact on the immediate Labor Party-Labor Committee circles than on the world situation. In effect, the Labor Party-Labor Committees themselves have been turned into the equivalent of a Renaissance University, where the continuous interplay between historical, scientific and other humanist studies have catalyzed a burst in creativity and productivity. The critical situation facing us internationally — once again a war danger manipulated by British agents of influence within the Soviet Union and the United States — puts added responsibilities on us to teach and publish this material as rapidly as possible, to provide the critical margin of increased intelligence that can propel the world's humanist networks into power.

Several works of revolutionary theoretical significance are already near completion for the *Campaigner* agenda for 1978, including in depth articles on Machiavelli; Paracelsus; Martin Luther; the Phoenicians' role in developing Ionian philosophy; Giordano Bruno; Leonardo Da Vinci; and the Tudor Renaissance. This does not include books in progress, on the subjects of energy potential and the history of electromagnetism; the 19th century advances in the political economy of the American Revolution; non-linear effects in plasma physics; and the political economy of the European Renaissance.

It is our objective, and necessity, to accelerate the rate of these breakthroughs to a rate of progress never before known to man. In the course of this year, this achievement should permit us to establish an actual academy in America that will extend the Renaissance ambience of the Labor Committees to a much broader layer of the population — a concept already being implemented by our cothinker organization in Western Europe. It is also the crucial ingredient that will allow us to rid mankind of its worst enemy, the British nominalists, once and for all.

— Nancy Spannaus,
member, National Executive Committee
and Director of Publications,
National Caucus of
Labor Committees

THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND TERRORISM

BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
THE EUROPEAN LABOR PARTY

The specific capacity... which differentiates man is not merely being, taken without qualification, for this he shares with the elements; neither compound being, for this we find in the minerals; nor animated being, for this is in plants; nor apprehension, for this is shared by the brutes; but apprehension by means of the potential intellect... And since that same potentiality cannot all be reduced to actuality at the same time by one man, or by any of the limited associations distinguished above the family [district, city-state, kingdom] there must needs be multiplicity in the human race, in order for the whole of this potentiality to be actualized thereby... Moreover, the intellectual faculty of which I am speaking deals not only with universal forms or species, but also, by a kind of extension, with particular ones. Whence it is commonly said that the speculative intellect by extension becomes the practical intellect, the end of which is doing and making...

It has been sufficiently shown that the work proper to the human race, taken as a whole, is to keep the whole capacity of the potential intellect constantly actualized, primarily for speculation, and secondarily (by extension, and for the sake of the other) for action.

Dante Alighieri, De Monarchia, I. 3-4



WIESBADEN, Oct. 24 — During the period the Basic Law (the *Grundgesetz*, which serves as the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany — ed.) was drafted, the United States happily had repudiated the "Morgenthau Plan" for a deindustrialized Germany. United States' hegemony among the forces launching NATO meant that the three occupying powers endorsing the Basic Law were committed, as were Germans themselves, to a policy of rebuilding a rubble-strewn Federal Republic of Germany as an industrial nation committed to technological progress. In that time the commitment to technological progress was so axiomatic a constitutional principle that it might have been argued generally that it would have been unnecessary to write a commitment to technological progress into the Basic Law itself.

Now, forces controlled from outside the Federal Republic are again proposing in effect to impose an echo of the "Morgenthau Plan" upon Germany, this time in the name of "environmentalism." This environmentalist assault upon the vital interests of the nation and its people is complemented by criminal attacks by the forces of international terrorism. Although leading forces of the majority of citizens have rallied in support of the Republic's nuclear-energy policies and against terrorism, there is no explicit provision in the Basic Law in defense of that principle of progress which was assumed in 1949 and which is still the proper organic impulse among the majority of citizens.

This defect in the literal Basic Law was alluded to, if indirectly, by Schleswig-Holstein Minister-President Gerhard Stoltenberg and others in response to a ruling by one court ordering a construction moratorium (*Baustopp*) on nuclear-energy development. The problem remains. The republic's courts and other official agencies must receive a clear and mandatory fundamental law on this matter, before further *Baustopps* and other weakening of the nuclear domestic and export programs effect permanent damage not only to the Republic's economy, but, through weakening the economy, cause serious damage to the welfare and rights of the citizenry as a whole.

There is undoubtedly agreement among an overwhelming majority of the citizens for such corrective lawmaking action. Such improvements in clarification of the Basic Law are not only in the most vital and urgent interests of the Republic, but the correlation of political forces exists potentially to accomplish such a correction. It must be done.

There are two approaches which can be taken to that urgent task. The most obvious approach would be to push forward the obvious action implied by the remarks of Stoltenberg and others who share his view. This would be good, but, we believe, inadequate. We propose that the time has come to modify the Preamble and other parts of the Basic Law to the effect of setting forth those permanent principles of law which are presently only left implicit by the opening sentence of the present Preamble.

To that purpose, we present here the following contributions to the adoption of an expanded Preamble, a Preamble which will set forth the humanist principles of a republic of constitutional law in such a comprehensive and unambiguous form that no doubt of intent is allowed in the mind of either the ordinary citizen or of those courts and other institutions which have the duty of serving the law on behalf of the state.

To serve that purpose, we divide the following discussion into the following categorical elements.

First, we examine the implications of the circumstances under which the Basic Law was drafted, endorsed by the occupying powers, and the Republic founded. Myths, including diplomatically shaded illusions concerning the 1947-1955 period, ought to be finally brushed aside and the truth of the matter seen as it was and as it is.

Second, we summarize the notion of a humanist republic from an historical vantage point, representing a point of view genealogically linked to Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa and Leibniz. In this connection we take into account the real history of Germany in summary form, and also use the process leading into the first, George Washington, administration of the United States as our principal historical reference for

Editor's Note

This statement, although primarily intended for the guidance of the Members of Parliament and parties of the Federal Republic of Germany, is also being published in France, Italy, and the United States.

The principal purpose of the publication outside the Republic is to aid in the defense of the Republic against the evil slanders appearing in parts of the international press, and to aid in this way and others in promoting the foreign cooperation and alliances which are in the vital interests of the nation at this time.

Overleaf: Contemporary reliquary bust of Emperor Frederick I Hohenstaufen (Barbarossa).

modern notions of a humanist republic and constitutional law.

Finally, we include a proposed draft Preamble.

I. The Influence of the Occupying Powers

The future Federal Republic of the 1947-1949 period was a fragment of an occupied Germany, a nation struggling with the effects such as the "winter of the turnips" to rebuild, often with bare hands, out of the rubble left by the war. If this circumstance were not difficult enough, this future nation was the adopted principal battleground for whatever new general war the "Cold War" might trigger.

The Allied powers, upon whose sufferance Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Kurt Schumacher, and other leaders depended to permit the establishment of even a semisovereign German state, had exonerated former Nazi Finance Minister Hjalmar Schacht, and in that fashion had outlawed the principal line of investigation proving London and Manhattan financiers' responsibility for imposing Hitler upon Germany in 1933. The British Special Operations Executive's doctrine of German "collective guilt" for the post-Versailles nightmares of Europe was a doctrine an oppressed German nation was obliged to tolerate — at least publicly.

Dr. Adenauer's approach, and that of his associates, was undoubtedly the best alternative visible to them under the circumstances. Crawl to the Allied occupying powers as much as appeared necessary, but do this to gain even part of a divided Germany those first rudiments of sovereignty through which to rebuild its economy, wean the Allies of their occupation policies, and work thus toward full national sovereignty.

In the main, the policy succeeded, but, as a number of scholarly commentators indicated during the first, 1949-1955 period, the anomalous circumstances of the drafting and adoption of the Basic Law left their scars upon the document.

The lesser scar the circumstances imposed upon the Basic Law is symptomized by the painfully excessive repetition of reference to the term "democracy." By ignoring such relevant matters as the British-dictated 1815 Treaty of Vienna, British manipulation of the rise of Bismarck's Prussia during the 1860s, and the circumstances and consequences of the Versailles Treaty, the conquering allies were in a position to assert unchallenged that nothing but some predisposition for "authoritarian" rule in the "German national character" had been the root and guiding principle of what those same Allies represented Nazi Germany to have been. To emphasize that point, the British intelligence establishment invented "reor-

ientation programs" and the practice of endorsing only those graduates who had been sufficiently perceptive of the realities of postwar power to meekly mouth thanks to their British tutors for acquired, proficiency in reciting the word "democracy."

The Americans, who should have known better, instead merely echoed the British policy in the matter. Hence, the Basic Law would not have been endorsed by the three occupying powers relevant to that matter had not the Basic Law been rhetorically designed to the effect of a Germany's self-humiliating repeated assurance, "We will never do anything like that again."

This is not to argue that Germany did not desire the establishment of a constitutional democratic republic. It is rather to point to those circumstances in which the drafters of the Basic Law were obliged to place great concern on appearances, thus diverting intellectual energies which would have otherwise been expended on certain issues of principled content.

These are harsh, perhaps undiplomatic observations. They are nonetheless, like some other harsh things which must be stated here, plain truths which must be taken fully into account if problems such as those of fighting international terrorism and defeating the *Baustopp* mania are to be efficiently solved in a principled, constitutional rather than merely ad hoc, pragmatic fashion.

A second, more profound problem was the fact that the needed endorsements by the occupying powers involved principally three nations — Britain, France, and the United States — which each represented mutually exclusive forms of constitutional law, and whose constitutional law and history defined such conceptions as "republic" and "democracy" in ways that were therefore also mutually exclusive. Among the Constitution of the United States, the constitution of the Fourth Republic, and the English parliamentary monarchical system there was in fact no fundamental agreement in principle — even though twentieth century developments in the United States had involved a significant amount of corrupting influence in legal practice and conceptions from British ideology. Despite these differences, despite the fact that the definition of "democracy" agreeable to the constitutional law of each of these nations could not be reconciled in a fundamental way with the conceptions of the other two, the occupying powers instructed occupied Germany that there was no difference of significance; occupied and powerless Germany was in no position to contradict this assertion publicly.

Consequently, in attempting to present the appearances satisfactory to the occupying powers, the Basic Law reworked the Weimar constitution with special emphasis on the mere forms of democratic rights of

the individual citizen. Having attended so to the forms of democracy within a federal parliamentary system, the issues of the purposes of the nation, the governing content of the Basic Law, were left chiefly to the opening sentence of the Preamble and the unarticulated consciences of leaders and electorate.

This is not to imply that a national purpose was lacking outside the words of the Basic Law itself. Most citizens of the Republic expressed such a purpose, often expressed with bared, calloused, and bleeding hands. The immediate purpose was to restore the economy, to build something thus for the population's posterity. If the impulse among the majority of citizens did not perhaps go much further than that, during the 1947-1955 period it was not the business of prudent national leaders to launch the kind of constitutional discussion which would have evoked proper self-consciousness of a longer-term, more profound sense of national purpose in the citizenry in general.

Events proceeded.

Most important, President de Gaulle led the establishment of the Fifth Republic in France. A President de Gaulle who knew European history better than the British, the Americans, Clemenceau, or the leaders of the 1946-1958 Fourth Republic, launched his entente with Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, building the basis for the future course of development of the European Economic Community and opportunities for the Federal Republic's "economic miracle."

Forces associated with the administration of U.S. President John F. Kennedy were displeased with the de Gaulle-Adenauer axis. The *Der Spiegel* affair and related developments weakened the de Gaulle-Adenauer bloc's future, while de Gaulle himself narrowly escaped attempted assassination — financed in part from the United States.

The period 1966-1968 was a period of undermining the accomplishments of de Gaulle and Adenauer, with London's hand prominent in both processes. By a kind of institutional inertia, the "economic miracle" was maintained fortunately even after 1968, and, meanwhile, the remaining vestigial indignities of the postwar occupation were somewhat lessened, if not to this date entirely removed from outstanding treaty agreements.

The British opposition to the de Gaulle-Adenauer effort and de Gaulle's well-informed opposition to British entry into the EEC are in general poorly understood when they are not simply, ignorantly attributed to some allegedly unreasonable prejudice of the French war hero. This issue bears directly on the difficulties of incorporating a statement of constitutional national purpose in the 1949 Basic Law draft.

England versus Europe

Since the period of Colbert's hegemony in seventeenth century France, and most emphatically since the American Revolution, despite gentlemen such as the honorable James Callaghan and others, the dominant forces in the City of London and in allied Amsterdam and Geneva financial circles have been governed by an obsessive determination to prevent the development of organic economic cooperation among nations of the European continent.

As Baron von Stein and his republican allies learned to their embittered sorrow at the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, the British and their tools, led by Talleyrand and Metternich, were determined to impose upon the continent a British-orchestrated "Concert of Europe," using British-sponsored aristocratic relics and a debt-linked relative economic stagnation imposed upon France as the means for maintaining British rule of Europe and — they hoped since the eighteenth century dreams of a Pax Britannica modeled upon the Pax Romana — the world.

Prior to 1792, the leading humanist forces of France, Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, America, and Spain were consciously committed to establishing a world-system of humanist republics committed to scientific and technological progress in urban-centered industrial and agricultural expansion. In some of these cases, as in Bourbon France and Spain, the national humanists immediately foresaw republics under a monarchy; in others, as in America or in Mainz and Naples of that period, they foresaw a republic of the American type, a view shared by the collaborators of Tom Paine, Condorcet, and Lavoisier during the 1789-1792 period. The "League of Armed Neutrality" of continental powers from Spain to Russia provided the decisive strategic element of humanist-organized monarchies which enabled the American Revolution to succeed. If this thrust had continued successfully on the continent during the last decade of the eighteenth century, the history of the world would have been far different, and vastly different than it has been under the influence and consequences of nineteenth century British hegemony.

Once this is properly understood, the citizen also readily understands the direct connection between the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, the assassination of Walter Rathenau, and the recent murder of the Dresdner Bank's Jürgen Ponto.

The humanists of eighteenth century France were committed to a policy of scientific and technological progress for the entire continent, and, led by such direct heirs of Colbert, Descartes, and Leibniz as



Konrad Adenauer (right, shown with French President Charles de Gaulle) served as President of the parliamentary council created in 1948 to draft the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, and went on to serve as the Federal Republic's first Chancellor from 1949 to 1963. Development of close Franco-German relations to further European economic development was a fundamental aspect of his policies, which shaped the Federal Republic's participation in the European Economic Community and led to the 1963 Reconciliation Treaty between the Federal Republic and de Gaulle's France.

Adolf Hitler with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, a leader of the coterie of British monetarists including Winston Churchill who installed and maintained Hitler in power despite the attempts of the German General Staff to overthrow him. Opposite page, Hitler, together with his Finance Minister, British bankers' agent Hjalmar Schacht [far right] inspects pick-and-shovel equipped Nazi Labor Front workers and other "public works" enlistees at the groundbreaking for the new Reichsbank on May 5, 1934. Low-skilled, labor intensive work, which culminated in the concentration camp system, was the hallmark of the British-dictated economic policies imposed on the Third Reich by Schacht.



Vergennes, were actively engaged in a rapid industrialization of France on the road to surpassing the then-stagnating industrial development of Britain. Just as the enemy of Colbert's earlier efforts for industrial progress was Amsterdam, so the enemies of continental Europe during the late eighteenth century were London, Amsterdam, and Geneva, those physiocratic, monetarist financial interests which saw general technological progress as a threat to their rule of the world, rule through debts imposed upon technologically-arrested development. Where the humanists saw the reinvestment of produced profit as the means for progress, the nominalists, the monetarists of London, Amsterdam and Geneva greedily clutched at ground rent extracted in the form of debt service on public and real estate indebtedness. To maintain the rule of the ground-rent monetary order, the proponents of that view, centered in London, have shown repeatedly that they will kill, kill, kill, to preserve their rule.

The humanist de Gaulle, committed to creating an entente "from the Atlantic to the Urals" on the continent through technological progress in development of industry and agriculture, represented everything the London monetarists most deeply hated and justly feared. Thus, London set out to destroy Gaullism in France and the policies of Adenauer in the Federal

Republic, just as they had murdered Rathenau to stop Rapallo, and booted von Seeckt out of the German Army for the same reason. So, more recently, they unloosed the terrorists created by their faction of the intelligence services to murder Jürgen Ponto, because of Ponto's brilliant leading role in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America in working toward the realization of the same humanist policies de Gaulle represented.

A defeated and occupied Germany of 1949-1955 was in no position to embed in its constitution those same principles which are the organic, traditional expression of German republicanism and the national purpose agreeable to the impulses of the majority of the Republic's citizens, but hated by London.

This point will become clearer as we turn, after an intervening discussion of Nazism, to consider the principles of a constitutional humanist democratic republic.

What Was Nazism?

During recent months, networks of the old British Special Operations Executive, including their friends in the editorial boards of the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, the *London Times*, *Paris Le Monde*, *Paris Libération*, and certain publications in Italy and the Federal Republic itself, have been escalating a



“revival” of themes and symbols of the Nazi period in behalf of a fraudulent doctrine to the effect that a “neo-Nazi” insurgence is either erupting or on the verge of erupting in the Federal Republic.

This theme is maliciously employed in a way otherwise emphasized by the recent British-published book on the Baader-Meinhof gang, *Hitler's Children*. This is all the more shameless on the part of the British Special Operations Executive-connected publications involved, since several leading OECD intelligence services have abundant evidence that the terrorism in Europe and in the Mediterranean area is predominantly a British-intelligence creation and covert-warfare tool, aided by Peking and certain British-linked Islamic networks.

It is more shameless since elements of that same British establishment were decisive both in imposing Hitler on Germany in 1933, and in intervening, first in 1936 over the Rhineland issue, and again in 1938 at Munich, to entrench Hitler's position so strongly in Germany that native forces, centered around patriotic leaders of the Wehrmacht, were prevented from eliminating Hitler at those junctures of his relatively acute vulnerability.

No matter how much this report offends deeply entrenched delusions, Nazism was not a German creation. It was a creation of the same factional forces

within the Allied Powers of Versailles who dictated the war-reparations stipulations, who directly placed top British agent and later Admiral Wilhelm Canaris in charge of the Marine Transport unit, and who later backed Hjalmar Schacht in forcing Germany to accept Hitler's appointment to the Chancellory.

The creation of the Freikorps and Hitler's takeover of the pathetic National Socialist German Workers party as an Allied Control Commission agent of Röhm were the work of this London-centered faction. The use of the Nazis during the 1920s, including the overall steering of funding to ensure Hitler's control of the Nazi party, were primarily directed by these same London-centered agencies. Hitler was put into the Chancellory because Schacht warned London and Manhattan that (a) Hitler was on the wane, and (b) that Schacht required Hitler if Schacht's program, backed by the same Versailles financier interests, was to be successfully implemented.

Hjalmar Schacht is the decisive feature of Nazism which the Nuremberg proceedings kept hidden — to the advantage of the London and Manhattan financier forces responsible for Hitler's power. Apart from the studies circulated by the European Labor Party and such analytical work on the subject as that of Jacques Rueff, the truth about Nazism, the essence of Nazism, is ostensibly unknown in nearly all of the mountains of

texts and journalistic treatments of Nazism, and not only in the Federal Republic.

A correct understanding of Nazism which should have been a prominent consideration in formulating the Basic Law during the late 1940s, is of absolutely vital importance to designing those amplifications of the Basic Law wanted to deal with "environmentalism," terrorism and related threats at this time.

As John Maynard Keynes made clear in the preface to the first edition of his *General Theory*, published in Nazi Germany in 1936, Nazism is essentially a natural political outgrowth of Keynesian policies carried to their ultimate conclusion. When an economy operating according to British monetary doctrines reaches a point of industrial depression at which the current debt service exceeds the gross profit on tangible industrial and agricultural production, it must either suspend that rate of payments on the debt or must resort to a combination of two forms of *hyperinflationary austerity*. This is a combination of looting the productive capital of one's own national economy and looting one's neighbors.

The procedures usually applied in modern historic cases of this practice attempt to prop up production in modern agriculture and industry on a reduced scale

by means of drastic reductions in real incomes, intensification of labor in "labor-intensive," "full-employment" projects like the Arbeitsdienst* and Bund deutscher Mädchen*, and looting of portions of "triaged" industries and farms of their accumulated capital in materials, plant, equipment and machinery. This process of internal austerity measures leads toward a breakdown in the productive potentialities of the labor force and an erosion of productive capital generally. This sort of imminent breakdown was frantically reported by top Nazi officials during the 1936-1937 period, leading to the ouster of Schacht. At that point, the Nazi economy either had to move toward collapse or find an offsetting source of wealth in looting of its neighbors. The process of decay merely continued, as looting policies in occupied territories converged upon the point of relative exhaustion.

The engine of all of those hideous practices attributed to the Nazis was Schacht's hyperinflationary monetary cancer, the combined Rentenmark and

*Arbeitsdienst - Nazi Labor Service, which put unemployed workers and all students seeking to enter universities to work in labor-intensive public works projects, the only pay being meager board and a place in a Labor Service barracks. Bund deutscher Mädchen - League of German Girls, the equivalent of the Hitler Youth for girls.

Today's environmentalist opponents of nuclear power were created on the exact model of the mass Nazi movement, which also glorified "nature," animal life, and primitive backwoods craft techniques. Right: antinuclear protesters in Berlin carrying banner reading "the old power plants are enough; anything else is a fraud." Opposite page: the Hitler youth on whose model they are based.



Mefo-Bill structure. Once it was determined that someone had to suffer, in order to prop up the financial cancer Schacht created, the evolution of political institutions and policies adapted itself to selecting which persons and groups must suffer even unto death in order to leave a margin of better subsistence for a remaining portion of the total population.

The corollary of this fact is that if the Basic Law presently contained an efficient prohibition against Nazism, which in fact it does not — for reasons of principle argued shrewdly by Weimar's Carl Schmitt — it would have had to prohibit monetarist policies of a Keynesian or similar type under conditions of threatened debt-driven hyperinflationary austerity in either Germany itself or in nations subjected to policy-making decisions in which Germany was a participant. This would mean that under such a stipulation in the Basic Law, "environmentalism" in the Federal Republic would be a violation of the constitution, and the Federal Republic and its citizens would be constitutionally obliged to withdraw from involvement in a World Bank under Mr. Robert S. McNamara's direction. The Basic Law would have been obliged to identify Schachtianism as the driving principle of fascism, and to have outlawed the proposing of any law or any action by agencies of the state which

replicated the austerity policies of Hjalmar Schacht.

To repeat this important point, to be an efficiently antifascist constitutional law, the Basic Law would make it a criminal offense against the constitution for any official or citizen of the Republic to either tolerate the imposition of Schachtian policies upon Germany or to make the Republic in any way complicit in imposing such policies upon other nations.

II. *The Principles of Constitutional Law*

The effort to define a republic is historically dated from Plato. During Plato's lifetime this definition was associated with a fundamental division in the perception of law, between Plato and his successors on the one side — the *humanists* — and the anti-Platonic *nominalist* faction of Aristotle and his successors on the other.

The Platonic current later gave way to the Neoplatonic. That form is characterized by apostolic Christianity, in which connection emphasis is properly placed on St. Paul, Origen, and the early writings of St. Augustine as exemplary. Out of this same current emerged Neoplatonic Judaism and the Ismaili currents of Islam embracing the Christians, Jews, and



Moslems of Islamic culture. Through the Templars, later Islamic Ismailis and Spain, Neoplatonic humanism prompted the early Renaissance in Europe, was the policy of the Hohenstaufen emperors, and was the dominant force of the golden age of the Renaissance, the fifteenth century.

During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century Neoplatonic humanism began its great resurgence, establishing the foundations for modern notions of a humanist republic and a self-perfecting body of positive constitutional law based on commitment to knowledge of natural law. This ferment flourished along the old routes of the Hohenstaufen culture, from Venice and Padua north through Switzerland, into southern Germany, and along the Rhine and its tributaries into the reviving Hanseatic culture of the north, in the Netherlands. It extended into France, and along northern sea channels into England.

The outstanding intellectual figure of the fourteenth century humanist resurgence was Groote of Deventer, founder of the Augustinian-linked teaching order, the Brothers of the Common Life. On this foundation, which immediately produced Thomas à Kempis and later the great French humanist monarch, Louis XI, emerged the gigantic figure of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa. It is Cusa's *Concordantia Catholica*, together with his later writings on the same themes, which founded the rigorous modern conceptions of a humanist republic, conceptions furthered by the Erasmians of the later fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

It was the Erasmian continuation of Cusa which produced the English Tudor Renaissance, the first conscious approximation of a modern republic committed to the fundamental constitutional principle of scientific and technological-industrial progress. It was the same Erasmian current in France, directly linked to the English Erasmians around the Dudleys, Gresham, and Gilbert, who numbered François Rabelais among them, and who are conveniently identified with the French *politiques*. It was Cusa who directly influenced the thought of Giordano Bruno, Johannes Kepler, René Descartes, and in a most important and direct way, the great Leibniz.

The antihumanists, the nominalists, are associated with the Sunni reaction within Islam, with the book-burning fanatic and agent of the Turkish barbarians, al-Ghazali, and with the Guelph faction stemming from a Roman banker who bought and corrupted the papacy, Hildebrand.

It is but one of those many hallowed, faithfully repeated frauds of the secondary school and university classroom that the Crusades were a great ideological struggle between Christianity and Islam. In reality, as is usual with such frauds, it was merely the poor dupes who suffered those wars who believed such nonsense in those times. In reality, there was an evil


alliance between the reactionary forces of Islam and the Hildebrand factions (the later Guelph faction) in the papacy, France, and the Holy Roman Empire. The basis for this alliance between the papacy and the faction of al-Ghazali's followers was the common bond of what was later known as "Lombard banking."

Contrary to other hoary myths, Lombard banking, or what is properly called monetarist policies and practices in its modern version, was well-established in the Middle East before the Christian era. Moreover, it was the association of usury with tax-farming which directly caused the collapse of Babylon, the rotten-ripeness for conquest of the Achaemenid Empire, and the internal rotting and collapse of Baghdad and Cairo in the face of the Seljuk barbarians. There were active connections between Baghdad bankers and Charlemagne's court and realm during the time of Caliph Harun al-Rashid, and decadent monetarist influences dominant in Byzantium.

The Ismailis' humanism placed them in direct opposition to Mesopotamian forms of "Lombard banking." The Ismailis, like their Hohenstaufen and Templar heirs also known as "city builders," not only created such cities of Islam as Baghdad, Samara, and Fatimid Cairo, but were most directly opposed to their enemies within and outside Islam on the basis of their commitment to scientific and technological progress. Their policies proscribed "Lombard banking," speculating in ground rent, and other nonproductive usurious investments in favor of concentrating the social surplus of states in both the building of cities and the fostering of technological progress in urban crafts and agriculture.

Consequently, the fundamental philosophical differences which separated Ismaili and Renaissance humanism from all forms of nominalism found their practical political expression in a fight between the proponents of technological progress and the forces which stood for "zero growth" in technology and Lombard looting of ground rent. These divisions cut across religious lines. The antihumanist forces of European feudalism were endemically and often actively allied with the al-Ghazali faction in Islam against the Christian, Sephardic Jewish, and Islamic humanist forces who, in turn, were usually directly allied with one another. The house of Pope Hildebrand, the founder of the Guelph or inquisitional faction, represented families of Roman usurers who allied themselves with feudal opponents of progress and with other usurers, to buy the papacy and turn it into an instrument of antihumanist policy.

The intellectual center of emerging European Guelph ideology during the eleventh century was a group of degenerated Cluniac monks centered in Lotharingen. Aided by these decayed Cluniacs selling



The Conciliar Movement sought to reform the Hildebrand-corrupted papacy by subordinating it to the temporal power of humanist republics and restoring the Church as a world spiritual center. Attempting to restore the Church's institutions to conformity with natural law, the Conciliarists attacked the Hildebrand-created Church tithe-collecting bureaucracy and such looting gimmicks as "Peter's Pence" through which the wealth of Europe was drained into the hands of monetarist bankers. Shown is a contemporary illustration of the Council of Constance [1414-1418], the first major Conciliarist meeting which succeeded in ending the schism of the papacy. The Conciliarists, who included Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, were successful to the extent of gaining significant influence over a succession of 15th century popes.

their services to usurer Hildebrand, Hildebrand used a forged document known as the "Donation of Constantine." This forgery, later exposed as a hoax by the fifteenth century scholar Lorenzo Valla and more widely denounced by Erasmus of Rotterdam, purported to show that the Emperor Constantine had given the pope secular rule over the Roman Empire of the West. Using his allies and corrupted forces to gain himself the papacy, Hildebrand and his family and faction used this forged real-estate title as the pretext for transforming the Papacy into an instrument for collecting ground rent on behalf of the banking circles who had purchased the papal authority.

This was the continuing focus of the fight between the European humanists and a corrupted papacy from the eleventh into the fourteenth century. The Hohenstaufens and their allies attempted, mainly unsuccessfully, to free the papacy of such corruption and to establish a secular order with a clearly specified division between the authority of the papacy and the state. With the aid of the English Normans, to whom Hildebrand's faction had donated England for the 1066 conquest, and with the aid of Philip of France, the corrupted papacy suppressed the humanist Templars on forged charges, as Languedoc had been butchered under Simon de Montfort, and was able to crush the Hohenstaufens in Italy and Germany

as well as deposing the Hohenstaufen cousin, Alfonso the Wise of Spain.

The debt-pyramiding policies of the Guelph usurers looted the estates of Europe and drove a major portion of the displaced peasantry into vagabondage. This looting, presaging the worst Nazi occupation practices of the 1942-1945 period, reduced the population of central Europe to such a wasted condition that the Black Death wiped out, according to estimates based on church statistics, about half the population of civilized Europe during the middle of the fourteenth century.

The associated collapse of the Guelph banking houses, notably the Bardi and Peruzzi, through the circumstances of mid-fourteenth century economic and population collapse, broke the power of the corrupt papacy. A great reform of the papacy emerged out of the Conciliar Movement. Through the mediation of the Conciliar Movement the way was cleared for the accession of humanist popes. It was in this great rebuilding process of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century that movements typified by Groote's Brothers of the Common Life and by great figures such as Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa emerged to shape the thought and achievements of the fifteenth century.

However, typical of the era, the rule of the Guelph-appointed Hapsburgs remained essentially unshaken in Austria, and the old evil arose during the late fif-

teenth century around the house of Fugger and its accomplices. With the accession of Charles V to the Holy Roman Emperors, bought and paid for by Jacob Fugger, all Europe plunged once again into the sort of holocaust which the Guelph bankers and their papal agents had generated during the century beginning from about 1266.

During the last half of the fifteenth century, the humanist Louis XI had created France as a nation, combining humanist principles with Italian-imported humanist economic policies. For this, the British monarchy has never forgiven Louis XI, in fact celebrating Waterloo by launching such vicious slanders against his reputation as Walter Scott's filthy, lying novel, *Quentin Durward*. Germany was not so fortunate. Despite the efforts centered around the work of Cusa to establish a German nation as a republic, the Hapsburgs, the Guelphs, and the Fugger-bought reign of the Spanish Hapsburgs launched a wave of bloody destruction, beginning with Martin Luther's command to slaughter the peasants, which continued through the Thirty Years War. From that time to the emergence of the Federal Republic, every effort to establish a humanist republic in Germany until now has been variously crushed and subverted by the Guelph faction, its heirs and allies.

After the abortive effort to establish a republic under Cromwell in England, the only success of the humanist movement to this purpose until this century was the American Revolution and the establishment of the United States as a constitutional republic from 1789 through 1828, reestablished with limited but most important success under Abraham Lincoln.

Nonetheless, despite the defeats by the evil forces of nominalism, humanism has not been entirely defeated. Every principle current of progress in scientific knowledge and the betterment of human affairs has been chiefly the fruit of the work of the Neoplatonic humanists. In this continuing humanist effort were developed all the notions properly associated with the principles of constitutional law and the humanist republic.

Provided certain historical qualifications concerning its later history and ideological corruption are taken into account, the establishment of the United States as a constitutional republic based on the principles of scientific and technological progress is the single clear, classic case of a model of reference for the notion of a democratic republic to date. However, the American achievement was not simply an autonomous product of American conditions. The ideas, and the essential strategic and material aid which made the United States possible were in chief the joint contributions of the entirety of the European humanist

movement and networks of the eighteenth century. The achievements of the United States belong in significant part to that nation's Founding Fathers, but properly viewed those achievements embody the collective contributions and heritage of Mediterranean and European civilization over, to date, approximately three thousand years since the rise of those predecessors of Ionian culture, the Phoenicians.

When this history is duly taken into account, and the conclusions so adduced compared with the evidence of all human history and prehistory, the fundamental questions which ought to govern the conception of constitutional law and a humanist democratic republic are rigorously, conclusively demonstrated to the advantage of our present knowledge and practice.

From the standpoint of law as such, the immediate line of separation between humanist republican conceptions and antihumanist, or nominalist policies is the nominalists' rejection of the principle that the *positive law* (law posited by ruling institutions) must be governed and delimited by knowable principles of natural law. Nominalist, or antihumanist, legal doctrine attributes the authority of constitutional law to either *social contract* (in one sense or another) or to the *power of sovereignty* to establish law by the efficient force of its will.

Lest this distinction appear to be too abstract, merely academic, we emphasize that that distinction between humanist and nominalist jurisprudence is precisely what is at practical issue in the effort of the proponents of *Baustopp* to wreck the economy of the Federal Republic — and hence the welfare of the overwhelming majority of its citizens.

The question can be posed thus. When the nation's commitment to technological progress stands opposite to neo-Malthusian environmentalism before the nation's court, does the court have the right to consider these two conflicting policies as equal before the law? Under the nominalist social-contract interpretation of law, the court can so judge, and the fate of the nation stands helpless to that extent before the personal prejudices of the judges. Or, are the judges properly to be bound to apply a set of governing principles defining the purpose of national existence? In the latter view of law, the humanist or constitutional law, the judges would be bound to find against the environmentalist, or at least to pursue any proper issues raised by the environmentalist plaintiff in such a way as to allow no damage in fact, as by delay, to the vital interests of the nation as defined by its principled purpose.

If the nominalist doctrine, the doctrine of purely positive law prevails, the following two evils are rooted in the institutions of the state. If the social-con-

tract versions of nominalist doctrine are in force, then the state is subject to the prejudices prevailing within the legal profession. Except as parliaments may specifically overthrow bad court decisions, the nation is not a government of law but approximately a dictatorship of the lawyers. If the force-of-sovereignty nominalist doctrine prevails, then we have such evils as the dictatorship by a monarchy or the doctrine of law practiced by the Third Reich, in which the courts are merely tools of the whims of a present government.

Indeed, when the present Basic Law is rigorously examined in those terms of reference, we must find that the Basic Law is pregnant with irreconcilable contradictions among various of its important features. This is not accidental. For two reasons, the Basic Law in its present form is not a constitution in principle, but a collection of laws which are distinguished from other positive laws only by the special procedures governing their enforcement and alteration.

The intent to establish a constitution is clearly admissible from the effort as a whole, but this intent dissolves in inconsistencies on key points of detail. The difficulty is that instead of being a constitution in principle, the Basic Law is to date a pragmatic collection of specifications of superior positive law. This pragmatism is reflected in the fact that many of the sections or subsections are included to fit the circumstances determined chiefly by the fact of the occupying powers. This defect of pragmatism is also historically a pervasive quality made necessary to a certain extent by those conditions. The need to satisfy the internally contradictory requirements of the aggregate occupying powers precluded the efficient application of a consistent constitutional set of principles.

This, we hasten to interpolate, can be efficiently remedied by amendments of two elements of the Basic Law. First, the Preamble must be expanded as an explicit specification of governing constitutional principles, and, second, that Preamble must be made enforceable with respect to contradictions otherwise arising in the application of other features of the Basic Law.

There is a variant of the nominalist doctrine which, at first glance, may appear to lie midway between nominalist and humanist jurisprudence. This is the special case of nominalist doctrine which adopts customs or other norms as an axiomatic basis for what is represented as constitutional principles.

One is properly reminded by G.W.F. Hegel's savage and entirely justified ridicule of Immanuel Kant respecting Kant's cooptation of the Aristotelian

categories. As with alcoholism or opium-addiction, an established habit is not self-evidence of virtue. Nor is the case for customary or normative law improved much by enterprising efforts to show a semblance of logical consistency within a body of customary law. Customary or normative law has no advantage but the convenience and comfort to the citizen of knowing that the law is not subject to the mere caprices of judges or parliaments.

As we have already indicated in several ways, once we pose to ourselves the proposition that the included proper principled function of a nation is to maintain scientific and technological progress, we have the proper clue to a notion of constitutional law in general. However, without further exploration that indication remains only a powerful clue. It does not by itself define the necessity for a democratic republic, nor of the coherent connection between the obligation of the state to the citizen or the citizen to the state.

We take for granted that some citizens will object that our approach to law is "too sophisticated." To such objections we answer at this juncture on two levels. We do so now because we are about to encounter the most profound and important considerations.

It has not been altogether unknown that some persons when ill search out an elderly woman whose practice with herbs has perhaps given her the reputation of being a witch. In such cases, the patient has been known more than once to have argued: "I don't trust doctors. I don't understand medicine." The life and well-being of a nation ought to deserve nothing inferior to medicine in respect of scientific competence.

Although statecraft is properly a subject of science, the necessary principles we develop here are not beyond the comprehension of the literate citizen of average intelligence. The difficulty which may appear at first is that the essential facts involved may often be previously unknown. For that aspect of the matter, they remain merely facts, which can be comprehended like any fact. More important, they require the citizen to look at the subject from a different standpoint than he or she has perhaps been habituated to do.

The problem here is not really one of great difficulty, but merely unfamiliarity. The arguments are not of the sort which can be assimilated by "speed-reading" methods of scrutiny, or by glancing at a few key phrases within paragraphs quickly skimmed across with the eyes. The essential difficulty with the case we are developing here is not that the case is beyond the ability of the citizen to think through; the only real difficulty is that these arguments require that he indeed think.



Above, left: Frederick I; right, Frederick II. Opposite page, left: Ibn Sina; right: Dante Alighieri.

Humanist architects of modern Europe: Islamic philosopher and scientist Ibn Sina [980-1037] represented the high point of the Islamic philosophy and statecraft which was instrumental, both intellectually and through direct trade and economic contacts, in shaping the civilization of modern Europe. Ibn Sina's writings were influential in the development of such great European humanists as Roger Bacon, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, and René Descartes. Hohenstaufen Emperor Frederick I [Barbarossa] — reigned 1155-1190 — broke with papal and Byzantine influence and strove throughout his long reign to establish his "grand design" of a humanist state based on economic progress. Centered in Swabia, Burgundy, and Lombardy, this state was to be the foundation for a world-wide network of humanist republics. Frederick II [Holy Roman Emperor 1220-1250], grandson of Barbarossa, was educated in Sicily by the finest Islamic, Christian and Jewish thinkers. Thus possessed of a scientific mind, Frederick successfully forged the Kingdom of Sicily into Europe's first centralized, modern state, despite bitter papal and Lombard opposition which caused him to be excommunicated no less than three times. Poet Dante Alighieri [1265-1321] was also a leader in the fight for humanist republics in Europe, and led the opposition to the monetarist leader Philip the Fair in the bleak period prior to the Black Death. His policy of a world republic is expressed in his treatise De Monarchia.

Concept of Natural Law

The agreement among a majority of citizens to the effect that technological progress is a principle of national purpose is not only correct as far as it goes, but it properly implies those broader inquiries which lead consciousness to a direct and adequate comprehension of the lawful principles of a constitutional democratic republic.

The rigorous proof of the theses is developed in the following way.

The formal development of the case begins with a conceptualization of the twofold necessity for technological progress. Such a preliminary view is pedagogically necessary, but is nonetheless only a preliminary pedagogical step toward the deeper understanding that the two facets are precisely that. They are not distinct "factors," but different facets of the same principle.

The first of these facets is *material necessity*, which is most efficiently stated from the standpoint of reference of political economy. In brief, the existence of a society demands technological progress; otherwise the society must stagnate and then decline.

The second of these facets identifies the necessary material conditions of society for satisfying the specific moral needs of the citizen. The empirical-historical distinction of man from the lower beasts is the realization of the human mind, or what Christian theology defines to the same practical effect as the human soul. If the form of society does not place practical social value upon the individual human mind's potential for self-perfection through advancing scientific knowledge and related governance of practice, the absence of such conditions tends to degrade the citizen's sense of social identity to one of moral likeness to the lower beasts, degrading the citizen's



consciousness and social practice to a parody of the culture of a troop of baboons.


Combining these two facets, it is shown that the material necessity for technological and related progress defines those material conditions of social practice which are uniquely in agreement with man's required moral nature. This connection is shown to be no coincidence; man's moral nature and the possibility of technological progress are two interconnected facets of the same fundamental principle.

When that essential principle is understood, the rigorous conception of the humanist republic is directly derived.

The method we employ to develop the proof here includes recent decades' discoveries in science. The use of these new discoveries provides a more rigorous proof than was available to preceding humanist thought, but is not therefore in any way set against the essential conceptions of humanism as developed over the preceding three thousand years of Mediterranean and European civilization. What we do that is new is merely to perfect conceptions which were formerly otherwise fully developed in at least all their characteristic features.

To clarify that point, we summarize the relevant points of the history of European humanism, and then situate our included advances within the body of humanism existing before this time.


As we have already noted, humanism was always associated with the policy of the "city-builders." In Germany, from Otto until Henry IV at Canossa, from Frederick Barbarossa until 1266 AD, in the revival of humanism from the late fourteenth century, from Groote through Cusa into the Erasmians, the consistent practical policy of humanism was the promotion



of an urban-centered technological progress. The object of this humanist policy was not the satisfaction of individual greeds of mere hominid biological individuals. The increase of wealth was regarded as a material necessity as well as a fulfillment of man's obligation to exert dominion over nature. What was regarded as more essential than the increase of wealth as such, was the fostering of those qualities of the individual human mind which express themselves inclusively in technological progress and scientific knowledge.

Man distinguishes himself absolutely from the lower beasts by his social progress in effecting changes in productive technology which qualitatively modify human behavior in a manner consistent with man's increasing practical mastery of the laws of the universe. In distinction to this, the lower beasts are limited to fixed ranges of behavior, to the effect that their ranges of possible behavior in reproducing their species has the appearance of being genetically fixed for each species. This distinction was regarded by ancient and medieval humanists as the empirical demonstration of the powers and existence of the human soul.

It is important to grasp the conception of humanist policies common to the great Christian thinkers. To them, technological progress was not viewed as a moral end in itself, but as an indispensable means to the most fundamental moral end. Only in a society in which the creative-mental powers of the individual mind were the practical basis for determining the importance of the individual personality could the citizens in general acquire a conscious sense of their social identity which was in correspondence with human nature. By causing the citizen to regard his powers to discover, transmit, and practice new scien-



tific knowledge as the essential feature of his identity, the citizen was induced to locate his identity in those creative powers of mind, rather than locating his identity in his mere biological individuality. To restate the point in theological terms, the object of technological progress was to mediate the self-perfection of the human soul.

Technological progress could not be separated from the issue of truth versus illusion. How do we know that what is proposed as knowledge is appropriate to increasing perfection of knowledge of natural law?

In the history and prehistory of our species, there is a secular growth in population correlated with cultural advances which have been shown, at least after the fact, to have represented technological progress. In other words, technological progress is correlated with an increase in the ecological population-potential of the human species. However, sheer numbers of individuals, while a relevant consideration, are not a conclusive measure. We cannot separate the quantity of persons from the quality of persons.

In this connection we encounter what is usually attributed to Karl Marx, Marx's notion of *labor power*. It is most relevant to emphasize that Marx was not the original discoverer of such a notion in political economy. We find the notion of labor power rigorously developed in U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander

Hamilton's 1791 *Report on Manufactures*, the policy proposed to and adopted by that nation's Executive and Congress during that period. The same notion of labor power is rigorously restated in the 1837 *Principles of Political Economy* by the leading American political economist Henry C. Carey. We also discover that these same conceptions were common among humanist circles in Bourbon France and Spain of the late eighteenth century, and had wide currency, if in varying degrees of comprehension, throughout the humanist circles of Europe during that same period, including most emphatically the German republican movement gathered around such heirs of the great Leibniz as Herder and Forster. It is a documented fact that Marx's credit for apparent originality in developing a notion of labor power is chiefly the result of his ignorance of and misguided hostility toward the leading humanists allied to Condorcet, Turgot, Vergennes, and Lavoisier.

If technological progress is progress in fact, it must effect increased powers for further advances in technology within the population. This was clearly understood by every leading humanist political thinker from the fifteenth century onward and generally understood in Europe from the point of Abelard's influence onward, including the first humanist period of the Holy Roman Empire, from Otto until Canossa.



"The individual who contributes a single valid scientific discovery has contributed... both a universal act and an immortal act": Technological progress is basic to the humanist conception of a constitutional republic, and German basic science and advanced industrial technology, supported by the majority of the German population, are today the fundamental barrier to a resurgence of Nazism. They must be defended against the environmentalist, self-professed "antifascists" who are in fact working to lay the foundations for a resurgence of the Nazi order. Left: advanced medical research in the Federal Republic; opposite page: West Germany's advanced plutonium fission fast-breeder reactor, under construction despite environmentalist opposition.

Carey's notion of value in his 1837 *Principles* is of notable relevance here. Carey refutes British political economy, including Malthus, Ricardo, and Mill, by proving the British doctrine of ground rent factually and historically absurd, and by rejecting in a related way the notion that a quantity of labor-time of a given price could be the determinant of value. Carey focuses on the effects of technological progress in economy for the determination of value, showing that yesterday's values are depreciated by advances in productive technology. He shows in a related way that the value of a commodity is its necessary cost of social reproduction, not its historical accounting cost. It is in this connection that he defines the combined quantity and quality (productive power) of labor to be the sole determinant of economic value in a capitalist economy.

On this point, relative to his differences with Carey, Marx is in error. Although Marx was governed in his essential conceptions by the notion of technological progress as primary, in his empirical approach to political economy in fact, as in *Capital*, Marx's analytical method is predominantly reductionist (mechanistic), focusing on short-range statistical features of the British economy (primarily). On this point, Carey adopts the superior empirical approach, making the primary datum of political economy the

transformation of values through technological progress. Marx, in his analytical approach, breaks away from his own conceptual approach, and attempts to first develop a model of economy without technological progress before attempting to modify this first-approximation model to incorporate technological progress. As a result of Marx's inferior choice of analytical method relative to Carey's, we have the wretched failures of *Capital* exemplified by the condition of the fragmentary concluding chapter of *Capital* Volume II. This included failure of Marx's *Capital* is not accidental. In his approach to the analysis of economy, Marx broke away from his own method and committed a fundamental methodological error. He regarded as empirically self-evident the determined ("cell-form") magnitude rather than the process which determines magnitude. Thus, in all his defects, if only in his defects, Marx is indeed influenced by the incompetent British school of political economy.

In general, all the leading currents of late eighteenth century humanism defined the increase in population of the number of individuals of enhanced productive powers as the essential parameter of political economic policy. This conception was largely the result of the powerful influence of Leibniz who, in turn, directly and properly attributes the proximate origin

of his relevant conceptions to Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa. That most relevant point is Leibniz's crucial understanding that truth is located in the process which causally determines magnitude and not in the determined magnitude as such. (This is also stated in different language in Erasmus of Rotterdam's "existence is not a predicate.")

The shortcoming of notions of labor power is that that power over nature remains unexplained in terms of the laws of nature. It is in this connection that we are presently able to provide a more rigorous proof of humanist principles than was feasible at the close of the eighteenth century.

Not only is the secular evidence of combined human history and prehistory a rise in both populations and ecological population-potentials mediated through technologically advancing forms of society, but examination of these modes of production in thermodynamic terms shows that the increase in population correlates with a growth in the number of calories at efficient human disposition in average, per capita rates of production. Furthermore, when this data is graphed properly, one adduces a secular tendency for an exponential growth in the rate of energy-density increase.

Going further in the same way, not only does the amount of energy per capita increase, but the amount of total energy required to reproduce a productive individual is produced at a lower average social cost. This reduction in social cost of producing an individual of higher negentropy is the proper primary parameter we require.

Thermodynamics of Human Progress			
Years Before Present	Per Capita Energy	Rate of Growth	Second Order Rate
1,000,000	2	2.0×10^{-5}	4.4×10^{-6}
100,000	5	0.8×10^{-4}	1.4×10^{-5}
5,000	12	3.6×10^{-4}	2.3×10^{-2}
500	26	6.0×10^{-2}	4.0×10^{-2}
100	77	1.6×10^{-1}	
1	230	1.5×10^{-1}	

Table shows increases in per capita consumption of energy over the course of human history. Column labeled "Second Order Rate" illustrates the fact that not only is the rate of growth of per capita energy consumption increasing, but the rate of growth of the rate of growth is increasing as well.

This is not the end of the investigation for all future time, of course. In that respect we are not arguing that the parameter defined in this way is the final, absolute measure for examining related subject matters for all time. The use of a scalar measure for energy is known at present to be both paradoxical and wrong. Yet, knowing this measure to be wrong, we are presently only at the outer doorway of solution to this paradox in respect of the physics of high-energy plasma processes and the related negentropic physics of biological processes. The parameter we have introduced is only relatively absolute with respect to earlier parameters. It enables us to solve more powerfully issues which could not be efficiently solved before this time, but does not solve those further issues which will become solvable later through development of superior parameters.

Nonetheless, despite those specified limitations, the parameter indicated does enable us to solve certain kinds of fundamental scientific issues with absolute finality for all future time, including the notions of natural law essential to the notion of a constitutional republic and also essential to present progress in the sciences.

By adducing the negentropic thermodynamics from the evidence of human history and prehistory, we pose the issue of progress in terms to the effect that we are able thus to directly connect the process of creative-mental development of scientific knowledge to the inner connection between labor power and universal material processes. The correlation of rising energy density with advances in technology shows that the innovations in technology arising out of progress in scientific knowledge are directly increasing mastery of not merely nature, but of the lawful ordering of nature.

What this demonstrates empirically is of the most fundamental importance to all human knowledge.

The empirical datum of reference for this study is not a particular advance in technology, not a particular scientific discovery in itself. The proper empirical datum is the comparison of the moments of progress in scientific knowledge with moments of manifest increased power over the lawful ordering of nature in the social practice of entire societies. What is to be compared is not a specific act of knowledge with a specific act of production. The data to be correlated are the process of creative-mental discovery on the one side with the negentropic process of advances in social-productive practice on the other. It is the connection between these two data, a connection itself conceptualized as a process, which is uniquely the primary datum of all scientific knowledge.

The primary question of knowledge is whether the methods of generation of crucial hypotheses concerning the order of nature employed in creative-mental

generation of hypotheses are in correspondence with increasing negentropy in society's productive relationship to nature. In this way, the fundamental critical experiment for all scientific knowledge is shown to be the efficacy of a way of creative-mental creation of hypotheses with respect to a population of increasing manifest labor power. In this way, and only in such terms, does mankind have any proof of the validity of knowledge. What is proven is not particular knowledge as such, but rather the perfection of the creative-mental powers of scientists into increasing appropriateness with the laws of nature.

The corollary of this is that man's knowledge of natural law is not located in existing particular scientific knowledge, but in the hypothesis-generating powers of cultivated creative-mental processes. Man's knowledge of natural law is located primarily in the process of self-perfection of his creative-mental powers for increasingly negentropic mastery of nature by society.

That is the essential conception of Neoplatonic humanism.

Constitutional Law

The only moral purpose of human society is the perfection of its mastery of and obedience to natural law. This obedience takes the form not of obedience to a fixed set of rules, but man's responsibility to take responsibility for the lawful consequences of his action. Man is responsible to develop foreknowledge of the consequences of his behavior, and to develop and obey scientific knowledge accordingly. The criterion by which consequences are to be judged is *mediately* technological progress as we have defined it above.

We are not responsible to shape the acts of our posterity in detail. We are absolutely responsible to provide our posterity with increased perfection and power to continue the process of human self-perfection in this way.

It is within this context that the proper relationship between the individual and the state is determined in a humanist republic.

The mediate source of all human progress is the creative-mental powers of the single individual. The individual who contributes a single valid scientific discovery has contributed a power to every other member of society. This contribution is more than an act; it is a permanent foundation for the future progress of all generations of humanity to higher levels beyond that contribution. The creative individual's scientific discovery is therefore both a universal act and an immortal act.

Yet, the most gifted scientists cannot effect such contributions to social practice only individually. Unless the idea is efficiently transmitted to social prac-

tice, their potential universality, their potential immortality is crushed at the outset. The transmission and assimilation of those contributions by others, the socialization of discovery, is the means by which the individual genius depends entirely upon society for realization of his own universal immortality in fact.

The transmission and assimilation of scientific contributions requires corresponding development of mental powers in the society generally. Without these advances in mental powers of the population, ideas cannot be transmitted and assimilated for practice. This development of mental powers is nothing but the development of the creative-mental powers to that purpose. Thus, the individual who transmits and assimilates valid new scientific discoveries also has the quality and practical value of universality and immortality.

Although great scientists and technologically cultured populations are at each moment the wellsprings of the self-perfection of their own generation and all posterity, they do not make such contributions as mere biological individuals of genetically determined creative capabilities. The creative mental power they represent must be developed in them by society. They must be educated, and must be provided those circumstances of individual life through which education can succeed and in which their creative potentialities as individuals are fostered.

Hence, the state cannot fulfill its purpose as a state without developing the individual, and the individual cannot fulfill the moral purpose of his or her own existence without a state, a republic, committed to those policies.

This quality of the individual we call *freedom*. Freedom is not the mere liberty to express any sort of impulse which might erupt from within the individual. Such confusion of mere liberty with freedom might be appropriate to a decaying society of baboons, but such immoral heteronomy has no place in human society. Freedom is the development of the individual's powers of self-fulfillment through the creation, transmission, and assimilation for practice of advances in scientific and related knowledge. This freedom depends primarily upon scientific education and material and social conditions of life of a sort agreeable to scientific self-development. It also requires liberty of expression, even a margin of liberty for error in the exploration of advances in scientific knowledge and related practice.

In this respect the notions of a humanist democratic republic and a Rousseauvian form of "pure democracy" are exact opposites, as opposite as good and evil. The Rousseauvian notion of "democracy" is precisely complementary to the Hobbesian notion of dictatorship and monarchy. This was understood by John Milton and by the Federalist Thomas Paine. Hobbes

and Rousseau defined man as essentially biological individuals, seeing each individual as intrinsically in antagonism to the whole society. Both Hobbesian man and Rousseauvian "noble savages" are not real men, but men and women degraded to the bestiality of baboons. Hence, for Hobbes and Rousseau only immoral dictatorships or "social-contract" democracies were conceivable. They defined society as aggregations of bestialized biological hominid individuals with no moral purpose but their heteronomic sensualities, their greeds, their baboon-like aggressions, and the pursuit of exotic gratifications for their jaded sensual appetites.

A state cannot be a "pure democracy," or it must inevitably degenerate into something like the Nazi state. A "pure democracy" is a nation and a people without moral purpose, a bestial form of society in which the caprices of a transient majority in power act to the same immoral effect as the whims of an absolute monarch. Thus, "pure democracy" leads through its chaos and anarchy to dictatorship, as one faction seeks to ensure the permanency of its own selected national purpose or advantage secured by the force of dictatorial sovereignty from episodic contrary whims within the electorate.

For this reason the notion of a humanist democratic republic is sometimes described as a nation "of laws, not of men." That is the only sane meaning of the term *Rechtsstaat*.*

The *Rechtsstaat* is not based fundamentally on a fixed set of laws. Laws must change. Particular positive law must change according to need. However, there is a higher law which may be improved, but which must not be alterable in the same way as ordinary positive law. This higher law is properly defined as *constitutional law*.

Formally speaking, constitutional law is a statement of both the governing, inalterable purposes of the nation-state and of the reciprocal relationship between the state and the individual citizen. Constitutional law must be impervious to the caprices of episodic parliamentary majorities, and binding upon courts to the effect that any judge who might act contrary to explicit constitutional principles must be impeached, his judgments nullified, and the damages caused by his evil judgments remedied.

Yet, in a certain manner of speaking, constitutional law itself is a form of positive law. It is determined law. By what process is constitutional law properly de-

termined, and in what coherent way altered in behalf of its self-perfection?

The answer is given by history. The three thousand years of the history of Mediterranean and European civilization are a struggle between the forces of humanism and the evil forces of nominalism. That was the issue between Abelard, Roger Bacon, and Henry III of Germany on the one side, and the evil faction around Hildebrand who bought, murdered, and kidnapped to seize the papacy from popes they had poisoned to establish the Guelph rule. That was the issue between the Hohenstaufen and the Guelph antihumanists. That is the continuing issue of humanity today.

Humanism must establish its power at the expense of a defeated nominalism, and must establish not only a humanist constitution of republics but must construct the institutions of those republics to such effect that never again can the evil, antihumanist forces of nominalism secure hegemony over nations. The state must be constructed in such a fashion that only humanist influences prevail in the modification of constitutional law and prevail in effective dictatorship of principle over the shaping of ordinary positive law.

That was precisely the purpose and commitment of those American leaders who prepared and led the American Revolution and who established the United States as a humanist form of constitutional democratic republic committed to scientific and technological progress.

The Case of the United States

The American Revolution was not a war of independence. Those teachers and others who argue that it was are either ignorant babblers of the sort who repeat whatever gossip they are taught or are simply liars.

The American Revolution was an international humanist conspiracy centered around the humanist Colbertistes of France, whose objective was to end the rule of the Guelph faction and to establish a world of humanist republics committed to the principles we have set forth here. The American Revolution was launched simultaneously with the efforts of Vergennes and others in France to exploit the weakening of the Guelph faction by the monetary crisis of 1773, which had weakened the power of Amsterdam and Geneva bankers. This conspiracy involved the networks established around Leibniz in Germany, the humanists of the Spanish Bourbon courts, the humanists of Naples, of Scandinavia, and even of England itself. The strategic role envisaged for the American Revolution was both to weaken the power of the English monarchy to the advantage of continental Europe, and to establish, primarily with French help, a new humanist republic

*The German word *Rechtsstaat*, commonly translated "constitutional state," carries the significance in German of a state ruled by law for the benefit of all its citizens, and is used in contradistinction to the terms "feudal state" and "police state."

The center of European antihumanism was the Guelph faction — stemming from a Roman usurer Hildebrand who used poison and the forged Donation of Constantine to seize both spiritual and temporal power as Pope Gregory VII (1073-1085). Top right, seventeenth century rendition of Hildebrand with quill and skull. Below, the burning of Jacques de Molay, Grand Master of the humanist Knights Templar, by the pro-Guelph monarch Philip the Fair, in Paris in 1313.



in North America which would serve as a model of rapid industrial development and republican institutions for the benefit of the struggle in Europe.

The American Revolution was a continuation of Charlemagne's denunciation of the fraudulent "Donation of Constantine," of the fight led by German emperors from Otto through Henry III, of the fight led by the Hohenstaufen against the evil Guelph, the fight of France's Louis XI — creating modern France at English and Burgundian expense — and the struggle of the Tudor Erasmians, the English Commonwealth humanists, and the French Colbertistes against the same antihumanist, Guelph-centered nominalist evil. Of this the leaders of the American Revolution were eminently conscious. So, Federalist Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin's adopted protégé, contemptuously derided the evil George III of England-Hanover and his predecessors as "Mr. Guelph."

Admittedly, there is a contrary literary view of the American Revolution. A glance at the authorship of that contrary view is most relevant to understanding both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany today.

During and following the American Revolution, the young North American nation was besieged by English forces both from without and within. The inner British forces, known as Tories, and also properly known as traitors, were centered in Manhattan in banking and related interests tied to the banks of London, Amsterdam, and Geneva. Aaron Burr, Vice President of the United States under the first administration of Thomas Jefferson was such a traitor, an agent of the Barings' banking interests. Burr led a filibuster on English behalf in the southern regions of the new nation, attempting to nullify the United States' purchase of the Louisiana territory and establish a monarchy allied with the British monarchy in that territory, for the advantage of Britain's efforts to destroy the United States. Later President Andrew Jackson was tainted with Burr's treason, barely escaping from sufficient involvement to have brought himself under the same charge of treason as British agent Burr.

Later, following the 1815 Treaty of Vienna and British rule over Europe as a result, the isolated and thus weakened United States was subjected to massive subversion.

Despite other difficulties, United States' national credit and industrial progress were the greatest in the world during the 1820s, although British undermining of the nation was already on the upsurge. In the 1828 election, a group of Manhattan banking interests connected to London and Amsterdam banks and centered around Aaron Burr's political heir, Martin Van Buren, engaged in a massive vote fraud which put Andrew Jackson into the Presidency as Van Buren's protégé.




Later, Van Buren himself succeeded his puppet Jackson in the Presidency. This was the birth of the power of the Manhattan-centered faction of the Democratic Party.

Through Jackson's election, British interests dissolved the United States' bank and placed the U.S. Treasury and national credit under the control of the City of London through London's corresponding financial institutions of Manhattan. Jackson also savagely attacked the established United States' policy of technological progress, turning the United States from the most rapidly advancing industrial nation in the world — technologically ahead of the British in crucial areas during the 1820s, to a policy of relative technological stagnation with emphasis on agriculture at the relative expense of industry. Under Jackson and Van Buren the plantation slave system grew massively, with the profits from slavery pouring largely into the City of London. (The famous British opposition to the slave trade of this period is one of the most monstrous hypocrisies and frauds — the British, who fostered slavery in the United States to London's profit, merely wished to avoid the unprofitable African slave trade for British shipping.) The result of the Jackson-Van Buren presidencies was the Panic of 1837.

From 1828 through 1864, the Manhattan-centered national machinery of the Democratic Party in the United States was in fact the party of treason, a party directly controlled from the City of London. This element within the Democratic Party (also within parts of the Republican Party) has continued down to the present day, centering politically around a small but influential *New Republic* magazine which is the leading literary voice of Britain's policies for the United States.

The opposition to treason in the United States from 1828 into 1860 centered around the American Whigs, whose leading national spokesmen were Henry Clay and the Philadelphia-based economist and publisher Henry C. Carey. Carey's father had been Matthew Carey, formerly an Irish political leader who had fled to Paris during the period of the American Revolution. Matthew Carey had spent five years in Paris becoming a supporter of Benjamin Franklin, and had emigrated to the United States to continue that role. He was associated with such important German economists as Friedrich List, who, before his return to Germany, was an important United States Federalist leader in the Reading, Pennsylvania area (where he founded a newspaper continued to modern times). This is reported to emphasize the nature of the continuity between Franklin, Washington, Hamilton, and Lincoln.

President Abraham Lincoln was a "Henry Clay Whig," and the candidate of the Whig kernel within the Republican Party. Lincoln's principal economic



Humanists and America: Benjamin Franklin (l.) [1706-1790], the inheritor of the political networks of Leibniz and Colbert, was the leading humanist organizer of the later 18th century in both America and Europe, and conceived of the United States as a humanist bastion from which to organize Europe. Known also as one of the foremost scientists of his day, his accomplishments have been significantly blacked out by British monetarist historians in the years since the Treaty of Vienna. Henry Carey (r.) [1793-1879] was the architect of the progressive Whig-Republican economic policies of Abraham Lincoln and the foremost U.S. economist of the 19th century. In his theoretical writings, Carey demolished the ground rent theories of the British monetarist David Ricardo and the population theories of Malthus. Karl Marx's (c.) [1818-1883] outlook as a youth was chiefly shaped by the influence of Franklin and his fellow humanists on Marx's father and his peers in Trier and later Bonn. Although his economic work was flawed by his partial methodological reliance on the British school of Smith and Ricardo, Marx stood in the humanist tradition of advocating material and technological progress for a rising population. A correspondent of Henry Carey, Marx's organizing played a vital role in preventing the British government from entering the Civil War on the side of the Confederacy.

advisor was Henry Carey, the same Carey who was the principal link between the Lincoln Administration and Karl Marx. (Despite Marx's criticisms of Carey, Marx adopted in full Carey's analysis and proposals concerning the elimination of slavery, and incorporated Carey's analysis of the roles of wheat and cotton as his own views.)

Lincoln's principal problem within his government and the Congress was that a key Manhattan component of the Republican Party was allied to British interests. It was with aid of those contaminated channels within the Republican Party (e.g., Secretary of War Edwin Stanton) that the British were able to effect Lincoln's assassination. Overall, this contaminating element within the Republican Party caused principally both the poor initial military record of the Union forces and Lincoln's vacillations on policy issues until 1863. It was Union military victories pointing toward the victory at Gettysburg which enabled Lincoln to free himself of much of the hindrance of Stanton et al. — without, unfortunately, dumping Stanton — by basing himself on the Western and Midwestern political forces. Even so, the British attempted to stop the Union victories by organizing the "Irish draft riots" in New York City in 1863. However, Union successes, aided by the work of Marx's International Working Man's Association, caused anti-Russell British factions to force a drastic change in British policy toward America in 1863, including a shift of British policy toward the Maximilian occupation of Mexico, originally a London debt-collecting project.

Despite Lincoln's difficulties, the Whig-Federalist policies proposed by Carey were significantly pushed through during the 1860s, to the effect that the United States was mobilized for its second great wave of industrial development, a policy flawed by Manhattan defeat of Lincoln's plans for industrial development of the defeated Confederate states.

Consequently, up into the turn of the present century, the secular tendency in the United States, despite all deviations and complications, was toward the realization of a constitutional republic as set forth by the Founding Fathers around Franklin. This secular tendency is the basis for the United States' wealth and power to this day.

Beginning in the 1880s, a new form of British ideological influence began to radiate into the United States through the mediation of such investment-banking forces as those associated with the Warburg interests, and with former Confederate elements of British-allied banking interests such as the Lehmans and Kuhn-Loeb. (The Confederacy was financially a total puppet of London, and had been organized directly from the City of London as part of an effort to bal-

kanize and thus subjugate the United States as a whole.)

The exemplification of this post-1880s development is the testament of Cecil Rhodes. Rhodes, who had been a protégé of the Rothschild and related London investment-banking interests and whose heritage is expressed by the Oppenheimer complex from London to Capetown today, donated his estate to the British monarchy for the explicitly stated, included purpose of subversion tending toward British reconquest of the United States. This same constellation of London financial interests, plus the famous Chamberlain family, created the Fabian Society as a political intelligence and subversion arm of the British Foreign Office.

The ideological expression of this attempted British subversion of the United States was twofold. On the one side, the academic side, there was the British-oriented James Gang (William and Henry). On the trade-union side there were the Fabian, professed Bernsteinists, Victor Berger of the Socialist Party of America, and Samuel Gompers, head of the American Federation of Labor. William James, the author of the doctrine of American pragmatism and the related doctrine of "pluralism," is the central figure for a collection of pragmatist intellectuals identified with the school of pragmatism of John Dewey, the Anglo-American political-intelligence faction centered around the *New Republic*, and the connected "revisionist" school of historiography associated with the corrupt and lying U.S. historian Charles Beard.

With the turn of the century, British subversion of the United States galloped ahead. Under Warburg (the putative model for the "Daddy Warbucks" of the USA's famous "Little Orphan Annie" comic strip), Colonel House and Bernard Baruch exploited the effects of the 1905-1907 crisis to institute the Federal Reserve System on the British model. Charles A. Beard wrote his fraudulent *An Economic Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution*. The gang around the *New Republic* and *Socialist Review*, including in their circles Walter Lippmann and Max Eastman, began pushing the Anglo-American alliance policy as liberal and socialist doctrine. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, ensconced in the U.S. Supreme Court by the same Warburg-centered forces who controlled the unstable Woodrow Wilson, overthrew the principles of the U.S. Constitution in practice by embedding his "force" doctrine in Supreme Court rulings.

The use of this concentration of British-oriented forces around Manhattan enabled the British and their sympathizers to systematically subvert U.S. universities, take over control of large sections of the press and publishing, and other measures directed at eradicating humanist influences and toward indoctrinating

all influential layers of the population in British ideology and the correlated doctrine that the United States must follow Britain in foreign policies.

However, despite that massive British corruption in key institutions of the United States, the continuation of institutionalized technological progress in industry and agriculture embedded the organic traditions of the American Revolution as characteristic impulses within American industrialists, trade unionists, and other layers. The British ideology tended to predominate as emerging American liberal and radical delusions among the nonscientific professionals, the paper-pushing bureaucrats, and the *déclassé* and semi-*déclassé* social strata. Hence, the propriety of former Vice President Spiro Agnew's use of the term "silent majority." Only about twenty percent of the liberal-radical strata of the United States population is thoroughly infected with British ideological impulses. The majority of citizens are still predominantly American humanists in impulse, but, unfortunately, with impulses which are too poorly informed. The political consciousness among the organically humanist majority of the U.S. citizens lags way behind the imperatives of the impulses themselves.

There is an analogy to this in the Federal Republic. The habit of bowing to British ideology is strong in large sections of the media, and among the liberal-radical social strata of the population. Yet, although inadequately informed, the organic humanist impulses associated with industrial progress are strong in a majority of the population. The common problem in both nations is that the expression of such humanist impulses is evoked only by selected issues of grave crisis. The rallying of citizens in behalf of expanded nuclear-energy programs both domestically and for export, and the rallying in defense of the republic against British-directed international terrorism are exemplary of the common features of the majority in both the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Because the humanistically inclined majority has been deprived of a competent political education, because the channels of communication are contaminated by British-oriented liberals and radicals, the citizenry has not developed yet the broad and profound consciousness of its own republican interests which would permit it to rally politically except on specific kinds of issues under circumstances of grave crisis.

This problem is a lawful one. In this power struggle between humanism and antihumanism, between the effort to build a humanist democratic republic and British ideology, it is only through the rallying of the majority of the population under conditions of crisis that the great constitutional and related institutional

tasks of strengthening a republic can be accomplished. The mobilization of a labor-industry alliance against international terrorism and for nuclear energy development must be viewed as the uniquely appropriate occasion for informing and mobilizing the consciousness of the citizens for strengthening of the constitution.

This is not only a national task of the Federal Republic and the United States respectively. In this hour of crisis, the Federal Republic and France are drawn into close alliance for common defense of fundamental interests against London-centered campaigns of international terrorism and "environmentalism." Italy, suffering under massive British subversion and external pressures, desires to be part of that same alliance. Japan is impelled to the same purpose. The struggle to strengthen consciousness and institutions in the Federal Republic is not to be separated from a mutual effort among these nations to establish commonality of purpose and cooperation through the development of a conscious community of humanist principle among allied forces.


After three thousand years of struggle for the principle of humanist society, after two recent world wars caused by the consequences of British ideological and related influences, the time is overripe to end once and for all the obscenity associated with the Guelph tradition, and to establish the ruling power in the world of networks of humanist democratic republics bound to common purpose by a community of principle.

The Problems of Legal Doctrine

There are legal doctrines which argue strongly against the principles of a constitutional republic. In such connection, one cannot fall into the folly of simply arguing against each of those propositions on their own terms. The arguments themselves are nothing but the determinate expression of an axiomatic antagonism to republican humanism in general. The proponents of the "social-contract" and "force" doctrines will of course cite precedents and case law interminably, or in desperation fall back to inductive fallacies based upon customary law. Their arguments are to be summarily dispensed with by going directly to the axiomatic premises for which all their scatter-brained arguments-in-detail are merely logical-hereditary expressions.

In this connection, it is of special relevance to take up summarily the case of Roman Law. Once it is understood that the traditional praise of Roman Law is itself merely a gigantic hoax, that useful exercise prepares the mind to dispense readily with the other nominalist doctrines of law.

The tradition of Roman Law in modern European



Roman Law: Puffed up by the British in the 18th century as "Rome's contribution to civilization" in order to serve as a precedent for their own imperial designs, Roman Law in fact was merely a codification of looting procedures which violated the principles of natural law and left the civilized world exhausted and ripe for the barbarian invasion which devastated the Mediterranean and finally ended Roman rule itself. The scene on the above relief, carved on the "triumphal" arch of the Roman emperor Titus [reigned 79-81 AD] and depicting Roman soldiers looting the treasures of Jerusalem, was repeated with only minor variations in city after city in the Mediterranean world from the second century BC until well into the Byzantine period. Roman law was also pressed into service by the Hildebrand-influenced medieval popes as precedent for their "Peter's Pence" monetarist swindling.

culture is the net outcome of two complementary frauds. The earliest of these frauds is the forgery we have already cited, known as the "Donation of Constantine." The second, in point of time, is a project fostered by the British Royal Society and related circles during the eighteenth century, of upholding Roman Law as the model of reference for reforms of European constitutions and statutes.

Both of these frauds are governed by the same anti-humanist purpose.

On the surface, the forgery denounced variously by Charlemagne, the Salians, the Hohenstaufen, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, Lorenzo Valla, and Erasmus of Rotterdam, the so-called "Donation of Constantine," is only a simple swindle.

A group of Roman "Lombard" bankers (usurers) associated with the family of Pope Hildebrand employed a combination of pecuniary corruption, poisoning of existing popes, kidnappings and other crimes to secure the papacy for themselves, holding that power in the main from the middle of the eleventh century into the Conciliar Movement of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The pecuniary object of this criminal occupation of the papacy was to use the forgery known as the "Donation of Constantine" to loot all of Western European Christendom through the institution known as "Peter's Pence." On the basis of the looting accomplished through such control of the papacy, the power of the Guelph bankers was established.

The opponents of this policy, including the Salians and the Hohenstaufen, were "city-builders," humanists fostering both the technological progress

and culture of Europe. The Hildebrand-linked Guelph faction, allied with the most brutish elements of the feudal aristocracy, was determined to prevent technological and cultural progress — a medieval "Maoist"-type "Club of Rome" policy and movement.

Against the antihumanist Guelph policy, the humanists raised the issue of natural law. Doctrinally, this centered around such documents as St. Augustine's *City of God*, the Pauline Neoplatonic outlook of the apostolic fathers, such as Origen, and the corroborating scientific evidence mediated through the Ismailis.

The corrupted papacy responded, denying natural law, raising the "force" doctrine of law, and deploying the Crusades and the Inquisition in the effort to terrorize and butcher the humanists. Insofar as the corrupted papacy troubled itself to give appearance of consistent form to such policy, it drew increasingly upon the precedents of Roman Imperial practice for its conduct in secular affairs.

With the Stuart Restoration in England in 1660, the nominalist faction set out to develop political doctrines and to subvert science to the purpose of eliminating consideration of natural law from both state policy and science. With the Guelph accession of the decayed house of Hanover to the British throne, powerful British forces launched an effort to resurrect Roman Imperial precedents for a new world order of Pax Britannica based on the model of Pax Romana.

One of the included difficulties of this enterprise was the abundant and embarrassing evidence that Imperial Rome made not a single notable contribution to human progress. Imperial Rome was based on an

Italy internally ruined economically, which, like post-1938 Nazi Germany, could maintain that rotten economic and social system only by looting its neighbors, and, as those neighbors were looted to the point of marginal gains, looting still further. Hence, the British Guelphians professed to have discovered that the unique Roman Imperial contribution to civilization was Roman Imperial law.

An efficient understanding of the Roman Empire proceeds from study of the struggles of the Gracchi brothers. The Gracchi attempted to reverse the internal decay of the Roman Republic, a decay caused principally by the institution of chattel slavery into Roman agriculture. Their opponents, the slaveholding Italian faction and the bulk of the Roman aristocrats, mobilized the lumpenproletariat of Rome, as British agents mobilized the immoral sansculottes of 1793 Paris, to crush the Gracchian republican faction in a bloodbath. The defeat of the Gracchi led to the perpetual crisis of the last century BC, and the emergence of the obscenity known as the Roman Empire.

There is no reasonable doubt that the defeat of the Gracchi and the emergence of Caesarism set back the progress of Mediterranean civilization by about one thousand years.

The relevant feature of Roman Imperial law is that it was based on a rejection of those principles of natural law reflected in the Gracchian proposals. Moreover, the judgment to be made of Roman Imperial law should not be advanced without noting the consistent relation between the application of that law and the decay of civilization which the Roman Empire accomplished, at least to the extent its rule was efficient.

The proponents of this revival of Roman Imperial law included notably the British agent Montesquieu and the British historian Gibbon. Most notably, the faction gathered around Lord Shelburne, including Jeremy Bentham, the allied forces around the despicable William Pitt the Younger, and the later Palmerston and Lord John Russell (Bertrand Russell's grandfather) were committed to the goal of world imperial rule under a Pax Britannica.

The case of Napoleon is also relevant. Although Thermidor itself is to be commended for bringing an end to the Robespierre rule, Napoleon's relationship to the Robespierre faction parallels the earlier case of Julius Caesar's connection to the lumpen-scum faction of Rome. It is also notable that Talleyrand was an agent of Amsterdam and London financial interests throughout, and the deluded Napoleon's imperial vanities reflected the same Guelphian ideology which his competitor Pitt represented from London. The Code Napoléon, as largely a pathetic abstraction from study of Roman Imperial law, has perhaps done almost as much damage internally to France to date

as the City of London has accomplished from the outside.

The fact that a principle of jurisprudence is defended from the standpoint of precedents of Roman Imperial law is *prima facie* basis for repudiating it pending a more careful examination.

The fact that some schools of jurisprudence argue for the "social contract" or "force" doctrines of law does not mean that we must balance the law of the Federal Republic according to their weight of opinion. On the contrary, the mere fact that a legal doctrine is consistent with the "social contract" or "force" doctrine is *prima facie* sufficient basis for repudiating it out of hand.

Man is properly, morally bound in his own interest by the obligation to discover and fulfill the body of natural law. The argument that "social-contract" doctrines must enjoy the privileges of respect due in a "pluralistic" order is nothing but a demand for a submission of all law to the nominalist, antihumanist doctrines of the "social contract." To the arguments of the proponents of the "force" dogma, we reply properly by imposing the force of a mobilization for natural law upon them.

Law In A Nation of Classes

As we have already indicated, the doctrine of "pluralism" was a twentieth century concoction of the British-oriented American pragmatist William James. Even Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his correspondence with Laski rejects James's doctrine of "pluralism" as crankishness, and rightly so. The doctrine of "pluralism" has no permissible standing before constitutional law, and is a doctrine which is properly unconstitutional in a democratic republic.

Nonetheless, misguided and credulous persons, obviously ignorant of the principles of a *Rechtsstaat*, argue and perhaps sincerely believe that "pluralism" is a necessary instrument of policy for liberty of opinion in a democracy. Such credulous persons are necessarily either ignorant of or have forgotten the axiomatic principles of a nation of law. The thrust of their defense of "pluralism" is the incompetent argument that the employment of constitutional standards of truth to determine which options have standing before the law is "authoritarian" in fact or in tendency, and that "pluralism" is the remedy for such imagined "authoritarian" dangers.

In mitigation of the gross error of the advocates of "pluralism," it must be conceded that a shallow-minded conception of the standard of truth does have the smell of authoritarianism of the old Hohenzollern Empire, and that such vestiges of medieval feudalism do persist in criminal law, including the interpretation of the law of criminal libel according to the Prussian

tradition down to the present day. It should be clear that such errors and abuses by courts require forceful correction of judicial practice, and reeducation of judges. One corrects the errors in the usage of constitutional law; one does not, as the "pluralists" propose, throw out the essential principles of constitutional law because some simple-minded persons have imported grave errors into judicial and related practice.

This discussion must be divided, for pedagogical and allied reasons, into two facets. We must first consider the problems of truth and liberties from the standpoint of the state as a primary whole. Then we must resituate the same discussion in terms of the relationship between the state and the individual citizen.

From the standpoint of the state as a primary whole, the formal difficulty is that informed jurisprudence and related practice has been broadly incapable of comprehending so far the significance of a principle emphasized by Leibniz, a principle which Leibniz rightly attributed to Cusa, a principle of which Erasmus was eminently sensible. The primary subject of law is the underlying, generative notions which determine the proper ordering of positive law for each case. This underlying, generative principle remains constant for all societies. However, from one society to another this unaltered generative principle may determine different orderings in positive law.

The problem of misguided authoritarianism, to which some advocates of "pluralism" and of other related doctrines refer, arises only as parliaments and jurisprudence attempt to locate the highest authority of law in a fixed body of positive law. This problem identifies the error examined by Leibniz and others.

As we have indicated before, the useful document of reference for modern notions of a republic and republican constitutional law is the *Concordantia Catholica* of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa. This document should not be regarded as a potential dogma; Cusa's own later writings on related topics would disallow such a misappraisal of the *Concordantia*. The approach exemplified by the *Concordantia* is properly situated in the whole course of development of humanist notions and practice of law; Cusa's document is to be employed properly as a center of intellectual reference for comprehending that course of development as a whole.

The generative, underlying principle of proper constitutional law is the notion of a world of humanist republics, a secular order of sovereign nations, all governed by a commonality in conception of purpose for human existence, and a commonality of conception of the proper principled relationship between the state as a whole and the individual citizen. As society develops, this constant, universal principle is



Humanist continuators of the idea of a constitutional republic: Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (upper right) [1401-1464], probably educated by the humanist Brothers of the Common Life, made fundamental advances in such areas of science as mathematics, astronomy, and botany. The foremost thinker of the Conciliar Movement, Nicholas formulated the notion of a world order of humanist republics in his chief political work, the *Concordantia Catholica*. Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (upper left) [c. 1469-1536], who also received his early education with the Brothers of the Common Life, was intimately associated with such humanists as the Tudor statesman Thomas More. Through his extensive translations and editions of both the Bible and early Christian thinkers, Erasmus demolished the basis for the papal theocracy established by the faction of Hildebrand, and fought to restore Christianity to the traditions of the Neoplatonic patristic fathers. The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz [1646-1716] developed the modern differential and integral calculus, and fought to implement a program to rebuild Europe from the disaster of the Thirty Years' War. Developed in close collaboration with Colbertian circles in France, Leibniz's program was based on a system of humanist republics, dedicated to fostering an increased population with increased intellectual and productive powers.

properly interpreted as an underlying, generative cause, which determines different orders of positive constitutional law for the specific practice of different qualitative degrees of development of society.

The proper notion of the relationship among different bodies of positive constitutional law so ordered is implied by Erasmus's warning: "Existence is not a predicate." Different bodies of positive constitutional law are properly merely determined products of the application of a constant cause, a permanent generative principle of law. This principle cannot be contained within any particular body of positive law, and could not therefore be identified inductively either by abstracting from a particular body of positive law or by attempting to abstract such a principle from a formal-inductive criticism of a number of bodies of positive law. The existence of the law is the permanent principle of natural law, with respect to which specific bodies of positive law are merely predicates. Existence is not one of its own predicates, and is not inductively determined by any or even a large number of its predicates.

This relationship determines that any body of positive law stands intrinsically in a condition of growing error with respect to the requirements of the higher body of generative law. In a nation committed to natural law, there must be provision for correction of this growing error.

That correction is a matter of science. Like all scientific work, the discovery of new elaborations of positive constitutional law and other positive law must originate with creative-mental processes of individuals who are suitably culturally developed for such undertakings. The conceptions advanced by such individuals first appear as questions, or, in a more advanced form, as hypotheses. These questions must be explored; these hypotheses must be examined in a scientific way. A certain latitude for experiment must be provided by society for this purpose. Parties and factions premised upon the socialization of this scientific process must function within society in behalf of changes in positive law. The state as a body self-consciously governed by principles of natural law must provide a process for deliberation on these proposed changes in positive law.

It is clear, or ought to be clear, that if any body of established positive law is taken as fixed for all time, such erroneous obsessions, such unlawful adherences to established or customary law do represent the sort of evil authoritarianism which appears to be the concern of the reforming "pluralists."

The evident evil and danger in the pluralists' argument is their denial of natural law. On grounds that a process of reform is necessary, the pluralists immediately open in principle the door to the chaos and



anarchy of amoral "pure democracy," a condition converging upon the anarchy of the Jacobin Red Terror in the French Revolution. This condition leads lawfully toward dictatorship under the "force" doctrine of law. The fact that any body of positive elaboration of constitutional law is in growing error, as long as it remains fixed in its precepts and specifications, is not to be interpreted as license for an anarchic alteration under the pressures of any proposed form of alteration.

What is required is a lawfully ordered process of criticism, discussion and debate among parties, and change in positive law, a process governed by the absolute authority of growing consciousness of the specifications of natural law. This is accomplished in a constitutional democratic republic by means like those adopted by the architects of the United States as a constitutional republic. "Checks and balances" in the institutions of government must be provided. These "checks and balances" must, on the one side, afford the maximum latitude for scientific inquiry and partisanship on behalf of necessary corrections in positive law, and yet must efficiently frustrate and nullify partisan efforts to overthrow the rule of constitutional principles of natural law. In particular, as the framers of the U.S. Constitution such as Federalist Thomas Paine insisted, government must be formed to prevent the capricious sway of episodic majorities in popular opinion or elected institutions.

The emergence of modern republicanism removes this discussion from the realm of apparent speculative generalities.

The struggle of European civilization has been a class struggle; all efforts to deny that fact are themselves a doctrine peculiar to antirepublican, nominalist influences. However, the ordinary, mechanistic representation of "class struggle," notably the pathological notion of "class struggle" associated with the followers of Karl Korsch et al., has no real correlation with the actual process to be considered.

The struggle for humanist republics was not a secretion of social classes *in themselves*. It is on this crucial point that the Korschite and "official Marxist-Leninist" notion of the class struggle, including the incompetent, romantical views of Franz Mehring, are altogether objectionable. The struggle for humanist republics was always first of all a scientific process, radiating from individual great intellects and from relatively tiny factions and networks (in respect to the population as a whole). These included the networks of the Hohenstaufen family and its allies the Knights Templar during the early and through the middle of the thirteenth century. Earlier, the struggle for humanist republics intersected the great Abelard and the Salian rulers of Germany. Earlier, it was the networks of the Ismaili. These networks, centered

around great individual humanist intellects, determined analytically which social classes objectively represented the positive interests of humanity. Based on that determination, efforts were made to cause those indicated classes to become conscious of their objective interest, and to mobilize themselves as fighting forces for the establishment of humanist republics. As Hegel or Marx would say, the positive feature of the class struggle in history is the work of great intellects and their associates to transform social classes merely in fact, *in themselves*, into social classes consciously self-governed *for themselves*.


The notion converging upon the ultraleftism of the Korschites, the notion of Beggars-Opera socialism associated with the reactionary nominalist Bertolt Brecht, that the individual within the class, as a Rousseauvian individual, secretes individually positive political impulses and conceptions, is reactionary nonsense. This is a Brechtian persuasion coinciding with the insane sansculottes among the followers of Marat's *L'Ami du Peuple* during the Jacobin Red Terror.

To rise to class consciousness, the individual within the class must become conscious of the positive interest of his class as a whole *according to natural law*. This consciousness can only be achieved through the intervention of great scientific and related intellects which educate the class forces to such consciousness. Not any popularized conviction of the majority of a class represents such class consciousness. Only those programmatic conceptions which concur with the determinations of natural law satisfy such requirements.

The Ismailis and the European Renaissance humanists, centered in such political forces as the Salians, Hohenstaufen, and France's Louis XI, attempted to employ the state, the monarchy, as the instrument for developing and rallying the technologically oriented urban classes around them as the hard social kernel of a factional force against the combined forces of the most reactionary feudal aristocracy and the leaders of that aristocracy, the "Lombard" banking interests besieging (and often occupying) the power of the papacy. The middle force was the peasantry. The humanists attempted to introduce the principles of technological progress to the ranks of the peasantry, and thus mobilize the peasantry as an ally of the urban classes. The bestialists, or nominalists, attempted to keep the peasantry in technological backwardness, and to use the induced backwardness of the peasantry as a means for employing it as a force against the urban classes.

The humanist effort was not simply a political campaign in the image of modern election campaigns. The humanists did indeed propagandize for humanism. Yet, they were eminently sensible in the main that the


European and Mediterranean Trade Routes c. 650 AD



Trade flows from Europe into the Mediterranean in the mid-seventh century still reflected the Byzantine hegemony of the preceding period. Raw materials flowed from northern Europe directly to the Eastern Roman Empire, and Europe received only minimal compensation in the form of luxury goods exported from Constantinople. The Byzantines sharply restricted trade other than that officially sanctioned by a rigid barrier of tariffs and customs duties at the border of the empire. Trade within the European lands was secondary and urban development was restricted:

By the end of the 640s, Islam had wrested Egypt and Syria from Byzantine control — with enthusiastic support of the trading and industrial classes of those regions — and, with the Byzantine customs barrier broken, had begun the revitalization of Mediterranean and Near Eastern trade which was soon reflected in renewed progress and urbanization in Europe. Of particular note is the reopening of the canal between the Nile and the Red Sea in the 640s as soon as Egypt was in Moslem hands.

European and Mediterranean Trade Routes c. 1150 AD




Mediterranean trade shows the effects of 500 years of interaction between Islamic world and Europe. Note in particular the northern trade route from Europe through Russia to Baghdad, founded in 754 as the capital of the Caliphate. This trade route was cultivated in particular by the Carolingians and such Caliphs as Harun al-Rashid in the eighth century, and was instrumental in the spread of urban civilization in Eastern Europe and Russia. Equally significant is the spread of trade within Europe itself, and the emergence of Venice as a leading trading city, which linked Europe via the Po and the Alpine passes with the Islamic Levant and the remaining areas under Byzantine control.

In the mid-twelfth century, the great fairs at Champagne were still the center of European trade, but they were soon to be supplanted by Flanders and the low countries. This was the result of the policy of *Drang nach Osten* initiated by the tenth century Saxon Emperor Otto I (whose reign initiated what Leibniz called the "Golden Age" of Germany) and continued by the subsequent Salian emperors and the Hohenstaufen line begun with Barbarossa. Skilled workers were recruited from Germany and the Low Countries in particular to found trading centers in Eastern Europe, a process which produced a major shift in trade flows as the thus opened-up areas began producing large supplies of timber, pitch, tar, and grain for Europe. Under Barbarossa, Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, founded such important urban centers as Munich and the trading city of Lübeck, and provided them with republican constitutions which emphasized the rights of the merchants.

Frederick Barbarossa's Great Design

At the same time that Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and Bavaria, was pursuing the *Drang nach Osten* in the north, Frederick Barbarossa's chancellor Rainald von Dassel in 1156 formulated the newly-crowned Emperor's "Great Design" for a humanist state in the center of Western Europe. He proposed to fuse together as an imperial state the area encompassing the headwaters of the Rhine, the Rhône, and the Ticino rivers, the last a major tributary of the Po, as well as the three major transalpine passes, Lukmanier, Septimanier, and Brenner passes. This area, the political regions of Swabia, Burgundy, and Lombardy, thus was a geographical nexus for all trade passing from northern Germany and the Low Countries through France to both the Eastern and Western Mediterranean.

Within this area, Frederick built extensive new castles and cities, established numerous colonies of both farmers and merchants — such as the city of Chemnitz — and actively promoted trade and commerce. Frederick conceived of his state as a model for a Europeanwide network of similar states, such as the one being forged by Henry the Lion, in the north.



hegemony of humanist conceptions depended upon proliferating the benefits of urban culture throughout the society. Thus, throughout the Renaissance, the universities and courts were the most immediate arenas for the struggle to assemble a cadre in behalf of humanist conceptions and policies, but the struggle for urban-centered, technological progress was the arena in which the objective side of the struggle for humanism was fought.

For more than a thousand years of Mediterranean and European civilization, the primary, generative locus of the objective struggle among the classes has been the ranks of the bankers. During this period, and actually longer, banking policy has been divided into two factions. On the one side, the humanists, such as the Ismaili "city-builders," demanded a banking policy which fostered accumulations of social surplus for technological progress in modes of urban and rural production. On the other side were the "Lombards" and their heirs, the modern British-oriented monetarists. The latter adhered to a policy of relatively fixing the technology of production (and social relations) — "zero growth" — and diverting the flow of social surplus through various forms of ground-rent payment away from productive progress and into the hands of the usurers.

This was therefore a division between those bankers and their allies whose policy was the increase of per capita rates of gross and net real urban and rural tangible output, and an increase in the quality of the labor force, on the one side, against the usurers (tax farmers, et al.) who advocated a policy like that of the "Club of Rome" or Robert McNamara's World Bank. The former bankers took the standpoint for practice of natural law: man's increasing dominion over nature. The usurers rejected natural law in favor of the nominal increase of the wealth of the usurers and their allies. Thus, it was within banking policy that the primary practical division between humanism and nominalism was rooted.

In those terms of reference one is obliged to see the great struggles of medieval Europe as a class struggle. Objectively, the interests of the urban classes and the real interests of the peasantry were arrayed against the alliance of "Lombard" bankers with those reactionary feudal aristocrats who opposed urban development and progress in rural technology.

In this course, actual political economies were first developed during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Seeds of political economy developed in the humanist centers of Italy and were most notably developed early in France under Louis XI and under the Erasmian faction's leadership during the Tudor period in England. In the Erasmian effort in Tudor England, the associates of the Dudleys, of Thomas

Gresham, of Dee, Gilbert, and others, fostered a policy of forced-draft scientific progress and technological progress. In aid of this policy, institutions for the scientific education of ordinary skilled working men, such as London's Gresham College, were established.

This Tudor development was the center of the birth of the modern urban classes of industrial capitalists and the productive working class, and the emergence of the scientific profession as the germ of a potentially additional new class.

It is purely nonsense, although unfortunately popularized nonsense, that capitalism arose out of the endemic aggregation of "free enterprise." In historical fact, capitalism was created willfully by Tudor law and by the currents of the *politiques* and later Colbertistes in France.

It was the state which created capitalism, by providing state credit and creating the right to patents of ownership for capitalist industrial undertakings. It was the same state policy which, in concert with the emerging industrial-capitalist class, brought a working class into being from out of the ranks of vagabonds, itinerant wage earners and recruits from the peasantry. The policies through which the state accomplished this were the guiding conceptions of Erasmian humanists in the footsteps of Cusa, Dante Alighieri, the Hohenstaufen, Salians, and Ismailis.

This historical fact immediately illustrates the principle which the great Leibniz attributed to Cusa. It was the action of the commitment to natural law which produced the material circumstances and class configuration upon which modern capitalist states are historically objectively grounded. The elaboration of positive law to order those states and their internal relations is a development of law for the special historical conditions so determined. This positive law would be, at its best, unsuitable for earlier forms of society, and yet all forms of society are properly governed by the same principles of natural law which, in turn, properly determine appropriate positive law for each case.

Consequently, only absurdity ensues if one does not view the proper positive law of the Federal Republic of Germany as a body of constitutional law appropriate to the capitalist form of class society, but otherwise subject to a higher body of natural law.

For example, it is becoming clear, and increasingly so, that the proper order of the Federal Republic is uniquely determined by a certain form of programmatic alliance between forces centered around the industrialists and the trade unions. These two primary social classes of the Republic are at once economically antagonistic and yet both dependent in common upon conditions of technologically oriented

industrial and agricultural expansion and development. While antagonistic on the one side, they are united under natural law by the dependency of industrial progress upon the development of the productive powers of labor, which means the education, the leisure, and the conditions of life and work of the working class. In this view, it is normal from the standpoint of natural law that these classes should be centrally represented by different parties, and yet unified programmatically on the issue of the most fundamental policies of the republic.

On what grounds does anyone then object today to the notion of social classes or of parties representative of social classes? History directly answers that question.

Although the monetarist financial interests are nominally part of the capitalist class and have massive financial penetration of the control and ownership of industries, the persisting vector of usury and its monetarist outgrowths is anticapitalist. Through Malthusian and allied doctrines, the persisting impulse from the ranks of political factions associated with monetarist interest has been one of opposition to industrial progress.

The continuing political center of this monetarist interest is the British monarchy and its allied investment-banking circles in the City of London. Having lost the means to establish a Pax Britannica, these forces today propose the same goal in a new guise, sometimes termed "World Federalism." This World Federalism is essentially nothing but a perpetuation in principle of the British rule of Europe through the Holy Alliance established by the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, and an emulation of that obscenity known as the Hapsburg Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Their present objective, typified by the so-called Schlesinger energy policies, the Witteveen proposals, the Robert McNamara proposals, and other Schachtian schemes, is to bring the world to a condition of relatively fixed technology of production, and even to force large areas to revert to more barbaric, labor-intensive modes, proposing this even wittingly at the price of large-scale depopulation (economic genocide). This "zero-growth" or "environmentalist" policy is complementary to the intent to establish neo-Schachtian forms of world monetary order. Under these arrangements, a growing mass of refinanced (pyramided) debt-service obligations is projected to extract increasing masses and ratios of ground rent from a contracting level of real industrial and agricultural output on a global scale.

This World Federalism is not only viciously anti-capitalist, but represents a repudiation of the very essence of natural law. The pyramided debts are to be collected, even when this is known in advance to re-

quire vast enmiseration and genocidal rates of depopulation. The British proponent of such schemes, schemes more criminal than crimes for which Nazis were indicted and tried at Nuremberg, argues that the genocidal depopulation is "regrettable," but necessary to meet the debt obligations! This is pure, totally immoral, criminal nominalism in its distilled essence.

Once the standpoint of classes and class interests is posed against such schemes, the criminal proposals must be rejected as criminal from the implicit standpoint of natural law, and rejected as a criminal abomination by all constitutional law in conformity with natural law's positive determinations.

Hence, the agents and dupes of the monetarist interest proposing such criminal policies are obliged to profess the nominalist position on all important matters, and to find a social base for such professions in those social classes (the liberal nonproductive classes, the lumpenproletariat, and the déclassé) for their advocacies. It is to the advantage of this nominalist "liberal-radical" alliance of de facto supporters of the old British imperialist doctrines that the mention of social classes is deprecated in favor of "pluralism!"

The constitutional problem of capitalist republics centers around the ordering of the relations among the two principal social classes and other classes according to the determinations of natural law. It does not deny class interest, but emphasizes it, while at the same time defending the equality of the citizen regardless of class before the law as an individual.

The contemporary notion of a classless society is not only a nominalist doctrine, but is reflective in tendency of the doctrines and practices of the sort of evil World Federalism to which we have referred. The denial of social classes is the aspiration of those monetarists who propose to destroy capitalism and socialism alike in favor of the universal rule of the extraction of ground rent from a generally contracting world economy.

It is consistently characteristic of the doctrine of classless society that it professes to advocate "human rights" while violently denying those state and related policies which distinguish man qualitatively from the lower beasts. The nominalist view of "classless society" and "classless law" defines man as a self-evident biological individual, who therefore defines his individual interest in whatever way he chooses according to his individual nature. The right of the individual to the development and realization of creative-mental powers, to access through this means to universality and immortality is ignored or derided.

The proper right of the individual is nothing but the right to development and realization of his distinc-

tively human powers, the capabilities and self-realization associated with the creation, transmission, and assimilation for practice of scientific knowledge as we have defined it here. To the purpose of realizing such individual human rights, the citizen is sacred on account of that purpose, and must be provided the liberty for the development and exercise of those powers *to that purpose*.

The only appropriate basis for the deliberation of positive law in a democratic republic is consciousness of natural law by the delegated lawmakers. This must be a consciousness of the principles of natural law, and must be a developed comprehension of the way in which natural law properly determines positive law and the interpretation of positive law for that state.

The broader basis for such a lawmaking process is the fostering of a corresponding consciousness among the citizens generally. It is the constitutional imperative of schools, public media, and other customary channels of information to communicate principles of natural law, and to defend the conception of natural law against nominalist efforts at subversion of the popular will. Although liberty to dissent in opinion even from natural law is a necessary included liberty of the individual within a republic, this liberty of opinion has the moral, constitutional, educational purpose of aiding the citizen to develop knowledge of truth through his or her own self-development in correcting such error. In the balance, the influence of natural law's standpoint must be kept preponderant at the expense of nominalist viewpoints.

The liberty to adhere to erroneous beliefs is also required because of the limited capabilities of the ruling bodies of parliament, courts, and other state institutions to determine precisely what is truth and error. The customary or otherwise prevailing opinion of bodies conducting government tends to be itself in grave error as it tends to project its own imperfect knowledge of truth as a kind of fixed truth. Thus, we restrain the power of the state respecting ostensibly deviant individual opinion, not to foster error but to provide the individual citizen and parties the lawful means for correcting errors embedded in present agencies of the state.

Despite the margin for error in the ruling beliefs of the state, the fundamental principles of a humanist republic are not subject to correction. These are the principle of technological progress and the corollary principle of the need to develop the productive and related powers of labor through education, leisure forms, and living and working conditions generally. The maintenance of those principles in practice depends upon forms of programmatic alliance to this purpose by the two great classes of modern capitalist society, the industrialist interest and the labor-movement interest. These forces are not the exclusive basis

for government, but are the principal social forces around which the other social forces of society are rallied efficiently to common humanist purpose.

The basis for such a programmatic alliance of class forces is the development of the self-consciousness of the members of the classes to not only know the whole interest of their respective classes, but to understand the indispensable commonality of principled interest between the purposes and interests of the humanist republic and the class.

Without that social basis, a humanist republic can be only a dictatorship of "philosopher kings" or an academic abstraction without substance.

Criminal Law

In a *Rechtsstaat* there is no permissible independence of criminal law or other portions of the law from comprehensive governance by constitutional and natural law. Similarly, in the civil law generally, there can be no independence of the ordering and judgment of relations among persons independent of constitutional and natural law.

In the outlook of incompetent doctrines of law, such as "social-contract" or "force" doctrines, a *criminal act* is merely an act in violation of the existing criminal code, and *criminal intent* is either, more narrowly, the intent to commit a criminal act so defined, or, more broadly, a perceived lack of humility of mind and will with respect to the sovereignty attributed to the body of law. Those doctrines of criminal law and their correlatives are to be rejected as either simply amoral or even immoral.

This question has been posed, especially in some Catholic jurisprudence, in connection with the query whether the person was morally obliged to submit to the prescriptions of penal law. To the extent that the law is intrinsically of a "social-contract" or "force" character, obviously there is no *prima facie* moral obligation of the person to obey such a law. The moral question is entirely the morality of either submitting to or resisting the "force" behind such law. To put the matter otherwise, one does not commit the immoral act of anarchistically disrupting society in a mere gesture against an immoral law.

The proper approach to criminal law means that criminality must be primarily defined as a practical expression of the *mens rea*, a criminal mind so defined from the standpoint of natural law. This is not the limit of the matter. As natural law is employed to generate positive law, the positive law takes on in several ways the moral color of the natural law.

This connection is not without difficulties. Since the determination of positive law, even under the governance of an informed effort to follow natural law,

leads to included errors in the law, the state is obliged to define the criminal provisions and implications of positive law with great care.

This caution applies most emphatically to the penal aspect of the criminal law. These provisions of law must defend the constitutional state and its order while exercising such restraint as to minimize penalties and maximize remedies for the alleged offender who is guilty principally of violating an error embedded in the law itself. This aspect of the enforcement of the law features most prominently the related duties of judges, who must otherwise receive mandate to this purpose and effect within the positive law.

For example, in general, positive law's stipulation of mandatory penalties is an abomination contrary to natural law.

For these reasons a purely penal law is an abomination.

The proper central principle of the criminal law is the principled conception of the *mens rea*, the *criminal mind*.

In general, the definition of the criminal mind derived from the standpoint of natural law is the mind which defines the desires and impulses peculiar to individual or family interest as superior to the interest of the society for purposes of practice. This state of mind is properly linked etiologically to the state of mind of the infant, and those forms of insanity and criminality of disposition which are to be considered for purposes of criminal law to share in common either failure of the individual to develop sufficiently away from an infantile outlook or a regression to a parody of the infantile outlook by the adolescent or adult.

From a rigorous standpoint, the criminal disposition is a form of insanity, and all efforts to distinguish fundamentally between the insane and the "responsible" criminal personality are essentially in error on this account.

The practical distinction employed to define the criminal mind is of special importance in this context. In principle, every citizen who holds the view, "I can't worry about society and the world; I must attend to my family responsibilities," is exhibiting a degree of relative infantilism tending in the direction of the criminal mind. We make a distinction in law between those who extend that infantile principle only up to the point of willful disposition to commit criminal acts, and those others who are restrained from crossing that line.

In philosophy and the proper philosophy of law, this identified infantile tendency is termed *heteronomy*. This heteronomic view is that attributed to the individual by the proto-fascist Thomas Hobbes and also attributed to the individual by the pro-heteronomic doctrine of Rousseau. In Christian theology this heter-

onomic tendency, the emphasis on animal-like individual and family advantage as axiomatic, is evil. To this point Christianity deprecates sensual gratifications as impulses which must be *subordinated* to the impulse for good, the impulse for atonement with the purpose of society as a whole.

In the ordinary citizen, as with the ordinary citizen as Christian, the two impulses, for evil and for good, are in a state of combat with one another. The pro-Rousseauian impulses, the impulses for evil, are held in check more or less efficiently by the citizen's efforts to perfect his or her commitment to a policy of atonement with the proper purpose of the human species's existence. This view of the history of the matter helps us to see more clearly how society properly distinguishes between the mind of the ordinary sinner and the criminal mind. The criminal mind is that in which the Rousseauian world-outlook has come to predominate for practice either continuously or episodically.

It is the coincidence between that criminal disposition and a specific disposition for manifestly violating the law which constitutes the criminal mind for the purposes of proper criminal law.

The principled approach to the criminal mind in general would be to treat its problems precisely as we treat insane persons dangerous to themselves or others. The practical problem is that we are unwilling to entrust to government agencies the discretionary power to determine when an individual criminal has been cured of his or her criminal disposition. Thus, we permit the continuation of the barbaric doctrine of *wergeld*, the barbaric doctrine of retributive justice, in the form of specified limits to the penalties imposed for criminal conduct.

What we do, in this pragmatic way, is to measure the degree of criminality of a specific sort of criminal conduct, and leave it to the judicial process to moderate the imposed penalties below the maximum allowed, according to the judgment of the offender's moral condition.

The remaining problem inherent in such a procedure is illustrated by the case of present proposals advanced for modifications of the code in response to the current wave of international terrorism. We see how proposed laws are infected with the attempt of some to use this occasion of crisis to import their own eccentric prejudices or honest ignorance into the statutes. Those who, for reason of ignorance or misguided impulse, have been unwilling to confront the fact that elements of British intelligence are the chief agencies responsible for developing and directing terrorist operations, lash out at various scapegoats, pointing their prejudiced wrath inclusively toward the innocent in this process. For example, the incompetent's effort to imply or state that the study of the

writings of Karl Marx is in any way responsible for terrorism is an example of such demagogic advancement of eccentric prejudices in this connection.

Such proposals for additions to the criminal and related law ought to be nullified automatically by the constitution. Similarly, all similarly offensive features of the carried-forward law of the Federal Republic, paradoxical elements of the Basic Law itself ought to be automatically and efficiently nullified by the Basic Law, and the Basic Law efficiently interpreted to that purpose. *The irrational impulses seizing an episodic parliamentary or judicial majority must not be permitted to violate constitutional principles governed by natural law.*

In brief, the criminal law and all other law must be systematically subject to the constitutional law according to the governance of natural law. Any criminal or other statute which is inconsistent with constitutional law must be deemed automatically nullified to that extent by constitutional law, and *the intent of constitutional law* must be efficiently binding on the decision of judges, with the remedy of the impeachment of offending judges.

The criminal law and the application of the law with respect to formal and implied contracts among persons and corporations must be delimited by the purposes and positive elaboration of constitutional law itself governed by natural law. In this respect, as an extension of constitutional law, the positive law in general comes under proper defense by the means of criminal law. This enforcement of the law applies to the state's role in fulfilling the national purpose of the state, defending the rights of the classes of the republic, and defending the rights of the individual citizen of the republic, in which latter respect all citizens stand as equal in their persons before the law.

There is no authority of carried-forward or customary law of the nation or among nations which can properly exert its authority contrary to this specification.

III. The Function of the Preamble

The broad, endemic fault pervading the Basic Law as a whole is that it is in large part adapted from the Weimar Constitution. That constitution, whose formulation and development was influenced prominently by Carl Schmitt, Weber, and others of nominalist persuasions, is correspondingly endemically paradoxical and otherwise defective. Although some effort has been made to isolate those included features of the Weimar Constitution which most conspicuously facilitated the quasilegal revolution establishing the Nazi

regime, other defects of similar potential remain, and some effort has been given recently to an attempt to reintroduce new features which would in fact resurrect the specific means by which Hitler was installed in the Chancellory.

The real danger embedded within both the Weimar Constitution and to a lesser extent not excluded by the Basic Law is that in both cases, the constitution was adopted under circumstances of foreign occupation following military defeat. The "loopholes," both explicit and implicit, which adapted the constitution to the reality of foreign occupation were necessarily circumstances which directly and otherwise embedded in the constitution a submission of the constitutional state to some authority outside the constitutional state.

Although the advantages of the Basic Law over the Weimar Constitution are not to be overlooked, the principal efficient present safeguards against the fresh imposition of a totalitarian order today are not the precautions embedded in the Republic's law, but the revived heritage of the de Gaulle-Adenauer alliance, and Warsaw Pact reactions against any effort by British-centered forces to use the vestigial occupation authority to once again impose a totalitarian order upon the Republic. The practical security of today's Republic against the imposition of a new totalitarian order does not lie in the Basic Law, but in that alliance with France which did not exist during the Weimar period, an alliance which, combined with Warsaw Pact hostility toward such a totalitarian development, represents more or less sufficient force and freedom of maneuver to enable the Republic to frustrate the totalitarian designs of London and its allies within the Republic.

The indicated faults of the Basic Law can be efficiently remedied. The purpose of such an undertaking goes beyond the negative task of strengthening the nation against future risk of totalitarian conspiracies. The immediate totalitarian conspiracy, the effort, centered in London, to promote inflationary schemes, impose "environmentalist" sabotage of industrial development, and international terrorism, must be fought by putting forward and mobilizing the nation in behalf of the nation's proper national purpose as a humanist democratic republic.

The most essential and efficient step toward the objective is, as we have stated earlier here, to amplify the present Preamble of the Basic Law while pronouncing that Preamble to be a statement of principles which is to be regarded as governing in respect to intent for all interpretation of other elements of the Basic Law and other law.

The means to accomplish this is to retain and to expand upon the opening sentence of the existing

Preamble. To this should be added the following expanded statement of principles, or the equivalent.

Amendment to Preamble

"The Federal Republic of Germany is established as a humanist democratic republic, which commitment shall be understood as a statement of national purpose and the efficiently governing intent of all law of this Republic.

"The national purpose of the state as a whole is to foster its self-perfection in scientific and technological progress on behalf of the existing population and its posterity, and to act in affairs among nations as a force working for similar benefits for all mankind.

"This objective of the state as a whole cannot be realized except through the initiatives of the individual citizens in creating, transmitting, and assimilating for practice new scientific and related knowledge. The citizens, in turn, cannot fulfill that realization of their distinctive potentialities as human beings absolutely distinct from the lower beasts unless the state acts to foster the powers of all the citizens to this effect.

"The right of the individual to enjoy the opportunity for such self-development and opportunity to realize the fruits of his achievements for the general benefit of society and his or her own greater self-respect, is the positive principle of individual freedom on which point the national purpose of the state and the moral purpose of the life of the individual citizen are inextricably united.

"This principle is realized through maintaining scientific progress, and industrial and agricultural development in such a mode that, barring sacrifices to this very purpose, the mass of investable social surplus from current production is increasing secularly at the same time as the average material benefits of the individual citizen are being enhanced. The two means, the investment of social surplus in technologically improved means of production and the development of the creative and productive powers of the individual citizen, are the complementary and interdependent policies upon which the achievement of this national purpose for the present citizens and their posterity constantly depends.

"These interconnected means are unified by the

progress of productive and other technologies through progress in scientific knowledge, and by the cultivation of the creative-mental powers of the citizens in correspondence with advances in science and productive technologies.

"Although the increase in wealth through scientific and technological progress is a necessary means to the essential national purpose, material progress is the means to a more profound, humanistic end. The fundamental distinction between man and the lower beasts is man's creative-mental powers for self-perfection in dominion over the lawful order of nature. In a society in which men and women are practically distinguished from lower beasts, and consciously locate their identities in that distinction, it is necessary that the value society places upon the individual citizen is in conformity with that distinction between man and lower beasts. Only in a society which is committed to scientific and related progress in the general form of social practice does the society place primary value upon such creative-mental qualities of its individual citizens.

"The human necessity of scientific progress is therefore declared to be not merely a material necessity, but the necessary condition of a society in which the individual citizen is valued and self-valued as truly human, and in which relationships are perfected increasingly to that same effect.


"The state of the Federal Republic is the common instrument of the citizens to that common purpose. The state shall order to that common purpose those matters which cannot be efficiently so ordered by the individual citizen or groups of citizens, and shall defend the individual citizen from policies and practices which deprive him or her of efficient rightful participation in that national purpose or impair his or her participation as an adult of sane mind in the selection of his or her lawmaking representatives.

"These principles are declared to be unalterable and inalienable. No law or institutionalized practice shall exist which is in contradiction to these principles. These principles shall be the mandatory principle of intent of the whole law applied as governing to every particular law or case in law within the Republic. The defense of these principles, this national purpose, is the first obligation of the state and each individual citizen."

Brt.
Solo

O Freun - - - de, nicht die - se Tö-ne!

Think



stimmen,



A detailed examination of such a well-known, large-scale musical work of art as Ludwig van Beethoven's Ninth Symphony involves much more than a polished presentation of musical delicacies for the gourmet. In reality, the task is to grasp the particularities hidden behind a resounding "Ninth" or other late works, as proof of the fact that the human mind is characterized by creativity, by a *law of negentropy*, which is no less compelling for the creation of a work of art than it is for social evolution and for the further understanding of physical phenomena.

In other words, Beethoven's accomplishment, his compositional method, can only be understood when Beethoven is viewed as a highly developed epistemologist; what Hegel is in the field of the phenomenology of mind, or Marx in the realm of political economy, so is Beethoven in the medium of music. He is a scientist of musical creativity. He is an investigator of the ways in which musical events act upon human reason. Lyndon H. LaRouche, for example, wrote in his article "The Secret of Ludwig van Beethoven" (1) that he


1. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "The Secret of Ludwig van Beethoven," *New Solidarity*, Vol. VIII, No. 21 (May 10, 1977), p. 7.



Like Beethoven

by Anno Hellenbroich

translated from the German by John Sigerson



owes a great deal to Beethoven for his own creative development and method of thinking. This is because the method by which Beethoven composed during his later period (approximately after 1810-1812) is not merely a musical problem, but in the highest degree an "epistemological" one as well, developed in order to arrive at a higher conception of the willful generation of new ideas. Beethoven's works, once correctly understood, demonstrate the "quality of creative self-development" which is only possible to evoke when Beethoven the composer is conscious of his own creative process. Therefore, whoever wants to seek out the key to the creativity of Beethoven's music, must regard the empirical results of his work, his compositions, as the output of the greatest "scientific" investigator of the creativity of the human mind. It was absolutely not Beethoven's inimitable "genius" or "musical instinct" which produced such works, but rather his rigorous development of new conceptions, his passionate struggle for the development of new musical lawfulness, which determined the unsurpassed abundance within his works.

The great unsolved problem in understanding the "Ninth," which in the past has always resulted in the

general failure of performances of it, is the fourth movement, the so-called "choral movement," which includes Schiller's poem "Ode to Joy." This was the first and last time Beethoven had soloists and a chorus enter at the conclusion of a symphony. Even when we disregard most of the insufferably gushing commentaries written for the credulous in program notes about the "meaning" of the movement — and particularly anything concerning the "ethical" significance of Schiller's text — until now none of the leading musicologists, conductors, and interpreters have known how to present the fundamental concept of this movement as it was originally intended by Beethoven. Listening to a performance of it from the correct standpoint, one notices that the entrance of the vocal parts suddenly sounds like the start of a completely new piece, which seems to have very little to do with the preceding "instrumental section" and the "accompanying" orchestral part. It is as if one had made the rather astounding discovery that all the doors to a passing train had suddenly been opened wide, and some of the passengers were preparing to "experience the beautiful divine sparks" (*Götterfunken*) by stepping off the moving train — with the obvious

uncomfortable consequences! Therefore, in order to prevent the future occurrence of such unfortunate mishaps as the crumbling of a Beethoven composition into two pieces, LaRouche has quite explicitly presented the principle underlying Beethoven's creativity: the notion that the fourth movement is nothing but a "Great Fugue" between orchestra and vocalists on the marvelous pun, "Freude-Freiheit" (Joy-Freedom)!

Since hundreds of musicians have wracked their brains over this problem, sometimes rearranging the musical material, other times extricating the individual themes, or else putting more emphasis on pure descriptions of the harmonic events ("the tumultuous, chaotic introductory fanfare" [Wagner] or "I thought I heard the heavenly voices of angels in the middle part of the movement"), but never comprehending the self-reflexive nature of the musical process, the simplest means of clearing up this deficiency in understanding is to discuss what is certainly the most careful analysis by far of the work, namely, Heinrich Schenker's 1912 monograph on the Ninth Symphony. (2) This is all the more useful since in this book Schenker seizes on every opportunity to attack the ignorance of his contemporaries, especially Mr. Wagner's pathetic descriptions, by means of Schenker's own well-founded insights based on his Kantian standpoint. This polemic is still useful to us today, insofar as it is conducted at least on a specific moral and theoretical level, which certainly cannot be said of current so-called "scholarly music debates," most of which are merely degenerate rehashes of the theories of the "Frankfurt School" along with other linguistic drivel.

The actually evil function of these latter theories has already been thoroughly exposed. (3) Theodore Adorno, for example, consciously collaborated in the "brainwashing" of target populations, especially following World War II, by psychologically profiling them for experimental music programs, rock music, and so forth.

Dealing with Wagner's views is important for our comprehension of Beethoven because it confronts us with the main question: Does Beethoven's key accomplishment consist in his setting to music of Schiller's poem (Wagner: "Finally there came the all-explaining Word"), or is it rather an expanded instrumental work (voices used as instruments)?

2. Heinrich Schenker, *Beethoven: Neunte Sinfonie. Eine Darstellung des musikalischen Inhaltes unter fortlaufender Berücksichtigung auch des Vortrages und der Literatur* (Vienna: Universal-Edition, 1912, 1969).

3. See Peter Wyer, "The Frankfurt School's Assault on Music," *New Solidarity*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (March 8, 1977), p. 4.

The special feature of Beethoven's work — the fact that his investigation of the creative activity of the human mind was conducted in the musical medium — also requires a special kind of presentation. It is first necessary to hear the entire work many times through with undivided concentration, and to learn to hear for oneself the specific "signposts" in the course of the piece, preferably with the help of musical examples, so as to hear the piece's "coastlines." And although the primary requirement for judging the course of musical development is one's ability to hear the piece, the musical score — especially of such widely misinterpreted pieces as the "Ninth" — should be regarded as an important helping device, since this contains the performance instructions written down by the composer, who of course was intent on obtaining the most accurate reproduction of the harmonic effects he had conceived. The score has the same function as a map or blueprint, which shows us exactly which roads we must take or which things we must perceive in the first place.

The Construction of the Fourth Movement

In his somewhat involuted style, Schenker makes it clear right at the outset of his commentary his understanding of the concept of this movement: "In his setting of Schiller's text, Beethoven was guided — "in spite of the text itself" — by the "laws of absolute musical development." From this standpoint Schenker's idea of considering the work as an inseparable whole, and not merely as a setting for the text, is entirely correct. He sees that the compositional plan of the work is divided into three large sections (Figure 1), which from a purely descriptive standpoint is true.

He considers the first section to be the portion containing variations on the "Freude melody," while the second portion is considered to be an elaboration of the verse, "Seid umschlungen..." ("Be embraced..."); and then in the third section, according to Schenker's divisions, both themes from the preceding portion are "followed through" in a double fugue. The conclusion consists of three sections, the last of which — "die Stretta" (the Stretto) — forms the triumphant conclusion of the movement.

In order to define the first section, which comprises almost 600 measures out of the last movement's total 930 measures, Schenker emphatically explains why he conceives of both the beginning portion, i.e., the "instrumental portion," and the "portion with soloists and chorus," as a unity. Beethoven wanted the first portion, where the "Freude" theme initially appears in the basses (cello and contrabass) and is then varied by other instruments, to be repeated once more —




Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the fourth movement by the Viennese musicologist Heinrich Schenker [1887-1935]. Schenker's divisions show that he blocks out Beethoven's notion of the "double fugue" developmental process.

"with changes..." — in the vocal medium. This repetition makes the relationship between the two portions just as strong as the relation between the preceding movement and the final one. In another location Schenker describes this passage as "an expression of the law of parallelism, the fundamental law of all absolute music."

It is now already evident that in spite of his careful observations, Schenker was not really able to identify the actual underlying notion of development. LaRouche's proposal is the following: Think of the last movement of the "Ninth" as a "rather standard last movement" among Beethoven's late works. It begins with what is in fact an improvisation (like the last movement of the Opus 106 "Hammerklavier" Sonata for Piano). This improvisation passes into the core of the movement through a recitative for bass, in which the key to the core of the movement proves to be the passage written for the voice for the single word "Freude" (Joy). The core of the movement is governed by the late-Beethoven principle of double-fugue, and is concluded by a coda. The "Freude"

passage in the opening recitative should be regarded as a device Beethoven evolved to supersede the fugal *stretto* (4) in Bach.

This transformed notion of the *stretto*, analogous to the after-the-fact addition of the two opening notes to the *adagio sostenuto* movement of the Hammerklavier Sonata, becomes, in respect to its implications within Beethoven's mind, the *generative notion* governing the development and developmental objectives of the double-fugal process. The coda "satisfies" the middle portion, by asserting the scientific discovery accomplished through the *driving* creative developmental process of the middle portion.

Even though Schenker was indeed able, on the basis of careful analytical work, to establish the connection between the respective recitatives by the bass and by the baritone, albeit only as vocal repetition, he nevertheless remained unclear — as will be shown further on — as to the underlying significance of the "Freude melody" as a "stretto," and as a basic outline for the entire development of Beethoven's compositional method. Schenker himself repeatedly identified to a

4. "Stretto": pressing, hurried. Usually understood as J.S. Bach's technique of effecting a further intensification at the end of his fugal compositions by having the entrances of the individual voices of the fugue follow one another in more

rapid succession than they did at the beginning of the fugue. The text shows the way in which this notion of "stretto" was extended by Beethoven.

certain extent all the relevant material, without, however, being able to present this as a finished concept; this would only have been possible for him had he thought like Beethoven!

The Opening of the Movement

The very first chord is a provocation, with "B-flat" grating against "A," followed by various groups of wind instruments playing a highly articulated, fanfare-like triad in D minor. We know that Beethoven only composed this passage after he had already evolved the "Freude theme" and large portions of the middle part had been written down. (The symphony was first performed in May, 1824 in Vienna under Beethoven's supervision: the major creative period during which it was worked out appears to have been around the year 1822. With the aid of sketches, however, the outlines of the "Ninth" can be dated back to 1817.) Not only is it important for the comprehension of Beethoven's plan to hear his abrupt insertion of the previous third *adagio* movement, but it is also important to hear the very beginning of the symphony, in order then to understand Beethoven's wrenching first passage. And then, in immediate contrast to this "fanfare," the basses break in, are interrupted after a short while by the fanfare again, followed by the development of more recitative improvisations, which themselves once again provide a "foretaste" of the powerful contrapuntal tensions Beethoven will build up later (see Figure 3).

It is of decisive importance for the highly condensed initial tension — in the midst of which Beethoven introduces the "Freude" passage as a "stretto" — that after the opening improvisations he first briefly gives the theme of the first movement, then contrasts this with an additional recitative, after which he briefly mentions the *scherzo* theme of the second movement, contrasts this once more with the recitative in the basses, and finally refers to the *adagio* theme (third movement) and then comes out with the full recitative, out of which he then evolves the "Freude" recitative (see frontispiece and Figure 2).

Schenker understands this introduction as follows: "The recitative goes in the direction of representing, so to speak, the composer searching his mind for a new theme. Viz., by allowing the themes of the first, second, and third movements to pass in review one more time through his imagination, and then lodging protest in each recitative against the moods evoked by each of the movements, Beethoven is expressing his yearning for a new idea, one which would suit him better than the earlier ones." Then, says Schenker, he selects the "Freude" theme, which, "joyously decided, he makes into the main theme"!

If one compares the beginning of the "Great Fugue"

String Quartet Opus 133 with this introduction, or with the last movement of the Opus 106 Hammerklavier Sonata, one can immediately discern a similar method: In the "overture" of the Great Fugue Beethoven presents the so-called "intervallic theme" alone with three other improvisations derived from the same material, after which he begins the double fugue, in which he gives to the leading voice (first violin part) a thoroughly surprising, highly differentiated first subject (a leaping theme), and then apparently attempts to suppress the second subject (undulating intervallic theme) of the overture which enters shortly thereafter in the viola — an ambiguity out of which the immense internal frictions and new configurations in this double-fugued work can be generated. The improvisational section in Opus 106 before the fugue begins in a similar fashion: The peculiarity of this sonata is that following the highly rhythmically contrasting improvisation, the "stretto" of the fugue — the most condensed mode of composition possible — appears as *the first fugal subject*: namely, one more leap followed by a connected trill — the trill which is the motive force of the fugue itself, and which is given an especially emphasized position in the concluding "stretto"! (See Figure 4.)

Beethoven evolved this still further in the "Ninth": The "old" themes, played in contrast with the recitatives, stake out the territory, so to speak, within which Beethoven intends to continue his building.

Beethoven once said in a conversation with Sporschil (5) that every work is based on "a psychical idea." Thus, once the contrasting introductory improvisations (fanfare-triadic arpeggiation versus bass recitative) have already been set forth, then his continuation with the "Freude melody" in the basses and the ensuing "growth" of this idea — the spinning out of an as yet undeveloped thought — is the decisive impulse for further development.

Of particular importance — and not understood at all until now — is also the portion of the recitative which was inserted at the beginning of the otherwise well-known "Freude" theme, and which is intended as the most immediate expression of the "stretto" notion.

This sequence of tones appears once again almost unaltered in the baritone solo, particularly on the word "freudenvollere..." ("more joyful..."). Judging from the similarity of the beginning of this passage, up until the very important new configuration in a higher register on the word "und Freuden..." with the "real" Freude theme, this passage is quite obviously the clearest formulation of the Beethoven "stretto" at

5. Johann Sporschil (1800-1863), historian and poet, in Vienna until 1827, had frequent discussions with Beethoven.

The image displays a musical score for the 'Freude' theme from the Ninth Symphony. It consists of five staves. The first two staves are for vocal parts: Baritono (Baritone) and Basso (Bass). The Baritone part begins with a forte (*f*) dynamic and features lyrics: 'Freude, Freu - de, Freude, schöner Götter-funken,'. The Bass part also begins with a forte (*f*) dynamic and has the lyrics: 'Freude! Freude!'. The remaining three staves are for Brt. Solo (Bass Solo) parts. The first solo part has the lyrics: 'Tochter aus E - ly - si - um, wir be - tre - ten feu - er - trun - ken, Him - mli - sche, dein Hei - lig - tum!'. The second solo part has the lyrics: 'Dei - ne Zau - ber binden wieder, was die Mo - de streng geteilt; al - le Menschen werden Brüder,'. The third solo part has the lyrics: 'wo dein sanfter Flü - gel weilt.'

Figure 2. The "Freude" [Joy] theme of the Ninth Symphony.

the beginning of the fourth movement, and is figuratively the "plan" of its entire musical development — as will be demonstrated even more explicitly later in my discussion.

At the same time it becomes clear that this unfolded ("auskomponiert" or "composed-out" — JS) "freudenvollere" is not an ornament or an embellishment, as was customary — at least most of the time — for Bach and Mozart, but must rather be regarded as "generative."

Immediately following the first sounding of the "thematic" material in the basses, the theme — now played by both violins and cellos — expands by means of contrapuntal contrabass and bassoon parts; this now brings in, as Schenker writes, "for the first time the perspective of the vertical direction," and thus proves to be "a generative thematic configuration." Schenker now states that this first variation is followed by a second, in which the theme is now carried by the woodwinds and is enriched "polyphonically," while the string orchestra simultaneously plays a continuous counterpoint (see Figure 1, Part I).

Schenker's descriptive subdivisions into "variations" — which in the course of the movement's

beginning he observes to be eight in number before reaching a new "main section" — betrays with increasing clarity that he blocks out Beethoven's conception of process-development, and attempts to iron this out by supplying plausible section headings. He has become — he knows not how — the observer of a great "natural drama," to which he can only apply his procedure of "sensible clarification" — just as Carl von Linné once did with the systematization of the vegetable kingdom. Schenker fails to grasp correctly the "generative principle" in Beethoven and to present this as process. He therefore speaks incessantly about the unattainable "genius," the "instinct" of Beethoven, who can only be regarded with astonishment by us lowly human creatures. Beethoven, thinks Schenker, never can and never will be reproduced a hundred- or a thousandfold, so that we can all become *Beethoven thinkers*.

Schenker does indeed establish the interconnectedness of the various aspects of the symphony which he analyzes, and also demonstrates why Beethoven composed such and such a passage just so and not another way; however, he relegates this *active principle for proceeding lawfully from one stage to the*

A
Presto. (♩ = 96)

2 Flauti
ff zu 2

2 Oboi
ff zu 2

2 Clarinetti in B
ff zu 2

2 Fagotti
ff zu 2

Contrafagotto
ff

I. II in D
ff

4 Corni
ff

III. IV in B
ff

2 Trombe in D
ff zu 2

Timpani in D-A
ff

Violino I
 (arco)

Violino II
 (arco)

Viola
 (arco)

Violoncello
 (arco)

Contrabasso
 (arco)

Figure 3. Beginning of the fourth movement [score]. Bracket A: fanfare. Bracket B: recitative. According to Wagner, stopping and starting in the trumpets is a "defect in Beethoven" [see arrow].

A

B

10

Musical score for measures 10-19. The score includes parts for Flute (Fl.), Oboe (Ob.), Clarinet (Cl.), Bassoon (Fg.), Contrabassoon (Cfg.), Trumpets (D) and (B), Trombone (Tr. (D)), Timpani (Timp.), and Violoncello/Double Bass (Vc. Cb.). The woodwinds and brass play a rhythmic pattern of eighth notes, while the strings play a melodic line. The tempo is marked as *f* *Selon le caractère d'un recitativo, mais in tempo.*

B

Musical score for measures 20-29. The score includes parts for Flute (Fl.), Oboe (Ob.), Clarinet (Cl.), Bassoon (Fg.), Contrabassoon (Cfg.), Trumpets (D) and (B), Trombone (Tr. (D)), Timpani (Timp.), and Violoncello/Double Bass (Vc. Cb.). The woodwinds and brass play a rhythmic pattern of eighth notes, while the strings play a melodic line. The tempo is marked as *dim.* *p*. The score includes dynamic markings such as *ff* and *zu 2*.



Figure 4. *Stretto*: highly concentrated tension. Here, the first fugal subject in the fourth movement of Beethoven's "Hammerklavier" Sonata, Opus 106.

next to the realm of "instinct." ("Beethoven never discarded his instinct for the laws of pure music even when he...wrote vocal music." — Schenker, introduction to his presentation of the fourth movement, where he discusses the question whether Beethoven only wrote this work in order to set the Schiller poem to music, or whether there is some unifying conception to it!) A most accurate description of why Schenker could make such catastrophic methodological blunders in his presentation of Beethoven's notion — though he was certainly much more conscious of the problem than any other musicologist — has been formulated by G.W. Hegel in his critique of Immanuel Kant: "He hunts around inside his soul's sack to see what valuables are still to be found there; and thus by merest chance he lights on Reason." (6) Schenker hunted around for something to explain the Promethean reality of Beethoven's thought to his own "inner self" — and found "instinct"!

To ensure the reader's correct comprehension of the "generative principle" — i.e., the "stretto" idea and the "Freude melody" in the broadest sense — I will now go briefly into the evolution of this melody as it is correctly given prominence by Schenker in his appendix on the musical literature. As is shown by Beethoven's sketchbooks (over 7,000 of these are sitting in archives, still unpublished!), the first suggestions and themes for what was later integrated into the "Ninth" had already been written down in 1817.

There are sufficient indications that, if Beethoven had so desired, he also could have written an exclusively "instrumental" fourth movement. For a

6. G.W.F. Hegel, *History of Philosophy* (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), Vol. III, p. 443.

long time he had wavered back and forth, and for this alternative he had already developed thematic material (which he later ended up using elsewhere, for example, as a theme in the String Quartet Opus 132); finally, however, he decided in favor of the inclusion of voices and Schiller's text. It is also instructive to see how Beethoven was simultaneously working on the development of his method, e.g., the evolution of his "fugal process." A small note jotted down amongst his 1822 sketches is indicative of his plans. It reads: "Also, instead of a new symphony, a new overture on BACH (i.e. a theme with the progression B-flat, A, C, B-natural — ed.) very fugued with 3 (drums? subjects?)." We know that from Opus 101 onwards, Beethoven increasingly used quite straightforward "fugues" in his works in order to maximize the impact of his entire output; we also know, however, as I have shown above with regard to the "Ninth," that in his late works he had succeeded in developing this into a much broader compositional principle.

A comment Beethoven made to Rochlitz (7) around 1822 shows how Beethoven was already struggling with various alternative notions while he was working on the "Ninth"; it also provides insight into Beethoven's own understanding of his creative work. "For some time now," he said, "I've been dragging myself around with three other large works. A lot of it is already worked out, in my head that is. First I have to get these off my chest; two big symphonies, and each one different, each one also different from my other ones, and an oratorio. And that's going to take a long time; look, for some time now I've had difficulty bringing myself to write. I sit and think and think; I stay that way a long time, but it just won't go down onto the paper. I get terrified about starting such immense works. But once I get going, then everything's fine!"

Nottebohm (8) (quoted from Schenker) reports that the year 1822 approximately marks the final initial form of the "Freude melody." The succession of sketches leading up to this clearly shows that each draft, along with Beethoven's subsequent corrections, supplies information on how the more general objective of forging this into a "generative stretto" was what elicited the finished form. Here I refer the reader to the corresponding musical examples (Figure 5);

7. Friedrich Johann Rochlitz (1769-1842), editor of the *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung* in Vienna and champion of Mozart and Beethoven. Quoted by Friedrich Kerst in his *Erinnerungen an Beethoven*.

8. Gustav Nottebohm, *Beethoveniana* and *Zweite Beethoveniana* (J. Rieter-Biedermann, 1872 and 1887). A presentation of the evolution of Beethoven's works through his sketches.

Heu - te ist ein feierlicher Tag die - ser sei ge - fei - ert
 mit Ge - sang und
 durch
 o nein, die - ses nicht, et - was an - de - res
 usw.
 ge - fäl - li - ges ist es was ich fordere
 auch die - ses nicht, ist nicht bes - ser, sondern nur etwas heiterer
 Auch die - ses es ist zu zärtl. et - was
 auf - ge - weck - tes (?) muß man su - chen wie die . . . ich wer - de sehn daß
 ich selbst euch et - was vor - sin - ge was der stimm . . mir nach
 die - ses ist es ha
 es ist nun gefunden Freu - de schö - ner

Figure 5. Notes and text from Beethoven's 1823 sketchbooks [see text].

The German reads (top left to bottom): "Today is a festive day . . . it should be celebrated with/through song and . . . O no, not this, something else that is pleasing is what I require. Not this either, it's no better, but only somewhat happier. And this is too mushy. One must seek something more intelligent (?), as the . . . I will see to it that I myself sing you something that the voice . . . after me this is it ha it has now been found Freude schöner"

first the notes with words supplied by Beethoven himself, who then substituted another text of his own design, sung by the baritone at the beginning of his entrance: "O Freunde, nicht diese Töne! Sondern lasst uns angenehmere anstimmen und freudenvollere!" ("O friends, not those tones! Rather let us make sounds more pleasant and more joyful!").

Here, as well as in the following example, it is important to bear in mind that these sketches, which Beethoven jotted down for his own reference, should only be regarded as the footprints left behind by the artist, reflecting a mere fragment of Beethoven's mental travels during those years.

Even more impressive is the process of condensation to which the melody has been subjected. Look first at the "finished melody" (Figure 2). Then examine the seven stages in the evolution of measures 9-12, which Schenker and Nottebohm selected for their example (Figure 6).

The reader is advised to sing or play these few measures out loud, in order to hear the difference between the initial phases and the melody which Beethoven finally found satisfactory. Note the increasing rhythmicization, the introduction of the leap (of a sixth) in measure 11, and the formation of a syncopation immediately afterwards. In the development of the movement, all these alterations continually work towards new developmental processes of fugal tension, to new musical manifolds, which are the "lawfulness" out of which Beethoven then creates new stages with new causal relationships! (This can be demonstrated through careful listening and a study group which goes into the particulars!) (9)

That the "Freude recitative" was appended to the beginning as a stretto, analogous to the opening notes in the *adagio sostenuto* of Opus 106, is indicated by a comment made by Nottebohm on the basis of his sketchbook researches: "Of the Finale, as we see it printed, the choral part and the preceding instrumental variations on the Freude melody were conceived first; the instrumental and recitative introduction were begun afterwards." (10)

9. When we compare this with Schenker's generic analysis of such themes in his work *Der freie Satz* on page 109 — namely tracing the "foreground" of the theme back to the underlying "tonal necessities" of the "middle ground" — we are, to be sure, shown that a quite lawful musical tension has been generated by this melody (Schenker's "background hearing"); at the same time, however, this immediately presents us with the Kantian antinomy between Freedom and Necessity. For in reality, the theme in this form becomes the producer of new universalities, proceeding lawfully to new stages of causal development, in which the alterations are not determined merely by further linear development of the laws prevailing in the previous stage: Freedom! We should not, however, hold Schenker himself responsible for the fact that contemporary structuralists such as Felix Salzer and others in New York, or Keller in England, under the pretense

In order to elucidate how Beethoven's primary concern was always a notion of totality, here is another one of his remarks: "In my instrumental works, too, I never lose sight of the *whole*" (cited by Schenker in *Der freie Satz*).

And now, if we refer back once again to the opening instrumental passages along with the "Freude recitative," and grasp how Beethoven evolved this idea, fugally and through contrast, all the way into a strict double fugue, then we can understand why after the bass recitative Beethoven inserts the initial fanfare and announces it with a drum roll, in order then to increase the tension still further vocally, by means of the baritone solo. As for the sung text, its only remarkable feature is the progression of tones connected with the word "Freude," which as an individual word displays a new quality, and which in the course of further musical development demonstrates that for Beethoven this actually meant "Freiheit" (Freedom)!

Schenker refers to this opening portion with its preludizing character as the portion intended by Beethoven as motivation for the "act of violence" represented by the entry of the voices!

Schenker's methodological flaw — a result of his "soul's sack" — is shown up very clearly when he attempts to provide some explanation for the baritone solo passage "O Freunde, nicht diese Töne!" He goes so far as to describe this text (i.e., "O Friends, not those tones!...") as a "lapse of logic," since this can only be understood as a rejection of the preceding "fanfare." But why this particular text and this melody? Schenker explains this from the compulsion to repeat the same tone progressions already played by the basses at the beginning of the movement. The law of parallelism in music, according to Schenker, can even bring Beethoven's music and "musical conscience" past this "lapse of logic"!

Following the baritone solo Beethoven develops an increasingly rich contrapuntal activity, in which other portions of the Schiller text are sung (one more indication of the subsidiary importance Beethoven gave to

of continuing Schenker's theories, are now consciously using their computer puppets in order to destroy all coherence of the musical process, and thus the true universal whose existence Schenker never doubted. These people are promoters of modern, heteronomic music, and hence are ultimately preparing the way for the proliferation of their fascist world view! It should hardly come as a surprise that, at the 1972 International Conference of Musicologists in Copenhagen, a question about why Schenker's theories are so much in vogue in the United States, was answered with the assertion that these are very similar to Chomsky's theory of "generative grammar"! (See also Harry Goldschmidt's essay in *Beiträge zur Musik, Wissenschaftliche Hefte* 1, 1976.)

10. Quoted from Schenker, *Beethoven: Neunte Sinfonie*, p. 313.

Brt. Solo

Dei-ne Zau-ber bindenwieder, was die Mo-de strenggeteilt; al -

mm. 9 10 11 12 usw.

Drafts

1 usw.

2 usw.

3 usw.

4

5

6

7

Figure 6. The evolution of measures 9-12 [drafts 1-7 in the sketches] shows how Beethoven condenses the succession of tones into a "generative" theme.

Schiller's actual text!); the four soloists expand the thematic material until the theme breaks up into eighth-note motion; the chorus takes over and the winds move contrapuntally — though somewhat less pronounced — along with the strings with their short trills: growing, liberating tension!

The "Turkish March"

Without going on to describe each individual phase, it is nonetheless important to correctly understand the change introduced right after this portion. The section of the score headed with the description "Allegro assai vivace, all marcia," is unmistakable. "The drums and contrabassoons begin a Turkish march, and the bassoons then present the new aspect of the theme, its rhythm." At the same time, after a change in key had already been announced during the previous modulatory portion (D Major), the march now follows with B-flat Major! (See Figure 1, Parts II and VII.)

The syncopated rhythm should also be heard in connection with the characteristic rhythm of the first movement — see how in his late works Beethoven ever and again makes us see and hear the tremendous coherence of his entire work! As even the anecdote writers report, this "Turkish march" was outrageous to listeners at the time: "What's this marching band doing in a serious concert?" one of them protested! By developing at this point another side of the original idea, namely the rhythmic (as opposed to the harmonic), Beethoven had in fact constructed a new dimension of manifolds, especially since this portion immediately issues into an extremely intense fugue-double fugue. For Schenker, completely out of breath by now, this portion is "wholly in the service of the Word," i.e., "Laufet Brüder eure Bahn, freudig wie ein Held zum Siegen!" ("Haste ye, brothers, on your way, joyfully like a hero victorious!"). This is what can still be grasped by the *Understanding*, but the

Figure 7. Part of the beginning of the fugue in the "march" section. A: first subject [last four measures from the "Freude" theme - see arrow]. B: counter-subject [march theme].

actual process of creative development still does not bring Mr. Heinrich Schenker out from his soul's sack!

From this new rhythmic representation of the theme Beethoven now leaps into a double fugue, which possesses two essential moments: the theme's first subject, taken from the last four measures of the "Freude" motive, is given weight by repeating it four times as a fanfare; it can be seen that this first-subject form (Figure 7) is reminiscent of the introductory fanfare, and that this, for example, turns out to be the strongest impulse to the fugal motion. Simultaneously with the first subject (first played by the cello and contrabass), the second subject is introduced (initially played by the second violin), which retains the initial rhythmic form of the theme in the "march" portion. In the course of the seven fugal statements of this increasingly more compressed voice leading (abbreviation of the theme and close registration), Beethoven has unfolded from the original "Freude" theme a completely new content, so that in the next part, where the chorus alone sings "Freude schöner Götterfunken...", the totality of what has been achieved up to then is pushed to a new high point. The essential complement to this is the orchestra's motion in eighth-note configurations, which are derived from the previous fugue. This motion is itself rhythmically contrasted once again to the woodwinds, who accentuate the parts sung by the chorus.

Concerning this portion Schenker can only come up with the following observation (aside from classifying it as the fifth to eighth variations): "All differentiated art becomes dispersed, and all that remains is that elementary simplicity, which — because it is borne by the masses — cannot fail to produce the most powerful effect. In this sense, the fifth variation rightly deserves its position, where it crowns the entire cycle

with power and majesty." But what does this mean, "All differentiated art becomes dispersed"? The attentive listener should actually examine for himself whether — considering what has already been said — *something becomes dispersed*, or whether on the contrary an *actualization* of the previous accumulated tension around the word "Freude," in the self-developing sense of "Freiheit" already indicated by Beethoven, opens up the entire movement!

Counterpoint — and Bach's Revolutionary Accomplishment

To show how musical "freedom" is expressed, to see how Beethoven made revolutionary discoveries about the contrapuntal method of composition and about creative mentation as the essential attribute of human beings, as well as how this is heard in his works, it is necessary to make a brief excursion into some essential aspects of the possibility of counterpoint in the first place, and particularly into the question of how Beethoven managed to liberate the unique accomplishment of Johann Sebastian Bach — the development of "The Well-Tempered Clavier" cycle — from its limitations and to develop previously unimaginable powers for a freer treatment of lawfulness. This tremendous potential is already implicit within the so-called "well-tempered" scale which presents a variety of musical possibilities, since each tempered tone has its own characteristic deviation from the respective tone of the so-called natural scale or the harmonic scale. This provided an opportunity of inestimable value to composers, namely, to produce "colors" according to the particular key — D Minor or F-sharp Major, for example — in which the entire movement is written or to which it modulates (i.e., is musically related to other keys). Schindler reports

that Beethoven spoke very often about the "colors" of the various keys. A second quality consists in the possibility of making various references within one single diatony (the way, for example, in which the well known scale characteristically constructed from C to middle C can hint at the scales of C, D, E,... Major or Minor!). One single voice can therefore already "function" contrapuntally. Thirdly, when two or more voices are brought together, for the skilled musician there are naturally unlimited possibilities for developing meaningful interplays, not only because of the immediate additional vertical dimension, but also in the rhythmical succession of possible, future, or anticipated interplay. Since within each key, C Major for example, there are certain scale-steps which sound most prominently (the upper fifth, G, as scale-step V, for example), there exist lawful ways of proceeding from one key to the next. Therefore the interplay between major and minor is not the only one with particular appeal, but rather a whole variety of modulations point up the infinite versatility of the well-tempered system. (Hence, the twelve-tone system, with its artificial rules, has completely thrown overboard the real tonal phenomena of the harmonic series and their relation to the listener's associated oral impressions and "emotional colors," and has therefore not been able to evolve any new, actually functioning lawfulnesses which could move an audience.)

Bach's essential accomplishment in his "Well-Tempered Clavier" was that in its 48 pieces (preludes and fugues) he lawfully evolved themes through all 24 keys (12 sharp and 12 flat), and hence for the first time conquered a "tonal space" not previously accessible in any systematic way. In his later works, and particularly in the "Art of the Fugue," Bach even attempted

to go beyond the universe of lawfulness he himself had evolved, but did not succeed — except for a certain extension of the old lawfulness — in achieving the necessary breakthrough. To graphically illustrate how such lawful transformations are possible, I will utilize an example given by Schenker in his groundbreaking work *Harmony* (see Figure 8). While examining this example it is important to understand that composing does not mean simply proceeding from one fixed chord to the next, but rather is the rigorous elaboration of the (in the broadest sense) contrapuntal interplay of voices.

This table presents (A) a triad with a major third and a perfect fifth (major triad), (B) a triad with a minor third and a perfect fifth (minor), (C) a minor third with a diminished fifth, and (D) a major third with an augmented fifth. The Roman numerals signify the location of the scale-step in the respective key, e.g., within the key of G Major the triad in (A) is located on the first scale-step (also called the basic triad or tonic if that is the basic key of the piece).

The chart therefore shows the various keys in which the same triad can appear — what Schenker describes as the triad's "valence" (mistranslated as "modulatory meaning" in the English version of *Harmony*, p. 184 f. — JS); this provides some idea of the possibilities for giving new meaning, and the lawful alterations available to a musician in order to express his idea precisely as he conceived it. Since every alteration, surprising new meaning, or sudden chromatization produces an "emotional" experience, and since every musical-lawful development — the expression of the composer's "intellectual" processes — therefore also makes us experience and conceptualize how the problem which the composer set himself was finally worked out, all this forms a "cathexis" within





A	B	C	D
			
G major I D major IV C major V	F major II E ^b major III B major VI	A ^b major VII F minor II	E <u>major</u> III minor B <u>major</u> VI minor
E minor III B minor VI A minor VII	G minor I D minor IV C minor V		

Figure 8. Table from Schenker's *Harmony* shows keys in which the triads based on the note G can appear. Group A is the major triad, with the various keys in which it occurs and its scale-step in that key [in Roman numerals]. Group B is the minor triad, Group C the diminished triad, and Group D the augmented triad.



Dionysian degenerate Richard Wagner

the listener, an imitative development and ordering of the composer's own "emotional" life. (11)

Given this background it becomes clear that for Beethoven the development of the double fugue method was the best suited methodological means for, on the one hand, integrating thematic material along with his own characteristic lawfulness, while at the same time counterposing this lawfulness with a second theme, and from there applying creative rigor towards evolving respectively new levels of universal lawfulness. The reader can try out this method for himself during the course of a conversation, if he suddenly ventures some pun whose effect is to take an unconscious or at least deliberately repressed emotional interplay between the discussants, and all at once render this conscious, without the newly found

word having anything directly to do with the prevailing mood as such (e.g., when the reader who feels ignorant about music suddenly thinks about having too few — muscles), but which sets into motion a train of planned associations which force the illumination of self-consciousness!

The task now posed by the organization of the following portion of the movement — especially for the conductor — is to carry out this original notion of the evolution of the double fugal process, which was always in the back of Beethoven's mind, by bringing chorus, soloists, and orchestra into this unity of development — particularly since a fugal process had already been worked through following the "march" and the new theme, "Seid umschlungen..." ("Be embraced..."), is introduced as an unmistakable second theme, which in the following double fugue — tightly intertwined with the "Freude" theme — becomes the high point of the labor process of the entire movement. The coda, especially in the concluding portion where the "Freude theme" is played in *prestissimo* tempo, clearly shows the result of Beethoven's labors: Freedom.

Schenker's Critique of Wagner

Schenker's painstaking approach led him to launch an impressive attack against the "dionysian element" in the later, post-1848 degenerated Wagner. In the course of his presentation of the "Ninth" Schenker proves how Wagner's proposals for reworking the symphony are a complete falsification of Beethoven's own concept. As Schenker demonstrates in his work, *Beethoven: Neunte Sinfonie*, Wagner's guiding viewpoint was to "explicate the melody." In order to substantiate his critique, Schenker cites passages from Wagner's treatise "Concerning the Performance of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony." (12) He points to one passage where Wagner thinks he has found "a flaw in Beethoven's works — namely the blurring of the harmony through supposedly incorrect instrumentation." Wagner complains that at the very beginning of the fourth movement, the brass instruments do not follow the same melodic movement as do the woodwinds, but rather — ostensibly because Beethoven was not able to write the corresponding tone "E-flat" for the brass due to the limitations of the natural trumpets — the thus interrupted motion of the brass instruments' line caused a new rhythmic emphasis to form, which "was absolutely not the master's intention" (see Figure 3). Wagner says: "Now we had been enlightened; the rhythmic chaos of the terrifying fanfare stormed over us, and we under-

11. Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Music, Laughter, and Creativity." Unpublished, New York, July 1976.

12. Richard Wagner, "Über den Vortrag der neunte Sinfonie," 1873. See also his "Beethoven," 1870.

stood why he finally had to arrive at the 'Word.' " Schenker explains that on the contrary, Beethoven composed this passage as he did because the brass instruments are there in the first place for the definition of continuous tones, and are not so much suited to slavishly following and accompanying the instruments which carry the melody. This is why Beethoven inserted the disputed rests in the trumpet part (Figure 3, see arrow).

Schenker explains this further from a dynamic standpoint: "For, only after they have been saved up and, as it were, given space to breathe, are the trumpets then able in the following measures 5-7 to participate in firing up the final decisive crescendo." (13) These observations by Schenker make it clear how Beethoven consciously utilized every available means in order to present as explicitly as possible to the listener's ears his concept of the creative musical idea. (Another one of Wagner's correction proposals relates to measures 407-414 in the first movement, where Wagner refers to how the flute part is set in too high a register and to the indistinctness of the melodic motion, and so declares: "Therefore we must make the decision to recognize and correct this *serious distortion of the musical idea, (!) since it diverts us from a correct comprehension of the melody!*" — emphasis added.)

Wagner's totally false conception of music (the inevitable outcome of his world view!) is revealed even more clearly when he describes the inclusion of words in the fourth movement as "emerging at last from the indeterminateness of music into the *determinateness of speech*"! Wagner is a nominalist! In turn, Schenker's attack on Wagner's "music-language" problem reveals the extent to which Schenker himself understood Beethoven, as well as the extent to which Wagner completely misunderstood him. In his essay on Beethoven, cited by Schenker, Wagner writes: "From the beginning it was not merely the master's critical faculties, but also his natural emotions (!) which gave the impulse for him to suddenly, as it were, fall out of the music, as if he had seen himself step outside a magical circle of his own making, and summon up powers of imagination completely different from his former musical conception. In reality, this momentous artistic event resembles a sudden awakening from a dream; at the same time, however, we perceive the benign influence of this upon what had been extremely intimidated by the dream;..."

In response to this thoroughly mistaken analysis by

Wagner, who therefore obviously does not comprehend the rigor of conscious artistic creativity, Schenker says the following: "Wagner's comparison with a sudden awakening from a dream comes from Schopenhauer, under whose spell Wagner learned to think about his own art. . . . The key to the understanding of the finale therefore lies exclusively in the so-called instrumental prelude, and we know how Beethoven took the utmost pains to motivate the entrance of the vocal parts!"

To expose even more explicitly how Wagner's misconception resulted from his "dionysian" world view, here is another quotation from Wagner: "With the beginning of the last movement Beethoven's music decidedly takes on the character of speech: it departs from the character of pure instrumental music held to during the first three movements, and manifested by infinite and indecisive (!) expressions; the progression of the musical poetry presses toward a decision, toward a decision such as can be announced only in human speech. We marvel at how the master prepares the entry of speech and human voices as an anticipated necessity, by means of this convulsed recitative in the bass instruments, which itself has already almost transgressed the boundaries of absolute music . . . (and) confronts the other instruments. . . ."

Schenker was already on the right track when, in the Preface, he commented: "It was Wagner, then, . . . who brought about that terrible catastrophe whose effects we are witnessing right now! It was he who, so to speak, usurped the royal power to grant universal suffrage on questions of art, and so set loose the 'naive' listeners, the millions of nobodies, onto so-called 'notables' and 'personalities'! And now these Wagner creatures are filling up the air with their sterile noise!" (14)

That Schenker came up with this critique against Wagner is no surprise. A rigorous Kantian, he could use musical lawfulness for itself, and lawfulness generally, to prove that the idea of "musical drama" and of Beethoven's "dreamy disposition," which according to Wagner inspired the master's compositions, the return to the most powerful feelings experienced by the naive soul, etc., is all "*bad music*."

Our Conception of Beethoven's Music

In order to actually arrive at a fresh understanding of Beethoven's "Ninth," which can then become the starting point for new compositions, we must proceed from the notion that in his late period Beethoven evolved and elaborated his works *under the general*

13. Heinrich Schenker, *Beethoven: Neunte Sinfonie*, p. 316.

14. *Ibid.*, p. xxvii.

notion of the double fugue, either directly as in Opus 106 or 133, or else in the broader sense, as in the first movement of Opus 106 and in the first and fourth movements of the Ninth Symphony (including the contained double fugue). The essential technique partially involves setting the "final stretto," originated



Beethoven out walking [c. 1820]. Drawing by J.D. Boehm [1794-1863]. The autograph is the composer's.

by Bach (see above, note 4 — ed.), right at the beginning of the movement as a means of allowing the possibility of intensifying the later fugal development, as we shall see.

The fascinating feature of this driving process, the coherent nonlinear unfolding of all music composed by this method, is that it *moves the preconscious* and *cathexizes* the listener's creative development with "affects." Even when someone thoroughly fails to recognize these pieces' profound coherence upon the first hearing, this is nonetheless the reason why Beethoven's music is "emotional" in the real sense of the term, and is "understood" to be so. It is only when the process of creative synthesis is experienced on the highest level, that a knowledge of Beethoven's late works acquires this kind of significance: What we hear is a total expression of the quality of human thought in the richness of Beethoven's own imagination, an empirical confirmation that *the self-development of the human mind, as evidenced in the climaxes of Beethoven's works, is at the same time a universal law*. Beethoven has proven in his activity and has expressed in his music what he discovered as an epistemologist: *The quality of the human mind is negentropic!*

Armed with this knowledge, he was also an essential contributor to the Enlightenment. (15) This is his contribution to the development of human society, to progress, and this is his republicanism, his notion of freedom. He created and expressed what Clausewitz, for example — who wrote his groundbreaking work *On War* during the same period— could not, in spite of all his efforts, adequately describe. The closest Clausewitz came was "*Gemüt*" (soul) — meaning more than just courage (*Mut*) and determination — but of course having nothing to do with the "*Gemütlichkeit*" (cosiness — JS) we frequently run across in Germany today!

Only when the final movement of the Ninth Symphony is performed on the basis of such a conception, will it sound right and be comprehensible.

Anyone constantly confronted with the problem of maintaining his creative output can precisely reproduce Beethoven's working method, which is an expression of the struggle entailed in *consciously* creating new coherencies, in order to proceed from one "set" of laws to the next stage of causal lawfulness: "freedom."

Herein lies the fundamental fallacy of the "new music": it rejects lawfulness altogether! It does not recognize that musical ideas address the human

15. See also Anno Hellenbroich and Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Beethoven Congress in Berlin: New Contributions to the Comprehension of Beethoven's Work," *New Solidarity*, Vol. VIII, No. 11 (April 5, 1977), p. 7.

mind's potential to register the most delicate perceptions, i.e. the preconscious, the synthesizing, gestalt-forming region of our consciousness. (Just as on another level one normally picks up from the inflection in another person's voice what he is actually thinking, despite the pleasantness of his words taken in their nominal sense — a dry, colorless ring to the speaker's voice — repressed aggression?)

Whether one "likes" Beethoven or not is definitely not a matter of taste, but it is rather the further conscious development of new "geometries" in these compositions which makes them so exceptional. It is quite the opposite with rock music, where "feelings" are expressed with about the same intensity as the stomping of an elephant or a jackhammer, rather than with the musical sensitivity of a human being! The path from the conception of music formulated by Wagner and its expression in his works (especially after 1848) all the way to the present rock culture, is distinguished only by degree. This serves to heighten our estimation of Heinrich Schenker: we would always much rather solicit support from a constipated Kantian than we would from a "modern" person, whose only remaining self-expression to society is the "pile of shit" he has produced for public examination over the TV or in the concert hall!

Schenker's 1912 polemic against new so-called musical conceptions such as twelve-tone, serial, or aleatoric systems of composition — namely that they are comparable to what in architectural terms would

be "a return to mud huts" — has not lost any of its force in the intervening years. (16) The only difference today is that the comprehension and "reproduction" of Beethoven's works is a vital prerequisite for broad layers of the working population to develop the mental qualifications required to solve the immense tasks now facing us in the realm of technology and new discoveries. Rock music has already transformed a wealth of such potential new discoveries into stinking rot.

Therefore, the door to the investigation of Beethoven's thought and the generation of his works must be pried open wider in order to expand this knowledge. After Bach had died, hardly any of his contemporaries believed there would ever be a greater composer. Mozart and Beethoven proved the contrary with their works. Now, 150 years later, it is about time we at least grasped the key to Beethoven's immense creativity, so that new composers and conductors can appropriate this method and develop it further; perhaps in the foreseeable future we may also have the pleasure of hearing *Beethoven's Ninth Symphony*.

The idea that this knowledge has importance not only for those initiated into music, was motivated by Beethoven himself in a polemic against his brother. When on New Years Day he received a greeting card from his brother which bore the signature: "Johann van Beethoven — Landowner," Beethoven grabbed a card and instantly sent it off to his brother, with the signature: "Ludwig van Beethoven — Brain-owner!"!

16. Other major works by Heinrich Schenker:

- (a) *Harmony* (1906), edited and annotated by Oswald Jonas, translated by Elisabeth Mann Borgese (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1973).
- (b) *Neue musikalische Theorien und Phantasien. Zweiter Band: Kontrapunkt. Erster Halbband: Cantus Firmus und zweistimmiger Satz* (Stuttgart/Berlin: J.G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1910).
- (c) *Neue musikalische Theorien und Phantasien. Zweiter Band: Kontrapunkt. Zweiter Halbband: Drei- und*


mehrstimmiger Satz: Übergang zum freien Satz (Vienna/Leipzig: Universal-Edition, 1922).

- (d) *Neue musikalische Theorien und Phantasien. III: Der freie Satz*, 2nd ed., edited and revised by Oswald Jonas (Vienna: Universal-Edition, 1956).
- (e) Beethoven: *Fünfte Sinfonie* (Vienna: Universal-Edition, 1925, 1969).
- (f) *Die letzten fünf Sonaten von Beethoven. Kritische Ausgabe mit Einführung und Erläuterung von Heinrich Schenker* (Vienna/Leipzig: Universal-Edition, 1913-1921).

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


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
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