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**Republic of Sudan
resists British genocide**




Republic of Sudan resists British genocide

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The survival of every nation throughout all of sub-Sahara Africa depends upon the success of three nations of Africa in continuing resistance to the British monarchy's ongoing attempts to bring about the bloody destruction of their present governments. These three nations are, in West Africa, Nigeria; in South Africa, President Nelson Mandela's Republic of South Africa; and, in East Africa, Sudan. If any of these three governments is successfully destroyed on London's stridently persisting orders, that entire region of Africa will be destroyed; if two of those three governments are overturned, all of sub-Sahara Africa is doomed to the kind of genocide which the British monarchy and its puppet, Uganda's bloody dictator Yoweri Museveni, have already bestowed upon Rwanda, and are currently conducting in Burundi.

The subject of this report is some crucial background on the current situation and crucial strategic role of the present government of Sudan. To situate today's developments, we begin with the role of Henry Kissinger in unleashing the bloody destruction of Ethiopia and Somalia, during his "incarnation" as U.S. Secretary of State.¹ Below, in this introductory portion of the *Special Report*, we reference

1. In his keynote address to London Chatham House's public conference of May 10, 1982, celebrating the 200th anniversary of the founding of the British Foreign (and foreign-intelligence) Service, by the consummately evil Jeremy Bentham, Kissinger referenced his "incarnation" in the U.S. government, under Presidents Nixon and Ford. (This report of the speech is based upon an official transcript of the address issued by the offices of CSIS based at Georgetown University; see excerpts in this issue, p. 9.) In that address, Kissinger bragged loudly that he had worked sometimes behind the backs of those Presidents, blindly carrying out British foreign service policy, rather than U.S.A. policy. He explained, that on the traditional issues separating President George Washington from Britain's King George III, and President Franklin Roosevelt from Prime Minister Winston Churchill, he, Kissinger, had always taken the side of Churchill's imperial Britain, against the anti-colonialist tradition of the United States. Key to the entirety of Henry Kissinger's career, during the past 45 years, is that he belongs to a special category of British spy first identified publicly by Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger. Pitt, in describing the Sultan of Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania), referred to that



Lyndon LaRouche meets students in the library of the African University of Khartoum, December 1994. Writes LaRouche: "Sudan is everything which Henry A. Kissinger is not: both poor and lovable. It is a hard-working country, expressing a distinctively greater sense of sovereign and constructive self-reliance than is customary around this planet today."

the widely underestimated significance of the ecumenical approach to Sudan which was made by Pope John Paul II.

The urgency of the needed shift in U.S. policy toward Sudan and Nigeria, is to be seen in the recent utterances of such London establishment figures as Sir Peregrine Worsthorne.² During the most recent weeks, since the auctioning of London's key Warburg bank, and the new, disastrous round in the bankrupting of Lloyd's insurance cartel, leading spokesmen for the British financier oligarchy, such as Lord William Rees-Mogg and Worsthorne, have abandoned earlier pretenses, now to confess, that, as **EIR** has warned, the present international monetary-financial system is doomed to an early collapse. For this reason, says the Worsthorne whose step-father sponsored Hitler's appointment as Germany's Chancellor, the world must move to a system of dictatorships very soon.

It was in this context, that Rees-Mogg and related figures publicly pre-orchestrated and then exploited the mass-murderous bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building

gentleman as an "agent of British influence"; that is the identity of the Henry A. Kissinger, whose bloody paws figure prominently in the suffering of East Africa (in particular) during the past quarter-century. The British intelligence service's ownership of Kissinger, reposes, to the present day, in the institution at which Kissinger spoke publicly, in 1982, and, more recently, March 29, 1995: Chatham House, the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA).

2. Peregrine Worsthorne, "The Right-Wing Path to Oppression," London **Sunday Telegraph**, May 21, 1995.

in Oklahoma City. Under the circumstances of the British oligarchy's perception that time is running out on all options, every active crucial strategic issue around the world is on an accelerated schedule. The U.S. crisis in Africa policy, the cases of London-targeted Nigeria and Sudan included, must be viewed accordingly.

How Kissinger fits in on Sudan policy

One of the leading issues in East Africa today, is the question, to what degree will the policy of the United States continue to be corrupted by British policy-shaping, as has been the case since the "incarnations" of Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski at the U.S. National Security Council?

Today, that problem is typified by the case of a Republican member of Congress from northern Virginia, Frank Wolf, whose somewhat influential Sudan policy is steered to the last punctuation-mark by a pair of imperial witches from the British House of Lords. The first of these is the present British Colonial Office head,³ and present official butcher of Africa, the same Baroness Lynda Chalker who cherishes such familiars as her puppet President Museveni of Uganda, the latter employed as London's hit-man for such enterprises as genocide in Rwanda, and war against Sudan. The second is the Baroness Caroline Cox, a most influential and active figure within the House of Lords. On

3. Officially titled, with characteristic British understatement, "Overseas Development" office.

In this report

Sudan, with Nigeria, is the key to the future of the African continent, said Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. after a December 1994 visit to Khartoum. This *Special Report* documents the nation's great potential, and its historical fight with Great Britain.

Introduction: Republic of Sudan resists British genocide. By Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

I. Sudan: a bull's-eye in Kissinger's Arc of Crisis

- a. Henry Kissinger boasts of his allegiance to the British Foreign Office.
- b. The "Bernard Lewis Plan" in action around the world today.
- c. How the British and Kissinger set up war and famine in the Horn of Africa.

II. Kissinger's policy of genocide for Africa

- a. The sabotage of "Operation Breadbasket," a plan for Sudanese food independence.
- b. Kissinger's National Security Study Memorandum 200 targeted Third World countries for population reduction, as a matter of U.S. "strategic interest."

III. Sudan's history and present geography

- a. A chronology of events from 6000 B.C. to the present.
- b. Sudan's battle against the British, 1880-98.
- c. The development potential of the Nile River system.
- d. A profile of Sudan's geography and physical economy.
- e. Sudan's educational reform.
- f. Sudan's political system today.

IV. London's Sudan policy

- a. The British program during the 1930s for separating the north of Sudan from the south, imposing an apartheid regime on the south.
- b. The dirty work of Sir Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard.
- c. London's stooges against Sudan: Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni.

V. London's NGO army against Sudan

- a. The new Crusade of Baroness Cox and Christian Solidarity International.
- b. A dossier on the non-governmental organizations and other agencies out to destroy Sudan.

Sudan policy, Wolf appears to be, so far, a most suggestible "Tribby" under the hypnotic direction of the two sulfurous ladies from London.

Frank Wolf's case is significant, but otherwise only an aspect of a more general need to free U.S. policy-shaping in Africa—and elsewhere—from London's corrupting influence. The problem is better understood by focussing upon the Kissinger-Brzezinski tradition within U.S. foreign policy.

The origin of every bloody folly which United States foreign policy has committed in East Africa, in particular, has been the direct result of the U.S. government's acting as a dupe of London. Among the notable U.S. foreign-intelligence service figures who have contributed a notably disastrous role to this effect, are a pair of products from a post-World War II British intelligence nest at Harvard University, the so-called "Wilton Park" branch-unit there, under the direction of a certain Professor William Yandell Elliott: Henry A. Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Respecting the subject addressed in the pages of this present *Special Report*, the importance of the role played by that pair is located under the rubric adopted by National Security Adviser Brzezinski, as the 1977-80 U.S. "Horn of Africa Policy." Brzezinski merely continued the same policy which had become operational under Secretary of State Kissinger.

That "Horn of Africa" policy was a subsidiary feature of a larger strategic plan also set into operation under Kissinger and Brzezinski. Brzezinski termed it, for public relations purposes, the "Arc of Crisis" policy; behind the diplomatic draperies, it was better known as "The Bernard Lewis Plan" brought into the National Security Council and State Department under Kissinger. The key to that smelly mass of tangled U.S. Africa, Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia policies which incoming President Bill Clinton found stashed in the White House closet, is the legacy of the influence of London's Bernard Lewis over Kissinger and Brzezinski. Lewis, lately tucked away at Princeton, is the conduit through which the "Arc of Crisis" and "Clash of Civilizations" doctrines were inserted into the foreign policy establishment of the United States.

On Lewis himself. When I mentioned Bernard Lewis's role in the British intelligence service to World Jewish Congress leader Nahum Goldman, now more than a decade ago, Goldman praised Lewis's competence as an Arabist scholar, and indicated that he had endorsed Lewis's qualifications respecting the then-pending appointment to British intelligence's Arab Bureau, then headed formally by Sir John Bagot Glubb Pasha. In that post, Lewis was set up as what German tradition terms a *salonfähig* spokesman for a set of mass-murderous policy-concoctions run through the Arab Bureau apparatus.

Lewis's "seconding" to the U.S.A., provided the special

channel used to launder those British intelligence doctrines into the U.S. "think-tank" establishment. From there, British agent-of-influence Kissinger picked them up and pushed them forward, beginning London's orchestration of the discrediting of incumbent Secretary of State William Rogers through the "Black September" massacres.⁴ By 1975, the "Bernard Lewis Plan," later known as Brzezinski's "Arc of Crisis," or "Islamic Fundamentalism Card" doctrine, was fully installed and operational. Secretary Kissinger's swapping of Ethiopia and Somalia assets with Moscow, leading into the ensuing war which destroyed both Horn of Africa nations, was the leading signal of the British Arab Bureau's intent to unleash genocide, and dismemberment of existing states, throughout an arc which circled up from the Asian Subcontinent, through Iran, into Turkey and the Arab Middle East, and thence down into the Horn of Africa. Wilton Park veteran Brzezinski, in his 1977-80 "incarnation," continued that mass-murderous policy.

That defines the general circumstance in which London has situated its threats to crush and dismember both Kenya and Sudan today. So far, at last report, Congressman Frank Wolf is among those influential U.S. figures currently duped into working for the wrong side.

'The Clash of Civilizations'

In the case of Sudan, and also Nigeria, there is a second aspect of Bernard Lewis's advocacies which comes to the fore. Prof. Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," places him as a surrogate for London's, and Princeton's, now-aging Lewis. The person of the internationally influential Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, a key figure of Sudan today, is very much in the eye of London's Arab Bureau and its own version of the "Clash of Civilizations" doctrine.

The "Clash of Civilizations" doctrine is to be viewed as a rewarmed version of the "Arc of Crisis." The rewarming echoes the 1989-91 disintegration of the Soviet system, and London's efforts to shift the application of those political energies earlier devoted to an East-West conflict, to a North-

South strategic conflict, instead. Who is to serve as the plausible adversary for such a shift of "balance of power" orchestration, away from the virtually demised East-West conflict, to a North-South conflict? The billion-odd actual or nominal Muslims, extended chiefly across a sweep from the Moros of the Philippines in the East, through South and Central Asia, and across the broad width of Africa, from Sudan, through northern Nigeria, and on to the Atlantic coast.

That is an old game of "divide and rule," which the waning imperial financier-maritime power of Venice embedded in its clone, the Anglo-Dutch financier oligarchy. As Lord Palmerston reminded the Parliament: The British monarchy has no permanent allies, only permanent interests. Venice survived as long as it did, by pitting its leading adversaries against one another, allying with the number two power against the number one to weaken the latter, and then allying with the latter to weaken the former ally. Thus, London orchestrated World War I;⁵ thus, London put Adolf Hitler into power in Germany, and supported Hitler for long enough to build up Germany to fight a war of mutual devastation with Soviet Russia.

London's difficulties in implementing the new "divide and rule" scenario, this "Clash of Civilizations," are two. First, to plant in the minds of governments and peoples in the northerly stretches of this planet, the compelling delusion that Islam is generically "the adversary." Second, to provoke and otherwise induce Islamic forces to play the part of that "adversary" in a credible fashion. That is key to the role of London's agents inside the U.S.A., in orchestrating the 1994-95 escalation of campaigns of harassment and vilification against the Nation of Islam led by Minister Louis Farrakhan. That is relevant to understand the special attention which London and its dupes have focussed upon the person of Sudan's Dr. Hassan al-Turabi.

Dr. Turabi represents a sophisticated movement within Islam, centered within Sudan and Egypt, a movement typified by those among it who have demonstrated themselves qualified to assume the functions of government with a rare quality of selection of focus upon the most crucial policy-issues.

Anyone who applies Zbigniew Brzezinski's catch-phrase of "Islamic fundamentalism" to the movement with which Dr. Hassan al-Turabi is associated, is making a fool of himself. The Vatican circles around Pope John Paul II appear to have grasped the truth of the matter. That issue, as I have seen it, as I have articulated it within earlier editions of **EIR**, and elsewhere, and as I have discussed it with relevant persons and circles, including circles among Christianity, Islam, and the Mosaic heritage generally, is the following.

5. See "London Sets the Stage for a New Triple Entente," **EIR**, March 24, 1995.

4. During his early days as National Security Adviser under President Nixon, Kissinger's efforts to discredit Secretary of State Rogers assumed the form of an obsession. Screaming like a jilted *maenad*, Kissinger roamed the White House corridors, brandishing his latest batch of cabled receipts from his British intelligence sources in London. Rogers did not realize that what seemed to him the impossible scenario described by Kissinger could come true, on condition that London was not merely predicting the events, but orchestrating the relevant behavior of the principal relevant players on the Middle East stage at that time. Kissinger's insatiable lust for power, money, and certain other things, not necessarily in that order, must have been a significant motivating factor in Kissinger's ranting campaign against Rogers. London's employment of Kissinger's perverse motives was a different matter; London's target was the "Rogers Plan" for seeking Middle East, Arab-Israeli peace. London, to this day, will do anything to prevent peace between Israelis and Palestinians from being consolidated in the Middle East.

It is my carefully formulated judgment, that to bring our imperilled global civilization into peaceful, just, and more prosperous condition, it is necessary to mobilize an ecumenical community of principle among those who share the message of the first chapter of Moses's *Genesis*, those whom the Muslims recognize as "the people of the Book." This is not to reject those who do not share that specific tradition; it is, rather, to assemble a core creative force which is needed as a global catalyst, to bring about the required conditions of justice and peace for all peoples. All that need be set down, for such an ecumenical accord, is set forth in the first chapter of *Genesis*: Creation is good; men and women, made in the image of God, are the best, the noblest beings in Creation. Man is made in the image of God, by virtue of that efficient creative power which is the gift, existing as potential to be awakened, within each human individual.

Those who walk in the Mosaic tradition, and who see the peril building up throughout the planet today, must view in such terms those, in Sudan and elsewhere, who in the name of Islam, seek to do good for peoples, and to define that good in the manner such an accord implies.

Without the quality of motivating "fire in the belly" which such an ecumenical accord implies, what must be done with this imperilled planet of ours can not be done. That estimation should be received as a very carefully considered, very rigorously formulated estimate of the strategic situation. Thus, has Pope John Paul II conducted his efforts for justice and peace; so, did the Egyptian religious co-thinkers of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi ally with us, and with the Vatican, in resisting the U.N.O. Cairo Conference effort to place even the bedrooms of the world under the supervision of an unelected mass of NGOs⁶ functioning as the Gestapo of a new world-government dictatorship; thus, must the British intent to dismember and destroy multi-confessional Sudan be assessed and resisted today.

The strategic importance of Sudan

Sudan is the largest country of Africa, and potentially its principal "breadbasket." It is the most "unracist" of countries, by blended ethnic legacies, and by cultural tradition. Strategically, it lies in the most crucial position on the map of Africa: It is the place where the principal natural corridors of both North-South and East-West development, for all of Africa, intersect, in a region of the Nile River, between the Omdurman-Khartoum area of intersection of the White and Blue Nile, and, south of that, where the rail corridor from the Nyala to Port Sudan crosses the White Nile. The extension of a developmental rail corridor, from Nyala, across Chad, through Ndjamena, into the railheads within eastern Nigeria,

6. Officially, the U.N.O. informs us that "NGO" signifies "Non-Governmental Organization"; experience suggests a better explanation: "No-Good Organizations."

is key to the future East-West resurrection of East and West Africa. The Nile defines the sense of the north-south developmental corridor, from Alexandria, on the Mediterranean, to the Cape of Good Hope. In the vicinity of what is called still, for no good reason, "Lake Victoria," Africa has the means to manage the flow of water, north and south, in a way which defines, at a relatively minimum cost, one of the great potential-growth regions of this planet.

As a matter of the general character of the nation, Sudan is everything which Henry A. Kissinger is not: both poor and lovable. It is a hard-working country, expressing a distinctively greater sense of sovereign and constructive self-reliance than is customary around this planet today. It is an extremely underpopulated nation, in which a little good added can do a great deal of good.

Sooner or later, perhaps sooner, the presently strained relations between Sudan and the government of Egypt will be reversed. One would hope that the foreign policy practice of the United States would contribute to that result.

Some, among those who have not made the relevant calculations, might deceive themselves, that that could mean that the management of the water of the Nile will represent the general basis for a solution for the internal problems of Egypt's economy. There is not sufficient flow through the Nile to accomplish that, as the sharing of the waters of the Jordan River and its adjoining aquifers could not solve the problems of Israel and Palestine. Large-scale desalination must be introduced throughout the Middle East; otherwise, there are no just economic solutions for the increasingly severe social and related political ills of those regions today. Water-management? Yes; but, do not become overly attached to cheap-shot remedies for the relatively vast scale of the present deficits in water, power, and many other things.

What is wanted is political-economic cooperation among sovereign nation-states, to the purpose of unleashing those large-scale projects of building basic economic infrastructure, in water, power, transport, and so forth, which are the indispensable foundations for success in any other aspects of economic development everywhere within Africa. Development corridors, based upon central arteries of water, rail, and power distribution, reaching north-south, east-west throughout Africa, are the key to justice and peace.

With all its limitations, Sudan has the crucial strategic location, a distinctively good quality of national leadership, and the other qualities needed. The possibilities of the moment are admittedly modest ones, but, with cooperation and understanding at a time when it needs it, Sudan is a nation which, with a bit of consideration, has a great future before it.

A constructive relationship with Sudan would become among the most valuable jewels which a wise U.S. foreign policy would bequeath to the children and grandchildren of today's United States.

Kissinger at Chatham House: making policy behind the back of U.S. Presidents

The following are excerpts from "Reflection on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy," an address by Henry A. Kissinger in commemoration of the bicentenary of the Office of Foreign Secretary, May 10, 1982, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London.

All accounts of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War and in the early postwar period draw attention to the significant differences in philosophy between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill reflecting our national histories. . . . Many American leaders condemned Churchill as needlessly obsessed with power politics, too rigidly anti-Soviet, too colonialist in his attitude to what is now called the Third World, and too little interested in building the fundamental new international world order toward which American idealism has always tended. The British undoubtedly saw the Americans as naive, moralistic, and evading responsibility for helping secure the global equilibrium. The dispute was resolved according to American preferences—in my view, to the detriment of postwar security.

Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's awakening to maturity in the years following. In the 1940s and '50s our two countries responded together to the geopolitical challenge of the Soviet Union and took the lead in creating the structures of western cooperation. . . .

The disputes between Britain and America during the Second World War and after were, of course, not an accident. British policy drew upon two centuries of experience with the European balance of power, America on two centuries of rejecting it. . . . Where Americans have tended to believe that wars were caused by the moral failures of leaders, the British view is that aggression has thrived on opportunity as much as on moral propensity, and must be restrained by some kind of balance of power.

Britain has rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in the ultimate efficacy of technology. . . . Philosophically, she remains Hobbesian: She expects the worst and is rarely disappointed. In moral matters Britain has traditionally practiced a convenient form of ethical egotism, believing that what was good for Britain was best for the rest. . . .

In American discussion of foreign policy. . . . the phrase "balance of power," was hardly ever written or spoken with-

out a pejorative adjective in front of it—the "outmoded" balance of power, the "discredited" balance of power. . . . Roosevelt, on his return from the Crimean Conference in 1945, told the Congress of his hope that the postwar era would "spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed." . . .

Americans from Franklin Roosevelt onward believe that the United States, with its "revolutionary" heritage, was the natural ally of peoples struggling against colonialism; we could win the allegiance of these new nations by opposing and occasionally undermining our European allies. . . . Churchill, of course, resisted these American pressures, as did the French and some other European powers for a longer period than did Britain. . . .

American attitudes until quite literally the recent decade have embodied a faith that historical experience can be transcended, that problems can be solved permanently, that harmony can be the natural state of mankind. . . . Disillusionment was inevitable.

The ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a source of wonder—and no little resentment—to Third World countries. Our postwar history is littered with Anglo-American "arrangements" and "understandings," sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal documents. . . .

The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a participant in internal American deliberations, to a degree probably never before practiced between sovereign nations. In my period in office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—indeed, they helped draft the key document. *In my White House incarnation then [as national security adviser], I kept the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department [emphasis added]. . . .*

In my negotiations over Rhodesia I worked from a British draft with British spelling even when I did not grasp the distinction between a working paper and a Cabinet-approved document. The practice of collaboration thrives to our day, with occasional ups and downs, but even in the recent Falklands crisis, [there is] an inevitable return to the main theme of the relationship.

Setting the 'Arc of Crisis' aflame

by Joseph Brewda

In 1980, *EIR* warned that the strategy behind then-U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's "Arc of Crisis" against the Soviet Union was a British plan to destroy the nation-state. The "Bernard Lewis Plan," as it came to be known, remains as the British design to fracture all the countries in the region, from the Middle East to India, along ethnic, sectarian, and linguistic lines. This, we warned, was the strategic gameplan behind the Anglo-American overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and his replacement by Ayatollah Khomeini, and the Oct. 31, 1984 assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) insurrection in southern Sudan, and efforts to plunge Sudan into war with Uganda and Eritrea, are part of the Lewis plan today.

Lewis is a British Islamic specialist who had entered British intelligence and served in the British Foreign Office during World War II, before he returned to his post at the University of London School of Oriental and African Studies. In 1974, Lewis was seconded to Princeton University, where he became an adviser to the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Lewis sold his plan to the Carter administration with the argument that ringeing the Soviet Union with Muslim fundamentalist states would break up the Soviet Union's southern tier. The British were bitterly opposed to the Shah's efforts to industrialize Iran, and related policy commitments in Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere in the Muslim world.

In 1992, Lewis published an update on his thesis, in the fall issue of *Foreign Affairs*, the journal of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. arm of Britain's Royal Institute of International Affairs. Lewis predicted that the entire Middle East would undergo a process of "Lebanonization"—a reference to the civil war unleashed in Lebanon in 1975 by then-U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

"Most of the states of the Middle East," he wrote, "are of recent and artificial construction and are vulnerable to such a process. If the central power is sufficiently weakened, there is no real civil society to hold the polity together, no real sense of common national identity or overriding allegiance to the nation-state. The state then disintegrates—as happened in Lebanon—into a chaos of squabbling, feuding, fighting sects, tribes, regions and parties."

The Lebanon war pitted the country's Catholic, Palestinian, Shiite Muslim, Sunni Muslim, Druze, and Greek Ortho-

dox populations against each other. The war resulted in the de facto partitioning of Lebanon by Israel and Syria. Today, the nation-state of Lebanon, no longer exists. ~

1. Algeria: Anglo-French-run civil war, pitting the Islamic movement against the government, threatens to spread into Tunisia and Morocco.

2. Egypt: IMF conditionalities fuel potential for Muslim-Coptic Christian civil strife and war with Sudan.

3. Egypt-Sudan: Plans to create an artificial Coptic Christian "Nubia," carved out of the border area, are designed to provoke war between Egypt and Sudan.

4. Southern Sudan: The British-backed SPLA is attempting to make the region into a separate state.

5. Ethiopia: With a new Constitution approving any desired secessions, Ethiopia is set to be divided up along tribal and ethnic lines, as has already been accomplished with the creation of Eritrea.

6. Somalia: Fragmentation into numerous warring clan-regions, with clan wars spreading into the Somali-majority ethnic regions of eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya.

7. Kenya: British efforts to topple President Daniel arap Moi and destroy his non-tribal ruling coalition, are meant to trigger tribal wars between the Luo and Kikuyu.

8. Rwanda/Burundi: Ugandan-backed Tutsi massacres of Hutus in both states are designed to make both states into satellites of greater Uganda.

9. Israel-Palestine: British and World Bank sabotage of the economy is meant to provoke a Hamas-PLO civil war that would destroy the Israel-PLO agreement, and to create the conditions for a new Arab-Israeli war.

10. Saudi Arabia and Emirates: The politically discredited British-run royal families and sheiks are about to be dumped, replaced by the networks run by Crown Prince Abdullah.

11. Yemen: Continuing efforts to renew civil war and spill it over into Saudi Arabia.

12. Greater Syria, incorporating Lebanon, has been largely consolidated; an Israeli-Syrian war remains on the agenda.


13: Kurdish region, straddling Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, has been blown up by the British, fueling a possible Turkish-Iranian war.

14. Turkey: Ethnic, sectarian, and political strife is meant to create a new "Algeria," destroying the last modern economy in the region.

15. Balkans: Serbia's invasion of Bosnia and designs on Kosova may lead to conflict with Albania and Turkey; Greece would ally with Serbia.

16. Azerbaijan's demands for reunification with

Bernard Lewis's Arc of Crisis



Iranian Azerbaijan, from which it had been separated in the early 1800s, could spark a Turkish-Iranian war.

17. Armenia-Azerbaijan: Continuing war over Nagorno-Karabakh creates conditions for Caucasus-wide conflict, drawing in Russia and Turkey.

18. Chechnya: The Russian invasion and destruction of the ethnic region has set into motion a guerrilla war of indefinite duration.

19. Iraq is being subjected to continued efforts to divide it into a northern Kurdish area, a southern Shiite area, and a central Baghdad area.

20. Western Iran: Plans are under way to unify the Turkmen ethnic region of northwest Iran with neighboring Turkmenistan.

21. Afghanistan: The civil war will split the country into three parts: a Tajik entity in the north, an Uzbek central entity, and a Pushtun entity in the south, to incorporate part of Pakistan.

22. Tajikistan: Russian-manipulated civil war may aid separate British efforts to organize territorial conflict between the Iranic Tajiks and Turkic Uzbeks.

23. China: Turkish-supported Turkic-ethnic separatism in Xinjiang province is meant to aid British efforts to split off neighboring Tibet (ethnically non-Chinese), and fragment China generally.

24. Pakistan: Karachi riots are meant to split off the Sind; Pakistan is to be divided into a southern Baluchi state that would also include part of neighboring Iran, a Punjabi state, and the reunification of the Pushtun region into a new Pushtunistan carved out of Afghanistan.

25. Kashmir: Long-standing Indo-Pakistani conflicting claims on Kashmir are being aggravated by a British-supported Kashmir independence movement, and feed plans to foster an Indo-Pakistani nuclear war.

26. Sri Lanka: The Tamil Tigers, supplied through international drug connections with Stinger-type missiles, have renewed war for the secession of northern Sri Lanka.

Horn of Africa: the British set-up and the Kissinger switch

by Linda de Hoyos

Throughout the postwar period, the countries of the Horn of Africa—Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, and Djibouti, and now Eritrea—have been victims of the British balance of power geopolitics practiced by Henry Kissinger and his mentors at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The balance of power stratagem for the region involves two phases. In the immediate postwar period, the British colonialists acquiesced to exit from the region as colonial administrators, but as in every other region under British imperial rule, they left behind a carefully designed mechanism to ensure perpetual war among the former colonial countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, these regional conflicts—apparently between the countries in the Horn of Africa themselves—were used as entry points for superpower sponsorship and proxy war. In the case of the Horn of Africa, Kissinger et al. held no particular loyalty to any one grouping, but switched proxy partners at will to ensure the maximum instability.

The result has been the political fracturing and economic decimation of the countries of the region. The primary target of Kissinger's mid-1970s Horn of Africa "switch" of sponsorship from the Ethiopia of Emperor Haile Selassie to the Somalia of President Siad Barre was Ethiopia. A nation of 30 million people, Ethiopia was a prime objective of Kissinger's National Security Memorandum 200 for forced population reduction. Perhaps even more dangerous to the British oligarchs and their partners, was that Ethiopia had produced an intellectual elite that was among the most competent in all of Africa. After years of war and famine under a violently anti-intellectual Marxist regime, Ethiopia—now minus its former coastal territory Eritrea—is struggling to revive itself, with little aid from foreign donors. Reflecting the degree to which the elites of the country have relinquished even the concept of their nation, the new constitution of Ethiopia, voted up May 7, grants the right of any one region to secede at will and was heralded by London's *Financial Times* under the headline "Ethiopia Buries the African Nation State."

Newly independent Eritrea has quickly slipped into the status of a British puppet-state, targeting Sudan along with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, the marcherlord in East Africa under the direct sponsorship of Lady Lynda Chalker, British Minister of Overseas Development (see article, page 53).

In Somalia, the nation-state is in an advanced stage of disintegration, as the region in the north—formerly British Somaliland—has carved itself out as a separate state, and the remainder of Somalia's postwar territory is now ripped with clan warfare, in the wake of the 1990 Anglo-American overthrow of President Siad Barre.

In this regional context, the next target of Kissinger's geopolitical game is Sudan, which despite the British set-ups for continual war in the south, has maintained its political and economic sovereignty.

The British set-up

1946: The mechanism for the Horn of Africa wars (1964 and 1977-78) began (in modern history at least) in 1946 with the so-called Bevin Plan. The plan was named after its architect and staunch advocate, then-British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. The idea was to create "Greater Somalia." According to the plan, the former Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, the Ogaden, and the Northern Frontier District,

FIGURE 1
Horn of Africa, 1995





Cuba's Fidel Castro (left) and British agent of influence Henry Kissinger (right). Kissinger and company held no particular loyalty to any one grouping in the Horn of Africa, switching alliance partners in order to create maximum instability.



all of which were at that time under British military administration, were to be brought together in a single unit as a United Nations trusteeship under British administration. The Bevin plan implied the unity of all Somali territories, except the part controlled by France. The Bevin plan was enthusiastically adopted by the Somali Youth League, the first political party in Italian Somaliland, with the slogan: "Unity of all Somali Territories." Somalis are a homogeneous people, with the same language (Somali) and religion (Islam). However, as in so many other cases, the British manipulation was to build up an "identity" for a particular language or ethnic group of people—in this case, the Somalis; attach that "identity" to a geopolitical goal—in this case, the retrieval of the Ogaden and Northwest Frontier into a single Somalia; and then deny the goal.

1948: Britain ceded the Ogaden region, which is mostly Somali-inhabited, to Ethiopia.

1949: The Somali Youth League opted for U.N. trusteeship for the south, but with Italian administration.

1955: Britain ceded to Ethiopia the Haud and Reserved Area, a pastureland primarily used by Somalis.

1956: Somalia was given self-rule, with Abdullahi Isa Mohamud, leader of the SYL, prime minister.

1959: On Aug. 25, during a visit to the Ogaden, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie said: "We remind you, finally, that all of you are by race, color, blood and custom, members of the great Ethiopian family. . . . As to the rumors of a Greater Somalia, we consider that all the Somali peoples are economically linked with Ethiopia, and therefore, we do not believe that such a state can be viable standing alone,

separated from Ethiopia." Haile Selassie had already annexed Eritrea.

1960: Somalia was granted full independence. The new Somalia had pro-West leanings, but was not permitted to join any "clubs" such as the British Commonwealth or francophone organizations. Somalia also had close relations with Nasser's Egypt.

1963: Britain announced it was transferring the whole of the Somali-inhabited Northwest Frontier District to Kenya, which itself was scheduled to attain independence in December 1963.

1963: On March 14, Somalia severed diplomatic relations with Britain. Later that year, the Somalia government rejected an offer of more than \$10 million in military assistance, extended by the United States, West Germany, and Italy, because it was considered inadequate, and because of the political conditions attached to it. Instead, the government decided to accept a larger Soviet military aid offer, estimated at \$30 million. Somalia also received aid from Egypt.

1964: War erupted between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden; Ethiopia retains Ogaden.

1965: Sources of external military assistance to Horn of Africa countries in the region were as follows: Ethiopia received military assistance from the United States, Sweden, Norway, India, Israel, and Britain; Somalia from Italy, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, and Britain.

1967: In June, the Six Days War broke out between Egypt and Israel; Egypt was defeated.

In December, the Yemen People's Democratic Republic (South Yemen) was formed from a partition of Yemen after

FIGURE 2
Horn of Africa, 1960s



FIGURE 3
Horn of Africa, post-Kissinger switch (1974-80)



a long civil war in Yemen against the British and Saudis.

1969: In January, the Revolutionary Command Council, led by the 27-year-old colonel Muammar Qaddafi, came to power in Libya in a coup against King Mohammad Idris.

That May, Col. Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri came to power in Sudan with a military coup, with a leftist coalition.

1969: On Oct. 15, Somali President Abdiraship Ali Shermake was assassinated by his security guard, while Prime Minister Egal was in the United States.

On Oct. 21, Siad Barre came to power in Somalia in a bloodless coup. The symbol of the new regime was a gun and a hand and in the background the Koran. Within a year, the Koran had disappeared, and Somalia headed into the socialist camp. In the ensuing period, Barre picked up the idea of *juche* (self-reliance) from North Korea, and built "education camps" for the civil service. A National Security Service was also created, with Soviet trainers. Many Soviet experts also worked in the Ministry of Defense, since Somalia got most of its military equipment from the U.S.S.R.

1970: On Oct. 15, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt died, to be succeeded by President Anwar Sadat.

1971: In February, Idi Amin came to power in Uganda, with British and Israeli sponsorship.

In July, an attempted coup against President Nimeiri in Sudan by communists, with the backing of the Soviet Union

and the German Democratic Republic, was aborted.

1972: Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie helped to mediate the end to the civil war in southern Sudan.

That February, Libya assumed sponsorship of the Idi Amin regime in Uganda.

The Kissinger switch

1974: Drought and famine hit Ethiopia. The British and U.S. press orchestrated a campaign against Haile Selassie, charging that aid was not reaching the people, because of the corruption. The United States withdrew from its military base in Asmara.

On Sept. 12, Haile Selassie was overthrown in a pro-American military coup with approval of Henry Kissinger. The grouping that came to power was largely pro-American, but pro-Soviet forces gradually grew stronger, as the United States shifted toward Somalia.

The Soviet Union organized a summit in Aden with Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen, with Cuba's Fidel Castro attending.

1975: Henry Kissinger launched the era of "shuttle diplomacy" between Israel and Egypt and other Arab countries.

1976: Egypt abrogated its Treaty of Friendship with the U.S.S.R. in March.

In December, East German Foreign Minister Oskar

Fischer visited Ethiopia.

1977: In February, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam overthrew the Ethiopian government with a military coup. The Mengistu regime was comprised of young officers, numbers of whom were graduates of the University of Chicago. Mengistu was himself the son of a slave-mother of one of the ruling princely families of Ethiopia. The first meeting Mengistu had, after wiping out Ethiopia's top military leadership, was with the Cuban ambassador.

In early March, 1,000 officers and soldiers of the East German defense forces reorganized Ethiopia's Defense Ministry and command structure.

In July, Somalia, now largely in the U.S. camp, overran the Ogaden as the second Ethiopian-Somali war broke out.

In the fall of 1977, Ethiopia asked for direct military assistance from the Soviet Union.

On Nov. 18, Somalia declared its Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union "invalid." Somalia demanded that all Soviet military experts and civilian technical staff leave the country. Somalia severed relations with Cuba.

In November, Egyptian President Sadat addressed the Israeli Knesset.

In December, more than 1,000 opponents of the Soviet takeover of Ethiopia were executed by the Mengistu regime. The Mengistu regime then instituted a Pol Pot-type of reign of terror to murder Ethiopia's intelligentsia.

Late 1977-early 1978: The Soviet Union airlifted into Ethiopia more than 10,000 Cuban troops from Angola via Tanzania; more than 15,000 Cuban troops from Cuba; more than 10,000 Soviet, East German, Czech, and Hungarian military advisers and technicians; and hundreds of security police advisers from Russian and East German contingents in South Yemen. The Russians also airlifted in \$1 billion worth of military equipment, including T-54 tanks. Five top Soviet generals were brought in to command the counterassault against Somalia.

1978: Somali forces were expelled from Ethiopia early in the year. Then Russian forces in Ethiopia turned on Eritrean secessionists in Ethiopia, and against the Tigre rebels on the border with Sudan.

In September, the Camp David accords were signed among Egypt, Israel, and the United States.

1981: Moscow set up the Treaty of Aden, a tripartite military alliance among South Yemen, Libya, and Ethiopia, that autumn.

1982: Mengistu, working closely with Libya, gave support to various groups fighting against the Somali central government in Mogadishu and the Sudanese central government in Khartoum. Libya was reported to be supporting certain opposition groups in Sudan, and up to 30,000 dissidents received training and instruction in Tripoli.

1983: Civil war broke out again in southern Sudan.

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How Kissinger sabotaged Sudanese food independence

by Joseph Brewda

In 1974, in the aftermath of the Kissinger-run Arab-Israeli oil war, the Sudanese and Egyptian governments announced plans to build the Jonglei Canal on the White Nile in southern Sudan. The canal would increase Nile water annual throughput by at least 7% through draining some of the vast southern Sudanese swamps, while opening millions of acres of former swamp land to agriculture in the first phase of the program. Blessed with rich soil, plentiful water, and an ideal climate, it was long known that Sudan could not only become food self-sufficient, but even become the breadbasket for the entire Mideast and African continent, if it were supplied with modern technology. The canal typified the kind of development program that was needed.

The idea of draining the swamps and using the water to increase the Nile's flow had been proposed as far back as 1893, just before Britain occupied the country. In 1912, British engineer William Willcocks outlined the first detailed technical scheme, which he said would increase the Nile's annual flow by over 7 billion cubic meters. But the British government rejected Willcocks's proposal, and a half-dozen subsequent proposals, as "too expensive." By the time of Sudan's independence in 1956, nothing had been done.

But in 1976, the Sudanese and Egyptian governments signed a contract with a French engineering consortium to begin the construction of the canal. The Sudanese authority established to oversee its construction, also planned to develop the entire, previously inaccessible canal region, through providing modern health care, sanitation, and employment for its 250,000 inhabitants, as well as introducing new kinds of crops and the use of animal vaccines and drugs. Discussions were also under way to bring in more than a million Egyptian peasants to supply the workforce for related agricultural projects elsewhere in the underpopulated country.

Around the same time, and in apparent agreement with the Sudanese development program, Saudi King Faisal and other suddenly rich oil-sheiks established a large-scale agricultural investment firm which proffered funds for food export projects in Sudan. The rapid and profitable expansion of Sudanese agriculture in the 1960s had already demonstrated the projects' feasibility, and talk of retaliatory food boycotts against the Arab states, in the aftermath of the 1973

war, greatly increased interest in Sudan.

The Saudi program, which was de facto put under the control of King Faisal's trusted relative, Prince Mohammed al-Faisal, envisioned a 20-year plan, involving \$6 billion of investments—dubbed "Operation Breadbasket." The Saudis offered to create several large firms to produce food for export. These included companies that would have produced 45 million eggs, 7 million chickens, 45,000 tons of milk, 15,000 tons of fruit, and 20,000 tons of fodder, annually. The plan also envisioned increasing wheat production to make Sudan at first self-sufficient, and then a grain exporter to the entire region. This latter scheme was opposed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, since it called for taking prime cotton-growing land and using it for food production.

British say no

The Sudanese effort to develop food independence flew in the face of longstanding British policy to prevent any such eventuality. Worse, the policy meant that the nations targeted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 1974 National Security Study Memorandum 200 and related British anti-population schemes, would be free of the type of food blackmail that Anglo-American policy demanded.

According to NSSM-200, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria were three of the 13 countries where, Kissinger et al. believed, population growth most threatened U.S. (and British) national security. Direct action was required.

- On March 25, 1975, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated, shortly after a diplomatic clash with Secretary of State Kissinger. The assailant was a deranged nephew who had a strange circle of friends in Colorado and California.

- On Feb. 13, 1976, Murtala Mohammed, the President of oil-rich Nigeria, was killed by another deranged assailant. Murtala Mohammed, who was an open opponent of Kissinger, had unified the country after the tragic Biafran war, and was committed to using Nigeria's oil resources to develop the country and region both industrially and agriculturally. His successor, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, reversed this policy. In March 1995, Baroness Chalker, British Minister of Overseas Development, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs attempted to reimpose Obasanjo on Nigeria in

another attempted coup.

● On Sept. 12, 1974, Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown soon after he had negotiated an end of the war in southern Sudan. In 1977, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam took power, and, aided by a group of military officers linked to the U.S. and British Communist parties, slaughtered the leadership of the country. In 1977, Somalia and Ethiopia went to war over the disputed Ethiopian province of Ogaden, creating the conditions for the 1984 famine. Over a million people died as a result.

Faisal was the main foreign sponsor of Operation Breadbasket, and following his murder, his successors not only lost interest in continuing it, but actively moved to sabotage the plan. By 1981, only \$15 million had been spent in Sudan on the plan out of the \$6 billion promised, and that mostly for feasibility studies and consulting. Meanwhile, Sudan had been lured into acquiring a huge short-term debt, in part in a futile attempt to attract petrodollars through developing infrastructure that would only be of use if the plan were actually implemented.

In 1980, Sudan had reluctantly given in to pressure from the International Monetary Fund and abandoned its drive for wheat self-sufficiency. The IMF claimed that Sudan should rather import wheat, which it supposedly would be able to afford by growing cotton for export, on lands formerly used for wheat production.

By late 1981, the IMF demanded massive austerity in the country, while the Saudis treacherously made further investment in the dying plan contingent on Sudan's honoring IMF conditionalities. Among the conditionalities were the prohibition of spare tractor part imports. Tractor "graveyards" were scavenged for parts to keep a dwindling number of machines in the fields. Rather than turning Sudan into the region's breadbasket, the Saudi investment scheme had instead become the means to cripple its development.

Target: Jonglei

But despite this sabotage, the Sudanese effort to build the Jonglei Canal, which had been decided upon prior to any Saudi involvement in Sudanese development, continued. Work on the canal had begun in 1978. By 1983, 51% of the 360-kilometer canal had been built. The completion of the canal, projected to be finished by the mid-1980s, would have vastly increased Sudanese food production, even without any other foreign investment.

Action to stop it was not slow in coming.

In October 1982, the Royal Geographic Society, patronized by Her Majesty the Queen, sponsored an international conference in opposition to the canal entitled "The Impact of the Jonglei Canal in the Sudan." According to the conference speakers, the canal would drastically affect the climate, destroy the fish of the region, and most importantly, cause "dramatic changes in the lifestyle of the Nilotic peoples" living in the disease-infested swamps. The introduction of

modern agriculture and communications, the Royal Geographers complained, would forever change these peoples' primitive way of life.

In May 1983, the British raised a new insurrection in southern Sudan that has continued to this time. Since its independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan has suffered from sporadic southern rebellions of greater or lesser intensity run by the British out of Uganda, Ethiopia, or Kenya, and with the aid of Israel. From a 1972 peace settlement until 1983, the situation had been quiet. Suddenly, a new civil war erupted.

The leader of the new rebellion, Dr. John Garang de Mabior had been a Sudanese Army intelligence officer who had received advanced training at Ft. Benning, Georgia. In 1981, Garang had completed his Ph.D. thesis at Iowa State University on the effect of the canal on the indigenous peoples of the south. Garang is from the Dinka tribe of southern Sudan, whose traditional pastoral way of life was allegedly threatened by the canal.

From the beginning, the prime targets of the new rebellion were the canal worksite and Chevron oil rigs then being constructed to extract Sudan's vast but completely untapped petroleum deposits. By November 1983, attacks by Garang's followers on foreign workers at the canal site forced the suspension of all work on the project. Similar attacks forced the suspension of all oil exploration and extraction.

On March 3, 1984, Garang officially announced the formation of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to lead the rebellion. He specifically labeled the construction of the canal as a primary reason for the insurgency, right at the beginning of his speech: "The general exploitation, oppression, and neglect of the Sudanese people by successive Khartoum regimes took peculiar forms in the southern third of our country. Development schemes that were implemented in the south were those that did not benefit the local population, such as the extraction of oil from Bentiu via the Chevron projects and extraction of water via the Jonglei Canal." In an April 1985 speech, he bragged that no company would ever agree to restart digging the canal, "unless the SPLA gives the green light."

Despite Garang's self-identified "socialist" rhetoric, the SPLA was rapidly joined by former Sudanese Foreign Minister Mansour Khalid, an old friend of George Bush since the days they were ambassadors to the United Nations. Khalid, who is the real brains behind the rebellion, helps direct the United Nations Development Program office in Kenya today. The office plays a central role in providing arms and related aid to the SPLA, working in close coordination with several non-governmental organizations coordinated by Baroness Chalker's Overseas Development Administration and the Royal Household directly. The Royal Geographic Society, the Royal African Society, and Prince Philip's World Wide Fund for Nature, are among the top organizations running the rebellion who are overtly opposed to the canal project out of professed concern for wildlife or indigenous peoples.

Kissinger's NSSM-200 policy of genocide

by Joseph Brewda

On Dec. 10, 1974, the U.S. National Security Council under the direction of Henry Kissinger prepared a then-classified 200-page study entitled "National Security Study Memorandum 200: Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S. Security and Overseas Interests."

The study was adopted as U.S. policy in November 1975, and outlines a covert plan to be implemented over generations which would lower the population growth rate throughout the former colonial sector. Contrary to public propaganda, the study argues that population growth in former colonies would *increase* the political, economic, and military strength of those former colonies.

NSSM 200 focuses on 13 "key countries" where there is a "special U.S. political and strategic interest" which requires imposing a policy of population control or reduction, precisely in order to prevent those countries from becoming more powerful.

These countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Colombia. The study stresses that even if population reduction programs are put in place there, "population growth rates are likely to increase appreciably before they begin to decline." Therefore these countries will become more important unless other factors intervene.

The hit list

For example:

Nigeria: "Nigeria falls into this category. Already the most populous country on the continent, with an estimated 55 million people in 1970, Nigeria's population by the end of this century is projected to number 135 million. This suggests a growing political and strategic role for Nigeria, at least in Africa south of the Sahara."

Egypt: "The large and increasing size of Egypt's population is, and will remain for many years, an important consideration in the formulation of many foreign and domestic policies not only of Egypt but also of neighboring countries."

Brazil: "Brazil clearly dominated the continent demographically." The study warns of a "growing power status for Brazil in Latin America and on the world scene over the next 25 years."

Kissinger's fears

Among Kissinger's fears was the fear that leaders of underdeveloped countries might realize that population reduction programs are intended to undermine their development potential:

"There is also the danger that some LDC [Lesser Developed Countries] leaders will see developed country pressures for family planning as a form of economic or racial imperialism; this could well create a serious backlash. . . . It is vital that the effort to develop and strengthen a commitment on the part of the LDC leaders not be seen by them as an industrialized country policy to keep their strength down or to reserve resources for use by 'rich' countries. Development of such a perception could create a serious backlash adverse to the cause of population stability. . . .

"The U.S. can help to minimize charges of an imperialist motivation behind its support of population activities by repeatedly asserting that such support derives from a concern with: (a) the right of the individual to determine freely and responsibly their number and spacing of children . . . and (b) the fundamental social and economic development of poor countries. . . .

"Beyond seeking to reach and influence national leaders, improved worldwide support for population-related efforts should be sought through increased emphasis on mass media and other population education and motivation programs by the U.N., USIA [U.S. Information Agency], and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development]. We should give higher priorities in our information programs worldwide for this area and consider expansion of collaborative arrangements with multilateral institutions in population education programs."

Food as a weapon

While Kissinger thought such efforts might be effective, he also outlined steps to force countries to adopt population reduction measures if persuasion proved ineffective. The primary weapon seized upon was restricting food aid.

"There is also some established precedent for taking account of family planning performance in appraisal of assistance requirements by AID and consultative groups. Since population growth is a major determinant of increases in food demand, allocation of scarce PL 480 resources should take account of what steps a country is taking in population control as well as food production. In these sensitive relations, however, it is important in style as well as substance to avoid the appearance of coercion. . . .

"Mandatory programs may be needed . . . we should be considering these possibilities now. . . . Will we be forced to make choices as to whom we can reasonably assist, and if so, should population efforts be a criterion for such assistance? . . . Is the U.S. prepared to accept food rationing to help people who can't/won't control their population growth?"

The history of the Nile region

by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

The rich history of Sudan presents many paradoxes, primary among them, the paradox of its relationship to Egypt. Throughout ancient history, the culture of dynastic Egypt and that of the Nubians were intertwined, at times in conflict, at times at peace. During the periods of peaceful coexistence, if not actual alliances, both cultures prospered, the arts and literature flourished, regardless of which nation was the ruler. It was in fact under the reign of a Sudanese pharaoh, Piankhy (or Piye), in the XXVth dynasty, that Egyptian culture, which had fallen into decay, was renewed; monuments were built, and a great age in sculpture was inaugurated. When, however, outside forces invaded, as in the case of the Assyrians, Egypt and Sudan were set against each other. Egypt's continuing efforts to subjugate Sudan led to repeated invasions and conquests, each time driving the Sudanese power into retreat, in rump kingdoms, moving further south. The Sudanese, regardless of the pressures, held on to their independence, albeit in reduced form.

The use which modern British imperialism has made of

Egypt in its subjugation of Sudan—personified, for example, by the figure of U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, grandson of the infamous Anglo-Egyptian operative—therefore rests on a historical contact-conflict going back 6,000 years, a fact fully appreciated by the geopolitical masterminds of imperial policy in the Near East. When Egypt controlled Sudan under Ottoman suzerainty, Britain was the power behind the scenes. Egypt invaded and conquered Sudan in 1821 and ruled it until 1882, when Britain officially stepped in to assert hegemony in Egypt, and, through Egypt, over Sudan. The brief period of independent Sudan under the Mahdia, from 1881 to 1898, represented an unprecedented break with this tradition of British rule by proxy.

The historical record, documented through archaeological research, shows that although the Egyptian and Sudanese cultures overlap and at times merge, there is a cultural identity reaching back millennia which lies at the root of the fierce spirit of independence which characterizes modern-day Sudan.

| Date | Dynasties and cultures (in Nubia-Sudan, unless noted) | Main developments, characteristics | |
|------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------|
| | | Nubia-Sudan | Egypt |

Prehistoric Period

| | | | |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|
| 6000 B.C. | Khartoum Mesolithic | Hunting, fishing pottery | |
| | Khartoum Mesolithic: This people, living 8,000 years ago, produced pottery which is considered the first ever. It appears in a hunting and gathering society, which had established settlements before developing agriculture. Fishing and hunting were carried out with the aid of stone knives and barbed-bone spears. The pottery has a characteristic design made by cattish spines, which makes the surface look like that of a basket. They buried their dead in recumbent position. | | |
| 5000 B.C. | Neolithic South Nubia | Black-topped red pottery | |
| | Khartoum Neolithic: Here the pottery is burnished, mainly red, but with a black top. Mussel shell was used instead of cattish spine, to make the basket-like pattern. Barbless fish-hooks were also made from mussel shells. Stone axes and adzes were produced. Granite mace-heads as well as "gouges," which were used to hollow out tree-trunks for boats, were also produced. The Fayum Neolithic culture, which existed at the same time (ca. 3900 B.C.), a thousand miles north of Khartoum, had advanced arrowheads. This culture also domesticated animals, cultivated and stored wheat, wove cloth, and had burnished pottery. | | |

| Date | Dynasties and cultures (in Nubia-Sudan, unless noted) | Main developments, characteristics | |
|------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------|
| | | Nubia-Sudan | Egypt |

Archaic Period

| | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 3100 B.C. | I | | Strengthening of central authority Wars in Sinai |
| 3100-2800 B.C. | A-Group (north) "Ta-Seti" (Land of the Bow) | Trade with Egypt, Near East, in gold, jewelry | |
| | <p>The A-Group: Here the earliest copper tools in Sudan were found. These people were known as the residents of "Ta Seti" to the Egyptians, which means the "Land of the Bow," because of their expertise in archery.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Egypt invades, rules north A-Group as colony</p> <p>Independent Nubia south of third cataract</p> | | |
| 3000 B.C. 2900 B.C. 2800 B.C. 2700 B.C. | II | | Cedar imported from Lebanon |

Old Kingdom

| | | | |
|-------------------------|---------|--|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2650? B.C. 2600 B.C. | III | | Step pyramid at Saqqara Great pyramid at Giza for King Khufu (Cheops) |
| 2500 B.C. 2400 B.C. | IV V | | Growth of regional princes Foreign trade increases |
| 2300 B.C. | VI | | Collapse of central government Regional princes recover local powers |

First Intermediate Period

| | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2200-2040 B.C. 2200-1700 B.C. | Pan-grave culture | Bowmen in Egyptian service | |
| 2100 B.C. | VII, VIII, IX, X | | Collapse of central authority Decline of trade |
| 2000 B.C. | XI | | Kings of Thebes reestablish central authority Trade expands on Red Sea, East African coast |
| 2000-1500 B.C. | C-Group, north | Cattle, farming, trade with Egypt, pottery | |
| | <p>The C-Group: Sometime between the 6th and the 11th dynasties, this group of people from south of the second cataract entered Lower Nubia. The C-Group seems ethnically related to the A-Group. They farmed on the Nile River banks, raised cattle and goats, and carried on peaceful commerce with Egypt. Their pottery, which shows similarities to that of the A-Group, has a sophisticated zig-zag design. They dressed in leather garments and wore ornaments of stone, bone, and shell. They buried their dead in graves inside stone-lined chambers, some of which had chapels.</p> | | |

Middle Kingdom

| | | | |
|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1900 B.C. | XII | | Pyramid building Irrigated agriculture at Fayum Depression Conquest of Nubia to second cataract to Semna Egypt builds forts in Lower Nubia (Kingdom of Kush) |
| | <p>The Egyptian occupation of Nubia by the 11th dynasty began under Amenemhat I (2000-1970 B.C.), whose mother may have been Nubian, and was finished under his son Senusret I. Fourteen massive forts were built along the Nile by the occupiers. The forts were used for defense, but were also trading posts.</p> | | |
| 2000-1550 B.C. | Kerma culture | | |

| Date | Dynasties and cultures (in Nubia-Sudan, unless noted) | Main developments, characteristics | |
|------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------|
| | | Nubia-Sudan | Egypt |

Second Intermediate Period

1780-1580 B.C.

| | | | |
|-----------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1700 B.C. | XIII, XIV | Kush Kingdom with capital at Kerma | Collapse of royal authority |
| 1600 B.C. | XV, XVI | Kerma kings ally with Hyksos, rule northern Egypt together | Hyksos invasion, with chariots |

The Kush Kingdom, which had its capital at Kerma, is known as the Kerma culture. Excavations at the Western and Eastern Deffufa have shown that the Kerma culture buried its kings on golden beds, placed under mounds of earth; often wives and others were buried together with the ruler, indicating widespread human sacrifice. It has been mooted that those buried here were Egyptian governors-general. This has been questioned, on the grounds that burial practices were not Egyptian.

Products of the Kerma culture include black-topped red pots, elegant beds with inlaid ivory patterns, copper daggers with ivory handles, and blue-glazed faience, which was used in tiles, beads, models, figures, bracelets, and so forth. Quartz objects were made with a blue glaze cover.

New Kingdom

| | | | |
|----------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1580-1050 B.C. | Nubia under Egyptian rule | | |
| 1550 B.C. | XVII | | Theban kings drive out Hyksos |
| 1500 B.C. | | | Theban war against Kush |
| | | Kerma destroyed, Kush Kingdom falls | |
| | | | Valley of the Kings rock tombs |

The inscription by Ahmes, son of the first king of the XXVIII dynasty, Ebona, relates how "after His Majesty had destroyed the Asiatics, he went upstream . . . to overthrow the Nubians." Ahmes's successor, Amenophis I, "ascended the river to Kush, in order to extend the frontier of Egypt." His successor Tuthmosis I (1530-1520 B.C.) pushed further to extend Egyptian occupation to the whole of Dongola Reach.

| | | | |
|-----------|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| 1400 B.C. | XVIII | | Standing army |
| | | Conquest of Palestine, Syria and Nubia to fourth cataract completed | |
| | | Egyptians reoccupy second cataract, build forts in Nubia | |

"King's Son in Kush"

Despite repeated attempts to rebel against the Egyptian conquerors, the Nubians of northern Sudan acquiesced to occupation. Many temples were built, at Buhen, Deir al Bahri, Sai Island, Faras, Uronarti, Sulb, and Sesibi.

| | | | |
|-----------|-----|--|----------------------------------|
| 1300 B.C. | XIX | | |
| 1200 B.C. | | | Ramses II: statues and temples |
| | | | War with Hittites of Turkey |
| | | | Exodus of Israelites under Moses |
| | XX | | War with Libyans |

Under the 19th dynasty, Nubia was an integral part of the Egyptian Empire, ruled by a viceroy known as "King's Son in Kush," who collected tribute and delivered it to the king personally. Most of the administration were Egyptians. Cultural integration followed. Alongside Amun-Re, who was the main deity, other gods included the ram god Khnum, the goddesses Satet and Anuket, and Dedun, the hawk-god, similar to Horus.

Nubia exported gold, in rings, ingots, and dust, to Egypt, as well as ebony, gum, ivory, copper, stones, ostrich feathers and eggs, perfumes, oils, cattle, leopards, giraffes, dogs, and baboons.

FIGURE 1
Egypt, Kush, and Meroe: 1500 B.C.-350 A.D.





FIGURE 2
Christian kingdoms, 600-1500 A.D.



| Date | Dynasties and cultures (in Nubia-Sudan, unless noted) | Main developments, characteristics | |
|------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------|
| | | Nubia-Sudan | Egypt |

Late Period

1000 B.C. XXI Palestine and Nubia break away from Egyptian Empire

900 B.C.

800 B.C. XXII

Dynasty founded by Libyan mercenaries of Egyptian army
Dynasties of Delta princes

XXIII, XXIV

750-270 B.C. Kingdom of Kush: Napatan Period

724 B.C.

Kushite King Piye (Piankhy) conquers Egypt, becomes pharaoh of Egypt and Nubia with capital at Napata

Piankhy (751-716 B.C.), "raging like a panther," conquered Egypt "like a cloudburst," taking Hermopolis and Memphis, and exacted tribute from the Delta princes. Piankhy was known for his compassion, his power, his religious conviction, and his great love for horses, demonstrated by his having eight horses buried near his tomb. Piankhy's brother Shabako (707-696 B.C.) completed the process of incorporating Egypt into the Kush Kingdom, and moved his capital from Napata to Thebes. Shabako was "King of Kush and Misr" (Egypt). Piankhy's son Shebitku succeeded Shabako and ruled from 696-683 B.C.

700 B.C. XXV

Kushite dynasty, capital Thebes

690-664 B.C.

Kushite King Taharka
Literature and arts revived

Taharka, who ruled from 688-663 B.C., was the greatest of the 25th dynasty kings. He is the only Kushite king mentioned by name in the Bible. His mother travelled from Nubia to Memphis, over 1,200 miles, to attend his coronation. According to an inscription, she "rejoiced exceedingly after beholding the beauty of His Majesty [Taharka] . . . crowned upon the throne of Upper and Lower Egypt." Taharka's reign was prosperous, owing in part to the record harvests that came after unusually heavy rains. Taharka probably introduced the working of iron ore in Napata and Meroe. He restored temples in Egypt and Sudan, building a huge colonnade at the temple at Karnak and restoring columns at the temple of Amun-Re at Jebel Barkal. His pyramid at Nuri was the largest in his dynasty. He built the great sandstone temple, overlaid with gold leaf, at Kawa, with the help of craftsmen and architects brought in from Egypt. There is reference in inscriptions to astronomers and their instruments, at the temple.

One colossal statue of Taharka, from Jebel Barkal, is in the national museum of Khartoum. Another statuette thought to represent Taharka, is very different from the massive work in black granite, and depicts the king in a more personalized fashion.

667 B.C.

Kushite King Taharka to southern Nubia

Assyrian invasion

When the Assyrian King Esarhaddon crossed the Sinai with camels and invaded Egypt, taking Memphis, Taharka retreated to Thebes, and returned to retake Memphis in 669 B.C. Then, Esarhaddon's son Ashurbanipal occupied Thebes in 666 B.C. and put the Egyptian princes back in as his vassals. Nonetheless, the prestige of Taharka lived on, as testified to by the fact that Mentuemhat of Thebes, under Assyrian hegemony, managed to restore temples ravaged by the Assyrians, in the name of Taharka. Taharka had given responsibility for governing Upper Egypt to this famous Sudanese, who was prince of Thebes, governor of the south, and the fourth prophet of Amun. Psammetik I, installed by Ashurbanipal, was not recognized as king in Upper Egypt, which still pledged loyalty to Kush, under Mentuemhat. Furthermore, the priests of Memphis continued to record dates of events as if Taharka's rule continued.

600 B.C. XXVI

Assyrians expelled from Egypt
Necho's canal to Red Sea

591 B.C.

Egypt invades Nubia

Kushites withdraw to Meroe

Meroe, a city on the Nile between the fifth and sixth cataracts, was the seat of one branch of the Kush royal family, even when its rulers were in their capital of Napata. Following the loss of Egypt, Meroe developed into the capital, with its palaces and temples in the Egyptian style. Exactly when the transfer took place is not certain, either in the sixth or the fourth century B.C. Meroe, which has huge amounts of iron ore, was the center of iron-working, dubbed by one archaeologist the "Birmingham of the northern Sudan" (Arkell, p. 147). Meroe communicated knowledge of the technology southwards and westwards throughout Africa.

| Date | Dynasties and cultures (in Nubia-Sudan, unless noted) | Main developments, characteristics | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| | | Nubia-Sudan | Egypt |
| 593-568 B.C. | Aspelta, king of Meroe | | |
| 500 B.C. | XXVII | | Persian dynasty |
| 400 B.C. | XXVIII-XXX | | Brief Egyptian dynasties |
| 300 B.C. | | | |
| 270 B.C.- 350 A.D. | Kingdom of Kush: Meroitic Period | Meroitic language replaces Egyptian Meroitic gods: Apedemak Iron manufacture | |
| <p>The Kush Kingdom in the Meroitic Period stretched from Nubia to Khartoum. It gradually became fully independent of Egyptian culture, including in language. It was King Arkamani (270-260 B.C.) who defied the power of the priests of Amun, who would determine when a ruler would die. Arkamani mobilized his army and put the priests to death. This signaled a rejection of Egyptian culture. In this period, the Meroitic god Apedemak made his appearance; he had a human body and the head, or sometimes heads, of a lion. The use of the Egyptian language and hieroglyphics also disappeared, giving way to Meroitic, a language with both a hieroglyphic and a cursive script. Although the phonetic values of the 23 characters of the alphabet have been ascertained, the language has not been deciphered. Women played an important role in the Meroitic Period, many of the rulers being queens. "Candace," the Meroitic word meaning "queen," has come down to the present as a woman's name.</p> | | | |
| 200 B.C.- 100 B.C. | | | Greek invasion Ptolemaic dynasty founded |
| 30 B.C. | | | Roman conquest of Egypt |
| 37 A.D. | First Christian conversion | Minister of Candace, queen of Meroe, embraces Christianity | |
| <p>Recorded in the Acts of the Apostles 8:25-39, the Eunuch, "a minister of Candace, the queen of the Ethiopians" (Meroe) became a Christian. This event, which took place in 37 A.D., represented an isolated case of a single conversion, although legends centuries later attributed a missionary activity to Eunuch. According to legend, he, with 72 disciples, evangelized the Meroitic Kingdom, and Matthew appointed him patriarch of Nubia, during a visit to Meroe.</p> | | | |
| 350-600 A.D. | Post-Meroitic Period | Nubian kingdoms in Nobadia (Faras capital); Makuria (Dongola capital); Alwa (Soba capital) | |
| <p>The Meroitic Kingdom degenerated and collapsed in the fourth century A.D., after which three kingdoms took shape. Of these Nile valley kingdoms recorded in the sixth century, one was Nobadia (or Nobatia), from Aswan to the second cataract. Its capital was Faras. Another was Makuria or Mukurra (Arabic al-Muqurra), which stretched from the second cataract to the confluence of the Atbara and the Nile. Its capital was (Old) Dongola. The third was Alwa (also Alodia), from the confluence of the Atbara and Nile, to modern Gezira. Its capital was Soba.</p> | | | |
| 543-580 A.D. | | Evangelization of three Nubian kingdoms | |
| <p>The evangelization of all three Nubian kingdoms was recorded by the Monophysite John of Ephesus in his "Ecclesiastical History," as taking place between 543-580 A.D. Nobadia was the first to adopt Christianity, as a result of the mission of Julianus, who had been sent by the Monophysite Queen Theodora. The emperor Justinian (527-565) had tried in vain to have his own emissary, a Chalcedonian (or Orthodox Copt, or Melkite), complete the same task. Makuria and the Garamantes (in the desert west of Dongola) were evangelized presumably by the emperor's Orthodox missionaries about 567 A.D., and Alwa was converted to Monophysitism about 569 A.D.</p> | | | |
| 600-1500 A.D. | Christian kingdoms | | |
| 750 A.D. | Rise of Makuria | | |
| 800-1000 A.D. | Golden Age of Nubia | Nubian language in Greek and Coptic alphabets Cathedral at Faras, frescoes | |
| <p>Makuria, which merged with Nobadia in the seventh century, became one of the most powerful kingdoms after the eighth century, as attested to by its architecture, art, and literature which was written in the old Nubian language using Greek and Coptic script. Seven episcopal Sees existed in the kingdom of Makuria, and bishops as well as other church officials were appointed by agreement of the king. The magnificent frescoes from the cathedral at Faras, now on display at the national museum in Khartoum, attest to the cultural heights reached by Nubian Christianity.</p> | | | |

| Date | Dynasties and cultures | Main developments, characteristics | |
|------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------|
| | (in Nubia-Sudan, unless noted) | Nubia-Sudan | Egypt |


Islamic Period

| | | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| | Muslim rule in Egypt | Islamization of Egypt | |
| | <p>Following the Arab conquest of Egypt in 640 A.D., hostilities broke out between the Nubians and the Arabs, which were settled by a negotiated agreement under Abdallah b. Abi Sarh, governor of Egypt in 646 A.D. The treaty, which fixed territorial rights and the exchange of slaves for foodstuffs, secured peace essentially until 1275. Under Arab rule, the Coptic Church assumed a dominant position over the Melkites.</p> | | |
| 909-1171 A.D. | Fatimid Dynasty in Egypt | 50,000 Nubians in Fatimid army | Peaceful relations with Nubia |
| | <p>The Kingdom of Makuria lived in peace with with Fatimid rulers of Egypt. In fact, the Fatimids under Caliph al-Aziz (died 996) apparently restored the Melkite in Faras, if not all of Nubia. Nubians had consistently enrolled in the Fatimid army, becoming 50,000 strong.</p> <p>Fatimid Egypt was organized along Abbasid administrative lines. Cities flourished, as did the economy and the arts, especially under al-Aziz (with his library of 200,000 books) and al-Hakim, whose astronomical observatory used instruments by Ali ibn Yunus and al-Haytham.</p> | | |
| 1174 A.D. | | Nubians in Egypt exterminated | |
| 1250-1517 A.D. | Mamluks in Egypt | Fall of last Christian king of Dongola | Fall of Soba |
| 1321 A.D. | | | |
| 1504 A.D. | | | |
| | <p>The Ayyubid and Mamluk rule in Egypt meant a severing of Nubia's contacts with the Mediterranean and Egypt. The loss in trade contributed to its degeneration, which manifested itself in raids against Egypt, and internal discord. Conversions to Islam were encouraged through the poll-tax required of non-Muslim adult males as well as through intermarriage of Nubian princesses with Arab leaders. After the last Christian king, Kudanbes, fell in 1321, Nubia became increasingly Muslim. The Nubian Church was weak, due to its close dependency on the monarchy, its lack of seminaries for training local priests, and its limited assimilation by the population. The kingdom of Alwa fell to the Arabs in 1504, to be succeeded by the Funj (Muslim) kingdom. The church, which had requested but not received bishops and priests from Abyssinia, soon faded out of existence.</p> | | |
| 1500 A.D.-present | Islamic period | | |
| 1504-1821 A.D. | Funj Dynasty Fur Kingdom | | |
| | <p>The Funj Kingdom, which stretched from the sixth cataract south to Sennar, contained two states, one under King Dunkas of the Funj and the other under Abdullah Jemma, sheik of the Qawasma, with centralized government at Sennar. The Funj Kingdom reached its height in the eighteenth century, after which the king became a puppet of rival groups. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Kingdom of Fur, contemporaneous to the Kingdom of Funj, and located in Darfur, was united under the banner of Islam by King Sulayman. The Fur Kingdom thrived in relative independence until 1916.</p> | | |
| 1517 A.D. | Turk Selim I conquers Egypt | | |
| 1517-1798 | Ottoman Period: Egypt is a province of Ottoman Empire | | |
| 1798 | Napoleon invades Egypt | | |
| 1805-49 | Muhammed Ali in Egypt | | |
| | <p>Muhammed Ali's rule over Egypt following Napoleon opened an era of reforms and modernization, virtually autonomous of the Ottoman Empire after 1840. Divesting the feudal aristocracy of its control over land, Muhammed Ali modernized and diversified agriculture, introduced agricultural machinery, seeds, and fertilizers, vastly increasing crop yields and farm income. Although cotton, sugar, tobacco, etc. were exported raw, the economy started to become industrial, as he introduced modern textile mills and factories for munitions production. Britain vigorously opposed this policy, and Muhammed Ali was called by Jeremy Bentham the Peter the Great of the Muslim world. Cobden saw the 30 cotton factories employing 30,000 workers in the 1820s as wasteful. Palmerston waged economic warfare against Egypt, eliminating state monopolies and protective tariffs.</p> <p>Muhammed Ali went into Sudan in 1821, and conquered the Funj Kingdom. In 1823, Muhammed Ali's son Ismail was killed by a local chief from Shendi. Defterdar, son-in-law of Muhammed Ali, avenged the death by massacring 30,000 in Kordofan. The Turko-Egyptian colonizers who set up a centralized government there, were known as the "Turks" (Turkiyya) because of their Ottoman umbrella.</p> | | |

Main developments, characteristics

| Date | Nubia-Sudan | Egypt |
|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1821 | Egyptian rule in Sudan | Muhammed Ali conquers Sudan |
| 1849 | Abbas and Muhammed Said succeed Muhammed Ali | Corruption, exploitation, slave trade flourish |
| 1863-79 | | Ismail, grandson of Muhammed Ali, succeeds Muhammed Said as Khedive in Egypt Westernization |
| 1869 | | Suez Canal completed |
| 1877 | Charles George Gordon deployed to Sudan, later becomes governor general | |
| 1879 | | Khedive Ismail deposed Gordon resigns |
| 1879-92 | | Twfiq, son of Sultan, rules Egypt |
| 1881 | | Egyptian nationalist Col. Ahmad Urabi leads revolt |
| 1881 | Al Mahdi in Sudan | |
| 1882-1922 | | British rule in Egypt |
| 1883 | Mahdi takes El Obeid, defeats British, controls Kordofan | |
| 1885 | Mahdist state in Sudan defeats British (Gordon) | |
| 1898 | Kitchener retakes Khartoum | |
| 1899 | Anglo-Egyptian condominium over Sudan Sudan becomes cotton exporter | |
| 1914-22 | | British protectorate over Egypt |
| 1924 | Anti-British White Flag League formed; Gov. Gen. Sir Lee Stack assassinated | |
| | In the 1930s, moves toward independence increase, in the Granduates General Congress. This was divided into two groups: the Ashiqqa Party (Blood Brothers) and the Umma Party. The former sought a democratic government in union with Egypt, the latter not. Ashiqqa allied with the Khatmiya sect and Umma allied with the Ansar (followers of the Mahdi). | |
| 1936 | | Anglo-Egyptian Treaty |

FIGURE 3
Egypt under the Ottomans and the Funj Sultanate, 1500-1700 A.D.



Main developments, characteristics

| Date | Nubia-Sudan | Egypt |
|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 1952 | | Nationalist revolution Gamal Abdul Nasser |
| 1955 | Six months before leaving, British start Sudanese civil war | |
| 1956 | Sudan becomes independent Jan. 1, 1956, with elected Parliament | |
| 1958 | Coup by Gen. Ibrahim Abboud | |
| 1964 | October Revolution, Abboud abdicates after failing to end civil war | |
| 1965 | Cabinet formed of Umma Party, National Unionist Party, and Muslim Brotherhood | |
| 1969 | Coup by Col. Jaffar Nimieri on May 25, 1969, who declares Sudan "democratic, socialist, and non-aligned," wages struggle against religious sects | |
| 1970 | | President Nasser dies, is succeeded by Anwar Sadat |
| 1971 | Attempted coup by Communist Party | |
| 1972 | Civil war ended by Addis Ababa agreement | |
| 1981 | | President Sadat dies, is succeeded by Hosni Mubarak |
| 1983 | Civil war starts again | |
| 1985 | Nimieri government overthrown; military-civilian government under Nimieri's Secretary of Defense Gen. Abdrehaman Swar el Dahab | |
| 1985 | Multi-party government, under former Prime Minister Saddig el Mahdi, brought in by elections | |
| 1985-89 | Saddig presides over three coalition parties including Umma Party, the DUP, and the Communist Party | |
| 1989 | Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC) under Lt. Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmed al Bashir takes power on June 30 | |
| 1989 | National Dialogue Conference on the Political System convoked in September to present plan for federal system | |
| 1991 | Federal system introduced | |
| 1993 | Abuja peace talks convened | |
| 1994 | Abuja II peace talks stalemated | |

Sources

A.J. Arkell, *A History of the Sudan: From the Earliest Times to 1821* (London, 1955). It is no surprise to find here that British archaeologists and historians, in reviewing the ancient history of Sudan, would tend to deny the existence of an independent culture which may have contributed to Egyptian culture. This is most marked in the accounts of Anthony John Arkell, an expert in Egyptian archaeology who was in the Sudan Political Service. Arkell is the author of numerous studies on Sudan which are counted among the standard reference works. His basic, racist premise, hardly concealed, is that of the two "races" in the Sudan, which he calls the "Brown and the Negro races," the "Brown," originally of Arab origin, has been culturally superior. Anything outstanding in the culture, Arkell attributes to "egyptianization," as he categorically denies

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Why the British hate Sudan: the Mahdia's war against London

by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

One reason that the British harbor such a visceral hatred for Sudan, is that they have never fully recovered from their experience with the Mahdist state, which lasted from the early 1880s to 1898. This was an independent, sovereign Sudanese state founded by a charismatic Islamic leader—an “Islamic fundamentalist”—which treated the colonial British as no other state had done. The Mahdi, according to a commemoration published in the Khartoum monthly *Sudanow* (December 1991), “was the leader of the first African nation to be created by its own efforts” and “laid the foundations of one of the greatest states in the nineteenth century which lasted for 13 years after his death.” His “greatest achievement was his insistence on a centralized state and his success in building it.”

It is no exaggeration to hear in certain aspects of modern Sudan's fight for national unity and sovereignty echoes of the Mahdist heritage, although the current Sudanese government has no sympathies for the Islamic sect which the Mahdi led. The fact that the Mahdist experience took place during the lifetime of the grandparents of today's Sudanese, helps explain how that heritage has shaped the Sudanese identity.

The nature of the Mahdia

The Mahdia was established by Dunqulawi Muhammad Ahmad b. 'Abdallah, in 1881, when he declared himself the Mahdi, that is, the “expected one,” inspired by the Prophet to cleanse society of corruption and the infidels. Muhammad Ahmad was born in 1844 the son of a boat-maker, in the Dongola province, and the family moved to Kereri, near the capital Khartoum, when he was a child. He showed an aptitude for religious studies and went in 1861 to study with Sheik Muhammad Sharif Nur al-Da'im, whose grandfather had founded the Sammaniya religious order in Sudan. After a disagreement separated the two, he later studied with Sheik al-Qurashi w. al-Zayn, a rival leader of the Sammaniya and, following the latter's death in 1880, assumed his place as leader, and then as the Mahdi. The Mahdi, in Sunni tradition, was “the guided one,” expected to appear to lead the Islamic community, and to restore justice. His coming was expected to precede the second coming of Christ.

After years in seclusion and study, Mohammad Ahmad presented himself as the Mahdi first to a small group of

followers, then to the notables of Kordofan and El Obeid, its provincial capital. Then, from a retreat on the island of Aba, he sent out letters to notables, announcing that he was the Mahdi, and urging them to join him, in a *hijra*, a flight for faith, modelled after the Prophet's flight from Mecca to Medina. The Mahdi moved into the Nuba Mountains, on the border of the Kordofan and Fashoda provinces, where the tribal chief welcomed him.

The Mahdi's appeal was both spiritual and social. It was an appeal to return to the original spirit of Islam. His was also a protest against the oppressive practices of the Egyptian khedive, who had ruled Sudan since 1821, under Ottoman suzerainty. The Egyptian government, known as the “Turkiya,” bled the poor tribes through taxation, and sent the bashi-bazooks, militia tribesmen armed with hippopotamus-hide whips, to exact payment. In a proclamation issued some time between November 1881 and November 1882, the Mahdi wrote:

“Verily these Turks thought that theirs was the kingdom and the command of [God's] apostles and of His prophets and of him who commanded them to imitate them. They judged by other than God's revelation and altered the *Shari'a* of Our Lord Mohammed, the Apostle of God, and insulted the Faith of God and placed poll-tax [*al-jizya*] on your necks together with the rest of the Muslims. . . . Verily the Turks used to drag away your men and imprison them in fetters and take captive your women and your children and slay unrighteously the soul under God's protection.”

His call to arms was based on the same protest: “I am the Mahdi,” he is quoted as saying, “the Successor of the Prophet of God. Cease to pay taxes to the infidel Turks and let every one who finds a Turk kill him, for the Turks are infidels.”

Government forces, fearing this potential, set out to arrest him, but several expeditions ended in failure. After each military success of the Mahdi and his followers, known as the Ansar (the name also taken by the followers of Mohammed), his ranks and prestige grew.

The Mahdi organized tribal leaders, themselves in various stages of revolt against the administration, behind him into a burgeoning national movement. A campaign which started in summer 1882 in Kordofan province unfolded as a series of tribal attacks against the administration, in different

areas, and a central attack on the provincial capital, El Obeid. Though repulsed during their first attack in September, the Ansar returned, equipped with captured rifles, trained military from government troops who had come over to the Mahdi (known as the Jihadiya), and in January 1883 forced the enemy to capitulate. El Obeid became the Mahdia headquarters.


British invasions: Hicks and Gordon

Two other expeditions failed which were of immense significance to the British. In 1882, Egypt came under British occupation, and Britain ruled the Sudan as well, through Cairo. The two expeditions were those of Col. William Hicks and "the hero," Charles "Chinese" Gordon, nicknamed for his success in defeating the Taiping rebellion in China.

Hicks, a retired officer from the Indian Army, was sent as chief of staff, on behalf of the Egyptian government, to halt the Mahdi. Equipped with a total of 10,000 men, Hicks marched from Khartoum (the Egyptian administrative capital) toward El Obeid through Bara, from the north. Among his guides, unbeknownst to him, were a number of Mahdist agents who relayed information to the Ansar. Suffering from lack of food and especially water, Hicks and his troops were harassed, their communications cut, until they were surrounded and attacked by the Ansar in November 1883 at Shaykan. When the assault started, Hicks's troops, organized in the British square formation, fell into confusion and commenced firing on each other. All but 250 men were killed, including Hicks and a number of British journalists. The massacre of Hicks's force was hard for the British to comprehend. Gordon is reported to have believed that they all died of thirst, and that no military encounter had even taken place! The fall of Shaykan led to the success of the Mahdist revolt in Darfur and Bahr al-Ghazal, and the continuing attachment of tribal units to the Ansar forces.

Gordon's expedition and fate have gone down in history. Gordon had two missions in the Sudan. The first started in 1874, when he was named by the khedive as governor of Equatoria province. Backed by a European staff, Gordon worked to bring this region of the Upper Nile under centralized control, which meant, among other things, breaking the power of the slave-traders. He decreed a government monopoly of the ivory trade, banned imports of munitions, and halted the creation of private armies. He reorganized the financial system and established military stations there, with a headquarters at Lado. In 1877, Gordon received the governorship for the whole of the Sudan; in that year, while Egypt was at war with Abyssinia and popular protest against increased taxation was rising, Britain sealed the Slave Trade Convention with the khedive. It called for ending the passage of Abyssinian and other slaves through Egypt, and terminating all slave-trading in the Sudan by 1899. Gordon called in Europeans and Sudanese to replace Egyptian officials in his administration. When faced with rebellions in the Upper

Sudan in the nineteenth century



Nile, Gordon resorted to brutally repressive tactics, and set one tribe up against others. When the khedive was deposed in June 1879, Gordon quit his post, resigning from the Egyptian service in 1880.

Years later, after the Mahdi had swept through one province after the other, an alarmed British government again called on Gordon. The British government's declared intention in January 1884 was to arrange for the evacuation of Egyptian officers and civilians from Sudan.

Thus, Gordon's initial mandate was merely to go to Suakin, on the Red Sea, and "consider the best mode of evacuating the interior of the Sudan." En route to Cairo, Gordon drafted a memo outlining his mission: Prepare Egyptian evacuation, and establish a stable successor government in an independent Sudan, by bringing back to power the petty

sultans who had ruled before the Egyptian takeover. To carry out this executive function, Gordon insisted that he be named governor general. When he reached Cairo for talks with Sir Evelyn Baring, the banker agent in Cairo, Gordon got what he wanted. While in Cairo, Gordon also met with al-Zubayr Pasha, a leading slave-trader who had been imprisoned in Egypt. Gordon immediately proposed that this man be put forward as the alternative leader to the Mahdi.

By February 1894, the Mahdi's forces had extended their control over Trinkitat and Sinkat, on the Red Sea coast, through the military campaigns of one of the Ansar's most able leaders, Osman Digna.

On arrival in Berber, and later, in Khartoum, Gordon hastily announced the dismissal of Egyptian officials, who would be replaced by Sudanese, and the plans for evacuation. He also declared taxes for 1883 to be eliminated and those for 1884 to be halved. Finally, he announced that the 1877 convention against the slave trade was not operational. The rationale behind this sudden reversal of British policy, seems to have been, that the only way to ensure the return of the ruling sultanates would be by legalizing the slave trade they were involved in.

In Khartoum, Gordon organized a dramatic happening, whereby tax books and the hated whips used by tax-collectors were brought out into the square and burned. Adulatory accounts relate that women threw themselves at Gordon's feet. Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, who accompanied him, wrote, "Gordon has won over all the hearts. He is the dictator here. The Mahdi does not mean anything any longer."

Apparently convinced he was dealing with just another petty tyrant who, like all petty tyrants, has a price, Gordon sent a letter to the Mahdi, announcing his magnanimous decision to grant the Mahdi the position of sultan of Kordofan. This, to a man who not only controlled Kordofan already, but who was about to take Khartoum, thus completing his unification of the nation! Adding insult to injury, Gordon sent along with the message ceremonial red robes and a *tar-bush*. The Mahdi responded:

"Know that I am the Expected Mahdi, the Successor of the Apostle of God. Thus I have no need of the sultanate, nor of the kingdom of Kordofan or elsewhere nor of the wealth of this world and its vanity. I am but the slave of God, guiding unto God and to what is with Him. . . ."

Three dervishes of the Mahdi's following delivered this note to Gordon, returning to him the red robes and offering the garment worn by the Ansar: a patched *jubba*, with the invitation that he adopt Islam and follow the Mahdi. Gordon rejected the Mahdi's offer with indignation. This occurred in March 1884. By April, the Mahdi had decided to organize the siege of Khartoum.

In late February, responding to news that his proposal that al-Zubayr be reinstated as a puppet had been turned down in London, Gordon made the following proposal:

"If Egypt is to be kept quiet, Mahdi must be smashed up. . . . If you decide on smashing Mahdi, then send up another £100,000, and send up 200 troops to Wadi Halfa, and send officer up to Dongola under pretense to look out quarters for troops. . . . Evacuation is possible, but you will feel effect in Egypt, and will be forced to enter into a far more serious affair in order to guard Egypt. At present, it would be comparatively easy to destroy Mahdi."

Gordon's ignominious defeat

Throughout the summer, Gordon, holed up in Khartoum, engaged the forces located there in skirmishes with the Ansar, but made no headway militarily. The Mahdi, meanwhile, was continuing to extend his control, taking the city of Berber on the Nile, thus further isolating Gordon in Khartoum. Osman Digna on the Red Sea coast, and Mohammed al-Khayr who was controlling Berber, blocked access from Khartoum to the east or the north. Gordon, for his part, dug in. He recounts that the people in the city spread broken glass on the ground, and others planted mines. Gordon concentrated on hoarding goods for the siege, and sending urgent requests to London via Baring for reinforcements. In September, Gordon sent the British and French consuls down the Nile on a steamer, in an attempt to run the blockade of the Mahdist forces, and to get news of the situation of besieged Khartoum to the world. The steamer was attacked before it reached Abu Hamed, and all the Europeans were killed. In October, the Mahdi moved with his forces to Omdurman, preparing for the assault on nearby Khartoum.

Finally, the British government decided to send a relief expedition, but by the time the steamers actually reached Khartoum, on Jan. 28, 1885, the British officers saw no Egyptian flag flying, and concluded correctly that the city had fallen to the Mahdi. The steamers turned around and fled.

The end of Gordon has remained somewhat wrapped in mystery. The common version is that he was killed in battle, on the staircase of his palace, by Mahdist forces armed with spears. Decapitated, his head was taken for identification to Rudolf Slatin, the Austrian governor of Darfur for the Egyptian administration.

The dead Gordon was to become an object of hero-worship in Britain, mostly for the purpose of whipping up jingoistic support for an expedition under Gen. Herbert (later Lord) Kitchener, to destroy the Mahdia and Sudan.

A few words about Gordon, the man, so to speak. Although painted as a quasi-god by his idolators (for example, *Gordon: der Held vom Khartoum. Ein Lebensbild nach originalquellen*, Frankfurt am Main, 1885), Gordon turns out to have been just one more pervert in Her Majesty's service.

As Ronald Hyam wrote in *Britain's Imperial Century 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion*: "The prince of pederasts (in the sense of small-boy lover) was unquestion-

ably an even more important figure: Gen. Charles Gordon, hero of campaigns in the Sudan and China. Totally and irredeemably boy-oriented, he was almost certainly too honorable or inhibited ever to succumb to physical temptation, and so this emotion was heavily sublimated into serving God, the Empire and Good Works. He spent six years of his life (from 1865 to 1871) trying to create in London his own little land where the child might be prince, housing ragged urchins (his 'kings' as he called them), until packing them off to sea when the onset of puberty occurred."

The Khalifa's rule

Gordon's ignominious defeat signalled the completion of the creation of the Mahdia as a national institution. The Mahdi established his headquarters in Khartoum, but did not live long thereafter. He died on June 22, 1885, and was succeeded by the Khalifa, who was to rule the Sudan until General Kitchener's forces invaded in 1898.

There was never any question as to who would succeed the Mahdi on his death. Modelling his reign on that of the Prophet, the Mahdi had named Khalifas (followers, or successors, deputies), and had designated Abdellahi b. Muhammed, as his successor in a proclamation on Jan. 26, 1883. But the consolidation of the national state was severely hindered by economic crises, in part triggered by the many years of a war economy, and aggravated by bad harvests leading to famine.

Following the Mahdi's death, Abdellahi organized the construction of a tomb and, across from it, the house and related buildings from which he was to rule united Sudan. Abdellahi, like the Mahdi, was acknowledged leader (after some initial clan conflicts) by the taking of an allegiance oath on the part of the leading tribes.

The state which the Mahdi had established had three institutional branches—the high command, the judiciary, and finances.

The Khalifa served also as the Commander of the Armies of the Mahdia, a kind of chief of staff, and, like the other khalifas, headed up a division of the army under his flag. Under the khalifas were the amirs, or commanders, who functioned as military governors. Under them were *muqaddams* or prefects, and the followers in general were known as *darawish* (dervishes). They dressed in the patched *jubba*, with a white turban and sandals, signs of simplicity and asceticism.

The financial organization of the Mahdia was based on two sources of revenue: booty of war and taxation. The Mahdi as Imam was to receive one-fifth of all booty taken in war. The other four-fifths were to be divided up "in accordance with the commandment of God and His Apostle" and distributed through the treasury to the needy. Furthermore, the *zakah*, a tax established as a tenet of Islam, was levied on the crops and the cattle of the tribes. Although taxes were thus

paid in kind, coined currency, issued by the Mahdia (a silver dollar and a gold pound) were used in trade.

The Mahdi (later the Khalifa) was the supreme judge of the judiciary, and his khalifas and emirs acted as judges on the provincial and local levels. The main focus of attention was the status of women and land ownership. In accordance with the *Shari'a* (Islamic law), laws were promulgated to legalize the status of women whose husbands had been killed in war, or whose marriages had otherwise been broken. Modesty in dress was prescribed for women, who were forbidden to roam through the marketplace. Regarding land, those dispossessed by the Turks were allowed to reclaim their land (going back seven years from 1885) and those who had abandoned their land because they could not pay excessive taxation to the Turks, were allowed to repurchase their land at the price given. Finally, the Mahdia fought with legal means against various popular superstitions, outlawing amulets and the like, as well as excessive wailing at funerals.

Tribal rivalries continued to threaten the integrity of the national state and throughout 1885-87, Abdullahi had to deal with uprisings from the Madibbu, the Salih, and the Fur tribesmen. His policy was to bring recalcitrant or hostile tribal leaders to Khartoum to thrash out differences, and win them over to the national cause. Those who refused the come to terms, were threatened with military might, and most acquiesced.

The Khalifa did not initially turn outward in search of military conquests. In 1889, however, he deployed his military commander al-Nujumi in an Egyptian campaign, which turned into disaster. Due to inferior logistics and supplies, the Mahdist campaign was defeated by the Anglo-Egyptian forces at Toshki in August 1889, which was to be a turning point for the Sudan.

The combination of military defeat and serious social problems deriving from the onset of famine due to a bad crop in 1888, led the Khalifa to make a number of economic policy shifts. He forbade the army from entering houses or damaging crops, and decreed that only licensed merchants could sell grain, in order to thwart black market tendencies, and to make sure that garrisons would be adequately supplied. He relaxed trade restrictions with Egypt, which helped alleviate scarcities, and led to the return of thousands of refugees from Egypt back to their homeland.

However, Lord Kitchener in August 1890 ordered that the port of Trinkitat, held by the Egyptians, be closed, and that grain shipments be blocked, under the pretext of a cholera scare. "It appears that cessation of supplies of grain from Suakin to the dervishes, owing to quarantine regulations, is having the effect anticipated, in breaking up the camp at Handub, as well as causing the Handub tribe to see the necessity of keeping on good terms with the government," Kitchener reported.

Despite this food warfare, and the general conditions of



Lyndon LaRouche (left) with his host Abed el Rahman Abdulahi Mohamed El Khalifa of the National Board for Antiquities and Museums, a grandson of the Khalifa who fought the British during the last century. Here, the two are visiting the defensive lines of Sudanese resistance to the British on the Nile.

dire need for the population, the Khalifa's rule was intact, largely because no matter how tough conditions were, they were certainly better than they had been under the Turks (via the Egyptians). As Sir Reginald Wingate, head of intelligence from Egypt, noted in 1892, a source named Mustafa al-Amin, a tradesman, stated that the Khalifa was trying to introduce "a more lenient and popular form of government," and that the Islamic monarchy, as he saw it, which had been installed there, was much preferred to the earlier condition under Egyptian rule. Mustafa gauged that the Sudanese, though in need, were optimistic about the future, and would, in the event of an invasion from Egypt, certainly rally to defend their nation.

The threat to Sudan came in 1890 from the east, where the Italians and Anglo-Egyptians had established a presence. The Italians had taken Eritrea in 1890, and in 1891 Tukur was occupied by the Anglo-Egyptians. In 1894, the Italians took Kassala. But the most important theater was in the south, in the Upper Nile, where the British-French conflict, which was to climax at Fashoda, was to be the backdrop for the Kitchener invasion of Sudan.

Kitchener's invasion

After the 1881-82 nationalist uprising in Egypt under al-Arabi and the defeat of Gordon, the British were eager to deploy their military might to secure their strategic position in Egypt and Sudan. Furthermore, the British were fully

aware of the strategic importance of control over the Upper Nile: Who controls the Upper Nile controls Sudan and Egypt.

The British, who took over Egypt, and therefore its territories, in 1882, signed a deal in 1890 with the Germans, whereby a British sphere of influence was recognized over Uganda and Kenya. This area was said to go up to the western watershed of the Nile and "to the confines of Egypt" in the north.

The British decision to reconquer Dongola province was communicated in a telegram to Kitchener on March 13, 1896.

The French must have been fully aware of the British plan. The French counterplan was to ensure the survival of the Mahdia state, at least until France could secure its position in the Upper Nile. The French appear to have offered a protectorate not only to Abyssinia, but also to the Sudan of the Khalifa. During a secret audience, the Abyssinians handed over a French flag to the Khalifa telling him "to raise this flag on the frontiers of his kingdom in order to be an independent king in his kingdom and France would be a protection to him." The Khalifa did not accept the offer, because he was committed to an independent Sudan.

The British did not intend to strand Kitchener, as they had Gordon. Accordingly, to ensure supply lines, the British launched a railroad project to bring a line from the Red Sea to Abu Hamed, as a supply line for Kitchener's army. The British-Egyptian force was equipped with vastly superior military means.

Knowing that the attack was coming, the Khalifa had concentrated his forces in Omdurman and begun to fortify the city. Kitchener's forces advanced through Dongola province to Fort Atbara, where Kitchener attacked on Good Friday 1898. Despite their valorous resistance, the Sudanese, overwhelmed by superior military technology, were mowed down. More than 3,000 died and 4,000 were wounded, as contrasted to a reported 510 Anglo-Egyptian casualties.

In September 1898, as the French Capt. Jean-Baptiste Marchand was secure in Fashoda, the British marched hurriedly on Omdurman with 25,800 men. Kitchener had 44 guns and 20 machine guns on land, plus 36 guns and 24 machine-guns on the gunboats. The British had the Martini-Henry .450, fast-firing Maxim Nordenfeldts, and Krupp cannon. Despite their hopeless inferiority in weaponry, the Mahdist forces fought to the end. Their strategy was to attack, in three locations. In one phase of the battle, Osman Digna let a few of his forces (whom the British had dubbed the "Fuzzy Wuzzys," in their inimitable racism!) be seen by the British cavalry, to lure them into an attack. He knew that once they charged over the ground, his men (about 700), who were concealed in a ravine, could ambush them, confuse the cavalry, and engage the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. In the battle that followed, lances and spears against guns, there occurred 40% of all British casualties in the war.

When the British began bombarding Omdurman on Sept. 2, 1898, they took *the Mahdi's tomb* as their primary target! The British, with gunboats and machine guns, could not be stopped militarily. It is estimated that 11,000 were killed and 16,000 wounded in a few hours of British assault. The figures for the wounded have often been questioned, because it is well known that Kitchener's forces killed the wounded.

But when the British marched into Omdurman they found that the Khalifa had eluded them. Once in the city, they dug up the grave of the Mahdi, and Kitchener ordered that the body be burned. One version has it that Kitchener ordered the bones of the Mahdi to be thrown into the Nile and that he sent the skull of the Mahdi to the Royal Surgeons College, apparently to submit it to phrenological examinations. It is said that Her Majesty Queen Victoria didn't take to the idea, and ordered the skull buried. Other accounts have it that Kitchener had the head buried at Wadi Halfa, the border town with Egypt. On Sept. 4, 1898, Kitchener's crew held memorial services for Gordon. On Sept. 5, they tried to capture the Khalifa, but failed.

In January 1899, Kitchener's forces signed the Condominium Agreement with Boutros-Ghali, grandfather of the current secretary general of the United Nations. Revolts in both Sudan and Egypt followed; the British realized that unless they killed the Khalifa, they would not be able to subdue the territories taken. In November 1899, Wingate went with a well-equipped force of 3,700 men to Jadid and Um Dibekrat, where they located the Khalifa. The Khalifa withdrew with his closest followers and placed himself upon

his prayer rug. According to an account in *Sudanow*, his 2,000 combat troops attacked Wingate's vastly superior forces. The Khalifa, together with his amirs Ali Wad Hilu, Ahmad Fadil, Bashir Ajab Al-Fiya, Hamid Ali, Sidig Ibn Mahdi, and Haroun Mohammed were all machine-gunned down as they prayed. Another of the khalifas, Mohammed Sherif, who was the Mahdi's son-in-law, was arrested together with two of the Mahdi's sons, by the British in August 1899. They were accused of a conspiracy to reinstate the Mahdia, and were promptly executed; they were probably innocent.

Wingate, Director of Intelligence from 1899, who accompanied Kitchener into Sudan, was reportedly "obsessed" by the Mahdia, and directed a propaganda war to inflame the passions of ordinary Britons, to support the genocidal attack against Sudan. To accomplish this, he organized publishers who would put out memoirs of Europeans who had been taken captive by the Mahdia, including the opportunist Slatin (*Fire and Sword*, 1896), the priest Ohrwalder (*Aufstand und Reich des Mahdi* and *Ten Years Captivity*, 1892), Rosignoli, and many others. Referring to the crisis in the Sudan in 1896 at the time the book Wingate co-authored with Slatin appeared, it is related that the publisher told his wife, "It is a joke between myself and my partner here that Major Wingate has fomented this just at the right time by means of his secret agents!"

As for Kitchener, one of the many adulatory accounts of the late Lord, called *With Kitchener to Khartoum*, published by G.W. Stevens, in 1899, paints the picture of a superman, "over six feet, straight as a lance. . . . His precision is so inhumanly unerring, he is more like a machine than a man. . . . So far as Egypt is concerned he is the man of destiny—the man who has been preparing himself 16 years for one great purpose. For Anglo-Egypt he is the Mahdi, the expected; the man . . . who has cut out his human heart and made himself a machine to retake Khartoum." The last characterization apparently refers to Kitchener's famous disregard for the condition of men in battle, whether in his own army or that of the enemy.

According to the previously cited Ronald Hyam, Kitchener was one of the many "inveterate bachelors" that filled Her Majesty's foreign service. "Kitchener was a man whose sexual instincts were wholly sublimated in work; he admitted few distractions and 'thereby reaped an incalculable advantage in competition with his fellows.' There is no evidence that he ever loved a woman; his male friendships were few but fervent; from 1907 until his death his constant and inseparable companion was Capt. O.A.G. FitzGerald who devoted his entire life to Kitchener. He had no use for married men on his staff. Only young officers were admitted to his house—'my happy family of boys' he called them; he avoided interviews with women, worshipped Gordon, cultivated great interest in the Boy Scout movement, took a fancy to Bothas's son and the sons of Lord Desborough, and embellished his rose garden with four pairs of sculptured bronze boys."

The potential of the Nile River system

by Marcia Merry Baker

Figures 1 and 2 show the geography and the hydrological projects of the Nile River system.

The Nile system drains a watershed area of 3,030,300 square kilometers, constituting approximately 10% of all of Africa. The Nile Basin encompasses land in nine nations: Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt.

The Nile is the longest river in the world, running for 6,650 km. Two rivers—the White Nile and the Blue Nile—join together at Khartoum to form the Nile, which then makes the long journey northward to the Mediterranean Sea. The only tributary to this final course is the Atbara River, which rises in the Ethiopian highlands, and joins the Nile about 320 km north of Khartoum. From Khartoum north to the Egyptian border and Aswan, the gradient of the Nile is steeper than south of Khartoum, and five of the Nile's six cataracts occur on this stretch.

As measured at Aswan, the annual volume of water of the Nile is given as 84 billion cubic meters. The relative shares of use of this water between Sudan and Egypt were given in the 1959 treaty between the two nations, called "Full Utilization of the Nile Waters," which apportioned 18.5 billion cubic meters for Sudan, and 55.5 billion cubic meters to Egypt (this is based on net yield of water, after Aswan reservoir and other storage and regulation is taken into account).

Up to 70% of of the Nile's 84 billion cubic meters (at Aswan) comes from the Blue Nile system during its flood season, with the remainder from the White Nile and Atbara. The White Nile's flow is especially important because it arrives during the months when the Blue Nile is very low, when the Blue Nile may contribute only 20% of the flow to the lower Nile. The Atbara, during its flood stage, may contribute 13% of the annual flow of the Nile (11 billion cubic meters,) but from January to June the Atbara shrinks to pools and ponds.

The Blue Nile rises in Ethiopia, at Lake Tana, and proceeds for about 804 km through Ethiopia before beginning its course through Sudan to Khartoum. This is a fast-flowing river during the summer of torrential rains.

The southernmost source of the Nile River is in the White Nile sub-system. The White Nile proper begins at Lake No in south-central Sudan, from which it flows 1,000 km to

Khartoum. But the most distant origin point of the Nile waters is far to the south in the Kagera River Basin in Rwanda and Burundi, and the upper Nile flow comes from the catchment of the equatorial lake plateau. The Kagera flows into Lake Victoria, from which Nile waters then flow on to Lake Kyoga, then Lake Mobutu Sese Seko (Lake Albert), and northward across the Uganda-Sudan border. Then, at the town of Bor, the land gradient changes, and the great swamp, the Sudd, begins.

The extent of the Sudd varies greatly with the volume of water received. During the period of the great rains of 1961-64 over the equatorial lake district, the Sudd reached 29,800 square kilometers (of both permanent and seasonal river-flooded area), which is close to the size of Belgium. At other times, the Sudd has averaged 13,100 square kilometers, still quite vast.

Through the Sudd, the Nile flow makes its way through various currents, mainly the Bahr el Jabal, which eventually forms Lake No, at a point about 1,156 km from Lake Mobutu Sese Seko (Lake Albert).

Flowing into the Bahr el Jabal from the west is the Bahr el Ghazal (the "gazelle" river). Flowing northward parallel to the Bahr el Jabal on the east, is the Bahr el Zaraf (the "giraffe" river).

The swamp is characterized by floating or jammed up "islands," called *sudd*, of marsh vegetation, broken off from their moorings, and in various states of decomposition. There are vast chunks of *sudd*, some up to 30 km long. In the sluggish waters there are many varieties of malaria mosquitoes and waterborne parasites. The Sudd is almost impassable overland or by rivercraft.

A huge volume of Nile flow is lost to evaporation in the Sudd. The mean annual loss from evaporation from 1905 to 1980 is estimated to be 16.9 billion cubic meters, and can reach 20 billion cubic meters, which is nearly a quarter of the annual volume of the Nile at Aswan.

Waterworks

Figure 2 shows the major Nile River system projects—some completed, some proposed.

At the Nile Delta, there are barrages to protect the last available river water from the Mediterranean seawater intrusion.

Farther south, the Aswan High Dam, completed in 1971, is used as a storage system, and to regulate flow between what hydrologists call the "timely" and the "untimely" annual periods of the Nile.

In Sudan, there is the Khashm al-Girba Dam and reservoir to store water on the Atbara River.

Not shown on the diagram is a project (between Russia and Sudan) announced this May, for construction of a dam at Keibar (400 km north of Khartoum) for irrigation and power.

South of Khartoum, the Gebel Aulia Dam and reservoir

FIGURE 1
Nile River System





FIGURE 2
Major Nile River projects



Source: Van der Leeden, *Water Resources of the World*, New York: Water Information Center, Inc., 1975.

on the White Nile, and the Sennar and Roseires dams and reservoirs on the Blue Nile, store and regulate water.

In Uganda, there is the Owen Falls Dam, at the point that the "Victoria Nile" leaves Lake Victoria.

The proposals for waterworks in the Sudd, and in the upper Nile lake plateau region, are either partially built, or not built at all.

The route of the proposed Jonglei Canal—over half excavated in the 1980s—is shown on Figure 2. There are other swamp water diversion plans for the Sudd to the west. Completing the Jonglei Canal alone would add significantly to the downriver Nile flow by reducing the Sudd evaporation.

Likewise, the potential upper Nile waterworks in the lake plateau region have not been built.

Vast resources exist for economic development in Sudan

by Marcia Merry Baker

In terms of physical resources, Sudan ranks high as one of the world's top "natural" breadbasket regions. In area, it is the largest country in Africa and the ninth-largest in the world, although it ranks only 32nd in terms in population. Sudan is over a quarter of the area of the United States.

Sudan is strategically located as a cultural bridge between the Arab Middle East and the African continent, and a geographical bridge between the Mediterranean and central Africa, stretching along the Nile River system, and bordering on the Red Sea (see **Figure 1**).

There are 2,506,000 square kilometers (966,757 square miles) in Sudan, much of it with gentle terrain. There are four mountain regions: In the east are the Red Sea Hills, running parallel to the coastline; near the west is the volcanic Jebel Marra mountain range, which forms the drainage divide between the Nile and the Lake Chad basins; on the central

western plains, the Nuba Mountains form scattered granite hills rising up to 1,000 meters; in the south on the Uganda border are the beautiful rain-forested Imatong and Dongotona Mountains. The Imatong is the highest mountain in Sudan, at more than 3,000 meters.

Besides its size, the geography of Sudan is notable for its diversity. Sudan's latitudinal span, extending from just below the Tropic of Cancer all the way south nearly to the Equator, allows the nation great agro-ecological variation, ranging from desert (about 25% of the country), to pasture land and grain fields in the central belt, to lush mountain valleys of orchards, and other fruits, vegetables, and fiber crops, through to coffee and tropical products in the south (see **Figure 2** and **Table 1**).

Sudan has at least 81 million hectares (200 million acres), which could easily be cultivated, which is more than half the currently cultivated acreage-base of the United States. This acreage could potentially produce crops sufficient to feed almost all of Africa. Sudan has another 88 million hectares (218 million acres) suitable for forestry, and 23 million hectares (57 million acres) for pasture.

However, at present, only 6.8 million hectares (17 million acres) out of the potential 81 million hectares are cultivated—only 8.5% of the potential farmland base. Of these 6.8 million harvested hectares, 5.1 million hectares are rainfed cultivation, and merely 1.82 million are irrigated. Because annual rainfall is highly variable—up to 40% variation from year to year—the annual output of the rainfed agriculture in central Sudan is therefore highly variable. These swings would be mitigated, even without large-scale irrigation, if other inputs were available—mechanization, farm chemicals, transport, and storage capacity.

Water throughput

Figure 3 shows how the average rainfall bands vary from 25 millimeters a year in the desert of the north, bordering Egypt, through to 400 mm in central Sudan—similar to the North American prairies—down to 1,100 mm a year in the south, where there are swamps and rain forests.

From south to north flow the waters of the Nile system, with the lower Nile formed at Khartoum by the juncture of the Blue and White Nile Rivers (see previous article).

In Sudan's water throughput, there are an average of 130

FIGURE 1
Sudan in the African continent




FIGURE 2
Sudan's average annual rainfall





FIGURE 3
Sudan's diverse agro-ecology: land use zones



Note: The letters on the maps refer to the ecological zones, described in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Sudan's agricultural resource areas in differing ecological zones
(millions of hectares; estimated by the Sudanese Agriculture Ministry)

| Ecological zone | Total area | Pasture area | Cultivated area | Total area available for agriculture | Forested |
|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| A. Desert | 71.9 | — | — | — | — |
| Semidesert | 48.6 | 9.7 | — | — | — |
| B. Savanna (sandy, low rainfall: 300-400 millimeters) | 32.4 | 28.6 | 3.8 | — | — |
| C. Savanna (higher rainfall: 400-800 mm) | 35.9 | 31.9 | 4 | 32 | — |
| Subtotal—Northern Sudan: | 188.8 | 70.2 | 7.8 | 32 | — |
| D. Savanna (high rainfall: 800-1,300 mm) | 34 | 22.7 | — | 11.4 | — |
| E. Flood area | 24.2 | — | — | — | — |
| Mountainous | .6 | — | — | — | — |
| Forested | — | — | — | — | 24.2 |
| Subtotal—Southern Sudan: | 58.8 | 22.7 | N.A. | 11.4 | 24.2 |
| Total Sudan: | 247.6 | 92.8 | 7.8 | 43.4 | 24.2 |

cubic kilometers a year of what hydrologists call "renewable water resources" (from precipitation, run-off from Nile system waters outside the national borders, etc.) available to the country. Because so much of northern Sudan is in the Saharan-Sahelian arid belt, Sudan ranks below, in absolute volumes of annual renewable water resources, geographically smaller countries located in the rainbelts of Western Africa. For example, Sierra Leone has, on average, 160 cubic kilometers a year of renewable water resources; Nigeria, 308; Guinea, 226; Liberia, 232; and Cameroon, 208.

However, the total national volume of water alone is not the story. The question is, how much of the available water is "withdrawn"—diverted for potentially productive uses (agriculture, industry, domestic needs, power production)—and how well is the water utilization organized for these purposes? For example, look at the Imperial Valley of southern California, where limited amounts of Colorado River water were put to efficient use, and a manmade garden oasis was created, yielding up to four crops per year in the desert sun.

In Sudan, the fraction of available water resources "withdrawn" for use is about 14%. This is comparable to other na-

tions located in arid zones—South Africa at 18%, or Mexico at 15%. Of Sudan's 14% annual withdrawals (18.6 cubic kilometers on average), fully 99% of this is applied to agricultural use for irrigation, and the other 1% fraction is for domestic use. Water use for industrial purposes is practically nil, which is an important consideration for development planning.

Moreover, Nile River Basin waters are shared among several nations. Therefore, were Sudan to withdraw significantly more of the Nile flow, Egypt would be shorted. Egypt at present uses 97% of its renewable water resources, which are currently confined to the Nile. Egypt ranks, with Israel, at the top of the list of nations with the highest "withdrawal" fractions of their renewable water supplies.

This is the context in which to understand what otherwise appear to be large per capita annual withdrawals of water in Sudan and Egypt. Sudan uses about 1,089 cubic meters per person per year, and Egypt 1,202 cubic meters. But with 99% of this water withdrawn going for agriculture in Sudan, and 88% of withdrawals going for agriculture in Egypt (7% for domestic use and 5% for industrial use), the seemingly large per capita annual withdrawals do not at all denote a

The Jonglei Canal

In the Sudd, the great swamp in which gather the waters of the upper White Nile, in the state of Jonglei (which borders on the south with the equatorial states of Sudan), there stands a half-finished, 180-kilometer long, manmade channel, the northern portion of the Jonglei Canal. The completed canal is intended to divert a portion of the water from entering the Sudd, and send it directly for a total of 360 km, from south to north, from Bor to Malakal (see **Figure 4**) to provide great ecological and economic benefits to both the immediate region and downriver lands.

In 1994, the President of Sudan, Gen. Omar El Bashir, announced a commitment to completing the project.

The channel digging began in 1978, after a 1976 agreement (and 1980 emendations) between the government of Sudan and the French engineering firm Compagnie des Constructions Internationales (CCI). A famous excavating machine, the "Roue-pelle," or "Bucket-wheel," was brought in from Pakistan, where it had dug the 101-km Chasma-Jhelum link canal between the Indus and Jhelum rivers (completed 1970). The Bucketwheel was built for the Pakistan project by the Lübeck-based German firm of Orenstein und Koppel Tagebau und Schiffstechnik, based on an adaptation of a digger in use

in the open-pit lignite mines near Cologne.

Thanks to the initiative of Sudanese hydrologist Yahia Abdel Magid, the Bucketwheel, which went into use in Pakistan in 1968, was refurbished and brought to Sudan for use. It is the largest excavator in the world, weighing over 2,100 tons. It consists of 12 giant buckets (3 cubic meters each) hung on a circular wheel (12.5 meters in diameter), which dig earth, then dump it onto a transmission belt, which in turn deposits it on an embankment. It is self-propelled. Operating at full tilt in 1981, the Bucketwheel was excavating 2 km a week, and digging at a rate of 2,500-3,500 cubic meters per hour. There were three eight-hour shifts of 25 operators, including Pakistani, Sudanese, and French nationals. The great machine requires 40,000 liters of gasoline per 24 hours.

Now the Bucketwheel lies disabled in Jonglei. In 1984 all work on the canal was suspended, after counterinsurgency operations were mobilized against it and other infrastructure initiatives, by opponents of development in Africa.

The canal is designed to divert about 25 million cubic meters a day from the southward flow of the upper Nile waters just north of Bor (see **Figure 4**), and channel it through a cut of 360 km, which would deliver at Malakal about 4.7 billion cubic meters annually.

This would mean adding to the downriver Nile volume about 3.8 billion cubic meters yearly, as measured at Aswan (subtracting for losses in transmission). Under applicable agreements, this increment of water would be shared

high-tech, advanced economic profile.

As a comparison, the United States withdrew 2,162 cubic meters per capita in the early 1970s, with 42% in agriculture, 46% in industry, and 12% domestic use.

Both Egypt and Sudan would gain more water from Nile flow from the Jonglei Canal and other upper Nile system improvements, perhaps up to 7% more water downstream, and there are watersharing agreements in place for this incremental increase. But the essential source of additional water to these dry lower Nile lands is to desalinate Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and Suez saltwater with cheap nuclear power, at strategic development locations on the coastlines.

Limited transport grid

The limited transport grid in Sudan reflects decades of deliberate non-development under imperial British rule, and its continuation under the postwar regime of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (see Figure 4).

There are only about 5,503 kilometers (3,432 miles) of rail lines in Sudan, and these lines are mostly between major towns. There is no real area density of rail coverage; statisti-

50-50 by Sudan and Egypt.

The draw-off of 25 million cubic meters daily from the feed waters of the Sudd would reduce the swamp area by an estimated 36%, from an average total swamp area (1905-80) of 16,900 square kilometers down to 10,800 square kilometers. The designed flow rate is 3.5 km per hour to inhibit weed growth.

The canal is designed to vary in width from 28 to 50 meters, and to vary in depth from 4 to 7 meters, to accommodate boat traffic. Parallel to the canal there is intended to be an all-season roadway, and ancillary projects include slipways, bridges, ferries, civil works for crossings and regulation, and other infrastructure.

Proposals for the Jonglei Canal, and other major Sudd and Nile Basin projects, go back generations. In many cases, engineers under British rule were the most enthusiastic designers and advocates of improvement projects, but imperial "hydropolitics" blocked development initiatives at every turn.


For example, in 1904, Sir William Garstin, inspector general of irrigation at the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, proposed what became known as the "Garstin Cut" to channel the White Nile; but it and successor designs were blocked, until Sudan became independent and took action on its own. In 1876, a member of the British Royal Engineers, Gen. F.H. Rundall, proposed a high dam at Aswan. But it took the development policy of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser to make this happen.—*Marcia Merry Baker*

cally, rails are 0.0019 km per square kilometer of the country. There are 29 diesel locomotives. The rail links run between Port Sudan and Khartoum in the east; Wadi Halfa' in the north (on the Egyptian border); El Obeid in central Sudan; Nyala in the west; and Wau in the south. The administrative center and manufacturing and repair shops of the Sudan Railways Corp. are in Atbara, north of Khartoum on the Nile River.

As of the mid-1980s, the overall road network, not counting dirt tracks, added up to 6,599 km (4,100 miles), of which 3,160 are main roads, and about 60% is paved. This means the national statistical road density is 0.03 km per square kilometer. Thus, like rail, this limited length of paved roadway does not constitute area coverage, but is a system of selective links. In 1980, a major road between Port Sudan and Khartoum was completed (1,197 km, or 744 miles). Bridge improvements on the White Nile have facilitated traffic circulation between Khartoum, North Khartoum, and Omdurman.

Another way to look at the lack of paved roads is that there are 98 km of paved roads per 1 million persons in Sudan. In contrast, there are 302 km of paved roads in Egypt per million persons. In Nigeria, 376 per million persons. In continental United States, there are 10-15,000 km of paved roads per million people.

FIGURE 4
Limited transport grid



For many locations in Sudan, the Nile River is the key transport link. River transport between Kosti and Juba (1,436 km, or 892 miles) had no overland alternative as of the mid-1980s.

The principal seaport of the nation is Port Sudan, on the Red Sea, and as of 1988, Sudan had 25 merchant vessels registered.

Small population

There are only 26.5 million people in Sudan, as of 1992, in an area the size of the European Community, where 300 million people reside. This means there are an average of 10 persons per square km, in contrast to over 200 per square km in Europe. Sudan's population is comparable to that of Taiwan, which is 80 times smaller in area. Sudan's small

population, and certain related vital statistics, reflect the consequences of decades of British imperial rule.

About 30% of the population lives in urban centers, and there are over 2 million refugees in various locations in the country. As of the mid-1980s, the principal towns, with their population at the last census, which was in 1983 (the populations are all higher now), were:

| | |
|--------------------|---------|
| Omdurman | 526,287 |
| Khartoum (capital) | 476,218 |
| Khartoum North | 341,146 |
| Port Sudan | 206,727 |
| Wadi Medani | 141,065 |
| Al-Obeid | 140,024 |
| Atbara | 73,009 |

Nuplexes can make new water, power resources

The additional flow to the Nile for Sudan and Egypt from the completed Jonglei Canal of some 4 billion cubic meters a year, when considered on a per capita and per square kilometer basis for 86 million people, shows the need for new sources of water. Likewise, were all potential dam sites to be completed on the Nile system (see diagram), the hydroelectricity produced, on a per capita and per square kilometer basis, would still not be enough for growing economies.

The source of new water and power in the lands of the Nile? "Nuplexes" of modules of nuclear power stations, coupled with advanced seawater desalination systems, and industrial and agricultural projects, located at strategic sites on the Red Sea for Sudan and the Mediterranean Sea, Suez Canal, and Red Sea for Egypt. This is the "Oasis Plan" approach for Middle East development and peace, proposed for years by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

First, look at the existing "energy balance" of Sudan. Then look at what one or more nuplex sites would mean for transforming the supplies for electricity and water to the economy.

As of 1987, the annual energy supply in Sudan amounted to 10 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE), 84% of which is from biomass—mostly from wood and charcoal, but also agricultural waste. Annual energy consumption is about 6.1 TOE, because close to 40% of supply is lost in conversion and distribution. For example, 44% of the wood is lost when converted to charcoal. Petroleum energy accounted for 13% of the total energy supply in 1987; and hydropower contributed 3%. How-

ever, hydropower accounts for 60% of the electricity supply. This share is declining somewhat, as thermal electric generating stations can be built.

But compared to even the most modern hydroelectric generator, just one nuplex installation can begin to shift the energy and water-use balances into new modes.

The Roseires Dam Hydro Station on the Blue Nile has a maximum capacity of 250 MW of electricity. The Sennar Dam downstream has 15 MW.

There are new designs for high-temperature gas-cooled nuclear reactors (HTGRs) based on underground modules of 200-350 MW each, that are safe, can be assembly-line produced and installed in series as required, and coupled with modern desalination systems. A study for the Metropolitan Water District of California for the Pacific coast, found that a single desalination plant, consisting of four 350 MW HTGRs, could produce 146.1 million cubic meters of water a year—the equivalent of a small stream. In addition, the four-module nuplex would provide 466 MW of electric capacity.

Another type of HTGR design comes from Germany, with many features made-to-order for the seacoasts of the dry lands of the lower Nile. The reactor is 200 or 300 MW (a useful size where the transmission grid is being developed), but highly efficient and safe. Called the "pebble-bed" reactor, the fuel is pellet shaped (0.5 millimeter diameter), and can employ thorium (the use of which has been developed in India) in the cycle.

The power and water from the nuplex generators could be put to intensive use for high-tech agriculture, food and industrial processing, and chemical production. In a compact region such as the Jordan River basin, merely 20 such installations—ideally located at points along man-made seawater canals—could create the water equivalent of a new Jordan River.—*Marcia Merry Baker*



Construction of a canal in Rahad, Sudan. One of Sudan's priorities to accelerate development is to make existing water resources more readily available for domestic, agricultural, and industrial use.

Figure 4 shows the locations of these largest towns, and some others. Outside the towns listed, the remaining 90% of the population lives in the smaller towns and villages.

As of 1994, the average life expectancy at birth was about 53 years for men, and 55 years for women. There were 42 births per 1,000 people, and 12 deaths per 1,000, for an increase rate of 3%. As of 1994, infant mortality was 80 deaths per 1,000 live births.

There are hospital beds on the ratio of 1 bed per 1,222 persons. There is one physician per 9,439 persons.

The average literacy rate is less than 30% for men, and less than 20% for women.

These statistics show only that large-scale improvements in essential domestic and social infrastructure—safe water, sanitation, health care, education facilities—are needed to make up for the degradation of conditions under British rule.

What is outstanding is the commitment and effort to provide for the general good, despite restricted means and inherent limitations.

Population expansion, and expanding the physical infrastructure to support this, are part of the explicit goals of the economic planning document *The Sudan: The Comprehensive National Strategy*, issued by the Government of the Republic of Sudan in 1992. This plan starts from the premise that the nation is underpopulated, assumes a continuing population growth rate of at least the present 2.7% per year, and sets goals for it as part of the economic development mobilization.

The school-age population is about 40%. Training the

youth is stressed in the introduction to the Sudanese strategy document, which states the aim of a “renaissance of thought and cultural development,” and in particular, giving “classical beauty and science” to the youth. It says: “Our nation is a young nation. The population growth indicators show that for a long time to come the predominance of youth growth will be the pattern. This fact necessitates that increased attention will be given to this very vital sector for its own sake, and for the investment of its potential.”

Not only youth, but “people are an incarnation of the divine on earth, and . . . from this principle spring basic human rights.” The plan’s overall statement of national objectives refers to “noble values” of the family and culture, “dignity of the state,” including its defense capabilities, and “liberty and prosperity of the citizen.”

Agriculture, the major economic sector

Agriculture is the dominant sector in the Sudanese economy. It is the source of employment for 68-70% of the labor force, and agricultural products account for 95% of export earnings. The main imports include a broad range of industrial goods, petroleum products, chemicals, and foodstuffs.

Figure 5 shows the annual tonnage of production of all grains in recent years, showing a differentiation, by farm sector (irrigated, rainfed “traditional,” or rainfed mechanized) for 1983 to 1994. The graph shows that during the 1980s, the size of the annual grains harvest (sorghum, wheat, millet, corn) was on average about 3 million metric tons, and the bulk of that came from the rainfed, not the irrigated

FIGURE 5

Sudan: annual output of all grains, 1983-95, and by farm and sector, 1983-92

(thousand metric tons of sorghum, wheat, millet, and corn)





FIGURE 6

Sudan: annual output of food crops rises, cash crops falls, in irrigated sector, 1983-92

(thousand metric tons)



sector. The cash crops were concentrated in this irrigated sector—cotton and peanuts, particularly in the Gezira, described below.

But starting in the last season of 1990-91, a policy shift was made by the new government, to cultivate enough basic grains in the irrigated sector, mostly the Gezira, to guarantee a certain tonnage of grains staples so that national food security would be guaranteed.

After two years, key parts of this emergency program succeeded, to the point that in 1993 Sudan began supplying grain to the World Food Program and shipping food aid directly to Bosnia, Afghanistan, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and other points of need. By carefully diverting certain limited agricultural inputs, such as irrigated area and fertilizers, away from quick cash crops and into staples, Sudan achieved a grain surplus in 1993.

Total grains output reached 4.59 million metric tons in 1991-92, and 5.691 mmt in 1992-93. The harvest this year is expected to be the best ever, projected at over 6 million metric tons.

Figure 6 shows the irrigated sector crop output shift from predominantly cash crops (groundnuts and cotton) to more grains as of 1991-92. However, even with the new balance of food-to-cash crops in the irrigated sector, sizable cash crop harvests are still taking place. The harvest of cotton and groundnuts that just ended this year is excellent.

The Gezira irrigation project is the largest, oldest, and most important agriculture scheme in Sudan, and the largest farm in the world under one management. Located in the triangle area formed by the Blue and White Nile rivers, and

the Sudan Railway line between the towns of Sennar and Kosti, the Gezira constitutes 12% of the total area cultivated in Sudan. It was started in 1911, with 250 feddans, which is 105 hectares (1 feddan is 0.42 hectares or 1.038 acres). As of 1962, it had reached 882,000 hectares. It was nationalized in 1950, and today the management system represents tenants, employees, and the national food security and export revenue interests. The main crops grown in the Gezira are cotton, sorghum, wheat, groundnuts, vegetables, and fodder.

As of the mid-1980s, the profile of the relative annual tonnages of the top agriculture food products produced were, in metric tons:

| | |
|---------------------------|-----------|
| Sorghum | 4,274,000 |
| Dukhn | 481,000 |
| Millet | 428,000 |
| Peanuts | 402,000 |
| Sesame(largest in Africa) | 228,000 |
| Wheat | 185,000 |
| Sugarcane | 4,800,000 |

In addition, there are thousands of tons of smaller food crops—tomatoes (150,000 tons), cassava (128,000 tons), yams (115,000 tons), dates (116,000 tons), and corn (40,000 tons).

Sudan is the world's largest producer of long staple cotton. In 1986-87, Sudan's cotton output was 780,000 bales. In 1985, cottonseed was 360,000 tons, and cotton 196,000 tons. Sudan is Africa's largest producer of sesame, and the world's largest producer of gum arabic—supplying 80% of

TABLE 2

Estimated numbers of livestock in Sudan, 1985-92

(thousands of head)

| Year | Cattle | Goats | Sheep | Camels |
|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1985-86 | 19,632 | 13,799 | 18,690 | 2,712 |
| 1986-87 | 19,739 | 13,942 | 18,801 | 2,705 |
| 1987-88 | 19,858 | 14,196 | 19,207 | 2,722 |
| 1988-89 | 20,167 | 14,482 | 19,668 | 2,732 |
| 1989-90 | 20,593 | 14,843 | 20,168 | 2,742 |
| 1990-91 | 21,028 | 15,278 | 20,701 | 2,757 |
| 1991-92 | 21,600 | 18,700 | 22,600 | 2,800 |

Source: Government of Sudan; UNIDO.

the world's use of the product, which is derived from the acacia tree.

As of the mid-1980s, the principal exports, in rank order of cash value were: cotton, gum arabic, sesame, and peanuts. In addition to that were a variety of other agriculture exports, including meat and livestock.

Table 2 shows the growth trend in Sudan's national livestock inventory in recent years. This past year, livestock numbers increased sharply because of the good rainy season, and good provision of inputs. Several institutions are intervening to develop the livestock sector, including "The Livestock Bank," with branches all over the country, and the Anaam Corp. (*anaam* means "livestock" in Arabic).

The principal imports to Sudan, in rank order of monetary value were, as of the mid-1980s: manufactured goods, transport equipment, machinery and other equipment, foodstuffs, chemicals, and petroleum products.

In the mid-1980s, Saudi Arabia was the single largest trade partner, accounting for about 15% of Sudan's imports (mostly petroleum), and buying 14% of Sudan's exports. Other important trade partners included the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, France, and Italy.

Mineral and oil wealth

Among the diverse rock formations in Sudan are identified deposits of a range of minerals including gold; sulphides of copper, zinc, and silver; chromite ores, iron ores, tungsten, and manganese. There are gypsum, silica sands, and many other economically useful deposits.

Exploration for oil began in the 1950s, and has identified several major fields. In 1993, Sudan for the first time ever, began to pump and refine its own oil.

The Sudanese "Comprehensive Plan" for the future calls for foreign investment in economic infrastructure for the purpose of "raising the volume of such investment in the agriculture and agro-industrial sector to the highest possible level," and using oil and mineral export revenues for that purpose.

Sudan emphasizes better education

by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

The education reform launched by the Bashir government of Sudan is sure to be seen as a *casus belli* from the British oligarchical standpoint. As that standpoint was enunciated by Lord William Rees-Mogg, a principal spokesman for the British monarchy and its elite Club of the Isles, in a commentary in the Jan. 5 London *Times* entitled "It's the Elite Who Matter—In Future Britain Must Concentrate on Educating the Top 5%, on Whose Success We Shall All Depend," upwards of 95% of the population would barely survive as uneducated, brutish serfs, in bondage to the remaining 5%, who will form a new feudal elite (see *EIR*, Feb. 17, p. 37).

If the oligarchy pursued that policy consistently during its colonial control over Sudan, with the aim of skimming off the top 5% of the subject population, putting it through British-type schools, and deploying it as its local lackey class, the new trend constitutes the opposite.

For the British, who controlled Sudan from 1898 to 1956, "education" was a means to ensure total control over the subject population. This involved destroying the existing school system and supplanting it with a British system, limited to those few chosen to be administrators for the masters.

In Egypt, for example, there were 5,000 traditional schools, and the famous Islamic university Al Azhar, which had 8,000 students and 300 professors. Britain disinvested in the traditional sector after it occupied the country in 1880, forcing instruction in English rather than classical Arabic. Governor-General Lord Cromer reportedly fought to prevent the founding of *any* universities, for fear they would become places to "manufacture demagogues." Thus, Cairo University was founded only in 1907. By the time the British left Egypt nominally independent, "the country had in its official modern educational sector no more than 10 secondary schools with 3,800 pupils (43 of whom were girls)."

In Sudan, British education policy was part and parcel of its attempt to create in southern Sudan what one historian has dubbed a "Christian, anti-Islamic bantustan . . . more rigidly controlled and also far larger and more important than any of those being set up in South Africa" (see article, p. 47). In 1922, the British sealed off the south from the north. In order to form a layer of southern lackeys, the British set up schools through the missionaries, which were dependent on the colonial power.

In the south, the British went to work to replace Arabic with English as the medium of education. Although the gov-



The University of Khartoum, Sudan's first university, was established in 1902 under British auspices. Today, the Sudanese government has an ambitious program of building new "Sudanized" universities.

error-general of Sudan thought "Arabic, after all, in spite of its risks, must be our instrument," in 1928, the colonialists put through six local dialects and English as the languages of instruction. Arabic "would open the door for the spread of Islam [and] Arabize the South," they feared, and they banished Arabic from the south. The local, tribal dialects were taught in written form through a Latin alphabet (not Arabic script), and were used for the elementary schools, which offered four years of instruction for clerks and employees of the government. The older students used English. By 1920, according to historian Jansen, "There were only 11 higher elementary schools in the whole area, and that figure remained stationary for the next 20 years" (emphasis added). Sudan's sole institution of higher education, Gordon College at Khartoum, taught in English, except in "Arabic and Islamic subjects."

Rectifying the wrongs

Rectifying the wrongs perpetrated by the British has not been easy. The Sudanese started in the early years of independence to Sudanize the schools, by manning them with Sudanese. However, the teaching methods employed, the textbooks, and in many cases the language remained that of the colonial masters. As one Sudanese would tell the story of being a student in the early post-colonial days, he felt proud to be caned and whipped in school—according to traditional British methods—but "at least it was a Sudanese who was

caning me."

In 1989, the Bashir government radically altered the course of education policy. The basic thrust of the policy is to take education to the people—where they live. This means reestablishing a national network of local schools and creating, for the first time, universities, not only in the national capital, but throughout the country, in its new federal structure.

Minister of Higher Education Prof. Ibrahim Ahmed Omer explained in an interview in *Sudanow* magazine in May 1991, what the objectives of the reform are. Professor Omer laid out the plan to open new universities in the new federal states of Sudan, to alleviate the problem earlier manifested, whereby "large numbers of secondary schools leavers were unable to find university places, as the few universities had only limited resources." To create new universities, the education budget had to be significantly increased. In addition, Omer reported, "Many people in the various states have made donations so that they can have their own universities. Funds which were previously spent on sending students abroad will be used for these universities." This does not mean that the states have responsibility to fund the universities, but that donations locally are accepted. As for the costs, 400 million Sudanese pounds were spent in 1990 and 470 million pounds allocated for 1991, plus donations.

The new universities—17 of which have been founded since 1989—are oriented to local economic needs. Thus, for example, in a state with great mineral resources, faculties of mineralogy, metallurgy, and mining will be privileged, while certain faculties, like law and religion, will be standard everywhere. The same is true of areas with great agricultural potential, large animal herds, oil resources, and so on. The idea is to graduate students who will become the cadres leading the economic development of their states. In 1991, when the minister of education gave his interview, there were nine federal states; now, there are 26, since the February 1994 decentralization took effect. To provide educational opportunities for those students whose states do not yet have their own universities, a quota system was established, already back in 1991, whereby, according to Professor Omer, "we allocate 20% of total university enrollment to less developed states or to those with severe manpower shortages."

By August 1991, many new universities had been founded, among them the Sudan Open University, the East, the Kordofan, the First September, and the Wadi Al-Neel universities. The Sudan University in Kordofan became the second university after the University of Khartoum. Although plans to establish such a center of learning go back to 1963, and a decree for its founding was issued in 1981, it was not actually established until 1990. It was founded under the supervision of the Agricultural Research Center at Al-Obeid, and has a faculty of Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, plus five departments—agriculture, veterinary sciences, pastures, land science, and water programming. Further devel-

opments were planned in 1991 for a faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Education, Engineering and Mining Economics, and Business Administration.

Darfur University, already planned under President Nimeiri, started with faculties of education, medicine and health sciences, agriculture, veterinary medicine, and social studies. This university admitted 200 students in 1991. In the eastern states, there is the Eastern University, which has faculties of medicine, education, natural resources, fishery and marine sciences, engineering and applied studies, economics, petroleum and mines, and the Islamic College. As the *Horn of Africa Bulletin* reported, in 1991, "The intake of the country's ten universities and polytechnics is being doubled again this year to 20,000 students. This was announced by the Higher Education Minister, Prof. Ibrahim Ahmad Omar."

In Kassala, the university started with medicine and education. In Port Sudan, the university features Fishery and Marine Sciences, the first of its kind. It had 200 students in 1991. Further universities were to be opened in Malakal (upper Nile), Wau (Bahr al Ghazal), Juba, Al-Imam Al-Mahdi, and Al-Azhari.

The University of Khartoum (which used to be called the Gordon Memorial College, established in 1902), was the first to allow women students, in 1945. The Khartoum branch of the Cairo University, founded in 1955, allowed co-educational instruction. In 1961 the Higher Teachers Training Institute was founded, and enrolled many women, as did the Shambat Agricultural Institute, established in 1954 and the Khartoum Polytechnic.

The Khartoum branch of Cairo University was under Egyptian control, and teaching for the 25,000 Sudanese students focused on an Egyptian curriculum, taught exclusively by Egyptian professors. Sudanese students received no training in matters suiting them for work in Sudan: The Sudanese economy, its legal system and history, were ignored. Sudanese students had to pay high tuition and book fees. In March 1993, the Sudanese government "Sudanized" the university and renamed it Al-Nilein University (the university of the two Niles), much to the disgruntlement of the Egyptians.

Important in the Sudanese educational reform process has been the introduction of Arabic as the language of instruction, as per a decree in 1991. Iraq made a precious contribution by providing Arabic language textbooks free of copyrights. English has been maintained as a foreign language, which students are encouraged to learn, but Arabic is the basic vehicle of instruction. Dr. Hassan al Turabi further notes that it would be very important for the Sudanese to finish efforts to publish complete dictionaries in various branches of knowledge establishing precise terminology in Arabic. Furthermore, he said he thought the fact that books would be available in Arabic would mean that knowledge would be available to all classes in society, not just the privileged.

Sudan's political system today

by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

Since 1989, the Republic of Sudan has developed a federal system, led by the President. In upcoming elections slated for 1995, the President is to be elected directly by the electorate. The Constitution is in the process of being elaborated. Citizenship is available to all Sudanese, regardless of culture, belief, or ethnic origin.

The country is to be organized through congresses at various levels, which are to provide for participatory democracy. Thus, at the local level, citizens meet to elect a Popular Committee. Popular Committees in turn make up the Council Congresses, which make policy and elect an Administrative Council which is mandated to implement policy. From the local congresses and administrative councils are elected members of the Province Council. The Province Councils, in turn, elect members of the State Congress, who also come from four Sectorial Conferences (Economic, Social Cultural, Youth and Students, and Women). The State Congress elects a specified number of representatives to the State Legislative Assembly, whose members are also drawn by direct election according to geographical representation.

The National Congress consists of persons promoted from the State Congresses and Assemblies, and from National Sectorial Conferences, which are Economic, Social Cultural, Youth and Students, Women, Legal, Administrative, Diplomatic, Defense, and Security. This body elects a number of members to the National Legislative Assembly, which also includes members elected directly on geographical criteria.

The current Transitional National Assembly is composed of 250 members, nominated as representatives on geographical, professional, cultural, ethnic, and religious bases.

The federal government, made up of ministers nominated by the President and ratified by the Transitional National Assembly, constitutes the Executive branch, flanked by the legislative assembly and the federal judiciary. The federal government is responsible for federal legislation; armed forces and defense affairs; national security; federal judiciary, public prosecution, and advocacy; foreign affairs, international representation, and external information; borders; nationality, immigration, passports, and aliens' affairs; customs; taxation (other than state taxes); planning of national economy and foreign trade; national development; currency and coinage; federal transport; inter-state highways; telecommunications; planning for higher education; education,



Sudan's President Omar Hassan Ahmed al Bashir has created a more decentralized government, creating 26 federal states to replace the previous nine.

cultural, and information planning; specialized hospitals; epidemics and pest control; land, natural resources, and environmental protection policies; census; public audit; national institutions and national public corporations; the national electricity network; inter-state water supply; the national committee for elections; and any other matters regulated by federal legislation.

State jurisdiction

The state governments have the following jurisdictions and powers: state legislation; state security; state and local development in coordination with federal planning; state tax, provided that the state shall be entitled to a certain percentage of the taxes levied on federal projects and services functioning within the state and of income tax on federal personnel within the state; border trade within the provisions of the law, provided that customs thereon shall be paid to the state; agriculture and forestry, other than national farms; animal wealth; wildlife and tourism; development of water resources and pasture; health services and establishment of all types of centers for medical treatment and health care; education up to secondary school level, in coordination with federal planning; establishment of institutions of higher education, in accordance with federal plans; establishment of organs of local government and control of their functioning; roads and telecommunications within the state; recruitment of personnel other than rare technical and technological

expertise, the recruitment for which shall be organized at the federal level; newspapers and local broadcasting stations; development of local cultures; and protection of the environment within the framework of national planning and coordination.

Sudan's federal system came into being in 1991, when nine states were established, on the basis of previous regions. These states, and their capitals, were the following: Khartoum (Khartoum), Northern (Al-Damer), Eastern (Kassala), Central (Medani), Kordofan (El Obweid), Darfur (Al-Fasher), Upper Nile (Malakal), Bahr al-Ghazal (Wau), and Equatoria (Juba). This was done explicitly to meet the demands of the south, which had called for federalism, since 1947, when the north and south were unified. Given the British machinations during the colonial period to strictly divide north from south, and to inculcate anti-northern sentiments among the southern population, fears of northern domination prevailed in the south after unification.

Federal system adopted

In 1972, with the Addis Ababa agreement which ended the civil war, the south was granted autonomy. In 1980, northern Sudan was divided into six regions, and in 1983, the south was organized into three regions. It was these nine regions which then became the nine states in 1991. The current government is the first to have adopted the federal system.

In March 1994, President al Bashir announced a further decentralization of government, through the creation of 26 federal states to replace the previous nine. Among these states are Northern, Nile River, Gezira, Blue Nile, White Nile, Sennar, Western Kordofan, Northern Kordofan, Southern Kordofan, Western Darfur, Northern Darfur, Southern Darfur, Lakes, Western Bahr Al-Ghazal, Warab, Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity, Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Bahr Al-Jebel, and Khartoum. The reasons for further decentralization included a desire on the part of the Khartoum government to enhance coordination of policy between the federal and state levels, facilitate governing, promote development, enhance security, and contribute to settling continuing ethnic conflicts.

Staffing the new state governments involved deployment of thousands of civil servants from the capital, and cost about 5 billion Sudanese pounds. One obvious aim of the decentralization is to establish government bodies in the southern states still devastated by war, capable of facilitating reconstruction. In this context, in addition to the five ministers each state will have (Agriculture and Animal Wealth, Finance and Economic Development, Education and Orientation, Engineering, Health and Social Affairs), the southern states will have a sixth, the Minister for Peace and Rehabilitation. Another important feature of the decentralization policy is its facilitating bringing new universities into these states.

Britain's 1930s apartheid policy in southern Sudan

by Linda de Hoyos

In 1930, the British administrators redefined their southern policy of separating the north from the south. It had in fact begun in 1902, and had been furthered in 1922, because they feared that the newly emerging anti-British sentiments in the north, encouraged by Egyptian factions, might spread into the south, and from there into British East Africa territory. On the 25th of January it was decreed that the object was "to build up a series of self-contained racial and tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirement of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditions, usages, and beliefs."

From *The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-72*, by Edgar O'Ballance

Led by Baroness Caroline Cox, the British press has long had a field day excoriating the government in Khartoum for the civil wars in the country that erupted in 1955, even before independence, extending to 1972, and then erupted again in 1983. Human rights violations on the part of Khartoum, religious oppression, economic abuse, and educational segregation are among the charges leveled at the Sudan government for the problems in southern Sudan. Even a brief perusal of British policy over Sudan demonstrates, however, that it is the British colonials, whose policies persist in the British Ministry of Overseas Development of Baroness Lynda Chalker, who created a completely artificial divide in Sudan, between north and south, imposing the harshest form of apartheid on the southern population which denied the southern citizenry access to education and economic development. Further, to accomplish this aim, with the help of anthropologists such as E. Evans-Pritchard (see article p. 49), the British colonial masters manufactured out of whole cloth a southern Sudanese tribal "identity"—distinct from the Arabized north—to induce the southern, besieged population into the hoax. *This is the origin*—along with logistics and arms amply supplied by British puppets in the region—of the civil wars in Sudan.

The policy was enunciated in a 1930 memo, by Angus

Gillan, governor of Kordofan from 1928 to 1932, who stated categorically that the aim of the apartheid policy between north and south Sudan was "to preserve authentic Nuba civilization and culture as against a bastard type of 'Arabization.'" The areas to be segregated were the three southern provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria.

As reported in a July 1990 article in *African Affairs*, journal of the British Royal Africa Society, by Kamal Osman Salih, the segregation measure was in part prompted by the advent of the cotton industry to the region, which revolutionized local economic conditions. From the 1920s onward, the ethno-cultural map of the Nuba Mountains had been reshaped owing to the spreading influence of Arabization. Cotton and the money from it tempted the Nuba to leave their mountain homes and come down to foothills, where they were in closer contact with Sudanese Muslims, or what the British designated as "Arabs." Cotton also brought new roads, which increased the contact. Every year, more Nuba males were leaving their hills to work in the northern towns. More had also applied to enlist in the different army units, either inside or outside the region.

The governor of the Nuba Mountains wrote: "Once the pagan Nuba starts mixing with the Arabs and the world outside his own community, as he is now beginning to do, this change will be rapid. With present conditions, therefore, and with the fact that immediately he leaves his hill, the pagan steps into a Mohammedan atmosphere, it will not be very long before he assumes Arab characteristics, i.e., dresses and talks Arabic."

A panicked southern district commissioner wrote in 1930: "All I can point out is, as far as this district is concerned, little has been done to prevent Islamization. . . . The urgency of the matter lies in the economic progress of the Arab; the contacts are bound to increase; for economic reasons the races must mix, and if a policy for Nuba is to be stated, it must be formulated now."

Thereupon the British decided to institute both a policy of physical apartheid of the southern Nubians from the so-called Arabs (i.e., Muslims), and also to forge a "Nubian" identity. Gillan admitted that the idea was to build a cultural bloc against the northern Muslims: The aim was "to preserve

or evolve an authentic Nuba civilization and culture, as against a bastard type of Arabization, or at least to support this evolution up to a point *where the people themselves will be fit to choose*, with their eyes open, the type of culture which most appeals to them" (emphasis added).

Extolling the apartheid policy, Douglas Newbold, who later succeeded Gillan as governor of Kordofan, 1932-38, wrote: "The Nuba policy as set forth in Mr. Gillan's printed memorandum and approved by the central government is a positive civilizing policy, based on what is best in local tradition and culture. It does not aim at keeping the Nuba in a glass cage, nor in making the Nuba Mountains into a human game reserve, but envisages the evolution of Nuba civilization through Nuba leaders and Nuba communalities."

The policy certainly worked. As southern anti-Khartoum activist Alexis Mbali Yangu wrote in his book *The Nile Is Red* in 1966: "The policy of assimilation through the Islamic religion and Arabic language is unequivocally opposed by Africans because this is calculated to destroy their African identity and national dignity."

Physical segregation

Two problems quickly arose in the policy's implementation: the heterogeneity of the Nuba tribes and their contiguity with northern Muslims. The Nubians consisted of dozens of tribes "of entirely different stocks, of different cultures, religions, and stages of civilization, speaking as many as ten entirely different languages and some 50 dialects, more or less mutually unintelligible," as an article in Britain's *African Affairs* noted.

Gillan hoped to overcome this problem with federation: "I am satisfied that the solution of the problem is summed up in one word: federation. . . . The best hope of attaining this and evolving an authentic Nuba civilization and culture is by creation of federations strong enough to stand on their own feet, and significantly imbued with Nuba tradition to present a firm barrier to Arabization."

The formation of these federations would be effected through the policy of "indirect rule"—so-called "native administration."

Secondly, the British had to deal with the Muslim overlordship of some Nuba communities. One faction of colonialists argued in favor of the elimination of Arab domination at once, and at any cost. The other spoke in favor of continuity of Arab suzerainty, because it believed that the Arab overlords could administer those communities better than anyone else. In some cases, the communities involved were so isolated that Arab suzerainty was left intact, or remained with restrictions.

British policy supported "villagization," and discouraged urbanization. The idea was to "institute a Nuba village, or series of villages, within easy distance of the town, whereby Nuba, whether permanently or temporarily, can live as far as possible under tribal conditions."

All those Nuba males who worked as daily wage laborers in urban centers such as Kadugli and Dilling were settled in the surrounding villages. No Nubians were permitted to live in the towns for fear they would become detribalized. A large number of Nuba reported to be in northern cities such as Khartoum and Medani were summarily rounded up and sent home. "By blocking their geographical mobility, the administration had undoubtedly undermined Nuba economic interests, and thereby increased their economic deprivation," reports Osman Salih. Various tribes were relocated in the border area, to create a buffer zone to the north. Tribe members were forbidden to live anywhere outside their tribal zone.

It was also feared that Nuba enlistment in army units stationed inside Kordofan would abet their Arabization. As a result, it was decided to stop all military recruitment of the Nuba outside the province. According to a British ordinance of May 15, 1930, "Nuba, domiciled in the Nuba Mountains, who present themselves at army units outside the province, will not be enlisted." Furthermore, any Nubian operating outside of the district was discharged—thus reversing the policy of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium since 1903 which had sought to bring the Nubians into the army.

The Closed District Order of 1930 was then used to bar Muslim traders from the south. Almost 75% of the cotton lands were reserved to the Nuba, leaving only one-quarter to the non-Nuba residents in the region.

Deculturation

Muslim-dominated areas in Nuba were treated as northern and they were provided with elementary schools of northern type. Nuba pagans were not permitted to attend them. In his Nov. 26, 1930 Memorandum on Education Policy in the Nuba area, British Secretary of Education and Health J.G. Matthew stated: "The wish of the government is that the Nuba should develop on their own lines and be assisted to build up self-contained racial or tribal units, but at the same time it is recognized that for their material advancement there must be easy communication between them and their neighbors and also the various groups of Nuba themselves who speak different dialects. It is considered that Arabic is the only possible language for inter-communication and it is recommended that for this purpose Arabic in roman script should be taught as a subject in the elementary schools."

"The use of Arabic script was thought undesirable because it would enable pupils to read Arabic literature of all kinds, thereby introducing influences tending toward the disintegration of their tribal life."

To further raise the cultural wall, Muslims in the south were prevented from practicing their beliefs; Arabic dress was forbidden, as were Arabic names, and intermarriage between northerners and southerners was banned.

Then began a policy of Christianization, or as Gillan stated, "through the help of the missions, to begin the battle against the introduction of Mohammedanism among the pa-

gans in the province before it is too late.”

The net result of these policies was that Nubia became an economically deprived region, and completely undereducated, while the army of Sudan came to be placed almost entirely in the hands of the northerners.

Colonial whiplash

Then, in 1946, when there was open talk of the British leaving Sudan, the Colonial Office suddenly reversed gears and placed the administration of the whole country in the hands of the northern Muslims. “Native rule” was abrogated in the south and handed over to Muslims from the north—after the British had so assiduously cultivated a “Nubian identity”! On April 23, 1946, the Colonial Office issued its reversal, stating that it was acting “upon the facts that the peoples of the southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably mixed to the middle Eastern and Arabised northern Sudan.”

Lord Winterton, arguing in the House of Lords against the reversal of apartheid, noted that “the southern Sudanese strongly objected, so far as they were able vocally, most of them of course being illiterate, to the removal of our power to protect them, and the dreadful events which have resulted [the 1955 civil war] show that their fears were justified.”

As the British pondered the civil war in the south, the debate in the House of Lords during the mid-1950s presaged precisely Baroness Cox’s demands today for a separate zone to be carved out of the south and overseen by international agencies. As the Marquis of Reading stated in debates in 1955: “It has been proposed that an international commission should be sent to the south, possibly under the auspices of the U.N., to see that the southerners get fair treatment. Other suggestions have been made that the International Red Cross or the World Health Organization should send a mission to the South. Either of these measures could be taken only with the agreement of the Sudan government, who would probably regard such proposals as a sign of lack of confidence and therefore be calculated to weaken its positions.

“The dispatch of the U.N. observers would almost certainly revive and strengthen the movement for some sort of self-rule in the South, thus widening the gap between North and South. . . . The present difficulties in Sudan can be solved only if the Sudanese government itself seeks a solution by consultations with all parties.”

The British colonial policy—first apartheid against the southerners and then placing them under northern administration—created the preconditions for the outbreak of civil war in 1955, which did not end until 1972. By the time the British had left Sudan, the identity exhibited by the southerners at this time was not only Nubian, it was pro-British! As Mbali Yangu admits: “British departure from the Sudan was thought of in the South with great anxiety.”

British family helps ignite two continents

by Scott Thompson

The Evans-Pritchard family, father and son, have been involved, respectively, in laying the basis for the operations of John Garang’s Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) insurrection in southern Sudan, and in the bloody Thirty Years’ War-style insurgencies in Central America. Whereas the father, structural anthropologist Sir Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard, fostered the myth of the “Nilotic tribes” from which Garang today recruits for his war against Khartoum, his son Ambrose Evans-Pritchard worked with British intelligence on all sides of the war in Central America.

And today, as Washington Bureau Chief of the London *Sunday Telegraph*, which is owned by a multibillion-dollar British intelligence firm, the Hollinger Corp., Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is seeking to stir up every possible scandal he can against President Bill Clinton, who has broken the “Anglo-American special relationship.”

The myth of the ‘Nilotic tribes’

Sir Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard was instrumental in creating the myth of the “Nilotic tribes.” He was born on Sept. 21, 1902, the son of Rev. John Evans-Pritchard, a vicar of the Church of England. During 1916-24, he was educated at Winchester College and at Exeter College, Oxford, where he studied under A.R. Radcliffe Brown, with whom he would later introduce structural anthropology to Britain. During 1923-27, he did his Ph.D. studies at the London School of Economics, in part under C.G. Seligman, who was among the first Englishmen to study the “Nilotic tribesmen,” especially the Dinka tribe of which Garang is a member, and the Shilluk of southern Sudan.

E.E. Evans-Pritchard started his field work with the Azande tribe, doing a study of their beliefs in oracle and magic. In 1930, he began his research on the Nuer tribe and their relationship with the Dinka. As E.E. Evans-Pritchard admitted in his anthropological “classic,” *The Nuer: A Description of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*, first published in 1940: “My study of the Nuer was undertaken at the request of, and was mainly financed by, the Government of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which also contributed generously toward the publication of its results.”

In short, E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s studies of the “Nilotic tribes” were financed and broadcast by the Colonial Office of His Britannic Majesty’s government.

Among E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s tasks was to complete a

census of various of the southern tribes, by tribe, clan, and sub-clan, thus giving the British Colonial Office a detailed historic and current profile of each family-grouping in southern Sudan. In this context, he accurately noted that the southern Sudanese represented a “melting pot” of various groupings, some from northern Sudan, some from central Africa, others having settled there from as far away as west Africa. This reality stands in sharp contrast to the myth of a racially distinct “Nilotic tribal grouping.”

One of the “political structures” stressed by E.E. Evans-Pritchard was the constant warfare of each against all among the different “Nilotic tribes,” particularly between the Nuer and the Dinka—conflicts that the British would use to their own advantage.

More importantly, E.E. Evans-Pritchard stressed that the “Arabs” of the north—an “Arab” being any Sudanese who was a Muslim—were to be painted as “slavers” against the south:

“The Arab slavers and ivory traders who caused so much misery and destruction among the peoples of Southern Sudan after the conquest of Northern Sudan by Muhammad Ali in 1821 . . . sometimes pillaged riverside villages. . . . [But] I do not believe that anywhere were the Nuer deeply affected by Arab contact. The Egyptian government and, later, the Mahdist government, which were supposed to be in control of the Sudan from 1821 to the end of the century, in no way administered the Nuer or exercised control over them from the riverside posts they established on the fringes of their country. The Nuer sometimes raided these posts and were sometimes raided from them, but on the whole it may be said that they pursued their lives in disregard of them.”

E.E. Evans-Pritchard also profiled the magical practices of the Azande tribe of southern Sudan. The work on the Azande spanned Central Africa between the Nile and the Congo rivers, including what became Sudan, Zaire, and the Central African Republic. He reported to his government that the Sudanese Azande had fallen from their “golden age,” when the British killed King Gbudwe in 1905.

E.E. Evans-Pritchard discovered the structure of a triangle between witchcraft, oracles, and magic in the tribe. Oracular pronouncements, a function limited to the nobility, were done by haruspication from poisoning a chicken, and the interpretations were then used for such purposes as determining which witch may have murdered somebody.

Soon after E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s Zande studies, the Zande Scheme was launched by the British to market the tribe’s labor on the world market. Under this scheme, the leaders of the tribe, the Abvongara, were induced to force the relocation of 50–60,000 families.

In the 1950s, as the British prepared to leave Sudan, E.E. Evans-Pritchard was called in again, to carry out other profiling studies of the “Nilotic tribes,” which were published as *Nuer Religion*, in 1956; and *Kinship and Marriage Among the Nuer*, in 1951.

Seconded to British intelligence

Although E.E. Evans-Pritchard had already in effect been an adjunct of British intelligence, he was officially seconded to it, according to his son Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, when he joined the British military’s wartime effort. During World War II, E.E. Evans-Pritchard was posted in special Army units, whose role included pitting Abyssinian tribes against the Italians in Ethiopia; striking across the Western Desert with the Bedouins to fight the Germans, which ended up with Evans-Pritchard founding the Kingdom of Libya; and, trying to drive the Free French out of Syria with a British-organized peasant revolt.

In the Western Desert, E.E. Evans-Pritchard won the Sufi mystics to the side of Britain, then installed their head, Idris, as king of Libya after World War II, as payment for services rendered. There is no question, based on Evans-Pritchard’s book *Cyrenaica and the Sanusi*, that despite his 1944 “aesthetic conversion to Catholicism” (as his son Ambrose described that “religious” event), E.E. Evans-Pritchard was quite absorbed by Sufi mysticism.

As noted by biographer Mary Douglas in the 1980 book *Edward Evans-Pritchard*, the anthropologist had a high appreciation of Sufism: “The Sanusiya is an Islamic Brotherhood, an order of Sufis or Dervishes. Of Sufi mysticism, Evans-Pritchard wrote that it fills the need of simple people for warmth and color in religion and provides personal contact and tenderness in the cult of the saints.”

Douglas quoted E.E. Evans-Pritchard: “The aim of Sufism has been to transcend the senses and to attain through love identification with God so complete that there is no longer a duality of ‘God’ and ‘I,’ but there is only ‘God.’ ”

The use of E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s field work was not limited to colonial and post-colonial policy. His 1930s book *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande* was revived in the 1960s and 1970s as part of the “New Age” counterculture movement in western nations. Ernest Gellner, one of E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s colleagues from Oxford who promoted the book, influenced a Manchester school of anthropologists and historians studying witchcraft and the occult. Gellner is today head of George Soros’s Central European University in Prague’s Institute for Nationalism and Liberty, which manufactures and attaches the designation of “Nazi” to any opponents of Soros’s looting of the former East bloc.

Auguste Comte and other influences

Together with A.R. Radcliffe-Brown of Oxford, E.E. Evans-Pritchard introduced structural anthropology into Britain, and he achieved near-sainthood at some colleges there for doing so. Among those upon whom the two relied heavily were Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl of the *Année Sociologique* group; the latter practiced psychoanalyzing the “collective representations” of the primitive mind.

In 1968, with the assistance of Sir Isaiah Berlin, E.E. Evans-Pritchard wrote a lecture titled *The Sociology of Comte: An Appreciation*, lavishing praise on Auguste Comte as a man of contradiction between being a "Catholic freethinker" and a "republican royalist." As E.E. Evans-Pritchard noted, Comte believed in the "Science of Number," which subsumed geometry. Comte had been the secretary to Saint-Simon from 1817 to 1824, and was a French *catamite*, adhering to the empiricist trend of the eighteenth-century Encyclopedists in general (e.g., Voltaire), but above all to the radical British empiricists such as David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke. Comte, in turn, had influenced John Stuart Mill, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and Emile Durkheim.

These are the influences underlying E.E. Evans-Pritchard's structural anthropological creation of the myth of the "Nilotic tribes."

Ambrose spills the beans

In a Feb. 10, 1994 interview with this author, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard spilled the beans on his involvement with British intelligence on all sides of the Thirty Years' War scenario in Central America, where he was ostensibly working as a journalist. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard stated that starting with the first three years of his involvement in Central America in the early-1980s, he had reported to the British political attaché in Managua, Nicaragua, whom he knew was an agent of British MI-6.

Evans-Pritchard defended this contact on the basis of the need for "swapping information" with British secret intelligence services, saying that they had such good sources that it was indispensable. He also made clear that he was using SIS sources, when possible, for his current stories designed to topple, or to set up the assassination of President Bill Clinton (see *EIR Special Report*, June 2, 1995, "International Terrorism Targets the United States").

In a second interview on Feb. 23, 1994, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard said he had spent a total of four and a half years working in Central America during the 1980s, where entire nations were being torn apart in bloody conflicts involving governments, religions, ethnic divisions, and drug-trafficking. He boasted that he was the only journalist to befriend both the Nicaraguan rebel Contras backed by Oliver North, and the guerrillas of El Salvador and Guatemala. He also visited Nicaragua, Peru, and Mexico.

Regarding Mexico, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard stated that he had gone to the Chiapas region, where he interviewed the pro-Zapatista guerrillas, who have since threatened to tear Mexico apart. In January 1994, he took a break from his Clinton-bashing crusade to do an eyewitness report for the *Sunday Telegraph* on the revolt in Chiapas, which had broken out on Jan. 1, 1994. His coverage was unabashedly pro-guerrilla.

During his first three-year stint in Central America, Am-

brose Evans-Pritchard worked initially as a free-lance journalist; then as a correspondent for the British *Spectator*, later taken over by the Hollinger Corp., owner of the *Sunday Telegraph*, where he is now employed; finally, he was hired as Central American correspondent for the London *Economist*.

One of the tribal, terrorist groups with which Ambrose Evans-Pritchard worked in Guatemala was the Orpa, an indigenous guerrilla group usually hostile to outsiders, which was

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard stated that starting with the first three years of his involvement in Central America in the early-1980s, he had reported to the British political attaché in Managua, Nicaragua, whom he knew was an agent of British MI-6.

one of the four groups that founded the Guatemalan UNRG guerrilla group. He eventually won this group's confidence. In El Salvador, he worked with the FPL guerrillas.

Living with narco-terrorists

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard also decided to meet with the Shining Path narco-terrorists, a group that had been largely shaped by anthropologists like his father to destabilize Peru. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard went to Ayacucho, Peru in 1986 to meet with the Shining Path. He claims he had to take a canoe up the Amazon to finally establish contact. His destination was a Shining Path cocaine laboratory, and he now claims it took him some time to convince the Shining Path that he was not an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration or some other agency. He spent a week in the cocaine lab run by these "Pol Pot"-style terrorists, without harm to his person, before he was "released" for his trip back up the Amazon.

American Spectator editor-in-chief R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., in a fawning column in the Feb. 11, 1994 *Washington Times*, described Ambrose Evans-Pritchard as "equal parts scholar, journalist, and adventurer."

Whatever the full extent of Ambrose Evans-Pritchard's real activities in Central America with his tie-in to British SIS, his propagandistic role of pitting indigenous, tribal, and ethnic guerrilla groups against sovereign nation-states is in imitation of his father. Now, as Washington Bureau Chief of the *Sunday Telegraph*, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has filed more than 30 stories, often based upon sleazy lies he himself has generated, to try either to topple President Bill Clinton or to pave the way for the President's assassination.

Idi Amin: London stooge against Sudan

by Linda de Hoyos

In February 1971, Gen. Idi Amin came to power in Uganda, in a military coup against President Milton Obote. British sponsorship of the semi-literate Amin, son of a sorceress, was quickly evident; Britain was one of the first countries in the world to recognize the Amin government, long before any African country. And when relations with Britain had soured after Amin expelled the Asian business community from Uganda, British intelligence operative Robert Astles remained as Amin's mentor in Uganda until the very end. Amin's tyranny, lasting until 1979, trampled Uganda's political and economic institutions, leaving the country a wreck-age from which it has never recovered.

For London, as the book *Ghosts of Kampala* by George

Major ethnic groupings of southern Sudan and Uganda



Ivan Smith reports, the primary reason for fostering the Amin power grab was Sudan. Idi Amin was willing, in fact eager, to permit Uganda to be used as a base of operations to aid the southern Sudanese in their war against Khartoum; Obote was not.

Nurtured Nilotics

Amin, now safely ensconced in Saudi Arabia, was a member of the Kakwa tribe, which straddles the borders of Uganda, Zaire, and southern Sudan. The tribe supplied Amin with his power base in the Ugandan Army.

As a young man in 1946, Amin joined the King's African Rifles, founded in 1902. The British had traditionally taken soldiers of this outfit from the grouping designated "Nilotic peoples," particularly southern Sudanese. In London's recipe for colonial rule, minority groups were assigned to the enforcement roles, enhancing reliability. In 1891, contingents of southern Sudanese were recruited by Captain (later Lord) Lugard for service in Uganda on behalf of the Imperial British East Africa Company. After Britain ruled Uganda officially, large numbers of Dinka and Azande troops, then living in Egypt, were sent to Uganda. Although nominally Muslim, they had fought against the Mahdi's army in the 1880s, on the British side. In Uganda, they were called "Nubis."

After Amin took power, he staffed all Army command posts with "Nubis," in much the same way that Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army is commanded by Himas, or Tutsis of southern Uganda, and the Banyarwanda, former Rwandan Tutsis. During the Sudanese civil war of 1955 to 1972, southern Sudanese had been brought directly into the Ugandan Army, making Uganda the perfect buttress for the southern Sudanese fighting Khartoum.

Obote bucks policy

In the early years of independence, Obote had invited delegations from Israel to help carry out farming projects in northern Uganda and to assist training the Army. Israel had a specific interest in Uganda: its proximity to Sudan. The Israelis were soon moving into southern Sudan to assist directly the Anyanya movement against Khartoum.

In 1966, however, Obote visited Khartoum, and came to an agreement that Uganda would exert every effort to restore peace in the south. But the policy was ignored by the Defense Ministry and by Idi Amin, who was up to his eyeballs in smuggling operations in the Congo (now Zaire) and Sudan. Amin was in charge of an operation which smuggled gold and ivory out of Congo, in exchange for giving weapons to Congolese rebels, and was brought before a commission of inquiry when it was discovered that he was pocketing thousands of dollars in the process. The commission further discovered that Amin had become involved in the Congo venture through Robert Astles, who was making contacts between the Congolese rebels and the Ugandan

Army. Astles's private airline company was handling the smuggling.

Ugandan Army officers also charged that Amin was working—against government orders—with the Sudan rebels inside Sudan. They alleged he went on a number of unauthorized flights with a foreign pilot—possibly Astles—to meet Sudanese rebels and arranged to supply them with matériel intended for the Ugandan Armed Forces.

A German mercenary named Rolf Steiner was an accomplice in the operation. In his autobiography, *The Last Adventurer*, Steiner relates that he had arranged a meeting in Kampala “under the supervision of General Idi Amin with the purpose of reaching an agreement on the leadership of the [Sudanese] liberation front.” Out of this meeting, Steiner was given money to buy goods wholesale and ship them across Uganda to the tribal chiefs in southern Sudan. Steiner notes that “although not all-powerful, he [Amin] was strong enough to order his army to turn a blind eye to my harmless smuggling service.”

Meanwhile, Obote refused to grant Israel landing rights for their supplies to the Anyanya. The crisis over Sudan policy hit in November 1970. Steiner was arrested by Ugandan police upon reentering Uganda from Sudan. Obote stated, in a later interview, “The government of Uganda as such was not involved in aiding the Anyanya but was involved in finding political solutions in the Sudanese conflict. The arrest of Steiner brought out the fact that Israel was using Uganda to supply Anyanya.”

Obote was cowed while he was in Nairobi, on his way back from the Singapore Commonwealth conference. As he relates, “It is doubtful that Amin, without the urging of the Israelis, would have staged a successful coup in 1971. . . . Israel wanted a client regime in Uganda which they could manipulate in order to prevent Sudan from sending her troops to Egypt. . . . The coup succeeded beyond their wildest expectations. . . . The Israelis set up in Uganda a regime which pivoted in every respect to Amin, who in turn was under the strictest control of the Israelis in Kampala. . . . The Israelis and Anyanya were hilarious; the regime was under their control.”

When the Sudanese civil war was halted in 1972, Israel quickly lost interest in Amin. Enter Libya. In February 1972, Amin visited Libya, striking a pact with its President Muammar Qaddafi. In March 1972, all Israeli personnel were told to leave Uganda. In August 1972, all Asians were expelled, whereupon Britain withdrew its support for Amin. In September 1972, Libya proffered full military assistance to Uganda and sent 500 technicians to Kampala. By 1974, the intelligence services in Uganda were being run by Libya, and Libya was giving Amin Soviet MiG fighters. Libya even supplied troops to defend Amin when the Tanzanian Armed Forces invaded Uganda to drive Amin out. Overseeing the entire venture, from beginning to end in 1979, was London's Astles.

Baroness Chalker's Ugandan mercenary

by Linda de Hoyos

Uganda remains today the on-the-ground headquarters for operations against Sudan. It is the major source of supply for John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Army. The SPLA is supplied from Kidepo Valley Park in northern Uganda, and Kidepo is the site for SPLA training and the SPLA headquarters. According to Ugandan sources, food, gasoline, and supplies are stored for Garang at the Mbuya military barracks, and the supplies are delivered by the National Resistance Army's 4th Division.

In the days when the SPLA was more militarily viable, Ugandan dictator Yoweri Museveni attempted to procure sophisticated weapons for Garang. In August 1992, Museveni's private secretary, Innocent Bisangwa-Mbuguje, and Ugandan Ambassador to the United States Stephen Kapimpina Katenda-Apuuli were arrested in Orlando, Florida, for illegally attempting to buy 400 TOW anti-tank missiles and 34 TOW launchers for \$18 million. The weapons were bound for the SPLA, through the border towns of Nimule or Kaya in northern Uganda.

Museveni and Garang are old school buddies, both having matriculated at the Dar Es Salaam University—the Julius Nyerere “kindergarten” where the curriculum centered on Franz Fanon, Lenin, and Marx.

Museveni came to power in Uganda in 1986, after five years of bush war. His most immediate sponsor was Tanzanian President Nyerere, who had ordered the coup against Ugandan President Godfrey Binaisa in 1981. During his years in the bush, Museveni received funding and arms from Libya, with which he retains close relations and a continuing arms supply. He also received cash injections from Nigerian businessman Mooshod Abiola, who in the early 1980s served as the bagman for ITT; and from Tiny Rowland, then director of Lonrho, who became an “honorary” member of the SPLA.

However, Museveni's most significant sponsor is Baroness Lynda Chalker, British Minister of Overseas Development. Chalker was the first foreigner to meet Museveni; he finally took Kampala in 1986. Her ministry has posted British civil servants as the “seconds” throughout Museveni's government. The relationship is personal. As one British source put it: “Chalker spends a lot of time, a disproportionate amount of time, in the Horn of Africa and Uganda.” Soon after the Rwandan Patriotic Front took Kigali in July

1994, Chalker flew to Kampala to visit Museveni for four days in a victory celebration. "He is," said one British source, "the blue-eyed darling of the British in Africa."

Map key: London's wars in East Africa

1. Egypt: Baroness Caroline Cox, deputy speaker of the British House of Lords and leading spokesman for Christian Solidarity International, arrived in Cairo on May 8 to address a conference of the Sudanese political opposition to the Al-Bashir government of Sudan. Cox's provocative visit was aimed at increasing Cairo's role as a subversive base against Sudan, right at the point that Cairo and Khartoum are working on a diplomatic solution to border disagreements.

2. Eritrea: Eritrean President Assiyas Afwerki spent nearly a month in the United States in January-February 1995, where he sought to win donor support for his new country, in return for his willingness to permit Eritrea to be used as a base of operations against Sudan. In December 1994, Eritrea suddenly severed relations with Sudan, likely at the behest of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, with whom Afwerki is known to have close ties, through former Lonrho Chairman Tiny Rowland.

3. Khartoum, Sudan; Kampala, Uganda: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and relief agencies centered in both cities are known to be operating against Sudan, often supplying arms to John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Army (see article, p. 52).

4. Nubian Mountains of Sudan: NGOs virtually control this area, by virtue of its remoteness and an erratic insurgency there.

5. Nimule, southern Sudan: This is the last military stronghold of John Garang's SPLA. Garang's forces train and camp in northern Uganda. According to multiple sources, the SPLA-held town of Nimule is being defended by Ugandan forces and has been heavily mined. The British newsletter *Africa Confidential* reported in April that there are U.S. military advisers on the ground in Uganda, aiding in this effort. The SPLA is supplied through northern Uganda, with the aid of the U.N. Development Program's Hans Farelus, a Swede.

6. Kenya: In January-February, the so-called February 18th Movement (FEM) ran military operations into Kenya from eastern Uganda. Kenya charged on Feb. 3 that FEM leader John Odongo is believed to be in Uganda and operating with full backing from the Ugandan National Resistance Army. The Kenyan Armed Forces have been moved up to the Ugandan border. Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, under extreme pressure from the International Monetary Fund and from British and allied press outlets, met with

Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir on May 24, to discuss water projects for the entire region. According to the Ugandan representative to an April conference of the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, "We hope to break relations with Kenya soon."

7. Rwanda: The Rwandan Patriotic Front, currently ruling in Kigali, invaded Rwanda in October 1990 from Uganda and then again in fall of 1993. The RPF is a section of Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA); most prominently, RPF chief and now Rwandan Defense Minister Paul Kagame was the head of intelligence for the NRA. Baroness Chalker is the only public figure in the West or in Africa to defend the RPF in its slaughter of thousands of men, women, and children in the Kibeho refugee camp in southwestern Rwanda in April 1995, and Britain has announced that it will soon open a full embassy in Kigali. The RPF is armed from Uganda and is operating in Burundi against Hutu refugees there, and also against Rwandan refugees in Zaire.


8. Burundi: The Burundi military is 99% composed of members of the Tutsi minority of Burundi. It is armed from Uganda via Tanzania, and sources report that Ugandan troops are also operating in northern Burundi against Hutus there.

In September 1993, the Burundi military attempted a coup against the newly elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye, who was murdered along with other Hutu elites. The attempted coup and subsequent bloodletting, which resulted in over 100,000 deaths, was little publicized in the West, but was crucial in creating the environment for the mass slaughters that took place in Rwanda in summer 1994. Before Museveni, Ugandan dictator Idi Amin was a sponsor of the Burundi Tutsi military in the 1970s, when Burundi military tyrant Jean-Baptiste Bagaza was in power.

9. Libya: Libya was an early supporter of Museveni's war in the bush against the second government of Milton Obote (1981-86). It has continued to supply Uganda with arms and to support Museveni, despite the fall of the Iron Curtain and despite Museveni's full embrace of the International Monetary Fund's free-market dogma. Burundi dictator Bagaza went into exile in Libya after he was overthrown in 1987.

10. Somalia: Since the overthrow of President Siad Barre in 1990, Somalia has been in perpetual war and has broken down to the point of total political, social, and economic chaos. It is expected that Museveni will attempt to utilize various Somali clans to run military operations against Kenya. Unless London's wars in East Africa are brought to a halt, the annihilation of the nation of Somalia is the future for all countries in the region.

London's wars in East Africa



Baroness Cox readies a new Crusade

by Joseph Brewda

Tearful displays of concern over "human rights violations" in order to justify British land-grabs and mass-murder were a favorite British imperialist technique in the nineteenth century. Prime Minister William Gladstone, for example, was a master of such cynicism, as his sanctimonious diatribes against the Ottoman Empire for its massacres of Christian Bulgarians and Armenians attest. Unfortunately, this technique lives on, and among its modern-day masters is Deputy Speaker of the House of Lords Baroness (Caroline) Cox of Queensbury.

A trained specialist in psychological warfare, Baroness Cox has been assigned the task of luring the Clinton administration into confrontation with Sudan, an urgent geopolitical aim on the part of London. Working with her on this task are her old cronies, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (now Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven), and Baroness (Lynda) Chalker of Wallasey, Minister of Overseas Development.

In the first week of February, Baroness Cox led a delegation to Washington charged with this task. The Sudanese regime has killed over a million and a half people through "forced Islamicization," she told the congressional Human Rights Caucus on Feb. 6, and called this "genocide" a threat to the region. She demanded that the U.S. and British governments "recognize the right of self-determination" of the southern Sudanese rebels, and impose an "arms and oil embargo against Sudan" and an "air exclusion zone over Sudan." Baroness Cox's delegation was composed of members of Christian Solidarity International, a Swiss-based British intelligence organization for which she is the most prestigious spokesman.

In her private discussions, the baroness had an additional message. "We feel the time is now ripe for the U.S. government, with the backing of the British government, to overthrow this regime," she told one congressman after her testimony, an assessment presumably repeated in her discussions with several U.S. intelligence agencies that week.

Simultaneous with Baroness Cox's arrival, Baroness Thatcher arrived in Washington, D.C., where she met many of her old cronies from the Bush administration whom she had used to lure the United States into its 1991 war against Iraq.

Also simultaneous with Baroness Cox's arrival, the bankrupt President of Eritrea, Assiyas Afwerki, began a three-

week stay in Washington, where he offered to make his country into a new base of U.S. operations in the region. Two months earlier, Eritrea broke diplomatic relations with Sudan at Britain's request, and sponsored a conference of the Sudanese opposition, where for the first time all parties agreed to the right of the south to secede, paving the way for a British grab of the oil resources of the area.

The British effort to dupe Washington into aiding their plan has had mixed results. Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), a member of Christian Solidarity International U.S. board, was enthusiastic, as were elements of the traditionally Anglophile U.S. State Department. On March 24, the CSI delegation returned for hearings on Sudan before the House Subcommittee on Africa, and it was clear that progress had been made, from their standpoint. Wolf called for "stepped up operations" against Sudan, while State Department Africa hand Edward Brynn said that a "closed session" would be necessary for him to answer one congressman's query as to whether the United States was now supplying arms to the Sudanese opposition forces based in Eritrea.

But such U.S. actions have certainly not satisfied Baroness Cox, who in early May denounced former President Jimmy Carter to a gathering of the Sudanese opposition in Cairo, Egypt. Carter, who has served as an unofficial envoy of President Clinton, had in the interim negotiated a fragile cease-fire between the government and the southern rebels. The initiative, she lamented, "only helped the government," and led to the "displacement of 60,000 people." Meanwhile, the negotiating role played by Clinton's special representative to Khartoum, Melissa Wells, who frequently bypasses Donald Petterson, the abrasive U.S. ambassador there, has been repeatedly criticized by CSI officials.

Who is Baroness Cox?

A life peer appointed by Thatcher, Baroness Cox began her career as a Tavistock Institute-trained expert on nursing education. Tavistock is British intelligence's psychological warfare division and was the center of British Army psychological warfare operations in World War II. Among her studies were the reactions of the average member of society, the prospective nurse, to an environment of suffering and death. The manipulation made possible by such an environment has long been a Tavistock focus of investigation. One of her

mentors there, Dr. R.D. Laing, had earlier championed "madness" as a means of political "liberation."

Baroness Cox's training served her well in the 1980s, when she began her first important field assignment as a leading would-be defender of Polish freedom from Soviet Russian aggression.

By 1990, Baroness Cox emerged as the principal international defender of Armenia in its efforts to seize the Armenian ethnic enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in neighboring Azerbaijan. It is here that one sees the manipulative techniques that she has since used against the government of Sudan.

Since 1990, Baroness Cox has traveled to Nagorno-Karabakh over a dozen times on Christian Solidarity International "fact-finding trips." She has repeatedly testified before the U.S. Congress and European parliaments on the theme that Azeri "Islamic extremism" and "hatred of Christianity" are the cause of the war. She has tried hard to rope in American Protestant evangelicals into supporting the "Armenian cause." "Azerbaijan has adopted an explicit policy of ethnic cleansing of the Armenians from Karabakh," she claimed, during the February 1995 National Prayer Breakfast in Washington. "The Armenians have been fighting for the survival of their lives, and their—and our—Christian heritage." And, as in the case of Sudan, she has demanded the posting of international "human rights monitors" to stop "genocide," the airlift of supplies to the Armenians, and international sanctions against Azerbaijan.

In 1992, Baroness Cox began to concentrate on Sudan. Since then, she has traveled there seven times, emerging as simultaneously the world's leading champion of Armenia and the southern Sudanese Christians—in addition to her other responsibilities as deputy speaker of the House of Lords. The common feature of her displays on Poland, Armenia, and Sudan, is alleged support of western Christian values against the Orient, and in respect to the latter two cases, also Christianity against Islam. But this campaign has a geopolitical edge, coming right at the time that Great Britain has been attempting to put together a Russian-centered alliance of Serbia, Greece, and Armenia, against a Turkish-centered alliance of Bosnia, Albania, and Azerbaijan.

CSI: a British propaganda tool

Throughout her career, Baroness Cox has been a leader of Christian Solidarity International, which she describes as an "inter-denominational Christian human rights organization which tries to help victims of repression, regardless of their color, creed, or nationality." Well, not quite.

The fact that neither Baroness Cox nor Christian Solidarity International has ever been known to attack Serbian ethnic cleansing and genocide against Bosnia, gives one pause. In a January 1993 Moscow press conference on Armenia, Baroness Cox even went so far as to decry "media preoccupation with former Yugoslavia," calling this "one of the greatest problems with the present situation," since it leads to ignoring Armenian suffering. And, CSI's annual

rating of the world's nations in respect to religious liberty, which places Azerbaijan and Sudan at the bottom of the list, omits any classification of former Yugoslavia. It reports that there is "insufficient evidence" to determine whether religious liberties there are being violated. Based in Switzerland, with representative offices in 20 countries, CSI specializes in "human rights campaigns" which serve British geopolitical goals.

CSI was launched by Rev. Canon Michael Bourdeaux, the staff director and founder of the Keston Institute in Oxford, England. Many CSI officials, for example its specialist on Islam, John Eibner, were drawn from the Keston Institute's staff. Operating under the patronage of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Keston Institute was formed in 1969 to "supply factual information on religious life in communist lands," and to aid underground missionaries operating there. From its inception, it has been deeply involved in operations in eastern Europe, working closely with BBC, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and Oxford University. In 1984, Prince Philip, an avowed anti-Christian, granted Bourdeaux the coveted Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion. Since the fall of communism in Russia and eastern Europe, the institute has broadened its mandate to research the life of Christian minorities, such as those in Sudan.

Lies and propaganda

Christian Solidarity International has never let facts deter it from its crusades. Wildly propagandistic, CSI literature claims that Turkey, the most secular of all states with a Muslim majority, is "encouraging violent crimes by Islamic extremists against Christians." It bizarrely classifies the Egyptian government of President Hosni Mubarak as an "Islamic fundamentalist state," committed to crushing the minority Coptic Christians.

But CSI does not just target Muslim countries. Its literature targets Mexico, for example, where it says that "violent attacks and murders have been waged against evangelical Christians in predominantly Catholic-controlled areas of central Mexico," not so far from the Chiapas rebellion. It also charges that the Peruvian government has carried out "violent attacks" against "thousands of Christians" who have refused to participate in government efforts against the narco-terrorist Shining Path.

Since 1990, this British intelligence spinoff has concentrated on building up its U.S. organization, and here one finds that it is deeply involved with those networks most closely associated with former President George Bush. One CSI U.S. board member is Faith Whittlesey, who, as U.S. ambassador to Switzerland, established Oliver North's "Iran-Contra" bank accounts, using funds and operatives provided by the National Endowment for Democracy.

Reps. Frank Wolf, Chris Smith (R-N.J.), and former congressman Mark Siljander (R-Mich.), all anti-Clinton activists within the "religious right," are also on the U.S. board of Christian Solidarity International.

Who's out to destroy Sudan?

by Joseph Brewda and Lydia Cherry

Church-linked NGOs

1. Christian Solidarity International: See article, p. 56.

2. World Council of Churches: The WCC is one of the largest funders and conduits of British operations against Sudan. The Lutheran World Federation, which is central to anti-Sudanese operations, is housed at the WCC's headquarters in Geneva; Norwegian Church Aid, Bread for the World, and other anti-Sudanese operations, are de facto tentacles of its operations.

Formed in 1948 in the Netherlands as an ecumenical gathering of 147 churches from 44 nations, the WCC has been from its inception a British-directed intelligence operation, primarily run by Anglican, Lutheran, and Calvinist (Presbyterian) layers. The Roman Catholic Church refused to join. John Foster Dulles, later to become U.S. secretary of state, gave the opening address; the group's initial "anti-communist" ideology reflected its Anglo-American Cold War mission.

In 1961, timed with the admission of the Russian Orthodox Church, the WCC began to change ideological format through, increasingly, an embrace of "Liberation Theology," which saw the churches' main mission to be social revolution. By the end of the decade, it became one of the major funders of the World Wildlife Fund-managed African "liberation movements," such as the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the Mozambique Liberation Front, and the Pan African Congress, which have kept that continent embroiled in warfare. As the WCC moved "left," Christian Solidarity International, another British-run church movement, maintained a "Cold War" posture, in nominal opposition to the WCC.

3. Lutheran World Federation: In 1987, and again in 1995, the Lutheran World Federation was caught supplying arms and ammunition to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). The role of Lutheran charities in subverting Sudan, in part reflects British use of the Scandinavian countries (which are all officially Lutheran) as a conduit for their East African operations. Swedish Lutheran church minister Hans Farelus was a key sponsor of British agent Yoweri Museveni's rise to power in Uganda. Swedish military officers are currently secretly deployed in Uganda to aid the SPLA, according to Swedish sources. Norwegian Church

Aid, the charitable arm of the Lutheran state church of Norway, is especially active in Sudan.

Formed in 1947, the LWF is an international federation of 119 state churches and congregations. It maintains several charitable arms active in the former colonial sector that provide cover for European oligarchical interests, notably including the German-based Bread for the World and the U.S.-based Lutheran World Relief. Its total annual grants exceed \$140 million; the grants of its affiliates are far larger.


4. Bread for the World: BFW is the most important group lobbying the U.S. Congress against Sudan, and it works in close collaboration with the National Council of Churches (the WCC's U.S. affiliate), the Jesuit Order-affiliated Center for Concern, and the New York Council on Foreign Relations. Its spokesman, Sharon Pauling, has frequently appeared before the U.S. Congress and the media as an "expert witness" on Sudan. The group has helped draft various congressional resolutions condemning Sudan; for example, the 1993 resolution sponsored by Sen. Paul Simon (D-Ill.), an important mouthpiece of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL). BFW has repeatedly demanded that the U.N. take action against Sudan, and that "human rights monitors" be deployed throughout the country. It has also endorsed "self-determination" for the south. In March 1994, a BFW-sponsored meeting of the Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa, nominally convened to map out medium- and long-term plans for the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) against the Sudanese government, had on its agenda the question of provision of arms to the SPLA.

Founded in 1959, BFW is the "charitable arm" of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany. It is the second largest German charity active in the former colonial sector, authorizing \$143 million in grants in 1994, including \$43 million to Africa. It works closely with the largest German charity, Misereor, the Catholic aid organization, both of which are government funded. In 1994, Misereor was caught funding the sponsors of the Chiapas revolt in Mexico (see *EIR*, March 31, 1995, p. 31).

BFW's U.S. affiliate was created in 1974 by the former head of the All African Council of Churches, Burgess Carr of Liberia. The specific mandate given BFW-U.S. by its German headquarters is to "mobilize the awareness of the U.S. population" on behalf of its aid efforts. From its inception until last year, BFW-U.S. was led by Arthur Simon, a Lutheran minister and brother of Senator Simon. Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.) is also active with the group, and has led their demonstrations in front of the Sudanese embassy in Washington. David Beckmann, the new head of BFW-U.S., had previously been the World Bank's liaison to all international NGOs.

5. Catholic Relief Services: Contrary to the efforts of Pope John Paul II to settle the civil war, CRS funds Bishop Taban Paride and Bishop Macram Gassis of southern Sudan. They, in turn, directly aid the SPLA, both militarily and

Controllers of the campaign against Sudan



financially, according to regional sources. In February 1995, Gassis testified before the U.S. Congress Human Rights Caucus. He condemned the pope's 1992 trip to Sudan as a "complete failure" from a political point of view, and ridiculed efforts made by the Vatican to promote an "Islamic-Christian dialogue." CRS public literature claims the war is a result of the government's effort to "annihilate" the Christians of the south, and has accused the government of a "relentlessly cruel bombing campaign" which has included "attacks on camps jammed with displaced civilians."

Founded in 1943 by the Catholic Bishops of the United States to provide overseas assistance, CRS receives three-quarters of its \$300 million annual budget from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). It has several former State Department officials on its staff. Its executive director, since 1983, Lawrence Pezzullo, recently rejoined the State Department Latin American division.

6. Pax Christi: Cardinal Godfried Danneels of Belgium, the president of Pax Christi, has been declared persona non grata by the Sudanese government because of the group's support for the southern rebellion.

Formed in 1944, Pax Christi has been a central promulgator and practitioner of the heretical dogma of "Liberation Theology." Under this dogma, various Catholic agencies such as Pax Christi have aided anti-Islamic or nominally anti-

imperialist revolutions in Africa and Ibero-America, under the covert direction of European oligarchical families and governments. Its role was central in the 1986 overthrow of Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos and in justifying the 1994 U.S. military occupation of Haiti, and it is now a main backer of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico. A former head of the WWF's eco-terrorist Greenpeace organization has been appointed to direct Pax Christi's U.S. office, indicating the future directions of the group.

7. World Vision International: In 1987, World Vision was expelled from Sudan, together with the Lutheran World Federation, after being caught providing arms to the SPLA. World Vision's Sudanese operations are now forward-based out of Uganda. In January 1995, in a policy document on Sudan, the group stated that its objective was "to enable the southern Sudanese to achieve the right to self-determination." The head of its Washington office, Tom Gettman, is also a leader of Bread for the World.

Founded in 1950, World Vision is a Seattle, Washington-based Protestant evangelical relief agency, with an income that exceeds \$250 million annually. Most of its funds come from USAID, a relationship which began no later than during the Vietnam War, when its numerous Southeast Asian field offices regularly supplied intelligence to the CIA, according to a 1979 article in *Christian Century*. During the Reagan-

Bush administration, World Vision helped install the Rios Montt government into power in Guatemala. Its refugee camps in Honduras were used to aid Contra operations.

World Vision is chaired by W. Stanley Mooneyham, the former press secretary of Rev. Billy Graham, and led by several retired U.S. military and intelligence officials who, like Graham, have had longstanding ties to former U.S. President George Bush. Among its leaders have been Robert Ainsworth, who ran the State Department negotiations of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Treaty, and John Hinckley, Sr., the Texas oil man and friend of George Bush whose son, John Hinckley, Jr., shot President Ronald Reagan in 1981 in an assassination attempt.

Human rights NGOs

8. Amnesty International: Always working closely with the media and the WCC, Amnesty International selectively targets Third World nations on the British hit-list, such as Sudan. In January 1995, it published *The Tears of Orphans: There Is No Future for Sudan without Human Rights*, which claimed widespread human rights abuses. At a Nairobi press conference releasing the book, Amnesty International General Secretary Pierre Sanny endorsed earlier calls by Baroness Cox to establish a network of international human rights monitors throughout Sudan. Amnesty International explicitly claimed in that book that adhering to *Shari-ah*, Islamic law, is a violation of human rights per se.

Amnesty International was formed in 1961 as a specialized British intelligence agency assigned to target former colonial sector leaders and governments. Its founders included David Astor, longtime editor of the *London Observer*; former British intelligence Thailand specialist Robert Swann; and Quaker activist Eric Baker. Its first major targets included President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Britain's most feared African opponent; and Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar of Portugal, whose African empire Britain was then targeting for reorganization. In 1966, the group was reorganized after its covert patronage by the British Foreign Office was exposed. It currently maintains 70 chapters throughout the world, with its headquarters in London.

9. Anti-Slavery International: ASI operations against Sudan include an international and growing effort to claim that the Sudanese government encourages slavery, reflecting a longstanding British and Israeli effort to pit black Africa against the Arab world based on the Arabs' historic role in the Venetian, Turkish, and British-run slave trade. On May 20, the group helped sponsor the first anti-slavery conference held in the United States in 120 years, which focused on Sudan and featured the Catholic bishop of El-Obeid, Sudan, Macram Gassis, an operative of Christian Solidarity International.

Founded in London in 1839, the ASI used the slavery issue to both provoke the U.S. Civil War and to undermine and take over the slave-based empires of Britain's imperial

rivals, France and Portugal. British-run Indian coolies, who were nominally free, were by then far cheaper than black slaves (but nonetheless Britain did not ban slavery among its East African colonies until 1920). The society has always been controlled by Quaker "chocolate baron" and banking families, such as the Barclays, Cadburys, Frys, Rowntrees, and Buxtons, who have been among the most savage imperial oppressors of Africa. Reorganized after World War I by British intelligence officer Lord Noel Buxton, ASI works closely with the Save the Children Federation which Buxton founded, and which is now led by Princess Anne. The Buxtons, who control Barclays Bank, helped found the World Wildlife Fund.

10. Minority Rights Group: Formed in 1970, the MRG of Britain is one of the most important controlling agencies over diverse NGOs internationally. It has played a major behind-the-scenes role in drafting several U.N. Human Rights conventions. Chaired by former British Ambassador to the U.N. Sir John Thomson, it has printed over 100 books and reports over the last 20 years targeting the former colonial sector for alleged abuses of minorities. The group serves as an important adviser to various "indigenous rights" NGOs, such as the German-based Society for Endangered Peoples, which in 1995 issued a report condemning Sudan.

11. Freedom House: A major force in the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy, the group publishes an annual rating system of nations. Sudan is currently listed with Iraq as the least-free nation of the 191 nations rated.

Formed in 1941 in New York out of networks deployed by British Security Coordinator Sir William Stephenson, Freedom House has played a role in coordinating smear campaigns against targeted states. The organization was chaired from the end of World War II through 1977 by Leo Cherne, later vice chairman of the Bush administration's President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

12. Fund for Peace: Fund for Peace has been one of the more important conduits of National Endowment for Democracy grants to the Sudanese opposition to aid its propaganda and intelligence efforts. In 1993, the NED allocated \$40,000 to the group to fund "activists within Sudan" to "document and disseminate information on human rights abuses in Sudan." The NED gave another \$44,000 grant to the FFP to fund the London-based *Sudan Gazette* of former Sudanese Foreign Minister and SPLA activist Bona Malwal. Its Cairo, Egypt office has been particularly active in organizing strategy conferences of the Sudanese opposition.

Formed in 1969 in Washington, D.C., FFP was directed until April by Nina Solarz, wife of former U.S. Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N. Y.). Solarz has been one of the key proponents of "democratization" in the former colonial sector, working closely with the ADL. Solarz is on the board of the NED, which funds his wife's group. FFP is now being reorganized following Mrs. Solarz's April 1995 conviction for embezzlement.

Relief NGOs

13. Norwegian People's Aid: Since 1986, the group has maintained a continued presence in southern Sudan. It supports the SPLA in its public literature as an organization fighting "ethnic and religious oppression," and calls for making southern Sudan a separate country. Its official \$15 million in grants per year are entirely provided by the Norwegian, American, and Dutch governments, and the U.N. In January 1995, the Sudan government lodged a formal complaint with the U.N. after the NPA and the Lutheran World Federation were caught dropping boxes of ammunition to SPLA troops from a hired Belgian military plane.

Founded in 1939 as an outgrowth of the Norwegian Socialist Party's support for the Republicans in the Spanish Civil war, NPA is a major Scandinavian conduit for British intelligence operations in Africa and Ibero-America. A major funder of the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime, NPA has also provided assistance to various "Indian liberation movements," such as in Chiapas, that claim that Columbus's discovery of the Americas began 500 years of oppression of native Americans. It has similarly aided tribal and revolutionary organizations throughout Africa, such as the Pan African Congress, the Eritrean Liberation Front, and the Tigre liberation movement of Ethiopia, that have kept that continent in nearly continuous civil war.

14. Save the Children Federation: Founded in 1923 by British intelligence officer Lord Noel Buxton, SCF is the largest British children's charity, operating under the patronage of Princess Anne. SCF is active throughout regions targeted for British destabilization. Important targets of SCF have been Angola, Mozambique, India, Tibet, and China. In 1992, SCF spent some \$20 million in southern Sudan, currently the group's largest project.

15. Oxfam: Formed in 1941, Oxford Famine is a highly secretive British intelligence organization which specializes in fostering insurgencies under the guise of food relief. Its operations in southern Sudan, where it has selectively aided rebels sponsored by the British government, are typical.

16. Doctors without Borders: The group has been active in southern Sudan since 1979. According to regional sources, it has been deeply involved with the SPLA in overseeing gold mining in southern Sudan to provide the funds necessary for arms purchases.

Formed in France in 1971 by Bernard Kouchner, later the humanitarian assistance czar under President François Mitterrand, Doctors without Borders is the world's largest nominally independent medical relief agency. The group has played a major role in putting forward the cynical claim that humanitarian concerns supersede national sovereignty. In 1991, Kouchner authored a French resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council which authorized "humanitarian assistance" in northern Iraq without the permission of the Iraqi government—an important imperial precedent. The same claim has since been used by the British and U.S.

governments to fund Uganda-based NGOs who enter southern Sudan without Sudanese government permission.

Direct British Crown operations

17. World Wide Fund for Nature: The WWF (formerly the World Wildlife Fund) is central to British operations against Sudan. The WWF-created Kidepo and Nimuli national parks, directly on the Ugandan border with Sudan, are the command centers, training grounds, and safe havens for the SPLA guerrillas. The area around the Nimuli park is also the remaining main entry point for the SPLA into Sudan. Additionally, WWF-organized flights over the border region, nominally to take censuses of endangered wildlife species, have been important sources of SPLA aerial reconnaissance, according to regional sources. The Kidepo park was created in 1962 by WWF founder and Ugandan Parks Department Chairman Sir Peter Scott, over the objections of local conservationists who argued that the siting was unreasonable. Since its inception, the park has been continuously used to aid the subversion of Sudan, which gained its independence from Britain in 1956. Other Ugandan parks have been used for the training of guerrilla organizations active in Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and South Africa.

In 1994, the WWF, in an apparent effort to bribe the Sudanese government, offered Sudan a 15-year \$100 million loan via the Wellington Fund, a \$500,000 anonymous grant per month over three years, and a \$6 million grant in its own name if it agreed to the establishment of national parks in southern Sudan in the region of the rebellion. According to the proposal, these parks would be under the management of British intelligence official Richard Leakey, the former head of Kenya's park system. Leakey is currently aiding the British-run, Uganda-based subversion of Kenya.

Founded in 1961 by Queen Elizabeth's Royal Consort Prince Philip, and by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, the WWF is the most important intelligence agency of the British-centered European oligarchy. Since its inception, its professed mandate to protect international wildlife has served as a cover to not only block industrial development in the former colonial sector, but to also carve out extraterritorial preserves within former colonies, in the form of national parks and game parks, which have been used to maintain control of those former colonies (see *EIR*, Oct. 28, 1994, "The Coming Fall of the House of Windsor").

18. Royal African Society: Peter Woodward, the editor of *African Affairs*, the society's quarterly, is the most important British intelligence coordinator of the Sudanese opposition. A former professor at the University of Khartoum in the 1970s, Woodward brags that "most of the leaders of the opposition have been among my students." His office at the University of Reading is an important meeting place for the Sudanese Communist Party, SPLA, Democratic Unionist Party, National Democratic Alliance, the Umma party, the Sudan Human Rights Organization, and other Sudanese op-

position movements based in Britain.

Founded in 1901 under the patronage of Queen Victoria, and continuing today under the patronage of Queen Elizabeth, the RAS remains the premier Crown intelligence arm for Africa. *African Affairs* serves to guide policy among broader non-government layers, as does its frequent conferences, often held in conjunction with Baroness Lynda Chalker's Overseas Development Administration and the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

19. Royal Geographic Society: In October 1982, the RGS sponsored an international conference in opposition to the Jonglei Canal. Among the more bizarre claims put forward there, was that the canal would turn the southern swamps into a desert. Other charges were that it would change the "life-style" of the "Nilotic peoples" living there through providing them modern transportation, communications, and industrial and agricultural employment. Fears were also raised that the canal would lead to a massive migration of Egyptian farmers looking for work. In May 1983, when John Garang began the insurrection, the canal was one of its principal targets. Garang had done his Ph.D. thesis while at the University of Iowa in 1981 on the canal's effects on the indigenous population. By November 1983, SPLA attacks on foreign workers at the canal site terminated the project.

Formed in 1830, the RGS has been from its inception the designated organizer of British geographical field explorations overseas. Its sponsorship of the famous expeditions of David Livingstone and Sir Richard Burton were central in carving out Britain's African empire. One of the Crown's most important intelligence-gathering agencies in Africa and Asia, in particular, in 1994 alone it organized over 500 exploration expeditions to Malaysia, Pakistan, Kenya, Oman, Australia, Brazil, Nepal, Tanzania, and other nations. The society's board is virtually indistinguishable from that of the Zoological Society of London, which was formed in 1826 by the former Viceroy of India, Sir Stamford Raffles, and whose professed effort to locate rare tropical species for London's zoos was designed to further colonial interests. Both groups, which are at the pinnacle of the British intelligence establishment, were among the founders of the World Wildlife Fund.

20. U.K. Parliamentary Human Rights Committee: Chaired by Lord Avebury since its formation in 1967, the committee specializes in using the human rights issue to destabilize countries. It works especially closely with Amnesty International and Christian Solidarity International, in which Avebury is an activist. In June 1994, Avebury and Baroness Cox chaired an international conference in Bonn, Germany on human rights in Sudan, which drew together top representatives from the SPLA, Sudanese Communist Party, northern Islamic parties hostile to the government, and others, to coordinate a campaign against Sudan. Avebury's parliamentary committee is also a major international patron of the Kashmiri independence movement of Ghulam Nabi Fai, and the Kurdish independence movement, which, like the

Kashmiri and southern Sudanese independence movements, are internationally based in Britain.

United Nations operations

21. U.N. Development Program: Sudan figures as one of the UNDP's primary targets. In 1994, the group labeled it as the 78th lowest in "human development" of 98 "developing nations." It also labeled it, with seven other countries, as being a "state in crisis" which threatened its existence. One of the heads of the UNDP field office in Nairobi, Kenya, is former Sudanese Foreign Minister Mansour Khalid, the controller of SPLA Chairman John Garang. Khalid, who announced that he was joining up with the rebels in a 1984 address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, has been closely associated with George Bush since the early 1970s when both were ambassadors to the U.N. UNDP flights in the region, especially on the Uganda-Sudan border, are used to supply arms to the SPLA as well as to transport its troops. The UNDP's Ellen Sirleaf is currently a sponsor and adviser to the murderous Rwandan Patriotic Front regime in Rwanda.

Formed in 1966, the UNDP's purpose was to propagandize in favor of the doctrine of "sustainable development," which labels physical economic growth and industrialization as contrary to development. Under this doctrine, the UNDP has massively funded indigenous and ecological programs against national governments.

22. U.N. Office of High Commissioner for Refugees: Established in 1950, the agency has been integral to U.N. destabilizations of regions wracked by war and natural disasters. It is an offshoot of the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which studied and utilized the destabilizing effects of the mass-movement of refugees in the post-World War II period. Since 1989, the agency has been central to orchestrating fears of mass-migration of North African Muslims to Europe. Among its most important roles has been the creation of refugee camps in war-torn areas which serve as recruitment bases for insurgent organizations, as well as a pretext for foreign intervention into sovereign states under humanitarian cover, as it has done in the case of Sudan. Working closely with the office is Francis Deng, U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's special assistant on displaced persons. Deng is a former Sudanese foreign minister affiliated with the SPLA.

Bankrollers

23. Overseas Development Administration: The ODA is directed by Baroness Chalker, the controller of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. Under her direction, Uganda is being made a marcher-lord for British operations throughout the region, including against Sudan.

Alone among any figure in any government in the world, Baroness Chalker has defended the massacre of an estimated 8,000 Hutu refugees at the Kibeho refugee camp in Rwanda on April 22 by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which was orga-



Baroness Lynda Chalker, the controller of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, whom one British source describes as "the blue-eyed darling of the British in Africa."

nized by the Ugandan Army to invade Rwanda in 1990. In remarks to BBC, she claimed that only 300 people were killed, and dismissed them as "Hutu extremists. . . . It must be for the government of Rwanda to restore order." She promised more bloodshed: "I'm afraid we have a long way to go and probably some more tragedies on the way, but we'll try and prevent them."

The ODA evolved from the old British Colonial Office that had run the British Empire. In 1964, the British government nominally disbanded the Colonial Office as part of its policy of "decolonization." But the Colonial Office continued to exist in fact, with all its officers, staff, and records, as the core of new Ministry of Overseas Development. Since that time, the ODA has been made a functional wing of the Foreign Ministry, in charge of all international grant-making for the British government, disbursing \$3.5 billion in grants annually. Reflecting its old status, the director of the ODA, Baroness Chalker, maintains full ministerial rank. Under the cover of grant-making, the ODA fields a variety of subversive operations, often in close coordination with the United Nations, as well as in collaboration with a network of British NGOs that operate above the government, such as the Royal African Society.

24. U.S. Agency for International Development: In 1994, USAID provided \$92 million in "humanitarian assistance" grants to NGOs operating in Sudan. These funds provided most, if not all, of the Sudanese operations budgets of such NGOs as Norwegian Peoples Aid, Save the Children

Federation, the Lutheran World Federation, Catholic Relief Services, and Doctors without Borders. Formed in 1961, USAID is a major cash-cow for diverse international intelligence operations.

25. National Endowment for Democracy: The NED directly and indirectly grants a substantial amount of funds to the Sudanese opposition movement based in Britain. This includes funding the primary opposition newspaper *Sudan Gazette* of former Sudanese minister Bona Malwal. The NED is also the primary funder of Fund for Peace, which describes itself as using these funds to build an "information network" within Sudan. Additionally, NED formal subsidiaries, such as its Free Trade Union Institute, bankroll the Egyptian-based Sudan Workers Trade Union Federation, an important forward base of subversion against northern Sudan. Other NED funds to Sudanese opposition organizations are conducted through a myriad of overlapping front organizations, such as the International Federation of Free Trade Unions, Africa Watch, and the African-American Labor Center.

Founded as a nominally private foundation in 1983 by an act of Congress, the NED dispenses USAID and other government grants to "democratic" organizations throughout the former colonial sector. Its formation was announced by President Reagan in an address, authored by longtime Kissinger aide Lawrence Eagleburger, to the British Parliament in 1982. Kissinger later served on the NED's board, as have several other State Department officials. NED operations rapidly became one of the primary means through which then-Vice President George Bush ran diverse intelligence operations that were nominally distinct from the U.S. government. In 1986, documents seized from Lt. Col. Oliver North's safe showed that the "Iran-Contra" sale of arms to Iran and to the Nicaraguan rebel Contras was entirely run through NED-funded organizations and personnel, and that North labeled this apparatus "Project Democracy," the name informally given to the NED by President Reagan. Despite the scandal, the NED apparatus was carefully protected.

26. Ford Foundation network: An interlocked network of eight U.S.-based foundations gave over \$15 million in 1994 alone to the major NGOs targeting Sudan in officially reported direct grants. These foundations are the Ford Foundation, Lilly Endowment, MacArthur Foundation, Pew Charitable Trusts, Rockefeller Foundation, Mott Foundation, Carnegie Corp., and Alton Jones Foundation. This same network is funding ongoing British efforts to overthrow the current Nigerian government. The total assets of the network, which serve as a cash-cow for British operations internationally, exceeds \$21 billion. NGOs active in Sudan funded by this network include the World Council of Churches, Lutheran World Federation, Bread for the World, World Vision, Oxfam, the World Wide Fund for Nature, Amnesty International, Save the Children Fund, Fund for Peace, and the Sudan Council of Churches—which SPLA leader John Garang takes credit for founding.