

MODERN IRREGULAR WARFARE

IN DEFENSE POLICY
AND AS A
MILITARY PHENOMENON

Professor Friedrich August
Frhr. von der Heydte

MODERN IRREGULAR WARFARE von der Heydte

 Franklin
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III. Models of Irregular Warfare

Josip Broz Tito (sitting), shown above in the mountains of Yugoslavia, was a military genius in irregular warfare, leading his partisans through four years of fighting to victory over the Nazis.



Greek Colonel Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, pictured with binoculars above, led a brilliantly successful campaign against the British occupiers in Cyprus, during the 1950s.

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WEST GERMANY, MAY 1986

When these "ecologists" attacked the police at the Wackersdorf nuclear reprocessing plant in Bavaria, West Germany on May 17-18, 1986, 200 police officers were injured and a million dollars worth of property was destroyed. The assaults were coordinated on the spot by the German Communist Party, the DKP, directing a corps of terrorist shock-troops. The strings on the DKP and its terrorists run through East Germany to Moscow.

The West is at war. Yet politicians on both sides of the Atlantic call pitched battles like Wackersdorf "anti-nuclear demonstrations," and Soviet-directed assassinations "political violence."

Today West Germany is on the front lines of this war. If the battle for Germany is lost, the battle for the West as a whole cannot be won.



Professor von der Heydte's book, the classic study of Irregular Warfare, first appeared in German in 1972. It is indispensable reading for those who want to understand how this warfare is proceeding, . . . and how to stop it.

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Vietnamese leaders Ho Chi Minh (center) and General Giap (right), shown in a planning session, were masters of guerrilla warfare, against both the French and the U.S.



The North Vietnamese used an extraordinarily mobile deployment, avoiding set-piece battles, but they also relied on technology, like the artillery shown above.


Mao Tse-Tung, shown above reading the proclamation of the Central People's Government on Oct. 1, 1949, wrote reams of instructions on irregular warfare, which have been followed internationally.



Mao, unlike some other guerrilla leaders, was able to set up permanent headquarters in Yen-an Province. Here, students are shown outside the Yen-an caves, where they lived and prepared for the long war.



Preparations for World War III have concentrated on readiness for combat under nuclear radioactive conditions, as the German soldiers on maneuvers above, show.



Henry Kissinger and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, shown together on West German-American Friendship Day in 1983, think they can replace warfare with their "crisis management," but they have only built up Soviet capabilities.

**To Jacques Massu and
Maxwell Davenport Taylor,
who were the first to realize
the essence and
the military significance
of modern irregular warfare.**

MODERN IRREGULAR WARFARE
in Defense Policy and as a Military
Phenomenon

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FOREWORD

Present-Day Irregular Warfare from a Classical Standpoint

On the weekend of May 17-18, 1986, forces linked to East-bloc influences launched irregular-warfare attacks in the vicinity of Wackersdorf, Bavaria. By the end of the following week, key military and intelligence professionals on both sides of the Atlantic had reached agreement on an assessment of these developments. These professionals agreed, that this was a new level of Soviet-directed irregular warfare against the institutions and populations of the Atlantic Alliance nations. Suddenly, Gen. Freiherr von der Heydte's out-of-print classic, *Der moderne Kleinkrieg*, was once again in demand.

While Moscow preaches détente and disarmament to the governments of the Atlantic Alliance, the new Russian empire of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov is accelerating its pre-war arms-buildup to the limit. Already, that empire has unleashed a shooting-war on the territories of Atlantic Alliance nations and their friends. In Central and South America, in Africa, in many parts of Asia, Soviet-directed irregular forces are on the march and shooting. The assault on Wackersdorf marked the opening of a new, third phase of this irregular warfare in the European theater. In the opinion of professionals consulted, Freiherr von der Heydte's classic, offers the military, the policy-making statesman, and the concerned citizen the best guide for understanding both the nature of this peril, and how best to combat it.

Although some of the targets of sabotage and assassinations are Soviet military objectives in and of themselves, the more general purpose of Soviet-directed irregular warfare on the territories of Atlantic Alliance nations, is to weaken the political will of the governments and population to resist. This is made most clear by looking back about twenty years, when newly-installed Soviet KGB chief Yuri Andropov launched the first phase of the operations leading into the Wackersdorf assault, and beyond.

Already, at that time, Western Europe and North America were experiencing the beginning of a sickness reminiscent of the internal collapse of the Weimar Republic: the convergence of the "new left" radicalization with the rock-drug-sex coun-

terculture. Between the years 1967 and 1969, Andropov steered the Warsaw Pact foreign services into a new venture, to penetrate, coopt, and exploit this seed of cultural decay within the West. By 1969-1970, Syria was functioning as a leading Warsaw Pact surrogate, in the creation of a new Soviet force, international narco-terrorism.

During the same period, in a related way, the KGB reached out to the new neo-malthusian movement just then being launched around the Club of Rome by such figures as the OECD's Dr. Alexander King and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's crony, Solly Zuckerman. The KGB entered into collaboration with the backers of the Club of Rome. A. Kossygin's son-in-law, KGB official Dzhermen Gvishiani, collaborated with King and Zuckerman in creating the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). Back in Moscow, the neo-malthusian Global Systems Analysis group was the KGB channel to the IIASA East-West back-channel.

There are two features of the West which the Soviet ruling class, the *Nomenklatura*, has feared the most, back during the 1960s, and still today. First, Moscow fears the West's political will to resist Soviet strategic demands. Second, Moscow fears the West's superiority in effecting technological progress; if the West could be induced to adopt an anti-technology ideology, neo-malthusianism, Western industrial superiority could be undermined, as has been the case, increasingly, over the past fifteen years. The tendency for convergence, between the neo-malthusians and the smaller radical pro-terrorist strata, represented the leading edge of Soviet potential for developing irregular warfare potentialities within the Atlantic Alliance nations.

The tendency for convergence of these two currents, has already produced a condition fairly described as a "Weimarization" process within all Atlantic Alliance nations. Against the weakened, less resolute economies and political structures of those nations, Moscow now unleashes escalating irregular warfare proper.

The documentation is massive, conclusive. The assessment is clear. Despite the evidence, policy-shaping circles generally refuse to allow the simple truth to be stated openly; in some cases, it is even forbidden to think such things aloud behind closed doors. There is a combination of motives for such

fearful avoidance of a simple truth. One of the motives is the understanding, that once we acknowledge that Moscow is escalating irregular warfare on the territory of the Atlantic Alliance nations, we must scrap that doctrine of crisis-management which has dominated the Alliance's policy-making increasingly over the past twenty years. In face of Soviet-directed irregular warfare on our territory, crisis-management portends early Soviet world-domination. Crisis-management must be abandoned, and a different, more appropriate doctrine adopted, instead.

The Trilateral Commission's Zbigniew Brzezinski states the point at issue in his recent book, *Game Plan*. He insists that the strategic policy must be, to abandon the means for securing victory, while avoiding outright defeat. This means placating Soviet surrogate Syria, the keystone of international narco-terrorism. Asking Moscow and Damascus to cooperate in limiting the irregular warfare being escalated on our territories, means negotiating a compromise with armed enemy forces on our territory, rather than rooting out what are in fact invading units of adversary military forces. It means, in effect, conceding to these invading forces, the right to base themselves on our territory, and to operate upon it. Such a policy is one of assured defeat over the medium-term.

Mr. Brzezinski's and other current proposals for continued crisis-management will either be rejected, or we ensure our own inevitable subjugation by Soviet world-domination. We require a new policy, a new strategy, to replace crisis-management defeatism. We require a strategy which includes policies for checking and eliminating irregular warfare on our territory.

The need for such a change in strategy began to be clear to a more numerous portion of our military and intelligence professionals, and others as well, beginning the week following the assault on Wackersdorf. The demand for copies of *Der moderne Kleinkrieg* came from such quarters, beginning that week. A republication, this time in several languages, was necessary.

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Leesburg, Virginia
July 17, 1986

A CONVERSATION WITH THE AUTHOR

The following interview with Professor Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte was conducted on July 29, 1986, in Aham, Bavaria, by Michael Liebig, an executive director of the European branch of Executive Intelligence Review. In it, Professor von der Heydte situates his work in the context of the strategic debate today.

Liebig: What were the circumstances which prompted you to write the book *Modern Irregular Warfare*?

Von der Heydte: The fact, that there is enough literature on modern irregular warfare to fill a library, but all of it, in my opinion, trickily and cleverly, misses the salient point of modern irregular warfare.

Liebig: Was there an added motivation for writing the book, out of the concrete historical situation at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s?

Von der Heydte: Yes; when I began to write the book, the Americans were still fighting in Vietnam—that is the typical case of an irregular war lost by a great power. I wanted to demonstrate the tangible mistakes of the Americans, in the form of theses. But I did not intend to judge the specific American conduct of this war, but to analyze the fact of irregular warfare. In addition, the French officer who defended Dien Bien Phu is a distant cousin of mine. For that reason, I wanted to investigate the kind of irregular war, which the French conducted in Indochina—in my opinion, better than the Americans. The French had the advantage, that they had gathered a good deal of experience in waging irregular warfare during the *résistance*.

Liebig: Did you have a particular reason for dedicating the first edition of the book to Maxwell Taylor and Massu?

Von der Heydte: These were the only generals among my circle of acquaintances who had a sense for the notion of irregular warfare. Massu himself waged irregular war in North Africa, at least to the extent that his government let him. There was a dramatic clash between Massu and the French

government, because the French government, despite the experience of the *résistance*, had no feel for the resistance of the Arabs. And Taylor is the only American general, with whom I not only talked about irregular warfare, but who also shared my views, in large part.

Liebig: Was there anything else in Germany, in the academic or political debate at that time, which particularly motivated or excited you?

Von der Heydte: Not really, because German military-science studies hardly dealt with the problem of irregular warfare, because, understandably, people had to catch their breath after having lost the war, and after joining NATO, everyone thought only in categories of conventional or nuclear war. So, while it is hardly possible to work through all the French and American literature, it would take only a good week to work through the entirety of what has been written in German—beyond good and evil.

Liebig: Were there other reasons, such as the so-called student unrest at the end of the 1960s?

Von der Heydte: I was particularly interested in the student unrest in France, in which Massu played a certain role. You know how de Gaulle came to meet Massu in Baden-Baden, to discuss putting down the uprising if it should spread. In reality, the actual uprising was limited to the students in Paris, and there was no sympathetic reaction to it in the French population, in fact, most average Frenchmen vehemently condemned it. Massu also, which is not generally known, advised de Gaulle, and de Gaulle followed his advice, to pull two or three divisions around Paris for an exercise. So, they maneuvered all around Paris, and that had its effect.

Liebig: Your book is not empiricist, and it is also not a manual in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the term. How would you characterize your methodological approach in the book?

Von der Heydte: Yes, it is a mixture of my own modest experiences and observations, which I made in World War II in the western and eastern theaters of war, and scientific considerations of a theoretical kind.

Liebig: Could you specify a little more, what you mean by considerations of a theoretical kind?

Von der Heydte: Very simply, as a German officer—with or without General Staff training—you have to put yourself in the enemy's situation, and think: what would you do, if you were in the enemy's position? If that's really what's being done, then that makes up a large part of what is called German military theory.

Liebig: In the book, you speak of the strategic model of irregular war. What are the conceptually crucial points, which distinguish irregular war from other kinds of war?

Von der Heydte: That irregular war lacks everything which a normal war entails. That begins with the declaration of war—irregular war is not declared. Then it continues with uniforms—there are no uniforms in irregular war, no insignia of rank, people simply know each other. And it ends with armament. Irregular warfare has a completely different armament from a conventional “large” war.

Liebig: What influence did German military-science theory, as it was established in the 19th century, have on your conceptual analysis of modern irregular warfare?

Von der Heydte: No, there I have to say, actually less than you probably suppose. The Germans, basically, have hardly ever waged or experienced a real irregular war. With the possible exception of the rebellion in 1848-1849. I had a wealth of material, particularly on the rebellion in East Hungary against the German-Austrians, because the only Austrian regiment, which participated in putting down the Hungarians who were waging irregular warfare—the Russians played a major role in that—was led by my great uncle. This man left memoirs, which I studied. Irregular warfare in general, of course, has a long history. The Spanish, for example, waged a bloody and effective irregular war against Napoleon from 1808 to 1814.

Liebig: Do you view the Liberation Wars from 1813 onward as forms of irregular war?

Von der Heydte: The Liberation Wars were essentially “large” classical wars. There were also irregular warfare features in

the Liberation Wars, such as Schill's irregular troops, or Lützow's “daring hunt.” But the importance of these irregular warfare features was limited.

Liebig: In your opinion, what significance do Scharnhorst and Clausewitz have for military-theoretical understanding of irregular warfare?

Von der Heydte: It is difficult to say. Clausewitz is the “father of modern military theory.” But, you have to consider, just to take one example, how drastically the notion of “time” in military strategy has changed. One of my military teachers tried to make clear to us what “time” meant for Napoleon, for Moltke 1870-71, for World War I, World War II, with motorization and aircraft. And then for real in the space age.

Clausewitz did make a highly interesting speech about irregular war in his time, but he primarily dealt with regular, large, classical war. By contrast, irregular warfare is a phenomenon, which manifests specific, unique characteristics. It is war, which is apparently not war. A war which ends, but has no beginning. No one can any longer deny the possibility, that we are already, here and now, in the middle of an irregular war.

Liebig: What effect did your book have in the Federal Republic of Germany?

Von der Heydte: I think the effect of the book on the West was very slight, because the American view was so dominant. Interestingly, people in the East Bloc were very interested in my book.

Liebig: Again, how do you see the effect of your book a) in political life, b) among the military, c) and among the police in the Federal Republic of Germany?

Von der Heydte: As far as the police is concerned, it is my impression, that the police in the irregular warfare situation at Wackersdorf were behaving and approaching the problem just the way they always behave and always approach the problem.

But I have some indications, that, in some layers of the leadership of the police, my book is treated as a kind of “secret hot tip.”

The official command of the Bundeswehr, to my knowl-

edge, has taken no notice of the book. Irregular war is beyond the imagination of the average Bundeswehr general.

In Germany, no one wants to see the danger of irregular war!

Liebig: What do you know about the effect of your book in the East Bloc?

Von der Heydte: On that point, I can say, that the book is circulating in the East Bloc. The book was republished in East Berlin as a reprint, naturally with a new introduction to give it the right "class standpoint." I assume, that it circulates there "for internal use" of the intelligence and security services.

Liebig: To me, the present irregular warfare situation in the Federal Republic looks like this: to use a metaphor, everything which has already happened over the course of 1986—Wackersdorf, Brokdorf, the assassination of Professor Beckurts, all of the bombing attacks and sabotage—is an irregular warfare conflagration. We have a whole forest on fire, but predominant opinion says, "That is only a statistical accumulation of individual trees on fire," and no one should try to construe any "illegitimate" connections.

Von der Heydte: Irregular warfare consists of individual acts. These individual acts are linked to each other in the larger framework. But anyone who wants to wage irregular war will have to hide this larger framework. It is characteristic of modern irregular war, that the one who wages it disguises himself.

That is how it was in Vietnam. The war against the French went over into the war against the United States without a break. In the West, people always overlook that. The period of calm was deceptive. The "founding" of the South Vietnamese "National Liberation Front" was a pure fiction, exclusively deception, so that the Americans would not get the idea, that everything was already in place. You can always reestablish something, which has been there for a long time.

Liebig: Are you not of the opinion, that what we have experienced in the first half of 1986 in the Federal Republic, in terms of terrorist irregular warfare actions, covers practically the entire spectrum of irregular warfare?

Von der Heydte: These events are characteristic of the con-

duct of irregular warfare. They comprise a large part of what can be done in modern irregular war. They do not yet comprise the entire spectrum of a modern irregular war.

Liebig: I have often heard the view expressed by security officials and intelligence services, that there is considerable evidence and knowledge of individual facts, which indicates an irregular war-connection between the diverse terrorist operations. But, since it is forbidden to look at the role of the Soviet Union in terrorist irregular warfare, there also seems to be a kind of "thought prohibition" on the strategic model of modern irregular war. Things have to be called by their right names.

Von der Heydte: Yes, after everything which has happened, it is simply absurd. It would be different, if less had occurred, then people could act as if they had not noticed an irregular war. But you can not do that any longer. You must not forget, this book was written at the end of the 1960s, at the high-point of student unrest. It always takes a year and a half for the completed manuscript to be published in book-form. Since that time, the other side has delivered us evidentiary proof by the barrel-full. So, the book was written before it was possible to say with certainty, that the other side is waging irregular war against us.

Liebig: In your book, you investigate the role of the Soviet Union in the irregular wars of the anti-colonial and post-colonial period as an "interested third power." Is not the role of the Soviet Union more direct in the conduct of irregular warfare against Western Europe since the end of the 1960s? Are not the control and direction of irregular warfare operations by the Soviets more direct, of course, on condition that they are covert?

Von der Heydte: That was always my view. There were a number of things and connections, which I was convinced were true, but which I could not take up in my book, because I could not prove them with "court evidence." You know: secret ink, checks, mission orders, etc.

If I had written a book about those "connections," you can imagine the treatment I would have received from the "critics."

Moreover, you have to take into account, that in more than

10 years of socialist government together with [Hans-Dietrich] Genscher, our German intelligence services have taken some severe blows. To get things back in order again is not simple.

Liebig: I have heard, that the “principals” and controllers of irregular warfare regularly knock out those among the terrorist activists, who know the most about the secret, covert lines of control. Then a “new generation” of terrorists comes along.

Von der Heydte: Precisely. I did not mention that so clearly in my book. That was a suspicion which I had, one which has been confirmed in the meantime.

Here in West Germany, there is always a hard-core of twenty persons, in the Baader-Meinhof gang. No matter how many are arrested, there are always twenty left over. In the logic of the German courts, twenty minus twenty equals twenty.

Anyone who wages irregular warfare has to expect, that the power which directs the irregular war is compelled, under some circumstances, to liquidate some of its own people. That is part of the nature of irregular war.

In addition to this way of “rejuvenating” the activists and leading figures in irregular war, the problem posed for the power waging irregular war, is to pull together a leadership in the country under attack. You can study that very well in the case of South Africa.

Liebig: What is your evaluation of the situation in South Africa?

Von der Heydte: What has been unfolding in South Africa for some time is typical of irregular warfare. That is an irregular war in South Africa, but an irregular war without a leadership. The communists have not succeeded in finding people in the black population, who could form a credible team of leading persons in communist irregular warfare. Neither Tutu, nor Mandela are such persons. I have also discussed this with blacks in South Africa, and they also thought, that the people who want to overthrow the white government have not yet succeeded in creating a leadership cadre which works together, a unified leading cadre.

Liebig: How do you view the role of the South African military in respect of modern irregular war?

Von der Heydte: The South African government stands on two pillars. The one is control of natural resources, which are not generally available in other parts of the world. For those resources, they need white engineers. The second pillar of the South African government is clearly the military.

I was the guest of a South African paratroop officer for some time, who came up with an excellent idea for how to educate people to be independent. A difference between the English and Americans, and the South Africans, is that in the South African armed forces there is pure “*Auftragstaktik*.” They make games out of it. There are two tree-trunks. Groups of four are formed. These four men are supposed to take the trees from point A to point B. Whichever team of four reaches point B first gets a vacation, or something else, in any case a reward. Now, they can decide, that two men each will take one tree. Or they can say, three men will take two trees together, and march in a squad, while the fourth rests. After a while, they exchange the fourth man, so that no one becomes too fatigued. Then there is the question of which route to take. One man may say, the best path is the most level one. But unfortunately, there are a few ravines. The others say, no, we’ll go around the ravines. These four men have to decide. They have nothing but the trees, and then they are sent on the trip. The South African armed forces have understood precisely what irregular warfare is all about.

Liebig: Let us return to the northern hemisphere. How would you characterize the Soviet strategy of irregular warfare in, and against, Western Europe?

Von der Heydte: The Soviet Union is playing through all forms of irregular war in Europe. When our security authorities believe they have the situation in hand in terms of one form of the conduct of irregular war, then suddenly there comes a new form. It is changing continuously.

Liebig: How do you explain the fact, that the political-military leaders in the Soviet Union, who are otherwise inclined to take a mechanistic and schematic approach, have so obviously mastered irregular warfare? As far as I can see, the Soviets are the only ones, who have integrated the war-types of nuclear, conventional, and irregular war into a comprehensive war-type.

Von der Heydte: From their own bitter experience. In the final analysis, the Soviets did not beat us Germans in World War II on the open battlefield, but in irregular warfare.

Liebig: Do you believe, that the Russian conduct of partisan war decided the war?

Von der Heydte: Yes, absolutely. I saw it myself. Under regular combat conditions on the East Front, we could handle the Russian soldier. But when a totally new adversary cropped up in these dense forests and swamp areas, one we did not know about, then the eagerness for war vanished rapidly. We did not know how strong this adversary was, nor how extensive his coverage was, nor did we know what he was doing. We only knew, this adversary is against us. The Wehrmacht was also disorganized in its morale by the partisan war in the East. That is a fact.

Liebig: It seems to me, that you attribute more importance to the Russian partisan war than Soviet military historiography does.

Von der Heydte: I believe, that the irregular war tactic was decisive for the Russian campaign. That happened not only to Hitler; the same thing happened to Napoleon. But Napoleon was not as crazy as Hitler, at least he never waged a two-front war. In the entire history of war, there is not one single example, in which anyone ever won a two-front war. In the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866, the Prussians allied with the French and the Italians. The result was, that, in Königgrätz in Bohemia, the Austrians lacked three army corps against the Prussians. Had they had those three army corps, the Prussian victory would have been questionable.

Liebig: Why are the Soviet-Russians so qualified to wage irregular war? Where does their particular talent for covert combat come from?

Von der Heydte: The reason for that is probably historical, because the Russians are one of the few peoples, who have a real tradition of irregular warfare. This tradition can be traced back to Peter the Great, at least.

Peter the Great did not work as a ship's carpenter in Holland for nothing. That is an historical fact. So, you have to ask

yourself: why? Because he certainly did not have to do that to become a Czar and supreme military commander. But Peter the Great wanted to learn the psyche of the West Europeans. Peter the Great's victories were basically due to the fact, that he just knew how his adversaries would react.

Liebig: What difference do you see between your strategic model of irregular war and the currently dominant theory, which defines terrorism as a sociological phenomenon?

Von der Heydte: That reminds me of the question, whether the French lost the Prussian-French war of 1870-71 because of Napoleon III's mistakes and Moltke's capabilities, or because the French were simply tired of Napoleon.

Liebig: The conception of terrorism as a sociological phenomenon has obviously not led to any magnificent successes in combatting terrorism. Western security forces never succeeded in more than a short-term containment. After almost 20 years of combatting terrorism on the basis of the sociological theory, terrorism is stronger than ever. That gives the theoretical question an eminently practical significance.

Von der Heydte: That is the wrong idea about terrorism. Terrorism is no mere sociological phenomenon. It exploits sociological facts, but it is not a sociological phenomenon. If I fight terrorism only as a sociological phenomenon, I miss the target.

Liebig: What do you think of the fact, that fighting terrorism in the Federal Republic takes place solely within the framework of conventional criminal law. The dominant theory presumes, that terrorist acts in irregular war are qualitatively identical to "normal," daily violations of law.

Von der Heydte: That is the problem which a *Rechtsstaat* (constitutional republican state in the western tradition) has in combatting the adversary in irregular war. That is the curse of the *Rechtsstaat*, when it is attacked in irregular warfare style.

In a *Rechtsstaat*, we have only two kinds of people, the upright citizen, and the criminal. The third kind of person, the one who wages irregular war, his existence is not taken into account.

When the *Rechtsstaat* and irregular warfare confront each

other, it seems to me to resemble a race between a non-swimmer and a swimmer. It can not turn out for the good.

The power which wages irregular war does not acknowledge any obligations, for this power there is nothing which binds it to civil law, to international law, and there is nothing which binds it to the law of war. The *Rechtsstaat* is bound, in every respect. Furthermore, the power which wages irregular war can totally exploit the legal possibilities provided to it by the *Rechtsstaat*.

Liebig: How might this dilemma be solved? What legal framework permits effective measures against terrorist irregular warfare?

Von der Heydte: There is, naturally, the possibility of giving up the *Rechtsstaat*. I believe, that it was only de Gaulle who succeeded in giving up the *Rechtsstaat*, but then resolutely returning to it once again.

It would only make sense to declare martial law if the power conducting irregular war also held to that law, but this it will not do. A solution is horribly difficult. I never wrote the second volume of my book, which was to have dealt with the subject of combatting terrorism, and the relationship between the *Rechtsstaat* and irregular warfare.

Liebig: In your book, you showed how the power which conducts irregular warfare creates new laws as the irregular war proceeds. Must not the *Rechtsstaat*, likewise, be capable of creating new law, which makes it possible to overcome the dilemma?

Von der Heydte: Absolutely, I am convinced of it. Present law is not adequate to the conditions of irregular warfare. Neither regular criminal law, nor the Hague Convention on Land-War, nor the Geneva Conventions, are appropriate to irregular war.

I could imagine, that the West German Emergency Laws could come to bear here. Not necessarily in their present form. They point in the direction of an effective combat against terrorist irregular war, without having to give up the *Rechtsstaat*. A correctly understood emergency legislation could close the gap between civil criminal law and the law of war. But, of course, in our democracy, that will be terribly difficult.

Liebig: What would the consequences be, in the framework of international law and the law of war, of identifying a foreign power, which is waging irregular war against one's own country?

Von der Heydte: Now, there you have the enemy and your conscious image of the enemy. Actually, you can only really combat irregular warfare effectively, if you wage irregular warfare yourself. That is then more a question of determining a nation.

Liebig: Since the Soviet Union has nothing positive to offer Western Europe, in terms of culture, materially-economically, or politically, it can only rely on exerting pressure through terrorism in irregular warfare, to have an effect upon leadership circles and the population in Western Europe.

Von der Heydte: That is quite right. But it is also possible to create "false ideals."

Liebig: The notion of "false ideals" seems to me to be a crucial conception in irregular war. Would you say, that the whole targeted and controlled "green" anti-nuclear power hysteria is a part of this Soviet strategy of "false ideals?"

Von der Heydte: In large part, yes. In part, it is real hysteria, which is then exploited.

Liebig: Since your book appeared, innovative forms of the conduct of irregular war emerged. What do you think of the "Wackersdorf Model" of violent uprising, a model which can no longer be characterized as a demonstration, or even a violent demonstration, but which really represents a new quality of irregular warfare?

Von der Heydte: A totally new quality. Real conduct of irregular war! But in a totally new form!

I would like to make a comparison in terms of the history of war: In World War I, there was still no such thing as "stalling resistance. (*hinhaltender widerstand*)" Stalling-resistance was an invention of the Reichswehr in the 1920s. Neither attack, nor defense, nor retreat. Without this conception which we elaborated, our losses in Russia would probably have been far greater. The French generals at that time never understood the significance of this new form of combat. The "Wackers-

dorf Model," in the framework of irregular war, is just such an innovation, as stalling-resistance was then.

Perhaps, in our historical comparisons, Wackersdorf should remind us of the uprising of 1848-49. After all, even Engels wrote about that.

Liebig: You said before, that you thought the deployment tactics of the police in Wackersdorf were unimaginative and ineffective. How will the police have to act in the future in cases of violent clashes on the "Wackersdorf Model"?

Von der Heydte: Like every form of combat in irregular war, the riot in Wackersdorf was aimed at achieving a psychological effect. Wackersdorf was not a demonstration, but it had a demonstrative character. You need a lot of people with flags and banners, who scream, sing, recite, and move more or less choreographically. You try not only to have a general propagandistic effect, but also to use all of this tactically against the police on site, you aim at knocking out the police psychologically.

Wackersdorf was also a real irregular warfare action, a genuine battle. There were people there, who were trained for combat, yes—drilled. They sustained their deployment tactic, which in some ways reminds me of Frederick the Great's linear tactics. The rioters had fine-tuned logistics. They had command and communication centers. And they were armed with weapons. These steel-ball sling-shots and Molotov-cocktails are real weapons, and they were employed in military fashion.

In such a situation, we must not prohibit the police from using their firearms. If the police confront armed persons, under conditions of irregular warfare, they must use their weapons to put the armed rioters out of action. These can be anti-riot weapons with rubber-shot, or tear-gas, but it can also be firearms. Low-flying helicopters are also very effective for ruining the rioters' fun in their violence.

Liebig: What is your evaluation of the role of Western media in modern irregular war?

Von der Heydte: Without a significant portion of the media, no irregular war can be conducted today in the West. A disorienting, disinforming press is part of the essential features of irregular warfare in the West. Obviously, the Americans

did not realize that here in Germany after the war; otherwise, they would not have imposed their press laws, which said that at least one communist had to sit on the editorial board of every newspaper. That was the beginning of disinformation, at least for West Germany.

Liebig: Now we come to a crucial question. How does the problem of direction and control by the East function in the conduct of irregular warfare against Western countries in general, and against the Federal Republic in particular?

Von der Heydte: This happens through people for whom this is their sole mission, who have no other mission than this. I have personal experience in this. I had a student in Würzburg, who wanted me to supervise his doctorate. This man had such an infiltration and control mission. That was in the 1960s. In these times of student unrest, he had this mission. By accident, his wife, who was also a student, became drunk once, and talked. Pullach [headquarters of the BND, the West German foreign intelligence service—ed.] heard about it, and the pair was soon arrested. I had to appear as a witness in the trial, and listened to everything. This doctoral candidate and captain of the Reserves of the Bundeswehr had a definite control-mission, not a propaganda mission.

Liebig: So his operations were entirely covert?

Von der Heydte: He fulfilled this mission completely covertly. He made no reports of the usual intelligence-service kind to his commanding officer. His mission was exclusively infiltration, direction, and control of contacts in the student milieu of that time. The full truth never came out, because he denied everything in the end, and even played "crazy."

Liebig: This example is very instructive. The control mechanisms in today's "green"-terrorist scene are probably not very different from what was done in the student scene of that time.

Von der Heydte: That is what I wanted to say. Basically, the communists have come up with little that is new. Or, maybe they have come up with something new, but we have just not noticed it.

Liebig: If we look at the explanations of the various German

and Western agencies, the suspicion you just expressed seems to me to be justified. Or do you know people or institutions in the Federal Republic, or in the West in general, who do not accept the blatant "thought prohibition" on Eastern-controlled irregular warfare? Why are these things not called by their right names?

Von der Heydte: That is the question I ask myself, too! I can only sadly say, that that is how things are.

Liebig: What problems and reservations do you see in the United States with respect to your conception of modern irregular warfare? Your book is not a counter-insurgency manual which sticks to dry empiricism.

Von der Heydte: Despite Cuba, Vietnam, and Nicaragua, communism for most Americans down to this day is still a European phenomenon, a European disease. On top of that, in my opinion, the United States has had counter-intelligence. Irregular warfare, at least in the beginning, is very small and seemingly undramatic. But all these apparently little things accumulate. I am convinced, that the dimensions of subversion in the United States are far greater than usually assumed.

Liebig: What prevents a qualified American counter-insurgency expert from seeing things the way you, or a French or British colleague see them?

Von der Heydte: That is a question of a bit of American pride. There are certain things about Americans, which you just do not touch, if you do not want to offend their pride. On top of that, there is the American education system, which is not exactly an exemplary model. Even if you take account of the fact, that the situation in education here has deteriorated, there is still a difference, if you just look at the matter of learning foreign languages.

Liebig: Do you see other weak points in the military and intelligence areas?

Von der Heydte: That is not easy to answer. One weak spot is doubtlessly the fact, that wherever the Americans set up a military command post, it takes on immense dimensions. It is simply too large. That makes it all too easy to infiltrate

agents into these puffed-up staffs. That makes it precarious, because agents infiltrated into the American armed forces are usually assigned strategic missions. On the other hand, I experienced in Kesselring's staff during the war, how the English successfully infiltrated an agent for six months. Before he disappeared again, no one suspected anything about "Lt. Colonel Sauerfeld."

Liebig: Do you know the book by Frank Kitson, in German *Im Vorfeld des Krieges*, in English *Low-Intensity Warfare*?

Von der Heydte: The book has only one mistake. It is designed more as a formalistic manual, but as such it is not bad.

Liebig: What role does psycho-cultural subversion play in modern irregular war: the counter-culture in music, literature, rock-music, drugs, and pornography?

Von der Heydte: Those are all instruments of influence which are deployed and exploited against Western nations and people. In Catholic areas, these things are less effective. In wartime, I observed, specifically in France, that prostitution was an important instrument for the conduct of irregular warfare by the Resistance against the Wehrmacht.

Liebig: How would the deployment and training of police have to change, in your opinion, in order to be able to deal effectively with irregular warfare?

Von der Heydte: That is another very difficult question, which is often posed. Actually, I have not found a satisfactory solution, except that our police today should really take a good look at what the paramilitary national police force ("barracks police") in Bavaria did at the beginning of the Weimar Republic. These paramilitary police had to fulfill special missions. In Munich and Bavaria, they observed and very effectively combatted both the communists and the Nazis. Officers of the paramilitary police would go into the relevant bars in civilian clothing, and talk with the communists or Nazis just the way they liked to hear it, like "this guy really deserves to be hanged!" A little while later, these communists or Nazis were taken by uniformed police for closer interrogation.

That means, that the anti-constitutional people, perpetra-

tors of political violence, and terrorists should not get the impression, that the police will leave them alone. The state must not begin to defend itself only after the steel balls and Molotov cocktails have begun flying at the police. Our own anti-terrorist National Police Force could probably learn something from the Bavarian paramilitary police of the 1920s.

Liebig: What is your overall evaluation of the situation with respect to modern irregular warfare, here and now, in 1986?

Von der Heydte: In Germany and in the West as a whole, the danger of undeclared irregular war is inexcusably underestimated. Modern irregular warfare is not a sociological problem, rather it is a military problem. It is the task of a capable government to understand that, and to act accordingly. Our parliaments must pay more attention to irregular warfare. The gaps in our present laws, which prevent effective action from being taken against terrorist irregular warfare within the framework of the *Rechtsstaat*, must be closed.

I wrote *Modern Irregular Warfare* in the late 1960s. The book was published in the early 1970s. At that time, many people thought I was more or less insane. Some may still believe that today. But I fear, that reality will teach us some more bitter lessons about modern irregular warfare.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

A month or two after the ink has dried on this English edition of Professor von der Heydte's study of *Modern Irregular Warfare*, it will probably become a kind of "recognition signal" when certain Americans discuss important matters, or when these certain Americans come together with certain Germans. Soon, if someone concerned with the strategic situation has not digested this book, or if he tries to evade the subjects discussed in this book, that person will either not be taken seriously, or suspicions will mount, that he just might belong to the other side.

This translation has been done with that in mind, and in that spirit. It is the translator's hope, that the book's effect in the original German—it "grows on you," and "gets under your skin"—will come across adequately in English.

Like the original German edition, this English edition is not intended only for a "professional" readership, so, although the text has not been amended in the slightest in translation, a military-science "layman" should be able to absorb the necessary conceptual background. Some words, however, in the original German, have very specific, rigorous meanings, which have no strict equivalents, and are not perfectly obvious in English. That is where the translator's, and the reader's, problems begin.

The first such problem is the subject itself, "irregular war(fare)." The German is "Kleinkrieg," literally "small-war," which is usually translated into English as "low-intensity warfare." Professor von der Heydte himself explains (footnote 1, Chapter 3), that the German "Kleinkrieg" is the literal equivalent of the Spanish "guerilla," the diminutive form of "war" in Spanish, "guerra." After consultation with Professor von der Heydte, I chose to use the term "irregular war" throughout for two reasons. First, "irregular" tends to always remind the reader that the subject of this study is something "out of the ordinary," i.e., something you can neither understand, nor counter within normal frames of reference—and that, after all, is the point of the whole study. Secondly, although "irregular war" can, often does, and may once again escalate from a stage of "low military intensity" into full-blown,

classical, conventional war, what we are going through in Western Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, today, is hardly "low-intensity," and some real conventional wars have probably had periods of a month or two when the "intensity" of combat was lower than it is now.

At the same time, I accept Professor von der Heydte's criticism of the language mess created by all the talk about "guerrilla fighters," and "guerrilla war." Professor von der Heydte used the original Spanish word in his German edition, "guerrillero," to denote the fighter in an irregular war, and so do I.

Irregular war, *Kleinkrieg*, is a distinct kind, a distinct type of war. German military terminology has a word for that: *Kriegsbild*, literally "war-picture." "Picture" here means what we mean in English when we say "So, do you get the picture now?" It is not a painting or a photograph, it is the totality of the characteristics of something, or a situation, which you must have in mind to understand that something, or situation. Here, *Kriegsbild* is translated simply as "war-type."

As far as military terminology is concerned, most terms will present no problem. I have retained the literal distinctions of the German for "Taktisch-Operativ-Strategisch," tactical, operative, and strategic. These terms primarily denote three levels of command, and all together, they denote a command principle. So, at the tactical level of "operations," a commanding officer gives "orders." But at the operative level, which corresponds to the level of a "theater of war," the commanding officer gives instructions and assigns missions for combat, which are aimed at the accomplishment of a "strategy," and leave a great latitude of freedom to the "executive officers" and soldiers to decide how they will accomplish these missions. "Strategy" as such is always a matter of policy-making. As a command principle, these distinctions are still practiced in the West German army, and the Soviet military has also tried to adapt them.

"War" itself, for Professor von der Heydte, is an "Ausnahmestand," which translates literally into English as "exceptional condition," where the "normal condition" is "peace." The reader might want to keep that in mind, since what we are now living through is war, although no declarations of

war have been exchanged. More of us, however, are becoming acutely aware of the fact, that we are living under an "exceptional condition," where something all-pervasive and "not normal" shapes our lives.

George Gregory

Wiesbaden

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INTRODUCTION

Humanity has hoped for centuries, that the progress of culture would increasingly eliminate violence from the relationships between people and between states. Up to now, this hope has not been fulfilled. The prohibition against the use, and threat of the use of force, contained in the statutes of the United Nations, has not led to the elimination of the use of force in international relations. In recent years, evidence has accumulated, that the kind of threatened, or actually employed force, and the form of this threat and its employment, is undergoing a significant change.

The years after World War II are characterized by a large number of armed conflicts; these are, in part, geographically limited, conventional wars of short duration, but the majority of such conflicts are irregular wars, which are drawn out over many years amid shifts in the intensity of fighting. Irregular warfare is gradually displacing conventional "large-scale" warfare: It seems, as if the prohibition against the use of force in modern international law, on the one hand, and the threat of nuclear war, on the other, have led people today to shift to a kind of war which occurs, for the most part, outside the norms of international law, and which generally excludes the use of nuclear weapons.

This book is about the specific characteristics of such a war. The intent is not to describe irregular wars which have been conducted, or are still being conducted, in the Mediterranean area, in the Far East, in Latin America, or in Northern Ireland. This work describes an irregular war which has not yet begun, but which can become a fearsome reality, perhaps in the near future—in Central Europe as well.

The author relies upon three kinds of sources for his description of tomorrow's irregular warfare: first, he relies upon reports of the experiences of participants in low-intensity wars which have occurred in Europe in the last 45 years, or which were conducted under conditions which allow, in one or another respect, certain conclusions to be drawn with respect to Europe as well; secondly, upon plans, instructions or prescriptions which have been drawn up for irregular warfare in Europe (by whomever); and finally, upon a plethora of theoretical investigations on the nature, preconditions, aims,

and conduct of irregular warfare. With respect to the first two kinds of sources, the effort is to derive general principles and maxims by attempting to abstract from concrete facts and plans, and then to draw conclusions, by making necessarily incomplete inductions, and to adduce certain principles by abstracting them from the spatial and temporal characteristics of specific irregular wars, concerning the possible behavior of certain people and groups in the future. With respect to the last kind of sources cited—which allowed the author to critically test the results of his own investigation against the judgment of others—the author has attempted to avoid, as much as possible, repeating what had already been said by others. This is also one of the reasons, why the author has limited himself to investigating only the military-political and military side of a possible, future irregular war in Europe (whoever might conduct it, and for whatever reason), whereby strategic questions are in the forefront in the first three parts, while in the last three parts he concentrates upon examination of tactical questions. Other authors have already written so much of value about the political, economic, and social roots of a modern irregular war—about its "civilian basis" and its role as an instrument of politics—that the author would hardly have been able to contribute anything essential and new in these areas.

There was also another reason for limiting the investigation to irregular warfare as a military-political and military phenomenon: "If one investigates the phenomenon of the guerilla, theoretically and in reality," writes one of the best experts on the material, Werner Hahlweg, "one will initially be almost overwhelmed by the sheer multiplicity of its features, as well as the complexity of the phenomenon; one is soon forced to limit oneself to the chief problems and aspects of the phenomenon, to avoid being swamped."¹ The author only sought to determine the principles and maxims of this kind of war, which apply to the "guerillas," i.e., the "aggressor." Only *their* expected actions are described, and not the "defender's" options to *react* to these actions. Principles and options for the defense can always be derived logically from the behavior of the "attacker"; to describe them in detail is superfluous.

¹Werner Hahlweg, *Guerilla: Krieg ohne Fronten*, Stuttgart 1968, p. 17.

The author does not provide instructions on irregular warfare for just anybody. Instead, his study is conceived as an appeal to responsible politicians to take timely steps by peaceful means, to prevent the potential developments described here from becoming reality one day.

The author speaks of a war which has not yet begun in Europe, but one which could break out tomorrow. Prophecies are not the issue, but rather the investigation of possible developments. The author himself hopes, that the potential developments he describes never become reality. But whoever wants to prevent war, must give some thought to how a war in the future *might* look. The question of whether the dictum, "If you want peace, prepare for war," still holds true today, is subject to debate. But what is unquestionably true in our time, is the dictum: "If you want peace, know war!" This work is in the interest of knowledge of war, not its preparation.

Thus, this present work takes the side of peace, against war. Beyond that, it does *not* intend to take sides. It attempts, to treat the principles according to which a modern low-intensity war in Europe will be conducted, as distinct from all ideological and particular, local, or specific political, social and economic conditions. It leaves aside all of those experiences which are *not* generally applicable; it also has no intention of describing any concrete irregular war as the war of the future—neither that conducted for the sake of communist ideas, nor that which might be conducted as defense against a possible Soviet aggressor in one or another European country. The guerilla, who conducts such war, may do so in the service of any idea, or of any country—this war is conceivable in any social order. Whoever reads this book to seek more than a neutral description of possibilities which lie in the future will be disappointed.

In order to comprehend these possibilities, the author necessarily relied upon the experiences of persons who have conducted an irregular war in the recent past in the service of a certain idea, or of a certain country, and upon writings which serve today as preparation manuals for the irregular war of tomorrow, in order to realize a certain idea or to defend a certain country.

The present study is not only to be understood as a scientific investigation in the strict sense of the word. It is not directed

only to the specialist in the narrow sense, but primarily to the interested layman. For that reason, the so-called "scientific apparatus" has been reduced to a minimum. Publications not cited in the text are only mentioned in footnotes where their citation is necessary to elucidate the content. To the extent that the author uses military writings of foreign countries, which are not available, or only available to a limited extent, they were not quoted, for reasons of courtesy.

The author would like to thank those authors whose works he was permitted to use, and for the valuable stimulus he received from their writings. His special thanks goes to all those friends, who helped him with advice and the collection of material, and not least to his co-workers in the Institute for Military Law of the University of Würzburg, especially his assistant, Oberregierungsrat a.D. Dr. Hans Rechenberg, and his secretaries Mrs. Reichert and Miss Meyrowski.

Part One:

FOUNDATIONS

I. THE ESSENCE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

§ 1

War as an Exceptional Condition

Since the end of the Second World War, a considerable literature has accumulated about the nature of irregular warfare and the principles of its conduct. From the Chinese party chairman Mao Tse-tung¹ to the Swiss Major H. von Dach,² from the South American rebel leader Ernesto "Che" Guevara³ to the Greek Colonel Georgios Grivas-Dighenis,⁴ from the American military author Charles W. Thayer⁵ to the German Helmuth Rentsch,⁶ practitioners and theoreticians of modern warfare have studied the problem of irregular warfare, conducted by gangs, and have investigated the remarkable phenomenon, that in such a war "ill-armed and ill-clad bands led

¹Mao Tse-tung is the author of numerous works about irregular warfare. The best known are: Strategische Probleme des revolutionären Kriegs in China (December 1936), in German translation published in: *Mao Tse-tung, Ausgewählte Werke*, Peking 1968, Bd. I, S. 209-298; Strategische Probleme des Partisanenkrieges gegen die japanische Aggression (May 1938), in: *Mao Tse-tung, Ausgewählte Werke*, Peking 1968, Bd. II, S. 127-228. The best introduction to Mao Tse-tung's irregular theory is probably the work by Scott A. Bormann, *The Protracted Game*, New York 1969.

²H. von Dach, *Der totale Widerstand, Kleinkriegsanleitung für jedermann*, Nr. 4, Schriftenreihe des Schweizerischen Unteroffizierverbandes, 3rd Edition, Biel 1966.

³Ernesto "Che" Guevara, *La guerre de guerilla*, in French translation by G. Chalaïnd and J. Minces, Paris 1967.

⁴Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, *Partisanenkrieg heute, Lehren aus dem Freiheitskampf Zyperns*, German translation by Eugen and Evangelya Weyde, Frankfurt/Main 1964.

⁵Charles W. Thayer, *Guerillas und Partisanen, Wesen und Methodik der irregulären Kriegführung*, German translation by Helmut Degner, Munich 1964. Charles W. Thayer was on assignment in World War II as the American liaison officer to the high command of the Yugoslavian partisans. His book, like that of Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, is therefore based on personal experience.

⁶Helmuth Rentsch, *Partisanenkampf, Erfahrungen und Lehren*, Frankfurt/Main 1961. The author of this book had extensive experience during World War II as a German officer. His work is one of the best publications in this area in the German language to this day.

by amateur soldiers so frequently succeed against superior forces led by professionals."⁷

If one searches the wealth of contemporary literature about irregular warfare for a convincing definition of the nature of this form of the conduct of war, one surprisingly finds, that the majority of theoreticians who deal with irregular warfare still owe us a clear definition of what it is they are talking about. Everyone knows what he imagines irregular warfare to be; but to draw a clear line between irregular warfare and a revolutionary uprising, on the one hand, and conventional war, on the other, is obviously difficult.

Usually irregular warfare is conceived to be an armed conflict, in which the parties are not large units, but small and very small action-groups,⁸ and in which the outcome is not decided in a few large battles, but the decision is sought, and ultimately achieved, in a very large number of small, individual operations, robberies, acts of terrorism and sabotage, bombings and other attacks. Irregular warfare is "war out of the dark."⁹ In place of the powerful thrust, there is a multiplicity of no less dangerous pin-pricks: instead of the supe-

⁷Thayer, loc. cit., p. 7.

⁸Compare Denise Bindschedler, *Reconsidération du Droit des Conflits Armés*, Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie, Geneva 1969, p. 68: "By the term guerilla, we understand here only a form of combat, which very generally is characterized by the fact, that it is conducted by dispersed and mobile groups, who avail themselves of surprise attacks, ambushes and sabotage, and generally avoid battle in the open field."

Martin Oppenheimer, *Stadt Guerilla*, translated from English by Samuel Wahrhaftig, Berlin 1971, p. 16, includes irregular warfare "under the term 'paramilitary warfare,' which I take to mean any behavior (usually, but not always violent, as we shall also see later) of an organized sort directed either defensively or offensively against the military forces (including police) of the dominant power in society, by military elements associated with no regular or recognized government (though it may be in exile). It implies some minimal political goal (as distinct from banditry or gangsterism) and may include a range of activities such as terrorism, an underground movement, a putschist conspiracy, or an actual outbreak of rebellion at some point which seeks as its goal the seizure of the government or the overturn of the social order." Oppenheimer's definition is doubtlessly too narrow. More than half of all irregular wars conducted over the course of history, or still being conducted today, are not included in this definition—or, if they are, only with the aid of daring intellectual acrobatics.

⁹This expression was used by the German publisher of the essays by Franklin Mark Osanka as the appropriate translation for the English title, "Modern Guerilla Warfare."

riority of weapons—and therefore firepower in the broadest sense—there is the superiority of a movement, which the enemy is no longer able to pursue.

But in all of these characterizations, irregular warfare is only described by insinuation; it is neither clearly defined, nor its nature exhaustively determined.

Irregular warfare is, in any case, war. It is “real” war and not a “substitute for war,” not a proxy for war, an “operation approximating war,” a “condition short of war”—or whatever other expression one might use in “semantic circumscription,”¹⁰ to pick out the so-called “large-scale war” for one or another reason as the only “real war,” in which large military units and means of destruction by uniformed soldiers play the decisive role.

Some theoreticians do in fact recognize, that irregular warfare is real war; but they do not want to see irregular warfare as a *form of war*, but only as a *form of the conduct of war*, in the context of a large war—comparable to submarine warfare or the bombing war of air forces. In this connection, Samuel Huntington distinguishes most sharply between *forms of war* and mere *forms of its conduct*. He defines the *forms of war*, respectively, as a “violent interaction between two organized political groups,” which differ “in terms of the nature of the participants, the nature of their goals, the efforts they make to achieve those goals, and broadly speaking, the resources they employ”; each of these forms of war constitute the “sum total of the military interactions between the participants.” Huntington sees *forms of the conduct of war*, on the other hand, only as “variations of military activity,” which are “determined by particular military forces, weapons, and tactics.” We can not follow Huntington, when he believes that he can conclude, on the basis of these definitions, that irregular warfare is “clearly a *form of warfare*, and *not a type of war*.”¹¹ The

¹⁰Samuel P. Huntington, *Der Guerillakrieg in Theorie und Praxis*, in: Franklin Mark Osanka, *Der Krieg aus dem Dunkel*, German edition, Cologne 1963, p. 17.

¹¹Huntington, loc. cit. p. 18. Also in the conception of the “comprehensive defense of Yugoslavia,” irregular warfare is taken to be only a form of the conduct of war, and not itself a form of war. Compare the essay in the same collection by Pavle Jakšić on the mutual transformation of frontal and partisan conduct of war, p. 258f., p. 262, and especially p. 266; and

phenomenon of modern irregular warfare is so difficult to scientifically grasp, precisely because we find irregular warfare today in some cases only as a *form of the conduct of war*, but in other cases as a special (form of war, in which at least one of the warring parties employs certain methods with all of the power at his disposal, and with the aim of exhausting the enemy and wearing him down internally, so that, in the course of time, and as a result of progressive weakening not only of his physical powers, but also his psychological powers, the enemy becomes incapable of a clear political and military volition, and *thereby* becomes incapable of acting. Where we encounter irregular warfare as a *form of war*, and not merely as a form of the conduct of war, under certain circumstances a limited *conventional war* can become an exceptional *form of the conduct of war*—the conduct of irregular warfare.

Our chief interest here is in irregular warfare as a *form of war*. Hugo Grotius¹² defined war as a *status per vim concertatum*, as a “status” of those who fight each other with violence. Status can not be otherwise translated than as condition: for Grotius war is a *condition*, not merely a sum of individual actions of a certain sort, which set the *per vim concertantes*.

War is the *exceptional condition* of international law. The use of violence in a condition of peace consists in one or numerous exceptional acts, which do not affect the condition of peace, as such, in the integrity of its nature. War, on the other hand, as an exceptional condition, suspends the condition of peace. It is a condition, in which the relations between states and peoples in *their totality* are realized and develop in other forms and according to different rules than is the case in peace. Under the condition of peace, the basic form and foundation—in manifold shapes—of relations between states is the *unity of will* of several states, a unification of will whose normal expression is the *treaty*. In war the assertion of the will, by employment of violence, of *one* state or *one* group of states takes the place of unification of will, the aim of that violence being to *break* the will of other states or groups of states, to *break* the will of the adversary or adversaries.

further, Mirko Vranič, *Die strategische Verwendung der Streitkräfte im allumfassenden Verteidigungskrieg*, p. 285f. and p. 288ff.

¹²Hugo Grotius, *De jure belli ac pacis*, I, I, II, 1, Paris 1625, p. 1.

If, as is claimed again and again, in countless attempts at definition, politics is the "gain, preservation and loss of power,"¹³ "use of power," the shaping and forming of community and society by means of power, then war is without any doubt, if not a form of politics, nevertheless a means of politics: For war is always a struggle for power. But power is nothing but greatly enhanced influence, a kind which is strong enough to induce others to submit—unconsciously or consciously, voluntarily or under compulsion—to the will of the one who exercises this influence, and thus to behave the way the other wants. At issue in war and politics alike, fundamentally, is this potentiated influence upon the adversary. It is in irregular warfare that the connection between war and politics appears most clearly: irregular warfare is, in a certain sense, the war of the politician, not the war of the soldier.¹⁴

The *essence* of the condition of war consists in the *comprehensive reliance upon force*, which threatens nearly all institutions of law of the state, and becomes the foundation of all relations between the states, which conduct war against each other. Violence need not necessarily occur as the violence of *weapons*, a war need not always be contested in the form of a *military* conflict; in war, it is only essential, that the use of violence takes the place of peaceful encounter, which is the basis for relations between states in peace. A single act of violence, or even a small number of such acts does not yet constitute war, as long as peaceful relations are maintained; on the other hand—and this is of particular importance for the problem of irregular warfare—the condition of war does exist, when the violence which the contesting states are intent upon using comprehensively is not only—or even not at all—military violence.¹⁵

¹³Friedrich Ruge, *Politik und Strategie, strategisches Denken und politisches Handeln*, Frankfurt 196, p. 9.

¹⁴Compare C.A. Fraser, *Revolutionary Warfare: Basic Principles of Counter-Insurgency*, Pretoria, o.J. (1968), p. 6ff.

¹⁵In this sense, Mirko Vranič, *Die strategische Verwendung der Streitkräfte im allumfassenden Verteidigungskrieg*, in: *Konzeption der allumfassenden Verteidigung Jugoslawiens*, Belgrade 1970, p. 281: "Under present conditions, war is a far more comprehensive and all encompassing phenomenon than armed combat."

§ 2

War as Deliberate, Comprehensive Employment of Violence

The comprehensive employment of violence must be intended by those who wage war; but it need not actually be carried out in every case. There is no war, if the conflicting parties do not have the *will* to go to war—i.e., the will to shape their relations to one another in the sense identified; there are, on the other hand, wars where hardly a shot is fired—especially when the states at war are so distant from each other, and have so little relationship to one another, that an immediate mutual employment of violence is as good as ruled out.

This will to wage war is political will. The decision to enter this exceptional condition in which political will realizes itself, is political decision in its primal form: it is *the ultimate* political decision.

No war is waged by only *one* nation. It is inherent to war, that the will to employ comprehensive violence, which one of the parties of the conflict manifests and implements, must be countered by the will of the other party with a violence just as comprehensive, one which is essentially the same in its nature, although not the same kind of violence in every case. If the violence, which one nation employs against another with the will to wage war, does not encounter a violence which is equally as comprehensive, one will, as a rule, speak of a severe breach (depending on the concrete circumstances) of international law by that nation, which has taken recourse to such violence; in this case, there is as yet no war. There is also no war if the violence of war, which one nation commits, does not encounter the will of the nation, against which this violence is committed, to respond to the violence it suffers with a violence which is identical in its nature.¹⁶

¹⁶For a different view of this, see Peter Wittig, in his unpublished habilitation thesis, *Völkerrecht zwischen Frieden und Krieg—ein Beitrag zu einigen Grundproblemen der militärischen Gewaltanwendung in moderne Völkerrecht*, Würzburg 1968. The real problem of defining the concept of "war" in violence consists, in my view, in the fact, that the threat of comprehensive violence alone can be a sufficient reason for declaring a state of emergency. It is not the ascertained comprehensive employment of violence, but merely the ascertained will to so employ violence—if it is present on both sides of a conflict—which is the basis for the condition of war.

It is the essence of war, in any case, that there is a *dialectic of will*, to use an expression coined by André Beaufre,¹⁷ which employs force to solve a conflict. That this force occurs as military force, is characteristic of a certain form of war—of the war we are accustomed to call conventional, and also for that we call nuclear war—but it is not an essential characteristic of war in general: war is older than the military. It was not the military which created war—it was war which led to the development of the military.¹⁸

§ 3

Irregular Warfare as Unlimited War

When the idea prevailed, that violence in war should be employed only by certain persons, who as a whole were called soldiers or “the military,” and that, in their employment of violence, these persons should use only certain instruments to inflict violence, “military weapons,” war became *limited* for the first time in human history: the limitation of the *employment of violence* to certain persons and to specific instruments, constitutes the content of the oldest norm of the law of war, the oldest “convention.” It has remained the central point in the law of war to this day, and has become so self-evident in the thinking of people, that one no longer dares to call it a condition of war, when two nations indeed demonstrate the will to employ comprehensive violence to enforce a certain behavior on the part of the adversary, but which do not demonstrate the will to respect this oldest “convention”—in that case, one looks for something between war and peace to describe such a condition. In fact, however, this form of violent conflict, as already indicated, is also real war—a war which is often more horrible, because it does not recognize the oldest of “conventions,” than that combat conducted only by military

¹⁷ André Beaufre, *Totale Kriegskunst im Frieden*, German translation by Walter Schütze, Berlin 1964, p. 24.

¹⁸ Compare Carl Schmitt and Joachim Schickel, “Gespräche über den Partisanen,” in Joachim Schickel, *Guerrilleros, Partisanen (Theorie und Praxis)*, Munich 1970, p. 13, and Carl Schmitt’s assertion, that “It was the mistake of the old pacifism, that, to it, the dissolution of the military meant peace in the world.”

persons, and only with military weapons, as horrible as these weapons in our time may be.

Since irregular warfare is *not* waged by the military, and *not in every case* with military weapons, anyone who is willing to take the risk of that kind of war, can and will take a position against “the military” and the use of military weapons, which, as we said, signify a limitation of war: the adherent of irregular warfare is the adversary of the soldier in the usual sense. Refusal of military service and opposition to military armaments, on the one hand, and the will to wage irregular warfare, not only do not constitute a contradiction: they mutually enhance each other.

Propaganda against military service and opposition to military armament often belong, as will be shown, to the psychological preparation of irregular warfare.

Irregular warfare, we established, is *unconventional* by nature. It is war waged outside the “conventions,” in which the “laws and norms” created for *conventional* war do not apply, or are applicable only to a slight degree.

While battle in irregular warfare distinguishes itself from battle conducted by militias or volunteer corps, both of which are included in Article 1 of the Hague Convention on the norms of land-war, irregular warfare is also distinguished from combat waged by “organized resistance movements,” mentioned by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in addition to militias and volunteer corps, thus extending the thinking of the Hague Convention, and also intending a connection to the norms of conventional war.

Irregular warfare can occur as *civil war*, in which hostile groups struggle for power within a single nation; in the *international* arena, irregular warfare sometimes occurs as a form of armed conflict between a number of nations.

As a domestic civil war, irregular warfare is usually conducted in an *isolated* fashion. It is often impossible, in this case, to distinguish between a form of war and a form of the conduct of war. *International* irregular warfare, in which two or more nations are involved as adversaries, may, in contrast, accompany a *conventional war*¹⁹ as a particular form of the con-

¹⁹ Today this is the “conception of the comprehensive defense of Yugoslavia”; compare the already cited collection of essays by the same name, and, in

duct of this war: it is then usually limited to irregular warfare operations *in front of* the actual operations-area of one's own or the adversary's forces, or to battle operations *behind* this operations area, and to thrusts, which have an irregular-warfare character, at the *flanks* of the enemy. We encounter irregular warfare as a form of the conduct of war in conventional war especially where—for whatever reasons—regular troops cannot operate, or where the regular forces of a state are too weak to defend against an advancing adversary.

Irregular warfare can also *prepare* a conventional war. In this case, irregular warfare then serves either to wear down an adversary before the outbreak of conventional hostilities, or to deprive the adversary of decisive positions²⁰: in both cases, it is intended to secure the side which begins such war, a great enough advantage over his adversary, that the risks of "large" war are reduced for that side. Under certain circumstances, the irregular warfare which precedes a conventional war is only intended to gain time for the state that wages it—to assemble regular troops, which it needs for the conduct of conventional war—an aspect to which Huntington, in particular, points.

Irregular warfare may also *follow* a conventional war, as the

this collection, particularly the contribution by Mirko Vranič, *Die strategische Verwendung der Streitkräfte in allumfassenden Verteidigungskrieg*. For Vranič, "the first and fundamental characteristic of the strategic employment of armed forces [consists] . . . in offering the adversary resistance simultaneously in the full depth of the territory, and reacting effectively to every form of his operations. Organized and continuous resistance against the aggressor is achieved by the combination and merger of frontal- and partisan-conduct of war." (p. 285) "The frontal- and the partisan-forms of the conduct of war represent two, equally important components, and have the same strategic importance and role. This does not mean, however, that there might not be larger deployments of frontal forces or partisan operations, respectively, in single operations and in certain operational phases." (p. 288) "The assignment of missions between the units of the operative army and the territorial units," delegated to partisan combat, "as well as the joint deployment of the one and the other, is assured by a unified operations-plan." (p. 294).

²⁰Hitler, for example, ordered a series of typical irregular warfare actions for August 25, 1939, immediately before the campaign against Poland, including the seizure of the Jablonka tunnel and the bridges over the Weichsel River at Dirschau. On this, compare Herbert Schindler, *Mosty und Dirschau, Einzelschriften zur militärische Geschichte des 2. Weltkrieges*, published by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Vol. 7, Freiburg 1971.

last and only possible form of the conduct of war, if the regular forces of one of the warring states are destroyed. The historic example of such an irregular war following defeat was given by the Boers at the beginning of this century; it was in just such a situation, that Tito's partisans began irregular warfare in 1941; Hitler thought of such an irregular war when he designed his dilletantish plan for a "Werewolf," which was a failure from its inception; such irregular warfare after a large war is especially conceivable in the case of nuclear war, in which the nuclear strikes of an adversary have destroyed the adversaries' conventional forces.

Modern irregular warfare, also when it is waged between two or more states, can occur *isolated*, as a special form of war, without the conflict between these states leading to combat actions which do not correspond to *this type* of war, such as, for example, actions of a conventional war; in that case, irregular warfare is an independent form of combat, which follows its own "laws." He who wages war seeks to achieve his war-aims exclusively with the specific material means of this kind of war, with forces characteristic of this *form* of war, and in a geographical area determined by this particular *conduct* of war.

II. IRREGULAR WARFARE AND REVOLUTION

§ 1

Irregular Warfare as an Instrument of Revolution

Irregular warfare is, by nature, mostly illegal combat, i.e., in violation of norms of law—but by no means is it an illegitimate form of combat, i.e., not justified by the idea of law. It occurs largely outside prevailing law, particularly outside every codified or contracted law, even if it is waged for a just cause—which is certainly possible, and often is the case.¹

Its essential illegality, but its possible legitimacy, shows that there is a relationship between the phenomenon of irregular warfare and the phenomenon of revolution. Like revolution, irregular warfare, if victoriously waged, can lead to the emergence of new law on account of its *success*, despite its initial illegality: irregular warfare is war, *real* war, and every war can lead to new developments in law and new legal institutions. Like revolution, irregular warfare has a certain significance for law, because of this possibility of the emergence of new law. Despite their original illegality, neither revolution nor irregular warfare can be viewed *only* as violations of law: were they only common violations of law, new institutions could not develop from them.

The notable dialectical tension between illegality and creation of law, which is characteristic of revolution and irregular warfare alike, is not the only relationship between revolution and irregular warfare. An irregular war often manifests, as will be demonstrated, a revolutionary tendency. For that rea-

¹Compare Carl Schmitt and Joachim Schickel, *Gespräche über den Partisanen*, op.cit. p. 12; for Carl Schmitt, "Irregularity is the first criterion of the partisan: to the degree, that the orientation to regularity recedes," Carl Schmitt argues in the cited discussion, "war transforms itself into partisan war, and the so-called limitation of war, which was applied in European international law, falls away."

son, numerous theoreticians, in particular recently,² have conceived of irregular warfare—incorrectly—as revolutionary warfare *per se*.

Whoever equates irregular warfare with revolutionary warfare, not only forgets, that the combat which gave irregular warfare the name by which it is identified today, the combat of Spanish and Portuguese partisans against Napoleon, but also the simultaneous "popular war" of the peasants of Tyrol against French and Bavarian occupation troops, the partisan operations of Russian peasants against Napoleon's armies in 1812,³ the actions of the Prussian "Streifkorps," (raiding parties)

²The primary example to be cited here is Mao Tse-tung, who is of the opinion, that the counterrevolutionary, i.e., the non-communist, is incapable, because of his psychological constitution, of waging irregular warfare, so that for this reason alone, every irregular war must be a revolutionary war. But there are also authors, who by no means accept Mao Tse-tung's theses without criticism, who conceive of irregular warfare too narrowly as the war of communist revolution—such as Helmuth Rentsch in his excellent book. Similar one-sidedness characterizes the already cited book by Martin Oppenheimer, who deals with the entire problem of modern irregular warfare in terms of the conflict between blacks and whites in the United States. It is self-evident that irregular warfare and revolutionary war are identical for the communist theoretician. But the observer living in the free world, whose task is to deduce some generally valid principles from a multitude of different, often contradictory experiences, ought to avoid such one-sided points of view.

On this, compare also Denise Bindschedler, loc. cit., p. 69: "The irregular war as a method of combat is *not* revolutionary war, it is not even the exclusive preserve of partisans in an occupied country."

³Pavlo Jakšić, *bei die gegenseitige Transformation der frontalen und der Partisanenkriegführung*, in *Konzeption der allumfassenden Verteidigung Jugoslawiens*, Belgrade 1970, p. 260ff., emphasizes the fact, that "the spontaneous armed uprising of the Russian peasants against the occupiers . . . occurred under conditions, in which a certain hope was cherished, that the occupier would liberate Russia from serfdom . . . and that only patriotism was the driving force of consciousness of the Russian fighters, while the backward, despotic, czaristic social order based on serfdom was a stranglehold on the unfolding of the creative powers of the people in its struggle against the conqueror."

Compare also Josef S. Roucek, "Partisanenkampf als Mittel revolutionären Politik, Bedeutung, Methoden, und Gegenmassnahmen," in *Europäische Archiv*, Vol. 27, p. 73: "An analysis of the partisan uprisings of that time shows, that, contrary to the widely accepted view, it is neither poverty and economic misery, nor instigation by a world-wide conspiracy, which is the chief motive of such movements . . . houses for the poor may breed crime, violence and all sorts of social evils—but they hardly generate a real, sustained partisan war. To the contrary, in Vietnam it is the relatively well-off farmers who sympathize with the Vietcong. Economic reasons can not explain the Vietnam War."

which preceded the war of 1813 and accompanied it, the nearly 50-years long irregular war of the Greeks against Turkish domination, and the simultaneous war of the Bulgarians and Serbian Komitadashi, were conducted for national, not revolutionary aims, and had nothing whatsoever to do with revolutionary war⁴; he also loses sight of the fact, that there have been a number of irregular wars in our century as well, in which one nation stood against another. In irregular warfare, the Boers, at the beginning of the century, attempted to maintain their national sovereignty against the British; Russian partisans, who waged irregular warfare against the Germans in World War II, as Thayer emphasizes, "were Russians fighting not for revolution, but for Mother Russia"⁵; the Polish and Yugoslav partisans fought out of love of their fatherland, not out of revolutionary motivations, but for the independence of their countries, although Marxists took over the leadership of the movements; at stake for the Israelis, who, as members of the Haganah, the Irgun, or the so-called Stern Gang, waged irregular warfare against the British and the Arabs in 1949, was the creation of a nation-state, not the realization of a revolutionary idea; the partisans of Colonel Grivas-Dighenis ultimately fought in Cyprus for the freedom of the island and in favor of joining with Greece, not as revolutionaries. Even the war fought in Vietnam, under the banner of communist ideology against the French, was, for those who fought it, primarily a national war of liberation.⁶

⁴Compare especially Friedrich Engels, *Über den Krieg* (reprint of two articles from 11 November and 9 December 1870 in the London newspaper, *Pall Mall Gazette*), in Joachim Schickel, loc. cit., p. 117-126, particularly p. 121.
⁵Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 13.

Also Jürgen Dennert, *Verschwügenes Zeitgeschehen, Kriege und Kämpfe der Gegenwart, von denen keiner spricht*, Vienna 1970, p. 115, poses "the question of the ideological orientation of the guerrillas," in the area of Southeast Asia which he studies. "Were they nationalists or communists? Communists spread almost everywhere in the countries of the Far East, by appealing to the national feelings of the population, and by subverting already existing political organizations, which were generally of a nationalist character. In a certain sense, that holds for the Chinese Communist Party as well, which was allied with the Kuomintang, founded by Sun Yat-sen, up to 1927."

⁶Compare Nguyễn Giap, *Volkskrieg und Volksarmee*, in Joachim Schickel, loc. cit., p. 166-174; the "peoples' war" of which Lin Piao speaks, ibid. p. 118-205, is essentially a national irregular war against foreign imperialists. The French idea, correct in itself, to use the experience of the lost war in Vietnam

Even where we encounter irregular warfare as revolutionary war, or as accompanying revolutionary war, a clear distinction must be made, in my view, between revolution and irregular war. Irregular war—also in the form of civil war—is not *itself* revolution, but at most an *instrument* and, under certain circumstances, *part* of a revolution. The relationship between irregular warfare and revolution corresponds, in some respects, to that between conventional war and "civilian" policy, which either calculates such a war into its conception of policy, or instigates the war. Irregular warfare, like conventional warfare, are, respectively, *procedures* to achieve political aims. The choice of political aims lies as far outside of this procedure, as the decision to employ a certain procedure to achieve a political aim: the decision as to political aims and that which pertains to the procedure to be employed to achieve these aims, is a matter of policy, and policy alone.

In order to achieve the aim of revolution, civil war, waged as irregular warfare, is probably the most spectacular, if we consider the history of revolutions, but it is certainly not the most frequently employed procedure. History knows not only of many of unbloody revolutions, but also a large number of bloody revolutions—just consider the case of the French revolution!—which did not employ the procedure of irregular warfare.

§ 2

Revolution as the Legitimization of Irregular Warfare

In revolution, there is formed an indissoluble unity between political creed, political will, political decision, and political act. A new political formula becomes manifest as the content of a form of new faith; out of this faith, political will attempts to assert itself; this will appear in the decision to carry out a thorough change of the existing political, social and economic

and to counter the Algerian partisans in a "revolutionary war," thereby to "hit the adversary with his own weapons . . . in a mixture of military and political motive elements," as Werner Hahlweg expressed it, loc. cit., p. 169, failed, in my view, because it proved impossible to counter the *national* idea with another, equivalent idea.

order; and this decision ultimately leads to the political act. That *wherein* this revolutionary act consists, depends upon the concrete historical situation; there are several diverse means of realizing the change decided upon, of which one or another of these means *may* have the character of irregular warfare. In such a case, the *legitimacy* of irregular warfare is derived from the new political formula, which the revolution seeks to realize. This new formula becomes the guerillero's *flag*, to a certain extent, and he fights, is victorious, or dies under this flag.

The flag is the symbol of an idea, its sensuous representation; in the political formula, it is the idea itself which lives and works. The political formula is the logical beginning and foundation of a political order; in it the political order becomes transparent, and its existence appears meaningful. The entire legal and social structure of the state and community of states, at any concrete historical point in time, is built upon a political formula. One such political formula, which lasted until well into the nineteenth century was the idea of the divine right of kings, the idea that, ultimately, all earthly power derives *from God*, and is *personally* delegated, over several steps, from above. Another such political formula today is the "sovereignty" of the people, the idea, that all authority derives *from the people*, and everyone who belongs to this order of things is called upon to co-determine in this order; this co-determination is expressed in elections and votes, in which the decision of the majority is delegated, according to issues, from below. Yet another such political formula is that of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the trail-blazer toward a classless society, where, in the final phase, "authority" is already distributed in society, so that there is no longer any need for a delegating procedure.

There is no political formula, which could be *scientifically proven* to be correct. Every political formula is a fiction: only the force which the political formula exerts as the content of a political faith, is real. The political formula is *taken to be* correct, true and necessary, and is *believed* by those who uphold it.

A political formula which no longer corresponds to the secret desires and efforts of the people, no longer corresponds to the thinking of the age, is ineffective among its contem-

poraries.⁷ It is no longer believed. Those who rely upon it and its force, lose their power, i.e., that influence, which had previously allowed them to impose their will. The *legitimacy* previously derived from this political formula, is reduced to mere *legality*, which still sustains the existing order and lends it validity, simply *because* it exists. This pure legality, extirpated from legitimacy based upon political faith, holds tightly to the fact that it exists,⁸ as if what *exists*, *should* and *must* be. The distance from such a recognition of the "normative power of that which is a fact," to the conclusion that "nicht sein kann, was nicht sein darf" (nothing can occur, which should not occur) is a relatively short one.

The used-up legitimacy of the old political formula is replaced by a new legitimacy, which is expressed in a new political formula and basis for validity. In the name of this new legitimacy, the older rulers, whose power has slipped out of their hands, are pushed aside and overthrown by the new rulers, who seize power themselves; the old order is replaced by a different and new one. It is this process within a state that we call a *revolution*. Every revolution bequeaths legitimacy, once its political formula is believed. The means of which revolution avails itself, to achieve its aims, are irrelevant. If

⁷A particular kind of *disappointment* is often the reason why one generation loses faith in the political formula of the fathers. A straightforward, or at least continuous political, social, or economic development is hoped for under the aegis of a certain political formula. If actual developments do not correspond to such expectations, a gap arises between the unrealized wishes and experienced reality. If such an expectation-gap becomes too great, or lasts too long before it closes, the political formula loses its credibility.

When Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 27, says that "revolutionary movements . . . are largely related to that strain stemming from perceived deprivation of society's resources in economic goods and services, political power, or social prestige," he has something similar in mind. But Oppenheimer's definition of revolution is too narrow. It is not only such "recognized" disadvantages of the cited kind, but also assumed ones—those which do not in fact exist to the degree believed—that can lead to revolution. On the other hand, history demonstrates, that disappointed national or religious expectations—expectations which have nothing to do with advantage or disadvantage—can constitute the beginning of a revolutionary movement.

⁸Carl Schmitt and Joachim Schickel, *Gespräche über den Partisanen*, loc. cit., p. 24f, and Schmitt's assertion: "legality, as well as regularity in our sense, is the functional style of the bureaucracy . . . i.e., a horrible reality."

ever the ends justify the means, then they do in this case. One of these means *can* be irregular warfare, waged in the name of the *new* political formula, from which it derives its legitimacy. Legality raises its head with the last ounce of force it still possesses, based upon a handed down, *old* political formula, and turns against those, who wage such an irregular war. The aim of revolutionary irregular warfare is to weaken the power of this legality, so that it can no longer assert itself; its actions are intended to push aside the representatives of this legality, or at least to make clear to them, that they no longer have any influence.

§ 3

Irregular Warfare and Civil War

Revolution must be distinguished from a rebellion. Revolution implies a special goal-orientation, whereas rebellion implies a certain behavior. Revolution often tries to reach its goal by means of a rebellion; but there are also revolutions without rebellions—"quiet" revolutions—and there are, repeatedly, rebellions without revolutionary aims. Among these we should count especially national rebellions: rebellions directed exclusively or primarily against a *foreign* suppressor, sometimes against an aggressor, sometimes against an occupier, against a foreign power which has annexed or otherwise taken possession of the territory in which the rebellion breaks out.

Revolution as well as rebellion can lead to civil war. For a revolution, civil war is one *means* to achieve its goal, for a rebellion it is the natural *result*, if the power against which the rebellion is directed defends itself. Like a rebellion, its continuation in civil war can serve different purposes—revolutionary as well as national. As Hartmut Schumann⁹ correctly argues, the intent of a civil war can be "the change of a political system while maintaining the territory of the state, or a change of power relationships while maintaining the territory of the state *and* its political system," and, furthermore, the intent

⁹Hartmut Schumann, "Der politisch-soziologische Tatbestand des verdeckten Kampfes," in *Wehrkunde, Zeitschrift für alle Wehrfragen*, Vol. XVII, No. 10, October 1968, p. 514.

can be the "separation of a part or parts of the territory of the state with the goal of achieving independence," and finally, the intent can be "the separation of part or parts of the state in order to seek an annexation with one or more third powers." Often the first of the cited aims combines with one of the other two in civil war into an indissoluble unity.

From the standpoint of domestic law, rebellion as well as civil war are violations of law, i.e., crimes: if the rebellion is not successful, or if the rebels in a civil war are defeated, trial and sentencing according to the existing laws await the defeated. If the rebellion is a success, or if the rebels in a civil war are victorious, success justifies the deed.¹⁰ The risk of undertaking a rebellion and a civil war lies in the legal consequences of failure: by analogy to the notion of the "risky act of war," one might also speak of a "risky political act." The risk of a rebellion and the subsequent civil war—regardless of whether it began as a revolutionary or a national movement—is the greater, the more legitimate the legality, which it violates, appears. Those involved in the rebellion must *always* seek to undermine the belief in the legitimacy of the adversary.

A crime committed *in* civil war is to be distinguished from civil war understood *to be* a crime. Crime can, as will be shown, become a means of irregular warfare, and so also a means in a civil war, waged as irregular warfare. In concrete cases, it is not a simple matter, to draw the line between a justified "deed out of conviction"—if not legally, then morally—and a morally reprehensible criminal act. "Nothing is more difficult to define, than a political crime," Danton is claimed to have asserted. The rebel believes, that he finds the justification for his action, whatever he does, in the goal he seeks to achieve; his adversary, on the other hand, will always be inclined to see the crime committed in the heat of combat as an additional proof of the criminal character of the aims of the rebellion.

¹⁰There is no criminal code of law which includes the crime of *successful* high treason. An "accomplished" act of high treason, in the sense of criminal law, is *de facto unsuccessful* high treason. If high treason is successful, the object of its attack ceases to exist by virtue of that success: the institutions of law to be protected by that norm which punishes high treason—i.e., the *then existing* political order—has been so altered in content by virtue of the success of the deed, that it is no longer threatened by this deed; to the contrary, under certain circumstances, it may even be protected by it.

Civil war is the comprehensive employment of violence *outside* the arena in which the customary, contracted norms of international law are valid. It is therefore an employment of violence for which there are no norms—since the domestic institutions of law do not recognize the *legal* possibility of comprehensive employment of violence. Civil war creates its own rules. If—which often happens—these norms, formed *ad hoc*, are modelled on the laws and customs of war in international law, civil war *can* unfold in the form of a conventional war: then there will be civil war “armies,” in which the “combatants” of both sides fight, as if they were waging war in the context of international law. If none of the rules modelled on the “conventions” of international law emerge in civil war, rules which limit the employment of violence to certain persons and certain instruments, then such a civil war will take on the form of irregular warfare.

Civil war usually begins with the violent rebellion of a part of the armed forces without *active* participation of the population, or the rebellion of part of the population without the involvement of the military side. In the first case, troops initially fight troops, soldier against soldier; it only comes to irregular warfare when the civilian population, not included in the military organization, takes sides for or against the rebelling part of the armed forces. In the case of a popular uprising, on the other hand, the government, against which the violent rebellion is directed, will attempt to put it down with the help of the armed forces.

Into the first half of the twentieth century, civilian rebellions had a certain chance to be victorious in such violent conflict with government troops. Combat was waged almost exclusively with small arms; it was possible for rebels to procure weapons which were more or less equivalent to those used by government troops—whether the insurgents had taken possession of such weapons and kept them hidden before the outbreak of the rebellion, or whether they had attacked warehouses and munition depots in the first phase of the rebellion, and captured the weapons. The use of such weapons was simple, and it was possible to train with them, if necessary, shortly before the rebellion in some secluded cellar.

Since the middle of the twentieth century, insurgents no longer have this prospect in open combat against regular

armed forces; the troops will no longer engage in combat, as they did previously, with small arms, but with tanks and aircraft. To seize a moderately adequate number of tanks and aircraft is just as impossible for insurgents with whom a considerable part of the armed forces does not make common cause, as it is to use these weapons, even if the insurgents did somehow succeed in obtaining them.

In view of the superiority of regular forces, which cannot be compensated for, against civilian insurgents who do not have larger troop units on their side, such insurgents today, despite their courage and willingness to sacrifice, no longer have a real chance to achieve their aim in open combat.¹¹ The only way to success which still offers itself in such a case is irregular warfare.

§ 4

From Civil War to International War

The essential feature of a rebellion—as already shown—is a certain *behavior*, not a specific goal-orientation. A rebellion may serve revolutionary as well as national aims. The same holds for the irregular warfare, which continues the rebellion, or—which is far more often the case—takes its place. *Theoretically*, one might distinguish between a revolutionary and a national irregular war¹²: not every irregular war is *per se* a revolutionary war as well, as we demonstrated.

The *revolutionary* irregular war usually has the features of a civil war: the armed forces confronting one another in such a war—action groups and active sympathizers on the one hand, military units, police formations, and counter-action groups on the other—all belong to one single state, which is also the theater of combat of this war. The *national* irregular

¹¹ Compare Martin Oppenheimer, *op.cit.*, p. 93ff. and p. 98. The risk of insurgency at the present time led Oppenheimer to investigate a behavior which he calls the “non-violent guerilla.” It consists predominantly in passive resistance, strikes and subversive propaganda.

¹² Compare Milojević Pantelić, *Die territoriale Verteidigung*, in *Konzeption der allumfassenden Verteidigung Jugoslawiens*, Belgrade 1970, p. 70, p. 328. Pantelić distinguishes three forms of irregular warfare: liberation war, defensive war, and revolutionary war.

war, on the other hand, usually occurs as an armed conflict of a specific kind between two or more states, and this is a war in the sense defined by international law from the outset.

In practice, however—in a concrete historical situation—it will not be easy, to draw the line between revolutionary war and national irregular war: the sharp contours become blurred. If the foreign suppressor is seen, rightly or wrongly, as representative of a certain political, social and economic order, revolutionary and national goal-orientations will pass over into one another.

As a civil war, too, irregular war, when it occurs as a revolutionary or a national “war of liberation”—as Hartmut Schumann correctly points out¹³—“is certain to obtain international support, and thus becomes implicated in the field of tension of international relations.”

The good will, which a foreign nation shows toward a party waging civil war, initially leads to indirect, and then direct, support of this party over the course of a civil war waged as irregular warfare. Propagandistic support is enhanced by financial support; over time, financial support is extended to supplies of weapons and materiel, and to training of the action-groups for irregular warfare, and the absorption of such groups after missions are accomplished. Via this development, an irregular war which began as a civil war, leads to a war between states.

In this connection, Schumann correctly emphasizes, that nowadays, “no internal armed conflict is possible, to which the United States and the Soviet Union do not have some relationship, on account of their global interests”;¹⁴ he notes, that, for that reason, “every internal conflict is embedded in international power relationships,” such that “the internal conflict inevitably has effects upon international relations, and the outcome of the conflict is inevitably influenced from the outside.” In this sense, one can speak of a necessary international reflex-effect of every internal conflict. In one case, one state helps the separatists in another state in combat against the central government; in another, it will come to the aid of

¹³Hartmut Schumann, loc. cit., p. 513.

Compare also Denise Bindschedler, loc. cit., p. 70.

¹⁴Hartmut Schumann, loc. cit., p. 513.

the central government to suppress the separatists; an intervening state will take the side of revolutionaries, which are insurgent against the existing order, or it may support the adherents of that existing order in defense against the insurgents.

International law may condemn or prohibit such “interference” in the internal affairs of another state; but since irregular warfare itself unfolds by and large outside the arena of contracted law, it is only fundamentally logical, that this gradual intervention of a foreign state in an irregular war, which began as civil war, ignores agreed norms of international law. In addition, the state which intervenes into such an irregular war, which began as civil war, will initially seek to justify its actions in terms of international law: perhaps by declaring its actions to be an *intervention d'humanité*, or at least seeks thus to excuse its actions as an intervention, which the adversary party itself provoked by violating, in irregular warfare, human rights which are protected by international law—how easily such an accusation can be construed in irregular warfare, which itself holds to virtually no conventions!—or perhaps, the intervening state recognizes the revolutionary party as “insurgents,” or—once the insurgents have actually asserted themselves in a considerable part of the territory of the state with some prospect of continuing to hold this territory—as a “party at war.”

By recognizing the rebels as “insurgents,” or as “a party at war,” the previous civil war becomes an “international” war in the sense of international law,¹⁵ although it is not yet a war between two states. Rebels recognized as “insurgents” or “a party at war,” appear in international law as stages in a process of development, be it a new state, be it a new political order within an existing state. They pose themselves as “a state in the process of becoming,” or “an emerging order of law.”

Once the rebels have been accorded recognition—whether as “insurgents” or as “a party at war”—that irregular war, which began as a civil war, can no longer be distinguished

¹⁵Compare Roscoe R. Ogelsby, *Internal War and the Search for Normative Order*, The Hague 1971, and—on the general problem of recognition—Frhr. von der Heydte, *Völkerrechtliche Anerkennung*, in *Internationale Festschrift für Alfred Verdross zum 80. Geburtstag*, published by René Marcic, Hermann Mosler, Erik Suy, Karl Zemanek, Munich 1971, p. 146f.

even in *legal* terms from an irregular war, which the population of a state wages against the armed forces, the authorities, and other representatives of *another* state. From the outset, there was no essential difference between the two in the characteristic features of irregular warfare.

The contrasting case to the internationalization of a civil war is the case of an armed conflict between states, which takes on the character of a revolutionary war, when in an international war it is no longer nation which fights nation, but it is the combat of one ideology against another. With good reason, Georg A. Zinn¹⁶ argued, that one cannot do justice to the last world war, if one considers it a war of nations against nations, and wanted to believe, that the issue was merely whether this or that nation was victorious. The Second World War, he argued, "was not so much a war between homogeneous states, but a civil war within the economic and international law-unit thought of as One World. The anti-thesis, here, to the international war circumscribed by norms of international law, is no longer civil war waged only between citizens of a single state, and only waged within this one state, but the "inter-ideology war," in which victory is won not by states, but by ideologies.

¹⁶Georg A. Zinn, "Unconditional Surrender," in *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*, 1947/48, p. 11.

III. IRREGULAR WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

§ 1

*Recognition of Guerrillas in International Law?*¹

The previous section dealt with the intervention of other states into a civil war—an intervention which gradually internationalizes the civil war, and thus makes it into a war within the framework of international law. *One* form of intervention of foreign states into a civil war, which is regulated by international law, is the recognition of rebels—the "aggressors" in a civil war—as "insurgents" or as "a party to war" by a state not directly affected by the civil war.²

International law requires, as the prerequisite for the recognition of rebels in a civil war as "insurgents" or "warfare party," as well as for the recognition of irregular armed forces as legitimate combatants in an "international war," among other factors, that the rebels to be recognized and the volunteer corps or members of resistance groups to be treated as legitimate combatants, demonstrate their intent, either by explicit declaration or at least by corresponding actions, to respect the laws and common law practices of the conventions of warfare.

The laws and norms of war are oriented to the "large" war, "conventional" war. The cited requirement of international

¹In German, we often say "guerilla" when we mean to speak of the fighter in an irregular war (Kleinkrieg, "small-war"). This is linguistically wrong. The Spanish word "guerilla" is the diminutive form of "guerra" and means nothing other than "the small war." The fighter in this war is called the "guerillero." Other current expressions, such as the word "partisan," are indissolubly connected to certain political ideas. Carl Schmitt, *Theorie des Partisanen, Zwischenbemerkungen zum Begriff des Politischen*, Berlin 1963, treated this issue extensively. For that reason, in this present study, I call the fighters on the side of the "attackers" in irregular warfare "guerilleros."

²One of the most remarkable antinomies of our time, is that modern international law is always ready to declare anathema any state, which violently attacks another state *from the outside*—theoretically, even when this attacker is successful—while, on the other hand, this same international law accords recognition to the successful attacker if that same state is attacked *from within*.

law means fundamentally nothing other than the demand, that rebels who want to be recognized as "insurgents" or "warring party"—and volunteer corps who want to be treated as legitimate combatants—largely forego waging an irregular war, a war outside of "conventions." It is the very nature of irregular warfare, that it does not occur within the limits drawn by those norms applicable only to the conduct of "large" war. For that reason, a foreign state will hardly ever be justified on account of international law, in the case of a civil war waged as irregular warfare, in recognizing the rebels as "insurgents" or "a party at war," nor will it be obliged to treat guerrilleros as legitimate combatants.

Should recognition of the rebels as "insurgents" or "a party at war" ensue, despite their non-compliance with the "conventions" of war, this represents disrespect for international law on the part of the recognizing state. But that recognition of rebels, even contrary to the norms of international law, places the civil war, in the course of which recognition has been accorded, under international law: Even legally illegitimate recognition makes that civil war into "real" war, war in the terms of reference of international law. If this war is waged—as is usually the case—outside the "conventions" as irregular warfare, even after the recognition of the rebels as "insurgents" or "a party at war," the question is posed, whether norms of international law can determine the behavior—and, if so, which norms—of the parties to the conflict in this irregular warfare, parties which do not feel bound to the "conventions." Are there rules of international law, which can constrain and bind the guerrillero, who fights consciously outside the "conventions," in disrespect of the prescriptions which hold for "large" war?

A similar problem to this one in a civil war, which has taken on an international character by virtue of the recognition of rebels as "insurgents" or "a party at war," and which has therefore been placed under the norms of international law, is also posed by a war which had an international character from the outset—which was therefore already war in the terms of reference of international law—with respect to the treatment of guerrilleros who conduct irregular war in the context of this war outside the "conventions." The state against which

irregular warfare is waged, is, we have demonstrated, not obliged to respect guerrilleros as legitimate combatants in the sense of international law. But does this mean, that the state can punish them, according to its laws, as civilian persons who have committed acts of war, on account of the acts they commit—the state therefore only demonstrating respect for the prescriptions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 regarding the protection of civilians in war? Or is there perhaps, in fact, a norm in international law, which regulates the behavior of the conflicting parties in irregular warfare outside the "conventions," which protects the guerrillero from being thrown totally to the "legality" of a state against which he fights, a norm which prevents the state from treating the guerrillero from the outset and *only* as a criminal, who, once he falls into the hands of the authorities of the state in the process of carrying out an irregular warfare operation, is to be considered "caught in the act"?³

In both cases, the issue is fundamentally the same. That an irregular war, which is not a *pure* civil war without any interference by another state, occurs in an arena comprehended by international law, is incontestable. On the other hand, it follows from the nature of irregular warfare, as war waged outside of "conventions," that the norms applicable to "large" war are not, or are not for the most part, applicable. The question posed is, whether international law has foregone a *special* regulation of the behavior of the conflicting parties in irregular warfare, and whether it *can* and *may* do without such a *special* regulation.

It is beyond the limits of this present study, which deals

³Compare Denise Bindschedler, loc. cit. p. 82: "With respect to this guerrillero, who does not respect the laws and norms of war, he can be executed; but, of course, one must grant, that the minimal standard of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applies to him as well, which demands judgment before a legitimately constituted court. This would have to be explicitly established by treaty." Denise Bindschedler only dealt with the question of the treatment of guerrilleros who do not comply with certain laws and norms of war as a side issue. One question posed, in addition to the one just cited, is whether *previously* prevailing international law only *permits* the punishment of the guerrillero by the state against which he fights, and into whose hands he falls—so that the combat actions of the guerrillero must be spoken of as a risky act of war in the sense of the definition given—or whether this international law *requires* such punishment under certain circumstances.

with the phenomenon of irregular warfare as a whole, and only secondarily with problems of law, to attempt to give an even moderately satisfactory answer to this question. It must be left to later, more specialized investigations. Here, suffice it to provide a sketch for a future investigation, without intending to prejudice the final answer.

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§ 2

The So-Called "Humanitarian Norms"

It has become customary in the last twenty-five years to consider the so-called *humanitarian* norms as a special part of the law of war. This tendency is obviously based on the insight, that there must be a core of the law of war, which prevents man from becoming a beast in war, and which therefore forbids making defenseless persons the immediate object of the means of destruction used in war.

Defenseless persons are those who can no longer fight because they are sick, wounded, or ship-wrecked, as well as those who no longer want to fight, and make this known by surrendering and becoming prisoners of war, and also, finally, those who are not allowed to fight—unless they want to give up the protection of international law—whether they be non-combatants in the armed forces, or members of the civilian population. This humanitarian core of the law of war, which protects the defenseless, is expressed and formulated in a number of norms which have been agreed upon for "large" war: it is binding in its basic principles, however, not only because it has been so agreed upon. Even were there no relevant agreements, anyone who wages war would be bound by these principles.

In our view, this primitive humanitarian law, which provides a certain measure of protection to defenseless persons, limits not only "large" war, but also the "small" (irregular) war, which is conducted outside of conventions. Inhumanity against defenseless persons is forbidden by *international law* in irregular warfare as well.⁴

⁴Compare Denise Bindschedler, loc. cit., p. 77: "It is also correct to say, that the circumstances of irregular warfare make the application of certain

It is still an open question, whether this is the only prohibition of international law, which limits irregular warfare. One widely held view is, that irregular warfare should not be permitted at all by international law.

If a civil war takes on at least the *appearance* of regular warfare, regulated by law (regardless of whether it is waged with conventional means or as irregular warfare), due to the recognition of the rebels as "insurgents" or "a party at war," it still has the blemish of being irregular, something which is forbidden, when it is waged as a war between states—and thus, incontestably within the arena regulated by international law.

For the "classical" international law of the nineteenth and beginning twentieth centuries, which had no general prohibition against war, "large" war was the "allowed war," whereas irregular warfare was "forbidden" war. When irregular warfare is mentioned in the international law literature of the nineteenth century, then it is usually only to establish, that those who wage such war "on their own cognizance and without permission of the sovereign," stand utterly outside the protection of the law of war and the customs of war among civilized nations.⁵

norms sometimes impossible, or make these norms themselves irrelevant. This certainly holds for such perfectionist conventions as those of Geneva, intended for application by well-organized states. This . . . however, does not mean, that the principles upon which these conventions and prescriptions are based, are not applicable. It were barbaric logic, if one wanted to claim, that it is necessary to execute—or even permit the execution—of prisoners, because the circumstances prohibit housing them in proper quarters. It is a firmly established norm, that it is prohibited to kill or wound an enemy who, after he has laid down his weapons and no longer has any means to defend himself, has surrendered himself to the mercy of his enemy; and the difficulties posed by guarding and quartering such persons always existed, without this prohibition ever having been put in doubt. Prisoners must either be freed, or another humanitarian solution must be found, such as—and this has been done—delivering them to a neighboring state or protective power to intern them." Denise Bindschedler refers in this connection to the Yugoslavian law on National Defense of 1968, which requires, that all members of the armed forces, including partisans, respect the norms of the law of war in every instance which is relevant to humanitarian treatment of persons from enemy forces, either wounded or taken prisoner. Denise Bindschedler finds this prescription inadequate, in that this is not the only humanitarian norm, which must be respected in irregular warfare.

⁵August Wilhelm Heffler, *Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart*, 2nd Edi-

Irregular Warfare as Justified Self-Defense

The distinction between an "allowed" large war and a "forbidden" small war has been superseded by the general prohibition against war in modern international law. The large war and the irregular warfare waged between states, are therefore legally, as far as their basic permissibility is concerned, on the same level.

Modern international law, which replaced "classical" international law after World War I, knows of only two genuine exceptions to the general prohibition against the employment of armed violence by one state against another. The one exception is the sanctioned war, conducted in the name of, and under the aegis of the world organization of the United Nations, in order to maintain or reestablish world peace and international security. The other exception to the prohibition against the employment of armed force in the international arena is the war of self-defense, which a state, which has become the victim of an unprovoked attack, wages in order

tion, Berlin 1948, p. 233ff. In the same way, Karl Gareis, *Institutionen des Völkerrechts*, 2nd Edition, Giessen 1901, p. 232, assumes, that in the case of a "patriotic popular rebellion . . . the effectiveness of international law in respect to the regulation of the conduct of war" ceases. Compare I.C. Bluntschli, *Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisierten Staaten*, 2nd Edition, Nördlingen, 1872, p. 287: "An armed party, which has not been empowered by an established authority of the state to employ violence, is nevertheless considered a party to war, insofar as it is organized as an independent war-power, and contests in good faith on behalf of public law in place of the state. . . . Many actions of volunteer corps are of this kind, which intend to force a political change. If these [forces] operate as a *well-ordered army*, such as the German volunteer corps under Major Schill or the Italian volunteers, who marched with Garibaldi to Sicily and Naples, then it is appropriate to characterize them as a party to war." Ibid., p. 321: ". . . when combat is not conducted by masses, but in small units, or when warlike acts are committed by individuals . . . it is impossible for the army to distinguish between peaceful citizens and bandits or robbers, if the character of a man of war is not immediately visible by some externally recognizable sign. . . . Persons, who undertake warlike actions on their own cognizance, without being so empowered by the state, and then arbitrarily disguise themselves as normal citizens, and hide their profession as warriors, are not considered the enemy, and may, under certain circumstances, be arrested and punished as robbers."

to maintain its existence as a sovereign state, or to maintain its domestic order, or its territory in its previous extent.

A small state, which is attacked by a superior adversary, will, under certain circumstances, only be able to wage the allowed war of self-defense against the aggressor as irregular warfare. In this case, irregular warfare becomes "allowed" war; the "large" war of the aggressor, on the other hand, is forbidden by international law.

The question of which actions of *irregular warfare* are allowed by international law in this case, and which other actions are held to be violations of international law, decisively depends upon the much-discussed, but, in theory and practice, as yet unsolved question, of whether the attacker and the attacked *durante bello* are equivalent, and therefore the state which has been attacked is bound in its war of self-defense against the aggressor to all the norms of the law of war, or whether it is legally justified in taking actions in its self-defense, which international law normally forbids, especially on the part of the attacker. In other words: The issue here is, whether also in terms of *ius in bello*, or only *ius post bellum* and the right to neutrality, there is a discrimination of the attacker, and where under certain circumstances—if such a discrimination is foreseen also by *ius in bello*—the limits are to be drawn.

For "classical" international law, irregular warfare was irrelevant, also because, as a rule, it occurred in connection with a "large" war—to a certain extent as a side-effect and deformation of this conventional war. The combat of Spanish guerrillas against Napoleon was initially taken to be only a phenomenon accompanying the combat of the British expeditionary corps in Spain, and Wellington himself, the commander of this expeditionary corps, viewed the irregular warfare action of the Spaniards only as an insignificant, even undesirable phenomenon. The activity of the Prussian raiding detachments in the war of 1813 remained, as valuable as they might have been in particular cases, an insignificant episode in comparison to the operations of the regular units; the operations of Italian partisans against the Austrians in the various campaigns in Italy, especially in the year 1848, induced Radetzky to work out a special handbook of instructions

for fighting them,⁶ but they were otherwise overshadowed by the conventional conflict. The actions of the Greek freedom fighters against the Turks were transformed quickly into a conventional war. "Classical" international law, from the prescriptions of the Hague Convention on Land War on the Freikorps, up to the norms of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which speak of an organized resistance movement, only conceived of irregular warfare as a phenomenon accompanying a large war, and attempted to place it within the normative context of such a large war—and therefore to subordinate it to the prescriptions applicable for this war.

The theory of classical international law proceeded from the maxim, that, in the same war, the *same* norms hold for all combatants. The idea, that some *special* form of the conduct of war also required special regulations, did not prevail in international law—except for the law of maritime war.⁷

Only after World War II do we encounter a large number of cases of *isolated* irregular warfare, which neither prepares a conventional war, nor accompanies it, nor concludes it, but rather one which must be considered as a phenomenon of its own kind. In this isolated irregular warfare, the cited consideration, that in the same war the same norms should hold, can no longer be the basis for the application of the regulations of conventional war. The phenomenon of modern irregular warfare, which no longer occurs only in the shadows of a conventional war, is a challenge to international law. International law must take up this challenge, in theory and practice, if it is not to draw upon itself the accusation of "neglecting the lawful regulation of an existing state of affairs," "which has moved from the periphery of events to the center."⁸

⁶On this, compare Arthur Ehrhardt, *Kleinkrieg, geschichtliche Erfahrungen und künftige Möglichkeiten*, Potsdam 1936, p. 9; further, Werner Hahlweg, loc. cit. p. 61ff.

⁷Eventually arising exceptions to the unified norms—binding all combatants—of the law of war were taken account of in the theory of classical international law always with reference only to the priority of the "aims of war," or to the "law of retaliation," if "the enemy employed forbidden means of combat"; in the latter case, the adversary could be treated as "without rights." A.W. Heffter, op. cit., p. 219ff.

⁸Hartmut Schumann, loc. cit. p. 508.

Compare also Denise Bindstedler, loc. cit., p. 71: "The growth, which irregular warfare has experienced in the world of today, particularly since

World War II, has given rise to the need, to reexamine the laws and norms of armed conflict from the standpoint of the particular characteristics of this special method of combat. If, of course, one approaches a reevaluation and reformulation of the norms, which ought to be applicable for such a war, one must not forget, that the essence of the laws and norms of war do not consist in granting a right to commit violence and destruction, but to *set limits* to such activities, whatever their origin, in order to preserve certain humanitarian and cultural values."

Part Two:

IRREGULAR WARFARE AND GRAND
STRATEGY

IV. GENERAL STRATEGIC-POLITICAL PROBLEMS

§ 1

The Role of Irregular Warfare in Strategy

It is not only the theory of international law, which is fundamentally a science of peace, or at least which ought to be that, but also the "science of war," the theory of strategy, which is challenged by the phenomenon of modern irregular warfare: The answer, which the theory of international law gives to the questions posed by modern irregular warfare, and the answers of the "strategist," mutually enhance and condition one another by their nature. International law can not make headway without the insights of strategy, and strategy alone is inadequate without the knowledge of international law.

It is considered good manners nowadays, when speaking of strategy, to point out, that strategy is not only the art of employing military force to achieve a certain goal set by policy. In the modern view, strategy is far more the art of employing power as such—be it force, be it influence of another kind—to the realization of political aims. Power—as was already indicated—is fundamentally nothing but influence of a certain intensity: an influence, which is so strong, that the one upon whom it is exerted, behaves the way the one who exerts it wants.

A *demonstration* of power is intended to convince the adversary, that it were useless to want to hinder the one who demonstrates power from achieving his aims, on account of which this power is demonstrated. Strategy is the art of the correct demonstration of power; it intends to call forth a certain *psychological* reaction in the adversary, in order to achieve a *political* aim.

Military strategy, too, which is a part of strategy in general, aims at achieving a *psychological* effect. It is distinguished from strategy in general only in that it employs a *specific* means of power, i.e., the means of military power.

Military strategy is not necessarily a strategy of war. The

real art of a military strategy is to achieve the political aim sought for *without* war—by means of the mere *demonstration* of military power.¹ The strategy of war, in which the demonstration of power is intensified to the *employment* of force, is only one form of military strategy. It is its last option, when it cannot achieve the success desired by any other means.

Military strategy as a whole, as well as the strategy of war in its own context, will *sometimes* attempt to achieve its aims in the immediate confrontation of the opposing forces. Such a "strategy of direct action" takes the bull by the horns, and seeks the grand decisive battle in war, in which the aim is to destroy an essential part of the adversary forces with a few, massive blows. *Another time*, military strategy as a whole—and, once again, the strategy of war in its own context—will seek to "outmaneuver" the adversary in space and time, while avoiding a direct test of the opposing forces. This "strategy of indirect action" evades the bull, in order to stick the banderillas in his neck from the side. It seeks to disorient the adversary, drawing him into a worse position, and—without engaging in major battle—wearing him down with small pin-pricks, so that he ultimately falls to his knees, exhausted.

In the context both of military strategy and particularly of the strategy of war, irregular warfare as a form of war, and as a form of the conduct of war, plays a significant role. By the threat of irregular warfare, or by actually waging irregular war, the adversary is to be induced to behave the way the other side, which threatens or launches irregular warfare, wants.

Strategy employs irregular warfare as an instrument of *indirect action*. The adversary is not "decisively beaten" in irregular war, instead he is "decisively outmaneuvered." Anyone choosing to employ irregular warfare as an instrument of

¹There is also the demonstration of the readiness to wage irregular war, which pursues the aim of achieving certain political aims. When, for example, in the large Autumn maneuvers in 1971, Yugoslavia clearly demonstrated its capability to counter the attack of the conventionally superior forces of an adversary *also* with the instrument of irregular warfare, this was certainly not exclusively a military demonstration to deter a potential enemy, but it had that function, too. A similar auxiliary effect may have been sought in the joint French-Belgian maneuvers in the Tournai-Leuze-Pérnwelz region in the Fall of 1971, in which guerrillero defense and the purging of a "contaminated" area were demonstrated.

indirect action, intends to achieve a certain *psychological effect*. His aim will be to make his *own* political aim appear as historically necessary, inevitable, and self-evident to his adversary.

The aim of *every* strategy is, basically, to produce a certain psychological reaction on the part of the adversary. Psychological influence therefore has priority in every strategic consideration. It is not only political conflict, but also war—*every* war—which is fundamentally a battle for the soul and will of the adversary. It is not only a fight over terrain and certain positions.

Taking possession of terrain, conquest of decisive positions, are only instruments, to enforce one's *own will* upon the adversary: as long as this *psychological* aim has not been achieved, the war has not been won. History provides a multitude of examples, in which a party conducting war has occupied the entire territory of his adversary, but was unable to break his adversary's will: in most of these cases, this will eventually assert itself against the presumed victor, although often after a period of generations.

In no other form of war is this psychological element as clear as it is in irregular war. Irregular warfare actions only obtain their importance in the psychological reaction they elicit in the adversary. As we will show, irregular warfare is fundamentally *war of attrition*.²

Only someone who has the appropriate psychological qualities can wage such a war of attrition. In the dialectic of will, of which Beaufre³ speaks, the stronger will wins out. It is not enough to *weaken* the adversary's will, while not either winning over all those who waver or believe, that they can be neutral, or *at least* intimidating them, but it is also crucial, instead, to keep the will of the fighters, and also the sympathizers, *strong*. More than half of the conduct of irregular war is psychological

²Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-(A)rmee-(F)raktion*, loc. cit., p. 28: "Since the destruction of the bourgeois military apparatus by an international war is not to be expected . . . consideration must be directed to those forms of combat and tactics, which make a gradual consumption of the forces of the enemy in the sense of a wearing down of *morale*, and simultaneously the development of a military potency of the proletariat appear possible: the form of combat of the guerilla-war."

³André Beaufre, loc. cit., p. 24.

warfare, psychological assault, as well as psychological defense and psychological armament.

§ 2

Irregular Warfare and Crisis Management

For some years now, discussion of new strategic ideas has been haunted by a new concept: "crisis management." The word itself can hardly be translated into German; it is not easy to determine even the content of the concept.

In economic life, by "management" we understand planning within an enterprise, its organization and control in a division of labor within the hierarchy of the enterprise. In order for this planning, organization, and control to be as effective as possible, in "management" we include the conception, testing, and application of all those means, which modern science and technology offer to this end.

The concept of "crisis management" is derived from this model of economic leadership. "Crisis management" is, accordingly, the conception of all planning, organizational, and control measures, which the political leadership of a state employs, in order to overcome tension at the moment when a far-reaching international conflict arises, without employment of comprehensive military force, but also without surrendering its own political aims. "Crisis management" is intended to achieve without war that, which otherwise could only have been achieved with the means of war. "Crisis management" is supposed to *replace* war in an age, in which the course of weapons development makes carrying out a conflict in war appear senseless.

"Crisis management," on the other hand, is not equivalent to dispensing with armed forces: the existence of armed forces is, rather, the prerequisite of effective "crisis management," since deterrence of the adversary is always, in the context of "crisis management," an essential means for achieving the established aim.

The war, which "crisis management" is supposed to prevent—or replace—is primarily conventional war and nuclear war. Where "crisis management" does not accomplish its task, it becomes a preliminary stage of such a war.

Up to now, investigations of the possibilities and modalities of "crisis management" have hardly taken account of irregular warfare. The reason for this may be that, as will be shown, irregular warfare usually does not occur as an explosive solution to a *prior* condition of international tension, but—as an accompanying phenomenon and symptom—it develops, and is *waged, during* such tension. Exaggerating, one could say, that it is not tension which leads to irregular warfare, but irregular warfare that leads to tension. But that means, that there is hardly any room left, for time reasons alone, for a "crisis management" which could prevent or replace irregular warfare.

Of course, an irregular war, which was limited in territory and personnel, i.e., with respect to the population it affects, could, under certain circumstances, sometimes be employed as a *means* of "crisis management," in order to prevent a threatening *larger* conventional or nuclear war, or it could be employed by the other side, which wants war, as a means to *circumvent* the "crisis management" of the adversary. It is precisely this latter case, which must be taken more account of in anticipatory planning of "crisis management," and which must become more the object of control-measures in situations of tension, than is the case at this time.

A "crisis management" prepared from the standpoint of the long-term view can, finally, can be employed to demonstrate to the world the possibility of countering an assault by conventional forces with the means of irregular warfare, and thus contribute to the deterrence of a potential aggressor and the maintenance of peace.

§ 3

Psychological Armament

War demands sacrifice. It demands many sacrifices—the sacrifice of life, of health, of freedom, including the freedom of favorite comforts. The only people who sacrifice willingly, are those who believe, that there is a value in their sacrifice, which makes this sacrifice meaningful for them.

The meaning which sacrifice has for the individual may lie in the fact, that, by his sacrifice, he avoids losing something

more important than that which he is required to sacrifice. The normal person prefers the *danger* of death—to use a simple example—which he incurs, to the assured death which threatens if he refuses to incur that danger.

The government of a state, which is preparing war or is conducting war, will do everything possible, to make the sacrifices which this war will demand of individual citizens, appear meaningful. The state will not rest with the threat, that those who do *not* sacrifice as is expected of them, must expect far greater deprivation. In addition to this "negative motivation"—for example, the fear of expected social discrimination or of a threatened punishment—the state will use all means at its disposal to pose a "positive motivation," which makes the effort required of the individual and the entire population appear meaningful and necessary. The state will attempt to convince each individual citizen, that he must place himself in the service of an idea, for which it is meaningful to make the necessary sacrifice—in the service of an idea which represents not only the interests of those governing, but a value shared by all the citizens of the country, a "bonum commune"!—something which is in the interest of *every* individual citizen. This psychological armament is the prerequisite for the successful conduct of the war, the preparation of which one has begun.

The faith in such an idea not only makes it possible for each individual to make sacrifices: it also unifies all of those who believe in this idea into a sworn community. This community provides the people who will fight in war.

The individual feels himself safe, "at home," in this community. The feeling of belonging, the knowledge of relying on each other, and the conviction, that one can trust all the others in the same community when the time comes—all of the rational experiences and all the emotions that are encompassed in our language in the idea of comradeship—can, over the course of time, cause the idea, which was initially the primary motive for the willingness to sacrifice on the part of the individual, and which was therefore the foundation of the community, to recede in the consciousness of the individual, and even displace it. The German soldier in the last phase of World War II, who performed his duty just as he had on the very first day of the war, accepted sacrifices and dangers, was

willing to risk his life, no longer generally believed in the ideas of the Third Reich so loudly proclaimed by its potentates, and he also thought relatively little of the fatherland: but he acted as a member of a closed community, and felt himself obligated to it and his "buddies." The performance of the individual was seen as the performance of the community—one was proud to belong to this community, and it would have been treason to leave it.

In this way, a certain "automatic performance of duty" can develop in conventional war, which for a certain period replaces the forgotten or replaced idea which was the original motivation. But, to return to the idea, which is the issue here.

If we leave aside the tradition ingrained into a person by his education, a tradition which makes him believe, that he is obligated to sacrifice for a cause or a person, because his father and grandfather have made the same sacrifice, or at least were willing to make it, then the ideas which were the motivation for the participants in wars of the past two hundred years, may be reduced to two common points: either these were ideas, which were derived from a certain *political formula*, which attempted to assert themselves in these wars, or these were ideas, at the center of which was the connection of the individual to the area in which he lived, and to the nation to which he was loyal—in other words, the *fatherland*.

It is interesting to note, that where the idea that served as a motive for military service was based upon a political formula, as well as where the idea of people and homeland was connected in such an idea, the idea of freedom—political, economic, social, or even personal freedom—comes up. One's own liberation of someone, whose willingness to sacrifice is at issue, or the liberation of others—liberation from a political, economic, or social situation perceived to be non-freedom or repression—is what is promised, if the idea which serves as the motivation for military service, be realized.

§ 4

The Psychological War

Psychological armament, at the center of which stands the propagation of an idea, which makes every required sacrifice

appear meaningful and necessary, has a correlate in psychological warfare. In psychological armament, it is one's own population, chiefly one's own armed forces, who are addressed. The first task of psychological warfare is to shatter the motivation for military service on the part of the adversary, with arguments which attempt to convince the soldiers and population on the other side, such that the idea, which serves him as military motivation, is represented to be false, a lie, and meaningless. Where this idea is derived from a political formula, this political formula itself will be put under attack, and another political formula will be posited, here too, usually, in the name of freedom. The aim is to make clear to the soldiers of the adversary, that a victory of the political formula for which he fights, would mean repression for him, at least in certain spheres of his life, subjugation, and poverty.

Where the idea which serves the adversary as military motivation is based on conceptions of nation and fatherland, the aim is to convincingly show these ideas to lack credibility, as empty, outdated, and to replace these ideas with others, which, one claims, correspond better to reality and the needs of the time. An appeal to some sort of international obligations—in whatever field—also has its place here, as well as casting suspicion, that the nation and fatherland of the adversary government are only camouflage for egotistical, expansive, even criminal goals, goals against which one's own goals—ever so selfless, noble and ideal—are contrasted.

If the idea of freedom and liberation—regardless of whose and from what—plays an essential role in the military motivation of the adversary, the issue in psychological warfare is to convincingly accuse the adversary of an intended or already accomplished repression, of whatever sort, so that the soldiers and population of the adversary begin to doubt the truth of the appeal to freedom, in which they had previously, but unreflectively, believed. One will be especially successful, if one manages to convict the adversary in the eyes of the world—and thus, ultimately, his own population—of racist, national, social and economic repression of a minority. Under certain circumstances, this propaganda becomes especially effective, when the allegedly repressed minority is small, and therefore defenseless from the beginning.

A proven means for shattering the adversary's will to defend

is to portray the idea, for which his soldiers are ready to fight, and his population willing to take upon itself the sacrifices of war, as utopian and unrealistic, to repeatedly announce the immutability and non-reversibility of certain so-called “realities,” and to appeal to the reason, the sense of reality, and the sobriety of the members of the adversary’s armed forces, or the adversary population as a whole.

Finally, one will also seek to appeal to people’s need for security in psychological warfare, especially people in our times. To that end, one will use all propaganda means at one’s disposal to graphically illustrate the immensity of the dangers awaiting the soldiers and citizens of the adversary, if their government begins a military conflict—as it plans to do—wages such a war, or continues to wage such a war. In this “operation insecurity,” sometimes the allegedly meager chances for survival, at other times the apparently doubtless, feared ruination of the perfect security, which would be guaranteed, if only the government of the adversary were to give in, will be contrasted with one another. Additionally, these propaganda actions will be complemented by terror operations, to intimidate the soldiers or part of the population of the adversary, and make clear to them the risk they will be taking, if they continue to support their government. If in Angola in 1969, three-quarters of all acts of terrorism, launched out of the Congo and Zambia by black partisans, were directed against the black population of Angola, such “insecurity” was certainly one of the aims of this obviously centrally controlled operation.⁴

§ 5

The Function of the Idea in Irregular Warfare

The struggle for motivation in psychological armament, on the one hand, and in psychological warfare, on the other hand, plays an important role today in conventional war; in irregular war, it becomes decisive. We indicated in another connection, that irregular war, more so than the “large” war, is conducted

⁴Glauco Carniero, “A Guerra do Ultramar”, in *O Cruziero* (Rio de Janeiro), 24 November 1970, p. 171.

with psychological means and is directed at exerting psychological influence. Fighters in irregular war do not fight under the same compulsion, which can form a “negative” motivation in a “large” war, when the effect of an idea, for the realization of which sacrifices are demanded, is not great enough to serve as a “positive” motivation. Irregular warfare has no “draftees,” only volunteers. The guerrillero forced to participate in the fighting—this was the experience of the Greek communists from 1946-1949 as well as the Vietcong in the first phase of the Vietnam war—will fail at the decisive moment.

Just this lack of a “negative” motivation requires, that the guerrillero be far more committed to the idea for which he fights, than the regular soldier. But the way in which combat in irregular war is conducted also requires this intensive commitment of the fighter to the idea. The guerrillero operates mostly as a solitary fighter, or in small or very small groups. He has to rely totally on himself in battle, and can not rely on relief or support in the moment of crisis; he can not demand the support of heavy weapons, nor can he hope for the deployment of reserves. For the most part, he must enter battle in a situation, in which the regular soldier would give up, without being accused of cowardice. In the time between battle deployments, he is hunted like dangerous wild game by the adversary. The guerrillero knows of no regulated supplies, no prepared positions, no relief. In this continuously exceptional situation, in his horrible loneliness, and in the danger which follows him everywhere, the guerrillero clings to the idea for which he fights. It gives him the power to deal with the situation, and enables him to bear loneliness, danger and sacrifice. “It must,” as Thayer⁵ describes it, recollecting his personal experience among Tito’s partisans, “invoke a vision of life after the struggle that can sustain the lonely young guerrilla’s morale as he lies cold and hungry in a mountain cave. It must overcome his fears when he undertakes a hazardous mission alone and against odds.”

The belief in the idea for which he fights, and in the possibility of its realization, must ultimately—Thayer refers to this too—give the partisan in his illegality the consciousness, that his illegal actions under the exceptional conditions in

⁵Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 61.

which he is living, are legitimate, even if under normal conditions, in peacetime, they would be morally and legally wrong, even criminal—"for example," Thayer⁶ explains, "when the young guerrilla is sent out to assassinate in cold blood a rival, an enemy, or an innocent bystander." "It is important for every urban-guerrilla," writes Carlos Marighella⁷ in his *Minibook for Urban-Guerrillas*, published in the underground in German translation in May 1970, "to always be aware, that he can only exist, if he is . . . willing to kill." It is no easier for a person, who is not criminally inclined, to kill than it is to demand that he be willing to die. This presupposes that his moral identity is completely in the service of the idea, for which he is supposed to kill and die. The belief in this idea—the belief in the justice of the cause for which he kills and dies—must be so great, that he overcomes all the inhibitions, which a person feels in the face of his own death: this belief must defy death and killing.

Carlos Marighella⁸ correctly observes, that an idea which has such a strong effect upon a person, that it is able to change his attitude toward death and killing, is a "moral advantage."

It was this moral advantage which accounts for the victory of the Algerian partisans in the 1950s: "The French did not succeed . . . in creating an ideology, which appealed to the population of the country."⁹

⁶Ibid.

⁷Carlos Marighella, *Mini-Handbuch des Stadtkriegs*, Berlin 1970, p. 15

⁸Ibid., p. 12.

⁹Werner Hahlweg, loc. cit., p. 170.

V. NUCLEAR WAR AND IRREGULAR WAR AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE CONVENTIONAL CONDUCT OF WAR

§ 1

The Problem of the War-Type

When Frederick the Great began the war against Maria Theresa, he naturally could not predict the outcome of the war, nor its course of development, but he could predict the type of war with near certainty. Everyone knew at that time how an armed conflict between two states would "look," i.e., in what form and with which means it would be conducted. At that time, there was only *one* possible such image of warfare: if it came to war, this—*any* war—war necessarily *had* to look like this, and not any different.

This uniformity of the type of warfare remained the same up to the end of the Second World War: The picture of warfare did, of course, change with the development of weapons-technology and tactics; wars were tied, respectively, to a large geographical area, but at any given point in time, and in any given area, there was respectively one *single type* of picture of war, never more than one. It is only in our times that the picture of warfare has fragmented. Today we can no longer predict "what a war," conducted in a certain area, "will look like."

Today we confront a multiplicity of various types of wars, an entire spectrum, ranging from nuclear war, in which nuclear weapons are actually deployed, as one unconventional extreme in contrast to the so-called non-nuclear war, in which each of the warring parties must expect that his adversary will take recourse to nuclear weapons at some point in time, and the conventional war in which the use of nuclear weapons is improbable, if not ruled out, all the way to the modern irregular war as the other—also unconventional—extreme.

The multiplicity of types of war necessarily leads to insecurities in strategic conceptions. Theoreticians who deal with questions of strategy today are generally inclined to pick just one type of war out of the colorful spectrum of various possible types of war—usually nuclear war—and focus their en-

tire attention on that one type. The war-type of the nuclear war is the central focus of attention in the writings of the Americans Kissinger, Strausz-Hupé or Maxwell Taylor, in the studies of the French generals Ailleret and Gallois, or the team-study produced under the aegis of Marshal Sokolovskii; each of these authors writes as if there were no other type of war—just as earlier centuries had their uniform war-type.

Among theoreticians, this fixation on only one type of war is perhaps understandable; but when the practice of overall planning of military and civil defense of a country also fixates on one single type of war, such one-sidedness can turn into disaster for the country in question.

Today it is impossible to assume merely one single type of war. All strategic considerations, as well as all concrete projects in the defense area, must have the possibility of *various* types of war in mind. The war-image of nuclear war requires a different strategic planning, different armament, different organization of troops, and, last but not least, a different training of officers and their troops, than the war-image of a purely conventional war; the war-image of the modern irregular warfare, in turn, requires a totally different strategic thinking, totally different tactics and battle technique, and accordingly, different training.

There is the additional element, that we must sketch the war-image of a nuclear war as well as that of irregular war, that conducted in a modern industrial nation, without any experience with either of these types. In the former, as well as in the latter case, we have to imagine a phenomenon which we do not yet know from experience. Therefore speculation, if not fantasy, by and large takes the place of experience. Here is the first, great, and unsolved problem of all strategic thinking, all planning for military and civil defense, all armaments projects.

§ 2

The Choice of the War-Type as Part of the Strategic Planning of an Aggressor

There are theoreticians and practitioners, who, because of the utter lack of any experience whatsoever in nuclear war, as well as in the modern irregular war conducted in an in-

dustrial nation, propose to take the conventional war, which we know from experience, as the basis for thinking and planning, and even for training. One simply cannot, they think, have any reasonable planning, nor reasonable training, without a basis in experience.

Many, who do not voice such thoughts out loud, because they do not want to appear backward, in fact act according to the same principle. Anyone who has had the occasion to be a guest at a field maneuver of one or another NATO member country in the last twenty-five years, must have had the impression now and then—of course, not always!—that the rich, all-too-rich salting of the battlefield with nuclear warheads was occurring rather haphazardly amid the unfolding of a conventional war; a few kilometers away from the presumed detonation of a nuclear warhead, where the KT-values were dealt with most of the time in grand style, other maneuver participants were behaving as though nuclear weapons had not yet been invented, or as if the German Federal Interior Ministry was correct in the claim it made years ago in a leaflet, that holding an attaché case over your head would protect you from nuclear weapons. In any case, these maneuver participants did not seem to fear that a nuclear warhead might explode in their vicinity; and sure enough, such a detonation had not been written into the “scenario” of the maneuver.

Extra Ilion peccatur et entra: While the *practitioner* often—often unconsciously—thinks in terms of conventional war, the *theoretician* often stares fixedly, as if under a spell, at nuclear war.

What this one-sided thinking all too easily forgets is, that the type of war-image is not one-sidedly determined by *one* of the conflicting parties—and that it is in no case determined by that party to the conflict who is attacked, and therefore can only deliver the second strike. It is just this potential for various types of war which today always puts the defender in the weaker position. The old adage, that pure defense can never lead to victory, holds today with increased force. Under certain circumstances, the defender today has already lost the war before he is capable of beginning it.

The aggressor, on the other hand, in view of the multiplicity of war-types, has a far more manifold potential for surprise,

particularly if he has taken all possible types of war into account in his own armament and planning. The nuclear-armed great power, which has strong conventional forces at its disposal at the same time, and is otherwise capable of conducting a modern irregular war, will, if it attacks, have the *choice of form of war*—whereby the consideration of the surprise effect in any given concrete case may make it advisable to begin a war, which one wants to conduct as a conventional war, as an irregular war, or to begin a war, in which one is firmly determined from the outset to use nuclear weapons, with a conventional attack.

The war-image of the coming war is not yet fixed as to its type on the first day of the war; what type it will be will unfold gradually. It reminds one of the old glass-plate photographs, in which the upper surface hides the real picture underneath—only after that surface is dissolved away does the picture become visible.

That the war-image changes in the course of a war, is not new. As the armed forces of the European powers assembled for the conflict of the First World War, none of the commanding generals suspected that this war, which began as mobile warfare, would soon freeze into a war of supplies and fixed positions. Today, of course, this possible change of the war-image is not only the result of an *unexpected* development of war, but can be sought by one of the parties conducting war. In addition to the choice of the *form* of war, which today is possible for the aggressor and gives him an additional advantage, the *shift in the image of war* becomes a component of strategic planning—and thus a threat for the adversary, with which he must constantly reckon.

It would be a mistake, in this connection, to believe, in the sense of a grand escalation, that there were only one transition from the war-image of the modern irregular war to that of conventional war, or from conventional war to nuclear war. It is also conceivable, that, for example, a great war begun with nuclear weapons would, after the first nuclear battles, be continued by one of the parties conducting war in the form of a modern irregular war, and it is just as conceivable, that the state in question had planned and prepared this transition to low-intensity warfare before the war began. That in the preparation of such an irregular war, which is supposed to

follow the nuclear level of conflict, psychological armament obtains decisive importance, is evident.

§ 3

Unsolved Problems of the Conduct of Nuclear War

Anyone who wants to draw up a theory of nuclear war must rely, as already said, on pure speculation. There were, in fact, two individual cases of nuclear weapons used at the end of World War II; but in its essence World War II was not yet a nuclear war. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were horrible, one-sided experiments, which did not fit in the war-image of World War II. So, the theoretician of nuclear war still lacks any experience. The first big difference between different conceptions of nuclear warfare is based on this lack of experience: At issue is the answer to the question of whether—when *one* of the parties to the conflict has first used nuclear weapons on the battlefield—a *limitation* on the employment of nuclear weapons can still be expected from the *other* side. Some theoreticians believe, that if *one* of the warring parties made limited employment of nuclear weapons in a modern conflict, then the *other* party to the war would also make only limited use of its nuclear weapons; other theoreticians, on the other hand, assume that “nuclear war” always means “all out war.” If one of the warring states uses nuclear weapons, the adversary will—and must—answer immediately with a preventive larger nuclear strike. Such a larger preventive nuclear strike secures the side which makes it an advantage, which his adversary could hardly compensate for; since, on the other hand, nuclear war has already begun, and nuclear weapons already used on the battlefield, the state which conducts this larger nuclear counter-strike need no longer bear the odium of a horrible violation of international law.

Among those authors who think that a limited nuclear war is possible at least for a certain period of time, there are Kissinger¹ and Maxwell Taylor²; doubt about such a possibility

¹Henry A. Kissinger, *Kernwaffen und auswärtige Politik*, German translation by Georg Ahrens, München 1959.

²Maxwell Taylor, *Und so die Posaune einen undeutlichen Ton gibt, wer wird sich zum Streite rüsten?*, German translation by Johannes Schwabe, Gütersloh 1962.

is the bond between the French Ailleret³ and Gallois⁴ and the Russians who worked under the guidance of Sokolovskii.⁵

The answer to this question is not without its importance for the theoretician of irregular war. If one believes in the possibility of the limited use of nuclear weapons, their limitation to the battlefield, and limited in their destructive capacity, then the transition to modern irregular war could be the only means—flight into irregular war carried into the territory of the adversary—to prevent the escalation of destruction: the use of nuclear assets in irregular war is no longer possible.

On the other hand, the first use of nuclear weapons could be exploited as the psychological trigger for irregular war operations in the country of the adversary, who used nuclear weapons: the fear of the effect of nuclear weapons, and the condemnation of their use, could be used with psychological effect upon public opinion by the side which wants to conduct low-intensity war.

The problem of controlled escalation poses itself, *mutatis mutandis*, as we will show, also in modern irregular war. Opposites touch each other: Just like the war-image of nuclear war, the war-image of irregular war manifests different phases; the war-image of conventional war, to the contrary, knows of no development into diverse, *pre-established* phases, which result *necessarily* from the very *nature* of this type of war.

Another question about nuclear warfare, one which is closely connected to the one just discussed, is also variously answered: This is the question of the relationship between fire and movement in the war-image of nuclear war. Among the theoreticians, Ailleret wrote in his first study that he expects a total immobilization of the events of war once nuclear weapons are used, because the immense fire-power of nuclear weapons can no longer be compensated by movement. Those theoreticians who are of this opinion see nuclear war to a certain degree as a gigantic, deadly duel, in which the bodies of the conflicting parties stand still. Under certain circumstances,

³Charles Ailleret, "Défense 'dirigée' ou défense 'tous azimuts'," in *Revue de défense nationale*, 1967, p. 1923-1960.

⁴Pierre Gallois, *Stratégie d'âge nucléaire*, Paris 1960.

⁵V.D. Sokolovskii (editor), *Militär-Strategie*, German translation by Uwe Nerlich, Köln 1965.

the transition to low-intensity war might be the only option to regain the capability for movement.

By the way, a well-conducted irregular war can—as Tito's partisans demonstrated to the Germans in World War II, and as Giap in Tonkin demonstrated to the French in the first half of the 1950s—paralyze the conventional forces of the adversary almost to the same degree, albeit in a different way, than is the case, in the view of the mentioned group of military authors, under acute nuclear threat. An interesting parallel: once again, the contraries meet.

Another group of theoreticians believes, that the velocity of modern delivery systems and their great mobility represent a certain offset to the fire-power of nuclear weapons. They see, to use a metaphor, nuclear war as a fearsome boxing match between very agile and mobile boxers: every moment of standing still in such a fight would be disastrous.

These theoreticians correctly point out, that success in nuclear war depends upon the mobility of the bases for the delivery systems. Fixed bases for delivery systems, which can be sighted by the adversary in peace time, and which are not installed under the cliffs of available mountains, and thus not protected to a certain degree from the countermeasures of the adversary, will in any case be the target for concentrated fire of the adversary at the outset of military hostilities, and can therefore be knocked out for the most part. Only mobile delivery systems, particularly nuclear powered submarines as the base for delivery systems, are capable of avoiding the adversary's concentrated fire at the beginning of hostilities. Mobile delivery systems assure the side which possesses them of superiority over an adversary who only has fixed bases. That raises the question of new forms of more rapid mobility, and more rapid movement: a problem which, as we will see, also plays a decisive role in modern irregular warfare.

§ 4

The Nuclear Threshold

The third major problem which presents itself in connection with the image of a nuclear war, is that of the so-called "nuclear

threshold." In NATO, this is taken to mean the question of *when* the western nuclear powers *can* and *should* decide to counter a conventional attack of an eastern large power against a nation of the free world with nuclear weapons, in the case that such an attack is made. This question did not pose itself, as long as the United States, conscious of its nuclear superiority, was ready to counter *any* attack against a nation of the free world with nuclear weapons. The theory of massive deterrence knew of no "nuclear threshold." The problem first arose, when the theory of massive deterrence had lost its original meaning when the Soviet Union developed nuclear armament and, thus, when the use of nuclear weapons became connected to the risk of a nuclear response—i.e., when the original theory of massive *deterrence* was replaced by a theory of a possible massive nuclear *exchange*. That such a nuclear exchange, also in the case of a possible later victory of *one* of the two warring nuclear powers, would unleash an inferno of destruction for *both* powers, and thus would extract from the victor unforeseeable suffering and irreparable damages, as the price of his victory, was clear to every knowledgeable observer, from a certain point in time, of the development of Soviet nuclear armament; from that moment onward, the question of the so-called "nuclear threshold" was a problem of balancing out the ante against the gains.

The problem of the "nuclear threshold" is both a problem of *space*, as well as a problem of the respective power relationships. The "nuclear threshold" can be reached, if enemy assault forces cross a certain, geographically fixed line, and take possession of an area, whose possession or loss is of such great importance for the subsequent conduct of war, that the power, which no longer controls this territory, no longer has a real, calculable chance, even with equivalent strength of forces on both sides, to decide the war in its favor, unless it surprisingly uses nuclear weapons. In addition to this geographical, or geo-strategic element, there is the second factor which determines the nuclear threshold, which is the respective strength of forces. The "nuclear threshold" is reached, if one of the parties at war is so inferior to his adversary in his conventional military potential as a whole, or also in respect of those conventional armaments which he can deploy immediately, or in a very short period of time, that if he does

not use the nuclear weapons at his disposal, he will have no real or calculable chance to win the war.

As much as I distinguish the American and French theoreticians in the diversity of their answers to the question of the possibility of limiting a nuclear war, they are very close to one another in their attempts at solutions to the problem of the "nuclear threshold." The considerations which have come into public view on this issue are, of course, very vague, and the intellectual approach to these considerations quite indeterminate. Both clearly want to differentiate between a "small" and a "large" attack. The American and the French theoreticians are agreed, that the nuclear threshold must be high, i.e., that the so-called "small" attack of a communist state against a state of the free world must not, under any circumstances, induce the western side to respond with nuclear weapons. But what should the criterion of the so-called "small" attack be, which alone, according to the Americans, and apparently also according to the French view, could justify the use of nuclear weapons? The French General Ailleret spoke of an irreversible breakthrough through a defensive-zone as one characteristic of this "large" aggression, and thus placed the just mentioned geographical, or geo-strategic factor in the foreground. In contrast to Ailleret, the Americans usually do not let themselves be pinned down; they try to evade the question, and think it sufficient to make a reference to the proportionality of means of defense and means of attack, and then they require the greatest possible, flexible adjustment of the means of defense to the respective assault.

The question of where in space, and in relation to respective forces, the "nuclear threshold" lies in case of a nuclear conflict, is of special significance for someone who believes he might prevent a nuclear war, by choosing to change over to irregular warfare before the use of nuclear weapons—the already mentioned flight into irregular war. In addition to this possibility of *preventing* the nuclear conflict by shifting the form of war to irregular warfare, there is also the *other* possibility, to delay the process of reaching the "nuclear threshold" by means of irregular warfare. It is possible, by means of irregular warfare actions, to contest for quite some time the domination of a decisive territory held by the adversary, which can no longer be held with conventional weapons. The question of such a

decisive territory, however, also largely decides the issue of whether the "nuclear threshold" has been reached, as we just demonstrated. If the use of nuclear weapons is prevented by the *transition* from conventional to irregular warfare, the type of war also changes; in the second case, irregular warfare appears as an episode in the image of a war which is still conventionally waged.

VI. THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR AND IRREGULAR WAR IN THE PROCESS OF WAR AVOIDANCE

§ 1

The "Nuclear Stalemate"

For the Americans as well as for the French, the use of nuclear weapons is the *ultima ratio*. The avoidance of this means of last resort becomes an independent strategic goal. The task of military leadership is not only to correctly determine the height of the "nuclear threshold," but also to avoid ever reaching this "threshold." The side—in possession of nuclear weapons, which threaten the adversary with such horrible retaliation if this adversary uses nuclear weapons himself—which can conduct war, such that there is no use of nuclear weapons at all, is strategically the victor in the war. It is the goal of correct military strategy, in logical pursuance of this notion of nuclear "stalemate," to prevent the use of nuclear weapons even *after* the onset of conventional hostilities. By continuing the nuclear threat, the adversary is to be prevented from using the king of nuclear weapons on the chess-board of war, because every move with this peace also means his own nuclear destruction. The example of World War II, in which a similar stalemate forbade each of the warring parties from using poison gases in their arsenals, shows that the maintenance of such a stalemate is at least not ruled out, although—as it seems—neither the American nor the French theoreticians entirely believe in their efforts to avoid the necessary use of nuclear weapons by possessing sufficient nuclear weapons, and making this fact known to the adversary.

This doubt about the possibility of continuing the nuclear stalemate after the beginning of war led to a peculiar competition among the larger members of NATO: the military theoreticians of each country seek to develop a strategic conception for the case of the necessary use of nuclear weapons, which spares their own country, as much as possible, from the inferno of nuclear retaliation. In the course of such efforts,

the Americans developed the notion of "graduated" employment of nuclear weapons, in which nuclear weapons are initially used only on the battlefield, and are intended to destroy their designated military targets there. The major exchange from hinterland to hinterland, which deals a deadly blow to the military and economic centers of both adversaries, is supposed to be prevented for the time being.

Such a graduated employment of nuclear weapons would signify a spatial *limitation* of the nuclear war to Europe, with all of its horrors, i.e., to the area between the Weichsel and the French Atlantic coast. Were the effort successful, to destroy or only decisively weaken the assault forces of the adversary in this way, and in this area, such a success on the battlefield, it is believed, might perhaps induce the adversary to break off his attack, and, thus, it might be possible to end the war with a return to the status quo.

That the thinking French soldier, that a de Gaulle, an Ailleret and a Gallois, did not agree with such a localization of nuclear war to the European theater of war west of the Weichsel, is understandable. For that reason, they rejected the American theory of graduated levels, even if they thought that such a limitation of nuclear war—primarily in space—was *possible*. It were necessarily the goal of French strategy, in the view of Ailleret and Gallois, to leap over the first level of nuclear war, if it ever came to nuclear war in Europe, in order to carry the nuclear destruction, from the very beginning, out of western Europe and into the Soviet Union—and if necessary—the American heartlands. Western Europe would then—so it was hoped—not be entirely spared the violent exchange of the world powers, but could remain a secondary theater of war. Ailleret hoped to be able to screen this secondary theater of war to a certain degree with an all-directional defense against the nuclear world powers—i.e., against both the Soviet Union and the United States—if necessary by employing French nuclear weapons. In this conception, which does not exclude the possibility of a simultaneous exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States, on the one hand, and a conventional conflict between the Warsaw Pact forces and NATO, on the other, the French theoreticians began to approximate the thinking of several German mav-

ericks, of whom Bonin is surely the clearest and most important.

The strategic conception was mixed with wishful thinking. Both the American and French proposals and plans remind one of the old prayer which one reads over the door of many a Bavarian farm house under the statue of St. Florian, the patron saint against fire: Oh, Holy St. Florian, spare my house, light fire to the neighbor's. The naive piety of the old Bavarian farmer and the profound minds of modern military theoreticians find each other arm in arm. Both feed off the same roots of egoism—healthy egoism, if one wishes. The starting point of *every* modern strategic conception is basically one single wish: to protect one's own country from nuclear annihilation, i.e., to prevent the adversary from using nuclear weapons against targets in *one's own country*.

One way to secure one's own country from the chaos of nuclear horror might also entail anticipatory preparation for irregular warfare under certain particularly favorable geographic and geopolitical circumstances, and only under such circumstances. In such a case, the nuclear threat, which will always remain an exceptional case, would be countered with the threat of total irregular warfare: a condition could, then, be reached, which is comparable to that of the nuclear stalemate. It is doubtless true, that the realization of the nuclear threat is far more horrible in its consequences than the realization of the threat of irregular warfare, even were this irregular warfare conceived as total war; nevertheless, the realization of irregular warfare could signify to the potential adversary—always assuming particularly favorable circumstances—that he can not achieve his war aims, for the sake of which he would employ nuclear weapons.

§ 2

Irregular Versus Nuclear Warfare

Every weapon requires a target appropriate to it. One possibility of preventing an adversary from employing nuclear weapons consists in offering him no targets for these weapons. Anyone who wants to prevent the adversary from using nu-

clear weapons, must shape his conduct of warfare, such that the adversary will find no nuclear targets. From this standpoint, there is a remarkable connection between the two extremes of the types of war-image of the present time—between nuclear war and irregular war: modern irregular warfare presents no nuclear targets, and thus precludes by and large employment of nuclear weapons. It is the only fundamental alternative to nuclear war.

In more than one respect, irregular warfare is the total opposite of nuclear war. It would be tempting, to investigate this opposition down to the details of the respective forms of conducting warfare. One might, to mention one example, speak of the primacy of fire-power over movement in nuclear war, and the primacy of movement over fire-power in irregular war, although that would be an exaggeration and a "horrible oversimplification." To take another example, while employment of nuclear weapons requires clarity as concerns the disposition of lines, and a clear differentiation between operatively or tactically relevant terrain, such that all doubts concerning the location of the forward-edge are removed, the conduct of irregular warfare forbids any strictly drawn line, any clear definition of terrain.

Nuclear war, by its nature, requires an approach which Liddell Hart¹ has called direct. Anyone who employs nuclear weapons takes the bull by the horns: he is willing to let it come to the final—nuclear—test of power, in order to impose his will upon the adversary by demonstration of a military superiority, a fearsome demonstration, and thus to end the war in a *military* victory. The modern irregular war, on the contrary, knows of *no* direct approach, by its very nature: the military balance of forces becomes irrelevant, because it is not the ultimate test of power which is at issue. Anyone who conducts irregular warfare seeks to avoid such direct tests of power, and seeks instead to unsettle, surprise and tire out his adversary, to throw him off balance, to wear him down intellectually and morally, without ever offering the adversary the opportunity, to employ his weapons, which as a rule are

¹B. Liddell Hart, *Strategie*, German translation by Horst Jordan, Wiesbaden 1965.

superior. At the end of irregular war there is not only a *military* victory, but also a total *political* victory.

The difference in nature between nuclear war and irregular war by no means precludes, as has already been indicated, that these two types of war-images—although in a certain dialectical tension—appear in the *same* war, whether irregular war precedes or follows the nuclear conflict in temporal succession. This was discussed in connection with the problem of the shift in type of war-image, prevention of the nuclear "all-out war," regaining freedom of movement in nuclear battle, and last but not least, delaying the point in time when the "nuclear threshold" is crossed. There can just as well be a parallel territorial development, in which the parties in conflict seek the decisive outcome with nuclear weapons at the focal point of the battle, but at the same time conduct irregular war in a secondary theater of war.

If there is a contradiction between nuclear war and irregular war in a number of respects, or at least a strong dialectical tension—in the succession in time or territorial parallel development of these two extreme types in the modern image of war—nuclear war and irregular war manifest, nevertheless, a remarkable parallelism in many respects as well. We have already mentioned some of these cases: for example the "imobilization effect" which both nuclear war and irregular war can exert upon the conventional forces of the adversary. Pierre Gallois² has pointed out, that nuclear weapons erase the distinction between small and large countries: in the future, he emphasizes, a small country like Switzerland, if it possesses nuclear weapons, can be just as strong, thanks to this nuclear armament, as the United States of America or the People's Republic of China. All three countries, if they possess nuclear weapons, will be capable of eradicating the forty or fifty vital cities of his adversary, and thus catapulting the adversary's country into chaos for centuries.

In the same way, irregular war nullifies the difference between large and small countries. A small country will—if it is able and willing to conduct a modern irregular war—suc-

²Pierre Gallois, in a presentation to the "Hessische Kreis" in Kronberg, March 20, 1964.

cessfully counter even the manifold superiority of a world power. In 1808, 50,000 Spanish guerrilleros fought successfully against 260,000 battle-hardened French soldiers. In the Far East, the Viet Cong, inferior in numbers and armament, have conducted a no less successful war against the militarily preponderant power of the United States. The action-groups of irregular warfare are comparable to swarms of nasty wasps: the hunter, who stumbles into such a swarm, succumbs, if he attempts to stop the assault of the wasps with his modern precision-rifle, which he has mastered, and which is perfectly suited for hunting any large wild game.

Modern irregular warfare gives the "small" a real chance against the "big" in a violent conflict.³ The fact that this chance exists is a factor, which the "small" can exploit to deter a potential "big" aggressor even before the onset of hostilities; the possibility of the threat of irregular war can—but of course only if such a threat is *really* credible—at least reduce, if not annul, the difference between the "big" and "small," and thus increase the risk of an attack against the "small" to the "big" to a degree at which it is no longer calculable.⁴

§ 3

The War of the "Super-Powers" and the "War of the Weak"

Gallois⁵ is correct theoretically, when he says, that the possession of a nuclear force of a certain size by Switzerland would annul the difference between Switzerland and the Soviet Union to a certain degree, as far as military strength and military potential is concerned; but this theory remains pure speculation, as long as the possession of nuclear weapons remains an oligopoly of the world powers, who have further extended their existing special status in the community of nations, a status which was legally recognized and fixed since 1945 with the permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and the veto right of Article 27, Paragraph 3 of the United

³Compare below, Part III, 2.

⁴Compare Savo Drijevec, *Die Rolle der geopolitischen, gesellschafts-wissenschaftlichen und militärisch-strategischen Faktoren, in Konzeption der allumfassenden Verteidigung Jugoslawiens*, Belgrade 1970, p. 242, 247, and 257.

⁵Pierre Gallois, in the above cited presentation.

Nations Organization Statute. When France decided, at the end of the 1950s, to construct its own nuclear forces, one of the many reasons for this decision—in addition to the wish for the opportunity to determine the "nuclear threshold" in French interests—was surely the consideration, that France itself was thus able to reconfirm its great power position, which it formally had in the UNO-Statutes through the assignment of a permanent seat in the Security Council. In fact, and despite Gallois, nuclear war today is, by its nature, a war of the "super-powers." Smaller states do not wage nuclear war.

Irregular warfare, on the other hand, is, by its nature, the war of the weak. Among many theoreticians, who have studied the problem of irregular warfare in the last two decades, there is none, to my knowledge, who did not point out, that irregular warfare is the war of the (militarily) weaker against the (militarily) stronger.⁶ In 1936 Arthur Erhardt⁷ wrote of irregular warfare as "the form of combat of weaker units against a superior adversary, against which they would not be able to defend in the normal fashion," although for him irregular warfare is only a form of the conduct of war in a war otherwise waged by armies, but not a special form of war, a war without armies. In this sense, one might think of David's combat against Goliath as an irregular warfare action. The militarily inferior guerillero kills the conventionally armed adversary with a sling-shot. A number of authors have wanted to ascribe to irregular warfare an essentially defensive character, proceeding from the insight, that usually the defense is the form of combat of the weaker. Irregular warfare, however, does not have a defensive character when it pursues revolutionary aims.

⁶That does not preclude the possibility, as a memorandum of the Führungsakademie der deutschen Bundeswehr from 1967 notes, that "now and then . . . especially in conflicts between two or more states or power groups . . . the stronger force, too, (will employ) the form of covert combat as a lower level (of combat)," "in order to keep the risk low, to keep open the option of threatening with stronger means of pressure, and the choice of higher levels (of combat), for example limited warfare."

⁷Arthur Erhardt, loc. cit. p. 7. On this compare also the more recent Mirko Vranič, loc. cit., p. 288: "The more pronounced the superiority of the aggressor is in modern technology, the more emphatic is the role of the partisan form of the conduct of war. In very difficult strategic situations, when the adversary forces have a great superiority, the possibility can not be excluded, that the partisan form of the conduct of war will temporarily predominate. . . ."

The fact, that irregular warfare is usually a war of the weaker, does not mean, that it is the war of a weaker force *standing alone*. All too often, a stronger force, which is itself not involved in irregular warfare, will support the weaker force, which wages irregular war. In what is, in our view, an exaggerated formulation, Carl Schmitt notes: "Somehow, the partisan, as an irregular fighter, always has to rely upon the help of a regular, stronger power."⁸ In fact, the question is posed more often in irregular warfare than is the case for other wars, conducted by smaller and relatively weak states, of what the larger power is, which stays in the background, but which supports the smaller power morally and materially. In this connection, Rolf Schroers⁹ speaks of the "interested third power"—a formulation which Carl Schmitt adopted, as well. "The powerful third power," he writes, "supplies not only weapons and ammunition, money, material aid and medication of all kinds; it also provides the form of political recognition, which the irregular fighting partisan needs, in order not to sink into being apolitical, like a robber and a pirate—i.e., into becoming a criminal."¹⁰

The "direct strategy" of a nuclear war knows of no such power in the background. Nuclear weapons are not delivered to other countries, but used, if at all, by the state which possesses them. The "super-power" wages "major" war itself; it wants to have irregular warfare waged by *others*—by smaller countries, or by groups of disaffected within the territory of the adversary.

By no means does this mean, that irregular warfare is usually—or even only in the majority of cases—a kind of "proxy war;" it is often only in the course of irregular warfare, that the collaboration of the "interested third power" starts. Often this collaboration intensifies gradually: it begins with well-wishing toleration, then escalating from the supply of weapons and other material, the dispatching of "military missions," and trainers, finally culminating in forceful intervention. In such interventions, air forces, for which the partisans provide

⁸Carl Schmitt, loc. cit., p. 77.

⁹Rolf Schroers, *Der Partisan. Ein Beitrag zur politischen Anthropologie*, Köln-Berlin 1961, p. 157-158.

¹⁰Carl Schmitt, loc. cit., p. 78.

cover against air reconnaissance and air attacks, play an especially important role.

Nuclear wars are avoided, if possible; irregular wars, as a rule, are waged. Since irregular warfare is a war of the weak and not a war of the strong, in irregular warfare there is a situation comparable to the "nuclear stalemate" only when—which will always remain an exception—the threat of irregular warfare carries as much weight with a potential adversary as a nuclear threat. Nuclear armament almost always deters an adversary; usually, its first task is precisely this deterrence. Preparations for irregular warfare, on the other hand, often provoke repressive counter-actions, which, under certain circumstances—when these create martyrs—can accelerate the beginning of violent conflict in irregular warfare. The deterrent effect of such preparations is an exception, and usually only accidental; it presupposes a certain, concrete situation.¹¹

Irregular warfare, we noted, gives the "small" a chance against the "large." It also gives the "poor" a chance against the "rich": it is, by its nature, not only the war of the small man, but also the war of the poor man.^{11,12}

Irregular warfare is the war of the poor man in two senses: it gives the "poor" *state*—the "have nots" in the area of modern armament, especially nuclear armament—the possibility of a successful resistance also against a "rich" nuclear power, which has attacked it; on the other hand, it also often appears as a war of the "poor" *layers* of the population against the established welfare of an adversary from its own or a foreign people.¹³

¹¹Compare above, p. 59, and p. 36.

¹²Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit. p. 16, conceives of irregular warfare per se as the struggle of socially disadvantaged against the "Establishment," a one-sided view, which by no means does justice to the reality of modern irregular warfare.

¹³It is interesting, that Savo Drljeceč, loc. cit. p. 254, also points out, that the armament of partisan units is significantly less costly than that of modern conventional armed forces. "According to world market prices, for the equivalent value of only one tank brigade or two wings of modern interceptor aircraft, almost one half million fighters can be armed, for example, 350,000 with modern, semi-automatic rifles, suitable for anti-tank operations, and 100,000 with hand-grenades, which are effective against all kinds of tanks and standard fortifications."

Compare Josef S. Roucek, loc. cit., p. 69: "The apocalyptic mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki have . . . by no means put an end to

war, they have only changed the rules of the game with death. While the more powerful paralyze each other with mutual deterrence, the small have found out, that they can be violent with impunity. . . . Since war with nuclear weapons is unthinkable, mankind has shifted his armed conflicts, in the most literal sense of the words, into the caves and jungles."

Part Three:

THE WAR OF BLURRED CONTOURS

VII. THE PROBLEM OF SPACE

§ 1

The Strategy of Irregular Warfare

We have already spoken, in another connection, of the role which irregular warfare plays in military strategy, and in a strategy of war. Irregular war was above defined as a *means*, which the "strategy of indirect action" employs to achieve an aim which it has set itself. Irregular war was not considered to be the *only* means of such a "strategy of indirect action"; irregular war is only *one* of the cases of application of this strategy.

The role of irregular war in strategy must be distinguished from strategy in irregular warfare. This chapter deals with strategy in irregular warfare.

The majority of treatments of modern irregular warfare attempt to develop valid strategic maxims which are valid for irregular warfare. The rules thus developed have a surprising multiplicity. For the most part, no distinction is drawn between strategic, operative and tactical principles;¹ often something spoken of as a principle of the strategy of irregular warfare is only an operative or tactical rule. Examples of this are operative and tactical principles named by Mao Tse-tung² in his diverse studies of irregular warfare: guerilleros withdraw from an approaching enemy, if possible to a central staging area; the enemy who behaves passively and does not move from his position, on the other hand, is to be unsettled and disrupted by the guerilleros; the enemy who is tired, should be attacked, if possible, on the move; if the enemy retreats,

¹A clear differentiation between strategic, operative and tactical principles in irregular warfare can basically only be found in Otto Heilbrunn, *Die Partisanen in der modernen Kriegführung*, Frankfurt/Main 1963, p. 37-107, and in Helmuth Rentsch, loc. cit., p. 40ff. and 81ff.

²Mao Tse-tung, *Strategische Probleme des revolutionären Krieges in China*, in *Selected Works*, Peking 1968, Vol. 1, p. 214-118, 233ff., 252-256; *Strategische Probleme des Partisanenkriegs gegen die japanische Aggression*, ibid., Vol. 2, p. 87-98, 100-121; *Über den langwierigen Krieg*, ibid., Vol. 2, p. 134ff., 154ff., 175, 188-210. André Beaufre, loc. cit., p. 153 divides the cited maxims into seven "basic rules."

guerilleros pursue; it can not be the aim of guerilleros to hold cities, but only to destroy the fighting power of the enemy; every *single* battle requires superior forces: while the *strategic* balance of forces in irregular warfare can be 5:1 to the disadvantage of the guerilleros, the *tactical* relationship must be 5:1 in their favor; an irregular war can not be conducted from fixed bases; the close connection between action-groups and the population is decisive in irregular war; booty solves logistical problems. The first four of these maxims are known throughout the world, and are repeated wherever anyone discusses irregular warfare. Their effect is due not least to their linguistic poignancy. These four maxims in the Chinese language, as Walter D. Jacobs³ established, consist of four Chinese characters each. More precise investigation shows, that most strategic principles posited for irregular warfare, are, in fact valid *also* for irregular warfare, but by no means *only* for irregular warfare. There is no *special* strategy of irregular warfare. Strategy of irregular warfare is nothing but the application of *generally* valid maxims of a strategy of war under the *special circumstances* of an irregular war.⁴ In irregular war, too, maintaining freedom of action and management of available forces is decisive; it also holds for irregular warfare, that one should discover and hit at the enemy's vulnerable points, and smoothly counter enemy actions; also in irregular warfare, one should only engage in battle, when success is probable; in irregular warfare, too, the chief aim is to surprise the enemy and fragment his forces.

Irregular warfare, as we see, is a means of *indirect* action. This is particularly expressed in the operative principles, formulated in the instructions of the Viet-minh for irregular

³Walter D. Jacobs, *Mao Tse-tung als Guerillakämpfer näher betrachtet*, in Franklin M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 238.

⁴Compare Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 110: "There is no particular 'type' of combat in partisan warfare, which one could follow, and consequently also no generally valid strategy. There are many strategic forms, and can be just as many cases of partisan warfare."

Likewise, August Ségur-Cabanac, *Kleinkrieg, Kampf ohne Fronten*, Vienna 1970, p. 17: "There are no fixed rules for irregular warfare, just as all fixed fronts are lacking in this form of combat. In practice, all forms of combat are applied to a greater or lesser extent, corresponding to the situation, the basic structure of the territory, as well as the strength of the forces deployed in irregular warfare."

warfare:⁵ among other things, they emphasize the importance of feigned attacks and the deception of the adversary about one's own intentions, positions, and movements; they point out, that it is necessary to avoid strong enemy bases, and only attack weak ones, to avoid encounters with a strong adversary, and force a weaker adversary to accept encounters—principles which are valid in *any* war, not only in irregular warfare.

While irregular warfare has no other principles than those which are also valid in a “major” war, the conditions under which these *same* principles are applied vary, according to the form of war and the form of the conduct of the war. Anyone who wants to investigate the strategy of irregular warfare, must therefore pay special attention to these conditions, the particular conditions of irregular warfare. All of these particular conditions have one thing in common: irregular warfare is, by its nature, a war with no sharp contours.

§ 2

A War Without Soldiers

The forces deployed in irregular warfare “are as multifaceted in their development, form, structure and mode of deployment, as in the way they are employed.”⁶

Irregular warfare knows of no such thing as the traditional legal differentiation between a soldier class and civilian population, which down to this day limits the acts of war in a “large” war; and even *within* the soldier class, irregular warfare knows of no clear distinction between legitimate combatants, on the one hand, who, according to international law, *can* carry out acts of war in “large” war, and *against whom* acts of war are allowed by international law, and non-combatants, who *can* not participate in combat, who do not *want* to participate any longer, or on account of a special humanitarian task to which they are assigned in war, *are not allowed* to participate in combat. In modern irregular warfare, all inhabitants of a state are *potentially* combatants; the *actions* of irregular warfare are, as already discussed, legally limited only by a few

⁵Reported in Otto Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 76ff.

⁶Memorandum of the Führungsakademie der deutschen Bundeswehr, 1967.

primitive humanitarian principles, which form the core of the law of war.

In a “large” war, *soldiers* fight against soldiers; in irregular warfare, to the contrary, groups confront each other, which are fundamentally different from one another in their military-strategic aims, and thus in their entire conduct of the war, in their personnel assignments, in their real options, even with respect to their legal status.

The South African General C.A. Fraser, in his excellent study of “revolutionary war,”⁷ pointed out the difference between partisans, who are on the side which begins irregular warfare, and the forces deployed to combat them. Fraser speaks of “insurgency” and “counter-insurgency,” and emphasizes, that the difference is one of different forms of the *conduct* of war within the same war, and not only a difference “in the forms of the use of forces” under conditions of equivalent conduct of war, comparable to attack and defense in “large” war. One can, in fact, move from the defense onto the attack, and from the attack into defense, but one can not move from “counter-insurgency” to “insurgency,” and vice-versa.

It will often appear to the superficial observer, as if parts of the *civilian population* were fighting against soldiers. A more precise examination shows, however, that the guerillero, in the various forms in which he appears, clearly distinguishes himself from the civilian population.

Guerilleros are, in their own self-conception, neither soldiers nor civilians. Instead, they make claim to a special status, which is not that of a soldier bound by the conventions of a “large” war, but also not that of an unjustified fighter, nor of a civilian who merely surrenders to the laws and courts of the adversary.

⁷C.A. Fraser, loc. cit., p. 4f.

Compare also Josef S. Roucek, loc. cit., p. 78: “Combating partisans is not the same as partisan combat. This is no artificial distinction: it results inevitably from the realities of the tactics in the two forms of combat. It is, for example, easy for an individual partisan to blow up a railway line somewhere, but it is a far more difficult task to protect this railway line against sabotage. Five well-trained saboteurs need perhaps two weeks to plan blowing up an important bridge, and then carry out the mission; to protect the same bridge requires the stationing of an entire company of security forces for an unlimited time.”

While, for this reason alone, it is wrong to suppose, that it is ultimately civilians who fight against soldiers in irregular warfare. This view, seen from the standpoint of the guerillero, is also refuted by the status of the adversary, against which the guerillero wages his irregular war. Thierry Maulnier⁸ notes in his observations on the case of Régis Debray quite rightly: The guerillero "directs his acts of war not only against the adversary combatants, but also, and perhaps primarily, against the non-combatants, especially against the bureaucrats, the administrators, those politically responsible, and the friends of the regime which he fights. He believes, that it is legitimate to use his weapons against an *unarmed* adversary. In pursuance of the tactic which represents his strength—to strike by surprise, and then submerge himself in a population, all the while feigning innocence and indifference—he seeks to divert the counter-strike to the non-combatants, and to provoke retaliatory action against them: not out of sadism, but because, for him, this is the way to drive the adversary up against the wall, and thus to win over new partisans. Shots in the vicinity of a village put this village in danger of being burned down, and every burned down village means new fighters."

In his entire field of operations, i.e., in the entire territory of the state, the guerillero neither knows of, nor acknowledges anyone who is not participating in the war: there are no neutrals. Whoever is not for him, is against him. This also holds for those persons, who not only have no interest in the irregular war, but are also in *every* way—not only actively, but also passively—non-participants, and who often learn of the irregular war only through still functioning mass-media. For the guerilleros, these persons are only objects, sometimes of their rejecting distrust, sometimes objects of their propaganda, and then again sometimes the objects of intimidating terror.

To "win over" such persons, to "turn them around," to make of them at least passive sympathizers, is a legitimate goal for the guerillero, and a permitted aim of his violent actions. If he does not achieve this aim with propaganda, he uses terror: someone who becomes a passive sympathizer, if

⁸Thierry Maulnier, "Lois de la guerre sans lois," in *Le Figaro*, 20 May, 1976. p. 1.

only out of fear of retaliation measures by the guerillero, is nevertheless useful for him. "On the island of Cyprus," Thayer notes,⁹ "the majority of Grivas' victims were not British or even Turkish but Greek Cypriots," who refused to support the guerilleros, or who worked with the enemy. "In Malaya," for the same reason, "far more native Malaysians were murdered than British. Again in Kenya, many more Kikuyu tribesmen were mutilated and murdered" by the Mau-Mau for the same reason "than whites." Seventy-five percent of all acts of violence by the black partisans infiltrated from Zambia and the Congo in 1969 were not directed against the white Portuguese, as already mentioned, but against the black population—obviously with the goal of winning sympathizers by showing strength.

§ 3

A War Without Fronts

The struggle for freedom of movement, as Beaufre¹⁰ observed, is the essential content of strategy.

Freedom of movement in a violent conflict, however, means fundamentally nothing but disposition over space and time. Whoever is able to prescribe to the adversary, where and when he must fight, can also be victorious with relatively weaker forces. The secret of success of every armed action, consists in being stronger and faster than the enemy in the right place and at the right moment. Under certain conditions, speed means strength.

This principle holds not only for the "large" war, but also—and with specific characteristics—in irregular warfare. In irregular war, too, the disposition of space and time, and their correct evaluation and calculation, determines victory or defeat.

Space, to begin with this element, has no lesser importance in irregular warfare, although its importance is *different* than in "large" war. Irregular warfare is large-terrain war. The operational terrain of guerilleros is—as already indicated—

⁹Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 162.

¹⁰André Beaufre, loc. cit., p. 182.

in the theoretical "ideal case," the *entire* territory of the country affected by irregular warfare. To constrain the operational terrain of the guerilleros, must be the aim of their adversaries. The defeat of the guerilleros begins with constraining the territory for their *spatial* freedom of action.¹¹

"Large" war, however diverse its forms might be, in the concrete historical situation in which it is conducted, is also characterized by the interplay of attack and defense. Attack and defense are categories of strategic thinking as well as of operative planning and tactics of large, small and very small units. In irregular war, there is a contrast, in the realm of strategy, between attack and defense; the dialectical tension between attack and defense, however, is foreign to irregular warfare at the operative level, and in the realm of tactics in the first phase.

Operatively and, especially, tactically, attack and defense cannot be conceived without a close connection to space. The issue in both cases is space. Attack is *forward motion* in space; defense, on the other hand, is *holding* space, digging into terrain, the prevention of enemy forward movement. In the attack, a certain space, which is important for the further progress of the war, although not decisive, is won away from the enemy; in defense, the enemy is denied access to such space, he is denied its possession and use. Attack and defense *require* room. Both are "nurtured" from the space to their rear.

Irregular warfare is, in the first place, combat of single fighters, or small groups. It is realized in the multiplicity of isolated acts of violence. These acts of violence, in the ideal case, are distributed over the entire territory of the state, against which irregular warfare is waged, or in which irregular warfare is conducted against a foreign occupier. Irregular warfare has no front and no limited battlefield. Its front is

¹¹ This fact has misled some theoreticians to assume, that smaller states, such as Belgium, Holland or Switzerland, could not be the theater of irregular warfare. This assumption is based on a wrong definition of the concept of "large territory." An irregular war does not require the space of a *large* state, but it does require the *entire* space of the state in which it is waged. Were the cited assumption correct, that irregular war can only be waged in large states, neither Cyprus nor Israel could ever have become theaters of irregular warfare.

everywhere. The actual terrain of battle changes like a kaleidoscope from one single action to another.

In irregular war, everywhere can suddenly be "forward." If the guerillero operates skillfully and successfully, his adversary's attempts to localize the conflict will be in vain. Once he believes he has "reestablished order" in one place, this order will unexpectedly be shattered in another place by new irregular warfare actions. Guerilleros fight everywhere and nowhere. They turn up where they are least suspected, and they disappear when one attempts to pin them down. If an action is successfully conducted, they leave the battlefield to the enemy, because it no longer has any significance for them.¹²

By exploiting the entire territory of the state affected by irregular warfare as his operational terrain, with continuous shifts of the action, the guerillero not only fragments the forces of his adversary, who must be ready to defend in every part of the territory; he also ties them down, because a larger portion of his forces are "transformed into occupation forces," and become, in the words of Andro Gabelić,¹³ "the slaves of space, instead of fulfilling operative missions."

Often, the guerilleros' adversary will not have sufficient forces at his disposal to control the entire area, which has become an operations terrain. He will then have to restrict "firm" control to key objects, and only exert an "insignificant" control over other areas of the territory in question. That creates a "spatial vacuum" on the part of the adversary in a military respect, in which the forces of the guerilleros "operate

¹² In the same sense Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 70: "The entire island was to be turned into a battlefield, so that the adversary would have no place where he felt secure, no matter where he was. The adversary should think we are everywhere, but he can never find us, and if he finds us, we offer him only insignificant targets: he should have the impression of an 'empty' battlefield."

Compare Andro Gabelić, *Die Universalität des Inhalts der allumfassenden Verteidigung*, in *Konzeption der allumfassenden Verteidigung Jugoslawiens*, Belgrade 1970, p. 165ff.

Compare further also A. Neuberger, *Der bewaffnete Aufstand, Versuch einer theoretischen Darstellung*, Introduction by Erich Wollenberg, Frankfurt 1971, p. 193: "Firstly, there are no fixed front lines between the combatants. For the proletariat, and for the ruling class, the front is everything around them, it is all over and everywhere."

¹³ Andro Gabelić, loc. cit., p. 169.

freely or semi-freely, whereby they continuously develop their own assault capabilities."

Since irregular war knows of no "front" and no "forward," there is also no *forward* defense, no depth, no possibility to prepare oneself in the *rear*, and especially no movement forwards or backwards. Irregular warfare operations—although always aggressive by nature—are not a "forward motion," which would be comparable to the forward motion of an attack. The normal evasive movements after completed irregular operations, by the same token, cannot be compared to a "moving back" in a "large" war.

§ 4

The "Contamination" of Space

Just as irregular warfare knows of no forward or backward movement in the usual sense, there is also no sense in which guerilleros "occupy" an area.

In conventional war, troops *occupy* a strip of terrain. In irregular warfare, there are not only no troops, who would be able to execute such an occupation; the very *conception* of occupying space contradicts the essence of irregular warfare.¹⁴

A specific space is neither "occupied" nor "held" by guerilleros: instead, it is "contaminated" by them. "Contaminate" in this connection means limiting the freedom of action of the enemy, to the greatest extent possible in the area in question by means of a growing number of irregular warfare actions particularly in this area. Without offering his own forces for engagement with the enemy in the "contaminated" area, the guerillero disrupts and paralyzes the enemy in this area with escalating acts of sabotage, especially against transportation routes, attacks on reporting stations, isolated weapons, solitary travelling vehicles, and small supply columns, and, last not least, by terrorizing the civilian population.

Just as contamination by bacteria or viruses is suddenly

¹⁴Only in the last phase of irregular war, when the guerilleros shift to open combat and are able to "liberate" certain areas," do we find something comparable to the condition of occupation in these "liberated" areas.

there, suddenly somewhere else, sparing the one and hitting the other unexpectedly, and—invisible but ever present—only detectable by its effects, in the same way the guerillero disrupts a strip of territory.¹⁵

In conventional war, the notion of "contamination" is unusual. It fits, although with very different content, the two extremes of the modern image of war, nuclear war and irregular war. In both cases, "contamination" carries an incalculable risk for the adversary, if he enters into the "contaminated" territory. Death lurks in the "contaminated" area.

"Contamination" in irregular warfare fragments and uses up the adversary's forces. If the guerilleros carry out the "contamination" in a tactically correct way, the adversary will initially not clear out of the "contaminated area"; he will, instead, attempt to hold it. But the adversary will be forced to deploy increasing numbers of security forces to this area, and thus suffer ever increasing losses of men and materiel.¹⁶ "Contamination" has not achieved its purpose, if it induces the adversary to leave the "contaminated" area after only a relatively short period of time.

The "contamination" of a terrain in irregular war is part of the general tendency of a way of conducting war which aims at creating insecurity in the ranks of the adversary. The country attacked in irregular warfare finds itself in a condition of *generalized* insecurity. In a well-conducted irregular war,

¹⁵Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 42: "When the enemy comes forward in formation and in numbers, he will not find the guerilla, and so he will not be able to fight him. But when the mercenaries of the enemy disperse, when they are unsuspecting and alone, and return to their quarters and homes, the partisans will be waiting for them and take them to task. The attacks of the guerilla should, when possible, not be directed against the simple soldier of the enemy, but against his officers and leading bureaucrats. For them there can be no peaceful territory, no 'base,' no peaceful home, where they have a secure private life. The officer or bureaucrat will not know which of his neighbors is in contact with the guerilla, nor when and under what circumstances the hit against him will come."

¹⁶André Beaufre, loc. cit., p. 155, points out, that Colonel Lawrence had "described quite graphically (this concept) in connection with the action against Medina. Compare also Werner Hahlweg, *Krieg ohne Fronten*, Stuttgart 1968, p. 100ff.

the site of deployment must be unpredictable for the adversary.¹⁷

As soon as a front emerges, as soon as lines and fixed positions form, as soon as irregular warfare action is localized to a specific area, the guerillero loses a decisive advantage: at this movement—and only at this movement—the state attacked in irregular warfare can bring its superiority in materiel and personnel to bear. If it is possible to make the evaluation, that only *certain* areas are contaminated by partisans, but other areas are *clean*; this alone, if it is in fact true, means that the state under attack has achieved a decisive success. It will therefore be the aim of the state under attack in irregular warfare, to bind the guerilleros *within* a certain area and *to* this area.¹⁸ The guerillero, on his own part, will avoid any longer-lasting confrontation and any commitment in conventional battle. For him, there is no spatially fixed defense, no “position” which has to be held.

¹⁷Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 29: “The guerilla must make clear with appropriate actions, that their attacks are directed against all institutions of the class enemy, all administrative authorities and police offices, all management centers of businesses, but also against all of the representatives of these institutions, against leading bureaucrats, judges, directors, etc., that the war will be carried into the housing areas of the rulers. In this way, the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces along this invisible front, in the literal sense of the word, while the guerilla always only attacks single, specially selected points on this long battle front, concentrates his forces there, and therefore can be superior to the enemy. The guerilla exploits the moment of surprise, and determines the place and time of operations.”

¹⁸Compare Andro Gabelič, loc. cit., p. 171, with special reference to Vietnam: “The troops of the occupier and Quisling must hold the so-called vital centers of the country at any price, centers known as strategic foci in military terminology. By losing these objects . . . these troops also ultimately lose the war. As far as the armed forces of the front of national liberation is concerned, there are no vital centers for them, no national foci in the geographical sense. . . . A series of new operative consequences derive from such a relative value of geographical factors, such as: the necessary dispersal of the forces of the occupier and Quisling, which are stronger in number, among ‘vital centers,’ which allows the less strong in numbers, the national liberation front, which is not bound to ‘vital centers,’ to create a tactical superiority, and thus permit a gradual liquidation of the bases of the enemy; the unavoidable binding of the major forces of the occupier and Quisling to various objects, or the freedom to maneuver, the greater potential for surprise and similar (chiefly offensive) operations on the part of the forces of the liberation front, allows them to continuously and persistently change the landscape of the theater of combat in their favor.”

In the course of irregular war, *temporary* spatial focal points might form. It is the art of the guerillero to shift these focal points quickly, as soon as they are recognized, and to involve other, new areas in the battle action. Irregular warfare is, in that sense, *mobility warfare par excellence*: but movement in irregular war is, of course, as we shall show later, of a different kind than movement in conventional warfare.

That does not preclude, that where the *adversary* has withdrawn into a fixed position, the guerilleros will attack, because they believe, that by so doing, they deprive the adversary of this position, and thus achieve a decisive success—but, in irregular warfare, this signifies primarily a decisive psychological victory. The guerillero will initially isolate this position with methods of irregular warfare, and cut the enemy off from his supply and reinforcement bases. In so doing, he also foils an enemy retreat, planned too late. The enemy's fixed position becomes an “island” in a “contaminated” area. Under attack from all sides, sooner or later the position will succumb. Once the fixed position is taken, and the enemy holding it destroyed, the guerillero will not occupy the conquered position himself: instead, he will shift the focal point of his actions as quickly as possible to another area, as far away as possible. No guerilleros will be found on yesterday's field of battle. Whoever happens to remain, once the fighting is over, will transform himself overnight into a peaceful civilian. The only witnesses to the battle just ended will be ruins and mass graves.

§ 5

The Problem of the “Base”

Even with the mobility, which characterizes the type of combat of the guerilleros, and which is also an essential prerequisite for his success, *he too* is territory-dependent and territorially bound to a certain extent. To be able to wage war over a longer span of time, the guerillero normally needs at least *one* territorial base from which he can operate, from which he can supply himself, to which he can return to elude pursuers and—which is of decisive importance—which remains unknown to the adversary, or is inaccessible, for military

or political reasons, to armed seizure. Without one or more such operative bases, which fulfill the three cited functions, it will only be in the exceptional case, that an irregular war can be successfully waged.¹⁹ These bases are of different *kinds*, depending upon the concrete situation. Sometimes it will be a base *within* the territory of operations—the territory of the state where irregular warfare is waged—and at other times these bases will be *outside* the territory of operations—in the territory of an interested third power. These operational bases should not be confused with logistical bases, discussed below.

More frequently, bases are located *outside*, the territory of operations.²⁰ “In the war in Indochina,” Beaufre notes,²¹ “such bases were developed in China, in the Algerian war, on Egyptian and later Tunisian and Moroccan territory. The guerilla movement in Portuguese-Angola had supply bases in the former Belgian Congo.” None of these bases in irregular warfare were created by the actors in the war itself, but by the interested third powers “on the chess-board of world politics,” and placed at the disposal of the guerilleros. Beaufre calls such an action by an interested third power, which usually has a more or less strong deterrent effect, and which uses “political, economic, diplomatic and military instruments in conjunction and to the same end,” an “external maneuver.”²²

¹⁹This principle holds only for irregular warfare waged in isolation, not for irregular warfare which accompanies a large war. On this, compare August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 13: “Forces of irregular warfare have no fixed bases. On longer deployments, a ‘resting place’ is sought in territory difficult to access, it should be favorably located with respect to the center of the deployment, an alternate territory is to be surveilled and fixed. Positions should be changed frequently.”

²⁰Tito’s partisans, the Mau-mau, the Philippine Huks and the guerilleros in Indonesia and Malaya, relied only, or almost only on bases *within* their operational territory—leaving aside the special case of China. But they all received more or less sustained support during certain phases of the irregular war from interested third powers. In *one* case, that of southern Thailand, where Malaysian guerilleros have their bases to this day, one might also speak of an “uninterested third power,” who does not promote the construction of a base, but tolerates it out of a certain uninterest or the inability to do anything against it.

On this, compare Jürgen Dennert, loc. cit., p. 135-140.

²¹André Beaufre, loc. cit., p. 155f.

²²Ibid., p. 147ff.

“Some authors,” Beaufre continues in the cited location,²³ “think this system of bases is the most decisive element in the conduct of guerilla warfare. It is not decisive by itself, but, without any doubt, it does have major importance, since guerilla movements which,” like those against the British in Kenya and Malaya in the 1950s, “remain isolated, have failed on account of this lack of support from the outside. This makes clear, what decisive operative importance obtains to the external maneuver in guerilla warfare.”

Not only the kind, but also the *number* and *size* of the bases is determined by the concrete situation.²⁴ *Within* the territory of operations, we usually find a larger number of *small*, local, secret bases, dispersed over the entire territory. If the guerilleros have recourse to larger bases *outside* their territory of operations, among interested third powers—such as in the cases cited above by Beaufre, or Grivas-Dighenis in Greece, or the Northern Ireland resistance fighters in republican Ireland—they will usually not expand their bases *within* the operational territory. In a series of cases—especially in the Far East: in China, in Indochina, in Malaya—of course, the guerilleros created bases of relatively *large extent* within the territory of operations itself, and in these areas they took over administration, passed laws, collected taxes, and under certain circumstances even levied troops. These bases gradually became, as Heilbrunn discusses,²⁵ “seed states within the state.” Some cases—such as in Tito’s Yugoslavia—also demonstrate a development from a number of smaller, local bases, into fewer, larger bases within the territory of operations.

Not every area under the control of guerilleros becomes an irregular warfare base. Only those areas within the territory of operations can be used as bases, which are suitable from the standpoint of location and terrain, and where it can be expected—I repeat—that its use will remain *unknown* to the adversary for a long time, or that it will remain *inaccessible*. The choice of an unsuitable area for a base has more negative effects on the conduct of irregular warfare, than not having

²³Ibid., p. 156.

²⁴In the view of Régis Debray, “conditions in Latin America preclude the construction of large bases for guerilla warfare”; compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 52.

²⁵Otto Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 38.

a large base within the territory of operations at all. As the history of irregular wars since 1945 demonstrates, the widely held view, that it is necessary to create a large base within the operational territory *at any price* is wrong, even if such a view—in my opinion not entirely justified—is based on Mao Tse-tung.

VIII. THE PROBLEM OF TIME

§ 1

A War Without a Beginning

It was already pointed out in another connection, that a dialectical tension exists between the concept of international law and that of irregular warfare. It was said, that irregular warfare unfolds largely *outside* the “laws and norms” of war established by international law, and that it frequently happens in an irregular war which began as a civil war in one state, that “interested third states” intervene, if not always *contra legem*, then *praeter legem*.

Irregular warfare often serves to circumvent the prohibition against war in modern international law, since irregular warfare is not only a “war out of the dark,” but also, in certain respects, a “war in peace.” One characteristic of modern irregular warfare, which does not occur in the context of a “large” war, is that the transition from peace into war is blurred. Anglo-Saxon literature attempts to do justice to this fact, as already mentioned, by speaking of irregular warfare as “proxy war,” or “a war by proxy,” “an operation approximate to war,” or whatever the relevant expressions are. We discussed this terminology, and the intent which leads to its use, earlier; and we have attempted to demonstrate, that irregular war is, in any case, *real* war—war in the sense of international law.

As we shall demonstrate shortly, it lies in the nature of irregular warfare, that, at least in its first phase, the phase of covert combat, which follows a preparatory phase *without violence*, is in fact war, but it *does not appear* to be war: this phase can only be grasped with *hindsight*—historically—as part of irregular warfare. Nevertheless, this phase of irregular warfare, too, is not a condition *between* war and peace, but the first phase of a war, although a war of a special kind.

War and peace—as we already demonstrated—preclude one another: there is no *transitional state* between peace and war, which is no longer peace, and not yet war. As long as the “exceptional condition,” which we call war, has not yet occurred, normal conditions prevail, i.e., peace. The normal

condition ceases as soon as the exceptional condition begins. This rule holds for every kind of war, also—which is often not understood—irregular war. But, precisely in the case of irregular war, it is not easy to answer the *quaestio facti* of when the state of peace ended, and the state of war began. It also lies in the nature of *violent* subversion, that it seeks to hide the existence of a state of war; but a state *afflicted* by such subversion will often be interested, for political reasons,—even if it has clearly identified the subversion and its aims—in maintaining the fiction of the continued existence of the state of peace. Of course, sometimes it will take a very long time, until the afflicted state has recognized the subversion in its extent and its intent.

The difficulty, of determining the borderline between peace and war in irregular war, exists not only where irregular war is carried out in the form of a domestic war, but also in an irregular war, in which two or more states confront each other from the outset, presupposing that this irregular war is conducted not only in the shadow of a “large” war. In an imperceptible escalation of deliberately promoted disaffection, unrest and insecurity about demonstrations in the streets, provoked clashes, isolated acts of sabotage, and individual acts of violence against the political enemy, up to organized acts of terrorism and increasing robberies, a state is gradually drawn into an irregular war, without the political and military leadership being conscious of the fact at the beginning.

The irregular war is suddenly there. At what point in time it began, even the historian later will hardly be able to say, down to the month and day. Usually, to fix the beginning of the irregular war in hindsight, one will construct a fiction, connecting historical facts from the first phase of the irregular war. One such historical fact is the “pronouncement of a state of siege” or the “proclamation of a domestic state emergency” by the government against which the irregular war is waged; one such historical event can be the formation of a top leadership by those who begin the irregular war, or a proclamation with which the guerilleros present themselves in public for the first time, unmask themselves, or, finally, it might be a certain act of violence within the first phase of the irregular war, which the leadership of the guerilleros admit having committed. This fictitious beginning of an irregular war, how-

ever, is always later—often months, perhaps years—than its actual beginning.

It will, likewise, sometimes be impossible to determine when an irregular war ended, especially when it follows a large war. It recedes gradually, like the irregular warfare against the Soviets in the Ukraine after the end of World War II; no one will then be able to identify the precise point in time at which the exceptional condition, which we call war, is actually ended. Here too, one will have to find a connection to some historical event, to be able to name a date, a fictitious point in time, for the end of an irregular war.

§ 2

The “Armed Forces” of the *Guerilleros*

Irregular war knows of no mobilization, which begins at one moment, and is completed at a certain point in time. In order to form the *armed forces* of the guerilleros, all potential combatants, i.e., from the entire population, must be won over, in the course of time, to become actual combatants. In irregular war, the mobilization—the winning over of new, actual combatants out of a mass of potential combatants—is a war for the minds and souls of people, which is drawn out over the entire course of the war. This mobilization requires time, a good deal of time. For that reason alone, irregular war is, to use an expression of Mao’s, a war for those who have long breaths. While “large” war is a brightly blazing fire, which, once it breaks out, immediately spreads through the entire building, irregular warfare is like a smoldering fire, which—unnoticed at the beginning—eats its way through a building slowly.¹

¹ Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 33: “To the extent, that the insight into the necessity of armed struggle becomes generalized, numerous military cells form, which together gradually form an impenetrable fabric for the enemy, which gain operative and tactical experience in combat against the forces of repression, and apply them on an increasing scale.”

Compare further, on “the basic strategic idea . . . that the Blitzkrieg eventually turns into a long lasting war,” and on the “principle of mobilization,” and the “principle of the volunteer” in such a war, Dušan Dozet, *Die gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen der allumfassenden Verteidigung*, in *Konzeption der allumfassenden Verteidigung Jugoslawiens*, Belgrade 1970, p. 90f.

Within these "armed forces" of the guerilleros which form over time, three different groups of persons who participate in battle must be distinguished, groups of which international law up to now has taken no account. The real core involved in combat are the small, independently operating, *armed action-groups*. They alone carry out armed robberies, sabotage and terrorist actions, executions and other violent operations. The total number of these active fighters must be kept as low as possible. Clausewitz,² in his treatment of the battles in Vendée, already pointed to this law of low numbers in irregular warfare. In 1808, there were five French soldiers for each Spanish guerillero, in Malaya at the beginning of the 1950s, there were never more than 5,000 communist partisans confronting 250,000 soldiers and police; at the end of the 1950s, at most 30,000 Algerian guerilleros were fighting nearly 500,000 French soldiers. Grivas-Dighenis reports in his book on the Cypriot freedom struggle, that his active groups over the entire irregular war on the island consisted of "only a handful for fighters," who "never had more than 100 automatic weapons, and 500-600 hunting weapons, and a corresponding amount of sabotage equipment," which stood against "an excellently organized army 40,000 men strong."³ As a rule, these action groups are selected and trained for certain kinds of missions, described below: their members are, in a certain sense, "specialists" of irregular warfare.⁴ The strength and armament of the action groups is determined by their respective missions,⁵ to gauge their strength correctly, and to

²Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege, hinterlassenes Werk*, with commentary by W. von Scherff, 2nd Ed., Berlin 1883, p. 221f., 18th Ed., published by Werner Hahlweg, Bonn 1966, p. 399.

³Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 110; compare on this *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 28f.: "The military adversary of the partisan fighters are the police and army. The partisan unit, by contrast, is of minimal size. It can only survive, if it is invisible to the adversary."

⁴Compare Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 57:

"The leadership organization of the groups varied. They adjusted to local conditions and requirements. There were units in the cities, which only had sabotage, execution, and diversionary groups. Other units had special commando groups . . . and others even had mountain partisan groups."

⁵August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 12, notes on the one hand, "that irregular warfare forces are to be formed and trained according to the purpose of their missions," and that "it is less the number of fighters, than their determination, capability and knowledge of local conditions, which is decisive,"

make the appropriate armament available, is the art of leadership of the guerilleros. The weaker the number in relationship to the adversary, and the less the mass of the population stands on the side of the guerilleros, the smaller—but, on that account, better trained and armed—must the individual action-groups be.

The armed action-groups require the support of a far larger number of *active sympathizers* to carry on their activity. The active sympathizers do *not* take part in armed conflicts; but they do take responsibility for necessary procurement of information and reconnaissance against the enemy *on behalf of* the armed action-groups; they replace missing communication links by transmitting the orders of the leadership to the action-groups, and transmit the reports of the action group back to the leadership, which is often unknown to the groups themselves; they supply the action-groups in every respect with food and other necessities, and sometimes with weapons which they have hidden themselves, munitions supplies, and by housing and caring for the wounded. They enable the action-groups, finally, to move suddenly into action, and disappear just as suddenly, by giving them places to hide.

The active sympathizers also represent the connection between the action-groups and the population: they are, as the instructions for the Viet-Minh graphically and appropriately say, the "antenna" for the guerillero to the people.⁶

but then adds later (p. 19) that "according to the unanimous testimony of all available experience, the most appropriate organization for irregular warfare is a commando in the approximate strength of a company. In certain exceptional situations, a number of commandos may be grouped temporarily to carry out a mission. The commando company must, in terms of its strength, armament, equipment, be able to fight for a long period of time without any special supply provisions, and with far-reaching mission goals." Ségur-Cabanac sets the strength of an action group, in our view, very high. The Greek partisan groups in Cyprus, as well as the special commando groups, were only 4 or 5 men strong, the execution groups only 2 or 3 men strong. (Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 90, 100, and 105.) Most communist subversion instructions for irregular warfare assume a group strength of 3 to 10 men. A. Neuberg, loc. cit., p. 253, speaks of a "well trained and technically schooled diversionary group of three to five men."

Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, p. 65: "What are the next steps? . . . To form commando troops (groups of 3, 5 and 10) with comrades, whom one must know very well, personally and politically . . ."

⁶Otto Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 85. Active and passive sympathizers are often

A distinction must be made between these active sympathizers, who are the eyes, ears and mouth of the action-groups, and the *passive sympathizers*, whose only task is to see nothing, hear nothing, and, especially, to know nothing. They support the action-groups and the active sympathizers by being blind, deaf and dumb. The reasons for this behavior—fear of terrorist acts or real sympathy—are irrelevant.

According to the well-known dictum of Mao Tse-tung, sympathizers have the same crucial importance for the armed action-groups as water does for the fish. Whoever wants to wage irregular warfare with action-groups alone, but without a sufficient number of sympathizers, has already lost the war before it has begun. A secret for the success of guerilleros is not only that they have *each* of the cited groups at their disposal; anyone who wants to win in irregular warfare must also know the correct numerical proportion between action-groups and sympathizers. Too many active sympathizers in relationship to the number of action-groups will make reconnaissance easier for the adversary; too few active sympathizers, on the other hand, endangers reconnaissance, communication, and supplies for the action-groups. There are no rules of thumb for the correct proportionate numbers between action-groups and active and passive sympathizers. Every situation, and every individual operation will require a different proportion. Gauging this relationship from case to case, and implementing it, is the great art of the higher leadership of guerilleros.

Action groups, active, and passive sympathizers together form the armed forces of the guerilleros. Even the passive sympathizer participates in irregular warfare in his behavior, i.e., he is a guerillero; he, too, is a member of the party, a partisan. Both the leadership of the guerilleros, as well as the adversary's, must take account of these groups in their combat planning; not to take account of the existence of one of these groups would be a disastrous mistake for each side. On the other hand, it could cost a member of one of these groups

characterized by the collective notion of "civilian resistance," among other authors by H. von Dach, loc. cit., *passim*.

his life, if he forgot, that he is a guerillero—and thereby subordinate to the discipline of the guerilleros.

The number of members of the armed action-groups, and the active and passive sympathizers, changes in irregular warfare from day to day—not only because of losses in the respective groups, but also because of a continuous mutual personnel exchange. The action-groups, active and passive sympathizers do not—and this is often overlooked—form individually fixed, clearly differentiated groups. It is characteristic of irregular warfare, that there is a permanent fluctuation between these three cited groups, which distinguish only in the different *momentary* intensity of their political engagement. Action groups are recruited out of the active sympathizers, and return—often for a long time—to the ranks of the active sympathizers again. It is only this permanent exchange of its individual members, which keeps an action group operational for a long time. In the same way, the transition from passive to active sympathizer is a fluid one. Here too, of opportunity are thieves made.

There are periods of time in every irregular war, in which armed action-groups no longer exist. Earlier action-groups have either been destroyed, or they have dissolved; their members have become mere sympathizers. The irregular warfare almost seems to be paralyzed. Then suddenly new action-groups crop up after this period of calm, in a moment of total surprise for the adversary; unexpectedly, covert combat flares up again. To choose these periods of "silence," and to correctly determine their duration, is an art which the guerilla leader must master: he must understand not only how to maintain freedom of action in time, but also how to use it.

§ 3

A War Without Decisive Battles

Freedom of action in time sometimes is of even greater importance in irregular warfare than freedom of action in space. By its nature, irregular warfare is war, whose successful conduct requires a good deal of time. There are strikes conducted at lightning speed; but it is never a blitzkrieg, but always a

war of waiting, and being able to wait. The strategy of irregular warfare is what Beaufre⁷ calls “a strategy of a long, drawn out conflict,” “in order thus to wear down the adversary, and tire him out. To sustain the war,” Beaufre continues, “the instruments may be primitive, while the technique of their employment will force the adversary to considerably greater efforts than he himself can sustain.”

The guerillero who puts his adversary under time pressure has usually played his cards wrong; a forced move means failure. The resistance fighters in the Warsaw Ghetto as well as the Chetniks of Draža Mihailovich learned this in World War II. The guerillero will therefore exchange “space for time,”⁸ when he must—like Mao Tse-tung 1946/1947 in his fight against Chaing Kai-shek. He will not accept offers of rapid gains in space, which would constrain him in time, in order to gain time.

In this connection, Edward L. Katzenbach correctly remarks: irregular warfare, which prepares or accompanies a “large” war, “is the instrument, which the grand weapon of ‘time’ provides to military strategy. Guerilla operations are the mud or the quicksand in which the military machine of the adversary gets bogged down.”⁹

Irregular warfare, we observed, is an instrument of *indirect* action. In irregular warfare—just in the sense Liddell Hart meant—“dispersed strategic advance” takes the place of “the simple idea of a concentrated blow by means of a concentrated armed force.”¹⁰

As a rule, irregular warfare knows of no “assembly of forces in space” in the Clausewitzian sense,¹¹ which is the precon-

⁷André Beaufre, loc. cit., p. 32. Régis Debray, too, never tires of pointing out, that “guerilla activity is an operation of the long view”; compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 52.

Compare furthermore also A. Neuberg, loc. cit., p. 239: “Hardly any situation is conceivable . . . in which the proletariat will be able, by one single, brief, though powerful blow of proletarian rebellion, to lay the state institutions of the dying class in rubble . . . and crush its armed backbone.”

⁸Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., and Gene Z. Hanrahan, *Die revolutionäre Strategie Mao Tse-tungs*, in F.M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 195.

⁹Ibid., p. 198.

¹⁰Liddell Hart, *Strategie*, German translation by Horst Jordan, Wiesbaden 1955, p. 409.

¹¹Carl von Clausewitz, loc. cit., p. 144f.

dition of every direct action; if, in the exceptional case, there is a spatial grouping of forces, this usually signifies the end of pure irregular warfare.

On the other hand, given certain preconditions, and *to a certain degree*, the Clausewitzian dictum holds for irregular warfare, too, that “all available forces directed at a strategic purpose . . . (should) be applied *simultaneously* to that purpose.”¹² Simultaneous irregular warfare actions, spatially distributed over the entire territory of the state affected by irregular warfare, lead to a fragmentation of the adversary’s forces, to insecurity and confusion in the camp of the enemy, and to the shattering of his fighting morale: and that is just what is at issue in irregular warfare.

Irregular warfare is not only—as we demonstrated in another connection—a *war* of the weaker, but also a war, in which numerical weakness can signify operative strength. The guerillero uses his inferiority in numbers to neutralize the conventional strength of the adversary, and turn it *ad absurdum*. Two kilograms of a modern, high-power explosive in the hands of each of two hundred guerilleros, placed in two hundred positions of tactical importance to the adversary, on the same day, in an area of 40,000 square-kilometers—in tunnels, bridges, railway stations, communications installations or energy supply facilities—all brought to detonation expertly at the same time, can, under favorable circumstances, cause the adversary to set a military and police apparatus 100 times superior in number to the guerilleros into hectic movement. The adversary will boast of his luck, if he manages to capture one-tenth of the guerilleros deployed. If two thousand guerilleros are deployed for the same operation—two hundred explosive charges—the adversary will have an easy game of it: with 20,000 guerilleros deployed for 200 explosive charges, the enemy can begin to exploit his numerical superiority.¹³

¹²Ibid., p. 150.

¹³Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Revolutionary Spain,” in *The Daily Tribune*, 30 October 1854, already pointed out, that action groups too large for their missions are no longer suitable for irregular warfare. Pavle Jakšić, loc. cit., p. 259, refers to this article, and quotes from the following section: “In the third phase, the guerilla supported the regular army; their units grew to a strength of up to three or six thousand men; this change in the

Likewise, defense against and pursuit of the guerilleros becomes easier for the adversary, if, in the same limited area, and at the same time, two thousand explosive charges are expected, instead of 200. There is an "optimum" of simultaneous actions for every area. It is the art of the leadership of guerilleros, to correctly estimate this "optimum" number, so that the adversary is fragmented and "made insecure," without offering him, on the other hand, the opportunity to carry out a major blow *against* the guerilleros. There are also limits to the "unification of forces in time" in irregular warfare. To overstep these limits is to endanger prospects for success.

§ 4

A War Without Victory?

Since, as a rule in irregular warfare, there is no long-duration occupation of "decisive points" by guerilleros, no "gathering of forces" in "space," and only a limited "unifying of forces in time," irregular warfare also knows of no "decisive" military actions *of the guerilleros* in the sense of classical strategy, no "decisive" battle, no decisive "operative movement."

Does it follow from this, that irregular warfare is also, fundamentally, a war without victory? There are theoreticians who make that claim. In Thayer,¹⁴ we find the sentence, that irregular wars "are never won by the guerilleros, but are often lost by their adversaries." Katzenbach speaks even more apodictically of the notion, that irregular war can indeed "stop"

organization of the guerilla played into the hands of the French; because of their strength of numbers, the guerillas were prevented from hiding themselves as they had done, attacking and then disappearing again, avoiding direct confrontations; the guerilla was often attacked at that time, destroyed unexpectedly, fragmented, and lost their capability to do any damage to the French for a long time." In the same article, Pavle Jakšić talks about the collapse of the units of the Yugoslav partisans during World War II, in those cases "where the earlier flow of fighters into the ranks of the liberation army of the partisans took on a *broad* dimension (Montenegro, Serbia 1941, Herzegovina 1942, etc.)."

Georgios Grivas-Dighenis' remark, loc. cit., p. 110, is to be similarly understood: "There are cases in partisan warfare, in which the terrain, independent of its morphological characteristics, must be considered 'saturated.'"

¹⁴Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 19.

the adversary "like mud," and thus "postpone the defeat of the guerilleros," "but it can not lead to victory."¹⁵

For the guerillero, the issue is to "annihilate" the adversary psychologically. Irregular war, too, is "an act of violence" to force the adversary "to submit to our will"—and to achieve this aim, the aim in irregular warfare, too, is to make the adversary "defenseless"—"defenseless," of course, especially in the sense, that he no longer has the *inner power* and the *will*, to defend himself. But the problem of making the adversary defenseless becomes thereby a *problem of time*.

Low-intensity warfare should lead to the adversary's gradually bleeding to death, physically and psychologically. To that purpose, it is first of all necessary to deprive the adversary of the *belief in the possibility of victory* over the guerilleros. To the adversary, the guerilla movement must appear as a form of Lunaan hydra: if one cuts off one head of this multi-headed monster, two heads grow in its place; and one of the heads is immortal. If an irregular warfare action is unsuccessful, or if a group of guerilleros is betrayed, discovered, captured, taken out of action, destroyed, within a short period of time new actions must demonstrate to the adversary, that the movement is still alive, and that the unsuccessful action was no "decisive" blow against them. Just as no low-intensity warfare action can be decisive by itself for the guerilleros, it must be demonstrated to the adversary, on the other hand, that there is no "decisive battle" against the guerilleros for him either.

It is the *organization of the adversary* which irregular warfare actions aim to destroy—in fact, *every* form of order, the military as well as civilian, the economic as well as political. Clausewitz,¹⁶ too, speaks of such a destruction of order: but he only

¹⁵Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., loc. cit., p. 199.

¹⁶Carl von Clausewitz, loc. cit., p. 190. On this purpose of irregular warfare actions—to disrupt and destroy the order of the adversary—compare Rote-Armee-Fraktion: *Das Konzept Stadtguerilla*, p. 12: "The urban-guerilla aims at destroying the state's ruling apparatus at individual points, to put it out of action at certain points, to destroy the myth of the omnipresence of the system and its inviolability." Irregular warfare actions which accompany a conventional war also aim at disruption of the order of the adversary, or to prevent him from developing such order; compare Mirko Vranič, loc. cit., p. 296: "The fundamental aim must be comprehensive resistance

means the destruction of the order of an army, which is to be obtained in a major battle, and he calls *this* destruction the *decision*. Irregular war is *total* war, in which the issue is not only the existence of armies, and in which, therefore, the destruction of the order of an army *alone* does not yet signify the decision. Just as nuclear war leads to chaos, the successful irregular war gradually dissolves *every* form of order of the guerilleros' enemy.

Beaufre¹⁷ characterizes irregular war accurately as "total, long-duration combat of lesser military intensity." At its conclusion, the side which can hold its breath longer has survived. Victory in irregular warfare comes unnoticed, through the back-door, in a certain sense.

Victory in irregular war does not signify—or at least not in every case—that the adversary has been *militarily* defeated, but it always signifies, that he is exhausted and bled dry, that he is *psychologically* defeated. If "victory" signifies *that* success, in which, by means of violence, that aim is achieved, on account of which violence was resorted to,—and Clausewitz¹⁸ also spoke of a victory, which is *more* than mere success on the battlefield—then there is also a *real* victory for the guerilleros. This victory, of course, is not achieved in a decisive battle, but in countless, single, small actions, and not seldom the world only discovers after the fact—such as in the case of the irregular warfare of the Mau-Mau in Kenya, or of the Ukrainian freedom fighters in the first years after World War II—with a certain astonishment, that an irregular war has just ended with the victory of one or another party. It is even possible, that the side which has achieved victory *only* becomes aware of its victory much later—possibly too late.

from the very beginning of the attack, by means of which the adversary can be prevented from establishing his power, supply and transportation."

¹⁷ André Beaufre, loc. cit., p. 32. The concept of "comprehensive," (*allumfassend*) which is continuously used in the German edition of the Yugoslavian collection of essays, Belgrade 1970, corresponds in its content to the concept of "total," as Beaufre understands it.

¹⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, loc. cit., p. 189.

IX. MOVEMENT, TERRAIN, AND POPULATION

§ 1

Movement in Irregular Warfare

We have spoken of the problem of space and time in irregular warfare. The function of space and time is movement. Freedom of action in war, as we saw, is the freedom of the disposition over space and time. It signifies primarily freedom of movement. Immobilization of the adversary is always—no matter what kind of war it is—the beginning of victory at the strategic, as well as at the operative and tactical level.

Irregular war, as already said in another connection, is essentially mobility-warfare. If there is any form of war, in which movement is capable of overcoming firepower and depriving it of its effect, in the battle interplay of movement and firepower, this is definitely true for modern irregular warfare.

Movement in irregular warfare, of course, is of a special kind. Irregular warfare has "marches," in the sense of "large" war, only in seldom, exceptional cases. Guerilleros normally do not march in more or less closed columns or units.¹ Instead, they infiltrate—individually, or in small and very small groups—silently and unnoticed into the area they want to reach. Seeping movement, infiltration, is the characteristic form of movement for irregular warfare, in the operative as well as tactical realm.² On the other hand, it should be noted,

¹ Mao Tse-tung's "long march" was accompanied and screened by irregular warfare actions; it largely prepared the subsequent irregular war; the march *movement* itself, however, was conventional. One might also, with Wilbur W. Dinegar, *Guerillakrieg*, in F.M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 210ff., think of the "long march" as the "extension" of an irregular war.

² Compare Mirko Vranič, loc. cit., p. 298ff.

August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 6: "The most important possibilities for preparing and implementing irregular warfare operations . . . are . . . *broad-area infiltration* of irregular warfare forces out of one's own area into the depth of the adversary's operations territory, in order to carry out irregular warfare operations in tactical collaboration with one's own main forces, and the planned and prepared leaving-behind of combat-strength

seeping movement is by no means restricted to irregular warfare. In World War II and afterward, the Soviet army demonstrated in numerous cases, that it has mastered the art of infiltration at every level³—in the large and the small, from the infiltration-staging of entire armies, to the infiltration of a shock force into enemy positions—also in “large” war.

In infiltrating, seeping movement, a unit is dissolved, “fragmented.” The issue is, as the irregular warfare instructions of the Viet Minh emphasize,⁴ that the “fragmented” unit is capable of assembling itself and disbanding quickly. “Only by being able to assemble and disband at will,” say the instructions to the Viet Minh,⁵ “are we always able to keep the initiative.” The seeping movement enables the guerilleros, to make themselves “alternately visible and invisible,” appearing suddenly where the enemy does not suspect them, and “stealing away,” when the enemy sets out to engage them.

Two different forms of seeping movement can be differentiated. The first of these forms is infiltration into unfamiliar territory. The guerillero, in this case, behaves like a scavenger dragging his booty. He goes out of the way of every human habitation and any contact even with the civilian population; he bears—this “Che” Guevara emphasizes especially⁶—hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, adapts to the terrain, so that he

units or companies within the depth of the territory occupied by the enemy, in order thus to make transition into irregular warfare at a given time and within a certain area, independent of one's main forces. In order to infiltrate irregular warfare forces into enemy territory, these will often infiltrate into the operations area, or they will be dropped in the rear of the enemy by aircraft. Upon retreat, they can be left behind in the operations area. Irregular warfare is also waged, however, by forces cut off (from the main force), when they have an order to that effect, or when there is no prospect for the success of being able to fight their way back.”

³The infiltration of parts of the Red Army in the summer of 1961, as has become known recently, preceded the building of the Berlin Wall. Many theoreticians believe, that one can note a special capability for such seeping movements among the Slavs; they reference, among of things, the infiltration of the Slavs into the Balkans in the course of the migrations, and contrast these long-duration peaceful infiltration movements, to the German migrations, which were usually a series of relatively short crusades: a not very convincing thesis. Compare Zvane Črnja, *Histoire de la Culture Croate*, Zagreb 1966, p. 54ff.

⁴Otto Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 96f.

⁵Ibid., p. 97.

⁶“Che” Guevara, loc. cit., p. 64.

seems to melt into it—becoming practically part of the terrain, and during this time the terrain becomes part of his self. Among Soviet and Yugoslav partisans in World War II, in one or another of the French resistance groups, which called the terrain in which they were moving the Maquis, among Ukrainian freedom fighters after 1945, and especially along the black guerilleros that moved in recent years into Zambia, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Angola, there were often masters of this seeping movement.

The second form of infiltration exploits the dense settlement of a terrain, heavy traffic, or some gathering of people who do not know each other—markets, demonstrations, exhibitions, festivities, and the like, to seep in. “We must especially act,” says the already cited irregular warfare manual of the Viet Minh,⁷ “when the enemy supports us. We then order our men to disguise themselves as coolies, as enemy soldiers, as salesmen on the way to the market. Our masked fighters exploit the element of surprise to destroy the enemy in his fort or garrison . . . the commandos fight in civilian clothing and mix with the population in order to avoid the attention of the enemy.”

Depending upon the situation, the guerillero will decide for one or another form of infiltration. At the level of tactics, very rapid shifts from the one to the other form of infiltration, at the right place and right time, can be of no less importance for the success of an irregular warfare action, than is the timely and rapid transition from infiltration-movement to assembling for combat action, and from the assembled force once again back to infiltration, after completion of an operation.

§ 2

The Importance of Terrain Characteristics

The problem of movement just discussed concerns irregular warfare less as a *kind* of war, than as a *form* of the *conduct*

⁷Otto Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 95.

Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 104: “If a determined minority wants to become terroristically active,” says an editorial in the *New York Times*, “then I am not sure anyone can stop them. . . . It is possible to infiltrate every city in the world.” As long as infiltration can be done, as long as a city is neither militarily nor socially isolated, an urban rebellion has chances for success even in a modern environment.”

of war. The question of the influence of terrain characteristics on irregular warfare—given an appropriately large operations area—is almost exclusively a matter of the *form* of conduct of war.

Movement in war is largely determined by the terrain in which it is conducted. Every form of the conduct of war has its own kind of movement. Combat is only possible with prospects for success, where concrete conditions allow this specific movement. The higher the degree of technical equipping of armed forces, the more multifaceted the kinds of movement become, and the more important, on the other hand, the question of whether the terrain is appropriate for the intended kind of movement. Modern technology does not free the soldier from his dependency on the characteristics of the terrain in which he seeks combat, or is engaged in combat. “Greater ability to work in a certain terrain,” Mirko Vranić⁸ notes, is one of “the essential elements” in battle, which influences the power relationship to the adversary. The non-motorized infantryman—and after him, the horse—are not only essentially more “cross-country capable” than the most capable vehicle; they can also more easily adjust to any terrain, and “melt into” the terrain much faster than the most modern motor vehicle. Finally, they can find some of their supplies, if necessary, in the terrain itself—which a motor vehicle can not do—supplies which can not otherwise be brought to them.

Irregular war is a primitive form of the conduct of war. It is therefore more dependent—as incredible as this might superficially sound—on the terrain for its conduct, than modern “large” war. Terrain may be suitable for irregular warfare operations—and in fact most appropriate—which, in its char-

⁸Mirko Vranić, loc. cit., p. 299.

Compare A.H. Sollon, *Überall und nirgends*, in F.M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 32: “As was already mentioned, one of the factors in the development of a partisan movement is a terrain appropriate for operations. Such terrains are swamps, mountains and forests, where only marches on foot and movement with light vehicles are possible. The fact, that the partisan operates in such terrain, is his advantage, since in an environment of this kind regular armed forces have to do without the use of their vehicles and artillery, and are unable to launch a massed attack with superior forces. In brief, this means, that the territory places the better equipped, better trained, and better armed regular armed force on a level, where the partisan is his equal.”

acteristics, is unsuited, or hardly suited, for the conduct of a “large” war with modern equipment. High mountains, extensive, thick forests, jungle, the maze of streets in a large city.⁹ Irregular war is conceivable in any space, where the terrain-cover, structure, and population density enable the action groups of the guerilleros to infiltrate unnoticed by the adversary, carry out a surprise strike, and disappear again once the action has been accomplished.

On the other hand, irregular warfare can *only* be conducted, where its characteristic infiltration movement is possible in some form. Seeping movement requires covered terrain, which prohibits the adversary’s rapid pursuit with motorized forces of the action groups, who have accomplished their mission, and which removes the individual guerillero, after his accomplished mission, as quickly as possible from the sight of the adversary, if not from the full effect of his gun-fire. For this reason, the jungle of Southeast Asia, and the brush forest of the Mediterranean area in World War II, were terrain especially suited to irregular warfare. Whether the terrain cover is natural or artificial is of fundamentally subordinate importance; it is only important, that the ground cover—whether vegetation growth or construction—covers a large area.

The housing-maze of a modern large city, with its extensive and walkable network of underground tunnels and channels, with innumerable cellars easily connected to one another, with the narrow spaces of the old city core, and with large, multi-story housing blocks, is quite suited to the conduct of irregular war. It is surely a “terrible simplification” to speak of our large cities in this connection as the “jungle of the West”: large-city combat and jungle combat are different in many respects. In the irregular war of the future, however, our large cities could *mutatis mutandis* all too easily assume a role similar to that of the jungles in Southeast Asia and in Latin America, and that

⁹Compare August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 18: “The following points of view essentially determine the suitability of an area for the conduct of irregular warfare: form of terrain (geographical structure and altitude), forest, cave areas, how long the snow-cover lasts, how long the vegetation period lasts, accessibility of the terrain, use of the land, transportation routes, industries, large cities and connected settlement areas, population density.”

For “Che” Guevara, loc. cit., p. 37, *inaccessibility* is the decisive characteristic of terrain favorable for irregular warfare.

which the bush forests of the Mediterranean area played until very recently: i.e., the role of a terrain suitable for irregular war. It seems, furthermore, that a large city is all the more suitable for the conduct of irregular warfare actions, the more modern it is: high-rise buildings with countless small apartments, whose inhabitants do not know each other, underground garages, large shopping centers, a plethora of courtyards, etc., make such actions easy.¹⁰

As the *Kollektiv Rote-Armee-Fraktion* explains in its instructions for "armed struggle in Western Europe,"¹¹ the large city fulfills "all of the necessary requirements in a way, which does not make it necessary, that the partisan units step out of their anonymity. After their actions, they can resubmerge into prepared quarters,¹² without having to rely upon assistance from the population. Their movements in the streets of a large city are unobtrusive, and can not be distinguished from the comings and goings of the rest of the population. Large city anonymity is a decisive factor for the urban-guerilla. Conspiratorial contacts with informants, sympathizers, and partisans with special missions in institutions of the enemy, can be more easily made and maintained in a large city than in other areas. They are largely independent of the attitude of the immediately uninvolved population.

¹⁰Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 102: "Guerillas can operate continuously even in urban areas, not in individual communities, but possibly in larger urban areas such as the Ruhr area in Germany, or in the area of New Haven southward to Baltimore or Washington"; and p. 104: "Information from Saigon demonstrates, that urban guerilla combat against regular troop units is possible, and can be waged effectively over a long span of time. That seems to be the case particularly, when urban guerillas receive regular supplies from rural areas, and are supported militarily from the suburbs or surrounding rural areas." The first instructions for irregular warfare in cities were written in 1868-69 by August Blanqui. Selected parts from them are reproduced in J. Schickel, loc. cit., p. 98-115. After World War II, one of the first to emphasize the importance of the large city for irregular warfare was Ferdinand Otto Miksche, *Secret Forces. The Technique of Underground Movements*, London 1951, p. 92: "Only large cities are actually suitable for underground actions: furthermore, the larger they are, the better are the conditions for secret movements. Small provincial cities, where the inhabitants know each other, and any unusual activity is easily observed, are by no means suited for an extended conspiracy."

¹¹*Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 33.

¹²Compare above, p. 85.

"One decisive advantage of the big city," the *Kollektiv Rote-Armee-Fraktion* continues, "also consists in the fact that the operations-area and the base-area are identical."¹³ Information can be obtained more easily and less dangerously. The big city is, at the same time, a mass of targets for attack. While a rural guerilla can only attack individual points, in the big city the entire flank of the enemy is open. He never knows, which object will be attacked. Since all objects are accessible to the partisans in the big city, the enemy must protect them all. His attempt to be everywhere means that he is nowhere strong enough. A few fighters can tie down strong enemy forces."¹⁴

In summary, the *Kollektiv Rote-Armee-Fraktion* points out, that identification of the guerilleros' combat unit in a big city is "very difficult." "Raids are seldom successful, and have more the purpose of demonstrating the presence of the state's power to the population. Bombardments are hardly possible, and totally useless for the adversary. While rural zones, which partisans have penetrated, can be declared enemy territory by the counter-revolutionary forces, and treated accordingly, in big cities, where the true face of capital and its ruling apparatus lives, this is impossible. Success for the police and military are only possible due to accidents, treason, tactical mistakes, or the overwhelming of a single commando during an operation. It is no longer speculation (to say), that the formation of armed commandos in big cities is always possible."

The advantage which terrain cover gives the guerillero for his combat is heightened by the appropriate characteristics of the terrain. The more variegated, the more cut up the terrain is, the more suited it is for irregular warfare operations. The mountains of Italy and Yugoslavia—as World War II showed—are ideal, almost made for irregular warfare. Under certain circumstances—such as in high mountains—enhanced vari-

¹³No distinction is made here between operative base and logistical base.

¹⁴Compare Hermann Gebhardt, *Guerillas: Schicksalsfrage für den Westen. Die lateinamerikanische Revolutionsbewegung*. Stuttgart 1971, p. 72: "Carlos Marighella and the journalist Abraham Guillén, who has worked in Uruguay for years, thought, and continue to think, that it is a strategic mistake to begin revolutionary struggle in rural areas when its political center is in the city. Guillén is of the opinion, that urban guerillas, in 20 motorized groups of 4 to 5 men, can paralyze the life of a city, and that 500 men in an urban guerilla mean much more than the same number in a rural area."

gation of the terrain can make up for a lack of terrain cover to a certain degree, presuming that the variegated terrain offers a certain cover against being seen from the air, in caves, under hanging cliffs.

Terrain without cover, which can be surveyed over broad areas, is unsuited for the conduct of modern irregular warfare: the steppes landscape of parts of southern Russia or parts of South Africa are hardly suited to irregular warfare.¹⁵

If the guerillero is forced, under exceptional conditions and temporarily, to operate in uncovered, unvariegated terrain, then—"Che" Gueverra has described this in flowery detail¹⁶—assault movements will be limited to nighttime hours. As soon as day comes, the guerillero must "disappear into the earth," either by finding a cover, where he spends the day without any movement, or he hides out among active sympathizers. The more unfavorable the terrain for irregular warfare operations, the more necessary it is, that the entire population in the terrain in question sympathizes with the guerilleros: in one or another case, the attitude of the population toward the guerilleros can be just as important as the terrain. But the sympathy of the mass of the population will never entirely replace cover. "Che" Guevara also explicitly points that out. In addition to the necessary propagandistic influencing of the "masses," particularly in an area with unfavorable terrain characteristics, he discusses the other necessary factor, to ruthlessly liquidate anyone who refuses to

¹⁵But compare Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 111: "The characteristics of the terrain do not play such an important role. One expects, that partisan activities will be more successful in mountains than in flat lands without cover. I recognized immediately, that this is not an absolute rule, and that remarkable partisan activity can also be developed just as well in flat country. . . . For example, in the area of Ammohostos (in the plain of Messaria), the terrain was totally flat and uncovered. Nevertheless, partisan activity in this area was significant, and the English considered the area as a 'death zone.' The area of Karpasias, a narrow strip of terrain with insignificant elevations especially in the north, could be easily closed off by land and sea, and thoroughly searched. Nevertheless, partisan activity in this area, too, was significant." What Grivas-Dighenis does not say is, that in the cited areas every house and every hut offered his guerilleros a place to hide, so that the artificial cover of the terrain was able to compensate for the lack of natural cover.

¹⁶"Che" Guevara, loc. cit., p. 39, 43, and in various other places.

cooperate with the guerilleros. "Within the operations area, no enemy can remain alive in places which offer no safety."¹⁷

§ 3

The Importance of Population Density and the Character of the Population

Aside from the factors of terrain-cover and terrain-characteristics, the possibility of conducting a modern irregular war is also essentially determined by population density. Irregular warfare actions are only possible in two kinds of areas: Firstly, where the lack of a density of settlement precludes observation, or makes recognition at least improbable: for this reason, the uninhabited forests of Russia were suited to irregular warfare. Likewise, modern irregular warfare actions can also be prepared and carried out in areas, that are so densely settled, that no one takes any notice of his fellow human beings, and the individual is swallowed by the anonymous mass. For this reason, the modern large city is ideal for the conduct of irregular warfare. The guerillero needs either *solitude* or *the masses*, to survive and operate: both offer him cover. On the other hand, irregular warfare can not be waged in areas, in which a moderate population density prohibits unobserved preparations for violent actions. Wherever the guerillero must expect to be observed and recognized, he hardly has any chance to succeed. Neither the sympathy of a pro-guerillero population, nor the fear of a population terrorized by the guerilleros can compensate over the long run for adverse terrain and population-density conditions, and replace the need for the cover offered, on the one hand, by the solitude of uninhabited swaths of land, or the anonymity of the masses in dense population centers. In areas with unfavorable population-density, a few opponents are enough to thwart a successful guerilla action—a few enemies, who observe the behavior of suspicious persons, and then report their observations to the institutions deployed against the guerilleros.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 49.

The view of Rentsch and others¹⁸—somewhat reminiscent of the propaganda thesis about war-like and peace-loving peoples—is historically unfounded, i.e., that irregular warfare presupposes a population, which, in its tradition and character, has guerillero potentialities. The guerillero, like the soldier, is not born, but *educated*. It is the environment and the concrete historical situation into which he grows, the suggestive influence of a charismatic leader, and the enticing force of revolutionary or nationalist ideas, which make a person into a guerillero. Every people has *its* partisans in *its own time*, just as almost every people, at a certain point in its history, has “*its*” soldiers, of which—rightly or wrongly—it is proud over the centuries. The path a nation takes, from being unsoldierly, from the philistine caught up in his prosperity, to Spartan heroes—and the other way around, from being militarist to conscientious objector—is often a very short one. Certainly not only the soldier, but the guerillero, too—if it comes to irregular warfare—is not only, in his *concrete* shape, influenced by the historic epoch in which he finds himself, and by the geographical area in which he lives, but also by the character of the people of which he is a member: the Irish guerillero is different from a Serbian, the Serbian different from the Chinese; the guerillero of the early nineteenth century had other characteristics than the one at the close of the twentieth century. The uniqueness of his time, the geographical conditions of his radius of action, the historical development of his people, the social and economic conditions in which he grows up, or with which he sees himself confronted, the constitution and law of the state, for or against which he fights, the domestic and foreign political situation of this state, by and large determine the combat *aim* and the *form* of combat of a guerillero: but guerilleros can rise up out of any people, and at any time.

¹⁸Helmuth Rentsch, loc. cit., p. 51ff.

Part Four:

THE PREPARATION OF IRREGULAR WARFARE

X. THE CONSPIRACY

§ 1

Foundations

To the extent that modern irregular warfare appears as a special *form of war*, and not only as an exceptional *form of the conduct of war* in conventional or nuclear war, it always unfolds in various, clearly distinguishable phases. For Mao Tse-tung, this fact is one of the foundations of his theory of irregular warfare. Mao Tse-tung distinguishes *three* phases which the “stalling war,” in his view, *must* run through, until final victory. In the *first* phase, the guerillero fights in mobile defense against an offensive, forward moving enemy; in the *second* phase, the guerillero is the equal of the enemy; in rapid *shifts from attack and defense*, the guerillero gradually immobilizes the enemy and reaches a form of *strategic stalemate*. The *third* phase is that of *attack* and transition to “large war;” regular troop units capable of taking the offensive emerge out of the guerilleros’ action-groups.¹ Mao Tse-tung hardly deals with the time *prior* to the first, targeted employment of violence, i.e., with the *armament* for irregular warfare and its *planning*. Thayer² correctly seeks the reason for this “gap” in Mao Tse-tung’s theory in the fact, that armament and planning of irregular war are already presumed as given in the organization and activity of a communist party, so that a theoretician who only speaks about irregular warfare conducted by communists may consider this armament and planning as self-evident.

In fact, the decision on success or failure in the later irregular war already falls in its preparatory phase. “Paramilitary activity, guerilla activity or uprising attempts in the cities,” Martin Oppenheimer³ notes, “are by themselves only capable

¹Relying somewhat on Mao, Enrique Martinez Codo, “Insurgency: Latin-American-Style,” in *Military Review* 47, 1967, p. 3ff., distinguishes a founding phase, a development phase, and an offensive phase, within which the activity of the guerilleros escalates gradually from individual acts of sabotage to open combat according to operative principles.

²Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 101f.

³Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 99.

of disrupting the established order where this order is already so weakened, that one push suffices to topple it.” This weakening of the order, however, against which the guerillas fight, begins—if the later irregular war is to be successful—already in the preparatory phase.

There is a certain conspiratorial element in the preparation of *every* war; planning a war of aggression is always a “conspiracy against the peace.”

This conspiratorial component of the preparation for war is more clearly apparent in irregular warfare than in other kinds of war, particularly if the irregular war does not serve the *national* defense, but a *revolutionary* attack.

There is a conspiracy at the beginning of *every* irregular war. “Like any other common venture,” Otto Heilbrunn⁴ notes in his excellent book *Partisans in Modern War*, “a guerilla movement begins with a meeting among a few like-minded people: officers, former guerilla or civil-war fighters, students, workers, or farmers, intellectuals or party leaders, patriots or traitors, all of whom want “something to happen,” whether it be against a foreign invasion, or against an actual or imagined suppression of the country or the domestic population.

Conspiracy means engagement, personal commitment, and personal ties. Conspirators are “sworn” to their goal, whether they have actually sworn an oath, or whether the commonly shared goal binds them so closely to one another, that it is as if they had sworn an oath.⁵

⁴Otto Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 18.

⁵Heinz Kühnrich, *Der Partisanenkrieg 1939-1945*, Berlin 1965, provides a list of examples of ceremonious “partisan oaths” from World War II, thus p. 439f., among the Slovak “Janošik-Combat-Communities”: “The acceptance of a newly registered member . . . is performed by the commander of the community in the presence of all members of the subordinate community, who appear in arms for the ceremony. . . . When the member is sworn in . . . every new member lays his oath of loyalty in the hand of the commander of the community”; p. 457, in the Bulgarian partisan movement: “With pride and joy, I adopt the name of honor of ‘Partisan of the People’s Liberation Movement.’ I swear to my comrades, the people, and to the memory of the fallen heroic fighters of the Fatherland Front, that I dedicate all my powers and my life to the liberation of the homeland and the world from the fascist conquerors and their Bulgarian servants from fascist tyranny, and that I will fight with weapon in hand for the realization of the program of the Fatherland Front. I promise, that I will carry out the combat orders of the commanders, and will betray no secrets which could be of

The conspirators of the first hour form the first leading cadre and the core of a fighting organization, which is carried and shaped by the idea, which the irregular war is to help to victory. They draft the first battle plan, which is necessarily only a rough sketch. This determines the goal of the struggle—in this moment a goal still far off!—it sketches the form of prospective combat, and contains the first instructions for procurement of intelligence concerning the enemy, as well as sketchy notes on the possibility of supplies in battle.

On the basis of this plan, together with the conspiracy, the assembly of the first action groups for later combat begins; the creation of a network of confidants and reliable friends, out of whose ranks these action groups will later be extended, and from whom the conspiracy can expect valuable assistance; the first information for later options for action and the development of a security system, which is intended to prevent any consciously committed treason from the outset, or treason out of mere negligence, in their own ranks.

§ 2

The Conspirators

The reason for the failure of an irregular war will often be found in the conspiracy. This is particularly the case, when

use to the enemy. May severe punishment and shame befall me, if I betray this promise. Long live the Fatherland Front! Long live the People's Liberation Army of Partisans! Death to Fascism! Freedom to the People!"; p. 490: among the French franc-tireurs and partisans, the written "obligations of honor" in 12 points, which recall the "articles of war" of earlier centuries, begins with the words: "I, the undersigned, declare, that I am joining the ranks of the FTPF, to honorably serve in all places until the ultimate liberation of French territory. I swear, to fight loyally and in discipline in the units of the FTPF, which are the vanguard of the army of fighting France. I am aware of the duties that I take upon myself as a member of the units of national liberation and when I fight on the side of the soldiers of the army of General de Gaulle, which won glory at Bir-Hakeim, and the army of General Giraud."

Members of the combat and sabotage groups of Abwehr II, intended for irregular warfare ahead of the German front, before and during World War II, had to sign the following oath, as Herbert Schindler, loc. cit., p. 19, reports: "I swear by my honor as a man, that I will be ready at any time and everywhere, to fulfill the missions assigned me in my service to my people, that I will maintain strict silence toward everyone about these missions and about my principles, that I will not shirk any hardship and danger, and, if necessary, will give my life for my people."

persons find themselves together, who, by their natures, are not conspirators. A conspiracy of non-conspirators will fail, be it "from below" or "from above." Also the political or military leader, who prepares the irregular war "from above," must have certain qualities, which are those of a conspirator. If he lacks these qualities, his call to irregular war will not be heeded.

The guerillero is, by his very nature, a *volunteer* fighter: he must—even in the case of a conspiracy "from above"—be won over to the cause of irregular warfare, daily won over anew. This will not happen with fiery words alone. A convincing *personality* is required.

The genuine conspirator is an idealist. He is possessed by an idea, for the realization of which he fights. He is ready to sacrifice his entire life for the success of this idea, everything he owns, treasures, and loves. In the service of this idea he knows neither inhibitions nor reservations. The idea determines his behavior, it is the foundation of his morality. Good is what serves the idea, bad what harms it.

The good conspirator must be willing and able, to break with his past, and with all existing ties.⁶ I say explicitly: willing and able. The willingness alone does not suffice. The ability to make such a break with everything gone before, presupposes a degree of energy and willpower, which is far beyond the average.

For all his idealism, the conspirator must also possess a certain degree of personal ambition. He *identifies* with the idea, but he also identifies the idea with himself. If he wants the victory of the idea, he also wants his own victory.

The conspirator of the first hour must ultimately have the characteristics of a kind of charismatic leader. He must *want* to lead, but he must also be *able* to lead. He must be a model for others, and so be able to represent and embody the idea for which he fights. He must be able to communicate belief in this idea to those who still have doubts; he must convince others, excite them, encourage them, and instill in them the

⁶Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 68, the interesting quote from Nechayev's "Catechism of Revolution": "A revolutionary is a person sworn to death. He has neither personal interests nor affairs, neither personal feelings nor ties, nothing which is his own, not even a name. Everything in him is ruled by one single interest, by one single passion: the revolution."

willingness to make sacrifices. The influence exerted by the conspirator by virtue of his personality and leadership qualities, is *enhanced* by the influence he has by virtue of a certain social, economic or political position, but these never replace his primary influence. Fighting in irregular warfare is always fighting in a crisis situation. In a conventional war, the crisis in combat ought to be the avoidable exception; but in irregular warfare, the moment of crisis is a prerequisite and essential constituent of fighting. In the crisis, however, the best leadership—and often the only possible leadership—is that of personal example; personal example must *enhance* the order in every case. Those incapable of giving such an example, are not fit leaders, and especially not in irregular warfare.

The conspirator must be eloquent if and when he must speak: he must be able to convey the truth as well as lies—whether they disgust him or not. He must be able to be silent when necessary and when a single word could mean treason: the conspirator is a “bearer of secrets” par excellence.

The braggart who parades his own abilities—be they real or feigned—and the one who makes himself seem important, by making hints about real or alleged secrets under the cover of silence, are a danger for any conspiracy.

§ 3

Officers, Priests, Party Bureaucrats, Students . . .

Many of the qualities which a successful conspirator must have, are also necessary in the daily life of officers, priests and—with certain reservations—party leaders. Among the leaders of a conspiracy, who have prepared themselves, over time, to wage irregular warfare against the “oppressor” among their own or a foreign people—in *tyrannos*—we find officers, religious leaders, and party officials far more often than persons of other vocations. It may seem odd to find the priest mentioned here *alongside* the officer, and *before* the party official: the Spanish monks, whom Napoleon I suspected to be the initiators in 1808 of the guerilla war against the French, and the Tyrolean priest Joachim Haspinger, the collaborator of Andreas Hofer in the irregular war against the French and Bavarians, have their successors in our time in the Buddhist

monks in Indochina,⁷ the Orthodox priests on Cyprus who supported Grivas, and in the Catholic priests, who often play an important role in Latin American guerilla movements. Officers and clergy who join a conspiracy planning irregular warfare, must each jump over their own shadows. The officer must be ready for insubordination and, if necessary, a formal breach of his oath, the clergy must be ready—at least formally—to violate handed down moral norms. The one, like the other, acts against tradition, and against the code of honor of a vocation, which is bound especially tightly to tradition; on the other hand, he acts out an idealism, which is particularly characteristic of *his* vocation.

So many authors have reported extensively and exhaustively on party officials in a conspiracy—usually based on examples of the Communist Party—that it will suffice here merely to reference what others have written. In this connection, Lenin's remarks on October 13, 1906 are of some interest: in an article titled “Partisan Warfare,” in a newspaper *Proletari*, he wrote on the “armed combat of small groups and individuals, of whom some are members of revolutionary parties,” and then criticized “the weakness of the party, which did not know how it was supposed to take these actions into its own hands.”⁸

The student has a special place among the conspirators in irregular warfare. The qualities, which we characterized as necessary or useful for a conspirator, are surely *not* the typical qualities of a student; and yet, again and again, we always find students among the conspirators who plan irregular warfare. There are a number of reasons for this. Students are perennially the proponents and vanguard of both of the grand ideas, which have inspired people to engage in guerilla actions, and for the realization of which irregular wars are fought: the idea of the nation, and the social-revolutionary idea.

Youthful idealism, which can become so intense that a utopian vision of the world becomes hostile to the world itself,

⁷ Josef S. Roucek, loc. cit., p. 76, notes, that one of the Buddhist monks in South Vietnam, who “often join the rebels of the national liberation front only after long meditation,” Thien Hao, “is even a member of their Central Committee.”

⁸ V.I. Lenin, *Partisanenkriegführung*, in F.M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 121.

and youthful radicalism, which wants "to go to the roots of things," and eradicate "injustice" at its roots, are combined for the student with not being content with pure theory—scientific thesis and hypotheses—but wanting to apply everything learned and seen as soon as possible. In addition to all that, there comes the Don Carlos complex of a young person, who, at the age of twenty, is convinced not only, that he must do something "for immortality," but he must also change and improve the world. "Students feel themselves," said Hermann Gebhardt,⁹ and this holds not only for Latin America, "to be the avant garde of the people."

For some time, as an anonymous leaflet directed *against* the student demonstrations in Paris, May 1968, emphasizes,¹⁰ "The university has represented the most vulnerable point in our social system. Its structures are fragile and the lack of a homogeneous academic milieu does not permit it to resist organized provocations. In the university, we see all of the contradictions of our system: it proclaims liberalism in principle, but is at the same time incapable of looking a violent provocation in the eyes without violating this principle It takes on a double function, that of integrating the individual

⁹Hermann Gebhardt, loc. cit., p. 68. In the same sense, *Kollektiv-R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 21: "For various reasons, the socialist cadre in the student movement have assumed an avant garde function in the total social dimension It is not the organizations of industrial workers, but the revolutionary parts of the student body, who are the bearers of today's revolutionary consciousness." On this compare, Richard Gott, *Guerilla Movements in Latin America*, London 1970, p. 367, who quotes from the so-called "First Declaration of Sierra de las Minas" of the "M 13" guerrilla movement in Guatemala from December 1964: "It is among the students that one finds the most immediate expression of dissatisfaction and the revolutionary ferment of the large masses in Guatemala. The students have a mission of enormous importance: To join the support organizations for the guerilleros, to support them and encourage them, and to solidarize with the struggle of the workers. . . . The student association must prepare for common action, in addition to the declarations and demonstrations in support of the guerilla struggle." Compare further Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 146: The university is ideal terrain for non-violent guerillas, who can be infiltrated into important positions, once they have finished their schooling. Such educated revolutionaries could penetrate the social establishment of the United States, even if they only represent a small minority among the students."

¹⁰I.R.B. La Machine Infernala, Paris 1968.

in society, but also enabling him to drop out of society; but from that fact, the conclusion is drawn, that, contrary to its own pretensions, the university is not the temple of knowledge, but has become a tool of oppression in the service of the ruling class."

§ 4

Forms of Conspiracy

We encounter the conspiracy, which constitutes the beginning of an irregular war, in the most diverse forms. Sometimes it is found to be a unified, centralized conspiracy. One group takes the lead from the outset. This group often remains in the background: only a few initiates know of its existence and know the names of its members. It directs various preparatory actions from behind the curtains of total anonymity. Another time—especially when it is an irregular war against a foreign occupier—an entire series of local conspiracies form spontaneously, more or less at the same time. The one usually knows nothing about the other. Cooperation develops gradually and—perhaps—grows into a merger. The classic example of such a decentralized, spontaneous chain of conspiracies is that of the regional conspiracies against Napoleon in Spain in 1808; there was no unified leadership until the end of the irregular war in 1813. One or another active resistance movement in Western Europe during World War II—such as the Dutch or the Belgian—began with such decentralized conspiracies.

The conspiracy, which plans irregular warfare, sometimes occurs as a conspiracy "from within," which begins in the country which is to become the theater of irregular warfare; sometimes it is a conspiracy "from the outside," which intends to carry the irregular war into foreign territory. On the other hand, it sometimes occurs—if the intent is to change the autonomously developed order in a process within the state—as a conspiracy directed "inward," and sometimes, in the course of international developments, it is directed against an order imposed from the outside—a conspiracy directed "outward."

And, finally, sometimes it is conspiracy "from below," sometimes conspiracy "from above."

In the case of a conspiracy "from below," "from the people," neither one's own nor a foreign government, neither one's own nor foreign military or civilian authorities are involved in any way—be it only acknowledgment and well-wishing toleration.

Historical examples are the numerous regional conspiracies, which prepared irregular warfare against Napoleon in Spain in 1808, most of the "Komite"-battles of the Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Greeks among themselves, and against Turkish domination, in the second half of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the secret accords of Ukrainian patriots, who waged a desperate irregular war against the Soviets after 1945, the secret agreements among courageous Israelis, whose guerilla actions in 1948 helped to create the state of Israel, the Mau-Mau conspiracy in Kenya at the beginning of the 1950s, and at least some of the conspiracies, which were the beginning of Fidel Castro's irregular war in Cuba.

This conspiracy "from below" contrasts with the conspiracy "from above," in which official institutions—one's own or of a foreign government, one's own or foreign military institutions—are accessories and participants.

The classic example of a guerilla movement controlled by its own government and military leadership, are the conspiracies which prepared and waged the irregular war of Russian partisans against the Germans in World War II. One week after the war began, on June 29, 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union issued a directive with the order, "to create partisan units and diversionary groups for the war against units of the fascist army, to launch partisan war all over and everywhere, for the destruction of bridges, roads, telephone- and telegraph lines, to burn down supply depots, etc."¹¹ Trained cadre were deployed into oc-

¹¹Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 436. Already on July 3, 1941—according to Valdis Redelis, *Partisanenkrieg, Entstehung und Bekämpfung der Partisanen- und Untergrundbewegung in Mittelabschnitt der Ostfront 1941 bis 1943*, Heidelberg 1958, p. 10—the Soviet leadership had "deployed a central staff for the partisan movement. It controlled both the passive resistance as well

cupied territories to that purpose, and specially selected officers were dropped by parachute into areas, in which partisan groups were to be formed, in order to assume the leadership of these groups with persons on site known to them, and to create a network among the inhabitants of the area—i.e., a local conspiracy—loyal to Moscow.

The Yugoslav concept is also fundamentally a conspiracy "from above," in which, in case of aggression by a superior adversary, there is a "downward transformation" of their own armed forces, which are too weak for a "frontal defense," into partisan combat units.

Among the resistance movements which emerged during World War II in Western Europe—insofar as these movements were to conduct irregular warfare—conspiracies "from below" often held joint meetings with conspiracies "from above." While in Western Europe, these meetings led to co-operation and, finally, to mergers, in Yugoslavia there developed bitter hostilities between different irregular warfare groups over the course of time.

Theoreticians have paid special attention to conspiracies, which are controlled by the headquarters of a totalitarian party, and in which delegates of this party have played a decisive role. The party for which irregular warfare is an instrument of its political struggle, will always attempt to portray the conspiracy which leads to irregular warfare as a conspiracy "from below," with itself as the "representative of the primal interests of the people," as the "avant garde of the masses." Nevertheless, from an objective standpoint, this is a case of conspiracy "from above," when the party concerned is the government in a state, or commands leading positions in the civilian and military apparatus of the state, which in turn are either themselves involved in irregular warfare against a foreign enemy, or participate as the "interested third power" in an "inward"-directed irregular war. In the latter case, where it is the government or leading institutions of another country which is involved, and not the country in which the irregular

as the combat movements behind the front. The underground movement not only served as a reservoir for the formation of the active combat movement, but always supported the latter, and often rescued it from dangerous situations, protected it against losses and surprises."

war is to be instigated, one can also speak of a conspiracy "from the outside."

§ 5

Conspiracy and the Legitimacy of the State

The majority of theoreticians is inclined to claim, that even the conspiracy which prepares for irregular warfare is manifestly illegal. This thesis, in its generalization, is wrong. Illegality is not a characteristic of conspiracy. It is not seldom, that a conspiracy which stands at the beginning of an irregular war, will wear the mask of legality. From the standpoint of positive law, the conspiracy is then a permitted association of like-thinking people; the conspiratorial aspect lies in the *agreement*, not in the *association* itself. The appearance of legality is usually given, when it is a conspiracy "from above," which prepares irregular warfare in its own country. The political party just mentioned will always try not to step outside the framework of the law in the first steps it takes toward the later irregular war. That, in addition to "legal" conspiracies, there are those which are illegal from the outset, hardly needs to be mentioned. These we encounter especially among the conspiracies "from below."

In the concrete case, the kind of conspiracy, as well as its chances for success, will be decisively influenced by the internal order of the state, which is the "seat" of the conspiracy, as well as of the state, whose territory is to become the theater of irregular warfare. Often, but not always, these are one and the same state.

In a democracy in the western sense, a conspiracy, if it comes "from below," will be much easier to realize than in an authoritarian police-state. The secrecy of a conspiracy "from below" is easy in a democracy; the conspirators enjoy the protection of the basic rights accorded everyone—which is certainly an effective obstacle to any blitz action of the state, on the basis of a mere suspicion, but without any proof; that state, on the other hand, whose foundation is the unconditional respect for personal freedom, does not have, by its very nature, the developed system of spies, which is characteristic of a dictatorship. The methods, which are most effective in

an authoritarian regime, "are made impossible" for the authorities in a democratic state "by law." "It is seldom," I quote Thayer, "that these will act as ruthlessly against centers of potential opposition, which can develop into guerilla movements, as a dictatorship acts against any opposition, even if it is not planning irregular warfare"¹²

"Characteristic of this," Thayer continues, "is the behavior of British authorities on Cyprus, who neglected to move against Colonel Grivas" himself, "during the initial phase of his terror campaign, when he was the most vulnerable." Another example of the obstacles which the constitution, on whose foundation the government stands, lays in the way of police action in the conspiracy phase preceding the combat of irregular war, is the role of the constitutionally guaranteed "right to habeas corpus" in the battle of the Philippine defense minister, Magsaysay, against the militant small combat-groups, the "Huks," at the beginning of the 1950s—"until he put limits on it."¹³

A conspiracy "from above," on the other hand, is much more difficult to realize with success in a free democracy than is the case in a dictatorship. The strict secrecy, which a dictatorship can brutally impose, is hardly possible for a conspiracy "from above" in a democracy: the principle, that what the state does must be public, which is the precondition for realizing the responsibility of the governing to the governed, and the watchful eye of the healthy distrust of the opposition, which enables it to fulfill its function in the democracy guaranteed by the constitution, make any conspiracy "from above" difficult, or prevent it altogether.

Conspiracy against a foreign occupier is, as a rule, easier than conspiracy against one's own government. It is easier in this case to keep secrets: treason in office and in favor of a foreign power is generally held to be more reprehensible, than treason in the service of one's own authorities and one's own country; the foreigner has a more difficult time of it, to build up a reliable police system with a sufficient number of reliable confidants, agents and spies.

¹²Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 105.

¹³Ibid., loc. cit., p. 105.

Protection of Secrets

Conspiracy means keeping secrets. There is no “public conspiracy.” Success in irregular war, as Thayer¹⁴ correctly remarks, depends upon maintaining secrecy, particularly in the phase of preparations: “The intelligence system and enemy police must not have reason to suspect anything, but must be lulled into a false security, until the security system of the guerilleros is sufficiently developed, and other preparations are completed.” Georgios Grivas-Dighenis,¹⁵ who is of the opinion that secrecy must be secured at all times, “even when it costs something in terms of strength,” names four ways to guarantee the secrecy of the conspiracy during the preparatory phase: first, the selection at the beginning of only few, and tight-lipped members¹⁶ then instruction of the individual members of the organization only about things which concern them directly, further, “systematic and planned work, which prevents the leaking of information”; and finally—last but not least—the earliest possible establishment of “services for espionage and counter-espionage, which observe the intelligence services of the enemy, as well as survey its own members, their contacts and their work”; mutual surveillance has always been the essence of a successful conspiracy.

During the entire course of irregular warfare, maintaining secrecy remains the highest precept for the guerillero—secrecy in *every* situation. In order to assure secrecy, guerilleros often take an oath of secrecy when they are “accepted” into the “community of fighters”; the *traitor* is threatened with death. The oath¹⁷ of the members of the French FTPF during

¹⁴Charles W. Thayer. loc. cit., p. 105.

¹⁵Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 120f; compare also p. 29ff. and p. 118.

¹⁶Compare also *Kollektiv-R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 65: “What are the next steps? . . . To form commando troops (groups of 3, 5, and 10) with comrades, who one must know well personally, and also politically, in order to judge whether they will be able to withstand the requirements and strains of armed struggle (especially in prison), and under all circumstances (also in bed!) keep their mouths shut.”

¹⁷Quoted in Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 491f.

World War II was: “With my signature under the regulations of the code of honor of the FTPF, I swear . . . 3. To maintain absolute secrecy toward everyone as concerns the units of FTPF, and everything connected with them, their organization, their actions, their commanders, as well as with all other organizations, 4. If I am taken prisoner by the enemy or the so-called French police, (I swear) to withstand all threats and even the most terrible torture, never to make any declaration, or give any indication, of whatever kind, concerning the organization of the FTPF or other organizations, concerning a known or unknown person, or concerning missions accomplished or to be carried out . . . 6. (I swear) to identify any traitor, who is guilty of betraying a patriot or an organization, and who has thereby sentenced himself to death, a sentence which must be carried out in the shortest time possible, and without recourse. Every person who contradicts carrying out the punishment of a traitor, shall be considered to be a person in solidarity with the traitor, and punished accordingly.”

A similar oath in much shorter form is contained in the “Partisan Oath” of the Bulgarian “People’s Liberation Movement.” In the directives of the “Central Staff” of the so-called movement, this oath is explained: “The partisan must not fall into the hands of the enemy alive. If, in consequence of unusual circumstances, he is taken prisoner alive, he must betray nothing, for even the slightest confession means treason.” Treason, the directive says in another place, “is punishable by death.”¹⁸

“Che” Guevara goes the furthest, as concerns ways and means to secure secrecy, and speaks of the “dumb” guerillero, and in the preparatory phase demands, that the surveillance of the members of the organization include control over private correspondence, “in order to fully learn of the relationships of every one. No member,” “Che” Guevara continues, “may live alone, not even go out alone; personal contacts of the future member of the ‘Liberation Army,’ of whatever kind they may be, must be cut off by all means.” “Che” Guevara mentions in this connection, as an especially important factor,

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 462 and p. 468.

the relationship of the future guerillero to his wife, and emphasizes "the necessity to prevent all relations with the other sex" during the preparatory phase. "The revolutionary, who must prepare himself for war in hiding," "Che" Guevara notes, "must be a perfect ascetic."¹⁹

¹⁹"Che" Guevara, loc. cit., p. 63 and p. 156f.

XI. SUBVERSION

§ 1

The Integration of the Conspiracy

Irregular warfare is especially psychological warfare. Propaganda, therefore, is a weapon for the guerillero which he can not dispense with at any phase of his war.¹ In the preparation and in the conduct of irregular warfare, the guerillero will grasp any and every opportunity, that offers itself to influence his adversary and an undecided third party. Sometimes he uses the printed or spoken word, or targeted or broadly reported information—false or falsified—sometimes pictures shown in public, or passed from hand to hand secretly, sometimes an exciting tune as the sensuous expression of a thought. The aim of each such form of influencing is to awaken in the target-persons certain ideas, or to call forth certain associations of ideas.

In the framework of the *preparation* for irregular war, propaganda has a three-fold task. First, it should firm up the ranks of future guerilleros, to arm the ranks of the first cadre intellectually and morally for what is coming, and thus integrate the movement which is to wage irregular war. It should also, secondly, proliferate the idea, on behalf of which irregular war is to be waged, among broad layers of the population, and win new members or friends for the movement of future guerilleros, who are either determined to employ force themselves in the service of this idea, or, if not in active combat, are ready to support and benevolently tolerate the fighters. Thirdly, and finally, it should weaken the adversary's power and will to resist, even before the actual irregular war.

While sometimes the issue is—in accomplishing the first of the cited tasks—to communicate the experience of the idea,

¹Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 74, is certainly correct, on the other hand, when he says, that an irregular war cannot be waged and won with propaganda *alone*. "Propaganda," he explains, "is an instrument which helps the guerilla and those fighting the guerillas. It . . . depends, with respect to the ammunition it is supposed to shoot, on political realities and military events."

on behalf of the realization of which violence is to be employed, sometimes, when propaganda serves the third task cited, the issue is to deprive the adversary of his faith in the success and the value of his own idea—or even its existence. In each of these cases, propaganda intends to excite *emotions*: here excitement, there depression, skepticism and despair. “Since propaganda must be adapted to the level of the audience to which it is directed,” Thayer notes in this connection, “it seldom happens, that purely logical or reasonable arguments, as correct as they might be, have a convincing effect.”²

A conspiracy which does not continuously reintegrate itself, falls apart. The integration of the first cadre is the chief task in preparation of irregular war. The task in this preparatory phase is, primarily, to maintain and consolidate the voluntary discipline, the unconditional faith in the idea, and the spirit of total dedication, among those who have already been won over to the cause of the guerilleros. To that end, a continuous psychological influence upon the conspirators of the first hour, along with the networks of cadre and friends they have created, is just as necessary as a strict organization of these cadre and networks.

A guerilla movement is integrated less by individuals who *reflect* upon the idea they fight for, than by the suggestive power of continuous, social *recitations*, in which this idea is expressed. The point is to exploit the power—psychologically—which lies in the continuous repetition of the same words.

All conspirators must be put into a state of intellectual and moral “mobilization” for irregular war, and kept in this state during the entire preparatory phase. Political “schooling” communicates to them the grandness and value of the idea, for which they are willing to fight in irregular warfare, and the necessity and possibility of its realization, on the one hand, as well as the despicability, the baseness, and evil of the adversary, as well as the necessity to destroy him, and the prospect for success in combat precisely against him; and in a time when science is the trump-card, all of this is “scientifically” argued. This psychological orientation occurs partly in leaflets, letters, memoranda, and collections of sayings, of one’s

²Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 74.

own heroes, and also of adversary leaders—the one as encouragement, the other conceived as proof of the correctness of the evaluation of the adversary; in part, “school-evenings,” secret conventions, and nightly meetings serve this purpose.

The organizational development of the apparatus necessary for irregular warfare goes hand in hand with this psychological orientation. This development, which begins at the bottom in cells and base-groups, is part of the “psychological mobilization,” of which we just spoke. “Someone who is convinced,” Michael C. Conley emphasizes in an article in the journal *Wehrkunde*³ on “The Vietnam Model,” “must be brought into an organization” in order to be able to live up to the demands, which irregular war will make upon him. It would be a mistake, “to convince a target person, but leave him isolated. . . .” In all of the instructions of the “Revolutionary People’s Party,” which had the task in South Vietnam of assuring a sufficient personnel replacement, “the common thread is the insight, that firmly defined activity within an organization of like-thinking people secures newly won convictions and makes them firm.” In this connection, Michael C. Conley quotes the testimony of a North Vietnamese political officer who worked in South Vietnam as district party chief and member of a provincial party committee: “If young people, who are thoroughly indoctrinated and proud of their new attitude, are not held together firmly, they will lose their enthusiasm to participate in daily meetings over time. It is also important, to challenge them daily with difficult tasks in the context of the organization.”

The first cadre and networks of friends are integrated into an intellectual unit, and thereby into the community, which is capable of beginning and waging the coming war, by means of schooling and firm organization. In addition to the integration of this community as such, there is the forming of the individual, the second, equally important purpose of psychological armament for irregular war. The individual should experience the community in which he will participate in the irregular war. In order to communicate this experience, all of the instruments of integration available are used: the

³Michael C. Conley, *Modellfall Vietnam*, in *Wehrkunde*, XIX, Vol. 12, Dec. 1970, p. 637.

knowledge of being the bearer of the same secrets, knowledge of the same dangers, which threaten all conspirators, a sign or password which ties everyone together, which only the initiates know, and by which they recognize each other. Fighting songs, sung during the evening meetings, whose melodies are hummed softly or drummed out on a table by day when one conspirator meets another. All this and much more serves to integrate the community, which one day will wage irregular war, in the preparatory phase.

Later, the adversary will himself place other instruments of integration at the disposal of the guerilleros: when he becomes nervous, and initiates the first police measures against individual members of the community, or follows individual members. Nothing welds so tightly together as persecution.

§ 2

Propaganda for the Idea

The integration of the conspirators of the first hour is doubtless important. But it is only one part of the entire complex of psychological armament necessary for the preparation of irregular warfare.⁴ In addition to the intellectual and moral "mobilization" of those already won over, among the other psychological measures characteristic of the preparatory phase of irregular war, is skillful and intensive propaganda to win the guerilla movement *new* followers. This propaganda, too, like that within their own ranks, employs black and white representations of reality. In content, it differs from the psychological influencing of the "old members" only in that the deprecation of the adversary takes up more room. Usually, the idea, on behalf of which irregular warfare is to be waged, is spoken of only vaguely, often only in innuendo.

The instruments of propaganda employed to win *new* party followers are more multifaceted than the psychological armament within the guerilleros' own ranks. Especially effective is the *indirect* influencing of those one hopes to win over: the

⁴Compare *Kollektiv-R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 30: The development of armed commandos "is, however, only the beginning of a process, for the further development of which many other conditions must be fulfilled, which have a primarily political character."

rumor, spread to damage the adversary—a rumor which must be credible, but does not have to correspond to the truth in the slightest, the "accidental" discussion at work, in the train, or at a restaurant, an exclamation shouted out at the right place, which the mass-media perhaps report, are just as much instruments of this propaganda as the fighting slogans on the asphalt of large streets, and hung on the walls of public buildings, or the protest songs, spread in "nonpolitical" cultural assemblies. "Continuous and persistent propaganda in letters to certain persons," we read in Carlos Marighella,⁵ "is quite successful. That is a way to influence certain parts of the population."

In addition to the spoken and written word, soon the printed word, in leaflets, in newspapers, and propaganda writings, appears as an instrument of propaganda in the preparation of irregular war. In the case of a conspiracy "from above," or where the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the press offers the conspirators "from below" the opportunity to make propaganda openly, if not for irregular war, then at least for the idea, it is tactically often wise to maintain the anonymity of the author, unless his name already has propagandistic effect. In certain circumstances, a certain known personality will be named as author because of the effect of his name, even if he was not the actual author. In this case, however, it must be guaranteed as much as possible, that this false pretense does not become known. For the conspirators, propaganda effect takes priority over truth: but a lie *which has become known as such* has no propaganda effect.

In certain situations, not only the author, but also the printer and the publisher must flee into anonymity. The printed work appears "in the underground." For a conspiracy "from below," this will usually be the case, for a conspiracy "from above" it will be the case when it is directed against a foreign occupier in occupied territory, after the occupation has happened.

Both of the writings about the urban-guerilla quoted in this section, were first printed "underground." "The urban guerilla," Marighella⁶ demands, "must absolutely establish secret

⁵Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 66.

⁶Ibid., p. 65. Compare also *Kollektiv-R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 65:

print shops, and he must always have copy machines at hand, expropriate them if necessary, if he can not buy them"—whereby Marighella, like Lenin, understands "to expropriate" as robbery out of revolutionary conviction—"to be able to produce underground newspapers, leaflets and stickers for agitation and propaganda against the dictatorship. The urban guerilla who can print is an immense help in integrating additional layers of the people into the revolutionary struggle; he establishes a lasting front for those who want to spread revolutionary propaganda, even when that means working alone, and risking his life as a revolutionary. If there is secret propaganda material, the inventive spirit of the urban guerilla will develop catapults, slings, rockets and other equipment to distribute leaflets over large distances."

Propaganda printed in the underground, which is supposed to be widely distributed, is often given a pseudo title and the cover of a harmless, apolitical publication. The French underground organization did this in World War II with a little writing disguised as "Instructions for First Aid" with a Red Cross emblem on the cover; in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Red Book 29 of the so-called Kollektiv Rote Armee Fraktion, which was a call for armed struggle in Western Europe, was circulated in the underground with the title, "The New Traffic Regulations."

The public demonstration, where it is possible, has a special place among the instruments of propaganda. In general, demonstrations have a double effect: the propaganda effect, on the one hand, by virtue of the avowal of political loyalty which the participants give, and it is also politically enticing in its form, with the flags, pictures carried, banners, songs, music, and a rhythmical movement which is either martial or like a dance for a unity. On the other hand, demonstrations intend to terrify, frighten, and unsettle those against whom the demonstration is directed. The effect of the demonstration is, not least, the effect of large numbers: a minority that takes to the streets pretends to be the majority. Two thousand, even ten

"What are the next steps? Massive propaganda for armed struggle: explain to the masses, why this is necessary and inevitable, and how it can be prepared (conspiratorial leaflets and wall-slogans)."

thousand, demonstrators are actually only a tiny fraction of the population of a city of millions; but a march of ten thousand demonstrators can make an entire city hold its breath. Demonstrations are also effective by being repeated. In this connection, it is interesting to read, what a leaflet of the "Rote-Armee-Fraktion" writes about the numerous student demonstrations in the Federal Republic of Germany, held for every conceivable reason at the end of the 1960s: "Ideologically-critical, the student movement conceived of nearly all areas of state oppression as the expression of imperialist exploitation: in the Springer campaign, in demonstrations against American aggression in Vietnam, in the campaign against class justice, in the Bundeswehr campaign, against the Emergency Laws, in the student movement. Expropriate Springer! Destroy NATO! War Against Consumer Terror! War Against Education Terror! War Against Rent Terror! were all correct political slogans. They took aim at the actualization of the contradictions produced by late capitalism in the consciousness of all oppressed people. . . . What gave it its consciousness, was . . . the consciousness of being part of an international movement, of being confronted with the same class enemy as the Vietcong, with the same paper-tiger, with the same pigs."⁷

⁷Rote-Armee-Fraktion: *Das Konzept Stadtguerilla*, Amsterdam 1971, p. 7.

Under the pseudonym Zajarchenko, a Latin American author, whom neither Richard Gott nor Hermann Gebhardt mentions in their studies of 1970 and 1971, respectively, of Latin American guerilla movements, wrote a leaflet in Spanish, "150 Questions for the Guerilla Fighter," from which excerpts appeared in German translation with no publisher identified at the beginning of 1972, and was distributed at German universities. This translation is probably a literal reproduction of the text, a document intended only for personal information of a certain West German government ministry. Zajarchenko, among other things, gives precise instructions for how guerilleros can incite "spontaneous" demonstrations, and how they should then behave. A number of them should first walk back and forth "at a frequented public place, in a football stadium or in front of a public building (university), "until a curious crowd of people has assembled, and the police begin to pay some attention to it." Individual policemen should then be engaged in a discussion, "while that is going on, other guerilleros encircle him, shout at him, and provoke him. By pushing in a certain direction, then changing direction, and pushing in that direction, the mass of people is transformed into a wave-like movement directed at the police, but then moves quickly in the other direction, and finally dissolves. The purpose is to create disorder, and disrupt traffic."

Psychological Combat in the Preparatory Phase of Irregular War

While, on the one hand, propaganda is supposed to communicate the reality of the idea to the guerrillero and the undecided third-party, who is to be won over to the idea for which the guerrillero is ready to wage irregular war, in the preparatory phase of irregular war, it also serves to create in the adversary camp, and before any violence has occurred—I quote Carlos Marighella—"an atmosphere of nervousness, distrust, insecurity, uncertainty, and concern," of fear and dissatisfaction.⁸

One might call the propaganda which serves the first purpose constructive, and the propaganda which serves the latter purpose subversive.

Subversive propaganda primarily intends to terrify and deter. To that end, there are the most diverse instruments. The most effective is to point to the lack of success of the policy of the adversary.⁹ Success and failure play a decisive role in propaganda. "When there is no success which can be propagated," Thayer¹⁰ correctly notes, "propaganda is a relatively weak instrument." It is the great art of propaganda, to turn the adversary's successes into failures, and one's own failures into successes. It is then only a small step from such falsifications in the evaluation of objective facts to false reports and lies, which Carlos Marighella names at the top of the list of instruments of subversive propaganda, and which he believes are something "where everyone can get involved."

⁸Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 67. Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 143, in this connection speaks of a "creative disorder," which must be created. "Creative disorder" can mean anything conceivable: strikes, blocking of military parades and recruitment offices, small disruptions in the suburbs, according to Saul Alinsky's method, hindrance of advertising campaigns by the army among the students, etc."

⁹Zajarchenko, loc. cit., advises the guerrilleros, in the framework of subversive propaganda in everyday discussions at work, on public transportation, or during sports events, to continuously complain about the increased prices for daily necessities, to mumble about exploitation of which one is a victim, or to complain about the lack of safety precautions by the state at traffic accidents, the late arrival of the police, and their favoring the socially "strong," in order to incite others against the police.

¹⁰Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 74.

As examples of lies in the service of subversive propaganda, Carlos Marighella¹¹ names, among others, giving false reports to the authorities by telephone and the mail, "including information about bombs placed, and other terrorist acts in public offices and elsewhere, about planned kidnappings and assassinations, etc.," playing falsified plans to the police "in order to divert their attention," proliferation of destructive rumors, compromising leading personalities, exploiting mistakes and failures on the adversary side, reports of information of breaches of law and acts of violence of the enemy "to foreign embassies, the United Nations, the Papal nunciate, and international law commissions, which defend human rights and the right to free press."

If irregular war is to be waged for *national* reasons, one of the instruments of psychological warfare, in the preparatory phase, is subversive propaganda aimed at the enemy troops, but in preparing irregular war with *social-revolutionary* aims, propaganda seeks the planned promotion of a growth of criminality without any recognizable political features.

Public demonstrations were already mentioned in another connection. They are an effective means to weaken the power and will of the adversary to resist. The same holds for inciting wage-strikes, regular or wildcat strikes "in working centers, schools and universities, in order"—I again quote Carlos Marighella¹²—"to inflict damage on the enemy by work-stoppage and study-boycotts." What Marighella says about the strike holds for all of these instruments: preparations must be made, "so that no traces or evidence remains to identify the action. A strike is successful, if it is prepared and organized secretly by a small group, where the methods also remain secret." This psychological war will eventually escalate into a war of nerves, which—according to Marighella¹³—"exploits means of mass communication and orally reported information, to demoralize the governments"—which for Marighella are equivalent to the enemy.

Resistance requires sacrifice. The aim of weakening the enemy's power to resist, and the enemy's will to resist, will

¹¹Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 67f.

¹²Ibid., p. 54. On the role of the strike in the preparation of irregular war, see Chapter 5, below.

¹³Ibid., p. 66.

have been achieved, when the enemy's readiness to sacrifice can be made to wither away. This, in any case, is one of the aims of psychological war in the preparatory phase of irregular war. The sacrifice necessary to defend against a partisan attack will be made to seem unnecessary and useless, and it will be made to seem as if the sacrifice benefits only a small, privileged circle of persons, who are themselves unwilling to make the same or a similar sacrifice to that demanded of the non-privileged.

Sacrifice means giving something up. So the enemy's voluntary or forced renunciation of something—renunciation *per se*, whatever it might be—will be denounced as foolish and unnatural, and the guerrillas will preach to the youth in the enemy camp, that a full life, live and let live—giving in to the instincts and desires of the moment—is the ultimate of wisdom.

The aim of psychological war in the preparatory phase of irregular war is to weaken the power of will in the ranks of the enemy in every area, and to reduce his intellectual and physical capacities. One means to that end—and thus an instrument of psychological war—can be to systematically promote among the enemy the consumption of drugs of all kinds, from alcohol to heroin. "Drug traffic," says one instruction handbook for urban guerilla combat, obviously published in the underground without any identification of the year or place of publication,¹⁴ "has a double purpose for us: it is a simple method to obtain the amounts of money necessary for waging the struggle, and, at the same time, it serves to com-

¹⁴*Ça ira! La bataille de la liberté*, p. 63. Jürgen Dannert, *Verschwiegenes Zeitschehen, Kriege und Kämpfe der Gegenwart, von denen keiner spricht*, Vienna 1970, p. 62, makes the interesting observation, that "it is probable that most of the drugs for the U.S. soldiers at Clark Air Base" in the Philippines "come from the Huk," a guerilla movement waging covert combat in the Philippines.

The "Red Calendar 1972 for Apprentices and Students," Berlin 1971, p. 96f., "advises" its readers on "well considered drug consumption": "Drugs are luxury—fantasy and delirium are enemies of the bureaucracy. Hashish can help you overcome one-sidedness and dogmatism. . . . There are two kinds of dealers—the one kind is on a profit-trip, and will cheat you whenever he can—the other dealers just have good stuff, dealing for them is a service. It is important to learn to distinguish dealers. . . . Avoid contact with the police and insane-asylums—don't ever give any information about yourself and the scene."

pletely demoralize the enemy, which is our aim." This sentence from a relatively recent publication recalls two theses of the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu, who provided thirteen rules for psychological war 2,500 years ago. The tenth and eleventh of these rules say: "Impair the will of the warriors of the enemy with sensuous songs; send them whores to complete the work of decay."

§ 4

Enemy Soldiers as Targets in Psychological War

That propaganda which is intended to win over new followers for the conspirators who prepare for irregular war, usually moves in two directions: untargeted, on the one hand, in a cautious probing of available opportunities for exerting influence, and dispersed *in breadth*; on the other hand, targeted, sometimes at a certain circle of persons, sometimes at specific key persons in the state and business, and with corresponding intensity *in depth*. Propaganda is enhanced by other instruments, employed in a targeted fashion to the purpose of undermining the adversary's power and will to resist.

An especially important object of the guerillero's psychological war in the preparatory phase of irregular war is the regular *soldier* in the service of the enemy. As the potential *adversary* in the coming violent conflict, he stands at the focal-point of this prepared, initially non-violent combat. The guerillero pursues a double aim with respect to what the soldier is, or should become: *either* to win over sympathizers in uniform, who will become or remain soldiers, in order to support the action groups of the partisans at the appropriate time, in one or another way, *or* to induce those in military service to refuse such service, and induce the soldier to desert.

The *active* sympathizer in uniform can be of inestimable value for the guerillero as a secret *trainer* of future action groups, and as a helper *in the procurement of weapons and ammunition*.¹⁵ Carlos Marighella¹⁶ speaks of urban guerillas under

¹⁵ Auguste Blanqui observed this one hundred years ago. Compare Auguste Blanqui, *Instruktionen für den Aufstand*, in Joachim Schickel, loc. cit., p. 105.

Compare also Robert F. Williams, *Wie sich die schwarze Revolution bewaffnet*,

arms, the so-called "Military UG," who, "must desert at the appropriate moment with modern weapons and ammunition." The irregular war instructions of the Viet Minh, also, advise that "mediators be found and cells formed" within the armed forces of the adversary. "In this way," the Viet Minh instructions explain, "success is generally assured, and our losses will be small. Once enemy soldiers and party followers are convinced by our propaganda, and won over to our cause, they will actually become our helpers. They will effectively cooperate with us; while our fighters storm the outer fortress, they will sow dissension from the inside."¹⁷ To that end, it is important that the right point in time be chosen for propa-

Ibid., p. 183: "Active revolutionaries, who are still in the army, can procure weapons of all kinds. Soldiers on vacation, too, who gather in entertainment establishments and night bars, are—if someone gives them a few dollars—a safe source for military equipment."

¹⁶Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 55. Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 102: "An auxiliary strategy almost always advocated by revolutionists is that of subverting the armed forces and the police by means of propaganda, especially through their families. Such propaganda, Raymond Postgate says, should suggest that the army and police consist of men of high character who are being misused in attacking the unemployed and suppressing black nationalists. Their own grievances must be given attention as well."

"Several newspapers devoted to propaganda inside the United States armed forces demonstrate this basic approach. Here is an excerpt from an article in a paper called 'Vietnam GI': 'You got to be off the wall not to see where all this [urban disturbances] is heading. Every year it gets worse. We may end up drafting men to fight—not in the Nam, but in Atlanta, Chicago, New York and L.A. Are we going to have black and white guys who served together in Nam killing each other in the States? ...' Enemy soldiers or police," Oppenheimer concludes his remarks, "rarely 'go over' to their opponents. More frequently they become neutral and disappear from the battle area. The general principles indicated by Postgate seem to suggest"—says Oppenheimer—"an effective beginning if such a development is desired."

¹⁷Quoted in Otto Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 95. Richard Gott, loc. cit., p. 368, quotes the following sentences from the so-called "First Declaration of Sierra de las Minas" of the "M 13" guerrilla movement in Guatemala from December 1964: "We call upon soldiers and officers to collaborate with M 13, not to take part in the oppressive measures of the army, to secretly organize soldiers' committees against the leaders, to rebel, to go over to the guerrillas with weapons and equipment. . . ." Compare also A. Neuberg, loc. cit., p. 149: "The question of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the destruction of the bourgeois state at the moment of direct revolution will depend to a large degree on the extent of demoralization of the respective bourgeois army."

ganda aimed at enemy armed forces. "We must," say the Viet Minh instructions, "exploit the advantage of the moment, when the enemy has suffered losses, and his morale is shaken."¹⁸

The second option, in addition to winning over active sympathizers in uniform, is to weaken the enemy forces in psychological warfare by aiming propaganda for refusal of military service and desertion into the ranks of the enemy. We already pointed out in another place the connection which exists between irregular warfare ideology, on the one hand, and refusal of military service in regular armed forces, on the other hand. Refusal of military service for reasons of conscience in itself has nothing to do with preparation of irregular warfare: the conscientious objector rejects any use of force; the guerillero, on the contrary, is preparing a specific form of the use of force. For the guerillero, however, refusal of military service is one of many instruments to weaken the power and will of the enemy to resist. In the preparatory phase, therefore, he will support every form of refusal of military service, without asking any questions as to intellectual reasons behind it.

In addition to refusal of military service for reasons of conscience, there is the attempt to avoid military service by pretending sickness. Here too, and especially here, the guerillero is very active in the preparatory phase of irregular war. He establishes secret advisory offices, distributes leaflets and launches newspaper articles, in which conscripts are not only instructed about the possibilities of simulating certain diseases, especially neuroses, or certain tendencies to disease—like homosexuality, but which also explain the ways and means to actually cause illnesses. The young man who takes this advice is risking not only his health, but also his life.

The call to the soldiers of the adversary to desert plays a larger role during actual combat than is the case in the preparatory phase of irregular war. The call to desert is often linked with the offer to accept the deserter into the ranks of the guerilleros. Heinz Kühnrich¹⁹ published a leaflet of the

¹⁸Compare also *Kollektiv-R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 33f: "Those who think they have a comfortable job in being policemen and soldiers will increasingly understand the risks, which this job incurs for them under the changed circumstances. In the course of this process, the armed forces of oppression will increasingly isolate themselves."

¹⁹Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 493.

“partisan staff” in the area of the German 13th Army, which appealed to soldiers and officers in this army “to escape a senseless destruction . . . and go over to the *Red Army* or to the *Soviet partisans*.” The leaflet, which promises to save “the lives of those who want an end to this criminal war” and promises that they “will be able to return to their homes, healthy, after the war is ended,” closes with the sentence: “Many German soldiers and officers live in our partisan divisions, people who went over to the partisans voluntarily. Follow their example!”

A *mass desertion* organized by the guerilleros at a specific moment can disrupt and hinder the adversary in his actions.²⁰ On the eve of the invasion in France on June 5, 1944, a large number of people from Alsace-Lorraine, who had served as drivers in the 6th Parachute Regiment, the reserve corps on the peninsula of Cotentin, suddenly left the troop, under instructions of a French resistance group, taking the keys of the vehicles with them; the regiment was forced to assign new drivers and make new keys for the vehicles quickly, rather than search for the deserters. Had this desertion occurred only a few hours later, the regiment would have been largely immobilized at the moment of the allied invasion.

Other targets of psychological warfare in the preparatory phase of irregular war, in addition to the armed forces of the adversary, are the administrative authorities and all opinion-making forces—the so-called multipliers of public opinion. It suffices, if the guerilleros can count on a single sympathizer in every important “decision center” of the state, from the morning hours onward, when they begin a violent action: they need this *one* man in the decisive position. To win him over or—if this is not possible—to infiltrate a sympathizer into the position in question, is a task, upon the fulfillment of which the success of the later combat can depend to an important degree.²¹

²⁰Compare, however, *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 9: “While the greater unreliability of a conscript army is obvious—demonstrated once again in the U.S. Army in Vietnam now—speculations about mass revolutionary insubordination and the fraternization of proletarian soldiers have only gone into fulfillment in the most seldom of exceptional cases after a military catastrophe in people’s wars.”

²¹On this, compare Robert F. Williams, loc. cit., p. 181, who proposes the establishment of a “security organization” of the black guerilleros of to-

It is essential, that this *one* man in the decisive position remain unknown in the state’s apparatus. If he betrays his sympathies for the guerilleros of tomorrow too soon, he becomes useless for them, even a burden and a danger.

Among the multipliers of public opinion, journalists and teachers of every kind have a special importance as agents of influence for the guerilleros of tomorrow. While a *few secret* sympathizers in the apparatus of the state suffice—*one* in each important position—the crucial point here is a large number, as well as the guarantee, that the idea, on behalf of which the guerilleros have committed themselves to fight, will be *spread* by the journalists and teachers, who have been won over to it, once the signal is given—after the “hour X.” The form that this takes depends upon the situation. In a conspiracy “from the top,” it will usually happen openly, but discreetly; in a conspiracy “from below,” on the other hand, the rule is, that a covert, imperceptible approach by the opinion-multipliers is advisable and necessary.

§ 5

The Propaganda Plan

Psychological armament as well as psychological warfare require, already in the preparatory phase of an irregular war, a clear, situation-oriented plan, which lays down the aims of both constructive and subversive propaganda, identifies the instruments available to achieve these aims, and—also geographically—indicates the path, which the propaganda should take. Planless propaganda is a waste of effort, and does not fulfill the mission assigned.

The small group of “conspirators of the first hour” plays the role of the spark, to use Hermann Gebhardt’s expression,²² which later ignites the blaze of irregular warfare. One decisive question for the preparations is, where this spark should *first* light up. There are various possibilities for lighting this initial

morrow. “This ‘security organization’ . . . has the task of building up an effective secret service, which subverts the army, the national guard, the FBI, the CIA, the public services, and all political groups, on the right, in the middle, and on the left.”

²²Hermann Gebhardt, loc. cit., p. 42.

spark of irregular war. Either an area is chosen, in which the conspiracy is least exposed to, or totally hidden from, the observation of the adversary, and thus where the danger of premature discovery is least; or an area is chosen, in which the spark of conspiracy can be most easily nurtured, and the smoldering fire of the beginning irregular war can spread, without running the danger of dying out.

In both cases, the concept of "area" may be understood both in a sociological, as well as in a geographical sense. If one is aiming at a social "area," the solution to the problem appears to be the more difficult, but also the more urgent, the more differentiated and individualized the society of the state in which irregular warfare is prepared. In a pluralist, modern industrial society, it is difficult to carry propaganda from one social layer into another; solidarization tendencies here seldom jump over the lines between social and professional layers.²³ In states with a relatively uniform social structure, such as we still find today—despite all national differences—in Yugoslavia, this problem of the lack of contact from one layer of the population to another is not posed to the same extent.

If one means the concept of "area" to signify a certain geographical area, the problem is to decide, whether the psychological preparation of the planned irregular war should be driven ahead from the (mostly rural) periphery to the (large urban) centers, or from the urban centers to the urban periphery.

Which of these approaches is taken, depends upon the situation. There is no universal recipe. Sometimes the danger of observation by the adversary will take priority; the guerrillero will then often take the path of the periphery to the center in the preparation of irregular war,²⁴ especially when

²³Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 52 and p. 97.

²⁴Helmuth Rentsch, loc. cit., p. 67f, believes, that the "direction of thrust from the periphery to the center" is a "general principle of partisan war." To the extent, that Rentsch only addresses the geographical or geo-strategic problem—i.e., that he means the direction of thrust in space—we can not follow him. Rentsch understands the principle of "thrust from the periphery to the center," however, "also in the figurative sense . . . i.e., with respect to the means and methods of combat, employed by oneself and the adversary." "There is," he explains, "also a periphery in the field of methods of combat, which consists of those methods of combat, which are

the irregular war is directed against a foreign occupier, who is forced by the traffic lay-out to concentrate his military and civilian installations in cities, or at least in their proximity. This strategy of the approach from the outside to the inside was, as Hermann Gebhardt²⁵ explains, "developed by 'Che' Guevara . . . and by Régis Debray: the center of resistance attaches itself like a fuse to the least observed position of the explosive charge, and in the most favorable moment for the explosion. . . . This can not be improvised in one month. The fuse has to be planted slowly, and on site. A minority attaches itself to one of the vulnerable positions in the country, spreading like an oil patch to the peasant masses, then to the medium-sized cities, and finally to the capital."

This conception contrasts with another, which intends to locate the movement which should lead to irregular war, initially in urban population centers, and then to carry it gradually out into rural areas. I quote again Hermann Gebhardt²⁶: "Carlos Marighella and Abraham Guillén thought, and still think, that it is a strategic mistake to begin revolutionary struggle in rural areas, when its political center is in the city. Guillén is of the opinion, that urban guerrilleros in twenty motorized groups of four to five men can paralyze the life of a city, and that five hundred men in the urban guerrilla movement mean more than the same number in rural areas." The same thesis is advocated—with respect to the irregular war of black guerrilleros against white supremacy in the United States, which he propagates—by the Afro-American Robert F. Williams.²⁷

The same problem posed here initially in the *preparation* for irregular war, is also posed again and again in the course

foreign to the adversary, methods of which he is not a master. In this sense, there is also a center, which consists of methods of combat, which *are familiar* to the adversary, and of which he is a master. This results in the necessity, that one attack from the periphery, thus to begin with those methods of combat, with which the adversary is unfamiliar, and to thrust toward the center, i.e., as one's own strength gradually grows, to then employ those methods of combat, with which the adversary is familiar." We must agree with Rentsch in *this* observation. Mirko Vranich means basically the same thing, loc. cit., p. 295, when he explains, that it is crucial in irregular war "to impose forms of combat on the adversary, which he does not expect, and for which he is not prepared."

²⁵Hermann Gebhardt, loc. cit., p. 43.

²⁶Ibid., p. 72.

²⁷Robert F. Williams, loc. cit., p. 180.

of the actual irregular warfare at the beginning of each phase. Should the development of violent actions, one will ask at the beginning of covert combat, take the path of movement from the outside to the inside, or from the inside to the outside—if, for reasons of lack of force or because of the situation, it is not possible, for the irregular war to break out in the entire country simultaneously? Should the general transformation, one will ponder later in the transition from covert to open combat, of action groups of covert combat into small and very small military units begin at the rural periphery, or in large city centers? Here too, there will be no correct answer for all cases. The problem can only be solved for the particular concrete situation, and only at a concrete moment, for this concrete moment.

This discussion of the planning and conduct of an irregular war must at least touch upon the question, so often and extensively dealt with in theory, of what role the *political* strike can play in the preparation and conduct of an irregular war—i.e., not strikes as labor struggles, which fulfill a completely different task. In *this* connection, one must distinguish more clearly than is usually the case, between the *general* strike, on the one hand, and *individual* illegal work-stoppages, on the other hand. The general strike, whose tactical aim is the “disarmament of the forces of the status quo,”²⁸ presupposes that the overwhelming *majority* of the working population approves of the political aims which are supposed to be achieved by the strike. If the political views among the workers are divided, then the call to a general political strike will be useless. To the contrary, it will become obvious, that the working population does not—no *longer*, or not *yet*—unanimously stand behind those, who proclaim the general strike to be a *political* means of struggle.²⁹ But if the call to a general strike for political reasons is followed by the working population, and

²⁸Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 94. In contrast, *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 7: “The general strike does paralyze the economy of an industrial country, but it does not automatically answer the question of power.”

²⁹The fear, that the call to a general strike would no longer be heeded, and that it would thus lay bare the weakness of the trade union leadership of that time, was probably one of the reasons, why the German trade-unions did not call for a general strike upon Hitler’s “seizure of power” in 1933.

if the strikers make common cause with those, who are ready to use armed force, then the strike takes on a *plebiscite* character. The plebiscite, which is expressed in the general strike, can be more important for political developments than the temporary paralysis of economic life caused by the strike itself. Such a plebiscite makes obvious the *isolation* of that group against which both the strike and the preparations for irregular war are directed. Under certain circumstances, this transparent—and recognized—isolation *can* induce the cited group to give up the battle, before it has even begun: the confrontation in irregular war then does not occur. In another case, the general strike, which serves the same aims as the planned irregular war, *can* lead to a situation, where events go out of control, and the violent conflict begins sooner than planned—either because the forces, against which the strike was directed, themselves employ force to once again become masters of the situation, or because the strikers, out of the sense of their own power which the strike has made evident, resort to force to achieve their aims, so to speak, by surprise.³⁰ Only seldom, in cases where the general strike is directed *against* the potential guerilleros, will it delay the outbreak of irregular warfare. The conspirators will then be forced to concentrate their entire power above all on the necessary—peaceful—subversion of the workers.

The role of individual illegal strikes in the preparation of irregular war must be evaluated quite differently. Individual strikes, if they accumulate, and paralyze here one, and there another, especially *sensitive* sector of economic life for short periods of time, can be an instrument for the guerilleros of the future to weaken the adversary’s power to resist. For the guerilleros, of course, such strikes incur the danger, that the potential adversary will become attentive to the conspirators of irregular war and their intentions *sooner*, than the guerilleros wish.

³⁰Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 94: “The scenario of general strike-rebellion was the Marxist model for unleashing a revolution.”

XII. ARMAMENT

§ 1

Training

Practical training of the first action groups is at the center of the preparatory phase of irregular war. One mistake very commonly made, which is due to a confusion between rebellion and irregular war, is when one believes, that irregular war is waged by untrained fighters, who spontaneously meet one another. The contrary is the case: the guerillero can only be deployed in irregular warfare, when he has been trained accordingly.¹

Most of the instructions for the conduct of irregular warfare—from “Che” Guevara’s book on irregular war,² to the two cited underground instructions for the combat of “urban guerillas”—place strong emphasis on training for irregular war. Marighella³ provides the most pointed expression of the necessity and content of the training of a guerillero: “No one who has not prepared himself technically can become an urban guerilla. Technical preparation reaches from physical training to training in vocations, learning many skills.⁴ The urban guerilla can only have stamina if he systematically trains. He can not be a good fighter, if he has not learned to fight. The urban guerilla must therefore practice all possible forms of combat, of attack and of self-defense.”

¹ Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 145 on so-called “non-violent” guerilla combat: “With initial, small-scale acts of non-violent guerilla conflict goes the equivalent of the guerilla foco, the non-violent training center. Schools, exercises in non-violent action including role-playing, and other kinds of training programs would be essential.”

² “Che” Guevara, loc. cit., p. 145ff.

³ Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 17.

⁴ As advice to its readers in this sense, the *Revista Kalender 1972*, loc. cit., p. 95, says, under the title “All the things you can do,” “Use every opportunity to learn important skills. (Driving and repairing cars, shooting contests, cooking, working with important tools: cameras, drills, tape recorders, sewing machines, electrical cable, washing machines).”

The training of a guerillero is quite different in content from that of a soldier. “Even among experienced soldiers one will” therefore “not be able to avoid a training period, however brief,” says the Swiss Major von Dach,⁵ in his work on total resistance.

The opportunities for training and the kind of training are different, depending upon whether it is a conspiracy “from above” or “from below.” In a conspiracy “from above,” regular soldiers, who are simultaneously active as training officers, commanders, and fighters, form the core of the action groups. This was the case in World War II—to mention only two examples—both among the Soviet partisans in European Russia, as well as among the Huks in the Philippines. Sixty percent of the 2,700 partisans operating in the Crimea were, according to Soviet reports, members of the Red Army⁶; according to American estimates,⁷ in March 1944 the Huks had thirty percent of their members infiltrating the American armed forces for the Far East. Often—as the example of the Huks shows—an “interested third power” provides the trainers for the action groups. Irregular warfare operations, such as those recently in Angola, South Africa, and Rhodesia, carried out by partisans from Zambia, betray the clear characteristics of training by Red Chinese instructors.⁸

Sometimes guerilleros are trained by their later adversary; the partisans in Malaya in the first years after World War II had taken their tactics and weapons-handling from British training, which they received during the war as participants in the underground campaign against the Japanese.⁹

⁵ H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 32.

⁶ Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 315.

⁷ Kenneth M. Hammer, *Die Huk auf den Philippinen*, in F.M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 249.

⁸ Compare F.R. Metrowich, *Communism and Terrorism in Southern Africa*, Occasional papers of the African Institute of South Africa, No. 25, Pretoria 1969.

⁹ Paul M.A. Linebarger, *In Malaya nennt man sie Banditen*, in F.M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 394. Compare Robert F. Williams, loc. cit., p. 183: “The ruling class demanded an integrated National Guard, which is trained and equipped for counter-guerilla. Here the black revolutionary has the best opportunity to infiltrate the ranks of the oppressor, and to learn the latest techniques of tactics and strategy and the handling of weapons.”

The training of guerrilleros in a conspiracy "from below" is far more problematic. "Che" Guevara pretends to be very optimistic in this respect. He believes, that it is enough at first, if the newly won partisans are trained "by a group of comrades . . . who instruct him a little in the use of weapons, teach him a few basic ideas about orientation in terrain, teach how he should behave toward the civilian population, how to hit, etc. . . ." After all, "for a freedom fighter, the life of a guerrillero is itself the best training."¹⁰

"Che" Guevara remained a theoretician his entire life; in practice, he was a failure. The practitioner Georgios Grivas-Dighenis does share "Che" Guevara's opinion, that "the life of the guerrillero" constitutes a part of his training, but otherwise he is far more skeptical than "Che" Guevara. "The most difficult thing," he reports,¹¹ "was the tactical training, because it had to occur under the nose of the British authorities. I achieved this training by means of preparatory, theoretical instruction, followed by small clashes with police units, and then finally enhanced by combat with English army troops. Combat taught the partisan groups to fight. I took care to design the first clashes to be successes, in order to keep up the morale of the men. I therefore did not hesitate, to take over the leadership of the strongest partisan groups myself, to give them an example of joint combat, and to demonstrate the methods of combat."¹²

¹⁰"Che" Guevara, loc. cit., p. 145. Similarly—although not referring to training, but to the forming of action groups—*Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., 65: "The composition of the commandos can not be discussed, or even decided in groups and organizations, which have not proven themselves in practice as intact conspiratorial units. . . . A fighting group can only develop in combat itself."

Also for Zajarchenko, loc. cit., a basic principle in the training of a guerrillero is "to learn while fighting." Every member of a guerrilla movement should be given the opportunity as quickly as possible, and repeatedly, to actively participate in guerrillero actions, in order to train and prove himself.

¹¹Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 89.

¹²Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 143, is of a different opinion: "In guerrilla warfare the first stage includes the organization of terror-and-sabotage groups. At this stage, 'revolutionary forces . . . are careful not to take any sort of military action that would give the forces of the established government reason for concerted counter-action.' (Alun Gwynne Jones) Only later is there a major effort to organize armed bands."

Procurement of Supplies

One of the most important problems in the preparatory phase of irregular war, in addition to the training of the future action groups, is preparation for supply in battle—especially supplies of weapons and ammunition. As diverse as the answers to some questions concerning the preparatory phase of irregular war might be, in one point at least all theoreticians agree, i.e., that—I quote August Ségur-Cabanac—"every irregular war which is not already in the thick of action requires preparation to assure supplies."¹³ Likewise, the leaflet of the Rote-Armee-Fraktion already quoted frequently, observes: "Urban guerrilla presupposes the organization of an illegal apparatus, i.e., apartments, weapons, ammunition, cars, papers."¹⁴ The widely held view, that the guerrillero in combat lives from hand to mouth, is only true to a certain degree, and only under certain preconditions, which are relatively seldom given. There are logistical problems also in irregular war: they are not easier to solve than those in conventional war. The Swiss Major von Dach correctly points out in his introduction to irregular war for everyone,¹⁵ that it is primarily "the chronic lack of ammunition . . . which influences the tactics of irregular warfare units to a high degree."

Just as in the question of training, a distinction must be made when considering the preparations for supplies, between a conspiracy "from above," and a conspiracy "from below." In the case of a conspiracy "from above," the problem of procurement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition for the guerrilleros is not more difficult to solve than this is generally the case in preparations for, and in the course of a "large" war for conventional armed forces. The governments, authorities, military commands, and party organizations, in whose hands the armament for irregular warfare in their own, or

¹³Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 22.

¹⁴Rote-Armee-Fraktion: *Das Konzept Stadtguerilla*, Amsterdam 1970, p. 12.

With respect to apartments, compare above, Part 3, IX, 2, p. 114.

¹⁵H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 36.

in a foreign country, lies, have the advantage, that the guerillero does not need heavy weapons for his combat. This makes it possible to supply the guerilleros from the air, if necessary.

The important weapons are—here I largely follow the Yugoslav General Savo Drljevič¹⁶—rifles, with and without telescopic sights, light and medium mortars, machine pistols and machine guns, light recoilless artillery, grenades of all kinds, from hand-grenades to rifle-grenades, various light rockets primarily for anti-tank missions, various types of mines and explosives. Every weapon made available for the guerillero to use, must be so constructed, that two men can move it and use it, if necessary; it must be possible to hide it—at least broken down—in the trunk of a reasonably large car, and it must permit economical consumption and primitive storing of ammunition.¹⁷

Supply of the guerilleros is not supply in volume—at least in the phase of covert combat. In this phase, irregular warfare does not—not yet—have large depots far behind the front, from which the stream of supplies can theoretically flow uninterrupted. Careful calculation of the equipment necessary, as well as of absolutely required ammunition, is far more necessary in irregular warfare than in “large” war. The supply of weapons and ammunition in irregular warfare must, therefore, be closely coordinated with one another. The best weapon becomes a burden for the guerillero, if he does not have sufficient ammunition to be able to use it.

In a conspiracy “from below,” the problem of supplying the guerilleros with weapons and ammunition is more complex, and more difficult to solve. One must distinguish, here, not only between self-made equipment and self-produced am-

¹⁶Savo Drljevič, loc. cit., p. 253.

¹⁷Compare August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 12: “The selection of equipment and weapons must also take account of the necessary mobility. The number of weapons is less important, than that every weapon has sufficient ammunition.” Likewise, Otto Heilbrunn, loc. cit., p. 101, remarks about the equipping of commandos deployed *against* guerilleros: “To burden commandos with heavy weapons would be a mistake; it has been correctly observed, that the combat group 100, which operated in Indochina on the French side, and consisted of motorized infantry, one artillery battalion, a tank company and a maintenance unit, was gradually destroyed, because it dragged too much of these good things along with it.” The same holds for guerillero action groups.

munition, on the one hand, and commercial weapons with their corresponding ammunition, on the other hand, but also between legal or semi-legal, and illegal procurement of weapons and ammunition. *Theoretical* treatments of the problem usually place priority upon self-made equipment and self-made ammunition, and illegal weapons and ammunition procurement. Anyone who deals with particular practical problems in irregular warfare—Major von Dach as well as “Che” Guevara, Grivas-Dighenis as well as Marighella, the anonymous author of the French handbook for urban guerillas, or the Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)—reports on the possibility of producing various instruments of close combat, explosives and fire-bombs oneself. Training and planning of supply go hand in hand in this respect: self-production of the cited instruments for combat is also part of the training of the future action groups in the preparation phase.¹⁸

For the conspiracy “from below,” there are strict limits to the procurement of conventional weapons and commercially available ammunition by legal or semi-legal means—most of the instructions for irregular warfare point this out.

The semi-legal procurement of weapons—purchases on the grey or black markets or, particularly for explosives, under false pretenses over phony companies, or with falsified papers—plays an understandably greater role than legal procurement. Irregular warfare means big business for non-authorized, international weapons trade and smuggling. The profits obtained by these “merchants of death” are fabulous sums of money; on the other hand, now and then the weapons trader is drawn into the violent conflict, without intending it, and becomes its victim. According to estimates, which, of course, can not be verified, during the irregular war in Algeria

¹⁸Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, p. 65: “What are the next steps? . . . distribute . . . instructions for the production of weapons, for combat tactics, etc.”

Robert F. Williams, loc. cit., p. 182ff., gives precise instructions for the production of Molotov Cocktails and fire-bombs of various sizes; for operations against fenced-in, or otherwise inaccessible oil and ammunition depots, vehicle parks, etc., he recommends the use of self-made, radio-controlled model airplanes to carry the explosive charges; otherwise, he explains, “students who have studied electronics, chemistry, and other natural science, can make their own contributions to the weapons arsenal of the guerilla.”

in the 1950s alone, black-market profits for weapons and ammunition reached the sum of more than one-half billion Swiss Francs; at least two weapons dealers in this period were victims of assassinations, which were directly connected to this irregular war.

The preferred weapons in such combat are light automatic weapons with short barrels, combat pistols, light mortars, and all kinds of grenades and explosives. "Even a sawed-off shotgun," Marighella¹⁹ observes, "is a good weapon for the urban guerilla . . . , smoke-bombs, mines, common explosives like dynamite and potassium-chloride, plastique-bombs, gelatin capsules and ammunition of all kinds are indispensable to success. By exploiting the advantages of modern weapons and introducing new weapons to his armament," the guerillero "can improve many tactics of urban guerilla warfare. The urban guerillas in Brazil, for example, changed their tactics, when they introduced machine guns in their attacks on banks."

In addition to *purchases* of arms, there is what the guerillero calls their "*expropriation*"²⁰: robbery of weapons and ammunition from weapons stores, from weapons caches in barracks and from munitions depots.²¹ In the preparatory phase, the guerillero will prefer break-ins to common robbery. Marighella, as well as the author of the French handbook for urban guerillas, emphasize, that it is crucial in such actions to avoid arousing any suspicion, that a political purpose is connected to such "expropriation." It is, therefore, advisable, counsels the cited anonymous French author, to use guerilleros with

¹⁹Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 21.

²⁰As far as I can determine, the term "expropriation" was first used in *this* sense by Lenin. In his article on partisan warfare of October 13, 1906—quoted in F.M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 121—Lenin speaks of the two aims of armed combat, which must be distinguished from one another. "The first aim consists in killing individual persons, such as high officials and members of the lower ranks in the police and in the army. The second aim is to get money from the government as well as from private persons." The process of obtaining this money Lenin then calls "expropriation" later in his essay.

²¹The *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, p. 38, in this connection, quotes from Lenin's Collected Works, Vol. 11, p. 153: "Weapons . . . and ammunition in the possession of the government are to be confiscated, whenever the opportunity offers itself. For example, the police have weapons, which belong to the government! If there is a chance . . ."

a criminal past for such operations. Accomplices in uniform—sympathizers among the armed forces—can provide valuable help in the preparations. The partisan will only turn to open robbery, when the preparatory phase for irregular war is completed, and the violent conflict has already begun—thus, at the earliest, in the phase of covert combat.

The question of ammunition supplies is posed in a completely different way—this bears mentioning here—as soon as the guerilleros make the transition from covert to open combat. Open combat requires different weapons and equipment from those in covert combat; it also requires, since it is conducted by larger units, a larger volume of ammunition for individual actions. Generally, neither the materiel still stored in supply-bases, which was not completely consumed in covert combat, nor weapons, equipment and ammunition taken from *the adversary* in covert combat, suffice for the conduct of *open* combat. The moment of transition from covert to open combat is, therefore, almost always the hour of reckoning for the interested third power as far as supplies are concerned: normally, only *it* can enable the guerilleros to make the transition to conduct open combat. This logistical dependency on the interested third power, among other things, characterizes the phase of open combat in irregular warfare.

§ 3

The Storage of Supplies

If at all possible, the guerilleros of tomorrow will already attempt to establish secret supply bases in the preparatory phase of irregular war. These supply bases should not be confused with the operative bases, discussed above; within such an operative base, of course, there will always have to be a larger number of such logistical bases. Here too, the base will differ, according to whether the conspiracy is "from above" or "from below." In the conspiracy "*from above*," the guerillero finds the necessary bases already provided—by the government, authorities, military commands or party organization; "munitions supply from a hidden depot set up by the army

command"—and later "sporadic supply by air of available reserves" as well as "systematic air-supply" by the interested third power—supply possibilities mentioned by Major von Dach²²—are all possible.

In the conspiracy "*from below*," the guerillero will have to establish supply bases himself, and ultimately supply himself from them. Normally, he will not have additional supplies by air.

Otherwise, however, the same rules hold for the establishment of supply bases. The success of irregular war decisively depends upon the correct operative and tactical establishment of these bases—at the right place, in the right way, and with the right materiel—and upon maintaining their secrecy. Their establishment is, in every individual case, a difficult logistical problem, and, if the bases fulfill their function, a logistical work of art.

The hide-out, where a secret supply base is to be built, must be carefully chosen. It must be difficult for the adversary to discover, but also easily accessible for the guerilleros. The number of options one has to select from is legendary. In each individual case, the concrete situation and the kind of action for which the equipment will be necessary, determine the selection of the location. Sometimes it will be a private apartment, or the office of a lawyer or merchant who is a guerillero member, while at other times, it will be a rented garage, the storage room of a factory or transportation company; sometimes a supply base will be set up in an aluminum foundry, a barn, in the attic of an old house, or in the tunnels of a mine, or in an old, unused cellar.²³

²²H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 36. In addition to von Dach, August Ségur-Cabanac, too, mentions three ways to supply guerilleros, which in his view "in all probability . . . will be employed . . . in a future irregular war": "establishment of supply bases and stocking them in the framework of far-ranging planning in peacetime," "air-dropping supplies," or "supply by helicopter," and finally, "supply by land." "The focus, however," in Ségur-Cabanac's view, "will doubtless be laid" on the first means cited—establishment of supply bases—"because this form of supply causes the most difficulty for the adversary to knock out supply sources, and it signifies, on the other hand, that irregular warfare forces are largely hidden, as concerns their supply, from adversary reconnaissance."

²³Valdis Redelis, loc. cit., p. 33, reports from World War II, that Soviet

The question of what equipment—in particular which weapons, which ammunition, and how much—should be stored in a particular case in the supply base, depends primarily on the planning of the specific actions in covert combat. Every supply base is, therefore, designed for a specific action—or at least a specific kind of action. Only in exceptional cases will the guerilleros be able to set up a supply base, so that the equipment stored there can be used for different kinds of actions in covert combat. This necessary restriction upon the equipment of a supply base means—which is often overlooked—a limitation, at the same time, of the activities of the guerilleros in covert combat. The respective instructions for a conspiracy "from above" and the one or another underground instructions for covert combat in a conspiracy "from below"—such as the already mentioned instructions for urban guerillas in the French language—all prescribe, that every logistical base must have stored at least a number of automatic hand-guns with the appropriate ammunition, as well as at least as much explosive material as is necessary to destroy the base itself.

Not only weapons and ammunition are put in the supply bases. The guerillero strikes from cover, and disappears—not to be found—back into his cover. All necessary materiel must be in the secret supply base to provide cover for the planned actions, as well as for evasions or flight: forged passes and official identification documents, vehicle license plates,

partisans often packed weapons and ammunition into "coffins, and loaded them onto ox-drawn wagons. The coffin was nailed shut, because 'the deceased had died of typhus.' Behind the wagon, a few 'crying and desperate' women and old men walked along. . . . Cemeteries in the forest were preferred weapons dumps, in which the 'typhus victim' was also buried."

Not only in Indochina, but also in Angola and Rhodesia, the guerilleros established underground supply bases, for which somewhat extensive tunnel systems had been artificially created. Reliable information from irregular warfare areas of more recent date on such underground bases are not available to me. Zajarchenko, loc. cit., provides instructions for establishing hidden storage depots for weapons, ammunition or food, and for the care of such materiel, which deal in particular with the conspiratorial security of the hide-out. He emphasizes the value of women for guarding the secret depots, in order to free the men for actual combat.

civilian clothing or uniforms of the adversary, wigs and make-up.²⁴

The number of supply bases must be large enough, and the size of each individual base small enough, that the loss of one or more bases does not fundamentally disrupt the overall supply of the guerilleros. The guerillero who should know of the existence of this base and its precise position, is the one who will have to rely on it in his actions.

Another guerillero nearby will be assigned the task of guarding and caring for the secret supply base. He must be one who has not played any political role up to that time, and has not been assigned any other tasks of whatever kind in the irregular war—neither in the context of propaganda activity nor in the planned violent actions—and, after the defense base has been established, he must have no contact with other guerilleros, unless the base has to be cleared out because of the danger of discovery, or it is to be used for a certain action. The guerillero who takes care of the base is responsible for assuring, that if the base is discovered, there are no clues for the adversary to indicate the origin of the stored materiel, nor the identity of the persons who had set it up, nor the nature of the *concrete* action for which it was set up.

If there is danger that the secret base will be discovered, it will be cleared immediately, with all necessary measures of caution. If at all possible, evasion bases have already been found and prepared for this eventuality. If there is no time to clear a base, or if clearing the supply base would mean that the danger of being discovered would be increased for the entire organization of the guerilleros, the guerillero responsible for the care of the base will destroy all of the stored materiel, and do everything possible to obliterate every clue, which could betray the fact that this had once been a secret supply base. If such a total destruction of the base is not possible, the caretaker will at least destroy all materiel, which could betray to the adversary where the stored objects—weapons, ammunition, papers and camouflage material—came from, by whom and to what end they were to have been used; after fulfilling this mission, he gives up the base, and “dis-

²⁴*Ça ira*, loc. cit., p. 71.

appears.” It is usually less dangerous for the organization of the guerilleros, if stored materiel falls into the hands of the adversary, than when the adversary catches the caretaker. *His security* takes priority over the security of the materiel. The equipment is dumb, the prisoner can be forced to speak.²⁵

²⁵Sometimes fingerprints of known guerilleros found on discovered equipment can give the adversary important clues. Compare Robert F. Williams, loc. cit., p. 181: “If the guerilla must fight where he can be seen, he does so masked, in order not to be identified. He handles his weapon with gloves, in order not to give the enemy the chance of discovering fingerprints on a captured weapon.”

I. Theoreticians of War



Hugo Grotius, the theoretician of international law, outlined the norms of civilized war-fighting in the wake of the Thirty Years' War.




Carl Philipp von Clausewitz, the Prussian general, established the connection between politics and war, which is crucial for understanding irregular warfare today.


II. Traditional Types of War



World War I, to the surprise of its participants, ended up being as a war of supplies and fixed position, as the U.S. soldiers shown in the trench above found out.



World War II was a much more mobile war, dominated by tank warfare. Shown above, German General Sepp Dietrich inspects a captured British tank from the Dieppe invasion.



Preparations for World War III have concentrated on readiness for combat under nuclear radioactive conditions, as the German soldiers on maneuvers above, show.



Henry Kissinger and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, shown together on West German-American Friendship Day in 1983, think they can replace warfare with their "crisis management," but they have only built up Soviet capabilities.

III. Models of Irregular Warfare

Josip Broz Tito (sitting), shown above in the mountains of Yugoslavia, was a military genius in irregular warfare, leading his partisans through four years of fighting to victory over the Nazis.



Greek Colonel Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, pictured with binoculars above, led a brilliantly successful campaign against the British occupiers in Cyprus, during the 1950s.




Vietnamese leaders Ho Chi Minh (center) and General Giap (right), shown in a planning session, were masters of guerrilla warfare, against both the French and the U.S.





The North Vietnamese used an extraordinarily mobile deployment, avoiding set-piece battles, but they also relied on technology, like the artillery shown above.

Mao Tse-Tung, shown above reading the proclamation of the Central People's Government on Oct. 1, 1949, wrote reams of instructions on irregular warfare, which have been followed internationally.



The Algerian war, 1958, combined characteristics of a war against a foreign occupier, and a revolutionary war—both of which reflect aspects, but not the totality, of irregular warfare.



Mao, unlike some other guerrilla leaders, was able to set up permanent headquarters in Yenan Province. Here, students are shown outside the Yenan caves, where they lived and prepared for the long war.



The Kenyan Mau-Maus, shown in their initiation ceremony above, represent one kind of guerrilla movement, which was notable for its brutality in terrorizing the population into support for its struggle.

IV. Methods of Irregular Warfare



Ernesto "Che" Guevara, whose body is being displayed by the Bolivians in the picture above, was a romantic theoretician of guerrilla warfare in Ibero-America in the 1960s, but never successfully built mass popular support.



The Colombian guerrilla group, the M-19, shown above in 1983, had to take over a radio station, in order to get its propaganda message across. Peaceful propaganda saturation is an early stage of preparation for irregular warfare.



The Montoneros, who emerged as a prominent Argentine terrorist movement in the mid-1970s, were obliterated by the early 1980s.




Demonstrations, like this West German anti-Euro missile one, not only serve to popularize the guerrilla cause, but build solidarity within the group.



Bombings of targets associated with prominent political opponents are a frequent method of guerrilla groups, in order to show the impotence of the police, as well as to do damage. Above, the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination League building in Washington, D.C., bombed by the Jewish Defense League in 1985.



At a later period in the struggle, guerrilla groups take on the police directly, through riots. Above, rioters throw rocks at U.S. army barracks in West Germany, in 1983.



Sabotage of infrastructure is also an integral facet of guerrilla warfare. This electrical tower was downed by the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso group in February 1986, during a nationwide campaign to wipe out the nation's economic infrastructure.



Kidnapping, and later assassination, used to be among the most popular methods of the West German Red Army Faction (RAF). Shown above is the scene in Cologne, on Sept. 5, 1977, when industrialist leader Hans-Martin Schleyer was kidnapped.

V. Cultural Basis for Irregular Warfare



Urban guerrilla warfare was popularized through publicity about the Algerian war, and is considered by many theorists to be the most efficient, per guerrilla. Above, women and children scatter in response to open fighting.



The drug-sex counter-culture, shown here in its full degradation in New York City, has been a major facet of today's preparations for irregular warfare, by Soviet-sponsored groups.




Mao Tse-Tung, shown above on his march from Yenan to Peking, concentrated on fighting in the countryside, where he had his logistical base.



The forces of irregular warfare are aided by the undermining of traditional cultural values. The sponsorship of "population control" by the United Nations epitomizes this weakening. Above, former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim announced World Population Year in 1974, in the company of Rafael Salas (left) and Dr. Antonio Carrillo Flores, (right)

VI. The Threat Today



Colombian narco-terrorists, led by the M-19, took over that nation's Judicial Palace in the fall of 1985, in order to prevent the implementation of the country's anti-drug campaign. A full military assault, shown here, was necessary to dislodge them.



Hideous political assassinations, including burning victims alive, are the trademark of the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso group. Above is one of countless victims killed in 1986 alone.



Islamic terrorists, shown here on parade in Beirut, pose a serious threat of political takeover throughout the Middle East and Africa. While supported by the Soviets, they represent a wild card of insane desire for martyrdom all their own.



The bombing of the LaBelle discotheque, in April 1986, has been traced to Libyan and Syrian terrorist networks. Bombings of places where U.S. military congregate are a near-daily occurrence in Europe today.

XIII. THE NATURE OF COVERT COMBAT

§ 1

Foundations

We have already made the observation in another connection, that modern irregular warfare runs through various *phases*. Each individual phase is, respectively, characterized by a certain *behavior* of the guerilleros—certain measures, certain modes of combat—which comes into the *foreground*.

In the *isolated*¹ irregular war, and in the irregular war which *precedes* a “large” war, the *preparatory* phase, which we have just described, is followed by a phase of “*covert*” combat, at the conclusion of which, as a general rule, there is a third phase of transition to open combat.²

The behavior patterns, which are characteristic of each of the individual phases of irregular war, *do not replace each other*; each of these three phases, preparation, covert combat, transition to open combat—only signify an escalation with respect to the preceding phase. In each of the new phases, a *new* mode of behavior is *added* to those previously manifested, new methods are *added* to those previously employed, without the guerilleros therefore giving up, or even only neglecting actions and activities, which had been characteristic of the preceding phase.³

The second phase of an irregular war—the phase of covert combat—begins with the first violent acts. The common char-

¹See above, Part 1, III, 3, p. 47.

²If irregular war *accompanies* a “large war,” there is a coincidence in time between open and covert combat. This was the problem during World War II in the Soviet Union, which the German military command had to deal with continuously. There may also be a transition from open combat, in which irregular warfare determines the conduct of combat, to exclusively covert combat, if irregular war follows a conventional war in which the party on behalf of which the guerilleros fight, has suffered a total defeat.

³The memorandum of the Führungsakademie der deutschen Bundeswehr on “Covert Combat,” from the year 1967, speaks of a “nearly stepless transition from one form of combat to another, thus from psychological warfare to covert combat, and from this to limited or general war, *whereby the higher, i.e., more intensive form, includes the lower.*”

acteristic of the *new* mode of behavior of the guerilleros in the phase of covert combat, and the uniform characteristic of the *beginning* activities in this phase, is the *employment of violence*—in fact, violence in general, not violence in any specific *form*, particularly not only military violence. Covert combat is *not* essentially *military* conflict; the acts committed in the course of covert combat can not generally be interpreted as *battle* actions.

The external *form* of violent actions is largely determined in covert combat by the concrete situation. Its typical *content*, on the other hand, is always the same during this entire phase of irregular war. It is “combat out of the dark,” or combat *in* the dark.

Often, one or the other side will attempt to hide the fact, that any fighting is occurring at all. The existence of combat of this kind—“or, in any case, many of its consequences”—Ernst Grimmel correctly remarks,⁴ “will always be *denied* by at least *one* of the principals, i.e., ‘covered up.’” Sometimes this serves the purpose of covering up *an aggression*, which lurks behind the irregular warfare; another time, however, it can put—again we follow Grimmel—“a constitutionally or power-politically badly equipped government on the *defensive*: it is conceivable, that this government—for well-considered reasons—must deny the occurrence of ‘covert combat’ against itself, even though the doormen at the government’s office building are already bound and gagged. It is, furthermore, conceivable, that this government must, at the same time, still maintain diplomatic relations in very polite tones to that very same government, in whose interest, or even upon whose initiative, these acts occur.”

“But ‘covert,’” Grimmel continues, “denotes *military-technically* quite precisely some characteristics of this form of combat, particularly the tendency of the attacker to seek a high degree of ‘*cover*’ in manifold guises.”

Covert combat, too, is always *real combat*. It is, as a memorandum of the Führungsakademie der deutschen Bundeswehr, from 1967, observes, “probably the oldest of all forms of combat and kinds of war. . . . With covert combat, violence is employed for the first time, and initially, at the lowest levels.”

⁴Ernst Grimmel, *Partisanen im Schwarzwald?*, Bremen 1964, p. 10f.

Heinz Kühnrich's⁵ observations, with respect to what he calls "partisan war," also hold for covert combat: "It is, as a general rule, the *initial stage* for armed rebellion, it is the *beginning* of the armed rebellion, and has the tendency to escalate into regular war."

With covert combat, the guerilleros pursue a double purpose. It is intended, firstly, to wear down the adversary, so that he is no longer capable of successfully withstanding subsequent open combat with the guerilleros. The activities of the guerilleros already in the preparatory phase can weaken the enemy *morally*. Covert combat is intended to break him down beyond that point *materially*, to force him to fragment his forces, to bind himself long-term in many locations, and to cut him off, by and large, from his bases, by continuous threats and continuously repeated short-term interruptions of his transportation routes. Fragmentation and tying-down of forces, on the one hand, hindrance of connections to the bases, on the other hand, signify isolation. Isolation—no matter what kind—is the overall "magic word" in irregular warfare.

The second, equally important task of covert combat is to separate the adversary in the operations area *psychologically* from the domestic population. By means of covert battle, the guerilleros want to turn the majority of the population in the operations area against the enemy, and win them over to their own cause. The magic word "isolation" appears once again.

The material and psychological isolation of the adversary turns the tables in favor of the guerilleros. While the guerilleros, *prior* to the beginning of covert combat, are still comparable to hunted wild game, *at the end* of this phase, they will have to be able to play hunter and driver at the same time.

The guerilleros' adversary, on the other hand, if he has recognized the nature and significance of modern irregular war, will attempt, especially in the phase of covert combat, to drive the guerilleros themselves into isolation, psychologically at first, and then, as a result, materially as well, to divide them from the mass of the domestic population, to cut them off from the interested third power, and thus gradually to *starve*

⁵Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 20.

them out materially and psychologically. "Who isolates whom—psychologically and materially?"—that is the crucial issue in covert warfare.

§ 2

The Instruments of Covert Combat

During the phase of covert combat, the guerillero, who in this phase—formally at least—is always the attacker,⁶ will limit himself to individual actions; sometimes these will occur as pure *acts of terror* against persons or objects, in order to make the adversary or the "neutral" civilian population insecure, to frighten or intimidate them; other times it will be *acts of sabotage* against objects, which could be important for the adversary, for whatever reason; and other times there will occur what are called, in the jargon of the guerilleros, "executions": attacks on the life of individual leading personalities in the adversary's camp, individual enemy soldiers, or even individual civilians, who are suspected of treason, betrayal or espionage. In the further course of covert combat, *armed raids* against isolated adversary positions or groups will become more and more frequent: police stations, military outposts, isolated depots and camps, individual vehicles and small march-groups and columns. If the adversary to be raided is on the march, the raid will occur as an *ambush*.

Acts of violence of covert combat, we have just noted, *do not take the place* of the preparations in progress, which we discussed above: they are *added to them*. Terror, sabotage, executions, and raids do not signify the *end* of conspiracy, subversion, and armament, whose beginnings, respectively, lie in the preparatory phase. In the phase of covert combat, all of the actions of the preparatory phase are continued, if possible

⁶Compare Pavle Jakšić, loc. cit., p. 269: "It is known, that partisan forces, if they intend to withstand and successfully conduct the war, must continuously attack, they must always be on the offensive, that this is determined by the offensive form of partisan war, while the defensive form is the form for the anti-partisan side, and rightly so, because the offensive operation of the partisan army lasts incomparably longer than the short periods of time, in which the anti-partisan army attempts to liquidate the partisan movement and its armed forces with spectacular, sweeping offensive operations."

in more intense form. The guerilleros attempt in covert combat to reintegrate the conspiracy of the first hour anew daily. They strive, at the same time, to win new followers for their cause by means of covert combat; so-called "armed propaganda" is intended to show the shocking effort of the acts of violence to be positive for the guerilleros, and accordingly exploited. The guerilleros, finally, seek to perfect the organization and training of the action groups through the experience of covert combat, and to improve their armament with materiel seized as booty in covert combat.

If they want to be successful, the guerilleros will have a meticulous division of labor. *Covert combat* will be conducted by *action groups*, which are *respectively* elected, trained, and armed *specifically* for terror, sabotage, executions, or raids, and which will have *no other mission* during covert combat in the framework of irregular war.⁷ The *conduct of psychological warfare*, propaganda and subversion, on the other hand, will be entrusted to other persons, other groups, who *have nearly nothing to do with* acts of violence of covert combat. The *coordination* of the activity of these various groups is not an easy task for the leadership of the guerilleros.

The German language instruction for the "Rote Armee Fraktion" in the Federal Republic of Germany, published in Amsterdam without identifying the year of publication, emphasizes the practical necessity of separating the "urban guerilla" who commits acts of violence, and propagandistic "base work."⁸ "It has been shown," it says there, "that each of us who collaborates in the part of the city, or in the factory, in the existing socialist groups, helps to influence the discussion process, gathers experience, and learns. It has been shown, . . . that the control, which the political police has over these groups, their meetings, their dates, the content of their discussions, already extends so far, that one can not show up, if one does not want to be identified—that the individual can not combine the legal aspects of the work with the illegal aspects."

The actions of the guerilleros appear, from the outside, to be individual operations against targets of opportunity. As

⁷Compare Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 51f., and p. 76.

⁸*Kollektiv Rote Armee Fraktion*, loc. cit., p. 12.

long as they only fight covertly, the guerilleros do everything possible not to give the adversary any reason to even suspect, not to speak of giving the adversary proof, that there is any connection between the individual acts, or between the respective individuals.

Every individual act, however, must in fact be a constituent part of a carefully designed operations plan, whose basic design, down to the finest detail, must be subject to a continuous reevaluation, both of the enemy's and one's own situation. It is not only unsuccessful actions, which can cause the guerilleros irreparable damage, but also successful ones, if they were meaningless or unnecessary in the framework of this operations plan. In covert combat, even a successful operation can provide the adversary important information concerning their strength, targets, mode of combat, and much more. Only the importance of the operation in the framework of the operations plan as a whole justifies the risks which such operations involve.

§ 3

Propaganda in Covert Combat

If covert combat is to fulfill its mission, among those activities which the guerilleros must always continue—and which were begun in the preparatory base—is propaganda activity in an escalated form. Covert combat, properly understood, is always psychological warfare. It is intended to win over new followers to the guerilleros' idea, and win new fighters and accomplices for the guerilleros themselves: it is intended to frighten and intimidate those who can not be won over, and make them doubt the cause for which they themselves are fighting.

At the beginning of covert combat, the *mass* of the population is usually *not* ready to actively support the guerillero. Were this the case, the phase of *covert* combat would last only for a brief time; following appropriate preparation—starting from an armed rebellion—irregular warfare could very soon become *open* combat, although initially conducted in a contained form of combat.⁹

⁹That the activities of covert combat are continued in the phase of open

The just cited, extreme case, in which the majority of the population actively supports the guerilleros from the very beginning, contrasts with the other extreme case, in which the mass of the population at first strictly and decisively rejects the aims and methods of combat of the guerilleros. "The partisan unit then arises," as the "Red Book" of the Kollektiv Rote-Armee-Fraktion explains, "out of nothing." There are only "some dozens of fighters, who really begin" to form it. But these few, determined guerilleros can, under certain circumstances, the Kollektiv Rote-Armee-Fraktion believes, "cause an avalanche. In the first phase," according to the "Red Book," "the task is only to demonstrate, by means of appropriate actions, that armed groups can form themselves, and stand up to the apparatus of the state; that armed surprise attacks can be an instrument to successfully assert legitimate interests against an oppressive system. In brief: the instrument of armed struggle must be *discovered*. It would be wrong," in the view of the Kollektiv Rote-Armee-Fraktion, "to use this instrument only when the 'agreement of the masses' is assured, because that would mean giving up the struggle altogether, because this 'agreement of the masses,'" in the view of this cited Kollektiv, "can only be achieved in the struggle itself."¹⁰

We spoke of the extreme cases, which are the infrequent exceptions in the history of irregular war. In general, the mass of the population, at the beginning of covert combat by the guerilleros, will either *indifferently acknowledge* the fact of the combat, but be only moved by the wish *not* to be drawn into the beginning armed conflict itself, or, *not sure* of the chances and ultimate goals of both parties to the conflict, it will *wait* for developments to unfold, hesitating over the question of whether, when, and how "one" might go over to the guerilleros, or take a position against them. To win the indifferent "citizen" for the guerilleros' cause, to give him security gradually and the courage to decide, is the task of *propaganda by action* in covert combat.

It has always been the secret to the success of guerillero

combat, even if somewhat in the background, was already mentioned above. As one example of the *premature* transition to open combat—while covert combat activity is *continued*—the irregular war of the Italian partisans against the German troops since the late Autumn 1943 could be cited.

¹⁰Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion), loc. cit., p. 43.

leaders, that they first consider how those groups which they hope to win over will react, and how, on the other hand, the adversary could be influenced by the planned operation, and this is taken under consideration before any large operation of covert combat, before every act of terror or sabotage, before every assassination and raid. The crucial point in acts of terror and sabotage is not only important *that* the bomb explodes, in assassinations it is not only important *that* the victim is killed and the perpetrators escape, in a raid it is not only the number of fallen among the adversary and the weapons captured. Acts of terror and sabotage, assassinations and raids, will have failed their purpose, despite this "material" success, if they drive groups into the enemy's camp, which it might have been possible to win over to the guerilleros, and if, on the other hand, they call mistakes to the attention of the adversary, which the adversary had previously made but had not recognized, rather than weakening him. That they were always able to correctly judge the reactions both of their followers as well as of the adversary to planned operations, without thinking the improbable possible, is the proof of the art of leadership of born guerillero leaders, such as Tito and Grivas-Dighenis were. That, on the other hand, the German leadership made innocent people responsible for the acts of guerilleros, wherever it met up with partisans in World War II, and thus also enraged and turned those parts of the population against it, which might have been willing to collaborate, demonstrates the complete incompetence of this leadership in all issues of irregular war. Grivas-Dighenis reports the same of the behavior of the British in the irregular war on Cyprus in the 1950s: "During the entire four-year war," he writes, "parallel to armed deployments between the two adversaries, the fight was also for the favor of the population. The British did it by demonstrations of their strength, with terror, arrests, internment camps, horrible torture, frequent curfews that lasted days, destruction of property, killing of innocent persons, and executions. But I observed, that the harder the policy of the English became, the more the people took their distance from them, and turned in our direction. No one wins a cultured people by force, but only by good behavior and a just and loving leadership. The English authorities on Cyprus, the military as well as the political, went against the population

almost with a passion, instead of being skillful. . . . We, on the other hand, applied methods based primarily on the psychology of the masses. We convinced them with cogent arguments, and thus also became their example for withstanding dangers and losses. But in particular, we strengthened the belief of the people in the justice of its concerns. For the entire duration of the war, I uninterruptedly and successfully worked on winning the hearts of the masses."¹¹

It is especially the *first* actions of covert combat which are propagandistically decisive. They draw the lines: if they are welcomed, or only tolerated by a larger part of the population, the first battle for the approval of the masses has been won; if the population rejects them, the first step has been made into isolation—a self-inflicted isolation.

The image which the majority of the population has of the personality of the guerillero *leader* is particularly important for the conduct of covert combat. Tito and Grivas-Dighenis succeeded in creating an aura of heroism, secrecy and success, against which attractive power the Germans in Yugoslavia and the British on Cyprus had nothing comparable to offer. Even the simple German or British soldier, who—the one in Yugoslavia, the other on Cyprus—fought against the partisans, could not resist granting the respective enemy guerillero leader a certain admiration.

Within the population to be won over in covert combat, the youth play a special role. The guerillero propaganda will primarily address itself to these youth. I again quote Grivas-Dighenis: "Among the youth, one finds the stormy force, the desire for danger, and the impulse to great deeds. I turned to the youth in particular, to put all of their abilities to the service of the struggle. If the youth in such situations is uninterested, the country to which these youth belong is beginning to collapse. . . . The youth were the garden of plants, in which I sought out the best fighters for the partisan and sabotage groups."¹²

If a modern industrial country is the theater of an irregular war, the guerillero propaganda has special tasks. The effect

¹¹ Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 33ff.

¹² Ibid., p. 37. The publishers of the already cited *Rote Kalender 1972 for Apprentices and Students* obviously had the same ideas.

of *covert combat*, too—and particularly—upon the sensitive organism of the economy and the complicated supply-paratus of the population is stronger in this case, than in economically less developed areas. Here, covert combat can lead to paralysis of the economy and supply base within a relatively short time. If the adversary succeeds in making the guerilleros the party to be held guilty for the chaotic conditions, which ensue as a necessary consequence of this paralysis, the mass of the population can be turned *against* the guerilleros, and this can lead to their psychological isolation, unless the guerillero can turn the mood in his favor by means of skillful propaganda—at least temporarily—and exploit the chaos to make an immediate transition to open combat, in order to defeat the armed forces and police of the adversary in concentrated attack, with rapid and hard blows. If the citizen seems himself deprived of the protection of the armed forces and police in this situation, he will be willing to surrender for the sake of survival.¹³

¹³ Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 32: "If the individual exploiter understands that the state can no longer guarantee his security, it can also be made clear to him through a correct policy, that the wage-earners are ready, under certain conditions, through their political organizations, to guarantee his personal security in general, and his scientific activities, with limitations, for the transitional period to a socialist transformation of the process of production and distribution."

In the copy of the "Red Book" available to me, the text actually speaks of "scientific activity"; "economic activity" would seem more appropriate. Is this a typographical error which twists the meaning, or was the author of the "Red Book" thinking of the situation at German universities?

XIV. LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS

§ 1

Leadership Qualities

Every act of war, including every act of irregular war, is "team work." It occurs in sympathetic collaboration between the leader and the led, between planners and those who make the plans reality through their acts, in pursuance of the same aim. However capable a leader may be, he fails if the troop which he leads fails, or only fails him, if the troop is not "congenial" in the sense of Clausewitz's definition of "the genius of war." The training, equipping, spirit, and valor of a troop, on the other hand, mean nothing, if it lacks a leader who is able to correctly judge, deploy and optimally exploit *this* specific training, *this* specific equipment, this spirit, and this valor in the conflict with the adversary. This coherence between command and execution must already have been created in the preparations of an irregular war, too, and must be guaranteed for the entire course of the expected combat.

The most impressive part of the book by Thayer on guerillas and partisans is the description of the meeting of Mikhailovich and Tito during World War II. Thayer uses this episode, of which he was probably an eyewitness, in order to present his reader with two kinds of guerilla leader, one a guerilla leader in a conspiracy "from above"—Mikhailovich was assigned the leadership of an irregular war against the Germans by his fugitive king—and the other a guerilla leader in a conspiracy "from below": Tito was the elected chairman of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, but—so Thayer reports, at least—"even the Kremlin seemed to hesitate to recognize him as their agent."¹

What interests us here is primarily what Thayer says about the qualities, which both personalities had *in common*. "Both men," we read, "were natural leaders whose followers were fanatically devoted to them. Among the Chetniks, Draja was

¹Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 78; compare Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito, autobierte Biographie*, Berlin 1953, p. 136 and 165.

almost as much revered as the King himself. Among the Yugoslav Communists, Tito had established a reputation which apparently gave the Father of Communism, Stalin, some qualms."²

The picture, which Thayer gives in the course of his description of Mikhailovich, corresponds to what the Swiss Major von Dach³ says about the leader of an irregular warfare unit: "General respect and recognition by his people is the precondition, since, once behind the enemy front, no military police and no military court can help to maintain discipline and fighting spirit. Military rank plays an only subordinate role. The 'blind' type of officer is not fit for such leadership. Such a soldier might be able to hold his own in regular troops for a certain time, thanks to the supporting corset of the entire military apparatus. But never in irregular war. Only real leaders of troops, who know how to get along with people, will make it."

Major von Dach believes that is all that need be said about the guerilla leader in general. In conclusion, he only speaks of those qualities required of the leader of a single action group—i.e., from the lower and middle level leadership.

Thayer would not be entirely satisfied with this picture of a guerilla leader. He asks, why Mikhailovich, who obviously possessed all of the described qualities to a high degree, failed nevertheless, and in this connection explains⁴ that, obviously, a successful guerilla leader "must have those characteristics that make a leader in any field: the charisma to attract and hold a loyal following, organizational skills and above all ruthless determination in order to maintain discipline within the ranks and enforce discipline among the non-active. For, in a sense, the guerilla leader is far more than a commander. He is in fact the political governor of the areas where his writ runs, the administrator of the civil government, the police force and the judiciary to mete out punishment as he sees fit. But beyond this," Thayer continues, "there are still two very special qualifications: knowledge of the terrain and the ability to extract from it the maximum advantage. By terrain, I do

²Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 79.

³H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 32.

⁴Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 90f.

not mean merely the geographical aspects of the area, the rivers and roads, the mountains and the passes, but, more important, the social, economic, and, above all, political features of the area. A successful guerilla knows more than the hidden mountain trail unmarked on the military maps. He knows as well the political, religious and racial prejudices of the inhabitants. He knows the taboos, the local beliefs and superstitions, the particular grievances of particular strata and regions. He also knows the political personalities, their friendships and rivalries, their weaknesses and strengths. And naturally he knows their languages and patois." Furthermore, it is Thayer's conviction, that a guerilla leader must possess one more quality, which Mikhailovich lacked, in his view: the ability "to make the best use of the features of the social and political landscape to gain one's aims."

Thayer does not investigate, where this ability of which he speaks comes from, and for him the most important characteristic is "that which distinguishes a victorious from a defeated guerilla leader." The answer to this last question, which Thayer leaves open, is given by Clausewitz in his treatment of the "genius of war,"⁵ "which we call imagination." A guerilla leader without imagination, will always be a failure. In conventional war, learned military knowledge, mathematical thinking and long experience, may be able to replace imagination to a certain degree; but never in irregular war. In irregular war, Jomini's⁶ dictum holds, spoken 150 years ago: that knowledge takes *third* place in a military leader.

That *unharnessed* imagination can endanger the guerilla leader's success, requires no special mention. It also holds for the leader of guerilleros, that reason must control imagination. Only after the critical examination by a cool reason, which is able not only to recognize possibilities in sober analysis, but also to correctly evaluate them and weigh them against each other, does there mature a successful operation out of what creative imagination has grasped and thought in a synthetic glance.

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, loc. cit., p. 47.

⁶ Antoine Henri Jomini, *Abriss der Kriegskunst*, German translation by A. von Roguslawski, Berlin 1883, p. 60.

Leadership Organization

The leadership in covert combat does not necessarily lie in the hands of the conspirators of the first hour. Conspirators are politicians, in their own way; leaders in combat, also in covert combat are, also in their own way, if not soldiers, in any case warriors. It is seldom, that the qualities of a good politician and a good warrior are found in one and the same person.

If the beginning of an irregular war is a conspiracy "from above," the leaders in covert combat will generally be called upon and deployed by the "conspirators." It is not the task of these "conspirators" to lead *themselves*; their task is usually only to *select* appropriate leaders.

If the irregular war arises from a conspiracy "from below," leadership in covert combat will generally fall to personalities, who know how to assert themselves within the circle of conspirators of the first hour—sometimes even to assert themselves against these. The selection of leaders is, to a large degree, up to those who are to be led. This can lead to severe internal conflicts and power struggles.

The necessary leadership *hierarchy* forms, in the first case, from above to below, in the latter case, from below to above.⁷ In the one, as well as in the other case, however, this leadership hierarchy manifests other characteristics, than those of a military hierarchy in conventional war. "Every leader in irregular war," H. von Dach⁸ observes in his short study of leadership in "total resistance," has incomparably more independence

⁷ Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 31: "In the initial phase, decentralized and independent partisan groups form, which undertake commando operations. It is necessary to develop numerous such groups in population centers, in order to force the enemy, in this phase of development, to fragment his forces and overburden his investigations apparatus. At the same time, the groups must establish links to one another, and coordinate their actions, to be able to use their forces more effectively and better target them. These links are the precondition for the formation of local centers of resistance. Once this tactic has achieved a sufficient thinning out of enemy forces, secret local military groups, under favorable circumstances, can be established."

⁸ H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 32.

and freedom of action, than he would have at the same rank in regular war. Irregular warfare will put many leaders of lower rank into situations, in which they have to act completely independently in *all areas*.

It corresponds to the nature of irregular warfare as mobile warfare par excellence, that the leadership, too, must be as mobile as possible. There can be no locally fixed headquarters and command posts in irregular war, no big staffs, which are difficult to move, and under no circumstances more "offices" and leadership bodies, than are indispensable for combat. On the other hand, the guerillero leader must always be at the center of activity of the fighters he leads and—changing the hide-out often—remain there; aside from the consideration, that actual leadership is not possible for him in any other way, news of his presence always has a *psychologically* favorable effect on the guerilleros and the sympathetic population, often decisively so.

One of the reasons for the success of the Greek partisans on Cyprus under the leadership of Grivas-Dighenis is, without any doubt, to be sought in the fact, that he held to both of these principles during the entire war.

"The concentration of a larger number of people in one place," Grivas-Dighenis writes, with respect to the first of these two maxims,⁹ "would have invited discovery. Furthermore, additional camouflage measures would have been necessary. It was always dangerous for a leadership staff, which, if it was supposed to do its job, always had to have a certain personnel strength, to establish a command post somewhere."¹⁰ A staff which was too large almost turned into a disaster twice for

⁹Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 49.

¹⁰Georgios Grivas-Dighenis followed the second principle of leadership cited above as well. He reports, loc. cit., p. 89, that he did not hesitate, "to take over the leadership of the strongest partisan group myself, in order to lead by example in joint combat, and in order to demonstrate combat methods." Tito, too, almost always stayed at the center of activities of his partisans during the entire phase of covert combat. His biographer, Vladimir Dedijer, says that Tito had initially stayed in Zagreb when German forces invaded; from there, he drove to Belgrade in the first days of May 1941 with forged papers, where he lived "in the suburb of Dedinje, first at Rumunskaja 16a, and then in Gladstone Street, both of which were not far from the apartments of the German military mission." He was in Belgrade when covert combat began after June 22, 1941.

Tito: the first time, when German motorized forces pushed into Jaice in January 1944, where "Tito had set up his staff in a chemical factory,"¹¹ and the second time at the end of May 1944 in Drvar, during the German operation "Roessel-sprung," in which "Tito himself barely escaped, and a number of important contact persons to the English and Americans, a number of partisan leaders, and important materiel, were captured, and the staff needed a long time to become operational again."¹²

As long as Europe's regular armed forces still had cavalry units, the secret of their success—so it was said—was not, that they could *ride* faster, but that they could *think* faster than the enemy. The same principle holds today for leaders of guerilleros. The success of leadership in irregular war depends on the rapidity of one's own movement, the rapidity of one's reactions to the behavior of the enemy, rapidity of decision and action.

Leadership in irregular war is only seldom organized; usually it is improvised. There is no scheme, according to which this or that level of leadership organization could be established. A guerilla leader will call upon this or that person for assistance, according to the situation and the plans for the coming period. Grivas-Dighenis reports, that he—when he had to relocate his staff from the mountains into a small city—

¹¹Helmuth Rentsch, loc. cit., p. 85. Vladimir Dedijer, in his biography of Tito, reports nothing of this endangering of the headquarters. Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 166f., reports, however, that "Tito was nearly killed on December 9, 1941, in a battle against the Italians." An Italian commando attacked the farmhouse in Drenovo, in which Tito was staying with some members of his staff, a radio operator, and a two- or three-man bodyguard. "Tito recognized the Italians . . . immediately gave the order to take the documents and the radio away . . . grabbed his light machine-gun, and ran with a few comrades out of the house, in order to give cover from a hill ten meters away for the removal of the radio equipment and archive . . . When the Italians entered the house, they found nothing . . . except Tito's camera, which had been left behind in the scramble."

¹²Helmuth Rentsch, loc. cit., p. 86. Rentsch mistakenly gives August as the date; in fact, the attack on Tito's headquarters in Drvar occurred on May 25, Tito's birthday. At that time, Tito barely managed to get out of the cave where he had hidden himself, and fled to a tunnel he came upon accidentally. Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 207, correctly remarks: "The attack was badly planned. Had the paratroops landed on the plateau above the cavern, Tito would have barely avoided being captured."

was forced, for security reasons, "to carry out all the tasks of the leadership and the staff myself, with only one assistant."¹³ If the situation changes, or if a mission has been accomplished, one in which an assistant had been assigned from those immediately associated with the guerilla leader to help with preparations, all of those who are not needed, will immediately leave the surroundings of the leader. At the same time, the leader will relocate his headquarters; the location of the new command post will be kept secret from those assistants not required for the mission.

While a military commander in conventional war will make his location known in every order he gives, the guerilla commander in irregular war seeks—and is forced—to keep his location secret even from his own guerilleros.¹⁴ Only immediately subordinate commanders and a few contact persons—who take over the role of the "radio man" in conventional war—learn where the guerilla commander can be reached. Situation-evaluations and issuance of orders do not take place in the respective "command post," but at a place previously determined and secured, one which will generally be used only once for such meetings. The good guerilla commander evades the danger which threatens him in this or that place with the instinct of a wild animal.

§ 3

Communication Through Contact Persons

The collaboration between leaders and those they lead—this team-work, which is necessary for every operation in

¹³Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 50.

¹⁴One of the major tasks of leadership at all levels in covert combat is to secure leadership facilities and supply bases. This security, on the one hand, must be effective, but it must also be unobtrusive. The Irish guerilleros, who fight in the so-called IRA, surround their leadership command posts and supply bases with two or three security perimeters and warning posts—active sympathizers, who have no other tasks, than to observe the movement of the armed forces and police of the adversary in the zone to be secured, and to give alarm if danger approaches. Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 144, reports, that at a meeting of the command staff of the Yugoslav partisans, "the individual participants . . . entered the house," where the meeting took place, "at time intervals of one-quarter hour," for security reasons, "in order not to attract the attention of the police."

war—requires the closest possible communication between the leader and those he leads. The simplest and most secure communication is eye-to-eye, mouth-to-ear. One's own observations, or at least direct reports from someone, who has directly seen what he reports, are the best basis for a command decision. Command by *example*, by a signal given with the hand, or orally, is more effective—especially under war conditions—than any other kind of command, however technically perfect the instruments for its communication may be. This immediate communication, of course, is generally possible in irregular warfare, too, only at the lowest level of command; at higher levels of command, it remains an infrequent exception. If this direct communication can no longer be established, leaders must employ certain instruments of communication in place of personal contact. Without such means of communication, leadership in irregular warfare, too, is simply impossible. The success of any operation depends upon the faultless functioning of these means of communication. Of course, a commander—in irregular warfare as well—should never forget, that all these means of communication are only a *substitute*—and often not a complete substitute, especially in a crisis—for personal contact!

We saw, in another connection, that groups generally confront each other in irregular warfare, which are not equivalent in kind. The guerillero does not fight guerilleros, he generally fights against conventional armed forces and police. In this combat, he uses instruments, which are different from those of his adversary; on the one hand, he does not have a number of instruments at his disposal, which the adversary employs, or could employ. Metaphorically, he has eyes and ears different from those of this adversary.

In an irregular war, a number of options offer themselves to the guerillero as means of communication between the individual action-groups, between the individual commands, and between the groups and the command. The guerillero gradually establishes a tight communications network with the aid of these instruments, not only so that the leadership can "exert a personal and detailed control" over all of the action-groups, but also so that the warning, in case an adversary counter-operation is identified, or in case of betrayal, can reach every group in time.

The primary instrument of communication in irregular warfare is the contact person, who transmits reports, instructions, orders, etc. The contact person is an active sympathizer, who is not otherwise involved in the irregular war, neither propagandistically nor in combat. His sole mission consists in maintaining the necessary communications. He can fulfill this mission only as long as he is not identified as, or even suspected to be a sympathizer.

Contact persons must already be selected and instructed in their missions, in sufficient numbers, in the preparatory phase—i.e., before covert combat begins. During covert combat, new contact persons must be selected, trained and assigned, in order to be able to take over the missions of fallen contact persons, if necessary.

Contact persons can employ certain signals for transmitting simple reports or orders. Signals are particularly suitable, when the purpose is to warn action-groups in time. "Smoke or light signals, as well as waving flags," H. von Dach¹⁵ notes, "are too obvious, and too dangerous for the person who has to give the signal. Suitable signals are necessary: open or close certain windows, hang up the laundry, park or do not park vehicles, etc., at night light up or darken roof-windows, doors, etc. Of course, such simple instruments are only useful to signal very short instructions, or reports, i.e., 'Warning!—Danger!—Enemy in Village!' or 'Village is Clean!' The signals must be employed, so that they are certain to be recognized from a nearby forest with binoculars."

H. von Dach's suggestions, just cited for rural areas, are also *mutatis mutandis* applicable for cities, where a closed or half-closed blind, a removable name plate on a door, some object placed in front of a door, or even a certain price-tag on an item in the window of a shopkeeper turned into a contact person, etc., can be employed as signals, and have been employed in the irregular warfare of recent decades.

If a more extensive message requires, that it be transmitted in written form, it must always be coded by using a so-called code-table, where the required words are translated into others, which usually have a completely different meaning, for

¹⁵ H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 59.

example "lemonade" for "enemy," "drink" for "evade," etc.¹⁶ The coding should be designed, so that it is not recognizable as such; the sentence to be transmitted must always have a reasonable and harmless meaning. In World War II, a paper was found on a Yugoslav partisan which read: "the archbishop is dancing at the wedding," so that even a gullible German field-commander noticed that it made no sense, which then led to the decoding of an entire partisan code-table. Some groups of the French resistance movement used a method which, as far as I know, remained secret until the end of the war. In letters, which were written or transmitted by contact persons, only words in a certain numerical order were code words. To determine which words were code-words, the day and month in the date on the letter were added; in one letter, dated March 3, every sixth word was a code word. It was certainly not easy to invent a reasonable and harmless sounding content for such letters, but it worked.

Code-tables with the real meanings of code-words, for coding and decoding, already mentioned, are agreed upon by the groups or issued by the leadership. These code-tables have to be changed from time to time, since—aside from the danger of betrayal—there is the possibility, that the adversary's counter-intelligence will be able to draw certain conclusions from the frequent use of certain words.

If the public mail service still functions in the guerilleros' operations-area, contact persons can use it. In this case, persons who normally have a large correspondence—such as businessmen—are especially suited for the activities of a contact person.

If the mail service in the guerilleros' operations-area is interrupted, slowed down, or otherwise constrained, or if it seems too dangerous to entrust a message to the mail, in spite of coding, contact persons will use so-called "letter drops." This is a place—I quote August Ségur-Cabanac¹⁷—"where instructions can be deposited"; it consists of "the mail-box itself, (i.e., a tree, a hole in a piece of wood, a crack in the

¹⁶ Compare Robert F. Williams, loc. cit., p. 181: "The first prerequisite for the urban guerilla is a far-reaching communications network and central planning. For that purpose, black freedom fighters need a secret communications code, however primitive it might be."

¹⁷ August Ségur-Cabanc, loc. cit., p. 16.

wall), and a pick-up or a danger signal. This indicates to the person who makes the pick-up, unobtrusively and at a safe distance from the letter-drop, whether a report is there, or whether danger threatens. Even messages entrusted to a letter drop must always be coded, because of the danger of discovery. If a contact person is missing, or if the contact person in question is overburdened, the letter-drop can substitute for the contact person temporarily, and to a certain extent. The location of letter-drops should be changed *as often as possible* because of the danger of discovery."

Only in exceptional cases—especially in very important and urgent matters—will a contact person *personally* transmit a message or an order to the addressee; and, in that case, always *orally*. On such occasions, the contact person must carry nothing written, which could give the slightest clue about his activity in general, and the content of the message or order which it is transmitting, in particular.

§ 4

Communications by Other Means

In irregular war, too, a considerable portion of all messages and orders are transmitted by radio. There are two different options: if the guerilleros have access to the broadcasting facilities of a public or private radio station—which may be the case, particularly when the irregular war is sponsored by a "conspiracy from above," or when an interested third power provides his facilities for the use of the guerilleros—various code messages, instructions, and orders can be mixed in at certain places, or certain times in the regular radio program. In the view of Ségur-Cabanac,¹⁸ this "is one of the most essential means" of communication in irregular warfare, "since transmission by different regional transmitters is more difficult to disrupt, and reception with modern transistor-equipment is possible everywhere . . ." The disadvantage of this means of communication lies in its one-sidedness, because it only allows orders to be given, but it does not permit individual action groups "to report back."

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

Even where public radio stations can be used to transmit orders, instructions, and messages from the top downward, radio communication must also be established from below upwards, as well as between the action groups themselves, by means of mobile or fixed installations from the stores of armed forces, or they must be constructed by the guerilleros themselves. If the beginning of an irregular war is a conspiracy "from below," the latter will usually be the only possibility for radio communication between the guerilleros, i.e., also between the leadership and the individual action groups. Therefore, most of the open or secret instructions for the preparation of an irregular war include training of future members of action-groups in the construction of radio transmitters and receivers, their use for transmission of Morse-code, as well as maintenance of radio equipment.¹⁹

The guerillero, however, will only use such radio communications in an emergency. The adversary's radio surveillance will be able to quickly locate the guerillero's transmitter; decoding of coded radio messages is simpler than decoding the key to code-words, mixed in harmless sounding letters, and the like. In this connection, Ségur-Cabanac correctly observes, that, "radio-voice communications," in particular, . . . [are] especially questionable and quite dangerous," and therefore "only to be used in an emergency." "The possibility of the discovery of the use of such means of communication to the outside, and within the operations-zone, involves the gravest dangers" for the action-groups of the guerilleros.²⁰

Finally, other instruments of communication in irregular warfare are, the carrier-pigeon and—although only in exceptional cases—the messenger-dog. Ségur-Cabanac²¹ remarks, "concerning carrier-pigeons as a means for irregular warfare units to send messages to command positions: extensive experience during the last war, as well as more recent exercises, have fully confirmed the reliability of this form of communication. There is no other form of communication,

¹⁹ As in H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 35; further, *Ça ira!*, loc. cit., p. 36; similar tendencies in *Rote Kalender 1972 für Lehrlinge und Studenten*, loc. cit., p. 83:

"It is neither very difficult nor expensive to become a radio amateur. One can build transmitters, receivers and antennae oneself. . . ."

²⁰ August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 23.

²¹ Ibid., p. 23.

against which the enemy can do so little." Additionally, preparations for carrier-pigeon communications, prior to the beginning of violent conflict in irregular warfare, can be made without the slightest danger of discovery. The disadvantage of deploying carrier-pigeons is, that the pigeon always flies a fixed route; and so, their use presupposes a locally fixed depot. Under favorable circumstances, the leader of the guerilleros may be able to establish such fixed depots, but not always. For that reason, the carrier-pigeon is not suited for communication from the top downwards.

In certain situations, messenger-dogs may also be used to establish and maintain communication links between individual contact persons, and, under certain circumstances, also between single action-groups operating in close proximity to one another. Messenger-dogs are relatively easy to train; and their training involves no danger of discovery. The disadvantage in the use of messenger-dogs is, that the dog must first be instructed in the route, over which he is to bring the messages. Usually, this route is "laid" with a scent which is undetectable by human beings. The messenger-dog carries the message hidden in his collar; he can easily be trained to "defend" his collar against any third person, who wants to take it away from him.

§ 5

Reconnaissance

In irregular warfare, too—and especially—the precondition for success is precise knowledge of the adversary's situation. Among the means of reconnaissance available to the guerillero, the informant is the chief one. The informant has the same importance for reconnaissance, as the contact person has for communications. The informant, too, is an active sympathizer: he, too, can not be involved in the irregular war propagandistically, nor as a fighter. He loses his value, as soon as the adversary identifies his political allegiances. Wherever an irregular war has been prepared in the last thirty years, we observe the attempt, in the course of these preparations, to place informants in decisive positions within the adversary camp, whether the appropriate people are infiltrated into

these positions (usually with the help of an interested third power), or whether an adversary official in such a position is won over to the guerilleros' cause. Usually, informants are assigned to provide information concerning specific questions. The informant generally transmits his information through contact persons, more seldom by means of letter drops. The informant also provides photographs, the importance of which, for the guerillero, is not immediately evident to anyone who might come across them,²² perhaps not even to the informant himself. He photographs what he is told to photograph, without knowing, or asking, why he must do this. Since the informant always runs the danger of being discovered, he should learn as little as possible about the composition and strength of the guerilleros, of their intentions and plans, and of the location of their leader.

One further means of reconnaissance available to the guerillero, already in the preparatory phase, is the *agent provocateur*, who seeks contact with members of the adversary's armed forces and police, and learns from his discussion partners numerous apparently meaningless details, in apparently harmless discussions in a cafe or restaurant, in a train or at a football game—information which is, nevertheless, useful for the leaders of the guerilleros.

In addition to these special means of gathering information, there are the observations made accidentally by one or another guerillero, and reported to the leadership.

The picture of the adversary, which the guerillero-leadership obtains in this way, is enhanced in important ways by news in newspapers and radio, speeches and announcements of adversary leaders, and even by actions, which the adversary threatens to take against the guerilleros.

That the guerillero will tap the telephone and monitor the radio traffic of the adversary whenever possible, requires no special mention. The guerilleros select and train specialists to that purpose in the preparatory period.

It is not so much the procurement of information in irregular war which poses problems, but the evaluation of this information. The guerillero leadership, generally, does not

²²The *Rote Kalender 1972 für Lehrlinge und Studenten*, loc. cit., p. 99, recommends taking pictures of "vulnerable points in the production process."

have a trained evaluations-staff; it is, therefore, the responsibility of the respective guerillero-leader himself to look at and evaluate all the information. Grivas-Dighenis, as well as Tito, were masters of evaluation, and owed a significant part of their success to this fact.

Reconnaissance, in the first place, is intended to give the guerillero the most detailed possible picture of his enemy. The guerillero leader must know not only the strength and combat value, positions, camps, quarters, command-principles, and patterns of behavior of his adversary in every detail; he must not only attempt to learn the intentions and plans of the adversary, as soon as possible; he must, furthermore, be able to think himself into the adversary's situation, on the basis of reconnaissance information, so that he can foresee the adversary's probable reactions to the actions of the guerilleros, and calculate them into his own planning. Whoever does not pose the question of the probable reaction of the adversary, or cannot answer the question with some prospect, that this forecast will be at least approximately correct in every case, will have little success as a commander in irregular warfare.

The guerillero's reconnaissance pays particular attention to personal relationships, economic relations, and political inclinations and activities of leading personalities on the adversary's side. The reconnaissance results, in this respect, sometimes also serve the guerillero as propaganda material, which is always an essential part of the war.

Finally, the guerillero requires constant information about the attitude of the population, in whose area he is supposed to operate. "The crucial issue is," H. von Dach²³ remarks, "who is generally reliable; who, among those who are reliable, is ready to help actively, for example, in procurement of supplies and information, hiding and caring for the wounded and sick, laying mines, etc., and who sympathizes with the adversary, or, in way or another, collaborates with him (fellow travellers, sycophants, informants, etc.)."

According to reports on irregular war waged in the last 25 years, there is also a phenomenon—this deserves at least brief mention in this connection—which is more frequent than in

²³H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 32.

"large" war, i.e., the phenomenon of the so-called "front man," an informant who pursues his activity as a business, to a certain extent, and provides information to both sides—the guerilleros as well as the adversary. This may, of course, be a peculiarity of the geographically large areas, in which most of these irregular wars have been conducted.

§ 6

The Interested Third Power

We have had occasion, repeatedly, to refer to the significance of the interested third power in modern irregular warfare—the significance of a foreign country, or an organization established in a foreign country, which, without participating in irregular warfare itself, secretly or openly provides active support to the guerilleros. The aid of an interested third power may sometimes consist in his providing his means of communication—especially mass-media—to the guerilleros; or the interested third power takes the side of the guerilleros propagandistically, or he provides a propagandistic platform for the guerilleros, or, finally, he makes his radio stations available to the guerilleros for coded transmission of instructions and messages from the guerillero leaders. In other cases, the interested third power supports the guerilleros, by allowing them to establish open or disguised bases on his own territory, where the interested third power takes over part of the task of equipping these bases. Often, the support of the guerilleros by the interested third power consists, finally, in supplies of weapons, equipment, munitions, or in assigning military advisors, individual trainers, or entire training companies. Sometimes, the interested third power takes over air-reconnaissance for the guerillero, including even armed air support. It is usually only a short step from this latter kind of aid to open intervention by the interested third power in combat.

In this connection, another problem should be mentioned at least peripherally: i.e., that of the infiltration of guerilleros, during covert combat, from another country where they have citizenship, but which plays the role of the interested third power in this case, into a country in which these guerilleros are foreigners, and which is intended to become their oper-

ations-area. Such infiltration over borders is often connected to the establishment of bases for guerilleros, who come from the operations-area, within the territory of the interested third power.

The country, which is the operations-area of these partly foreign-national guerilleros, can initially only defend itself against such infiltration—as long as covert combat has not become open combat—by protesting to the interested third power, by economic or other sanctions, and by strict border controls by its armed forces and police. These sanctions and controls can then be propagandistically exploited by the guerilleros against the government of this country. On the other hand, such an infiltration over state borders, in covert combat, is only useful for guerilleros in those cases, where the population on both sides of the national-border, over which the infiltration runs, are the same or closely ethnically related; only in this case can the guerillero expect a sufficient number of sympathizers in the operations-area, and only in this case will he be able to “submerge.”

Such infiltration over national borders is prepared by the interested third power prior to covert combat, in close co-operation with the “conspirators” within the operations-area; the individual action-groups, whose missions for combat are already fixed, are disguised within the national territory of the interested third power as sport-groups, brigades of forsters, members of factory-security organizations, etc. In this way, they can obtain thorough training for their later missions more or less unobtrusively.

As welcome as the support from the interested third power usually is for the guerillero leader, under certain circumstances, this aid can become a decisive command problem for him: the guerillero becomes more and more dependent on the aid of the interested third power, in his conduct of the war over the course of the irregular war. In this dependency, he runs the danger of becoming a mere tool of the interested third power, to be used as the latter sees fit, or to be left to destruction.

The classic example for the interested third power which betrays guerilleros—in this case, the Soviet Union—is the sacrifice of the Polish freedom-fighters under General Bor-Komorowski, in Warsaw in the Summer of 1944. Thayer re-

ports in detail about the desperate fight and destruction of this courageous Polish “home army.”

Dependency upon an interested third power remained a problem for Tito, too, during his entire war. The chapter, in which Vladimir Dedijer reports on the first phase of irregular war of the Yugoslav partisans, is headed by two Tito sayings from 1942: “If you can’t help us, then at least don’t hinder us,” and “we fought for twenty months without the slightest material aid from any side....”

I have deliberately named Bor-Komorowski and Tito alongside each other in this connection. Tito was, at first, largely able to do without the support of one or more interested third powers, because he made the entire territory of Yugoslavia into his operations-area from the very beginning, and was thus able to evade enemy superiority. Bor-Komorowski’s operations-area, on the other hand, was limited to the city, which was ideally suited for individual operations, but whose close quarters eventually became a death trap. Tito appealed to the people—the *entire* population of Yugoslavia—and soon found a response in broad parts of Yugoslavia; Bor-Komorowski first appealed to the interested third power, and therefore found no considerable support outside Warsaw, in the totally surprised population or Poland, utterly *unprepared* for the rebellion, despite the sympathy Bor-Komorowski otherwise enjoyed. He remained isolated, and was destroyed in isolation. The help of an interested third power can never be a substitute for the agreement of the large majority of the population, which it is the primary task of the guerillero leader to win over; it can never substitute for the active or passive support of the population.

Therefore, the adversary who does battle against guerilleros will put first priority—if he does not want to put his own success in question from the outset—on isolating the guerillero from the population, and only secondarily will he concentrate on isolating the guerillero from the interested third power.

One of the many strategic mistakes, which the German Wehrmacht made in World War II, in irregular warfare too, was not to have understood this, and not to have at least attempted to win over the population in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, to separate them from the guerilleros.

XV. TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE IN COVERT COMBAT

§ 1

The Act of Terror

In terrorism, the criminal act becomes an act of war. The terrorist act is to be understood as a violent act in *irregular warfare*, which the criminal law code of the state in which the act is committed, takes to be a premeditated criminal act, and which, in the intent of the perpetrators, is aimed at causing fear and panic among those indirectly or directly affected.¹

The act of terror is intended to make the adversary insecure, intimidate him, and to convince the population which the guerillero wants to win over to his cause, of the weakness of the adversary, and of his inability to defend himself; the terrorist act, as the *Kollektiv Rote-Armee-Fraktion* explains,² should

¹Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 32, draws a certain parallel between the terrorist and the "social bandit," and cites E. Hobshagm's definition of the bandit: "A man becomes a bandit because he does something which is not regarded as criminal by his local conventions, but is so regarded by the State of local rulers."

In this connection, it is interesting, that the *Rote Kalendar* 1972, loc. cit., p. 50, quotes the following from a work by Marighella: "The accusation of being a robber or a terrorist no longer has the negative connotations it once had. It does not shock any more, it is no longer reprehensible. To be a robber or a terrorist, is a quality, which does honor to any honest person, for it precisely characterizes the attitude of the revolutionary, who takes up arms against the enemy of the people."

²*Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 31. The cited sentence is at the end of an extensive treatment of the "tactically correct" procedures of terrorist groups. "If the commandos proceed in a tactically correct way," the cited section reads, "they will compel the forces of oppression, especially the police, to give up their system of individual patrols in housing areas, and they will then only be able to move in combat-strength units, i.e., the enemy must partially reverse the dispersal of his forces. That, however, means, that he can no longer protect and control all areas. He will have to withdraw into certain areas—at least temporarily, and repeatedly. In order to keep his loss of control at a minimum, he will seek a minimal size for his patrols, in order to be able to increase their number. The guerilla will be able to concentrate sufficient force, according to his own tactical discretion, armed with automatic weapons, which can successfully attack such patrols. In this way, the enemy will be forced to increase the strength of

"impressively and exemplarily demonstrate, that the state's apparatus of oppression is no longer capable of effectively and lastingly defending the interests of the owning class in certain areas." Finally, the act of terror is intended to prompt enemy *counter-terror*, and provoke the enemy's retaliatory measures, which affect either the *entire* population, or at least those in the population who are innocent, not participant in the act of terror—measures, which are ineffective, make the population resentful, and give the guerilleros welcome material for their propaganda.

The material result of the act of terror—the real, actual damage to the adversary—only plays a subordinate role in comparison to the psychological effects, the intimidation or fright effect, on the one hand, or the propaganda effect, on the other hand.³ "One possible object of terror," Martin Oppenheimer⁴ points out, "is to make repression of it so costly that a government (for example, in a colonial setting) prefers withdrawal to continued occupation. Indiscriminate terrorism tends to be more disruptive; discriminate terrorism more politically symbolic and oriented to gaining allies rather than discouraging an occupying power. It may even be motivated primarily by the calculation that counter-terror will be provoked, hence allies from among the victims of the government's (likely indiscriminate) repression can be gained. This has been the case more often than not. Terrorism, therefore, is often merely an entering wedge, and it can be effectively used to build a larger movement even by a very small vanguard."

Terrorism in covert combat is always only *one* instrument *alongside others*. "Terrorism," explains a leading member of the Guatemalan guerilla-movement M 13⁵ at the beginning

his groups, and at the same time limit his patrol-areas, avoid unfavorable terrain, form points of concentration, and thus neglect other objects, etc. Under these conditions, the guerilla can impressively and exemplarily demonstrate, that the state's apparatus of oppression is no longer able to effectively and lastingly protect the interests of the owning class in certain areas."

³This distinguishes the act of terror from sabotage. Compare below 5., p. 209 (in original).

⁴Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 76f.

⁵Richard Gott, loc. cit., p. 368. Richard Gott quotes this remark in connection with the publication of the so-called "First Declaration of Sierra de las

of the 1960s, "has never destroyed a (social) class or government. It should only be used as an enhancing activity for the support of other actions."

Thayer,⁶ who extensively studied the role of terrorism in irregular warfare, but, like Martin Oppenheimer, does not distinguish clearly enough between terrorism and sabotage, calls terrorism "the most limited form of the conduct of guerilla war." "Ordinarily, guerillas resort to violence of this nature," Thayer believes, "only when other forms of irregular warfare are denied them by lack of followers or lack of suitable weapons . . . if and when the guerilla force grows in numbers and strength, terror assumes a less important role. Terror can be used against the enemy to destroy his will to resist. . . . But against a resolute enemy, terror of this nature seldom succeeds and, as Grivas discovered, by its very horror it often increases the will to resist. However, in conjunction with other circumstances, it can succeed as it did against the British in Palestine in 1947 and again in the Suez-Canal zone in 1954, when the costs of suppression began to exceed the value of the objective in dispute."

The classical weapon of terror is the bomb: the bomb has become a kind of symbol for this kind of covert combat in the last hundred years, and its purpose is to spread fear.⁷ Terrorist and bomb-placer were synonymous over a long period of time. The bomb takes a number of forms: sometimes it is a relatively harmless, soot-filled paper fire-cracker, such as those which exploded in the covert combat of the National Socialists in Austria prior to 1938 in coffee houses, movie theaters, or railway waiting rooms, and covered the people and objects in their proximity with a cloud of black soot; sometimes the bombs are explosive charges on telephone and

Minas," December 1964, in which it says: "Combat in the city must not be limited to terrorism. M 13 and the MAR are the only movements in the capital city, which have taken responsibility in their own names for all strikes against the enemy in the city and in the mountains. But it is not their aim, to overthrow the governments by means of simple terror, a method of combat which only slightly impairs the bourgeois state and the capitalist dictatorship, but rather to combine military actions with the social struggle."

⁶Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 161.

⁷In this respect characteristic, is the *Rote Kalender 1972*, loc. cit., p. 22, which notes March 16 as a day of commemoration: "March 16, 1968: the first bomb attack on a criminal court (Berlin)."

high-tension towers, such as those used by the "Boomers" in South Tyrol in the 1960s, to call the attention of the world to the fate of their homeland; sometimes they are the dangerous explosive charges, which Grivas-Dighenis used to demolish police stations and public buildings on Cyprus, to drive the British off the island.

Terror is intended to induce people and groups of people to adopt a certain behavior. Terror is intended to demonstrate an influence of a certain intensity. Terror—viewed in this way—is a demonstration of power, the power of an active and resolute minority, determined to do anything to achieve its goals.

§ 2

The Escalation of Terror

Acts of terrorism are directed at people or things. The act of terrorism against persons begins with public insults, quarreling with or shouting down the political adversary, disruption or hindrance of teaching at schools and universities, anonymous threats, and organized character assassination. This extends, in a gradual escalation, to include kidnapping, torture, and killing, as extreme cases of acts of terrorism against persons. Under the heading: "All the things one can do!" the *Rote Kalender 1972 für Lehrlinge und Schüler*⁸ published a list of suggestions for acts of terrorism, which fills an entire page. The *Rote Kalender* cites, among other things, "interrupting sermons of all kinds (including by leftists), purposeful use of fire-crackers, stink-bombs, and paint, sending garbage through the mail to bosses of industry, explicit sexual reports in the confession-booth, nailing or gluing toilet doors shut,"

⁸Ibid., p. 95. Earlier, on p. 7, the *Kalender* speaks of illegal actions. They "will force the capitalists or their accomplices to make concessions or reveal themselves . . . For example: leaflets and posters, house occupations, actions against home-owners and land-speculators, against exploiters in luxury hotels, against bureaucrats in the administrations, against the owners of rental housing, against buildings and against the property of exploiters or their accomplices. In such actions, it is absolutely important, that the situation be analyzed, the political goals determined, the consequences calculated, the action planned, and the population informed."

and the like; the “revolutionary,” which the “Rote Kalender” wants to make out of trainees and school children, should “behave stupidly toward the bureaucrats . . . or give them unnecessarily detailed information, . . . ask for the reasons for every instruction without exception . . . , wear down hated people by means of telephone calls, letters, ringing their door bells, and appropriate music or by menacingly following them around.” Publication of “clever newspaper ads” on “deaths, marriages, and bankruptcies,” which never happened, is listed in this connection, as well as “expropriation or damage of instruments of domination,” among which are “school books, keys, money, the wives of bosses,” mentioned all in the same breath.

We observe the same escalation in the case of acts of terrorism against things, as we do in acts of terrorism against persons. These range from damage—“burning crosses” into things, warning or combat symbols “in the lawn in front of the house of political adversaries,”⁹ smearing of the walls of houses, littering in rooms to the point they become unusable, city-councils, court-rooms,¹⁰ schools and universities, and other public buildings—to destruction of equipment, destroying files, etc., destruction of electric-cable towers, violent occupation of buildings, to arson and bank robbery.

One form of terror—particularly frequent in Western Europe—is the occupation, also cited by the *Rote Kalender 1972*,¹¹ of “houses, lawns, beaches and other private property.”¹²

Marighella¹³ distinguishes between breaking into buildings, and their occupation. I quote: “When raids and break-ins are carried out against certain houses, offices, archives or public offices, the purpose is to seek and capture secret papers and documents, so that one can reveal the connections, the income

⁹Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 161.

¹⁰The *Rote Kalender 1972*, loc. cit., p. 65, lists September 5 as a day of commemoration: “September 5, 1968, Karl Heinz Pawla shits in the Berlin state court.”

¹¹Ibid., p. 95.

¹²The *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 44, cites as a typical example for the action of “revolutionary” irregular warfare, “when the guerilla exemplarily prevents a forced evacuation by armed action, so that all such actions in the future will only be possible under the protection of tanks and machine-guns.”

¹³Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 48.

and corruption of people in the government, their dirty business and criminal transactions.”

On violent occupation of buildings, Marighella writes¹⁴: “Occupations are attacks, which are carried out when the urban guerilla lodges himself into certain buildings and places, in order to temporarily resist the enemy for reasons of propaganda. Occupation of schools and factories—for example, during a strike—is a method of protest, or it occurs in order to divert the attention of the enemy. The occupation of radio broadcasting stations is done for propaganda reasons.” In general, Marighella observes: “The occupation is a very effective action-model, but in order to avoid losses of people and materiel in our own ranks, it is well to plan the withdrawal in painstaking detail, and to carry it out at the right moment. Occupations are limited in time”; and then Marighella concludes, “the quicker they are ended, the better.”

Marighella’s cited remarks on the occupation of buildings have three interesting features: first, Marighella does not explicitly mention the occupation of universities and university institutes, which is beginning to play an important role in covert combat, and instead he merely speaks in general about occupation of schools; he says nothing at all about occupation of empty apartment houses or apartments as protest against high rents or other real or supposed social grievances; and finally, he lays special emphasis on the brevity of the occupation.

In distinction to Marighella, the anonymous author of the French instructions of urban guerillas published in the underground¹⁵ emphasizes the importance of occupations of universities and other public buildings, as well as empty apartments in the housing areas of more wealthy people. The anonymous author does not think very highly, on the other hand, of brief occupations; he emphasizes, that the occupation should last as long as necessary, until the desired fear, intimidation or propaganda effect has been achieved.

Occupation of schools is intended to prevent certain things from being taught and proliferated, teachings which are opposed to the opinions of the guerilleros. To deny the political

¹⁴Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁵*Ça ira!*, loc. cit., p. 79

adversary the opportunity to publicly voice his views, and to influence the population by means of propaganda of the written and spoken word, sometimes in the mass media, is often the purpose of certain terrorist acts. The means of exerting terror in this respect are, firstly, hindering, breaking up or diverting the subject of public gatherings of the adversary, and at other times violently disrupting the distribution and sale of adversary newspapers, journals and other printed works,¹⁶ including the destruction of typesetting and printing equipment; at yet other times, temporary occupation of radio and television stations, and making crucial components of the transmission equipment unusable. In countries in which the right to free speech is guaranteed, terrorist acts of this kind can effectively limit this freedom; where the adversary of the guerillero claims a monopoly on influencing opinion—which an occupying power will usually do—such terrorist acts can be a vent for freedom of speech. In the latter case, the propagandistic effect of violent protest against monopolization of opinion by the adversary is often considerable. The Yugoslav partisans' irregular warfare against the Germans began with organized, simultaneous raids on one hundred newspaper stands, and the newspapers which were either published by the Germans, or at least licensed and censored by them, were burned, to the general jubilation of the domestic population. These actions were carried out by very small partisan groups consisting of three or four youths.

§ 3

Arson and Bank Robbery

The anonymous French author of the instructions for urban guerillas, quoted several times already, explicitly discusses arson as an effective means of terror. In that connection, the

¹⁶The *Rote Kalender 1972*, loc. cit., p. 29, commemorates "April 12, 1968: Delivery of the Springer press stopped in Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover, Munich, Essen, and Esslingen . . ."

cited instructions say,¹⁷ "two points are to be considered: Large impact of the action, and low possibility of discovery. Arson should cause tangible damage to the one immediately concerned, and produce fear among the mass of the enemy. It would be, however, damaging to the revolutionary cause, if suspicions respecting the perpetrator were to fall upon a member of the revolutionary movement." In the view of the anonymous author, warehouses are particularly good targets for arson, because considerable damage and a mood of panic can be caused easily, while the danger of discovery is slight. As Hermann Gebhardt¹⁸ notes, warehouses are, in fact, favorite targets for Latin American guerilleros.

Additional targets suggested in the anonymous French instructions for urban guerillas are buildings and other facilities, where the police will initially suspect fascist circles as the arsonists. Reduced to a more general rule, in committing arson as an act of terrorism, one should do it in such a way as to have the adversary blamed for the act.

While Marighella only touches on the question of arson in

¹⁷*Ça Ira!*, loc. cit., p. 81.

Compare Robert F. Williams, loc. cit., p. 182: "The most dangerous weapons of attack of the guerilla are the arson-divisions. Organizationally, they operate completely separately from the other units in their own ranks. Thousands of such teams, whose chief mission is sabotage, are to be established all over the United States; they are to consist of three or four persons, who are only known to each other. To the outside, they appear to be fervent fighters for civil rights, or appear completely indifferent, or even like Uncle Toms, who pretend to be super-patriotic, and are quite ready to conspire with the police. They never meet, never discuss with each other, unless they are suddenly assigned to a mission or there is an emergency. Then they begin to set fires strategically. They travel from city to city, and set burning candles hidden in large paper bags, so that the flame has enough air to burn until the dry leaves and grass catch fire. The size of the candle depends on how much time is needed to get away. At night, the bag hides the light of the candle. These torches are set to every building in the city and countryside, which belongs to the enemy. This activity in rural areas achieves a double effect: the adversary is forced to disperse his forces and pull them out of urban areas; he is no longer able to deploy his forces in numbers in ghettos, since: 1) the heat and smoke of a fire miles long make the country roads impassable for troop transports, and 2) the farming areas are so extensive, that strong troop units and a lot of materiel must be deployed to protect them. But America cannot afford to let its rich wood reserves and land go up in flames. The arson-groups travelling in cars cannot be kept away from the countryside."

¹⁸Hermann Gebhardt, loc. cit., p. 85

a brief remark—"setting fires and the production of fire bombs,"¹⁹ he writes, "are essential to the technique of revolutionary terrorism"—he deals more explicitly with bank robbery. I quote²⁰: "The most popular example of attack" in covert combat "is the attack on a bank; in Brazil, urban guerillas organized raids on banks as guerilla operations. Today, this form of attack widely serves as a kind of pre-examination for the urban guerilla during his training in the techniques of revolutionary conduct of war. Important innovations have been introduced to this technique of attack, which . . . guarantee the escape, seizure of money, and the anonymity of those involved. . . . Attempts by the banks to install new alarm systems, deploy guards, and install electronic spies and other U.S.-inventions, have proven to be fruitless, when the raid is carried out on a political basis and with the technique of urban-guerilla warfare."

For Marighella, bank robbery is not so much a terrorist act, but, as he remarks in conclusion of his remarks on it, "a typical *expropriation*."²¹ Marighella points out, in that regard, "that the revolutionary is handicapped by a double-competition in each armed expropriation: 1) by the competition of bandits, and 2) by the competition of 'right-wing' counter-revolutionaries."

This competition causes confusion, which makes itself felt in an insecure attitude of the population. "It is the task of the urban-guerilla," Marighella continues, "to prevent anything like that from happening. He does that in two ways: a) he avoids the tactics of the bandits, i.e., he avoids unnecessary violence, and expropriates no property which belongs to the people,²² and b) he uses the attack for purposes of agitation.

¹⁹Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 64.

²⁰Ibid., p. 46 f.

²¹Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 32: "The owners can be levied with obligatory contributions by the proletarian organization. It is the task of militia groups to accomplish the fulfillment of these obligations and to develop, together with the commandos, the appropriately 'convincing means,' and to employ them against exploiters who may resist."

²²Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 68, who cites Liddell Hart, who observed that an armed resistance movement "drew a number of shadowy figures into its ranks. Here, under the cover of patriotism, they were allowed to pursue their vices and give free reign to their resentment. . . . The result was disrespect for 'law and order,' which inevitably lasted

To that purpose, he must distribute propaganda material, during and after the attack, in order to make clear in every possible way, what the reasons for the action of the guerillero and their principles are, that the urban-guerilla is the expropriator of the government, of the ruling class and of imperialism."²³

§ 4

Kidnapping

Among the acts of terrorism against persons, kidnapping plays a special role: it is hostage-taking in irregular warfare. By kidnapping well-known personalities, the adversary is supposed to be forced to adopt a certain behavior—payment of ransom, intended to fill the guerilleros' "war chest," forcing the release of captured guerilleros, or causing the cessation of certain measures of persecution against the guerilleros. "Kidnapping means," we read in Carlos Marighella,²⁴ "to take a police-agent, a U.S.-spy, a political personality, or a notorious or dangerous enemy of the revolutionary movement prisoner, and to hold him at a secret place. Kidnapped persons

well beyond the time when the intruder had been driven out." To this, Oppenheimer adds the following remark: "Setting free aggressive tendencies, which is sanctioned by revolution, is attributed with a curative effect by Savon, but it exerts no therapeutic effect upon society after the revolution, for the feeling that violence is permitted, does not disappear when the revolution is over."

²³Compare Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 53:

"According to Debray, propaganda does not precede military actions, it instead *follows* military actions by the focus or the centers of the revolutionary army. Propaganda of the need is the beginning of all propaganda—for example, terrorism. Debray's guerilleros thus," Oppenheimer observes, "complete the historical slide back into banditry, and the ideological work follows after. In his own words, 'Armed propaganda follows military action . . . the most important form of propaganda is successful military action.'"

²⁴Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 59f. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the *Rote Kalender 1972* mentions a number of kidnappings by communist guerilleros as days of commemoration, among them the kidnapping on March 31, 1970, of the German ambassador in Guatemala, Count Spreti, and the June 12, 1970 kidnapping of the German ambassador in Brazil. While the assassination of Count Spreti is not mentioned, in the case of the kidnapping of the German ambassador in Brazil, it is added that "he was exchanged for political prisoners."

are used in exchange for, or to liberate imprisoned revolutionary comrades, or to stop torture in the prison cells of the military dictatorship. The kidnapping of famous persons, such as artists, athletes, professors, etc., who demonstrably, however, have no political interest, could be a useful form of propaganda for the revolutionary and patriotic principles of the urban guerilla. But this kind of kidnapping," Marighella concludes this section, "must be well-thought out and it must be carefully executed, so that the population says Yes to it."²⁵

The counterpart, in a certain sense, to kidnapping, is the liberation of prisoners; this, too, is a characteristic act of terrorism in the phase of covert combat. I quote once more Carlos Marighella²⁶: "The imprisoned urban guerilla looks upon the prison as a terrain which he must understand and master, in order to free himself . . . the urban guerilla at liberty considers the prisons of the enemy as an inevitable target of his actions, in order to free his ideological brothers. The urban guerilla at liberty and the urban guerilla in prison form the combination, upon which a liberation guerilla-action is based." Marighella pointedly notes in this connection: "there is no prison, not on an island nor in a city, nor in the countryside, which can resist the cunning, skill, and the fire-power potential of the revolutionary."

The liberation of a prisoner was the beginning of covert combat for Tito's partisans—the freeing of Alexander Rankovich from the Belgrade hospital for political prisoners on

²⁵The *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 44, emphasizes this propagandistic element of kidnapping, citing the example of a kidnapping action in a case where "a partisan commando takes the boss of a business prisoner, because he has fired workers, and is thereby forced to rescind their dismissals."

Compare also Manfred Neuber in *Die Welt* of April 16, 1970, p. 2: "If the authorities of the state give in to the demands of the kidnappers for release of political prisoners and ransom, they will have confirmed their impotence to the population, and their authority will dwindle away. If they reject the attempt at blackmail . . . they will be hit by the protest of world opinion—at least in the case of foreign diplomats—and the revolutionary climate in their own country will be heated up."

²⁶Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 58. The *Rote Kalender 1972*, p. 53, lists as a day of commemoration "July 29, 1971: Long live the revolution! the day that the prison warden Iguala in Mexico freed 125 persons. July 30, 1971: 39 Tupamaro women escape from the women's prison in Montevideo through a tunnel they had constructed themselves." P. 63: "September 13, 1970: the Weathermen liberate T. Leary from prison."

July 29, 1941, one week after the official "Proclamation" of irregular warfare by the Yugoslav communists. It was a daring feat, which, as Vladimir Dedijer reports,²⁷ and German soldiers then deployed in the Yugoslav capital city confirm, "caused immense excitement in Belgrade." "A few days later, a larger partisan unit attacked the prison in the Serbian city of Saboc, and they were able to free 80 comrades." In this case, too, the propaganda effect in favor of the partisans was great.²⁸

§ 5

Sabotage

The act of sabotage is a central feature of covert combat. Covert combat is not exclusively sabotage, but it is primarily sabotage. Sabotage usually means premeditated, deliberate hindrance, disruption, or destruction of a business, factory, or a transportation, supply, or communications facility by means of deliberate damage, usually—but not always—by employing violence. From the standpoint of intra-state law, sabotage, too, is a criminal offense. The act of sabotage is distinguished from the act of terror not so much in respect of its external—objective—effect, as by virtue of the fact, that its *intended aim* is different. The *material* result of the action is now the chief consideration, i.e., the objective, actual damage to the adversary; the psychological result—intimidation or inducing fear, on the one hand, or the propaganda effect, on the other hand—which is the chief aim of an act of terrorism, now becomes secondary to the intended and accomplished material or psychological-damage effect.

The categories of possible sabotage acts are just as broad, as those of possible terrorist acts. Any attempt to provide a systematic overview of possible forms of sabotage is condemned to failure from the beginning.

²⁷Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 150.

Compare A. Neuber, loc. cit., p. 219: "Steps must be taken to free political prisoners at once at the beginning of a rebellion, even if chances of success are only slight."

²⁸The so-called "liberation" of Mussolini by German paratroops was also, fundamentally, an act of covert warfare, although in the framework of a conventional war.

Sabotage is the continuation of subversive propaganda with greater intensity, and with other means. We already observed, in respect of its definition, that sabotage does not always signify employment of violence, although, as a general rule, this is the case. Oppenheimer²⁹ cites a number of examples of *non-violent* sabotage: "attempts to disrupt government authorities by means of false accusations, letter- and telephone-campaigns; throwing sand into the machinery of industrial production by proliferating false reports; over-burdening the system by means of false alarms; systematic slow-down of work in a factory; frequent sick-days; or, following the example of the good soldier Schweik, excessive appeal to legalistic regulations, and excessively correct adherence to them."

The examples cited here and in other places³⁰ by Oppenheimer have a remarkable similarity to the "proposals" mentioned above,³¹ in another connection, in the *Rote Kalender* 1972, which also mentions one case in its list of subversive activities, that apprentices "... sometimes make mistakes when working with expensive machines."³² Oppenheimer's list, as well as that in the *Rote Kalender* 1972, demonstrate that the dividing line between subversive propaganda, on the one hand, and terrorist actions at the lowest level of terror and sabotage, on the other hand, is a very blurred one.

Marighella³³ calls sabotage "an especially destructive form of attack" in irregular warfare. As he explains, "only a few people are necessary; sometimes a single person can accomplish the desired result. When the urban guerilla uses sabotage, the first phase consists in isolated acts of sabotage, carried out by individuals, and then goes over into a second phase, which is dispersed, general sabotage, carried out by the entire people. Well-done sabotage requires study, planning, and careful execution. ... A little sand, the smallest amount of flammable fluid, faulty lubrication, removed screws, short-circuits, a few pieces of wood or metal in the right places, can cause irreparable damage."

One of the primary missions of the regional guerillero lead-

²⁹Martin Oppenheimer, loc. cit., p. 76.

³⁰Ibid., p. 86 and p. 137 to 149.

³¹See above 2., p. 200 (in original).

³²*Rote Kalender* 1972, loc. cit., p. 95.

³³Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 60f.

ership, in the phase of covert combat, is to select appropriate targets for sabotage in a particular area, and to coordinate the different sabotage operations, so that the sabotage *as a whole* is as effective as possible, the damage to the adversary as great and lasting as possible. Heinz Kühnrich,³⁴ who reports in detail on the activity of communist partisans during World War II, demonstrates with a series of instructive examples, how the communist partisan leaders solved this task.

Neither acts of terrorism nor sabotage operations are directly intended in their basic aims—aside from a few exceptions—to destroy human life *per se*. In both cases, the guerillero will attempt to evade any armed confrontation, any open combat, with the adversary. But in acts of terror, as well as sabotage, the guerillero must expect that the operations he carries out will, in their results, cost human lives. He consciously runs the risk of killing and being killed in his operations. In the one case, he will have to overwhelm a guard, or another time he might have to "shoot his way out" of a situation; then again, he might have to kill innocent persons who are in his way, and at other times, innocent persons will be the victims of the consequences of an act he has committed, for example, when a piece of a machine has been deliberately produced to be faulty.

Marighella³⁵ makes an interesting reservation, in this connection, when he speaks of sabotage of railway transportation. "In such acts of sabotage," he writes, "there is only one consideration: not to kill or hurt passengers, especially working commuters."

§ 6

Targets of Sabotage

The focus of all partisan operations in World War II—Heinz Kühnrich observes³⁶—was "sabotage of enemy transportation and supply lines."

The targets most vulnerable to sabotage are railway lines.

³⁴Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 58ff.

³⁵Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 62.

³⁶Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 287.

Tito's partisans began their actions against the Germans, according to Vladimir Dedijer's reports, "with a first sabotage action on the night of June 23-24, 1941, against the Belgrade-Zagreb railway line."³⁷

"A barrier blown up, a blocked tunnel, a wagon as an obstacle," Marighella³⁸ remarks, "can have immense consequences."

Swiss Major von Dach's instructions on irregular warfare for everyone³⁹ summarize a number of tactical principles for interrupting railway lines, on the basis of World War II experience. "The object," von Dach writes, "is to make regular railway operation impossible, and to extend the times of interruption as much as possible. That is achieved by causing the maintenance organization to deploy as often as possible (alarms of working teams, coupling of maintenance trains, etc.). *One railway catastrophe* per month is less of an impairment for the adversary than the task of having to *continuously* repair small damage on a *daily* basis. Simply blowing up a railway track causes an interruption of traffic on the line of 5-6 hours; a derailed train interrupts service for 12-13 hours. As a counter-measure, the adversary will introduce a speed limit for the locomotives. That reduces the number of cars derailed to 3 or 4. But the speed limit considerably reduces the efficiency of the railway lines in question. . . . The most permanent destruction is useless, if the demolition sites can be circumvented." If, for example, two places are connected by three tracks of rail, "All three lines must be interrupted simultaneously, or one right after the other."

Demolition of bridges is the most effective way to temporarily disrupt enemy road transportation. Von Dach⁴⁰ warns correctly, however, against expecting too much in terms of the extent of damage. "Therefore, it is not so important," he writes, "*how* you demolish an object; the crucial point, instead, is *when* you do it. A technically primitive demolition, detonated with tactical skill shortly before a decisive action, is militarily

³⁷Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 142.

³⁸Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 62.

³⁹H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 211.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 113.

more useful than a perfect demolition at an off time, when the adversary does not have to rely upon that transport connection."

As another option for sabotage of road networks, von Dach⁴¹ cites the spreading of nails or metal thorns in large quantities, stretching cables over streets, and setting up other barriers, especially construction barriers, and finally, mining streets with improvised mines.

Roadblocks play an important role at the very beginning of covert combat. The publication "University Combat—Fighting Newspaper of the Initiative Committee for the Red Cells in West Berlin," points to this in connection with a street demonstration at Kurfürstendamm in mid-May, 1971. Written as a kind of maneuver-critique, the cited student newspaper says⁴²: "It was good to set up obstacles to traffic with cars and construction materials. The pigs are ultimately dependent on their cars. So, nothing gives us more freedom of action than road-blocks and traffic chaos. . . ."

While in World War II, which constituted the basis for H. von Dach's conclusions, railways and roads were the most important means of civilian and military overland transportation in war—whether it was "large" war or irregular war—today air transportation is an additional, third, and equally important means, not only for civilian transportation, but also for military cross-country transportation. Large military transport aircraft can deprive disruptions of rail and road traffic of its effect to a great extent. In addition, helicopters in irregular warfare—especially when covert combat has escalated into open combat—can transport light, non-armored adversary combat troops quickly and surprisingly to their deployment area, or—armed—even to intercede directly in a ground battle. With this development, adversary air-transportation facilities—both ground facilities as well as the aircraft themselves—have become important targets for guerillero sabotage and raids. Von Dach, who does not discuss *sabotage* of air-transport facilities, and only considers the problem of raids,⁴³ cites as important "demolition targets . . . a)

⁴¹Ibid., p. 59.

⁴²"Solidarity with imprisoned comrades," in *Hochschulkampf—Kampfblatt des Initiativ-Komitee der Roten Zellen in Westberlin*, No. 9/10, May 24, 1971.

⁴³H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 114.

mobile heavy radio stations, b) mobile radar stations, c) stationary aircraft," in addition to attacks on crew and ground-maintenance personnel, who can only be targets of raids, but not sabotage.

Von Dach only speaks of stationary aircraft; Marighella,⁴⁴ on the basis of his experience in the 1960s, goes much further. In a chapter on the attack in covert combat, he writes: "Aircraft on the runway can be seized and the crews overwhelmed. Once in the air, aircraft can be hijacked by a guerilla operation or a single person, or it can be forced to change course." Aircraft hijacking has developed in recent years into a special form of sabotage of air-transportation.⁴⁵

⁴⁴Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 46.

⁴⁵Compare Edward McWhinney, *International Legal Problem-Solving and the Practical Dilemma of Hijacking*, in the collection of essays by the same author, *Aerial Piracy and International Law*, Leiden 1971, p. 16ff.: "The 'Cuban' hijackers began harmlessly enough at the beginning of the 1960s with a series of forced course changes of smaller aircraft and small ships from Cuba to the United States, by political adversaries of the Castro regime which had just taken power, who used these hijackings as a way to flee from Cuba. . . . When the first civilian passenger plane was hijacked shortly thereafter to Cuba, the Castro government . . . exploited the situation, in order to conclude a quid-pro-quo deal with the United States, according to which all Cuban aircraft or ships hijacked to the United States should return to Cuba, while on the other hand, all American civilian passenger planes forced to alter their courses for Cuba, would be released. This de-facto agreement between Cuba and the United States seems to have worked rather well over the years. . . . In the Mediterranean area and in the Middle East, airplane hijackings—particularly after the resumption of military conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis in June 1967—. . . seems to have developed into one means, in addition to others, to attempt to achieve political aims, without having to resort to direct military action or military confrontation, with all the risks of another disastrous defeat, which every such military action seems to involve. The advantage of such hijackings as a weapon to achieve political aims with non-military means is particularly the unusually low cost, in terms of money, energy and human life, which such actions seem to have required previously; furthermore, the relative ease with which they can be carried out; the worldwide publicity which can be obtained for one's own political program; and finally—at least up to the multiple hijackings in the Jordanian desert in September 1970—a certain element of perverse sympathy, which the hijackings seem to have unleashed in many places, and whose cause is doubtless to be sought in the superficial comparison between the physical weakness of the hijacker himself (especially the Palestinian women commandos) on the one hand, and the concentrated power and established nimbus, on the other hand, which is symbolized by the jet or jumbo-jet, which the hijackers managed to seize." In this connection, it is interesting, that the "Rote Kalender 1972,"

In irregular warfare, sabotage of communications installations can be equally as important as sabotage of transportation. At the beginning of September 1943—in the period between the Italian cease-fire and the Allied landing at Salerno—Italian partisans cut nearly all of the German communications cables in the area of southern Rome, where the German Oberkommando Süd had set up headquarters, and where most of the German reserves in Italy were located.⁴⁶ On the night of June 5, 1944, French resistance fighters destroyed a considerable part of the German military telephone lines on the Cotentin peninsula, just a few hours before the Allied landing in Normandy. In both cases, the acts of sabotage had no appreciable significance for the combat action on the whole, but it did represent a certain support of the Allied armed forces—help, which—particularly in the last case cited—was significant for the battle which broke out shortly thereafter.

It is difficult for guerilleros to do anything against radio communications, unless they have jamming equipment at their disposal. Radio stations can only be knocked out by open acts of violence, and then only briefly. Such acts of violence against radio stations, however, are not infrequent. In 1968, as Hermann Gebhardt⁴⁷ reports, the Tupamaros in Uruguay "made a bomb attack against the broadcasting station of CX 10 'Radio Ariel,' during a speech by the Uruguayan President Jorge Areccco. The station belonged to Dr. Jorge Battle, who was among the chief supporters of the regime at that time." An-

loc. cit., p. 52, notes the day of commemoration of "July 23, 1968: First hijacking (to Cuba, of course)."

⁴⁶Compare Josef Schroeder, *Italiens Kriegsauftritt 1943. Die deutschen Gegenmassnahmen im italienischen Raum: Fall "Alarich" und "Achse," Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, Vol. 10, Göttingen 1969, p. 297, on German counteractions to the Allied invasion in Salerno: "The Supreme Commander South, the Army High Command 10, and the General Command of the 14th Tank Corps, left no doubts in the course of September 9 of their determination, expressed in appropriate orders, to break the just-formed Anglo-American bridge-head . . . it was a disadvantage, in the attempt to bring the German units quickly to the focal point of the action, that all communication lines between the Supreme Commander South and the Army High Command 10, on the one hand, and the Army Command 10 and the subordinate General Commands, had been cut. . . ."

⁴⁷Hermann Gebhardt, loc. cit., p. 118.

XVI. ASSASSINATIONS AND RAIDS IN COVERT COMBAT

§ 1

The Assassination

In the assassination, or—to use the language of the guerilleros—in the so-called “execution,” the destruction of human life becomes the actual purpose of the action in covert combat.¹ Lenin saw these “executions” as the “chief aim” of partisan warfare in general.² Executions are primarily directed against traitors or other recalcitrants in one’s own ranks. The documents published by Heinz Kührich in his book on

¹Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 41: “In an article in 1857 on the English-Chinese war, Engels discussed the hypocritical howling of the liberals about the methods of partisan warfare. He emphasized, that, with partisan warfare, the Chinese people had found a method, which, if continued, could make British victory impossible: . . . now the mass of the people actively participates, and even finances the fight against the foreigners. They poison, en masse and in cold-blooded calculation, the bread of the European colony of Hong Kong. . . . Chinese go on board merchant ships with concealed weapons, and while underway, they kill the crew and the European passengers, and take over the ship. They kidnap and kill every foreigner they can capture. . . . In a people’s war, the methods used in rebellion can not be judged according to the generally recognized rules of regular conduct of war, nor according to any other abstract standards. . . .”

²V.I. Lenin, *Partisanenkriegführung*, in F. M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 117: “The armed struggle is directed at two different goals, which must be strictly differentiated. The first goal consists in killing individual persons, such as high officials and members of lower rank in the police and army. The second goal is to collect money from the government as well as private persons.” The *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 38, cites other Lenin quotes along the same or similar lines. Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 15, also proves to be a true student of Lenin, when he observes: “The armed struggle of the urban guerilla” is directed “against two chief targets: a) the physical liquidation of the bosses and hangers on of the armed forces and police, b) the expropriation of property and means of production, which belong to the government, the monopoly capitalists, large land owners, and imperialists.”

other time, “the terrorists broke into the broadcasting station and repeatedly played a tape-recording with a revolutionary proclamation . . . during the broadcast of a football game by CX 8 ‘Radio Sarandi,’ which was received by hundreds of thousands. . . .”

Supply facilities are often targets of sabotage in irregular warfare. Two guerilla raids on supply facilities made headlines in the world’s major newspapers: the demolition of the electricity supply of Nicosia was Georgios Grivas-Dighenis’ beginning of irregular warfare on Cyprus, March 29, 1955.⁴⁸ In early October 1971, North Irish guerilleros knocked out the water supply of Belfast.⁴⁹

In addition to transportation lines, communications, and supply facilities, agriculture and industrial production are also targets for sabotage in irregular warfare. I quote Marighella⁵⁰ once more: acts of sabotage “in agricultural and industrial production, where the urban guerilla has precise knowledge of the local situation, are difficult to prevent. Industrial workers, who are urban guerillas, are the best saboteurs of industry; better than anyone else, they know the system of production and its easily destroyed crucial components: they can disrupt the entirety of production, and do much more damage than less informed people.”

⁴⁸Charles W. Thayer, loc. cit., p. 154.

⁴⁹Compare Carl Schmitt, *Gespräch über Partisanen*, in Joachim Schickel, loc. cit., p. 16: “I can imagine, that here in Southern Westphalia, where we are having our discussion, if the appropriate tactical-nuclear possibilities were given, a real partisan, dressed up as a pediatric physician, could go up into the nearest mountain, and destroy the dams of Southern Westphalia and the surrounding area, with the effect, that the entire Ruhr area would be turned into a swamp.” Further, Robert Williams, loc. cit., p. 184, who speaks of large-area arson by black guerilleros, and then continues: “If the offensive has reached its peak, car-drivers with heavy wrenches will disperse to all parts of the city and open the hydrants wherever possible. The covers will be removed, the windings of the valve-screws destroyed, and the valves turned on wide-open. That reduces the adversary’s chances to right the fire, and fire is the blacks’ most effective weapon.”

⁵⁰Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 61ff.

partisan warfare during World War II³, show the common thread of the idea, that a traitor—to cite the words of the “Oath of Honor of French frantireurs and partisans”⁴ as an example—“has passed the death sentence *upon himself*,” and that this death sentence must be carried out “in the shortest possible time and without recourse.” “Any person who resists carrying out the sentence upon a traitor,” the cited “Oath of Honor” continues, “should be considered to be a sympathizer with this traitor, and accordingly punished.”

A number of partisan movements in World War II established *revolutionary tribunals*—such as the Slovak Janošik Battle Community—which passed down sentences in a kind of court-martial. If such a tribunal was not convinced of the innocence of the accused, its judgment—as can be seen in the Directive of the Central Staff of the “People’s Liberation Army” of Bulgaria in the spring of 1943, on the character, organization, and tasks of the partisan movement⁵—would usually be the death sentence.

Even the traitor who does *not* come from the ranks of the guerilleros, faces death. Along these lines, Marighella⁶ writes: “Those who go to the police out of free will, to inform against and make accusations against (guerilleros), who report and

³Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 434. Compare Brooks McClure, *Russlands verborgene Armee*, in F.M. Osanka, loc. cit., p. 134, who reports the following on a Soviet partisan group: “The slightest violations of the regulations of the ‘group’ often resulted in immediate execution, as one sees in the following orders by Grishin”—the leader of this group: “October 13, 1943: the group leader Wbatscharew is to be shot, because he left his post of his own volition. January 19, 1943: The partisan-spy Andre Jenkowa is to be shot, because he repeatedly failed to carry out reconnaissance orders. May 11, 1943: Repeated licentiousness with women has resulted in seven cases of pregnancy. These women are a burden for the ‘group,’ they are to be shot. September 22, 1943: company commander Lukhanov procured liquor and drank it with his men. He is to be shot. Despite Grishin’s strict discipline,” McClure adds, “new candidates continued to join his ‘group.’”

⁴Heinz Kühnrich, loc. cit., p. 491.

⁵Ibid., p. 468. According to Zajarschenko, loc. cit., spies, traitors, and provocateurs, are to be publicly exposed, so that they become known to the members of the guerilleros among the population. He demands, that such persons be taken to a court martial of the guerilla movement, and that they be given the opportunity to defend themselves. That is intended to avoid condemning persons who are active in the enemy’s camp on secret assignment from the higher leadership of the guerilleros.

⁶Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 59.

transmit information, and spy behind people’s backs, must also be executed, if they are caught by the urban guerillas.”

Individuals are also “executed” as “punishment,” particularly hated or particularly dangerous members of enemy leadership groups, or enemy intelligence services and persons who either have or are still interrogating guerilleros—the guerilleros speak of “torture slaves”—and these persons are at the top of the list for assassination.

Morally, the guerilleros justify assassination—to the extent that they give it any thought at all—in terms of the illegality of their combat, which prevents them from turning persons who are criminals in their eyes, over to a “normal” court which they could expect to serve justice according to *their* convictions as well. Since he finds no court which serves his notion of “law,” the guerillero takes the law into his own hands.⁸

Georgios Grivas-Dighenis⁹ describes the activity of his “execution groups” on Cyprus in detail. They “consisted of two or three persons, who had excelled in boldness, cleverness,

⁷Compare *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 34: “The guerilla will . . . act according to the principle: ‘Punish one, and educate a hundred!’ . . . The state’s forces of oppression rest upon the complacency of the oppressed within the apparatus of oppression. This complacency, on the one hand, is rooted in the fear of those, who have decided on a professional career within this apparatus. The rule of capital is inconceivable without this army of people who shit in their pants. . . . For them, the revolutionary forces proclaim *personal* responsibility for anything done against the interests of the working class, for every betrayal of the interests of the working population. They are to be individually and respectively held responsible for their crimes. Their cowardice then becomes a lever to accelerate the collapse of enemy power.”

Typical of this kind of covert combat is the report by Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 144, from the summer of 1944: “The German military command had . . . ordered curfews. . . . In certain parts of the city (Belgrade), mass searches of all houses and apartments were carried out. The partisans decided, as a retaliatory measure, to punish all Yugoslav police” who collaborated with the Germans “with death. They were shot down in the middle of the street, and a number of them killed.”

⁸This line of thinking reminds one, to a certain extent, of the regulations of the armed forces of a number of countries, that, in war, a battalion or regiment commander can establish an ad hoc court martial in a case, in which a punishable offense against disciplinary regulations, or in the conduct of combat, has been committed, which requires immediate punishment, and where a competent court is not immediately at hand. The judgment of this ad hoc court martial, following confirmation, is then carried out immediately by the commander in question.

⁹Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 100f.

and their shooting accuracy. They acted in agreement with the principle contained in the main plan, to make the adversary believe that he could never feel secure, but also to free us of certain dangerous persons. . . . As weapons, they usually carried pistols, sometimes machine-pistols and hand-grenades. These groups were especially active in the cities, where they found good targets. The members of the group, as a rule, could not be wanted persons, they had to be unsuspected, thus able to follow their target by day, work out the battle plan, and then be able to attack their target on the open street. Everyone will be able to appreciate how difficult their mission was. Successful accomplishment of the mission required additional courage, initiative, intellectual mobility, and physical strength. . . . The executioner must not carry the weapon with him. . . . It is advisable to have the weapon transported by another person, someone who can not be suspected so easily (a small boy, an old woman or old man)."

I do not know, whether Marighella knew of Grivas-Dighenis' book. He expands upon it, in any case, consciously or unconsciously, when he observes, that "in many cases . . . the execution (can) be carried out by a sharp-shooter . . . who operates in absolute secrecy, alone and unknown, and cold-bloodedly."¹⁰

In Latin America, in particular, revolutionary covert combat is characterized by an almost unbroken chain of "executions" of traitors or especially feared, especially hated, or especially important persons on the adversary side. Guatemala and Colombia have obtained a macabre reputation in this respect in world public opinion: they are the cited examples for a situation which we also find in a similar war in other Latin American countries—although on a smaller scale. "The number of political assassinations" in Guatemala since 1957, Hermann Gebhardt¹¹ writes, "is reported to be 2,000 annually, a number, which," in Gebhardt's view, "is probably exaggerated. In 1967, there were 'officially' 307 dead in six months, in January 1968, 26 killings in the course of two weeks." From Colombia, Richard Gott¹² reports the number of 135,000 vic-

¹⁰Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 59.

¹¹Hermann Gebhardt, loc. cit., p. 77.

¹²Richard Gott, loc. cit., p. 171.

tims of covert combat over the last decade of so-called "violencia," among them more than 3,500 police. About one-half of these deaths are probably due to guerillero "executions." Tirofijo—"sure shooter"—was the name of one known Colombian guerilla leader. The methods of killing recall, in their sadistic brutality, descriptions from the Middle Ages or the Thirty Years' War.

§ 2

The Significance of the Raid in Covert Combat

The raid in covert combat is an armed action, in which a unit or an installation of the adversary is attacked by guerilleros at a moment, when the adversary is inferior to the guerilleros, either in terms of armament or combat readiness, or due to a terrain which is unfavorable to him. The aim of a raid is to destroy the unit or installation for a long time, i.e., to kill or capture persons on the enemy side, and to destroy or capture the adversary's materiel. The raid is characterized by a surprise attack, a brief battle,¹³ and rapid withdrawal of the guerilleros. It is no less characterized, on the other hand, by the fact, that it can be carried out in innumerable variations within this framework.

The raid is distinguished from the act of terror and the act of sabotage, in that the guerillero here engages in combat, and engages an armed adversary in attack, while the success of the act of terror or sabotage almost always depends upon the guerillero not encountering the adversary, and the as-

¹³Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 94, emphasizes, that in a raid "the encounter with the adversary must last only a few minutes."

Whenever we speak of an "attack" in this discussion of the raid in covert combat, we do so with the reservation, that we do not mean the attack in the tactical sense, in distinction to defense, which is unknown in covert combat, because the distinction between attack and defense is foreign to its nature. The French can distinguish between "aggression" and "attaque"; the German only has one expression for "attack," for which there are a number of conceptual meanings. Sometimes attack means an aggressive activity in contrast to a passive, *waiting* behavior, whatever form it might take; then again, one can define "attack," in contrast to a defensive, *holding-off* behavior, as an offensive behavior; one can also, finally, define attack in the tactical sense, in contrast to defense, as a certain military act, at the center of which is movement *forward*, the thrust.

sassination is characterized by the fact, that the guerillero encounters the adversary at the moment when the latter is defenseless. Terrorism, sabotage, and assassination are, by their nature, criminal offenses from the standpoint of law; the fact that they are committed in covert combat can only be a subjective ground of justification, and then only from the standpoint of morality. Under certain conditions, the raid can be understood objectively as an act of war—also from the standpoint of law—in which the question of punishability can only be solved in connection with the entire problem of responsibility in war, and for the war. One could call acts of terrorism, sabotage, and assassination, para-criminal acts of covert combat, but the armed raid, on the other hand, must be conceived as a paramilitary action of this combat.

The armed raid in covert combat serves a five-fold purpose. First, it intends—like sabotage and assassination—to hit the adversary materially at a vulnerable point, to actually damage him. The damage caused by the *individual* raid, will, as a rule, be within limits which are still tolerable for the adversary. This holds particularly when the raid is against individual vehicles or small columns, guard posts, or other weak units of the adversary in exposed quarters. In such cases, the damage will only become tangible for the adversary in connection with *other* actions in covert combat. *To that extent*, the individual raid is only meaningful and useful in the framework of broader planning.

The armed raid, secondly, is intended to facilitate the continuation of covert combat for the guerilleros who carry it out—similar to sabotage operations. Particularly in *this* respect, the *individual* raid, *too*, has its special importance. The advantage sought in covert combat may consist in temporarily hindering an adversary counter-action, and temporarily knocking out one position, from which the enemy would be able to move against the guerilleros. Examples for such a case are raids on police stations, on an enemy staff, a reporting station, or an adversary supply base,—a weapons, munitions, fuel, or food supply depot—on a communications center, or the position of electronic equipment, stationary aircraft, or adversary flight security installations.

The advantage, which the armed raid is intended to obtain for the guerilleros, will, thirdly, often materially consist of the

procurement of explosives, weapons, fuel, or urgently necessary and not easily procured munitions. Marighella put such a priority on this goal of a raid—capture of materiel—that he included it in his definition of the attack of urban guerillas.¹⁴

Fourthly, the armed raid—just as terrorist acts and sabotage—is intended to “throw the enemy off balance,” make him insecure, and convince him of the “omnipresence” of the guerilleros. On the one hand, it should contribute to the material isolation of the enemy, by inducing him to establish comprehensive defense and security measures, which cost him men and materiel, which therefore are not available for other purposes; it should, on the other hand, demoralize the individual officials, police or soldiers on the enemy side, by making clear to them, that they are in continuous danger in the guerilleros’ operations-area, wherever they stay.

Finally—a fifth, last purpose—the armed raid also serves, in the same way as any other instrument of covert combat, as propaganda for the guerilleros’ cause. Every successful raid wins new followers over to the guerilleros, especially when it is directed against installations or persons unpopular with the population.

Among the cited five purposes of the raid, one or the other may be primary, depending on the circumstances. The target of the raid is primarily determined by its purpose. Civilian targets—Marighella¹⁵ explicitly cites banks, commercial and material enterprises, prisons, government property, and means of mass communication—are additional to military targets, among which, in covert combat, are all facilities of the police and foreign occupying authorities; there are fixed targets as well as mobile targets.

Acts of terror and assassination are, in historical reality, phenomena which regularly accompany covert combat, and from the point of view of the guerillero, are even essential and necessary. But they do not characterize the picture of this combat in its general features in the same way as sabotage and raids do. Covert combat is theoretically conceivable with-

¹⁴Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 44.

¹⁵Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 44.

out terror, and without assassination, but never without sabotage or without raids.

§ 3

Prerequisites of the Armed Raid

The surprise of the adversary is essential to the success of a raid. A successful surprise can, in a concrete case, also compensate to a degree for numerical weakness or inferior armament of the attacker, which should not, however, be overestimated. A raid which the adversary expects, will fail, whatever the reason the enemy expects the raid, whether he learns of the guerilleros' intent because of betrayal, or whether he suspects a raid on account of his own, correct judgment of the situation and the terrain.

"Surprise is achieved," as Ségur-Cabanac¹⁶ formulates the point, with particular reference to the raid in irregular warfare in terms of the old soldier's adage, "by attacking when the enemy is least prepared for it, for example when it is dark, foggy, when it is snowing or raining heavily," or when "the attack is made from an unexpected direction." One facilitates this by approaching over terrain apparently difficult to negotiate, or from the rear of the enemy.

For Marighella,¹⁷ surprise in covert combat depends on four conditions. The first of these is that the attackers have precise knowledge of the situation of the attacked, and under condition that the attacked be ignorant of the situation of the attacker. Marighella's second condition is closely related to the first: the attacker must know the strength of the attacked, while the strength of the attacker is unclear to the attacked. This enables the attacker—and this is the third condition for surprise in Marighella's sense—to use his combat force sparingly, an option which the unsuspectingly attacked does not have.

The last condition for surprise is, that the attacker exploit the possibilities inherent in his own determination of the time, place, and target of the attack. These four preconditions of

¹⁶ August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 26.

¹⁷ Carlos Marighella, loc. cit., p. 45.

surprise, of which Marighella speaks, fundamentally signify nothing else, than that the attacker have complete freedom of action; the action of the attacked, on the other hand, will be prescribed by the attack.

With the just cited four preconditions of a surprise, Marighella demands—without explicitly saying so—that the guerillero have a complete picture of the political and military situation of his enemy. Careful reconnaissance—by one's own observation and by evaluation in minute detail of all information, which the responsible leadership of the guerilleros receives from third parties—is the precondition for successful surprise.

This careful reconnaissance is also necessary, furthermore, when, in addition to surprise, a second element of the success of an armed raid in covert combat is supposed to be given. The raid must always, as we have just seen, be directed at a relatively weak point of the adversary. An all too great superiority in the strength of the enemy—whether in armament, or in numbers of fighters—generally can not be entirely compensated by the guerilleros by means of successful surprise, nor by greater courage. A raid by guerilleros on a disproportionately strong adversary—at his points of force concentration—will fail, unless the adversary makes serious mistakes in his own defense. But in formulating a plan of attack, one can not assume, that the adversary will make mistakes of that kind.

For a raid, therefore, it is crucial to determine the adversary's weak spots as precisely as possible.

The enemy's weakness may consist in his disposition in dispersed quarters, in small, exposed groups, in lack of local security, or in too fixed, routinized procedures of the security contingent; other times it will consist in unsecured, and far too regular supply and communications traffic, sometimes in lack of security and protection of communications links. The weakness of the adversary can, finally, consist in gaps in the inner constitution of the troops—lack of discipline, bad morale, or lack of the will to fight. To ascertain, whether one or another of these problems is the case for the adversary who is to be attacked in a raid, and where the weakest point of just *this* adversary is, is the task of the leadership which plans the raid, and this is an indispensable precondition for its success: the

raid must hit the adversary at his weakest, most vulnerable point.

If reconnaissance has turned up the first evidence for a vulnerability of the adversary, one which offers itself for a raid, then reconnaissance on the appropriate terrain for a raid begins. "The terrain," we read in Marighella,¹⁸ is the guerilleros' "best ally. He must know it like the back of his hand, like the lining of his pocket . . . blind-alleys and narrow areas, road construction sites, police control points, military zones, blocked roads, tunnel entrances and exits, police-barrier options, bridges which one can walk over, intersections, guarded or patrolled, traffic lights, traffic signs—all of that must be thoroughly studied and known, to avoid fatal mistakes."

Reconnaissance and observation are the fundamentals for planning a raid. The first task is to choose a specific target, to fix the place and time of the raid, and to determine the strength of the group to be deployed. Generally, the action-group assigned to each individual raid will be specially assembled by the leadership. It is constituted out of several small troops with different, precisely fixed missions, and it should not be stronger, than the leadership judges to be indispensable to the fulfillment of the mission. Ségur-Cabanac¹⁹ explains, that an action-group, which is to carry out a raid, requires, in addition to its leadership, the attack force to accomplish the concrete mission at hand, a support element, and a security element. As an example of the composition of an action-group, which has the mission to destroy an enemy installation, a combination of five troops—a storm-troop, which takes possession of the object, a demolitions-troop, which destroys it, a support-troop, which gives protective fire, a barrier-group, and a close-combat-troop for the silent removal of posted guards. If necessary, sharpshooters are assigned to one or another troop. Securing the captured enemy materiel, particularly weapons and munitions, can be assigned to one or another troop, which has already fulfilled its mission, but a special troop may also be assigned to this task.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁹ August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 27ff.

I follow Ségur-Cabanac²⁰ further: "Although worked out in every detail, the battle plan for a raid must be simple, flexible and not dependent upon too many circumstances. The disposition of the troop and the battle-plan must guarantee a rapid, smooth accomplishment of the mission. . . . An evasion-plan should be foreseen, in case unforeseen circumstances make fulfillment of the original battle-plan impossible."

§ 4

Execution of the Raid

Guerilleros raid an adversary who is in movement—particularly when he is dependent upon roads, or he has insufficient security—usually in the form of an ambush. In all other cases, the raid occurs out of the guerilleros' own infiltration movement. The ambush must be designed and disguised, the approach of the infiltration movement carefully executed, so that the possibility of premature discovery of the action-group by the adversary is largely precluded. Especially in the case of a raid, the guerillero must completely blend into the terrain in which he fights, and exploit every advantage, however small, offered by the terrain, light conditions, and weather.

The raid generally begins with a surprising, brief, and concentrated burst of fire at close quarters. The effect of the fire-burst depends—not least because of the short time available—upon prior and clear assignment of targets²¹; if a *shooting battle* develops out of the *fire-burst*, the action as a whole is in danger. Opening fire prematurely not only ruins the chances for success, but also lays the action-group open for destruction by the adversary. The troops assigned exploit the fire-burst to fulfill their respective missions—setting incendiary charges or explosives, and their detonation and destruction of those enemy elements not caught in the fire-burst, capture of weapons, munitions, or other equipment—as rapidly, but also as precisely as possible.

Under certain circumstances, it will be preferable or nec-

²⁰ Ibid., p. 30ff.

²¹ H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 64, puts particular emphasis on this point.

essary to carry out the raid silently, using exclusively weapons to hit or stab.²² In this case, too, it must be guaranteed that the adversary is first paralyzed by the raid, in order to enable the guerilleros to achieve their real goal.

The action-group which carries out the raid will often be distributed into two or three sections, which take the adversary in a pincer-movement, and attack him from different sides—each section simultaneously, or at short time intervals. Such pincer-attack, by deploying forces from different sides, is especially frequent when a raid is designed as an ambush. It has the advantage of being more effective; but leading an action-group is more difficult in this case, and the possibility can not be excluded, that—especially at night—the individual sections will endanger each other. This form of attack presupposes well-trained, combat-experienced guerilleros.

Under certain circumstances, the adversary who is to be attacked in an ambush-raid, must first be lured into the ambush. If the target of the ambush is police forces, this is usually relatively easy. Marighella, as well as the anonymous author of the French instructions for urban guerillas, point out, that false information, anonymous telephone calls or feigned betrayal, will all too easily draw the police into a trap set for them. It is more difficult to draw parts of armed forces into an ambush. The Viet Minh achieved this, in part by setting up many ambushes on a road at intervals, and with a certain system. The last ambush, which goes into action first, was manned with relatively weak forces, and only attacked individual vehicles or small enemy columns: the Viet Minh forces, who lurked in earlier ambush positions of the system, did not engage in this battle. The raided column called for support by radio; the forces hurrying to the aid of this column were then attacked and destroyed by the Viet Minh forces lying in ambush, which had not previously appeared. "The column which ran into the first ambush," Ségur-Cabanac remarks,²³ "is the bait to draw the reinforcements or a full column. Instead of an ambush, a raid on an installation or an outpost

²²H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 64, also counts smaller caliber weapons among the "silent" weapons (for example, the Flobert).

²³August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 51.

can be carried out and serve as bait to draw in reinforcements, which are then destroyed in an ambush."

In this case, Ségur-Cabanac²⁴ speaks of assembling many ambushes into a system, as a "surface ambush." The "surface ambush" not only serves to draw enemy units into the ambush, but also, in a terrain in which the ground-cover channels the movement of the adversary after the first ambush has occurred, i.e., forces the enemy to move in a limited number of directions—such as in a dense jungle, in swamp areas, or in cities and large villages, where houses are built very close to one another—it can be used to destroy larger enemy units. In this case, a "central ambush" is set in the middle of the "surface ambush"; "at appropriate distances from the central ambush," as Ségur-Cabanac describes this form of "surface ambush," "all evasion options and escape routes are cut off by smaller ambushes. As he approaches, the enemy is allowed to pass the 'gate ambushes', and runs into the destruction-zone of the 'central ambush.' If he succeeds in evading or escaping the central ambush," or if he attacks the guerilleros lying in the center ambush, and overwhelms them, "he runs into the surrounding ambushes, and suffers losses. The smaller 'gate ambushes' only go into action, when the enemy has run into the 'central ambush.'"

It is interesting to note, that Tito's partisans, in the phase of covert combat, conducted raids more frequently on the move, and more seldom from ambushes, while Grivas-Dighenis, as he reports himself²⁵ "preferred the ambush to other methods of combat . . . because this method proved to be especially successful, and the enemy remained incapable, despite everything he deployed," of "effectively countering" the Greek partisans.

§ 5

Tactical and Combat-Technical Notes

Grivas-Dighenis describes very graphically and explicitly the tactics employed by his partisan groups, and their various

²⁴Ibid., p. 51.

²⁵Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 94.

weapons. He emphasizes²⁶ that the action-group for a raid must be kept as small as possible, and that the necessarily small number of guerilleros must be compensated by the correct selection and combination of the weapons they use. Like von Dach,²⁷ Grivas-Dighenis also points out, that the raid is usefully coupled with sabotage. Coordination of the timing of a raid and sabotage increases the chances for the guerillero in almost every case considerably. As an example of this, both the theoretician von Dach, and the practitioner Grivas-Dighenis mention the combination of road-blocks—von Dach speaks of rapid-barriers, Grivas-Dighenis mentions pressure mines or remotely detonated mines, which “explode under the first or last vehicle in the enemy column, in order to cause both confusion and losses to the enemy, and to force him to dismount from the vehicles”—with a raid carried out from an ambush.

In all acts of covert combat—terrorism, as well as sabotage, in assassination no less than in raids on the move or from an ambush—it must be guaranteed, that the participating guerilleros can get away from the adversary and disappear, without leaving tracks which can be followed. It is not only the lives of the *participating* guerilleros which are at stake; pursuit after an accomplished mission could lead to the discovery of non-participating guerilleros, too, and have far-reaching consequences for the entire movement. Each action in covert combat is a success, only when the guerilleros, who have carried it out, have succeeded in withdrawing from the enemy and evading pursuit. The withdrawal movement is *always* an essential part of the accomplishment of the mission in covert combat.

The withdrawal routes and ultimate gathering points must be identified and fixed. Points on the terrain which do not provide the opportunity to disappear unnoticed after an action, are inappropriate for the action in question. The timing of an action must be chosen, so that it facilitates the withdrawal of the participating guerilleros. The Greek partisans on Cy-

²⁶Ibid., p. 95.

²⁷H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 60.

prus, as Grivas-Dighenis reports,²⁸ therefore preferred the evening hours before sundown for their operations.

If an action is carried out by a single guerillero or a few fighters, then, if circumstances allow, an unobtrusive vehicle will be placed ready in the vicinity of the deployment site, so that it can receive the participating guerilleros after their mission is accomplished, and exploit the next opportunity to move into a dense flow of traffic. Frequent change of vehicles, disguises, etc., facilitate the escape.

The more guerilleros participate in an action, the more difficult withdrawal will be. The guerilleros will do everything to deceive the pursuing enemy, and slow down his movements. Under certain circumstances, one or two sharp-shooters can detain the pursuing enemy. “If the situation requires it,” Ségur-Cabanac advises,²⁹ “the action-group will split into small troops, dispersing in different directions, and gathering later at a predetermined place. . . . In the process of withdrawing, an ambush can be laid for the pursuing enemy.” “Troops which are pursued at close quarters by the enemy do not attempt to reach the first gathering point, but lead the enemy away from the main force, and attempt to shake him off in appropriate terrain.” If the enemy uses rubber-tired vehicles for his pursuit, the guerillero will attempt to detain him with nails or triangle-thorns thrown on the street, if he does not want to use fire-arms.

Once an action in covert combat is a completed success, the first concern of the guerillero leadership is to evaluate this success propagandistically. The guerilleros’ propaganda must come out before that of the adversary: the first news is what impresses the most, and which can therefore exert the most influence in its formulation. That also drives the adversary onto the propagandistic defensive; he must first correct the information reported by the guerilleros, or deny it outright; if will not be easy for him to be credible.

²⁸Georgios Grivas-Dighenis, loc. cit., p. 95.

²⁹August Ségur-Cabanac, loc. cit., p. 35.

Part Six:

THE TRANSITION TO OPEN
COMBAT

XVII. COVERT AND OPEN COMBAT

§ 1

Fundamentals

There is no battle in *covert* combat, which is extended over time, and in which forces and capabilities are put to the test in direct engagement with the adversary. By contrast, this kind of battle is at the center of the action in open combat.

In a battle, as Clausewitz¹ showed in detail, each of the parties to the conflict assumes the risk of its own physical and morale losses in the expectation, that it will be able to inflict far greater physical and morale losses on the adversary. In addition to this general "purpose" of *any* battle, to *inflict damage* on the adversary, there is the concrete purpose of a *specific* battle: the achievement of a useful strategic or tactical *advantage*, whatever form it might take.

Every battle is an interplay of the effect of arms and movement. The effect of one's own weapons in battle should negate the weapons of the enemy, enable movement of one's own forces, and deny such movement to the enemy. In that way, the enemy is either prevented from achieving the aim, which he set himself in this battle, or, if he achieves it, then only by suffering such losses, that they far outweigh the value and significance of this aim. One's own movement in battle should deprive the movement of the enemy of its purpose, and deny his weapons their effect, while the effect of one's own weapons is exploited, such that the pre-established aim of the battle engagement is achieved while suffering the lowest possible losses.

Since guerillero *covert* combat has no battles, the distinction between attack and defense is alien to it. Open combat, by contrast, consists in attack or defense actions; insofar as the enemy is not destroyed in battle, i.e., rendered incapable of continuing combat in general, he will either be compelled by an attack to give up advantages, in retreat or flight, which—whatever they might be—are of potentially decisive impor-

¹Carl von Clausewitz, loc. cit., p. 141.

tance for the continuation of combat, and therefore give the attacker the advantage; or the enemy should be denied the achievement of such advantages by means of an effective defense.

Neither the achievement, nor the loss of advantages of this kind are at issue in guerillero actions in *covert* combat, but rather the gradual whittling away of the morale of the enemy. Tactically, guerillero actions during covert combat are always, as such, offensive, although they may serve strategic or operative defensive purposes. Nevertheless, even the raid can not be called an attack in the tactical sense². The raid in covert combat, to the contrary, always lasts only a few, short minutes. Its characteristic is, that it can not be continued if the first attempt fails. *After* the raid, whether it was a success or not, the guerilleros will always leave the site of combat as quickly as possible, without making the slightest attempt to hold a position, no matter how important the position might be for the adversary. There is a "raid-like attack" in open combat, but there is never an "attack-like raid" in covert combat.

Covert combat alone will seldom lead to the success which the guerilleros desire. Out of covert combat, in which the guerilleros avoid direct battle engagement with the adversary, there generally develops a kind of open combat over the course of the irregular war, in which the guerilleros directly engage their adversary in battle, and in favorable positions they may even seek battle engagement.

The transition to open combat does *not* signify the end of covert combat. The guerilleros, who accept or seek battle engagements with the adversary, continue covert combat, nonetheless, in the same form as before. It is characteristic for the new phase of irregular warfare, which generally begins with the *first* battle between the guerilleros and units of the armed forces and police of the adversary, a battle which is deliberately waged as such by the guerilleros, that combat in this phase unfolds on *two different levels*—sometimes open, sometimes covert combat. Sometimes, open combat will dominate, at other times, it will be covert combat. The guerilleros' engagement with their adversary in this phase resembles a ship hitting an iceberg: most of the iceberg remains hidden

²Compare above, p. 213f., fn. 26.

under the surface of the water; only a small part is visible. Covert combat is conducted under the surface, at depths which are invisible to the adversary, while open combat is conducted where it is also visible to the adversary.

§ 2

The Creation of Larger Units

Covert combat actions are conducted by action-groups, which are kept as small as possible. The strength of a *squad* in the regular armed forces—eight to ten men—is almost never exceeded. A number of action groups often work together for a short time during raids, but once the raid is over, they disperse again immediately.

In the battle of *open* combat, the units or detachments deployed will be made as numerically strong as possible. The lack of a few soldiers at the decisive moment of battle could determine the outcome in favor of the other side. For the guerilleros, therefore, the prerequisite for the transition to open combat is the formation of larger units and detachments, partly drawn *from*, partly *in addition* to the independent action-groups, which continue to exist, and which are constituted by specialists in covert combat, who will continue *this form* of combat. The minimal strength of a unit capable of waging a short battle in irregular war corresponds to a *platoon* in the regular armed forces, i.e., 25 to 30 men. Generally, however, battle in irregular war, too, will be waged by larger units and detachments—in company-, battalion-, or even brigade-strength.

H. von Dach³ points out how necessary it is to find a "balanced proportionality of strength" for these units. "*Weak* irregular warfare units at the strength of squads or platoons," H. von Dach explains, "permit the adversary to deploy relatively weak occupation-detachments, while keeping a central, strong intervention-force in reserve; weak occupation-detachments, in turn, allow the adversary to take up many individual positions. These many positions then result in a dense observation- and surveillance-grid . . . *Strong* irregular warfare units with heavy weapons compel the adversary to form

battle-strength garrisons. He will have to limit his occupation to the most important positions and transportation routes, and will not be able to hold any considerable central intervention-force in reserve. All of the smaller positions in the terrain between the major positions will have to be taken down, because they would otherwise become sure victims of the stronger irregular warfare units. . . . Fewer posts, however, signify a thin observation- and surveillance-grid. That enhances the freedom of movement of the irregular warfare units. . . . The best suited are units of battalion-strength with some heavy weapons (mine-throwers, recoilless guns). They will be strong enough to launch successful attacks against larger enemy posts (company bases) . . . If the formation of irregular warfare units of approximately battalion-strength is successful, the adversary will not be able to effectively occupy any major part of the country."

The formation of units capable of conducting open combat places special demands on the organizational capabilities of the guerillero-leadership. It must be accomplished *during* covert combat—often in territory which is partly occupied or controlled by the enemy—without attracting the attention of the enemy, and in the shortest time possible, i.e., under time-pressure, which is precarious, particularly in irregular war. This, therefore, is always a moment of weakness for the guerilleros. If the adversary succeeds in identifying the guerillero-leadership's intention to form larger units and battle-strength detachments early, the adversary will be able to exploit this momentary weakness of the guerilleros to strike against them with some prospect for success. Escalated *covert* combat activity during the formation of the larger units can sometimes serve to hide this formation from the adversary.

The choice of area for the formation of the first guerillero-units, which are to be deployed not only in covert combat, but also in open combat, is a difficult problem for the guerillero-leadership to solve. Only those areas are suitable, which have terrain-cover to prevent observation by the adversary, but on the other hand also allow a suddenly approaching enemy to be identified, so that the alarm sounded by an observation-post can initiate counter-measures before the enemy arrives. The area must either be unpopulated, or *overpopu-*

lated to such an extent, that the assembly of a larger group of guerilleros is unobtrusive. Tito, as well as Giap, had such areas available.

Sometimes the formation of such guerilla-units must occur outside the country which is the operations-territory—in the territory of an interested third power. The guerilla-units will then be moved into the operations-territory in a time-consuming infiltration movement. It is not impossible, that Hitler had such an artificially instigated irregular warfare escalation in mind, when he established the so-called “Austrian Legion” on the territory of the German Reich.

Usually, there will be a certain time-gap between the formation of guerilla-units suitable for open combat, and the actual transition to open combat in the first battle with adversary forces. This time is used to integrate the units formed, give them basic training, and also deploy them in covert combat.³ The guerilleros must wait for a favorable opportunity to engage the enemy in the first battle with prospects for success. The outcome of this first battle is of crucial importance for the combat-morale of the newly formed units. Another difficult problem for the guerillero-leadership to solve, is to make the correct assignments to leadership positions in the transition to open combat. Not every proven leader in covert combat is necessarily capable of leading a larger unit in open combat. This may lead to bitter altercations within the guerillero-leadership over leadership assignments to higher command positions, which can sometimes endanger the unity of the guerilla movement as a whole.

That Tito, as well as Giap ten years later, succeeded in laying the foundation for the transition to open combat by forming larger units, was an achievement which deserves admiration in both cases, although the intact and strict party organization,

³During World War II in France, that is how “the individual guerilla-units of various groups” were brought together on February 1, 1944 under a unified command, and thus founded “the FFI (Forces Francaises Interieures).” “Furthermore, France was divided into 12 military districts, regional military commanders were assigned, and the partisan groups assembled on the model of a regular army.” (Werner Hahlweg, loc. cit., p. 139.) Parts of the FFI only went into open combat against German troops, however, in August 1944.

of which both Tito and Giap could avail themselves, surely facilitated the fulfillment of this task considerably.⁴

The combat value of the guerilla-units created for open combat will vary widely, particularly at the beginning of this combat. That suggests the creation of elite-units of higher combat value for special battle missions, as Tito did at the end of December 1941 with the formation of the so-called “Proletarian Brigades,” which were “special partisan units,” as Vladimir Dedijer⁵ reports, “distinguished by particularly strict discipline and the mode of their employment, for they were not tied to their home areas, but could be deployed all over Yugoslavia. In that way, the partisan units,” Dedijer continues, “became something of a symbol of the struggle of all Yugoslavian people.” Tito was constantly with the First Proletarian Brigade in its first battles when it was transferred to Bosnia, and thus stressed its importance. The Proletarian Brigades possibly inspired Régis Debray in his dream of creating a kind of international professional revolutionary army as an elite unit, which would move from country to country, supporting guerilleros at the point when they made the transition to open combat.

The guerilla-unit is enlarged from the ranks of volunteers, which it recruits, or who join of their own volition. These “candidates” must be trained by the unit itself as quickly as possible, and then assigned to the special units according to their abilities. Special training programs must be elaborated, in the framework of the basic training, for tactics, political instruction, and propaganda. Valdis Redelis⁶ provides interesting and graphic examples in his book on partisan warfare in World War II.

§ 3

Some Prerequisites for the Transition to Open Combat

Covert combat is combat out of the dark, out of “cover,” out of anonymity. Successful guerilleros remain anonymous,

⁴Note the famous remark by Giap, which Werner Hahlweg cites, loc. cit., p. 11: “Every party cell, every administrative village committee, was a command staff.”

⁵Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 166.

⁶Valdir Redelis, loc. cit., p. 74 and 81.

invisible, and inaccessible to their adversary and the otherwise omnipresent public, for the entire duration of covert combat.⁷ Discovery—*individual* discovery in his capacity as a guerillero—is usually synonymous for the guerillero in covert combat with utter failure. With this discovery, his hopes end, and frequently his freedom and his life, as well. It is characteristic of the conscious and deliberate anonymity of the guerilleros, that leaders in a large number of modern irregular wars have chosen combat pseudonyms, “noms de guerre,” which they continue to carry—if they are successful—after the war in civilian life.

The cameras of the police,⁸ photographs of demonstrations and in exceptional cases of one or another raid, are the adversary's “weapons” which the guerillero in covert combat fears: they can lead to his identification.

With the transition to open combat, the guerillero steps out of the dark, out of his cover, and out of his anonymity, by engaging in *battle* with the adversary. I compared the confrontation of guerilleros with a ship's encounter with an iceberg on the high seas. The form and size of the iceberg can only be captured optically when it juts out above the surface of the water. Similarly, the form and extent of a guerilla movement is only revealed to the adversary in the transition to open combat, insofar as the guerilleros “emerge” from the cover, from which they had previously conducted their strikes, and show themselves to the adversary and the “public” in battle. The Yugoslavian theory of war employs a graphically expressive word to describe the transition from covert to open

⁷For this reason alone, the requirement of the Hague Convention on Land-War and the Geneva Conventions, that volunteer corps and members of organized resistance movements wear recognizable insignia, can not be implemented in *covert* combat.

⁸Compare *Rote Kalender* 1972, loc. cit., p. 21: “A textbook example: The director takes pictures of the students, who are standing around in the (illegal) ‘smokers’ corner’ behind the school, and he sends the pictures to the parents. Note: these things are done to accustom students to the practices of the political police in the Federal Republic and West Berlin. One can make such measures ineffective by making sure that many students are photographed. So the students protest political justice by self-accusations. An effective way to prevent students from being isolated in order to punish them.”

combat: an “ascending transformation.” The guerillero is “discovered.”

The choice of the point in time, at which the guerilleros go over to open combat is decisive for the success or failure of the irregular war as a whole. This choice will initially depend upon how the guerillero-leadership evaluates the situation of the enemy, his combat-strength, his combat-morale, the decisiveness of his leadership, and, not least, how much the adversary knows about the guerilla movement. The choice of the point in time for the transition to open combat will also be considerably determined by the—suspected or known—attitude of the population. It is crucial in irregular war—this has been emphasized often enough in earlier chapters—to *isolate* the adversary. If the police and the armed forces succeed in isolating the guerilleros psychologically from the mass of the population *before* they go over to *open* combat, there is a good chance, that the *covert* combat will run aground over a period of years, as the number of sympathizers gradually recedes. If, on the other hand, the guerilleros succeed in psychologically isolating the police and armed forces of the adversary, so that the latter must rely upon a minority of the population, which is despised by the majority as “collaborators,” then the guerilleros will succeed, sooner or later, in making the transition to open-combat—unless the adversary withdraws, as in Cyprus, beforehand, and therefore leaves the guerilleros with a small victory in order to deny them the grand victory, which they want.

Due to the importance of the attitude of the mass of the population at this moment, one last fight will be waged, with all available propaganda forces, for the sympathy of the population, prior to the guerilleros' transition to open combat. The guerilleros and their adversary—if he recognizes the danger—will each attempt to portray the idea, for which they are respectively fighting, in as attractive a light as possible.

Behind the “dialectic of *will*,” which employs power to solve a conflict,⁹ there is the conflict of *ideas*—this becomes clear here—which take possession of people, and which the people want to consciously experience as such: the psychological conflict initiates open combat. The *pre*-decision in the outcome

⁹André Beaufre, loc. cit., p. 24.

of irregular war, to vary a line of thought of Beaufre's, is sought in a psychological reaction, which one intends to evoke, not in the adversary, but in a third-party—i.e., the majority of the population. Here, too, one might speak of a strategy of the *indirect* approach.

Frequently, certain layers of the population will take one side of the conflict, and others, the other side. It is crucial for the guerilleros, as well as for their adversary, that they activate just those layers of the population, respectively, which are ready to sympathize with them. The guerilleros, as well as their adversary, will promise particularly *these* layers freedom and security. Immediately prior to the transition to open combat, the guerilleros will begin to distribute weapons to their reliable sympathizers, who are *potential* candidates for the units to be forced for open combat; and since, as the *Kollektiv Rot-Armee-Fraktion* observes with a certain disdain,¹⁰ the state will not be able "to protect every individual capitalist, government official, judge, officer, etc. with armed guards," the guerilleros' adversary, too, can not hesitate to provide those sympathizers upon whom he can rely, with the instruments to defend themselves, if necessary, including against terrorism.¹¹

In the psychological conflict, which immediately precedes the transition to open combat, the guerilleros, as well as their adversary, will attempt to provoke unconsidered actions on the other side: the guerilleros, by escalating covert combat to provoke retaliation, curfews, collective punishments and other controls, which incite the population; the police and armed forces deployed against the guerilleros, in that they attempt to force a direct *battle* engagement following some *covert* combat action, before the guerilleros are ready. A premature transition to open combat can lead to the destruction of the guerilleros.

§ 4

The Battle in Irregular Warfare

The battle in irregular warfare is essentially a battle of light, independently operating units. Usually, the guerilleros will

¹⁰ *Kollektiv R(ote)-A(rmee)-F(raktion)*, loc. cit., p. 32.

¹¹ C.A. Fraser, loc. cit., p. 20f., is one of the few theoreticians to clearly articulate and argue this point.

not have artillery, even after the transition to open combat, which can support their attack, or, in the defense, foil the attack of the adversary ahead of the guerilleros' position. The weapons, which they can employ in place of artillery, are heavy infantry weapons at best, which, as H. von Dach observes¹²—sometimes broken down—can be transported off-road in open terrain.

It is just as important, that the guerilleros exploit the resulting greater mobility in battle, as it is, that they correctly employ these support-weapons tactically, the effect of which must be increased to the greatest extent possible by purposeful assignment of targets, good selection of positions and evasion positions, careful camouflage, opening fire while maximizing the surprise effect, use of silenced weapons, and anticipatory munitions-planning. The guerilleros can not afford to "bang away" with their weapons in battle; but they must also avoid being too stingy with their fire-power. A few sharp-shooters, dispersed in the terrain where the adversary can not find them, and equipped with sights, must—and can—compensate for the lack of concentrated fire, which the guerilleros do not have. That the terrain is also the guerilleros' best ally in battle, too, hardly needs to be mentioned, after what has already been said.

Guerilleros almost never fight in the framework of large units. Their units, which have to operate in a territory occupied or controlled by the enemy, conduct combat independently as "wayward gangs." "In contrast to 'large war,'" H. von Dach emphasizes,¹³ "guerilleros cannot expect reenforcement, relief, or assistance." The guerilla-unit is always on its own in battle. It must rely exclusively upon its tactical expertise, its own battle capabilities, its own weapons and munitions, which it carries itself, or captures. In this respect, the battle of a guerilla-unit largely resembles that of an airborne infantry unit, which is dropped far behind the enemy front, in an area dominated by the enemy.

Like the battle of such an airborne infantry unit, that of the guerilleros, too, is put into a surrounded condition, a situation which, in the attack, requires continuous observation

¹² H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 30.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

and securing the flanks, the rear, and, in the defense, a kind of all-round defense, without, however, dispensing with the formation of a clear defense-center.

There are a number of differences between battle in irregular war, and battle in "large" war. There is no system, there are no "classical" principles—except for *one*, i.e., that *frontal* engagements with a numerically and, usually, technologically superior adversary, the "battle" in the classical sense, as Clausewitz describes it at the beginning of the fourth book of his *On War*,¹⁴ are to be avoided if at all possible.¹⁵ In order to realize this principle, the guerilla-unit must be more flexible and mobile than the adversary, whom he confronts. This necessary mobility often places great demands on the physical condition of the individual guerillero; in order to measure up to these demands, a very high combat-morale is necessary.

Pétain's instructions to the War College in 1911—although intended for a different kind of war—are important for battle in irregular war: "In war, morale is crucial, and its unsurpassed expression is mobility, while material potency, even the most perfect, can only be seen as support for the element of morale, and thus movement."¹⁶

It is obvious that the guerilleros' attack will be conducted with as much mobility as possible. Guerilleros usually prefer the "seeping movement" over the classical "storm attack" in their approach, as well as for the breakthrough. But the defense, too, is usually conducted by guerilleros as mobile defense. Valdis Redelis¹⁷ gives a graphic description of such mobile defense—comparable to a delaying-battle in conventional war—by a Soviet partisan unit in the forest of Jelinsk in the Ukraine on March 23, 1942. On the other hand, guerilleros often reenforce their defense perimeters with artificially constructed facilities, wooden-bunkers sunk into the earth, with shooting slats, which are sometimes linked to each other with camouflaged channels.

¹⁴Carl von Clausewitz, loc. cit., p. 166.

¹⁵Compare the report of Werner Hahlweg, loc. cit., p. 129, on the partisan war during World War II in Yugoslavia.

¹⁶Pierre Bourget, *Der Marschall, Pétain zwischen Kollaboration und Résistance*, Berlin 1968, p. 40.

¹⁷Valdis Redelis, loc. cit., p. 60ff.

The unique characteristics of battle in irregular war compel the guerilleros, more than armed forces in a 'large' conventional war, to exploit every vulnerable point of the adversary for a surprise attack. Surprise is the chief weapon of the guerilleros, also in open combat, which enables them to compensate for their material inferiority to some extent.

It is characteristic of covert combat, as well as open combat, that political and military missions are combined.¹⁸ If a guerilla-unit is successful in battle, it will immediately exploit this success politically and psychologically to win the population in the area where the battle occurred for the cause of the guerilleros. An appropriate propaganda apparatus is among the instruments of a guerilla-unit no less, and no more, than weapons and other equipment of war.

§ 5

The Operative Irregular Warfare Operation

The higher guerillero-leadership must generally limit itself, in its relationship to the individual guerilla-units, to issuing general instructions for the conduct of combat, the assignment of certain operations-territories to individual units, and to general mission-assignments related only to the enemy, instructions which leave the decision on the way in which the instructions and missions are to be carried out largely to the discretion of the assigned unit. The aim of such leadership "on a long leash" can only be—but it must also be this—to guarantee coordination in space and time for the actions of individual guerilla-units. In exceptional cases, individual, independently operating units, such as, for example, Tito's leadership of the partisans, reported by Dedijer,¹⁹ in September 1941, where the discussion in Stolica foresaw "a grouping of these units by the higher command into a powerful storm-troop, for the case that they were forced into a larger battle."

Even without such an infrequent and risky massing of guerilla-units, the planned, initiated, and directed coordination of the actions of individual units by the higher command, leads—

¹⁸Valdis Redelis, among others, emphasizes this, loc. cit., p. 91.

¹⁹Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 152f.

generally both in open as well as covert combat actions—to a systematic interplay of numerous irregular warfare actions at several levels, which interplay can be termed an “operative irregular warfare operation.” Such an irregular warfare operation has all the more prospect for success, the less the coordination of the actions—and thus the unified leadership—can be recognized by the adversary.

The “operative irregular warfare operation” has a similar effect on the adversary as the attack of a swarm of poisonous insects on an individual. He vainly tries to defend himself by flailing his arms around. The insects evade his hands to immediately attack once again. The irregular warfare operation provokes the enemy to counter-strike; but the thrust he makes generally misses the target, if the “operative irregular warfare operation” is correctly planned and coordinated.

The aim of an individual “operative irregular warfare operation” is primarily the attrition of adversary forces, while conserving one’s own. Every individual “operative irregular warfare operation” is, furthermore, a link in a chain of operations, which, in the way they are conducted, always present the adversary with new surprises and, therefore, new problems. The goal at the conclusion of these operations is the spatial isolation of the enemy. A long series of “operative irregular warfare operations” are intended to drive the adversary gradually onto a few “islands” within the territory of operations, which—encircled by the flood of the guerilla movement—the adversary can hold only at the price of great losses, and only for a limited time. While the *psychological* isolation of the enemy is at the beginning of the transition to open combat—his isolation from the population—at the conclusion of this phase, there is the *spatial* isolation of the enemy within these “islands.”

The political or military liquidation of these islands is the central event of the new, and last phase of irregular warfare. The guerilleros will largely employ the instruments of “large” conventional politics, and “large” conventional war. In this latter case, in order to successfully conclude this last phase of irregular war—to use the terminology of the Yugoslavian theory of war—the guerilleros will reach the last, highest level of an “ascending transformation”: the guerilla-units will transform themselves into conventional armed forces. As a mili-

tary-political and military phenomenon, this last phase of irregular war—if it ever develops that far, and if one side has not already given up—is not distinguishable at all from a “large” conventional war. For this phase of irregular warfare, Werner Hahlweg’s²⁰ observations, in his excellent book on irregular warfare, are valid: that there is an interfacing transition from irregular war to “large” conventional war, and a “borderline with depth” in the pure conduct of irregular war. We can, therefore, dispense with a detailed treatment of this last phase of an irregular war successfully waged by guerilleros, since the content of this book is an investigation of irregular war as a military-political and military phenomenon in its *special characteristics*.

²⁰Werner Hahlweg, loc. cit., p. 223f.

XVIII. UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSITION TO OPEN COMBAT

§ 1

The Problem in International Law

If one leaves aside the general prohibition against inhumanity toward defenseless persons—a prohibition which has as much the character of natural law as international law—then covert combat develops outside the regulations of international law. International law has, however, developed principles and norms for open combat, which are also applicable for an irregular war conducted by guerrillas, *insofar as it is open combat*.

Let us refer once again to the already mentioned metaphor of the iceberg on the high seas: just as the iceberg only appears within the field of vision of the mariner with *that part*, which protrudes above the surface of the water, the guerrilla steps into an area, which is normally regulated by international law, only with that part of his activities, in which he encounters his adversary in *open combat*: if the Hague Convention on Land-War, as well as the Geneva Convention of 1949, require of volunteer corps fighters and members of an organized resistance movement that they respect the laws of legitimate combatants—if they want to enjoy the rights of legitimate combatants—, then both the Hague Convention on Land-War and the Geneva Convention only have *open combat* in mind.

But, can covert and open combat, in the phase of transition to the latter, be as clearly distinguished, as is necessary in order to subordinate those acts, which are committed in open combat—and *only* these acts—to the norms of international law, or do not *both* forms of combat form an indissoluble unity in this cited phase? The “operative irregular warfare operation,” discussed above, in which the phase of transition to open combat has a crucial importance, usually consists of covert combat actions, as well. If, however, this essential connection between covert and open combat exists, is the guerrilla, nevertheless, *to that extent* bound to the norms of

international law—and does the guerrilla come out of the “depths” of illegality *to that extent*, and step into the “visible arena” of legality—when he engages his adversary in *open combat*?

Prima facie, one will be inclined to assume, that this is the case. But a second question comes up immediately: what is the juridical effect of such a partial subordination of the guerrilla to the norm of international law? Does this partial exodus from—self-imposed—illegality give him the right to be treated as a legitimate combatant in the sense of the Hague Convention on Land-War and the Geneva Conventions, as long—and *only* as long—as he conducts *open combat*? If we assume this, it would imply, that the legal status of the guerrilla changes continuously, like the colors of a chameleon, depending upon which irregular warfare actions he participates in, under the compulsion of the exigencies of the particular situation and particular moment. Even if one thinks such a construction is possible, a new question is posed immediately: Can the guerrilla, who falls into the hands of the enemy in open combat, while respecting all of the norms of international law in the conduct of this combat, be called to account for covert combat actions, which contradict the rules of international law, and in which he participated only a few days before his arrest?

If, however, the guerrilla who respects all norms of international law—to *the extent that* he is engaged in open combat—is, nevertheless, *not* considered to be a legitimate combatant by the enemy, because the unit to which he belongs is also conducting *covert* combat at the same time, and outside the norms of international law, and because the guerrilla in question was, perhaps, himself participant to covert combat: in that case, what inducement is there for this guerrilla to keep to the norms of international law, and thus impose a limitation upon his behavior in open combat, which is not honored by the enemy? Is this inducement supposed to consist in his own sense of law, in his own conscience?

Conscience, in such a case, will be an all too insecure—and usually all too silent—counselor. It will probably induce the guerrilla to behave humanely toward defenseless persons, in covert and in open combat. But in irregular warfare, *more* can hardly be expected from the “voice of conscience”!

Every war brutalizes those who participate in it as fighters; but no war leads to brutalization in the same way as modern irregular war, by reason of the types of actions characteristic of covert combat. Normal international law is in no position to effectively arrest this brutalization. This is fully demonstrated by the experiences with irregular wars conducted on three continents after World War II, not least the experience of both "dirty" wars in Vietnam. The norms of normal international law break down in irregular war, although, theoretically, they can be applied, on the basis of objective evidence, to the part of irregular war, which is waged as open combat.

The attempt to comprehend irregular war in the framework of international law, because it does protrude into the area regulated by international law, at least with a *part* which can be comprehended by international law, necessarily concludes with an escalation of recriminations and reprisals, which put international law *as a whole* into question, with respect to its capacity to at least humanize violent conflicts, although it can not prevent them. Neither the guerilleros, nor their adversary, will hesitate, in the phase of transition to open combat, to declare, that they feel bound to the handed-down regulations of international law. Since, however, covert and open combat cannot be separated from one another, the guerilleros, as well as their adversary, will always accuse the other party to the conflict of multiple violations of these norms of international law, and both will then resort to using weapons,—this is made clear, not least by the Vietnam war—the permissibility of which in international law is at least not generally acknowledged.

It is the task of the international law of tomorrow to develop new regulations for irregular war, which are adequate to that kind of war, which comprehend irregular war as a unified whole, regardless of whether it is conducted as covert or open combat.

I spoke just above about "dirty" wars. They are called "dirty," because, in these wars, the principle which was the foundation of every "honor code in war," that one must also behave toward the enemy "in good faith," *bona fide*, has no weight.

Etiā hosti fides servanda est: which, first of all, means, that the regulations established by international law for the con-

duct of war are also to be respected in behavior toward the enemy. But it also means, that one can *presume* of the enemy, that he will follow the norms of the international law of war, and that, in the most gruesome game man ever conceived, he will at least play by the rules.¹

In irregular war, there is no such confidence in the adversary, and there *can be* no such confidence, because—once again, aside from the prohibition against inhumane treatment of defenseless persons—rules of the game for irregular war do not exist. Checkers—if my reader will forgive me this banal metaphor—can not be played by the rules of chess, nor chess by the rules of checkers. The prescriptions, which have been developed for "large" conventional war, can not be applied to irregular war, although the open combat of irregular war does manifest characteristics, which are similar to combat in "large" conventional war. Covert and open combat—as explained above—form a unity in irregular war, and *new* international law norms must be found for this *unity*—this cannot be overemphasized—before it is too late for our generation, and for our home, Europe.

§ 2

Liberated Territories

Generally, guerilleros will only be able to start thinking about taking "ground" away from the adversary, in its proper sense, after the transition to open combat. "Liberated" territories gradually develop out of contaminated territories. In a contaminated territory, the enemy will attempt to maintain at least a system of bases interlinked with one another; the "liberated" territory, by contrast, is effectively enemy-free, i.e., it has been evacuated by the enemy, and left to the guerilleros, at least for a certain period of time.

The more the adversary is taken by surprise in the guerilleros' transition to open combat, the more complete will his isolation in the population be, and the fewer troops available

¹ Friedrich August von der Heydte, "Die bona fides und die einzelne Rechtsnorm," in *Österr. Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht*, Vol. XI (1961), p. 264ff.

for occupation purposes, the more rapidly the guerilleros will succeed in creating "liberated" territories.

In the phase of transition to open combat, contaminated and "liberated" territories exist alongside one another. The transition from contaminated to "liberated" territory is just as fluid as the demarcation of a "liberated" territory. The adversary will always attempt to regain "liberated" territory. Vladimir Dedijer² reports, how a number of Yugoslav villages changed hands often in the course of the German offensive against Tito's partisans. In the Bosnian city of Foca, he met "the owner of a small shop . . . who had a stock of flags stored under the counter, one Italian, one Ustaschi flag, and a Yugoslav flag with the partisan star. Every time the fighting flared up during the night, he listened tensely, and then pulled out the appropriate flag."

A "liberated" territory is often surrounded by contaminated territory, through which the adversary must pass in an attack upon the "liberated" territory. That induces the enemy to prematurely develop his assault forces. The force of his thrust will be absorbed in the contaminated area, at points of concentration, by means of *covert* combat, without the adversary ever encountering the guerilleros in open combat. In the case of an attack to regain "liberated" territory, the adversary resembles a swimmer, who is separated from the water he wants to swim in by a deep swamp.

As soon as an area is "liberated," the guerilleros will create an infrastructure serving their political and military aims. The "liberated" area will be thoroughly reorganized in all areas of administration. Generally there are such total reorganizations "from top to bottom" in conquered territory in "large" conventional war, only where there is an ideological conflict raging behind the curtains of the "large" war. For irregular

²Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 168; compare also H. von Dach, p. 19: "The combat idea" of irregular war "is for the local civilian resistance movement to wage resistance in the entirety of the occupied territory (passive resistance, sabotage, counter-propaganda, etc.) and *at the same time* to create certain 'liberated areas' by means of mobile irregular warfare units. The liberated areas have no fixed size. They can be a few dozen square-kilometers, or they can be the size of an entire canton or section of the country. Liberated areas can usually only be held for a few weeks or months, until the adversary mobilizes for a purge operation, *which must be evaded*."

war, by contrast, such total transformation of the entire infrastructure of a "liberated" territory is characteristic.

In irregular war, on the one hand, there is no clear distinction between the active "parties to war" and the population, which is only passively participant in the events of war, which distinction is characteristic of "large" war, by means of uniforms and insignia. In irregular war, everyone is at least a potential fighter. On the other hand, irregular war is a fight for the favor—the "soul"—of the mass of the population, so that political and military actions must form a tighter unity than is the case in "large" war: both of these essential features of irregular war *compel* the guerilleros—if they do not want to be defeated—to completely transform the infrastructure of a "liberated" territory.

Dedijer describes this reorganization in detail in the "liberated" territories of Yugoslavia during World War II. What he reports is characteristic of the seizure of power by guerilleros and reestablishment of at least orderly conditions, although not normal, in a "liberated" territory. Reports almost identical in content are available today from the parts of South Vietnam dominated by the Vietcong.

"People's Committees replace local authorities who provided their services to the enemy. These committees were elected by the people themselves in large pubs. . . . In Serbia, a National Liberation Committee for all of Serbia was formed, which became the seed-cell for the future government. In liberated territories, it was soon possible once again to attend school. The newspaper 'Borba' appeared three times every week in Užice."³ "A railway line of the partisans of approximately 150 kilometers length traversed the territory, and postal service was also established."⁴ "Old Yugoslav stamps were used, which were already printed over with the insignia of Pavelić's 'Autonomous State of Croatia.' Now the partisan's insignia, the five-point star, was added. Telephone lines were laid through the entire territory."⁵

That the guerilleros will develop bases in "liberated" territories for the continuation of combat, or shift such bases

³Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 154.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 169.

into such territories, if they are geographically or economically suitable, requires no special mention. Dedijer⁶ reports, that Tito's partisans established such a base in the area of Užice after the German troops had evacuated West Serbia in the Fall of 1941. "The city became . . . a kind of symbol for the first liberated area in Yugoslavia, which the people called 'the Republic of Užice.' In the evacuation, the German garrisons had to leave behind a rifle factory in this city, which had a daily capacity of 400 rifles and a large amount of ammunition. The workers in this factory soon came together again. The machines were transported to an underground cave near Užice, and there began to produce rifles marked with partisan insignia, which made them particularly valuable for the partisan units."

Such bases in "liberated" territory are of decisive value in the preparation of the last phase of an irregular war, in which the task is to create large military contingents out of guerilla-units, which are hardly distinguishable any longer in their structure, armament, and conduct of combat from regular armed forces; their task, as already mentioned above, is to liquidate the last "islands," into which the adversary has withdrawn, in the operations-territory. Such large military contingents can only be formed in territory which is enemy-free.

§ 3

The Interested Third Power in the Transition to Open Combat

The dependency of the guerilleros upon an interested third power, which we have repeatedly discussed in this study, is one of the central political and military problems for the guerillero-leadership. Werner Hahlweg, to whom we are indebted for the best historical treatment of the development of irregular warfare through the centuries, correctly notes, that the fate of guerilleros, who fought on all fronts against the German troops, was largely determined by the military and political conceptions of Great Britain and—in the last phase of the war—the United States, on the one hand, and of Soviet-Russia on the other hand. "The guerilla in World

⁶Ibid., p. 153.

War II, which took hold of immense masses of people, obtained political-strategic significance in the framework of the entire 1939-1945 conflict, and also grew into dimensions which had a significance of its own, nevertheless ultimately remained the *object* of world political decisions at the highest levels."⁷

Generally, the dependency of the guerilleros on an interested-third power is not reduced over the course of irregular war, but it usually grows from phase to phase. Dedijer⁸ reports on the desperate appeals for help, which Tito directed at the Soviet Union in the phase of transition to open combat.

Although—looking back—it was fortunate, not only for Yugoslavia, but for all of Europe, that these calls for support initially went unheeded, so that Tito was forced to move against the Germans only with his own resources, Dedijer's reports, on the other hand, demonstrate clearly how much Tito himself thought he was dependent on the help of the interested-third power.

The problem of air supply, and thus also of the necessary conduct of an air war, even if limited, played a great role in Tito's pleas for help. In fact, in air war the dependence of the guerillero on interested third parties reveals itself with particular clarity.

At the point when the guerilleros form larger units for open combat, the adversary's air-force becomes the most dangerous enemy for them. An action-group of five men can not be detected from a helicopter; an irregular warfare unit in battalion-strength, which does not find full cover against observation from the air, or is forced to leave its cover, will be detected by every reconnaissance post, and the victim of every fighter aircraft which attacks a contaminated area on suspicion of a concentration of guerilleros, or which—against international law, but effectively—snuffs out practically all life in an area of 1,000 square miles and more with bombs.

The problem, which is posed to the guerilleros in this connection, is complex. On the one hand, it is important that the guerilleros screen themselves from observation, and protect themselves against the effect of enemy air attacks; on the other hand, there is the question of the possibility both of an active

⁷Werner Hahlweg, loc. cit., p. 140.

⁸Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 169-175 and p. 185f.

defense against enemy aircraft, as well as a compensation—in close connection with air defense—for the lack of their own air forces for reconnaissance, pursuit and battle missions. Screening against observation from the air is the easiest to accomplish. Permanent and good camouflage is part of the everyday life of the guerillero, as well as movement in the dark at night. Underground bunkers offer a certain protection against enemy air attacks. We spoke of them above in another connection; they are characteristic for some irregular wars, which were waged at the end of World War II—and are possibly a confirmation of the contention of Carl Schmitt about the “telluric,” earth-bound character of guerilleros.

An active air defense is far more difficult for the guerilleros.⁹ Modern technology has recently developed a series of light, portable, but also very expensive pieces of equipment for mountain and high-mountain troops, which are also appropriate—and especially so—for irregular war. In a conspiracy “from above,” such weapons might be stocked in supply bases in anticipation. But how, in a conspiracy “from below,” are guerilleros supposed to obtain such weapons in sufficient numbers—unless they obtain them from an interested third power? In one or another case, the guerilleros might succeed in capturing such weapons from the adversary in raids. But with raids alone, the guerilleros will hardly be able to obtain the required number of *complete* pieces after the transition to open combat, particularly an adequate volume of munitions.

Guerilleros will hardly ever succeed in developing their own air force even in the smallest format, without the assistance of an interested third power, even when, after the transition to open combat, one or more adversary aircraft falls undamaged into their hands, and there are sufficient trained pilots in their own ranks. Aircraft and pilots are not enough. The guarantee of adequate maintenance, the required volumes of fuel, and suitable landing areas, create more problems, which are very difficult to solve over the long term without the aid of an interested third power.¹⁰

⁹Compare Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 209, where he reports, that on the island of Viš, where Tito's headquarters was then located, a British unit for manning the flak artillery was stationed.

¹⁰Vladimir Dedijer, loc. cit., p. 208, reports, that allied aircraft came to the

On the other hand, the guerillero does not necessarily need—at least for reconnaissance and combat—the same, expensive aircraft of the newest construction, such as the regular armed forces generally have today for “large” war. Rebuilt civilian sport planes are sufficient for his purposes.

In the last two phases of irregular war, helicopters and the quick, light, rocket-carrying and machine-gun armed propeller aircraft are perfectly suitable for reconnaissance and combat, “because their flexibility allows them to evade enemy weapons in low altitude flight, they do not need to fly over their targets, and are nearly invulnerable to jet-fighters.”¹¹

The dependency of the guerilleros on the interested third power, which becomes ever clearer with the progress of irregular war, has not only military, but also political effects, both on the relationship between the guerilleros and their adversary, and his relationship to the interested third power, as well as on the relationship of the guerilleros to their powerful *supporter*. Increasing support by the interested third power for the guerilleros leads to ever more tangible tension between the guerilleros' adversary and this third power, to a tension, which one day, when the support for the guerilleros escalates to an “indirect attack” against their adversary, can lead to a sudden explosion—politically or militarily, in one or another form. The support of the Bosnian guerilleros by the Serbian government was the immediate trigger for the outbreak of World War I.

The relationship between the guerilleros and the interested third power, too, can be severely strained over time by the increasing dependency of the guerilleros on their supporter. Guerilleros do not fight over a period of years for freedom only to exchange one form of bondage for another in the end. The history of irregular wars in our century provides many examples, which show that guerilleros have changed the interested third power out of fear that that would happen, just as one changes horses, and sometimes have continued irregular war against just the country which had supported them in the first phase.

aid of Yugoslav partisans for the first time in June 1944, in the defense against the eighth German offensive against the partisan units.

¹¹Horst Günther Tolmein, “Kann man die Zonengrenze mit Jägertruppen decken?,” in *Die Welt*, January 15, 1972, p. 3.

The Behavior of the Guerilleros' Adversary

The guerilleros' adversary will resort to preventive, intelligence, repressive, and constructive measures to fight the guerilleros. The intelligence measures should *inform* the adversary as soon as possible about the guerilla movement forming, or already in existence, and its aims, plans, and intentions. The preventive measures—object projection, surveillance of suspicious persons and groups and other security measures—should *prevent* the guerilleros' planned irregular warfare actions; the repressive measures—securing clues in covert combat, search operations, arrest of suspects, punishment of convicted persons; in open combat, combing through contaminated areas, regaining "liberated" territories, and defeat of guerilla units in offensive defense—should *destroy* guerilleros, who have conducted irregular warfare actions, i.e., render them permanently incapable of continuing the combat, or resuming it¹²; the constructive measures, finally,—continuously informing the population about the danger represented by the guerilleros, effective propaganda for the national or social idea which the guerilleros are fighting, raising the living standard especially of those layers which show sympathy for the guerilleros for economic or social reasons—should *isolate* the guerilleros.¹³ Intelligence, preventive, repressive, and constructive measures mutually enhance each other; if the guerilleros' adversary neglects any one of these four areas, he delivers the guerilleros opportunities. The guerilleros live off of the mistakes of their adversary.

Successful counter-action against the guerilleros will only be possible, if the adversary obtains as early as possible—i.e., already in the *preparatory phase of irregular war*—a clear picture

¹²H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 221-275, discusses in detail "the approach of the occupation power in combat against irregular warfare actions" and "the combat against civil resistance movements," but limits himself to repressive—and some preventive—measures. He mentions neither intelligence nor constructive measures.

¹³Compare Josef S. Roucek, loc. cit., p. 76: "As long as the civilian population can not be induced to actively cooperate with the troops and the institutions of the state, the task of pacification is usually a long, tiring job, full of setbacks."

of the aims, plans, and potentialities of the guerilleros: in this phase, therefore, intelligence measures will have priority.¹⁴ But, hand in hand with intelligence measures, the guerilleros will be confronted with the adversary's preventive and, especially, constructive measures, already in the preparatory phase. Constructive measures usually take effect only after longer periods of time. The earlier they are implemented, and the more targeted they are made, the greater the chances will be of their success. Constructive measures against the guerilleros undertaken too late, or too little directed at the psychological isolation of the guerilleros, will be circumvented by the guerilleros in psychological warfare. Constructive measures are not fire-extinguishers, with which to fight a fire which has already broken out.

In the *phase of covert combat*, adversary preventive and repressive measures against the guerilleros will be primary. The intelligence and constructive measures, initiated in the preparatory phase, will, however, be continued in intensified form by an adversary, who has the serious will to destroy the guerilleros. In the repressive measures, the guerilleros' adversary will restrict himself in the phase of covert combat to the deployment of *police*. It were a crude mistake, if the adversary drew upon the armed forces at this early phase to fight the guerilleros. During the phase of covert combat, the armed forces should restrict themselves to intelligence and preventive measures *for their own security*.

It will not always be easy for the guerilleros' adversary in the phase of covert combat to coordinate constructive and repressive measures. Such a close and frictionless coordination, however, is unconditionally necessary for him in this phase. Especially when they are directed at entire groups of the population, and therefore also affect innocent persons, premature or purposeless repressive or unpopular preventive measures, planned "overnight," in the literal sense of the word, will deprive all carefully and painstakingly planned constructive measures of their value and effect. An adversary, who knows what is at stake in irregular war, will never lose

¹⁴Compare Josef S. Roucek, loc. cit., p. 78: "An efficient reconnaissance of the enemy . . . in addition to well-trained police and the interruption of supplies from abroad, is among the most important prerequisites for a victory over a partisan movement."

sight of the aim of psychologically isolating the guerilleros in his preventive and repressive measures, and will therefore examine every intended preventive and repressive measure before it is initiated, in terms of its possible psychological effect on the population. "To want to overcome the guerilla, as a total war where one's own existence is at stake, with military and police instruments, or even with intensified terror," Hahlweg observes, "is among the greatest mistakes, which the German high political and military leadership made in World War II."¹⁵

The adversary will deploy *part* of his armed forces for actions against the guerilleros only in the phase of transition to open combat. When they do so, the armed forces will encounter the guerilleros largely with their own methods. The light units deployed against the guerilleros will be just as mobile as those of the guerilleros themselves. They will launch their actions with "systematic irregularity," exploiting operative and tactical surprise as an instrument of success, just as the guerilleros do. "The tactical principles," which the adversary employs in the deployment of parts of his armed forces against the guerilleros in the phase of transition to open combat, are otherwise, as a memorandum of the Führungsakademie of the German Bundeswehr from 1967 notes, "comparable to the principles for defensive battle under nuclear threat . . . The most important difference lies in the shift of independent combat to much smaller combat units, and thus a greater dispersion of combat in space," whereby the numerical strength, composition, and equipping of such combat units are gauged according to the suspected strength and combat-power of the guerilla-units, against which they are deployed. The adversary's forces will then be either equal to, or superior to the guerilleros, numerically, in suitable armament, and not least in combat morale.

The employment of parts of the armed forces against guerilleros after the transition to open combat must occur in the framework of overall planning of *all* of the measures initiated

¹⁵Werner Hahlweg, loc. cit., p. 148. H. von Dach, loc. cit., p. 250, distinguishes, in the counter-measures against civil resistance movements, between actions, which are launched by the police alone, actions which the police conduct with the help of the army, and measures, which the army implements with the help of the police.

against the guerilleros. This deployment must—under strict observation of secrecy and maintenance of surprise—be *indirectly* prepared by propaganda, and accompanied by effective constructive short-term measures, so that the population does not perceive them as a shock, but as the beginning of a better time, in which calm, order, and security are guaranteed.

The commitment of a part of the adversary armed forces to fight the guerilleros can potentially be exploited by an interested third power to intervene with his own *regular* armed forces into the irregular war, an intervention, which the interested third power will interpret as politically permissible, and necessary assistance, which it provides the guerilleros as victims of a military raid.

With such an intervention, the *isolated* irregular war comes to an end. A "large" war begins, and the irregular war is relegated to the shadows. If this irregular war is continued, it no longer appears as its own *kind* of war, but only as a special form of the *conduct* of war in this "large" war.

The guerilleros' adversary must be prepared for such a "deformation" of irregular war by preparing intervention reserves, which also enable him to conduct the beginning, limited "large" war. Sometimes, the deterrent effect of assembling a sufficient strategic reserve for a "large" war, is sufficient to keep the interested third power from initiating an armed intervention into the irregular war, and will thus achieve at least a *limited* isolation of the guerilleros in their relationship to the interested third power. This would be a psychological success—and psychological successes decide the outcome of irregular wars. Irregular war strategy must be *psychological* strategy. *Combat*—whether it is covert or open, actually conducted, or merely threatened—is only a *means* to that end.

AFTERWORD

This present study describes modern irregular warfare as a strategic model—as the model of a total, violent conflict, one which takes hold of the totality of the state and people, is conducted with all possible instruments, and lasts a long time, a conflict with is initially of low military intensity, but for which the tendency for a gradual escalation is characteristic. In this conflict, that party to the conflict will be victorious, which succeeds in isolating his adversary in the course of combat, psychologically and in space, and wears down his adversary's morale, so that the latter accepts all the conditions imposed upon him.

Our study speaks of a collective employment of armed violence, which evades the nuclear threat, just as it evades the prohibition against the employment, or the threat of the employment of military force in domestic relations.

We have not described the unfolding of concrete *historical* events, which already lie in the past. On the basis of such events, the war of the *future* has been described. In clear contradiction to the theories of the extreme left, however, this war is *not* viewed as an historical necessity, but—to use a philosophical term—as a contingent fact. On the basis of facts, which we know, possibilities have been investigated, which *could* occur. A judgment about the a posteriori probability, that sooner or later—and especially—in Europe, this possible development will occur, should not, and can not be given.

This study treats of a war, which breaks out unnoticed, and generally remains unrecognized for a long time, of a war in which the attacker is able to disguise himself as a freedom-fighter, and the attacked enjoys all too much basking in the security of being able to continue to live in peace.

Our investigation has demonstrated, that the modern irregular war has a Janus head. It is, by nature, usually a “dirty” war, a war which cloaks itself in the mantle of justice, and thus deceives the credulous, but a war, which in most cases is distinguished from conventional war particularly by the fact, that it knows of no law, nor good faith. That does not preclude, that the modern irregular war sometimes appears as the means of last resort—the *ultima ratio*—of the weak, who is only thus capable of defending himself against the strong aggressor.

The ethical value, or lack thereof, of irregular war is determined by the purpose it serves. This abstract observation is not an attempt to justify the employment of force, also not the employment of force in the form of irregular war. The author of this study has nothing in common with those scientists, who attempt to introduce a “positive” conception of peace—as they call it—into theory and practice, who sanction the same employment of force, even demand it, whose absence might be characterized as the condition of peace in a “negative” conception of peace.

To examine the essence of peace and *hic et nunc* realize it, is the great task of international law. To that end, it must grapple with the phenomenon of irregular war. The theory and practice of international law have dealt too little up to now with the phenomenon of irregular war. One purpose—and not the least—of our study, was to point a way, upon which norms of the international law of tomorrow can be developed. This is only possible on the foundation of a model of irregular war. Our study intends to provide such a model—not more—*also* for theory and practice in modern *international law*. We wanted to point up problems, not offer finished solutions. If the reader, when he lays this book aside, feels himself inspired to give some thought to what he has read, our study will have fulfilled its task in a time, in which so much is said about détente (relaxation of tension), where détente usually signifies nothing but the continuation of tension with other means.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF PROFESSOR VON DER HEYDTE



—Born March 30, 1907 in Munich, son of a Bavarian cavalry officer and his French wife.

—Attended the humanist gymnasium, graduation in Munich.

—Military service in the Reichswehr from 1925. Discharged 1927 while still under military obligations.

—Studies of law and economics in Innsbruck, Graz, and Berlin.

—Doctor of Law (jur. utr.) in Graz, Doctor of Economics (rer. pol) in Innsbruck.

—Two years of study at the Consular Academy in Vienna.

—Assistant with Professor Kelsen at the Cologne University up to his emigration.

—1934 obtained Austrian citizenship while maintaining his German-Bavarian citizenship.

—Stipend from the Carnegie Endowment Fund for Peace.

—1934 rejoined the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht as Lieutenant of the Cavalry/Anti-Tank Corps.

—Participated in the French campaign (decorated with the Iron Cross Second Class, and Iron Cross First Class).

—Summer 1940 reported for duty with the Paratroop Corps.

—Battalion Commander in Crete in May 1941 (decorated with the Knight's Cross).

—Service in Wolchow on the north section of the Eastern Front.

—Commander of the training and testing battalion of the paratroops.

—Service in Africa. Commander of the "Combat Group v. d. Heydte" in the Africa Corps and Commander of the rear-guard from El Alamein to Tunisia.

—Chief of Staff of the Second Paratroop Division in Rome, Italy.

—Commander of the Paratroop Regiment 6 at the Battle of Normandy.

—Commander of the paratroop engagement in the Battle of Ardennes.

—Prisoner of war in England until 1948.

—1948 joined the Christian Social Union party (CSU) in Bavaria as its 97th member.

—1950 inaugural dissertation on "Die Entstehung des modernen Staates" (The Emergence of the Modern State).

—1951 Professor's Chair at the University of Mainz for Civil and International Law.

—1956 participated in military exercises of the German Bundeswehr.

—1962 Promoted Brigadier General of Reserves (the only General of Reserves of the Bundeswehr in addition to General Reinhard Gehlen, former director of the Bundesnachrichtendienst—BND).

—1966-1970 member of the Bavarian State Parliament for the CSU.

—1972, publication of *Der moderne Kleinkrieg*.

—Publication of Professor von der Heydte's memoirs, *In Höhen und Tiefen*, is planned for Spring 1987.

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The office of the Executive Intelligence Review in Paris is shown above, soon after a bomb blew off the door, and destroyed the copying machine. This bombing, claimed by an offshoot of the Action Directe group, was meant to signal that the group was a target.



Part Five:

COVERT COMBAT



Open warfare by the Green Party, the political support group for the RAF terrorists, has been the order of the day throughout West Germany for years. Here, a "greenie" assaults a policeman at an anti-nuclear "demonstration" in 1982.

MODERN IRREGULAR WARFARE

IN DEFENSE POLICY
AND AS A
MILITARY PHENOMENON

IV. Methods of Irregular Warfare



The Colombian guerrilla group, the M-19, shown above in 1983, had to take over a radio station, in order to get its propaganda message across. Peaceful propaganda saturation is an early stage of preparation for irregular warfare.



Demonstrations, like this West German anti-Euromissile one, not only serve to popularize the guerrilla cause, but build solidarity within the group.

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**by Professor Friedrich August
Frhr. von der Heydte**

Translated by George Gregory

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The Algerian war, 1958, combined characteristics of a war against a foreign occupier, and a revolutionary war—both of which reflect aspects, but not the totality, of irregular warfare.



The Kenyan Mau-Maus, shown in their initiation ceremony above, represent one kind of guerrilla movement, which was notable for its brutality in terrorizing the population into support for its struggle.




Ernesto "Che" Guevara, whose body is being displayed by the Bolivians in the picture above, was a romantic theoretician of guerrilla warfare in Ibero-America in the 1960s, but never successfully built mass popular support.



The Montoneros, who emerged as a prominent Argentine terrorist movement in the mid-1970s, were obliterated by the early 1980s.



Bombings of targets associated with prominent political opponents are a frequent method of guerrilla groups, in order to show the impotence of the police, as well as to do damage. Above, the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination League building in Washington, D.C., bombed by the Jewish Defense League in 1985.



Kidnapping, and later assassination, used to be among the most popular methods of the West German Red Army Fraction (RAF). Shown above is the scene in Cologne, on Sept. 5, 1977, when industrialist leader Hans-Martin Schleyer was kidnapped.



At a later period in the struggle, guerrilla groups take on the police directly, through riots. Above, rioters throw rocks at U.S. army barracks in West Germany, in 1983.

Sabotage of infrastructure is also an integral facet of guerrilla warfare. This electrical tower was downed by the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso group in February 1986, during a nationwide campaign to wipe out the nation's economic infrastructure.



V. Cultural Basis for Irregular Warfare



The drug-sex counter-culture, shown here in its full degradation in New York City, has been a major facet of today's preparations for irregular warfare, by Soviet-sponsored groups.



The forces of irregular warfare are aided by the undermining of traditional cultural values. The sponsorship of "population control" by the United Nations epitomizes this weakening. Above, former UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim announced World Population Year in 1974, in the company of Rafael Salas (left) and Dr. Antonio Carrillo Flores, (right)



Urban guerrilla warfare was popularized through publicity about the Algerian war, and is considered by many theorists to be the most efficient, per guerrilla. Above, women and children scatter in response to open fighting.



Mao Tse-Tung, shown above on his march from Yen-an to Peking, concentrated on fighting in the countryside, where he had his logistical base.

VI. The Threat Today



Colombian narco-terrorists, led by the M-19, took over that nation's Judicial Palace in the fall of 1985, in order to prevent the implementation of the country's anti-drug campaign. A full military assault, shown here, was necessary to dislodge them.



Hideous political assassinations, including burning victims alive, are the trademark of the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso group. Above is one of countless victims killed in 1986 alone.



Islamic terrorists, shown here on parade in Beirut, pose a serious threat of political takeover throughout the Middle East and Africa. While supported by the Soviets, they represent a wild card of insane desire for martyrdom all their own.



The bombing of the LaBelle discotheque, in April 1986, has been traced to Libyan and Syrian terrorist networks. Bombings of places where U.S. military congregate are a near-daily occurrence in Europe today.

I. Theoreticians of War



Hugo Grotius, the theoretician of international law, outlined the norms of civilized war-fighting in the wake of the Thirty Years' War.



Carl Philipp von Clausewitz, the Prussian general, established the connection between politics and war, which is crucial for understanding irregular warfare today.



The office of the Executive Intelligence Review in Paris is shown above, soon after a bomb blew off the door, and destroyed the copying machine. This bombing, claimed by an offshoot of the Action Directe group, was meant to signal that the group was a target.



Open warfare by the Green Party, the political support group for the RAF terrorists, has been the order of the day throughout West Germany for years. Here, a "greenie" assaults a policeman at an anti-nuclear "demonstration" in 1982.

II. Traditional Types of War



World War I, to the surprise of its participants, ended up being as a war of supplies and fixed position, as the U.S. soldiers shown in the trench above found out.



World War II was a much more mobile war, dominated by tank warfare. Shown above, German General Sepp Dietrich inspects a captured British tank from the Dieppe invasion.

WEST GERMANY, MAY 1986

When these "ecologists" attacked the police at the Wackersdorf nuclear reprocessing plant in Bavaria, West Germany on May 17-18, 1986, 200 police officers were injured and a million dollars worth of property was destroyed. The assaults were coordinated on the spot by the German Communist Party, the DKP, directing a corps of terrorist shock-troops. The strings on the DKP and its terrorists run through East Germany to Moscow.

The West is at war. Yet politicians on both sides of the Atlantic call pitched battles like Wackersdorf "anti-nuclear demonstrations," and Soviet-directed assassinations "political violence."

Today West Germany is on the front lines of this war. If the battle for Germany is lost, the battle for the West as a whole cannot be won.



Professor von der Heydte's book, the classic study of Irregular Warfare, first appeared in German in 1972. It is indispensable reading for those who want to understand how this warfare is proceeding, . . . and how to stop it.

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