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
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**Germany's missed
historic chance of 1989**



Germany's missed historic chance of 1989

by Helga Zepp-LaRouche

On July 7, 1998, the German Federal Government published *Documents on Germany Policy*, 1,398 pages of confidential and secret documents, which reveal the pre-history of German reunification. According to the Bundesarchiv-Gesetz (Law on Federal Archives), there is normally a 30-year period in which such documents on affairs of state are to be kept from public view. That the Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, made the unusual decision to release such internal memoranda, protocols of discussions, and telephone notes, probably has less to do with what the weekly *Der Spiegel* suspected—i.e., that the Chancellor was working on building a monument to himself—than with the fact that Kohl knows that the catastrophic effects of the systemic global financial crash might well explode during the federal election campaign in September, and the government might be required to take some sovereign decisions to defend the German nation, decisions which, according to the Treaty of Maastricht and the provisions for the agreement on the euro currency, Germany should no longer be permitted to make. The Chancellor could then refer to these documents, with the argument: “You see, I never agreed to the euro voluntarily; international pressures were so massive, that reunification was only to be achieved at the price of surrendering the D-mark!”

Not only do the newly released papers throw light upon the unrepentant Germanophobia of Britain's Margaret Thatcher, but—and this was not previously known publicly to the same extent—the uncompromising way that France's François Mitterrand operated, in order to destroy the strong deutschemark and to break the power of the hated Bundesbank (the German central bank). Even more astonishing is the brutality, however, with which the proof comes to light about what was the “best kept open secret of NATO” up to 1989: that the Federal Republic of Germany was as good as a totally occupied country, in which the three Western powers behaved, in political practice, like the postwar Allied Control Council, and considered the preemptive obedience of the German government to be self-evident.

Particularly if one recalls the stormy events at the end of 1989 and beginning



Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. and Helga Zepp-LaRouche at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate, Oct. 11, 1988. The following day, in a West Berlin press conference, Mr. LaRouche outlined the prospects for the early reunification of Germany. At the time, his forecast was greeted with widespread skepticism; but just one year later, the ugly Berlin Wall came down, and on Oct. 3, 1990, Germany became a united nation once again.

of 1990, the protocols are well suited to stimulate patriotic impulses in every German citizen, provided that he is not utterly without a soul or ideologically twisted, and presumably it is just that effect at which Chancellor Kohl is aiming with this publication. Kohl and his team probably assume that they will urgently need such patriotic support in the immediate future.

But, if we today, almost nine years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, consider the strategic situation—the international financial system teetering at the brink of a chain-reaction collapse; Russia confronting national bankruptcy, with the alternatives between chaos or brutal military dictatorship; Japan and Southeast Asia in a severe depression, just to cite a few elements—then the question is indeed appropriate: What has become of the “great historic opportunity of 1989”?

Was it a miscalculation when many people thought, as Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker did, when he addressed the Bundestag (Parliament) in May 1990, about the “great historic opportunity of Europe”? Did this opportunity never exist, or was it missed?

Pressure on Chancellor Kohl

Admittedly, the situation in which Kohl had to operate was extremely complex. Great Britain attempted to prevent reunification by any and all means, and then to delay it; it then fell into the same geopolitical manipulations against Germany as it had practiced before World War I, manipulations

which included the “Fourth Reich campaign,” initiated by Thatcher, as well as the assassination of the chairman of Deutsche Bank, Alfred Herrhausen, supposedly by the Third Generation of the Red Army Faction, or RAF (which is actually nonexistent). All this poses the question of “*cui bono?*” Mitterand’s tactics, to link agreement on reunification to the surrender of the deutschemark, can only be called blackmail. U.S. President George Bush was listening to Lawrence Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft, as well as Vernon Walters, who insisted that the Germans, since German unity could not be prevented, had to be induced to contain themselves by integration and self-control.

It was unclear how the various forces in the Soviet Union would react to German unification, even if President Mikhail Gorbachov might respond favorably; and the possibility that the East German regime of Erich Honecker, or even Honecker’s successor, Egon Krenz, would rely upon repression, could not be ruled out. But also Holland, Italy, Poland, and Israel expressed their opposition to reunification.

Under these circumstances, the 10-point program which Kohl presented on Nov. 28, 1989, in his courageous step (by Bonn political standards), without previous consultations with the Western powers, was the right initiative (see box). Kohl, for a decisive moment, took the law of action into his own hands, and took the initiative, and for that, he deserves respect. The problem was, that the government had no viable concept beyond that, for how to continue the initiative in the future: “There were no preparatory plans for the Federal

Chancellor's Office to fall back on."¹ Events unfolded, and what happened in those days can only be called the material for a Classical tragedy. Three days later, on Dec. 1, Alfred Herrhausen was assassinated, a man in a leading position, who not only played a role in shaping Kohl's 10-point program, but also wanted to present an independent perspective for the development of Eastern Europe outside of the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).² With the assassination of Kohl's adviser three days after the very first sovereign baby-step of the much-touted German "solo initiative," the announcement of the 10-point program, an unmistakable signal had been delivered to the West German elite: If you dare to move outside of the Yalta framework of the postwar period, you will end up exactly like this.³

Then, only a few days after Herrhausen's assassination, Bush and Gorbachov met in Malta, and, contrary to all assurances that nobody was talking about a new version of Yalta, in this case media such as *Le Figaro* and *Libération* were not far off the mark, when they warned that in Malta, the intent was a new grand alliance of the superpowers, which would attempt to control developments in Europe. These French newspapers naturally remained silent about Mitterrand's own ambitions in this respect. But, the Anglo-American-Soviet condominium was a reality at that point in time: Henry Kissinger, co-thinker of Eagleburger and Scowcroft, warned about the "new German danger" and called for close consultations on policy toward Germany between Bush and Gorbachov. At the subsequent meeting with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze saw Kohl's 10-point program as "fraught with dangerous consequences," and claimed that it impinged upon "the vital interests of the Soviet Union." Obviously, it was against this background of a potential external, and even personal, threat, that Kohl saw himself compelled to capitulate to Mitterrand's ultimatum, and to agree to the European monetary union, and thus the end of the *deutsche-mark*, already at the Strasbourg summit of the Council of Europe.

The now-released protocols report, referring to Kohl's confidential discussion with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker on Dec. 12, 1989, on joining the European economic and monetary union: "This decision he would have made contrary to German interests." According to *Der Spiegel*, Kohl admitted in early summer of 1997, to a small group of people: At that time, "I went through some of the darkest hours of my life."

1. Introduction to the *Documents*, p. 59.

2. Herrhausen, in a speech he intended to deliver in December 1989 in New York City, said that the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau of the postwar period was supposed to be the model for the development of Poland. See article, p. 37.

3. Comment by a member of the board of a large German firm at the Leipzig Fair, to a representative of the Schiller Institute.

Just as in a great historical tragedy of Shakespeare or Schiller on the stage, the circumstances here were also dramatic, even monstrous, but, just as in real life, it was the tragic flaw in the personality of the chief protagonist, which ultimately decided that the tragedy would "take its course." Of course, the circumstances were intricate, but Kohl's subjective problem and that of the inner circle of associates who conducted the negotiations in those days with the Western powers, Gorbachov or Krenz, and then Hans Modrow, consisted in the fact that they themselves thought in the same terms as the victorious powers. Although Kohl's 10-point program was a step in the right direction, even this concept was rooted in the geopolitical matrix of the victorious powers. It would have been necessary for Kohl to free himself from these mental constrictions, and, with a grand vision, to shape history on a completely different level.

The LaRouche alternative

Although there had been no preparatory plans made by the government that the Chancellor could fall back on, there was indeed a concept which would have made it possible to put the East-West relationship on a completely new basis, different from that which, with Versailles, Yalta, and finally Maastricht, had characterized the political order of the twentieth

Chancellor Kohl's program

In a speech to the West German Bundestag on Nov. 28, 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl laid out a 10-point program for reunification of his divided nation. He presented a cautious outline for a federated state, initiated through confederative structures that would help the two German states grow together smoothly. Kohl declared that "the special character of the relations between both German states requires an increasingly tight network of agreements in all sectors and at all levels.

"This cooperation will also increasingly require common institutions," he said. "Existing joint commissions can assume new tasks, further commissions can be created. I am thinking especially of the economy, transport, environmental protection, science and technology, health and culture. It is self-evident that Berlin will be fully included in this cooperation.

"I urge all social groups and institutions to participate in the formation of such a community.

"We are also prepared to take a further decisive step, namely, to develop confederative structures between the two states in Germany in order to create a federated. A legitimate democratic government in East Germany is a prerequisite.

eth century. This was the programmatic concept which American economist Lyndon LaRouche had developed through a series of proposals: first for the reconstruction of Poland, then for the Paris-Berlin-Vienna Productive Triangle, and finally for the Eurasian Land-Bridge.

Had Kohl moved along this path after the fall of the Berlin Wall, up to Oct. 3, 1990, and taken up these ideas and made them his own, then not only would his promises of a blossoming landscape in the new federal states of Germany have become a reality, but the hopes of the people of the countries in the former Soviet Union and the Comecon, to turn to the West and become part of the so-called First World, would have been fulfilled. Despite all of Mitterrand's, Thatcher's, and actually also Bush's geopolitical intrigues, Kohl at that time had historical momentum behind him; if, for example, he had made televised speeches to the people of Europe and especially in the East, offering the grand design of the "Productive Triangle," and thus showing a perspective for how a new economic miracle in the East could not only overcome unemployment in western Europe, but also be the beginning of the end of underdevelopment in the Southern Hemisphere, then he would have been assured of the overwhelming support of people in the East, the West, and the South. The realization of the LaRouche plan for the economic development and

modernization of the East would have created the basis for an order of peace in all of Europe, for the first time in this century.

Instead, Kohl acted *against* German interests, and, as is now a matter of published record, he knew quite well that he was doing so. The entirety of the so-called "IMF reform policy" for the republics of the former Soviet Union was willfully aimed, by the international financial oligarchy, at eliminating Russia as a potential future competitor on the world market—i.e., the policy was to deliberately deindustrialize Russia and return it to the status of a raw-materials supplier. This intent was declared in a CIA study which became public in September 1991.⁴ We see the results of this policy today: Russia is on the brink of chaos and possibly a not-so-friendly military dictatorship. Following the assassination of Detlev Rohwedder (the head of Germany's Treuhand, the agency overseeing former East Germany's state-owned enterprises), which was fed by motives similar to those in the Herrhausen assassination, supposedly by the non-existent Third Generation of the RAF, the economic hatchet descended on the head of the new federal states of Germany. The results of the election in Saxony-Anhalt in April 1998, in which Kohl's Chris-

4. Peter Schröder, *Wiesbadener Kurier*, Sept. 4, 1991, on the CIA study during the Bush administration.

"We could imagine the following institutions coming about soon after free elections [in East Germany]:

- "a common governmental committee for permanent consultation and political harmonization;
- "common technical committees;
- "a common parliamentary committee.

"Previous policy toward East Germany," the chancellor went on to say, "essentially had to concentrate on small steps that strove to alleviate the results of our division and uphold and sharpen the consciousness for the unity of the nation. If in the future a democratically legitimized, that is, a freely elected government, becomes our partner, totally new perspectives open up.

"New forms of institutional cooperation can emerge and develop in stages. Such a growing-together is part of the continuity of German history. Now we can again make use of these historical experiences.

"Nobody knows what a reunified Germany will look like. But I am sure that unity will come, if it is wanted by the German nation.

"The development of intra-German relations remains embedded in the pan-European process and in East-West relations. The future structure of Germany must fit into the whole architecture of Europe as a whole. The West has to provide peacemaking aid here with its concept for a permanent and just European order of peace."

Point two of Kohl's address dealt with the issue of East-West transportation. Here, the Chancellor significantly departed from his written text and presented a design for continental development, including high-speed rail.

The trans-European rail grid

"There are," Kohl said, "currently negotiations taking place on the modernization of the rail route leading from Hanover to Berlin. I do hold the view, however, that this is not enough, and that in the context of recent political developments we should discuss the transport and rail connections between the G.D.R. [East Germany] and the Federal Republic in a more fundamental approach.

"Forty years of being divided also mean that the transport routes have taken on, in part, a quite different structure. This is not only true for the border crossing points, but also for the traditional routing of transport connections in Central Europe, for the connections between East and West.

"Why, therefore, aren't we considering the classic route from Moscow via Warsaw and Berlin to Paris, which always ran through Cologne and had great importance at all times, to have a role in the era of high-speed trains, on the eve of the extension of the respective future trans-European transportation grid?"



French President François Mitterrand (left) and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn, 1990. The newly released German government documents show Mitterrand's fanatical efforts, in league with Britain's Margaret Thatcher, to destroy the power of Germany.

tian Democrats were badly defeated, and the fact that 22% of all children in the new federal states are living below the poverty level, show a predominantly desolate picture, despite the billions of deutschmarks that have flowed into the new states.

So, once more: Was the great historic opportunity of 1989 an illusion? Did it never exist, or was it missed?

Franklin Roosevelt versus Churchill

The conceptual problem with which the Kohl team was beset, becomes clear in the reply which Federal Minister Rudolf Seiters gave on Oct. 24, 1989, in discussion with the ambassadors of the three Western powers to the question of the British Ambassador, Sir Christopher Mallaby, as to what the allies should expect in view of the statements of the Chancellor, that the German question was on the agenda. Seiters emphasized the legitimate demand for freedom and self-determination for all Germans, but he also emphasized: "Now would not be a time for plans, but a time for processes and developments, which one observes and prudently promotes."

It was, however, quite possible to recognize at that time, that much more was opening up than just the "German question." This leads us immediately to the issue of the oligarchical dictatorship of the Versailles Treaty, and thus to the real pre-history of the First World War,⁵ the motives for the inter-

national support for Hitler⁶ between 1932 and 1938, and the Yalta partitioning of the world.

In this century, which has been principally dominated by oligarchical, imperialist, and colonial forces, merely with shifting centers of focus, there was a single moment in which it would have been possible to implement a totally different order of the world. In the spring of 1945, when the conflict between President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill erupted openly, the United States was definitely in a position to implement a new order in the world, based upon a community of principles. As Roosevelt's son, in his book *As He Saw It*,⁷ reported on the conflict between his father and Churchill, Roosevelt had said: "We've got to make clear to all the British from the very outset, that we don't intend to be simply a good-time Charly who is to be used to help the British Empire out of a tight spot, and then be forgotten forever." "Churchill told me," Roosevelt said, "that he was not His Majesty's Prime Minister for the purpose of presiding over the dissolution of the British Empire [Churchill later repeated this in a radio address]. I think I speak as America's President when I say that America won't help England in this now simply so that she will be able to continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples."

That put the subject on the table which had been the issue

5. See Webster G. Tarpley, "London Sets the Stage for a New Triple Entente" and "King Edward VII: Evil Demiurge of the Triple Entente and World War I," *EIR*, March 24, 1995.

6. Webster Tarpley and Anton Chaitkin, *George Bush: The Unauthorized Biography* (Washington, D.C.: Executive Intelligence Review, 1992).

7. Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, 1st ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946).

of America's War of Independence against the attempt of the British Empire to maintain the North American continent as its colony, and in which America successfully insisted upon its right to freedom and independent industrial development. President John Quincy Adams subsequently explicitly extended this right to defend the inalienable rights of all their citizens to other nations with which the United States wanted to live in a "community of principle."⁸ With the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901, and the seizure of power by President Teddy Roosevelt, the foreign policy of the United States slipped back under the skirts of the British Empire.

The United States became the "American brawn" which followed the "British brains" in imperialist and colonialist policy.

This was the policy with which F.D. Roosevelt wanted to break. Even if his anti-Nazi attitude escalated unfortunately into a profound anti-German attitude,⁹ and this naturally represents an epistemological weakness on the part of Roosevelt, the decisive point remains, that at the end of World War II he wanted to put an end to the colonialist policy of the British Empire. In the spring of 1945, there was a great opportunity to end the British-dominated oligarchical control over the world. The U.S.A. was in a unique situation: There was no country from which it had anything to fear. It was essentially up to the United States to determine the rules of the game of the postwar order in the world, as far as financial, monetary, and economic policy was concerned. The regrettable fact that Roosevelt died just at that moment, and was replaced by the totally Anglophile and not very intelligent Harry Truman, signified that Churchill was the one who provided the essential parameters of influence to the postwar order.

Such moments of brilliance occur in history now and again, in which it is possible to influence the course of developments. It is at such moments that it is decided whether those in positions of responsibility are politicians or statesmen, whether they are pragmatically pursuing a "policy of what is feasible," and thus, in view of oligarchic control of especially international financial and currency affairs, subjugating themselves to the given structures of financial and monetary policy; or whether they are acting on the basis of a fundamental philosophical commitment, that the oligarchical control of

the world should one day be overcome and the common good within sovereign nation-states should rule.

For Germany in 1945, for the reasons indicated here, there was not a real new beginning, and many of the structures of power that had gone into force with Versailles and Yalta, continued to hold sway. It was only in 1989-90 that an opportunity was offered to Germany—and, on account of the complexity of the issue, also for history—to break with the oligarchical order, and to make the reunification of Germany the lever for the realization of a new, just world economic order. Paradoxically, despite the problems that Roosevelt had with respect to Germany, German policy would have had to link up with Roosevelt's dirigistic economic policy and his anti-colonialist perspective, if the favorable moment were to lead to a fruitful result.

New opportunities

When Pope Paul VI published the encyclical *Populorum Progressio* in 1967, he was already battling against the paradigm shift which the international financial circles had set into motion worldwide, following the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963. The encyclical was a powerful argumentation, based on natural law, for the right of all people on this earth to create the conditions for every individual to be able to lead a life in human dignity, which corresponds to his identity as in the image of God. The Non-Aligned Movement fought under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and others, also for a new, just world economic order, but the Non-Aligned Movement was ultimately neutralized by several critical operations, to the point that it became virtually the mirror-image of the United Nations, in which most nations looked after "their" interests, which made it extremely easy for the leading colonial powers to play them off against each other. Too few took the more noble standpoint of the interests of mankind as a whole.

But, while the "Second UN Development Decade" was still spoken of under UN Secretary General U Thant, and thus the idea was sustained that the "developing countries" would, indeed, gradually "develop," still, preparations were under way to eliminate this idea, and instead to capture the industrialized North into promoting the idea of "overpopulation" against the underdeveloped South. The result of 30 years of such brainwashing has been that the idea, that the so-called Third World must urgently develop, is utterly foreign to many representatives of the younger generation.

When, for that reason, in 1975 Lyndon LaRouche made the proposal at press conferences in Bonn and Milan, to replace the already morally bankrupt IMF with an International Development Bank (IDB), the impact was immense. Although nearly 100 media representatives attended the press conferences, and had scratched, with hysterical attention, meticulous notes on every word LaRouche uttered, not one single article appeared on this comprehensive proposal for a new world financial system, which would have the function of

8. John Quincy Adams's Monroe Doctrine of Dec. 2, 1823 reads: "The American continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered a subject for future colonization by any European power. . . . It is impossible that the Allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent [North and South America—ed.] without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord." Adams had earlier declared that "the whole system of modern colonization was an abuse of government, and it was time that it should come to an end." See Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "Renew and Expand the Monroe Doctrine of John Quincy Adams," *EIR*, Dec. 11, 1984.

9. Introduction to the *Documents*.

financing technology transfer, in grand style, from the North to the South, as well as a multiplicity of well-defined infrastructure programs.

In the following months, associates of LaRouche in many countries in Europe, the United States, and Ibero-America circulated the IDB proposal in all of the developing countries, and among industrial representatives, trade unions, and politicians in the industrialized world.

Several central banks, among them one European central bank, conducted "feasibility" studies on the IDB, and their conclusion was, that the IDB would indeed function quite excellently. "But, we do not want the political result," said one Swiss private banker. In other words, the political result would be that the countries of the so-called Third World could develop into modern nations, with living standards worthy of human dignity.

The developing countries, by contrast, completely agreed with LaRouche's proposal. At the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in August 1976, many aspects of the IDB proposal were reflected in the final resolution. Eighty-five nations, representing the absolute majority of mankind, spoke in favor of realizing a just, new world economic order. Yet again, the media of the U.S.A. and Europe reported not a single word! This author called the station chief of Germany's DPA news agency, and asked impatiently when they would report the text of the Colombo final resolution. The laconic reply was: "That is not newsworthy." What? A declaration of 85 nations is not worth reporting? This is how one learns more about the reality of politics, than a whole course of political science studies at the university.

In September 1976, a good friend of Lyndon LaRouche, the Foreign Minister of Guyana, Frederick Wills, presented LaRouche's ideas for a new world economic order to the United Nations General Assembly in New York. That caused a political earthquake. The fact that it was Henry Kissinger who played a leading role in the ensuing destabilization of a number of countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, should not be surprising, if one knows that the notorious National Security Study Memorandum 200, defining population growth in Third World countries as a security threat to the United States, was commissioned and signed by him when he was U.S. National Security Adviser under President Ford.¹⁰ After the destabilization of India's Indira Gandhi, the assassination of Pakistan's Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the removal of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike as Prime Minister in Sri Lanka, the assassination of Italy's Aldo Moro, and a number of other operations, the movement for a just, new world economic order was destroyed for the time being. The oligarchic control over the financial institutions of the world was consolidated, which expressed itself, among other things, in the fact that the notorious conditionalities of the IMF against the Third

World were greatly escalated in this period.

The next chance for humanity, to replace the oligarchical control of the world which had existed since Versailles and Yalta, by a community of sovereign nations, was the grand design which Lyndon LaRouche developed at the end of the 1970s, and which later became known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The fact that NATO and the Warsaw Pact had incompatible military doctrines dangerously escalated the crisis at that time. It was clear that work was being assiduously pursued in the Soviet Union, directed toward creating an antiballistic-missile defense system. With the stationing of the Pershing II and SS-20 missiles, the warning time in case of war had shortened to the point that required a "launch on warning" strategy, and thus the danger of an "accidental" global nuclear war was very great.

LaRouche elaborated a comprehensive strategic concept to replace the NATO doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) by a doctrine of defense for both sides, Mutually Assured Survival. Both sides would initially develop together a system of several layers of defensive beam weapons, and then station these in a coordinated fashion. In this way, a situation would be avoided in which one of the superpowers, virtually at the last minute, could attempt to use its arsenal of nuclear weapons if the other side had begun to install such an anti-missile system. Nuclear weapons would not only become obsolete and mankind be freed of the Damocles sword of nuclear terror, but LaRouche also proposed cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the employment of these technologies, based on new physical principles, in the civilian economy. The productivity of the economy of all participating states would have been enhanced through the "science-driver effect," and the efficiency of human beings in the physical universe would have been improved by an order of magnitude.

LaRouche's proposal was much more than a military strategy: it was a concept to overcome the partitioning of the world into blocs, to no longer exploit the Third World for proxy wars and conflicts, and instead to help overcome their underdevelopment by means of a massive technology transfer from the North to the South. LaRouche outlined the principles for such a new order of peace in his "Protocol for the Superpowers." Dr. Edward Teller at that time spoke of the "common goals of mankind."

Over one entire year, from the beginning of 1982 until February 1983, LaRouche conducted back-channel discussions with Soviet representatives, with the expressed agreement of the U.S. National Security Council, on such a change of military doctrine. In February 1983, Moscow announced its definitive refusal, with the argument that the West would obtain greater advantages in the civilian sector than would the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviets claimed that they had assurances from the highest levels of the U.S. Democratic Party, that LaRouche's ideas would never become American policy.

10. "Kissinger's NSSM-200 Policy of Genocide," *EIR*, June 9, 1995.

On March 23, 1983, that is exactly what happened. President Reagan announced, in a televised address, that the United States was officially adopting the policy that later became known as the SDI. A part of this new policy was Reagan's offer, that the United States would help the Soviet Union in the modernization of industry and overcoming bottlenecks. Reagan held to this policy up to the time of a letter on this issue, dated August 1983. Once the forces around Bush, Baker, Kissinger, et al. in the Republican Party had assembled for a counter-strike against the SDI, initially by watering the proposal down, so that only "off-the-shelf" technologies would be used, the American opportunity was lost.

LaRouche was the only Western politician in 1983 who not only had the range of vision to see that the Soviet Union would collapse in about five years, because of its negative attitude to the SDI and the neglected modernization of the economy, but he also published this prognosis.¹¹ Precisely five years later, on Oct. 12, 1988, when the increasing supply problems in the Comecon mounted, LaRouche was the only Western politician to develop a usable perspective, which he presented at a press conference in Berlin's Kempinski Bristol Hotel. This was the program, which ought to have helped reunified Germany to develop Poland as the model for all of Europe.

Where we go from here

Once the events of 1989 had led to the end of the Yalta order, and the issue of a new policy for Eastern Europe was on the agenda, Deutsche Bank Chairman Herrhausen formulated a program for Poland which went in a similar direction, i.e., a dirigistic economic policy on the model of the reconstruction after World War II. In the decisive phase of 1989-90, the Kohl government attempted to integrate such ideas into its policy for the East.

The *Documents on German Policy* illustrate that Germany and Kohl were prevented from carrying this through by a concert of powers, the main ones being the former occupation powers. Our own additional knowledge about this period of time complements the picture which the *Documents* provide, and is an integral component of the events. The overall picture of this history makes it clear to anyone who is interested in the truth, what the consequences are for the current strategic situation, and how solutions for the highly dramatic crisis today can be found. The documentation contained in this report proves that we, as an organization, have consistently worked for the implementation of a just, new world economic system for the past 25 years.

The present global financial crisis is the direct result of the fact, that the former occupation powers have forced Germany—contrary to German interests—to play a certain role

11. See for example, *Global Showdown: The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988*, *EIR Special Report*, July 24, 1985.

in the destruction of the world economy. It is this policy of Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Bush, which is also responsible for the catastrophic situation in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

We have now reached the end of this road. If the policies of globalization, free market economics, and Maastricht, are continued, the imminent collapse and disintegration of the world financial system is a certainty; civilization will collapse into a new Dark Age.

The only way out is to put an end to the entire British, American, Canadian, Japanese system of globalization, dominated by speculation, and everything connected with it. Only if a coalition of sovereign nation-states once again stimulates the world economy by means of radically protectionist and dirigist measures, can the catastrophe of global collapse and chaos be prevented.

The peaceful revolution of 1989 and the opportunities which could have resulted from the reunification of Germany, were in fact the great opportunity of this century; and it was missed. Today, as we are at the brink of Armageddon, we would do well to learn the lessons of the failure of 1989-90, because it will be the same forces who today will oppose the realization of a new, just world economic order. This time, they have to be vanquished, and nothing less depends upon that, than the survival of our civilization.

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Secret documents on German reunification

by Helga Zepp-LaRouche

The *Documents on German Policy, Special Edition from the Archives of the Chancellor's Office 1989/90 (Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90)* provide, in first approximation, a useful overview of the conditions under which the fall of the Berlin Wall and German unification occurred. Even these meager files demonstrate the arrogance with which Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand, George Bush, and, in his own way, Mikhail Gorbachov, assumed it to be self-evident, that the rights of the allied forces over Germany had been set for eternity. These files also shed light upon how tight the corset was, in which the close circle of people around the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, felt themselves constrained during the stormy events of that year.

The documents, which consist simply of transcripts of meetings at the Chancellor's Office, letters and notes about discussions and telephone calls, either completely ignore, or, at best, mention in a fragmentary aside, those developments in this period which did indeed have a decisive influence upon Kohl's behavior and the outcome of events, but which are all situated ultimately in the domain of the affairs of intelligence services. These include the campaign led by Thatcher's Minister of Trade and Industry, Nicholas Ridley, against Germany as the "Fourth Reich,"¹ as well as the assassination of Deutsche Bank Chairman Alfred Herrhausen² and the massive purchase of Stasi agents and material by the British, American, French, and Israeli intelligence services, along with the resulting susceptibility of German politicians to blackmail.³

Unfortunately, the very first sentence of the introduction to the *Documents* begins with a falsehood. "No one in the spring of 1989 foresaw that German unity would soon be reestablished." As documented in this report, Lyndon LaRouche presented the prognosis that Germany would soon be reunited, and with Berlin as its capital, on Oct. 12, 1988, at a press conference in the Kempinski Bristol Hotel in Berlin. This occurred at a point in time when nearly all West German

politicians were speaking in various ways about the "lie of the century: German reunification." LaRouche proposed, in addition, an emergency program for the economic development of Poland, to be undertaken by reunified Germany. Had Kohl had this proposal in his baggage when he travelled through Poland one year later, it would have been the most appropriate proposal with which to allay Polish reservations about the unification of Germany.

'International contacts'

The attitude of the three Western powers toward events in Germany is characterized in one segment of the introduction to the documentation. The description of Thatcher's position is itself an exercise in British understatement: "The Chancellor is unable to discover any understanding of German problems on the part of the British Prime Minister Thatcher," and "Kohl thinks she is a very committed, but also very critical head of state, who thinks in anachronistic, insular categories of security, and has difficulty adapting to modern social developments."

In view of the nearly racist features of Thatcher's pathological animosity ("Thus, Germany is in its essence more a destabilizing than a stabilizing factor in Europe," Thatcher writes in *Downing Street Years*), which were elevated to the rank of a theory in the discussions which Thatcher conducted at her Chequers country residence on the "German crisis," such formulations are unfortunately the expression of a fatal blindness with respect to "the British problem." Not only was Thatcher in full accord with Ridley's "Fourth Reich" campaign, but her difficulty "to adapt to modern social developments" was only the personified expression of the fact, that for the British geopolitical establishment, Germany, a country which had to be destabilized, lied to, and contained, in British interests, has been looked upon as the enemy for nearly 300 years.⁴ As will become clear, Mitterrand also pursued a policy which, despite Kohl's many contacts with him, was aimed at weakening Germany in a surprising way.

One of the myths which has come to surround reunification, is that it would not have been possible without Bush, that Bush was the only one who really reacted positively, and so on. On closer inspection, Bush had no other choice, if he wanted to avoid a "meltdown" in American policy toward Europe. If the United States had insisted on continuing the partition of Germany despite the peaceful revolution in East Germany, the United States' image of itself as the "agent of providence and progress," which is to promote the "proliferation of freedom and democracy,"⁵ would have suffered irreparable damage.

Prof. Detlef Junker, director of the German Historical

1. Mark Burdman, "The British Establishment's 'Ridley Affair,'" *EIR*, July 27, 1990, p. 38.

2. "Moscow and the Trust Retaliate in Germany," *EIR*, Dec. 8, 1989, p. 34.

3. A controversy has raged between Bonn and Washington over the release of Stasi files on more than 20,000 Stasi associates in the West.

4. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).

5. Prof. Detlef Junker: "Deutschlands Einheit, Eindämmung und Integration," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 13, 1997.

Institute in Washington, wrote a noteworthy article on that subject in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on March 13, 1997, in which he said that Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and a small group of associates had formulated "for this time the classical triad of American policy toward Germany in the twentieth century" at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall: "Unity of Germany, containment, and integration." Junker pointed to the incontestable fact, that the leitmotif of America's policy toward Germany, from Woodrow Wilson down to George Bush, was to contain the power of the German state, whether that was in the age of imperialism, during the Weimar Republic, the Federal Republic from 1949 onward, or reunified Germany from 1990 onward.

Professor Junker puts his finger on the sore point when he writes: "The cooperation with Federal Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister [Hans-Dietrich] Genscher, and a limited number of advisers functioned so excellently just because the Federal Republic, since the 'Ten Point Program for German Unity,' of the Federal Chancellor on Nov. 28, 1989, pursued parallel goals: the unity of Germany and its self-containment through integration." This evaluation, unfortunately, corresponds to the truth.

If one considers more closely the advisers of Bush mentioned in the documentation, it becomes clear how problematic this parallelism of goals was, i.e., Germany's self-integration into existing parameters of policy. Brent Scowcroft, for example, who was the chief discussion partner for Ministerial Director Horst Teltschik in this period, not only comes out of the stall of Henry Kissinger, but, as his successor as National Security Adviser under President Ford, he implemented the policy outlined in National Security Study Memorandum 200,⁶ and thus pursued a policy which is fundamentally contrary to the interests of Germany as well as the real interests of America.

Chronology

Late May 1989: Official visit of President George Bush to Germany. Kohl makes the prognosis that there will be three regional centers of power; Japan, Korea, South Asia; the United States of America, and Canada; and Europe (apparently China was not at that time in the Chancellor's field of vision, and the Southern Hemisphere was also not envisioned to play a role). Kohl assures Bush that the European Community would not be protectionist.

June 12-15, 1989: Gorbachov visits Bonn, which unleashes a Gorbomania in the Federal Republic, which is utterly incomprehensible to the Russian population. In a joint declaration, Gorbachov agrees to the right of every nation to self-determination, which in the evaluation of

Washington does not represent a decisive concession. The documentation⁷ notes, with reference to the issue of what divided Germany's future will be: "In the spring of 1989, there is as yet no sign of how fast the German question will become the central issue."

Late June 1989: The leadership of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R., or East Germany) comes under increasing pressure. "Supply problems, long queues in front of shops to buy consumer goods, lack of infrastructure in transportation and communications, unaltered monitoring and repression by the state. The feeling of desperation and frustration among people in the G.D.R. increases. The basic depressive mood leads to an increased pressure in the demands of people desiring to leave the G.D.R."

July 3-4, 1989: Chief of the Chancellor's Office, Rudolph Seiters, visits East Berlin, and conducts various discussions "at the fringe of official meetings." That and other signs "point to an imminent bankruptcy. From discrete remarks of individual high officers of the Ministry for State Security [Stasi], it is gathered that the thinking about German-German developments is changing." At this point, at the latest, the "preparatory work" for the Chancellery should have begun, particularly in view of the supply problems in the Soviet Union, and its known dependency on production in the G.D.R. within the enforced division of labor in the Comecon. LaRouche's proposal to make the development of Poland by reunified Germany into the model for the development of all East European countries, had been on the table in all the capitals of the West and East since October 1988.

Late July-early August 1989: Suddenly, there is a rapidly growing flood of people seeking to leave the G.D.R., who occupy the West German Embassy in Budapest and the Permanent Representation of the Federal Republic in East Berlin, in which 130 persons take up residence on Aug. 7. "The office of the Federal Chancellor is compelled to close the Permanent Representation to the public," which the leadership of the G.D.R. does not want to accept. When the embassy of the Federal Republic in Budapest issues passports to G.D.R. citizens, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the G.D.R. condemns the act as contrary to international law. One hundred and fifteen people who want to leave the G.D.R. put the Federal Chancellor under pressure, by directly writing to him.

Aug. 25, 1989: A secret German-Hungarian meeting is convened at Schloss Gymnich, in the vicinity of Bonn. With assurances that Gorbachov will agree, and that the plan will have the active support of the West, Hungarian Prime Minister Nemeth agrees on Sept. 11, shortly before the party convention of the West German Christian Democrats in Bremen, to allow Germans from the G.D.R. to leave the East via Austria. More than 500 refugees move into the embassy of the

6. "Kissinger's NSSM-200 Policy of Genocide," *EIR*, June 9, 1995.

7. Quoted material, unless otherwise identified, is from *Documents on German Policy*.

Federal Republic in Prague, and 100 in Warsaw, but it is uncertain whether the Hungarian solution can be carried through in Warsaw as well.

Sept. 19, 1989: The opposition group "Neues Forum" constitutes itself in the Gethsemane Church in East Berlin, with the civil rights politician Baerbel Bohley at its head.

Sept. 21, 1989: NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner reflects on the discussions in NATO to Federal Minister Seiters: In the case of a change in East-West relations, NATO would have to gain greater significance as a political alliance.

Oct. 6, 1989: Celebration of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the G.D.R.

Oct. 7, 1989: Gorbachov speaks with Erich Honecker, chairman of the East German ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), during the anniversary celebrations, and "once again experiences that the SED General Secretary is incapable of reform, a change of leadership in unavoidable."

Oct. 16, 1989: Intensive discussions about the strategic situation between Helga Zepp-LaRouche and Lyndon LaRouche, continuing through October 1990, lead to formulation of the idea of the "Productive Triangle."

Secretary of State Baker delivers a speech in which he says that the striving of Germans for self-determination in peace and freedom is the country's legitimate right. He does

not speak of reunification, however, but only a "reconciliation" (Versöhnung). "Behind this is the idea that the G.D.R. could continue to exist as an independent state, if the communist system is swept away."⁸ This reflected the belief of the U.S. administration, that the reform of socialism was less probable than its collapse, a suspicion addressed in the introduction to the documentation. Bush, Baker, et al. are interested in sustaining the partition of Germany as a key element of the post-war order in the world.

Oct. 18, 1989: Honecker is overthrown in a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED. Egon Krenz is named as his successor. Krenz is considered uncompromising, someone who will be relentless in pursuit of the SED's claims to power and will use all means at his disposal to that end, if necessary. (No. 63, draft of Ministerial Director Duisburg to Chancellor Kohl, Oct. 19, 1989.)

November 1989: At a meeting with Seiters, Stasi-linked arms trader Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski states: "The G.D.R. is on the brink of imminent bankruptcy." The demonstrations during the Monday peace-prayers grow to 200,000 people.

During German-French consultations, Kohl turns explicitly against a plan for Germany's future. The priorities for him are his visit to Poland, the coming summit meeting in Malta between Gorbachov and Bush, and the German-French relationship. For the discussions in the European Council, he wants to link the decision on an economic and monetary union of Europe with the initiation of discussions about a political union of Europe, while Mitterrand, in light of the intensification of the crisis in Eastern Europe, wants to force through the economic and monetary union.

Nov. 8, 1989: *Neue Solidarität*, the newspaper of the LaRouche movement in Germany, publishes a "Five-Step Emergency Program for the Reconstruction of Poland," proposed by Helga Zepp-LaRouche. This program is an explicit alternative to the "shock program" proposed by Harvard Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, and it foresees the creation of an internal market by developing a productive layer of medium-sized businesses and modernization of industry and infrastructure, for which especially German, French, and Italian businesses should contribute their knowledge. Point 4 states:

"On the basis of the economic theory of Leibniz's concept of physical economy, of the cameralism of Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, a general economic program must be elaborated for Poland, which defines the priorities, such that a maximum increase of productivity in the economy and labor power is achieved through technological progress. The economic reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II, or the industrial revolution in Japan, could serve for orientation."

At the same time, in a declaration on German-French

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8. Zelikov, Roce, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, p. 96.

cooperation in policy toward eastern countries, Helga Zepp-LaRouche calls for the proposal of the former French ambassador in Bonn, Fremont Maurice, to be acted upon: Kohl should visit Moscow with Mitterrand and tell Gorbachov: "The Soviet economy is collapsing, the people of the Soviet empire are starving! We Germans and French are willing to help on a grand scale with food and other economic commodities, and we will make our influence felt in the West to accomplish this end.

"But the Soviet leadership must guarantee the Germans and Poles freedom and self-determination in exchange. . . . Germany and France must take up the great issue of the survival of humanity in common: a new and just world economic order, thus the solution of the debt question for the Third World and project-linked economic aid."

Nov. 9, 1989: Kohl visits Warsaw with an 80-man delegation of top-ranking political and economic leaders. The discussions with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and President Lech Walesa focus on the mass demonstrations of 600-700,000 people in Leipzig and East Berlin. Kohl does not yet see the situation as dramatically as does Walesa, who doubts whether the Wall "will still be standing in one to two weeks."

A few minutes following this discussion, Günter Shabowski, SED Central Committee member in East Berlin, informs the international press about the new regulations for people who wish to leave the G.D.R., a declaration which is understood to mean opening the Wall. When Kohl learns of the opening some hours later from Ackermann, his initial reaction is skeptical.⁹

"He simply cannot believe, that the Wall is really to be opened, an inner joy he hardly feels. It is more the uncertainty about how developments will unfold, which prevails." Kohl interrupts his visit to Poland for one and a half days in order to participate in an SPD-initiated demonstration in Berlin in front of the Schöneberger Rathaus, and to conduct a number of important telephone calls and discussions in Bonn. West Berlin Mayor Walter Momper speaks of history now being written "by the people of the G.D.R."; thus, he assumes still that two states of Germany will persist. But people in East and West are exhilarated.

Nov. 13, 1989: Soviet Ambassador Kvizinsky demands from the German Federal government that it treat the G.D.R. as a sovereign state. In view of the precarious supply situation in the Soviet Union, negative effects from the events in the G.D.R. are feared; imports from the G.D.R. constitute 20% of Soviet foreign trade.

Mid-November 1989: Kohl receives reports about the mood in East Germany. Anger against corruption is growing, but hopelessness and paralysis are spreading also; a shift toward a depressive mood is observed among the opposition

groups. "Surprisingly, 40 years after the founding of the two German states, the Day-X of the opening of the border has come, and the Federal government has no practicable plan for what to do. Nothing has been prepared, no scenarios, no crisis scenarios, for the eventuality of imminent unification, which the Federal chancellery could fall back upon. No considerations are devoted by governments and planning staffs for events which they do not foresee. Who knows what conditions will ultimately determine the concrete situation. Furthermore, there have been no advanced warnings from the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) [Federal Intelligence Service]."

In fact, LaRouche's proposal for a soon-to-be-reunified Germany to help with the development of Poland with Western technology, had been on the table since October 1988. Already in 1983, LaRouche had forecast the collapse of the Soviet Union in about five years, when the Soviet Union rejected Reagan's offer for cooperation on the SDI. The preparations, in other words, had indeed been made, albeit not by an obviously inefficient government bureaucracy, but by LaRouche and his associates.

Nov. 15, 1989: Kohl speaks with Bush in favor of the necessary food aid for Poland, and calls for a credit support from the American government in the amount of \$250 million. "Bush admonishes to be cautious. He fears having to make concessions to the euphoric mood of the Europeans." Gorbachov should not be offered a pretext for an intervention with military means. "Bush blocks exaggerated demands for support."

LaRouche calls for setting a policy of "real economic development" into motion, in the tradition of the German national economist Friedrich List. "The beginning should be made with the development of industrial infrastructure. The G.D.R. would take on the role of a hinge in the development of Poland," he says.

Nov. 17, 1989: Kohl telephones Bush, who emphasizes that the United States intends, irrespective of remarks in the U.S. Congress, to support the reforms. "In the U.S.A. there would be a euphoria on account of the changes in these countries. This would be a certain risk. One would have to avoid unforeseen reactions in the G.D.R. and the Soviet Union. For that reason, one would have to abstain from grand rhetoric. One must also abstain from speaking about reunification or a timetable for tearing down the Wall. It must not be permitted that the President of the United States be put in a situation in which he must make concessions to the euphoric mood." In the discussion, Bush refuses to see Kohl for one or two hours in Spain before his meeting with Gorbachov.

Nov. 21, 1989: Zepp-LaRouche writes, in a personal letter to Kohl: "It seems all the more urgent that continental Europe, under the leadership of the Federal Republic and France, sets a clear agenda, in which the major orientation must be European support for Poland. As correct as it is to link economic aid to the G.D.R. with clear political concessions, in view of the entire complexity of the desperate situation of

9. Ackermann, *Mit feinem Gehör*, p. 309.

the Communist countries, this must not lead to continental Europe's losing momentum. The situation in Poland requires immediate stabilization, but the dimension of hope for economic development is also necessary for the people in the G.D.R.

"It does no harm if the 'five wise men' were to work out a plan by next spring, for how the economy of the G.D.R. can best be developed. But until that time, events may well have passed us by. The best way to generate short-term hope and momentum would be to announce the construction of a rapid railway system from Paris through Berlin to Warsaw, as the indispensable precondition for the development of productive medium-sized industries, at first in Poland and then in the G.D.R., as well as eventually in Hungary and the Czechoslovakia."

Soviet envoy Nikolai Portugalov meets Teltschik. "In commission from [Valentin] Falin, Portugalov should find out what the Bonn government thinks about reunification. He does not suspect what an avalanche he inadvertently causes in the Chancellor's office, which causes the Soviet leadership considerable problems in the coming weeks." Two documents couriered by Portugalov reflect the fear of the Soviets that developments could go out of control, and how the "Occupation Statute," as Portugalov calls the Four Powers' rights, can be sustained also from London and Paris. "Teltschik reacts 'as if electrified.'" It is suddenly clear to him: The thinking in the Soviet leadership about German unity has already gone further than officials of the Chancellor's office suspect. Teltschik proposes a meeting to occur as soon as possible between the Federal Chancellor and General Secretary Gorbachov. "For Teltschik, 'the sheerly incredible' has come into motion."

Nov. 22, 1989: Zepp-LaRouche authors a leaflet, distributed in hundreds of thousands of copies, entitled "Beloved Germany, Keep Going—With Confidence," in which the idea of the economic development of Poland is presented as a perspective for how the peaceful revolution can become the turning point for the development of the East and the developing countries.

Nov. 23, 1989: Kohl meets with his public relations staff. Teltschik proposes that the Chancellor should lay out a realistic path toward reunification during the debate on the federal budget in the coming week. Seiters and Duisberg doubt whether, in view of the reactions of Western countries and the possible effects on the population of the G.D.R., it is tactically prudent to allow the Chancellor to go public now with a reunification plan. In the end, a plan is worked out and presented to Kohl.¹⁰

Contrary to usual practice, neither the other partners of

10. Facsimile excerpt of the "original draft" of the ten-point program for German unity, not made available for this edition of the documents, with the handwritten notes of Chancellor Kohl, "Ich wollte Deutschlands Einheit" ("I wanted Germany's unity"), p. 162.

the governing coalition nor the Western powers are informed in advance. Only Bush receives the text in Washington, by cable, one hour before Kohl delivers the speech.

Nov. 27, 1989: Kohl writes to President Mitterrand, proposing a working calendar for further steps through to 1993, which makes it clear that Kohl wants to postpone the end of the role of the German *deutschmark* as long as possible. The European Council should establish that "at the latest in December 1992," the "Community has made institutional preparations in order to begin the next steps toward an economic and monetary union, and then political union, in the coming years, in accord with the actually achieved convergence of economic and monetary policies."

A 50-person delegation, the "Franklin Brigade" of the Schiller Institute in the United States, visits the "old and future capital of Berlin" and demonstrates in front of the Brandenburg Gate and Checkpoint Charlie for freedom and German unity.

Nov. 28, 1989: Kohl issues a ten-point program, presenting a concept for the long-term unification of Germany, which is buffered on all sides: embedding Germany in the European process of integration, support for the G.D.R. with its economic difficulties: opening toward eastern Europe; and reassurance with respect to the West that there will be no unilateral action on reunification.

The Bush administration sees the ten-point program chiefly as "an instigation to unification." There is agreement with that judgment: With this plan, the German Chancellor has taken the initiative. The American side must put on the brakes, in order not to provoke Gorbachov to ill-conceived reactions.¹¹ "Thatcher and Mitterrand are extremely upset about Kohl's pressing ahead alone. The Western powers have not been accustomed to such a sovereign act of the German side for a long time."

Nov. 29, 1989: Zepp-LaRouche issues a leaflet, entitled "What Good 80 Million People Can Cause in the World: For a Christian Europe of the Fatherlands!" The leaflet proposes linking the European industrial centers from West to East, and that this territory, the size of Japan, become the locomotive for the world economy. *Neue Solidarität* publishes her proposal of October 1989 for extending the European Monetary System for the economic development of the East and the South.

Nov. 30, 1989: Alfred Herrhausen is assassinated.

Dec. 2, 1989: Zepp-LaRouche issues a statement upon Herrhausen's assassination in which she assures Kohl of her full support, and indicates the geopolitical reasons for the assassination.

Dec. 2-3, 1989: At a summit meeting between Bush and Gorbachov on the cruiser *Maxim Gorki* near Malta, the American President signals to Gorbachov that he will undertake no steps to accelerate consideration of the German issue.

11. Zelikov, Roce, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed*, p. 118-121.

Kohl's adviser Joachim Bitterlich prepares a memorandum for the Chancellor, in which he puts forward his view that Mitterrand thinks Kohl's demand for more rights for the European Parliament is "a maneuver to distract from the monetary union, and the French President dispenses with Kohl's reservations with respect to stability in a suspicious way with platitudes."

Mitterrand's reply makes clear that he links his agreement to a "confederation" (not reunification), to the monetary union, and to the condition that Germany agree to abandon the deutschmark and speed up the timetable for the realization of the economic and currency union, and that this decision be taken already at the Strasbourg summit of the European Council on Dec. 8 and 9.

Dec. 3, 1989: Kohl and Bush meet in Laeken near Brussels. Bush demands three concessions from Kohl, among them that there is no alternative to European integration, and Germany's membership in NATO.

Dec. 4, 1989: Lyndon LaRouche publishes an article "Mittelstand as a Locomotive for Eastern Europe," in which he emphasizes the significance of small and medium-sized industry as the centerpiece for the economies of the G.D.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Dec. 6, 1989: In a letter to Kohl, Zepp-LaRouche writes: "The Strasbourg summit meeting must establish a clear alternative to the concept of a superpower condominium. That would be best achieved if representatives of continental Europe were to obligate themselves to develop the Europe of national sovereign fatherlands into a bastion of economic and technological progress.

"Precisely if the two superpowers want to maintain a monetarist, or collectivist, economic conception, it is of the greatest importance that western Europe point toward the 'third way' in economic policy, which has always led to successful industrial revolutions, i.e., an economic policy in the tradition of Jean-Baptiste Colbert and Friedrich List. The salvation of Poland has to be one central core of this policy, and there would be no better way to announce this intent than by announcing the immediate construction of a two-lane high-speed railway from Paris to Berlin to Warsaw, as the indispensable precondition for the development of a productive medium-sized industrial sector in Poland.

"The intent should be clearly stated at Strasbourg, to develop continental Europe into a superpower of economic progress and peace, in which all of those countries of the East bloc which are willing to reform, are invited to participate. In light of the coming harsh winter in the East bloc, it is urgently necessary to portray a perspective of cultural optimism, which also shows an alternative to military solutions for the Soviet military."

Dec. 8-9, 1989: Summit of the European Council in Strasbourg. Never before did the German Chancellor "experience an EC summit in such an icy atmosphere." He has to submit to an almost "tribunal-like interrogation" about his

intentions with the ten-point program. He agrees to the date demanded by Mitterrand for the monetary union. Kohl is well aware: "A future renunciation of the deutschmark is a sacrifice of German interests." The self-containment is a success.

Dec. 12, 1989: Baker emphasizes to Kohl in a discussion that the German government should not further force developments.

The ambassadors of the four victorious powers, after 20 years, meet in Berlin in the building of the Allied Control Council, for the Four-Power Discussions, in the style of old occupation powers, which is perceived by the German government to be an act of diplomatic degradation. There is great suspicion that there will be "a four-power conspiracy."¹²

Dec. 14, 1989: During a visit in Budapest, Kohl says to Nemeth about the situation in the G.D.R.: "The smell of vengeance is in the air; and indeed from the top down to the local level. The loss of authority and discreditation of the party and the state security apparatus, including the entire administration, are the main problems."

Dec. 19, 1989: Kohl's makes his first official visit to East Germany. "As the Chancellor experiences the joyous masses of people when he was received at the airport in Dresden, he became suddenly aware of his responsibility for the people in the G.D.R. Dresden became for him the key experience on the way to unity."

Year's end 1989-90: The government entertains various ideas about how it should proceed; a new foreign policy strategy is needed. "With its defensive unification strategy, the government will not go very far." Kohl decides to push developments ahead, but in such a way that "the pressure comes from the people on the street."

In his New Year's speech, Kohl says: "The year 1989 has brought Germans much closer" to reunification, and the next decade could consummate it, and become, at least for Germans, "the most happy of this century." But Kohl is in a dilemma. He neither wants to stabilize the communist regime of the G.D.R., nor does he want to bring about a political collapse. He places his hopes in the elections to the Popular Chamber (Volkskammer) in the G.D.R. and a change of power with as little friction as possible, which would offer the opportunity to move from a confederation to a federation. But what should the form of German reunification be? And, how can the Soviet Union be brought to agree to it?

Kohl could have retained the initiative in this period, from the fall of the Wall up to Oct. 3, 1990 and beyond, had he used television to address not only the population of the G.D.R., which later became the new federal states of Germany, but the population of the West as well, and outlined LaRouche's plan for the development of Poland and the "Productive Triangle," in order to give the population a perspective. The enthusiasm and the support of the people in the East would have

12. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, p. 667.

been assured. The program of the "Productive Triangle," as well as that of the Eurasian Land-Bridge, which LaRouche proposed after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would have put the East-West relationship on a foundation of reason, and contributed to freeing these populations from the geopolitical relics of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Jan. 15, 1990: The state institutions of the G.D.R. have completely lost their credibility, as the population storms the central office of the Ministry for State Security in the Normanenstrasse in East Berlin, without being hindered.

Mid-January 1990: The program of the "Productive Triangle, Paris-Berlin-Vienna: Locomotive for the World Economy" is published. Elaborated by a working group of the Schiller Institute, the plan elaborates in detail proposals advanced by LaRouche. The program is sent to all heads of state in Europe, and is distributed in many hundreds of thousands of copies. An international campaign to implement the program begins, and this continues in the coming months and years in all countries in eastern Europe.

Late January 1990: Thatcher escalates the "Fourth Reich" campaign, and is clearly panicked that she may not be able to prevent German unification. The power in these weeks is in the streets of East Germany. Without the help of the Federal Republic, the G.D.R. threatens to collapse into chaos. (The hour for the "Productive Triangle" had struck, and at that moment Poland would have agreed to it immediately.)

Feb. 6, 1990: The discussion about a "direct transition from planned economy to market economy," was based on false economic theories. Instead, productive credit creation in the context of the "Productive Triangle" would have meant a real program for economic growth. "If the union permits it," Kohl declared at the federal executive of the CDU on the evening of Feb. 8, "that our country draws back from unification out of financial fears in this fateful hour, then the Federal Republic of Germany will have retired itself from world history." The "Productive Triangle" was on Kohl's desk at this time.

Feb. 7, 1990: In a letter to Chancellor Kohl, Zepp-LaRouche writes:

"Dear Mr. Chancellor,

"I would like to recommend the enclosed brochure of the Schiller Institute, 'The Productive Triangle Paris-Berlin-Vienna, Locomotive of the World Economy,' to your kind attention. I do think it is very urgent that western Europe demonstrate such a clear programmatic perspective in the present, turbulent strategic situation, one with which peace can be secured."

Feb. 14, 1990: Zepp-LaRouche publishes ideas on an educational program for Germany, in which she emphasizes the necessity of linking the economic development of the East with the perspective of a cultural Renaissance, which is based upon the Weimar classics and the period of Schiller.

Feb. 19, 1990: Representatives of the heirs of the American Martin Luther King Movement support the peaceful revo-

lution in the G.D.R. and address the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig.

March 7, 1990: In a letter to Chancellor Kohl, Zepp-LaRouche writes, among other things:

"It would therefore be very important for you to take up, in your next speeches, the ideals and points of reference, which are most easily understood by people in the G.D.R., and also to point out the highlights of German Classical culture, i.e., the Weimar Classics. That is what people can be proud of, and can identify with. It is that pride which they now need.

"I have heard how you, Mr. Chancellor, have made reference occasionally to Freiherr vom Stein. A broad study of these ideas seems to me to be very important in view of the newly inflamed debate about the relevance of the Congress of Vienna as a concept against German unification.

"I deeply believe that people need something to sustain them in times of crisis, and I also believe that you are in a unique position to communicate hope to people."

July 1990: German currency union.

Aug. 21, 1990: In a letter to Chancellor Kohl, Zepp-LaRouche writes:

"Dear Mr. Chancellor,

"I recommend the enclosed study to your attention. It contains a proposal for a comprehensive European infrastructure program as the precondition for the economic development of East Europe. This concept was elaborated in a proposal of my husband, Lyndon LaRouche, and is based on the idea that only such an economic development program, which also includes the Soviet Union, shaken by a severe economic crisis as it is, can be an effective policy for maintaining peace. . . .

"The rapid realization of this program is all the more urgent for strategic reasons, since there are irrefutable indications that the Gulf crisis is a scenario manipulated by Anglo-American interests, which is inspired by the same spirit as the remarks of former Minister Ridley. A number of things indicate that the beginning of this crisis is to be seen in various events in February of this year, and thus as a reaction to the beginning German-Soviet rapprochement."

The study mentioned in this letter was also sent to all members of the cabinet. The following were the replies:

Aug. 29, 1990: Federal Minister of Finance

"Dear Mrs. Zepp-LaRouche,

"I thank you in the name of the Federal Minister of Finance for sending the study on the development of a comprehensive European infrastructure program. I have taken the liberty of forwarding the study to the relevant department of the Ministry of Finance.

"With Friendly Greetings,

"Wolfgang Solzbacher"

Sept. 3, 1990: Federal Minister for Post and Telecommunications

"Dear Mrs. Helga Zepp-LaRouche,

"I thank you in the name of Mr. Federal Minister Dr. Schwarz-Schilling for your letter and the included EIRNA study, 'The Productive Triangle Paris-Berlin-Vienna.' The Minister has asked me to reply to you. Your study will be reviewed in the Federal Ministry for Post and Telecommunications and included in our deliberations.

"With Friendly Greetings,
"Klaus Reischmann"

Feb. 13, 1990: Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Order

"Dear Mrs. Zepp-LaRouche,
"I thank you for the brochure, 'The Productive Triangle Paris-Berlin-Vienna, Locomotive for the World Economy,' which you sent me on Feb. 7, 1990. I have forwarded the study to the responsible Federal Minister for Economy.

"With Friendly Greetings,
"i.A. (Dr. Fendrich)"

Nov. 5, 1991: In a letter to Federal President Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Zepp-LaRouche writes:

"Dear Mr. President,
"Included with this letter I am sending you the invitation to the Berlin conference of the Schiller Institute. . . .

"A full year after achieving formal sovereignty, Germany has allowed the political initiative to be taken out of its hands. Under massive pressure by the U.S.A. and Great Britain, the German government has capitulated on crucial issues and is currently pursuing a policy which is contrary to German interests. . . .

"Is it really not understood in Bonn, that it will lead to assured catastrophe if the bankrupt Anglo-American model of the IMF is extended to the republics of the former Soviet Union? If we want to prevent all of Europe from being drawn into a war soon, then the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] have to go, and [be] replaced with a reasonable economic policy. . . .

"Germany must itself steer the course of the world economy in a different direction and draw the conclusion from the knowledge that the financial crash will be the worse, the longer it is postponed. In particular, all greed must disappear from economic policy, which managers and bankers from the West have so often practiced, and thus caused much bitterness. An end must be put to what the Pope just denounced as 'savage capitalism' in Brazil, 'whose prevailing characteristic is unbridled striving for profit, with the incurred disregard for the original value of labor and the dignity of the laborer.' . . .

"The program for an integrated all-European infrastructure program has been on the table for two years. It is the proposal of my husband, Lyndon LaRouche, to integrate the so-called 'Productive Triangle Paris-Berlin-Vienna,' by means of a high-speed railway system and to realize, on that basis, 'development corridors' in the direction of Warsaw, through the Baltic states, to St. Petersburg, to Moscow, Kiev, up into Siberia, into the Transcaucasus, the Balkans, and to



Schiller Institute founder Helga Zepp-LaRouche, July 25, 1998.

Sicily and over Spain to Gibraltar, as the bridgehead to Africa. . . .

"The financing for such a grand project can of course not come from the private sector alone. We therefore require a return to a national banking system, as this was most elaborately described by the first Secretary of the Treasury of the U.S.A., Alexander Hamilton, applied by him, and always imitated since then, whenever the issue was to set a successful industrial revolution into motion. Friedrich List and the German Customs Union were in this tradition, as well as the government of Lincoln in the U.S.A., the Meiji Restoration in Japan, and MITI [Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry] of today. . . .

"If the program of the 'Productive Triangle' is realized, then Europe can become the locomotive of the world economy and set the urgent development of the Southern Hemisphere into motion. We need similar infrastructure programs in Africa, Asia, and Ibero-America, as the precondition for the development of industry and agriculture there. . . .

"If the political initiative for a just economic order were to proceed from Germany, that would be anything but a 'German solo-initiative.' If Germany gives a signal, all of the nations of the East—perhaps with very few exceptions—and of the South, and also of continental Europe, would immediately follow. The majority of mankind would then be on the side of Germany."

LaRouche's 1988 forecast of German reunification

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. gave the following speech at a press conference at West Berlin's Kempinski Bristol Hotel on the morning of Oct. 12, 1988. He was at the time an independent candidate for the Presidency of the United States.

I am here today, to report to you on the subject of U.S. policy for the prospects of reunification of Germany. What I present to you now, will be a featured topic in a half-hour U.S. television broadcast, nationwide, prior to next month's Presidential election. I could think of no more appropriate place to unveil this new proposal, than here in Berlin.

I am the third of the leading candidates for election as the next President of the United States. Although I shall not win that election, my campaign will almost certainly have a significant influence in shaping some of the policies of the next President.

Although we can not know with certainty who will be the winner of a close contest between Vice President George Bush and Massachusetts Gov. Michael Dukakis, it is the best estimate in the United States today, that Mr. Bush will win the largest electoral vote. Obviously, I am not supporting Mr. Bush's candidacy, and I am not what is called a "spoiler" candidate, working secretly on Mr. Bush's behalf. Nonetheless, should Mr. Bush win, it would be likely that I would have some significant, if indirect influence on certain of the policies of the next administration. How this result would affect the destiny of Germany and Central Europe generally, is the subject of my report here today.

By profession, I am an economist in the tradition of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Friedrich List in Germany, and of Alexander Hamilton and Mathew and Henry Carey in the United States. My political principles are those of Leibniz, List, and Hamilton, and are also consistent with those of Friedrich Schiller and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Like the founders of my republic, I have an uncompromising belief in the principle of absolutely sovereign nation-states, and I am therefore opposed to all supranational authorities which might undermine the sovereignty of any nation. However, like Schiller, I believe that every person who aspires to become a beautiful soul, must be at the same time a true patriot of his own nation, and also a world-citizen.

For these reasons, during the past fifteen years I have become a specialist in my country's foreign affairs. As a result of this work, I have gained increasing, significant influence among some circles around my own government on the inter-related subjects of U.S. foreign policy and strategy. My role

during 1982 and 1983 in working with the U.S. National Security Council to shape the adoption of the policy known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, is an example of this. Although the details are confidential, I can report to you that my views on the current strategic situation are more influential in the United States today than at any time during the past.

Therefore, I can assure you that what I present to you now, on the subject of prospects for the reunification of Germany, is a proposal which will be studied most seriously among the relevant establishment circles inside the United States.

Under the proper conditions, many today will agree, that the time has come for early steps toward the reunification of Germany, with the obvious prospect that Berlin might resume its role as the capital.

For the United States, for Germans, and for Europe generally, the question is, will this be brought about by assimilating the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin into the East bloc's economic sphere of influence, or can it be arranged differently? In other words, is a united Germany to become part of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, as President de Gaulle proposed, or, as Mr. Gorbachov desires, a Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic?

The reality of the worldwide food crisis

I see a possibility, that the process of reunification could develop as de Gaulle proposed. I base this possibility upon the reality of a terrible worldwide food crisis which has erupted during the past several months, and will dominate the world's politics for at least two years to come.

The economy of the Soviet bloc is a terrible, and worsening failure. In Western European culture, we have demonstrated that the successes of nations of big industries depend upon the technologically progressive independent farmer, and what you call in Germany the *Mittelstand* [Germany's small and medium-sized entrepreneurs]. Soviet culture in its present form is not capable of applying this lesson. Despite all attempts at structural reforms, and despite any amount of credits supplied from the West, the Soviet bloc economy as a whole has reached the critical point, that, in its present form, it will continue to slide downhill from here on, even if the present worldwide food crisis had not erupted.

I do not foresee the possibility of genuine peace between the United States and Soviet Union earlier than thirty or forty years still to come. The best we can do in the name of peace, is to avoid a new general war between the powers. This war-avoidance must be based partly on our armed strength, and our political will. It must be based also, on rebuilding the strength of our economies.

At the same time that we discourage Moscow from dangerous military and similar adventures, we must heed the lesson taught us by a great military scientist nearly four centuries ago, Niccolò Machiavelli: we must also provide an adversary with a safe route of escape. We must rebuild our economies to the level at which we can provide the nations of



Lyndon LaRouche speaks at Berlin's Kempinski Bristol Hotel, Oct. 12, 1988: "I can assure you that what I present to you now, on the subject of prospects for the reunification of Germany, is a proposal which will be studied most seriously among the relevant establishment circles inside the United States."

the Soviet bloc an escape from the terrible effects of their economic suffering.

I give a concrete example.

Recently, in response to the food crisis, I sponsored the formation of an international association, called Food For Peace. This association has just recently held its founding conference in Chicago Sept. 3-4, and since then has been growing rapidly inside the United States and in other nations represented by delegates attending that conference.

One of the points I have stressed, in supporting this Food For Peace effort, is that the Soviet bloc will require the import of about 80 million tons of grain next year, as a bare minimum for the pressing needs of its population. China is experiencing a terrible food crisis, too. As of now, the food reserves are exhausted. There are no more food reserves in the United States, and the actions of the European Commission in Brussels have brought the food reserves of Western Europe to very low levels. Next year, the United States and Western Europe will be cut off from the large and growing amount of food imports during recent years, because of the collapse of food production in developing nations throughout most of the world.

During 1988, the world will have produced between 1.6 and 1.7 billion tons of grains, already a disastrous shortage. To ensure conditions of political, and strategic stability during 1989 and 1990, we shall require approximately 2.4 to 2.5 billion tons of grain each year. At those levels, we would be able to meet minimal Soviet needs; without something approaching those levels, we could not.

If the nations of the West would adopt an emergency agricultural policy, those nations, working together, could ensure that we reach the level of food supply corresponding to about 2.4 billion tons of grains. It would be a major effort, and would mean scrapping the present agricultural policies of many governments and supranational institutions, but it could be accomplished. If we are serious about avoiding the danger of war during the coming two years, we will do just that.

By adopting these kinds of policies, in food supplies and other crucial economic matters, the West can foster the kind of conditions under which the desirable approach to reunification of Germany can proceed on the basis a majority of Germans on both sides of the Wall desire it should. I propose that the next government of the United States should adopt that as part of its foreign policy toward Central Europe.

Rebuild the economies of Eastern Europe

I shall propose the following concrete perspective to my government. We say to Moscow: We will help you. We shall act to establish Food For Peace agreements among the international community, with the included goal that neither the people of the Soviet bloc nor developing nations shall go hungry. In response to our good faith in doing that for you, let us do something which will set an example of what can be done to help solve the economic crisis throughout the Soviet bloc generally.

Let us say that the United States and Western Europe

will cooperate to accomplish the successful rebuilding of the economy of Poland. There will be no interference in the political system of government, but only a kind of Marshall Plan aid to rebuild Poland's industry and agriculture. If Germany agrees to this, let a process aimed at the reunification of the economies of Germany begin, and let this be the *punctum saliens* for Western cooperation in assisting the rebuilding of the economy of Poland.

We, in the United States and Germany, should say to the Soviet bloc, let us show what we can do for the peoples of Eastern Europe, by this test, which costs you really nothing. Then, you judge by the results, whether this is a lesson you wish to try in other cases.

I am now approaching the conclusion of my report. I have two more points to identify.

All of us who are members of that stratum called world-class politicians, know that the world has now entered into what most agree is the end of an era. The state of the world as we have known it during the postwar period is ended. The only question is, whether the new era will be better or worse than the era we are now departing?

The next two years, especially, will be the most dangerous period in modern European history, and that worldwide. Already, in Africa, entire nations, such as Uganda, are in the process of vanishing from the map, biologically. Madness on a mass scale, of a sort which Central Europe has not known since the New Dark Age of the fourteenth century, has already destroyed Cambodia, is threatening to take over the Middle East as a whole, and is on the march, to one degree or another, in every part of the world. As a result of these conditions of crisis, the world has never been closer to a new world war than the conditions which threaten us during the next four years ahead. What governments do during the coming two years will decide the fate of all humanity for a century or more to come.

There have been similar, if not identical periods of crisis in history before this, but, never, to our best knowledge, on a global scale, all at once.

I recall the famous case of a certain German gentleman of the Weimar period. This gentleman was persuaded that a second world war was inevitable. He searched the world for a place to which he might move his family, to be out of the areas in which the next war would be fought. So, when the war erupted, he and his family were living in the remote Solomon Islands, on the island of Guadalcanal.

In this period of crisis, there is no place in which any man or woman can safely hide in a crisis-ridden world without food. One can not duck politics, with the idea of taking care of one's career and family, until this storm blows over. There is no place, for any man or woman to hide. There is no room for today's political pragmatists in the leadership of governments now. If we are to survive, we must make boldly imaginative decisions, on the condition that they are good choices, as well as bold ones.

The time has come for a bold decision on U.S. policy toward Central Europe.

If there is no Soviet representative here in this audience at the moment, we may be certain that the entire content of my report to you now will be in Moscow, and will be examined at high levels there, before many hours have passed. The Soviet leadership has said in its newspapers and elsewhere, many times, that it considers me its leading adversary among leading individual public figures today. Nonetheless, Moscow regards me with a curious sort of fascination, and, since President Reagan first announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, considers everything I say on policy matters to be influential, and very credible.

Moscow will read the report I deliver here today. It will wait, as Soviet political leaders do, to see what other circles around the U.S. establishment and government might echo the kind of proposal I have identified. Once they see such a signal from these quarters, Moscow will treat my proposal very seriously, and will begin exploring U.S. and European thinking on this.

Germany's sovereign choice

As far as I am concerned, it is Germans who must make the sovereign decision on their choice of fate for their nation. My function is to expand the range of choices available to them. So I have come to Berlin, where the delivery of this report will have the maximum impact in Moscow, as well as other places.

I conclude my remarks with the following observation.

Moscow hates me, but in their peculiar way, the Soviets trust me to act on my word. Moscow will believe, quite rightly, that my intentions toward them are exactly what I described to you today. I would therefore hope, that what I am setting into motion here today, will be a helpful contribution to establishing Germany's sovereign right to choose its own destiny.

For reasons you can readily recognize from the evidence in view, I know my German friends and acquaintances rather well, and share the passions of those who think of Germany with loving memory of Leibniz, Schiller, Beethoven, Humboldt, and that great statesman of freedom, Freiherr vom Stein. If I can not predict Germany's decisions in this matter exactly, I believe that if what I have set afoot here today is brought to success, the included result will be that the Reichstag building over there, will be the seat of Germany's future parliament, and the beautiful Charlottenburger Schloss, the future seat of government.

If the conditions arise, in which that occurs, President de Gaulle's dream of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals will be the peaceful outcome of thirty years or so of patient statecraft, and that durable peace will come to Europe and the world within the lifetime of those graduating from universities today.

Heute, bin ich auch ein Berliner.

The assassination of Herrhausen: murder as a tool of (geo)politics

by Rüdiger Rumpf

Three weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall had put Germany into a mood of joyous celebration, a terrorist bombing shook the republic, and the effects of it are still felt today. It was already apparent immediately after the assassination of Alfred Herrhausen, that one of the most important personalities in Germany and in the world of international finance, had been murdered. The background of the assassination, and the effects it was to have, remained veiled for some time, or, at least, no one spoke about it in public. Politicians seemed unaffected by the killing of an important and close adviser of the Chancellor, and everyone expected that the process toward reunification of Germany would continue, although not as rapidly as it in fact happened.

Initially, the public was sold a package of pseudo-information about the assassination, based on the ostensible claim of the "Red Army Faction" (RAF), that they had carried out the bombing. The veneer seemed plausible: The RAF, after all, had a long history of being an underground guerrilla troop of enraged, misled desperadoes. Why should this gang of terrorists, which had fought the state for two decades, not also kill the head of the largest and most important bank in Germany? Had this gang, now in its "third generation," not proven that it could successfully regenerate itself? The first generation was completely destroyed; the second was either in prison or its members had disappeared to parts unknown, but the "third generation" seemed to be a complete unknown, even to security authorities. Former Federal Attorney General Kurt Rebmann had admitted that, since the mid-1980s, there was no proof that any deed committed by an identified person, had been in connection with terrorist acts ascribed to the "RAF."

The fall of the Wall gives birth to monsters

The fact that the bloodless collapse of the hated East German SED dictatorship led to the revelation of some of the best-kept secrets of the West German elite, may be an irony of history. When, in the spring of 1990, the newly elected (and last) German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) government began a series of arrests and extraditions of RAF terrorists long sought by West German authorities, it soon turned out that the people whose faces adorned the terrorist wanted posters hanging all over the walls of official buildings in West Germany ("Warning! Armed and Dangerous!!!"), had not vis-



Deutsche Bank Chairman Alfred Herrhausen. His assassination on Nov. 30, 1989 was a powerful blow—and a threat—to Chancellor Kohl.

ited the G.D.R. on vacation: They had lived there as citizens of East Germany, in the grayness of everyday socialist life. After a bit of chatter in the media about whether the G.D.R. had been the real string-puller behind terrorism in the Federal Republic from the beginning, it turned out that Gen. Erich Mielke's East German State Security (Stasi) bureaucracy had, in fact, now and then provided protection and helped the terrorists escape, but he could not be called the initiator or contracting party for the RAF first and second generations. In the trials against former RAF members, most of whom have now finished serving their sentences, the prosecuting attorney was unable to present any evidence of East German support for the terrorist group in the period before they had become "citizens of the G.D.R."

The West German government had always denied having known that the RAF cadre were staying in East Germany. The authors of the book *RAF Phantom: What Do Politics and Business Need Terrorists For*¹ printed for the record, in the first edition (1992), the reply of the government to a question posed by Westdeutscher Rundfunk (West German Radio) on July 5, 1990: "The office of the Chancellor first learned that

1. *Das RAF—Wozu Politik und Wirtschaft Terroristen brauchen*, Gerhard Wisenewski, Wolfgang Landgrüber, and Ekkehard Sieker (Muenchen, Drömersche Verlaganstalt, Knauer, second printing, 1997).

'RAF' members were staying in the G.D.R. at the time of the arrests in June 1990." The authors printed a dossier-entry of the Terrorism Department of the Federal Criminal Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA), dating back to 1986, demonstrating that the government's claim could not be true. They showed (p. 383) that the West German government's denial of having entered into an agreement with the G.D.R. was also not credible. The authors' remark in this connection is significant: that the then-chief of the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND), Klaus Kinkel (now Foreign Minister), personally attempted to dissuade a "Stern TV team" from broadcasting a report on government agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the G.D.R. on former RAF members. Kinkel is reported to have said, in the course of the attempt to prevent the broadcast, that such agreements would be "de jure tantamount to support for a terrorist association."

Kinkel's remark cannot be dismissed easily. *RAF Phantom* also cites remarks by George A. Carver, the former CIA mission chief (1976-79) at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn (p. 381), in an interview with *Tageszeitung* on March 27, 1992. Carver left no doubt that West German authorities had known about the former RAF members in the G.D.R. as early as the beginning of the 1980s. This point, said Carver, had been the subject of discussion between American and West German intelligence services on several occasions.

If ten of the most wanted terrorists, including Inge Viett, suspected of being among the leadership of the RAF for many years, and who was indeed among the first contact points for the East German Stasi in the West German and West Berlin terrorist scene, could be proven to have had nothing to do with the spectacular terrorist attacks of a "Red Army Faction" since 1984, then the question is: Who was the legendary "third generation" of the RAF, in reality?

In fact, just recently, on July 29, 1998, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, in an article entitled "The 'RAF' Consists of Three People," reported on a study conducted by the Cologne Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), on "The Dissolution of the RAF," following the so-called declaration of the RAF in April 1998 that it was dissolving itself. The 38-page study reports that even some of the people highest on the wanted list since 1985 may not have even belonged to the RAF. This includes Andrea Klump, accused of involvement in the Herrhausen murder.

Who committed the assassinations, including of Herrhausen, if it was not this gang of "desperadoes," as they were often portrayed by West German authorities? Was it possible that a terrorist organization could keep secret the identity of its membership, from 1985 to 1989, in a Federal Republic thoroughly saturated with electronic surveillance? How was it possible that this legendary terrorist gang, over the course of so many crimes, had never left a single strand of hair, not a drop of saliva, no identifiable piece of clothing, not a fragment of a fingerprint, no traces of an abandoned hideout, had successfully hid themselves from relatives, and left no

other traces of any kind, which might have been used to identify them? All of this is hardly possible.

Witnesses at the site of the Herrhausen assassination, according to authorities, reported having seen at least a dozen people around the site at that time, so that a considerable number of people were presumably involved in preparing and carrying out the bombing. But, according to their own statements, authorities do not know who these people may have been. That is all the more astonishing, since the entire area around the site of the assassination was under close surveillance by local police, the State Criminal Office, private security services, and also, on account of Herrhausen's personal importance, officials of the Hessen Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) and the BKA. While building superintendents and other witnesses noticed several joggers and other persons at the site, no one thought to be acting peculiar was observed by any of the official security agencies even a half-hour before the bomb exploded.

If the fact is also taken into account, that up to five persons had erected barricades at the site just before the assassination, on Nov. 30, and that they had chiseled a trench in the asphalt, into which they allegedly laid the cable with which the bomb was detonated, then the debility of official observational capabilities is indeed alarming.

One week following the assassination, Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble refused to provide the Interior Committee of the Bundestag (lower House of Parliament) with any information about the investigation, claiming that anything he said might interfere with the ongoing investigation. All he said, was that "the substance of the message, taking credit for the deed, contrasts with the severity and technical perfection of the hit."

On Dec. 7, 1989, Richard Meier, the former president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, was questioned by the Bundestag Interior Committee. He was sufficiently informed to be able to testify that "a walking tour of the immediate vicinity of the site of the attack, one-half hour prior to Herrhausen's drive through the site, would have revealed to a schooled eye that two young men, dressed in jogging outfits, and each with an earphone, i.e., in radio contact with each other, were attending to a bicycle" (p. 113). Meier drew sharp criticism against himself personally, when he testified that the advance vehicle of Herrhausen's convoy had been "withdrawn" (p. 112).

For whom was Herrhausen a thorn in the side?

If it seems plausible that Herrhausen was not killed by "deranged desperadoes" for "political-ideological reasons," then the question is: Who had an interest in eliminating Herrhausen? An American expert on intelligence services, Col. Fletcher Prouty (ret.), made some interesting observations concerning this question. It was Prouty who, in the 1960s, provided the District Attorney of New Orleans, Jim Garrison, with the crucial evidence of a conspiracy in the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy. Prouty explained the back-

ground of this conspiracy to film director Oliver Stone, for his movie "JFK." Prouty was depicted in the film as "Mr. X."

Prouty sees a parallel between the assassinations of Kennedy and Herrhausen: "His death, at that time . . . and the astonishing circumstances of his death . . . resemble the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963," Prouty said in an interview with the Italian daily *Unità* in 1992. "Some great power center wanted for some reason to get rid of the board spokesman of Deutsche Bank on that day and in that manner, in order to teach others a lesson. So there is a message in the way he was killed."

Prouty said: "When you consider the great importance of events in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, and especially in Germany . . . then the Herrhausen assassination is tremendously significant. We must not allow it to be swept under the rug."

Prouty points out that the key to the assassination of Herrhausen was contained in the first 11 pages of a speech which Herrhausen had intended to deliver in New York on Dec. 4, 1989. In that speech, Herrhausen outlined a revolutionary proposal to found a bank for the development of Poland, modelled on the German *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau*, which had played a crucial role in the postwar economic reconstruction of Germany. This new bank for Poland was to be financed by funds from Western banks. Poland was to be enabled to participate in a Western-financed reconstruction, which was highly improbable at that point in time, since Poland was straining under an enormous foreign debt burden, and it could not have freed itself under its own power. The foundation for the kind of economic development which Herrhausen foresaw for Poland, would have been the renunciation by Western banks and countries of their claims to the payment of the outstanding debt: a monstrosity of a proposal—for the financiers. Clearly, this proposal went hand in hand with that which Lyndon LaRouche had made one year previously in Berlin. As Prouty emphasized, Herrhausen thus sided with a number of politicians and leading businessmen who had all been killed for the same reason, i.e., because they wanted to break the control of the "Condominium of Yalta" over the world. Among those Prouty included were John F. Kennedy, Aldo Moro, Enrico Mattei, and Olof Palme.

With this speech, Herrhausen would have put the prevailing management policy regarding the growing, catastrophic debt crisis into question. The policy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, all of the commercial banks with the exception of Deutsche Bank—a policy directly contrary to that of Herrhausen and LaRouche—was clearly not to develop the overindebted countries, Poland among them. Instead, by means of so-called structural and "financial reforms," these countries were ostensibly to be enabled to service their unpayable debt—at the cost of the lives of their citizens. In view of such a commitment, it is not at all surprising that this policy has taken its toll everywhere, and these countries have experienced no development since the debt crisis began more than 30 years ago. The last year in which

there was a net capital transfer from the financially stronger industrial countries into the wrongly termed "developing countries," was 1964.

Two months before his assassination, at the IMF annual meeting, Herrhausen expressed his conviction that the only chance to end the debt spiral consisted of at least a partial debt moratorium, not only for Poland, and provision of financial means for the economic development of indebted countries. Herrhausen drew the fire of the world of international finance against himself, with that proposal.

Biographer Dieter Balkhausen quotes Herrhausen, who had left Washington quickly following one such meeting, as saying that the air was "full of lead." Herrhausen hinted on other occasions as well, that he saw himself in the role of a "reformer"—about whom Machiavelli had once warned, that such a person would have as adversaries those who profitted from the old system, while those who stood to profit from the new system would support him only half-heartedly. Today, the situation has not changed from what it was 300 years ago. By those who profitted from the old system, Herrhausen surely meant the international banking world, for which writing off their claims to payment of Third World debt could have threatened their existence.

Deutsche Bank was in a rather unique position in the world of international finance, because over many years, the bank had used its profits to write off its foreign liabilities almost completely. A serious public debate would have revealed the fact that the most highly indebted countries, in Ibero-America, for example, were in fact unable to pay their debts, and other banks, the competitors of Deutsche Bank, would have inevitably had to write off their bad debts as well. That would have led to collapsed credit ratings for those banks, below the level necessary for them to continue doing business internationally.

Herrhausen was not himself the inventor of this extraordinarily progressive policy. Deutsche Bank board member Werner Blessing was known, years before Herrhausen, for his public criticism of the debt-crisis recipes of the leading banks and financial institutions. Balkhausen notes that Herrhausen was impressed with Blessing's attitude on this issue. Blessing, who was responsible for North America on the Deutsche Bank board, had announced in 1987 that Deutsche Bank would in the future intensify its operations in the U.S. market. That would have meant that Deutsche Bank would have become the second-largest bank in the United States, after Citicorp. Blessing died of a heart attack in 1987.

Herrhausen, just before his death, demonstrated that Deutsche Bank wanted to expand its operations worldwide. For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, Deutsche Bank had bought an internationally leading investment house, Morgan Grenfell in London, for nearly DM 3 billion, and thus demonstrated in a way which seemed almost aggressive, that it would no longer content itself with being the leading bank in Germany.

One major problem, although it was not evident initially,

was Herrhausen's relatively isolated position, which derived from the relative strength of Deutsche Bank in comparison to other, including German, banks. Although all of the large German banks saw themselves compelled to write off bad debts in high-risk countries, and to do that in a timely fashion, and although they could thus have absorbed a possible debt moratorium without severe disruption, Herrhausen had no supporters in those banks. Even Blessing's ideas about reducing debts and forgiving interest payments had been denounced in banking circles as a "crazy idea." Herrhausen's most prominent opponent, Walter Seipp, speaker of the board of Commerzbank, not only disliked Herrhausen personally, but the *Frankfurter Rundschau* went so far as to claim that Seipp hated his banker colleague. The criticism from banking circles against Herrhausen was that he did not act in "solidarity" with them (cited in *RAF Phantom*, p. 162).

Adviser to the Chancellor

Prior to his assassination, it was generally known that Herrhausen had significant influence with Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and that he had shaped the views of the Chancellor with respect to upcoming reunification, in the form Kohl presented those perspectives in his 10-point program to the German Parliament. The same influence was undoubtedly present in Kohl's views concerning an economic and monetary union, for which Kohl thought that a political union of European states was a precondition, and that this union was

still far in the future.

As recently published, secret government documents show that on Nov. 27, 1989, Kohl described the difficulties with, and his reservations against a premature fixing of the time schedule for the economic and monetary union to an impatient French President François Mitterrand, who was also insisting on the need for the Four Powers to agree to a possible reunification of Germany. Kohl is reported to have insisted that the "large divergences in stability developments" would endanger the "actual achievement of the divergence goals in the first stage" of a monetary union. On Nov. 30, Herrhausen, who was clearly Kohl's most important adviser on European monetary union, was assassinated, while Mitterrand, on that very day—his letter arrived in Bonn on Dec. 1—demanded categorically, that "we make decisions in Strasbourg, which obligate us unmistakably to the path of economic and monetary union."

Kohl's capitulation did not take long: On Dec. 5, he retreated from his position and conceded to let the resolution pass at the upcoming meeting in Strasbourg planned for Dec. 9. There, Kohl agreed to the resolution to establish a governments' conference one year later to implement the monetary union—against the interests of Germany, as Kohl acknowledged in a discussion with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker three days later, according to the Dec. 18, 1989 *Der Spiegel* (*RAF Phantom*, p. 108). This is the background to the betrayal of German interests which Kohl has now made public.

While the criticism of the policy Herrhausen had articulated had not yet exploded at the time of his assassination, that changed radically in the spring of 1990. The sabotage launched by the British government under Thatcher against Bonn's efforts to achieve reunification, culminated in the "Fourth Reich" propaganda campaign against Germany invented in Britain, and the shameless attempt to equate Kohl's and Hitler's ambitions.

Compared with the tremendous destruction of the two world wars, "low-intensity warfare" operations, also known as terrorist warfare, cost relatively little. If one can successfully enforce one's will upon an adversary with little expenditure of force and money, then that manifests a far greater mastery of the tools of power, with which a political victory can be achieved. It is crucial in such operations that the form of the murder—of a more or less brutal execution of an adversary who plays a strategic role—contains a message, as Prouty correctly noted. The message is: From us, the perpetrators, you cannot protect yourself, because we commit our atrocities in public and we cannot be attacked. The astonishing thing is the degree to which the institutions of the Federal Republic saw it as their duty to cover up such blackmail.

The overlap in time of the largely confidential negotiations with allegedly friendly, or at least allied governments, and the publicly committed, nearly celebrated atrocity, leaves no doubt that Herrhausen's assassination was meant to deliver just such a message to the governing elite of the Federal Republic of Germany, by London- and Paris-centered forces.



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A 'Productive Triangle' for Europe's integration

by Angelika Beyreuter-Raimondi

In December 1989, Lyndon LaRouche commissioned a group of scientists and other specialists to work out an economic program for Europe. The central point of the program is the Paris-Berlin-Vienna "Productive Triangle," a proposal which circulated widely, was translated into many languages (especially East European languages), and was the theme of many conferences. This geographical area, a spherical triangle approximately as large as the territory of Japan, encompassing the industrial regions of northern France, western and eastern Germany, and parts of former Czechoslovakia and Austria, was envisioned to become the center of the world economy, where there is the largest concentration of productive economic power, to serve as a locomotive to restart the collapsing world economy.


The grand design of this program aimed at stimulating the entire economy of eastern and western Europe following the fall of the "Iron Curtain," by means of immediate construction of large projects for the modernization of infrastructure in transportation, energy, water, and communications. These projects, to be financed chiefly through state credit at low rates of interest, would stimulate the demand for investment goods over the long term, secure employment, and favor the creation of modern industrial factories.

The backbone of the triangle is an integrated system of high-speed and magnetic levitation rail, to be used for transport of both passengers and freight. The transportation network is to be expanded with roads and waterways, linked by automated freight-transfer systems. The urban centers would be connected with magnetic levitation lines. Within the triangle, a computer-controlled container-transport system would allow delivery of freight door-to-door within 24 hours.

Passenger transport and freight turnover would be intensified and expanded, reestablishing and extending the east-west links which were broken by the partition of Europe. Extending outward from this core region of the Productive Triangle, spiral arms of infrastructure corridors would reach into the remaining regions of Europe and integrate a market of over a half-billion people. The "arms" of the triangle would stimu-

FIGURE 1

The Productive Triangle, and its spiral arms of development, from a 1990 EIR study



late the construction of completely new cities and industries. Modern nuclear power plants would be the chief source of energy, providing electricity and process heat.

These spiral arms would extend eastward from Warsaw, branching off to St. Petersburg and the Baltic republics, and toward Moscow through Minsk, as well as through Ukraine to Kiev and Kharkov; from Prague and Dresden through Wroclaw to Krakow; in the southwest, along the Danube and Black Sea, with a branch to Istanbul. In the south, one arm would extend through Italy and into Sicily. In the southwest, an arm would reach through Lyons and Marseilles to Spain; in the northwest, to the ports of the Netherlands and to Great Britain; and in the north, into the Scandinavian countries.

Maximizing productivity-density

The unique characteristic of LaRouche's proposal was to exploit the geographical and technological conditions for an integrated European infrastructure in such a way that a maximum of productivity-density would be achieved. This notion of productivity- or flux-density is an economic magnitude which is correlated with the increase of population density, the quantitative and qualitative increase of energy consumption per capita and per hectare, the intensity of agriculture and industrial activities, and the density of passenger and freight movement per square kilometer.

Under conditions of scientific and technological progress, the increase of productivity-density also contributes to an increase in the rates of growth of productive forces in the economy. This effects a profit which surpasses the costs of initial investments many times over. Thus, the state credits for such a program are not in any way inflationary.

Such a development of a total European infrastructure could not be feasible if its realization were left up to the "free play of market forces." A conscious political decision of participating governments would be necessary for the implementation of the Productive Triangle, and thus, a conscious political decision against the monetarist economic policy conceptions of "shock therapy," as propagated by Harvard Prof. Jeffrey Sachs and the International Monetary Fund. Instead, the decision would be in favor of an economic policy based on *principles of physical economy*, that the real wealth of a society consists in human creativity and its realization in the labor process, and not in ownership of real estate, raw materials, or money.

The European Union drew upon this conception of the Productive Triangle in its "White Book," written under then-EC president Jacques Delors. According to the plan, investments of some \$500 billion would be required by the year 2010, and 26 high-priority projects are listed, including the construction of a comprehensive Europe-wide high-speed rail network. The construction of a modern rail connection from Berlin to Warsaw would signify an important improvement of the "continental bridge" to the Asian part of Russia and on to China.

Thatcher's obsession to block German unity

by Elisabeth Hellenbroich

Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and in particular since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the "German question" has moved to the center of the British "geopolitical" agenda in Europe. The British obsessively did everything in their power to prevent German reunification—to create a strategic *entente* with France, as well as playing the role of guardian for the interests of Eastern Europe. Once it became obvious that British attempts to forestall German reunification had failed, they initiated a campaign against Germany as the "Fourth Reich," while simultaneously drawing the United States and its European allies into two consecutive wars: The Persian Gulf War against Iraq and the Balkan war, whose sole purpose was to keep Germany contained and to ruin the potential for development of the East.

The credo of British foreign policy at the end of the 1980s was:

1. Do everything possible to prevent and/or undermine German reunification.

2. Never allow Germany to become a hegemonic economic power on the European continent.

3. Prevent Germany from becoming an important factor in the economic development of the Eastern European economies, which, with their skilled labor power, were seen—according to informal studies made after 1989 (e.g., Morgan Stanley)—as a potentially major source of wealth, in cooperation with Germany and France. If the fall of communism was inevitable for economic reasons, then the East—according to British strategic thinking—should be reduced to nothing more than a supplier of cheap raw materials, which, with aid of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities, could be exploited and kept in perpetual backwardness.

Historical documents which have been made public, in the context of the just-released papers on Chancellor Helmut Kohl's foreign policy over the last 15 years, prove that the British establishment—that is, Mrs. Thatcher and most of her Cabinet ministers—were hysterically obsessed with the perspective of German reunification and the strategic consequences that would follow.

Thatcher's own account

In her memoirs, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher provides a clinically interesting insight into British geopolitical manipulations.



"Iron Lady" Margaret Thatcher signs her book in Maclean, Virginia, November 1993.

In the section on "The German Problem and the Balance of Power," Thatcher writes that she firmly believes that there is something special about the German "national character," of which Germany's neighbors, such as Poland and France, should be fully aware. Wavering between "aggression" and "self-doubt" since Bismarck had unified the country, Germany, according to Thatcher, is by "nature" a destabilizing force on the European continent—one which, given its potential for taking economic leadership with respect to the East and the rest of Europe, had to be contained.

"The true origin of German *angst* is the agony of self-knowledge.

"As I have already argued, that is one reason why so many Germans genuinely—I believe wrongly—want to see Germany locked into a federal Europe. In fact, Germany is more rather than less likely to dominate within that framework; for a reunited Germany is simply too big and powerful to be just another player within Europe. Moreover, Germany has always looked east as well as west, though it is economic expansion rather than territorial aggression which is the modern manifestation of this tendency. Germany is thus by its very nature a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force in Europe. Only the military and political engagement of the United States in Europe and close relations between the other two strongest sovereign states in Europe—Britain and France—are sufficient to balance German power: and nothing of that sort would be possible within a European super-state.

"One obstacle to achieving such a balance of power when I was in office was the refusal of France under Present Mitter-

rand to follow his and French instincts, and challenge German interests. This would have required abandoning the Franco-German axis on which he had been relying and, as I shall describe, the wrench proved just too difficult for him."

Then Thatcher describes how, in September 1989—that is, three months before the Wall came down, and amid a mass refugee wave from East Germany—she went to see Mikhail Gorbachov in Moscow. She was quite hopeful that she could convince the Soviets to act against German reunification.

"In Moscow the following morning and over lunch Mr. Gorbachov and I talked frankly about Germany. I explained to him that although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany's aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather apprehensive. Nor was I speaking for myself alone—I had discussed it with at least one other Western leader, meaning but not mentioning President Mitterrand. Mr. Gorbachov confirmed that the Soviet Union did not want German reunification either. This reinforced me in my resolve to slow up the already heady pace of developments."

Yet to her great regret, as the historical events were unfolding in an unforeseeable, if breathtaking and revolutionary, way, it "turned out . . . the Soviets were prepared to sell reunification for a modest financial boost to their crumbling economy."

On Nov. 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall came down. The following day, in the evening of Nov. 10, 1989, Thatcher spoke to Chancellor Kohl on the phone and urged him to speak with Gorbachov, given the deeply troubling events, in which, as she writes in her book, all kinds of incidents could arise (such

as attacks on Soviet troops). Her concern had been excited by a message to her from Gorbachov, which was handed to her that same day by the Soviet ambassador.

Yet, to Thatcher's dismay, Kohl, confronted with events unfolding in East Germany, had given a speech in the Bundestag demanding that the East Germans be given the chance to determine their own future. For this, they would not need outside advice. This also would be true "for German reunification and German unity."

Panicked at the events that unfolded after the Berlin Wall fell, French President François Mitterrand hastily called for a special European Union heads-of-state conference for Paris, to take place on Nov. 18.

"This was the background to President Mitterrand's calling a special meeting of Community heads of government in Paris to consider what was happening in Germany. . . . Before I went I sent a message to President Bush reiterating my view that the priority should be to see genuine democracy established in East Germany and that German reunification was not something to be addressed at present. The President later telephoned me to thank me for my message with which he agreed and to say how much he was looking forward to the two of us 'putting our feet up at Camp David for a really good talk.' "

At the Nov. 18 meeting, Kohl stressed that it would be the right of the German people to determine their own future. Thatcher countered:

"I said that though the changes taking place were historic we must not succumb to euphoria. The changes were only just beginning and it would take several years to get genuine democracy and economic reform in eastern Europe. There must be no question of changing borders. The Helsinki Final Act must apply. Any attempt to talk about either border changes or German reunification would open up a Pandora's box of border claims right through central Europe. I said that we must keep both NATO and the Warsaw Pact intact to create a background of stability."

On Nov. 24, Thatcher met with President George Bush at Camp David, to whom she presented the same views as she had at Paris:

"I reiterated much of what I had said in Paris about borders and reunification and of the need to support the Soviet leader on whose continuance in power so much depended. The President did not challenge what I said directly but he asked me pointedly whether my line had given rise to difficulties with Chancellor Kohl and about my attitude to the European Community. It was also clear that we differed on the priority which still needed to be given to defence spending."

On Nov. 28, Kohl, to the utter surprise of everybody, and, as Thatcher remarks, "without any previous consultation with his allies and in clear breach of at least the spirit of the Paris summit," presented his famous 10-point declaration in the Bundestag, which dealt with the future development of Ger-

many. The fifth point addressed the "confederative structures between the two states—with the goal of creating a federation" in Germany. The tenth point was that the government intended to achieve "unity, reunification, the reattainment of German state unity."

U.S. policy at the time was, as Detlef Junkers reported in an article in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on March 13, 1997, that when the Wall fell, "President Bush's Secretary of State Baker and a small group of collaborators again formulated the three points of American foreign policy, which meant German reunification, containment, and integration." Had the United States rejected German reunification, it would have meant the end of its Europe policy. The greatest resistance, according to Junkers, was expressed by Thatcher, "that lady with the handbag, who equated Britain's interests in 1990, with the glory of the victorious powers of 1945 and the division of Germany."

The U.S. position was laid out in a press conference by Secretary of State James Baker III, in which he stressed that reunification would have to be based on four pillars:

1. German self-determination.
2. Germany to remain a member of NATO as well as part of "an increasingly integrated European Community."
3. Moves toward unity to be peaceful and step-by-step.
4. The principles of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) regarding borders to be maintained.

In December, President Bush gave a speech in Brussels in which he reemphasized the interests of the U.S. government concerning reunification, namely, to see a Germany embedded within the "federal Europe" structure. Thatcher was furious. Taking all possible options into account, she came to the conclusion that only a revived Anglo-French Entente could sabotage Germany's drive.

"If there was any hope now of stopping or slowing down reunification it would only come from an Anglo-French initiative. Yet even were President Mitterrand to try to give practical effect to what I knew were his secret fears, we would not find many ways open to us. Once it was decided that East Germany could join the European Community without detailed negotiations—and I was resisting for my own reasons treaty amendment and any European Community aid—there was little we could do to slow down reunification via the Community's institutions. I placed some hopes in the framework offered by the 'Four Powers'—Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union—which were responsible for the security of Berlin. But with the United States—and soon the Soviets too—ceasing to regard this as anything other than a talking shop for discussion of the details of reunification, this framework too was of limited use. The CSCE—on which I was to develop my ideas the following year—would provide a basis for restricting any unwelcome attempts to change borders in eastern Europe as a whole, but it would not stand in the way of German

reunification. So the last and best hope seemed the creation of a solid Anglo-French political axis which would ensure that at each stage of reunification—and in future economic and political developments—the Germans did not have things all their own way.”

In December 1989, the Council of Europe met in Strasbourg, which Kohl regarded as one of his darkest hours. In the framework of that meeting, as Kohl said in his speech on April 30, 1998 before the Conference of Leipzig Savings Banks, Thatcher came up to him, and said, “We beat you twice, and now you are here again.”

Thatcher reports that she met President Mitterrand twice unofficially during the conference, to discuss the German question. “He was still more concerned than I was. He was very critical of Chancellor Kohl’s ‘ten-point’ plan. He observed that in history the Germans were a people in constant movement and flux. At this I produced from my handbag a map showing the various configurations of Germany in the past, which were not altogether reassuring about the future. We talked through what precisely we might do. I said that at the meeting he had chaired in Paris we had come up with the right answer on borders and reunification. But President Mitterrand observed that Chancellor Kohl had already gone far beyond that. He said that at moments of great danger in the past France had always established special relations with Britain and he felt that such a time had come again. We must draw together and stay in touch. It seemed to me that although we had not discovered the means, at least we both had the will to check the German juggernaut. That was a start.”

Beginning in January 1990, Thatcher had another meeting with Mitterrand at the President’s Elysée Palace. She had ordered a working group to work out how the Anglo-French Entente could be enforced. Dismayed by his earlier public remarks in East Berlin that “he was not ‘one of those who were putting on the brakes.’” she continued: “I hoped that my forthcoming meeting with him might overcome this tendency to schizophrenia.

“Almost all the discussion I had with President Mitterrand at the Elysée Palace on Saturday 20 January concerned Germany. Picking up the President’s remarks in the margins of Strasbourg I said that it was very important for Britain and France to work out jointly how to handle what was happening in Germany. East Germany seemed close to collapse and it was by no means impossible that we would be confronted in the course of this year with the decision in principle in favour of reunification. The President was clearly irked by German attitudes and behaviour. He accepted that the Germans had the right to self-determination but they did not have the right to upset the political realities of Europe; nor could he accept that German reunification should take priority over everything else. He complained that the Germans treated any talk of caution as criticism of themselves. Unless you were wholeheartedly for reunification, you were described as an enemy

of Germany. The trouble was that in reality there was no force in Europe which could stop reunification happening. He agreed with my analysis of the problems but he said he was at a loss as to what we could do. I was not so pessimistic. I argued that we should at least make use of all the means available to slow down reunification. The trouble was that other governments were not ready to speak up openly—nor, I might have added but did not, were the French. President Mitterrand went on to say that he shared my worries about the Germans’ so-called ‘mission’ in central Europe. The Czechs, Poles and Hungarians would not want to be under Germany’s exclusive influence, but they would need German aid and investment. I said that we must not just accept that the Germans had a particular hold over these countries, but rather do everything possible to expand our own links there. At the end of the meeting we agreed that our Foreign and Defence Ministers should get together to talk over the issue of reunification and also examine the scope for closer Franco-British defence co-operation.”

Thatcher then commented that Mitterrand did little in any practical manner, to radically change his foreign policy toward Germany. He had two choices, she said: “Essentially, he had a choice between moving ahead faster towards a federal Europe in order to tie down the German giant or to abandon this approach and return to that associated with General de Gaulle—the defence of French sovereignty and the striking up of alliances to secure French interests. He made the wrong decision for France. Moreover, his failure to match private words with public deeds also increased my difficulties. But it must be said that his judgement that there was nothing we could do to halt German reunification turned out to be right.”

It was Kohl’s visit to the Caucasus—which, again, to Thatcher’s dismay, was not planned in consultation with the Allies—that sealed the German reunification question: “In February Chancellor Kohl—again without any consultation with his allies—went to Moscow and won from Mr. Gorbachev agreement that ‘the unity of the German nation must be decided by the Germans themselves.’ (The *quid pro quo* would soon become clear. In July at a meeting in the Crimea the West German Chancellor agreed to provide what must have seemed to the Soviets a huge sum, though they could in fact have extracted much more, to cover the costs of providing for the Soviet troops who would be withdrawn from East Germany. . . .)”

As result of her having been unable to stall German reunification, she recounts, the problems now coming to the fore in Europe resembled the Europe of 1914 and 1939. “The Europe that has emerged from behind the Iron Curtain has many of the features of the Europes of 1914 and 1939: ethnic strife, contested borders, political extremism, nationalist passions and economic backwardness. And there is another familiar bogey from the past—the German Question. . . .”

“West Germany’s absorption of its next-door relations

has been economically disastrous, and that disaster has spread to the rest of the European Community via the Bundesbank's high interest rates and the ERM. We have all paid the price in unemployment and recession. East German political immaturity has affected the whole country in the form of a revived (though containable) neo-Nazi and xenophobic extremism. Internationally, it has created a German state so large and dominant that it cannot be easily fitted into the new architecture of Europe. . . .

"I will not reiterate here all the reasons I have given earlier for believing these developments to be damaging. But I will hazard the forecast that a federal Europe would be both unstable internally and an obstacle to harmonious arrangements—in trade, politics and defence—with America externally; that the Franco-German bloc would increasingly mean a German bloc (in economics, a deutschemark bloc) with France as very much a junior partner; and that as a result America would, first bring its legions home, and subsequently find itself at odds with the new European player in world politics.

"These developments are not inevitable. One revelation that emerged from the failure of Britain's Germany policy was the evident anxiety of France in relation to German power and ambition. It should not be beyond the capacity of a future British prime minister to rebuild an Anglo-French entente as a counter-balance to German influence."

Keep in mind that Thatcher wrote this at the height of the Balkan war (1993), which was initiated by the Anglo-French Entente, as a way of keeping Germany from developing the East.

British press launches 'Fourth Reich' campaign

Like every other leader in Europe (including Gorbachov, who admits it in his memoirs), Thatcher had been taken by surprise by the pace of events unfolding in East Germany. If Germany were reunified, it would constitute a grave danger to British imperial and strategic interests, especially in the economic arena. So, a major "Fourth Reich" campaign was unleashed by the Hollinger Corp. press, to depict a Germany that was reviving Hitlerism. The line was: If Germany should become a strong economic power in Europe, it might feel tempted to develop the East—which would translate into Hitler's *Drang nach Osten* (Drive to the East).

• On Oct. 31, 1989, even before the Wall was brought down, London *Times* editor Conor Cruise O'Brien wrote a signal piece headlined "Beware a Reich Resurgent." O'Brien identified two interacting historical events as forming the lead item at the close of the century: the dissolution of the Soviet empire and German reunification.

"We are on the road to the Fourth Reich," O'Brien wrote, "a pan-German entity commanding the full allegiance of German nationalists and constituting a focus for national pride. The First Reich was that founded in A.D. 800 by Karl der Grosse, known to the West as Charlemagne. It was dissolved

in 1806, at the behest of Napoleon. Germany then remained a state in dissolution until the advent of the Second Reich, that of the Hohenzollerns, in 1871. The Second Reich was destroyed in 1918 and the Weimar Republic was substituted for it, by the victorious foreigners. And when the Third Reich was destroyed in 1945, new political institutions were once more imposed on the Germans by victorious foreigners. . . . In the new and proud united Germany, the nationalists will proclaim the Fourth Reich, for while the term Reich is associated with victory and periods of German ascendancy; Republik is associated with defeat and ascendancy of alien values. I would expect a reunited Germany to bring back the black-white-red flag of the Hohenzollerns and possibly a Hohenzollern Kaiser to go with it."

O'Brien warned in his conclusion, that the Germans would rise from their knees and revive race science, and that "nationalist intellectuals will explain that true Germans should feel not guilt, but pride about the Holocaust, that great, courageous and salutary act. . . . I fear that the Fourth Reich, if it comes will, have a natural tendency to resemble its predecessor."

• On Nov. 12, 1989 an editorial appeared in the *Sunday Times* of London under the headline "The Fourth German Reich." "The events broadcast live from Berlin this week are the first step towards the creation of an 80 million strong Fourth German Reich," the editorial states. "We do not know exactly how it will come about but, *de jure* or *de facto*, it will happen and sooner than most people think. The result will be a German economy twice as big as any other. . . . A united Germany will then become the locomotive in the rebuilding of the newly free market economies of Eastern Europe, for Germany is preeminent in the capital, industrial know-how, and management skills that these countries need. The Fourth Reich is set to boom, becoming Europe's economic superpower in the process. . . . That leaves one question nobody here has yet dared to ask: Where does that leave Britain?"

The Fourth Reich campaign became even more aggressive, when it became clearer that German reunification would go its own way and could not be sabotaged, as was originally intended by Thatcher. Following the Group of Seven summit in Houston, in July 1990, the Anglo-Americans were pushing the confrontationist line, insisting that IMF conditionalities had to be imposed upon the Soviet Union as well as on the rest of Eastern Europe, while Kohl and Mitterrand argued in favor of immediate aid to the Soviet Union without conditionalities attached (see *EIR* July 27, 1990).

• On the eve of the summit, the confrontation with Germany was launched in the British press, with a column in the July 8, 1990 issue of the *Sunday Correspondent*, by Dominic Lawson, son of the former British Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson. Lawson bemoaned the lack of British press coverage of the "German threat" to the finances and currencies of Europe.

As editor of the Hollinger-owned weekly *The Spectator*,

for a meeting with Mrs. Thatcher in a German car: " 'What is that *foreign* car?' Thatcher glowered. 'It's a Volkswagen,' he replied, helpful as ever. 'Don't ever park something like that here again.' "

"Mr. Ridley's confidence in expressing his views on the German threat," commented Lawson, "must owe a little something to the knowledge that they are not significantly different from those of the Prime Minister, who originally opposed German reunification, even though in public she preferred not to be so indelicate as to draw comparison between Herren Kohl and Hitler. What the Prime Minister and Mr. Ridley also have in common," he continued, "which they do not share with any of their Cabinet colleagues, is that they are over 60."

Lawson then asked Ridley: "How relevant to us now is what Germany did to Eastern Europe in the war?"

Ridley: "We have always played the balance of power in Europe. It had always been Britain's role to keep these various powers balanced and never has [that] been more necessary than now, with Germany so uppity."

Lawson: "But suppose we don't have the balance of power; the German economy runs Europe?"

Ridley: "I don't know about the German economy. It's the German *people*. They're already running most of the Community: I mean they pay half of the countries. . . . You can't change the British people for the better by saying, 'Herr Poehl says you can't do that.' They'd say: 'You know what you can do with your bloody Herr Poehl.' I mean you don't understand the British people if you don't understand this about them. They can be dared; they can be moved. But being bossed by a German—it would cause absolute mayhem in this country, and rightly I think."

The Ridley interview wrought havoc between Germany and Britain, as well as internationally. The German government called his statements "scandalous" and warned that the interview "would discredit the whole of the European Community." Kohl's national security adviser Horst Teltchik, told the *Sunday Times*: "We do not normally comment on internal matters [of other nations]. It is at this stage up to Mrs. Thatcher to decide what to do with Mr. Ridley. It is up to Mrs. Thatcher to live with the consequences of what Mr. Ridley said." On July 14, the West German newspaper *Bild Zeitung* attributed the affair to "*The Spectator*, whose publisher, Conrad Black, is a close friend of Maggie Thatcher."

On the same day, West German Social Democrat Annemarie Renger, former Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, wrote in the daily *Die Welt* that Ridley's comments were reminiscent of the anti-German remarks that British publishing magnate Robert Maxwell had made when he met with East Germany's dictator Erich Honecker in October 1989. Referring to Maxwell as "a former British occupation officer," she noted that he had told BBC on Oct. 3 1989, that "a

united Germany is a threat to Europe, to the Russians, the Poles, the Germans themselves, and to us. We don't want it. It is no good, neither for us nor for the Germans, and we do wish there to be two separate German states."

Maxwell, Renger stressed, went on to praise the "remarkable achievement" of the East German communist state, adding that "we must not do anything that could destabilize this country," and praising Honecker as "a reformer throughout his entire life." Renger expressed doubts that "the political blindness of this Englishman" was a "singular case," given that Ridley had said the same thing. Such comments, she warned, are a "dramatic sign of political miseducation, which documents a lack of standards in the very motherland of democracy that all Europeans must feel ashamed of."

But very indicative, also, were reactions by residents from Coventry, which was destroyed by the German Luftwaffe during World War II. Interviewed by the London *Independent*, on July 14, Coventry residents, reflecting on the city's collapsed economy and infrastructure, offered comments: "Maggie Thatcher has caused more damage here than the Luftwaffe," said one. "If the Germans want to take over here, mate, they're bloody welcome," said another. "Ridley is a bigger threat than the Germans," offered a third. One person argued, "Both of my parents were in Coventry during the war. That was all about the Nazis. Is Ridley saying the Germans are Nazis again? If you ask around this place, you'll find a lot of people who think Thatcher's more of a danger than the Germans."

With such pressure—including sharp condemnation Ridley's statements by the European Parliament—Ridley had to resign, although it was not lost on observers that Thatcher refused to fire him.

The Chequers minutes

Meanwhile, the "German crisis" deepened over the July 14-15 weekend, when the July 15 issue of *Der Spiegel* magazine leaked the minutes of a meeting that had occurred in March at the Prime Minister's country estate, Chequers, involving the Prime Minister, Cabinet members, and six British and American "experts" on Germany: George Urban, Gordon Craig, Timothy Garton Ash, Fritz Stern, Norman Stone, and Lord Dacre (Hugh Trevor-Roper) on the German question.

The minutes compiled by Thatcher's personal secretary, Charles Powell, warned darkly of the potential reemergence of an expansionist, chauvinist Germany and spoke of the Germans' ostensible negative character traits, including, in alphabetical order, aggressivity, *angst*, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, and sentimentality. (One Briton, upon seeing the list, commented: "They must have talked about Margaret Thatcher.")

Under the heading, "What are the Germans?" the Chequers group asked what lessons should be drawn from the

past to apply to the future. The minutes, as translated from the *Spiegel* exposé, report that the participants concluded that "like other peoples [Germans] have certain characteristics which one can derive from their past and can project [as holding good] also for the future. The participants thought it would be more adequate and suited to the discussion to think about the less agreeable characteristics of the Germany, such as: insensitivity toward the feelings of others (most clearly this is demonstrated in the attitude concerning the border question with Poland), their self-centeredness, a strong penchant to self-pity and the longing to be liked. . . .

"Two other aspects of the German character were mentioned as reason for concern in the future: On the one side, the tendency of the Germans to exaggerate things, to run riot. On the other, their tendency to overestimate their own capacity and strength. One example would be the conviction of the Germans that their victory over France in 1871 was the result of a deep moral and cultural superiority and not—as was really the case—the consequence of a minor advantage in the military technology. . . .

"Did the Germans change?"

"... Reservations concerning Germany had not only to do with the Hitler era but referred to the period before, the whole era after Bismarck. The way in which the Germans currently used their elbows and threw their weight around in the European Community suggested that much had not changed. Nobody, it was agreed, would have serious concerns now about Germany, but what about the political situation in 15 or 20 years? Could some of the unhappy consequences of the past reemerge with just as destructive consequences? . . .

"What are the consequences of reunification?"

"Even optimists had concerns with respect to the possible impact. One should not expect that Germany would act as it has up to now. . . . There was already a kind of triumphalism in German thinking and attitudes which would be uncomfortable for the rest of us. There could be a growing tendency to revive the concept of Central Europe in which Germany would play the role of the broker between East and West.

"Would a reunified Germany strive for dominance in Eastern Europe?"

"... For the near future, there would be no reason to assume, that Germany would have any territorial claims. Yet it would be probable that Germany would dominate East and Central Europe economically, which does not necessarily mean one should be led to think that Germany is doing with economic means what Hitler did with military ones."

The Chequers group further agreed that "we want Germany to be constrained within a security framework which has the best chance of avoiding a resurgence of German militarism."

"Some perceived in the German attitude of, 'we pay and so we have the say,' nothing but a striving for economic hegemony in Western Europe. There were differing opinions

on whether the Germans are serious about their promises, that they would want, parallel to German reunification, a politically unified Europe—whether this were all a tactic, to calm down the others, or the real desire to integrate the latently nationalist potential of Germany into a bigger thing [structure]."

"There were no formal conclusions at the end of the meeting," the protocol stated. The overriding theme was, however, unmistakably clear: Be nice to the Germans. Yet this did not exclude remaining wary. They were not so much concerned with the near-term behavior of the Germans, "as with the long term, concerning which we have no insight."

• On July 22, 1990, Peregrine Worsthorne wrote a signed editorial page commentary in the *Sunday Telegraph*, on "The Good German Problem." Worsthorne, whose stepfather was Bank of England Governor Montagu Norman during the 1930s, wrote that his stepfather was right when he said "that the burden of Germany's virtues might bear down on Britain even more heavily than the burden of Germany's vices. That is the question Mrs. Thatcher should have posed at Chequers, instead of discussing Germany's past with a bunch of historians. . . . How on earth can any effective defence be put up against a united Germany that intends to win by obeying the rules? Germany is going to be very powerful . . . only the unrealistic, however, can suppose that this great role will be achieved without putting such strains on NATO and the EEC that they will become so transformed as to be unrecognizable. . . .

"Germany now enjoys alternatives which are available to no other European state and . . . is exploiting strength which has suddenly been unbound by unification and this new relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . In the not-so-far-distant future, there are going to be lots of European countries, East and West, looking for a shoulder to cry on as a result of grievances against a do-gooding Germany. Perhaps Britain's role should be to preserve enough independence to be free, at the right moment, to make use of these grievances. In the course of doing good, Germany will make as many enemies as ever it did in the course of doing harm, and America may well be one of the enemies, as might be Russia. Sooner or later, it is going to be balance-of-power politics all over again. This could be an opportunity for Britain, which knows about the balance of power, if only all those Euro-enthusiasts could forget about Monnet and mug up on Talleyrand instead."

Britain's assets inside Germany

In its Aug. 4-5 issue, the *Sunday Correspondent* took note that British diatribes against a unified Germany shared something in common with the statements put out by the Baader Meinhof/Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorists, taking credit for a bomb attack that nearly killed Assistant Interior Minister Hans Neusel on July 27. "Last week," wrote the *Correspon-*

dent, "the RAF let it be known that the Neusel attack marked the start of a long period of struggle against the newly emerging Greater German/West European superpower. 'West Germany and the new political elite in the G.D.R. [East Germany] are pursuing the same aims and political plans as Nazi fascism,' it said in a letter. 'The third invasion of Europe by German capital this century will not be carried out militarily, but economically and politically.'

"A year ago such views were seen as absurd. Today they are equally so, but more people may be ready to listen. After all, the content of the remarks of the British Trade Secretary in the *Spectator* last month was not so different."

But even leading figures of the German Social Democrats (SPD), such as Peter Glotz, Oskar Lafontaine, and Grass, were part of the Fourth Reich campaign, as is mentioned in a book by historian Hans Peter Schwarz, *Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Rueckkehr auf die Weltbuehne* (Siedler Verlag).

According to Schwarz, many leading SPD politicians were directly involved in the Fourth Reich campaign. Thus, Peter Glotz was one of the first in Germany who sounded the alarm. On Aug. 2, 1989, before the refugee flood started to pour into Hungary, Glotz warned in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*: "At the present time, no European architecture is thinkable, in which the economically strongest state of the EC would be united with the economically strongest state of the CMEA [the Comecon]. Please, at least in this century, no more plans for a 'Fourth Reich.'"

In the Sept. 25, 1989 issue of *Der Spiegel*, just as the East German regime was about to crumble, Lafontaine told an interviewer: "The specter of a strong Fourth German Reich frightens our western neighbors no less than our eastern ones."

On March 30, 1990, after local elections in the East Germany, the SPD's Jürgen Habermas wrote an article in *Die Zeit*, under the headline: "Deutschemark Nationalism Extends Itself." This sparked a series of articles and books, among them, *The Fourth Reich*, by a Spanish leftist (and East German Stasi agent) journalist Heleno Sana, which appeared in late 1989/early 1990. Sana, who since 1959 had been living in Germany, is typical of the left: "The Fourth Reich will not be a mechanical copy of either the Third or those that came before it, but a colorful mixture of all of them." According to the author, the ideological orientation of the Fourth Reich will be "late capitalist." Its political system: a controlled pseudo-democracy with slogans about freedom, rule by law, and self-determination. The Germans will not, however, want to use only these concepts "to adorn German history with new brilliance"; they will exploit and subjugate other peoples without scruple, either by "political manipulation" or, if necessary, "by open repression." The new system of Germany hegemony would be "a Europe whose ideological foundation is a mixture of instrumental reason, utilitarian power and avarice, and racist pathology."

British, French launch Balkan war vs. Germany

by Elke Fimmen

In June 1991, four months after the end of the Persian Gulf War, the "Greater Serbia" war of aggression by Slobodan Milosevic and his minions began, and the war is not over yet. It has brought unspeakable misery for millions of victims in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same *modus operandi* is being repeated today in Kosova, and threatens to begin a new round of regional war.

From the outset, this war had a purpose quite different from the unbridled great-power aspirations of a Milosevic, although Milosevic is very close to realizing his aims. The geopolitical background of the war and the string-pullers who made it possible, are to be found at a different level: The aim was to undermine a grand design for the economic development of Europe, after the end of communism, and the Versailles and Yalta orders. The economic potential of Germany could have played a significant role in that development, which was the vision against which England and France formed the Entente Cordiale before World War I.

British politics under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major, and French politics under President François Mitterrand, looked upon Milosevic's "Greater Serbia" ambitions as one of their most effective tools to destabilize Europe. Traditionally, the Balkans has functioned as an important bridge to the Mideast, and it is therefore of strategic importance in the realization of a Eurasian development program. At the time of the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway earlier this century (a *casus belli* for British foreign policy), Serbia was the trigger for the conflict that led into World War I, and destroyed the opportunity for a continental alliance for development.

In 1991, when Germany promoted the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, once it had become clear with what brutality Milosevic was attacking these countries, there was a cascade of British, French, and Serbian denunciations of Germany as the "Fourth Reich." Germany, it was claimed, wanted to reestablish its old sphere of influence in the Balkans, and it was entering an alliance with the "Ustashi" (fascists) in Croatia to that end.

Germany's official recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on Jan. 15, 1992, over the resistance of other European Community (EC) countries, the United States under George Bush, and Russia, marked the end of an independent German policy for the Balkans. From that point onward, Germany subordinated itself to the British-French line. When a new interna-

FIGURE 1
The Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina



tional constellation emerged with the inauguration of President Bill Clinton in 1993, Bonn failed to encourage the United States to take a tougher stand against Milosevic and Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadzic, which could have quickly put an end to the war. Instead, Bonn preferred to play tactical games with the European "allies" and Russia.

The aim of destabilizing any plans for economic development was achieved with this war: Not a trace of development and reconstruction has occurred in Europe, and, instead, hunger and destruction prevail, attended by the danger of renewed escalation of fighting. The southeastern corridor of what Lyndon LaRouche proposed to be the "Productive Triangle" has been blocked for seven years. The potential of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, completed just before the Balkan war broke out, has yet to be realized. The reconstruction of Bosnia has been blocked by the inherent defects of the Dayton Agreement, and the conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the European Union; the economic situation in Croatia and Slovenia is largely paralyzed by International Monetary Fund (IMF)-dictated policies. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosova are still seeking asylum in Germany, because other EC countries, especially France and England, have all but closed their borders to refugees from the war.

Here, we examine the British and French policies, and U.S. policy under Anglophile George Bush, which led to the outbreak of this horrible war. We do not overlook the fact that the war was also intended to counter the justified demands for

FIGURE 2
The Kosova crisis region



national self-determination, following the collapse of Yugoslavia, artificially created at Versailles. These changes could have taken a peaceful course, as they did in Czechoslovakia, for example, had Milosevic's "Greater Serbia" policy not been energetically encouraged from the outside, and had the IMF shock therapy not escalated the crisis, as it did throughout eastern Europe, in its beginning phase.

IMF shock therapy in Yugoslavia

Brutal shock therapy has been implemented by the Milosevic government, on the advice of Harvard Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, since 1989. The economy was thrown into a deep depression, with mass unemployment and hyperinflation. The standard of living was set back several years, and state development programs were halted. Gross National Product fell 10% in 1990, foreign debt climbed to \$16 billion by mid-1991, and Yugoslavia faced insolvency on the payment of debt service in the fall of 1991. Savings deposits in foreign currencies in the amount of some \$10.5 billion were officially "blocked," but in reality they had already been spent by the state. A social explosion was imminent because of the inability to pay wages, especially in Serbia, in the fall of 1991.

The disastrous economic developments, as well as the Greater Serbia provocations of Milosevic and his clique following the first free multi-party elections in the summer of 1990, in which non-communist parties won in Slovenia and Croatia, made it impossible for the republics of Slovenia and Croatia to continue to accept this situation. Milosevic had already annulled the autonomy of Kosova and Vojvodina with violence in 1989, and he attempted to force his policies through in the State Presidium against the other republics. In the winter of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia approved a new

Constitution. There were proposals to transform Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of states with a common market and customs union, and, in case of foreign aggression, coordination of defense efforts. Serbia rejected these plans. On May 15, after repeated military threats and provocations, including by Serbian separatists in Knin, Croatia, the Serbian power clique sabotaged the election of the Croatian representative, Stjepan Mesic, who was supposed to become the new President of Yugoslavia in the revolving Presidency. The blockage of this institution of the Constitution, and the ensuing installation of a Serbian-controlled emergency cabinet, left Slovenia and Croatia with no other choice than to proclaim their complete independence on June 25, 1991. Two days later, the tanks of the Serbian federal army rolled against Slovenia and then against Croatia. The war had begun. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the next victim, beginning in April 1992. Today, the victim is Kosova.

The friends of Milosevic

On the British side, political support for Milosevic came from EC mediator and former British Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington (1991-92), and Lord David Owen (1992-95), who replaced Carrington. UN mediator and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, together with Owen, worked out the notorious "Vance-Owen Plan" in 1992, which was intended to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten ethnic enclaves. The basic outline of this plan, the ethnic partitioning of the country, has remained a constant feature of policy to the present day. In addition, there was the British-dominated UN bureaucracy, under UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his emissary, Yasushi Akashi, as well as the British and French commanders of the UN Protection Forces (Unprofor) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The "friendship among men" between Unprofor commander, British SAS Gen. Sir Michael Rose, and the genocidal Serb war criminal Gen. Ratko Mladic, cost tens of thousands of Bosnians their lives.

The Anglophile government of President Bush was also on the side of Greater Serbia aggression in 1991-92. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III had assured Milosevic publicly in June 1991, that the United States would commit itself to the "territorial integrity of Yugoslavia," and that assurance was delivered during a whirlwind visit to Belgrade two days before the official declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. With that assurance, Baker gave Milosevic the green light for the aggression which began a few days later. It was especially the clique around Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, including Henry Kissinger, that was behind this policy. This "Belgrade Connection" in Washington was committed to a pro-Milosevic policy, and it blocked the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Both Eagleburger and Scowcroft had close personal ties to Milosevic, a Harvard-educated banker who was, for a time, director of the Belgrade bank, Beobanka.

Eagleburger, who in 1957 worked in Yugoslavia as an official of the State Department, was U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade during 1977-80, and, on the recommendation of Kissinger, was named Deputy Secretary of State. In December 1989, he became Bush's personal coordinator for East European affairs. In the closing phases of the U.S. election campaign in 1992, he was also briefly Secretary of State. Of particular interest are his connections to Yugoslavia: During 1986-88, Eagleburger was one of the directors of the LBS Bank, 100% owned by the Yugoslav Ljubljanska Banka. In 1988, investigations were launched against leading representatives of the LBS Bank in New York, on suspicion of money-laundering for organized crime. Eagleburger was also director of Global Motors, Inc., the U.S. sales firm for the "Yugo" automobile, as well as chairman of the U.S. branch, Yugo-America Ltd. The Yugoslavian producer of the Yugo, Zavoidi Crevna Zastava, was at the core of the Yugoslav arms industry.

More than economic interests were at stake. Eagleburger was also chairman of the consulting firm Kissinger Associates (1982-88), and on the board of directors of its branch, Kent Associates. Scowcroft was the first stockholder at Kissinger Associates and, during 1982-89, he worked for Bush as National Security Adviser. During the war in Yugoslavia, Scowcroft and Eagleburger worked together closely, and at government meetings they often spoke with each other in Serbian, which both speak fluently, according to the *London Times*.

A third director of Kissinger Associates was Lord Carrington.

The decisive first phase of the war

Following the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991, troops of the Yugoslav National Army, under Milosevic's orders, first attacked Slovenia, and then Croatia. Hostilities ended quickly in Slovenia, and soon thereafter, in October 1991, some 250,000 people in Croatia fled from the Greater Serbia terrorist militias. Thousands were killed or wounded.

In September 1991, the UN passed a weapons embargo against all the republics, negotiated under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington in The Hague.

The east Slavonian city of Vukovar, Croatia fell into the hands of the Serbian army on Nov. 19, after a siege of 86 days, and was nearly completely destroyed by Serbian artillery. (In 1998, mass graves with thousands of corpses were found there.) Under the eyes of the International Red Cross, 246 patients and care-takers were dragged from the city hospital. They, too, were killed. Vance, who visited Vukovar a short time later, said that there was another side to the story besides the Croatian victims. The Serbs, he said, had fought so bitterly only because the barracks of the Yugoslav Army in Croatia had been encircled by Croatian forces.

When the Serbian troops withdrew, they were allowed to take their heavy weapons with them, because of the interna-

tional pressure on the Croatian government.

On Nov. 27, the UN Security Council declared its full support for Vance as UN negotiator, whose plan was to deploy peace-keeping troops into the demilitarized zones in Croatia, modelled on UN operations in Cyprus and southern Lebanon. Vance negotiated a cease-fire, which was immediately violated by the Serbs once Vukovar had fallen. The Serb forces then launched new assaults on Osijek, and consolidated their conquests in Slavonia and Baranja.

Also on Nov. 27, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke about "the possibility of recognizing" Croatia, which occasioned angry diatribes against the German position.

On Nov. 29, 1991, French President Mitterrand defended the Serbian aggression, in an interview with the German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: "All I know is that the history of Serbia and Croatia is full of such dramas. During the last war, especially, many Serbs were killed in Croatian camps. As you know, Croatia was part of the Nazi bloc, and Serbia was not. . . . Since Tito's death, it was inevitable that the latent conflict between Serbia and Croatia would break out again. The time for that has now arrived. I do not believe that Serbia intends to go to war in order to keep Croatia, but only to draw new borders and to achieve a kind of direct or indirect control of Serbian minorities."

On Dec. 10, UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar wrote a letter to the German government, in which he claimed that a "premature German recognition" of Croatia would encourage an escalation of hostilities on the part of the Yugoslav National Army. He demanded that Germany show restraint. Russian Foreign Minister Yuri Vorontsov stated that he hoped that Germany would not go through with its recognition. President Bush and Prime Minister Major pressured Kohl to abstain from recognition of Croatia. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger wrote threatening letters to all European governments, warning against "premature recognition," because, as he claimed, it would "inevitably lead to more bloodshed."

Germany was put under immense pressure again at the ten-hour marathon meeting of the EC foreign ministers on Dec. 16 in Brussels. In the end, the EC magnanimously proclaimed its willingness to review the requests for recognition of the republics by Dec. 23. On Jan. 15, 1992, Germany, the Vatican, Austria, and Iceland officially recognized Croatia. Other countries followed, but the U.S. government continued to withhold recognition. The word which circulated through diplomatic channels was that the U.S. government was "shocked" that Germany had so abused its "new power position." This was to be the last time that Germany would run a solo political initiative in the Balkans.

At that point, as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported on Jan. 7, British-controlled newspapers were writing that the real issue behind the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was "preventing a German zone of power in the Balkans."

Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The recognition of Croatia did not imply that this country was to regain its national sovereignty, nor did the EC and UN recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the spring of 1992 protect that country from Serbian genocide. Serbian aggression continued unabated.

By early 1992, some 30% of Croatian national territory had been occupied, 10,000 people had been killed or reported missing, and a half-million were driven out as refugees. Lord Carrington insisted in February 1992, that it was out of the question that Vukovar would be taken away from the Serbs. The cease-fire which Vance had negotiated in January 1992, and the subsequent deployment of UN troops into the so-called "pink zones" on the lines of demarcation between Serbian and Croatian forces, consolidated the gains of the Serbs. According to UN reports, at least 500 more Croats were killed in these areas up to 1993, and 2,000 more driven to flight. Nothing was said about a return of the refugees or the Croatian administration, let alone the disarming of Serb militias. Quite the opposite: UN areas were used as bases from which to launch assaults against Bosnia over the entire course of the war, which began in April 1992. Yugoslav National Army units were allowed to transport heavy weaponry from this secured hinterland without the slightest interference.

Under the threat of massive sanctions, in early summer 1992 Croatia was forced by the international community to stop its support for Bosnian forces in Posavina, the border area adjacent to Croatia. This proved to be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war, because subsequent developments established this area as the corridor through which Serbian forces resupplied themselves in northern Bosnia.

At the beginning of July 1992, joint operations of Croatian and Bosnian military units had severed the lines of communication between Serb-controlled northern Bosnian and Croatian areas under Serbian control. Under international pressure, Croatia withdrew its forces from Bosnian territory, and Bosnian resistance in the north collapsed. Tens of thousands of refugees flowed into Croatia, and from there into Western countries, especially Germany and Austria. The route for the transfer of Serb heavy weaponry to Banja Luka, another Serb power-center, was open.

In Bihac in northwestern Bosnia, on the border with Croatia, 300,000 people were already enveloped by the Serb army. The UN, which controlled access to Serbian-occupied territories in Croatia, permitted only the most meager humanitarian aid to pass through. The UN allowed Serb military transports of the Yugoslav Army from Belgrade into Serb-controlled Knin, Croatia and into Banja Luka, Bosnia, although the Croatian government protested and demanded that the flights termed "humanitarian" be brought under control.

On June 28, 1992, a carefully selected, symbolic date, Mitterrand visited Sarajevo, where 450,000 people were encircled. This was the anniversary of the 1914 assassination of the successor to the Austrian throne, Franz Ferdinand, by

Greater Serbian terrorists, and also the anniversary of the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, which had given birth to Yugoslavia as an artificial, Serb-controlled state. Miterrand's visit signalled one thing in particular: There would be no sanctions against Yugoslavia, or military action against the Serb aggressor. There was to be only humanitarian aid.

Up to the convening of the international peace conference in London on Aug. 26, in which great expectations were invested, Serb troops were thus free to create a *fait accompli*. In October 1992, some 70% of the national territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the occupation of "Greater Serbia" Chetnik troops. At least 150,000 people had been killed and a half-million had already fled for Germany. Lord Carrington, who gave up his position as EC negotiator, which he had held also for Bosnia since the spring, claimed that the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina had provoked the Serbs to launch this "civil war." His successor, Lord David Owen, who was trained as a psychiatrist at the Tavistock Institute, continued this line of apology for Serbian genocide; he negotiated with Milosevic and Karadzic for the EC up to 1995.

Mounting reports about Serb concentration camps and a systematic policy of genocide by the Serb Chetniks were increasingly difficult to silence, although on Aug. 17, President George Bush claimed, in *U.S. News and World Report*, "There is no proof that what has happened in Serb concentration camps, is genocide." Negotiators Vance and Owen effectively organized the "orderly wave of refugees" for the Chetniks, by demanding, at the end of September 1992, that the refugee convoys should be protected, "even if this promotes the evacuation."

Eagleburger said in September that a commission for war crimes should be established under the UN, if "the upsetting reports should be confirmed." In the meantime, Milan Panic, an American multi-millionaire in the immediate orbit of Eagleburger and Scowcroft, was named Prime Minister in Belgrade; he proceeded to buy time for a number of months for "Greater Serbia" to consolidate its conquests in Bosnia.

The non-recognition of Macedonia by the EC, under the pretext of a "name conflict" with Greece, permitted the unhindered transport of fuel, weapons, and other supplies to Serbia. Smuggling from Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania to Serbia bloomed. No one moved against the violations of the embargoes, while the weapons embargo against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was strictly monitored and enforced.

At the beginning of 1993, the EC and the UN attempted to implement the "Vance-Owen Plan," which gave the official green light for partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Vance-Owen Plan created the climate in which the vicious dynamic developed, of battles within the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croats and Muslims; those battles ended only in February 1994, under the pressure of the new Clinton administration, in the "Washington Agreement." Concrete evidence continued to mount that British SAS soldiers had been involved as provocateurs on both sides in the

massacres of the Muslim and Croatian civilian populations. The aim had been achieved: The British and French governments, especially, could claim that there were many aggressors. "All sides are guilty," was the line. Lifting the weapons embargo would only escalate the "civil war," they said.

The continuous propaganda against Germany from Great Britain and Serbia, alleging that Germany wanted to build up a sphere of influence in southeastern Europe, had its effect. The image of the threat of a "Greater Germany" spread more and more. It was necessary to contain "German predominance over Europe," said former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, on the eve of the French referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in the fall of 1992. (Maastricht was a scheme designed to emasculate the economic power of Germany, and nation-states generally.) The German government thereupon rejected a German military intervention against Serbia, and supported the continuation of the weapons embargo against Croatia and Bosnia.

U.S. Balkans policy shifted slowly following the inauguration of President Clinton. Amidst an ongoing battle with the British lobby within the Clinton administration, and under the pressure and sabotage by the Europeans, in which Germany shifted its position back and forth, it took three years until, with the Dayton Agreement in the winter of 1995, the hostilities were at last ended and the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina halted. However, a just peace, in which past injustices were punished and restitution brought about, did not occur. Another two years passed until Croatia, in 1998, finally reestablished its sovereignty over its national territory, with the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia. The Croatian Army had liberated western Slavonia and the Krajina region from Serbian occupation in 1995.

British and French policy played a crucial role again and again in sabotaging the efforts of the United States to contain the Serbian aggression.

The London *Guardian* reported, on May 20 and 21, 1996, on the problems which confronted American policy from the start: "When Clinton took office in January 1993, the Bosnia crisis went out of control. His government urged him to intervene. But his bureaucrats saw themselves immediately facing the monolithic power of the British Foreign Ministry. . . . The chief proponent of this policy was the Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, but it essentially derived from Lady Pauline Neville-Jones, the political director of the Foreign Office, who has a background in the intelligence services. . . . The British opposed nearly all of the American initiatives: even the parachuting of food packages, not to speak of air assaults. One of the advisers of Mrs. Albright claimed, that England was pursuing its foreign policy via the UN."

Of the several cases, we examine here the role of British Gen. Sir Michael Rose, who took command of the UN troops stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina for one year, starting in January 1993. His especially good relationship with Serbian General Mladic became legendary. It was with Mladic that Rose

concluded an endless series of cease-fires, which the Serbian side repeatedly exploited to improve their positions and launch new assaults. In October 1997, under U.S. pressure, Rose's close associate, the translator Milos Stankovic (alias Mike Stanley), was arrested and accused of having betrayed highly sensitive information to the Mladic clique. Stanley was among the first British soldiers sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, and he had access to political and secret military information.

When British SAS Special Forces were commissioned by the UN to transmit the coordinates of Serb artillery positions around the besieged city of Bihac to NATO aircraft in the fall and winter of 1994, their orders were countermanded by General Rose. NATO aircraft had to turn around without accomplishing their mission to dislodge the artillery. The discussions were monitored by the American side. The American government ceased its intelligence cooperation with Great Britain in the Balkans.

The French Unprofor commander, Gen. Bertrand Janvier, was not much better. He permitted the massacre of several thousand people by Mladic's troops in Srebrenica, which had been declared a "UN protected zone." In May 1995, he issued written orders to his subordinate, British General Rupert, not to ask for any NATO air support. Meanwhile, a clause was forced through the UN Security Council by British UN Ambassador Sir David Hannay, that Unprofor and NATO were to react only if NATO troops, not the people in the "protected zones," became the targets of Serbian attacks.

Economic sabotage

Even after hostilities had ended in Bosnia-Herzegovina, British policy continued to play a decisive role. The British representative at the negotiations, Lady Pauline Neville-Jones, who was the guiding hand in British policy in the Balkans, argued for partitioning the country and lifting the sanctions against Milosevic.

The reconstruction of the destroyed country was placed in the hands of the World Bank and the IMF, institutions under British policy control. The commissioning of reconstruction contracts was given to two organizations delegated by the EC, among them the British firm Crown Agents, a known international front for British secret services operations. At the beginning of 1996, the commission for the two organizations was withdrawn, because of protests from Germany and other EC countries, against unfair business methods. The World Bank imposed the precondition for issuance of credit, that \$3 billion in old debts of Yugoslavia be taken over by Bosnia, and that what was left of the country's industrial potential, be privatized.

The political positions of the contending countries were also evident in the way that war crimes were prosecuted. The UN tribunal in The Hague complained that the French Stabilization Forces (SFOR) allowed individuals who were sought for war crimes to move freely in their zone of responsi-

bility. In 1998, the accusation was made, that French Maj. Hervé Gourmillon had prevented the planned arrest of Serb leader Karadzic by betraying information to the Serb side.

The Federal Republic of Germany again came under domestic and foreign pressure over the issue of the participation of German SFOR troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even more momentous was the issue of the return of Bosnian refugees, of whom 360,000 were still in Germany in 1996, the largest number of any EC country. Since there is no real reconstruction going on in Bosnia, and the majority of refugees, despite promises made at Dayton, cannot return to their homes in Serb-controlled parts of the country, German political initiatives are at a dead end. The long-overdue effort by a Bosnia staff, under former Baden-Württemberg Interior Minister Dietmar Schlee (Christian Democratic Union), to institute a more effective German policy for Bosnia development and refugee repatriation, has been strangled by the conditions in the country and the usual tactical maneuvering of German politicians. The European Union bureaucracy has played an especially insidious role in this process, continually blocking German funds already allocated for reconstruction.

'Greater Serbia' aggression continues

Instead of being removed by the West after the war, Milosevic, the butcher of the Balkans, today enjoys an uncontested position of power. Serbia functions blatantly as the revolving door for dirty money from Russia, the Caucasus, Israel, Cyprus, Great Britain, Ibero-America, and European countries.

Exemplary in this connection, is that the British chief negotiator at Dayton, Lady Neville-Jones, after the conclusion of the negotiations, at which she argued vehemently for suspension of the sanctions against Milosevic, went to work in 1996 for the British NatWest Markets Bank. This bank receives royalties for the privatization of the Serbia's telecommunications and the electricity utilities. Her former boss, Douglas Hurd, was already serving on the bank's board of directors. They were both involved in concluding a most interesting deal for NatWest: the administration of Serbia's national debt. That continued the close collaboration of criminal Western elements with the Milosevic regime, which made the bloody beginning of the Balkan tragedy possible, with its relations to the Eagleburger-Carrington clique and their partners in Kissinger Associates.

Peace and development will be possible in the Balkans only when Milosevic is politically removed. All of the tactical maneuvering among the "allies" leads to ever new and worse atrocities and a new phase of expansion of the war. The chief question is: Will the United States, and also Germany, finally shoulder their responsibilities and live up to the confidence the people in the war areas still place in them? If that does not happen, not only southern Europe will go up in flames this time. The slim remaining chance for a Eurasian development and peace policy, may also be destroyed.