A Scientific Problem:
Reclaiming the Soul of Gauss
By Michael Kirsch
Before launching
into his highest achievement in Book V of the Harmony of the World, in which he demonstrated that it is through
harmonics that the physics of the solar system are known, thus redefining the
nature of humanity as a whole, Johannes Kepler demonstrated that the causes of
those harmonic proportions with which we measure the universe, have their
origin from within the rational soul, as “abstract
quantities”. At the height of his argument he declares:
“Finally there is a chief and supreme argument, that quantities possess a certain wonderful
and obviously divine organization, and there is a shared metaphoric
representation of divine and human things in them. Of the semblance of the Holy Trinity in the
spherical I have written in many places... We come, therefore, to the straight
line, which by its extension from a point at the center to a single point at
the surface sketches out the first rudiments of creation, and imitates the
eternal begetting of the Son (represented and depicted by the departure from the
center towards the infinite points of the whole surface, by infinite lines, subject, to the most perfect
equality in all respects); and this straight line is of course an element
of a corporeal form.
“If this is spread
out sideways, it now suggests a corporeal form, creating a plane; but a
spherical shape cut by a plane gives the shape of a circle at its section, a true image of created mind, which is in
charge of ruling the body. It is in the
same proportion to the spherical as the human mind is to the divine, that is to
say as a line to a surface, though each is circular, but to the plane, in which it is also placed, it is as the curved to
the straight, which are incompatible and incommensurable. Also the circle exists splendidly both in the
plane which cuts, circumscribing the spherical shape, and in the spherical
shape which is cut, by the mutual concurrence of the two, just as the mind
exist in the body, giving form to it and to its connections with the corporeal
form, like a kind of irradiation shed from the divine face onto the body and
drawing thence its more noble nature.
“Just as this is a
confirmation from the harmonic proportions of the circle as the subject and the
source of their terms, equally it is the strongest
possible argument for abstraction, as the suggestion of the divinity of the
mind exists…. in a circle abstracted from corporeal and sensible things to the
same extent as concepts of the curved, the symbol of the mind, are separated and, so to speak, abstracted from the
straight, the shadow of bodies.”[1]
Nicolas of Cusa’s
influence on Johannes Kepler in every field of his works had its origin in
Cusa’s establishing the nature of the human soul’s relationship with the
universe and the Creator of that universe.
This relationship addresses
the greatest challenge facing mankind, and especially the youth generation
today.
The nature of the
universe as demonstrated in the two webpages of the LYM on Kepler, has pointed
to the reality, that the principles which man discovers, never begin with
necessity, or mere practical use. Science is in fact, not a means to an end, but an end itself: to address
the higher purpose of mankind. What is
this higher purpose? In all the aims of
science, mankind has been driven by an inner desire to accomplish the greatest
function of the human being: to have fun. Man is a creature which cannot be bounded by
any bounds, because of that which lies inside man, his soul. It is in the nature of the human soul to have
fun, but a certain kind, which can only be called, real fun.
Today the ‘Boomer’
generation filling the institutions of government and science have lost an
understanding of how to have real fun; in
doing so, they have misplaced a thorough conception of their own souls. Since
they lack this freedom, they also fail to understand the deeper implications of
science, and its relation to humanity. The effect of an entire generation having lost the conception of the immortality
of the human soul, has been a dynamic and multilayered collapse of the U.S. and
world economy, the U.S. institutions of Government, and a rabid empiricism
which dominates science. Therefore,
given the need and possibility of such events as the recent Russian proposal
for joint U.S.-Russia cooperation on the Bering straits project, what is
required today is a clear conception.
Three months ago,
and none too soon, a sea change occurred in modern science; the elaboration by
the LYM of Kepler’s achievement in actually redefining the potential of the
human species, the human soul, and the nature of all human knowledge, put
modern empiricism on notice and has shaken the rotting foundations of current
thinking. This revolution in science
sparked by the Kepler Two project, must continue so that a new generation of
economic scientists are unleashed who do not fail to bring the essence of the
human soul as defined by Kepler in TheHarmony of the World fully into the domain
of modern science.
In a fantastic
irony, the needed challenge for such a change in science intersects the
specific task of this of this report: The
third phase of ‘Animating Creativity’ on Gauss begs the question: by what means,
might we discover the thought process that allowed Carl Gauss to discover the
orbit of Ceres? Understanding the
principles he did discover, and comparing them with the method employed in his
1799 Fundamental Theorem of Algebra,
it is furthermore clear that Gauss greatly obscured the nature of his thoughts
throughout almost all his work. The
Napoleonic tyranny that swept Europe, and later the cultural collapse of
Romanticism following the Congress of Vienna, were the conditions in which
Gauss decided to take such a course.[2] However,
since the nature of ‘harmonics’ as discovered uniquely by Kepler, must be carried forward and applied to the
domain of modern science, the implications of Carl Gauss’ discoveries and the
thinking he had concerning them, must be fully comprehended.
To this end, there
are no means more suitable for such an immortal task—in reviving the nature of mankind in science
today, and the consequences which that implies—than to study the mind of
Nicolas of Cusa and his student, Kepler, whose relationship released the Earth
in motion from the shackles of empiricism, and with it all of modern
science. In carrying forward the
scientific revolution of Cusa and Kepler, without losing the freedom of
thinking involved in the completely integrated epistemology contained therein,
the hidden genius of Gauss will become accessible. In other words, how did Cusa and Kepler think,
as reflected in what is explicit in their work—which can be a guide to reflect
back onto Gauss’s work—thereby drawing out the substance of what was implicit
in his unspoken thoughts?
Abraham Kästner, the
architect of the German renaissance and the teacher of Carl Gauss, considered
Nicolas of Cusa to be a founder of many fields of science, which preceded the
work of many, including Kepler and Leibniz. This is cause for celebration, and
also indicates the great likelihood of Gauss’ acquaintance with Cusa’s ideas.
Therefore, what we
now show is how the discoveries of Cusa and his conception of the human soul,
took root in Johannes Kepler, and today provides the basis for discussing Carl
Gauss’ elaboration of: an anti-Euclidean harmonic solar system, his
comprehension of the transcendental nature of the Kepler Problem, the
applications of the method of Leibniz’ infinitesimal in his discovery of the orbit
of Ceres, and above all, his contribution to the ‘higher purpose’ of mankind.
Part I: The Edifice of the World
Abraham Kästner, in
1757, in his Praise of Astronomy declared
Nicolas of Cusa to be, one of two “revivers of the edifice of the world” along
with Copernicus.[3] Although
Cusa was a close collaborator of Toscanelli, who was a famous astronomer at the
time, the most probable reference is to Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia. In that
work, there lies a principle so vast, that its implications will guide us
through the entirety of this investigation.
Nicolas of Cusa sought to demonstrate
that the Creator of the Universe was not something able to be reduced to a
particular metaphor or described in any way, but only known inconceivably by
the mind of man, and that all knowledge sought and captured by man came from
seeking after this knowledge of the Creator. Cusa investigated the nature of
such a universe, that which he calls a “contracted maximum”, as the medium
between the absolute infinite and the plurality of finite things. Here he
returns the conception of the universe to the Pythagorean conception of forms,
which make up the ‘world soul’ in a universe which is not a duality, as defined
by Aristotle, of, on the one side, unknowable principles and, on the other, the
world of the changeable sense, but instead a universe with an infinite Creator
whose perfection reaches through the universe to all matter. Although there are
many paradoxes he sets forward concerning how the idea of a maximum existing in
plurality is known, we go here to the heart of the issue.
In the course of investigating the Absolute Maximum—a
subject to which we will return—he makes the following observation: of things
admitting of more or less, we never come to an unqualifiedly maximum or
minimum. Therefore, he states, since
only the cause of all causes, is the Maximum, and is the only absolute infinite
not subject to being greater or lesser by any degree, we never come therefore
to Absolute Equality, except in the Maximum. That is, only the Maximum which
contains all things in it, including the minimum, is equal to itself. Since only in the Maximum is found absolute
Equality, all things differ. From this
comes an immortal statement by Cusa:
“Therefore,
one motion cannot be equal to another; nor can one motion be the measure of
another, since, necessarily, the measure and the thing measured differ”…..
and…. “With regard to motion, we do not come to an unqualifiedly minimum”.
What implications did this hold for astronomy?
“…It
is not the case that in any genus— even
[the genus] of motion—we come to an unqualifiedly maximum and minimum.
Hence, if we consider the various movements of the spheres, [we will see that]
it is not possible for the world-machine
to have, as a fixed and immovable center, either our perceptible Earth or air
or fire or any other thing. For, with regard to motion, we do not come to
an unqualifiedly minimum—i.e., to a fixed center. For the
[unqualifiedly] minimum must coincide with the [unqualifiedly] maximum;
therefore, the center of the world coincides with the circumference. Hence, the
world does not have a [fixed] circumference. For if it had a [fixed] center, it
would also have a [fixed] circumference; and hence it would have its own
beginning and end within itself, and it would be bounded in relation to
something else, and beyond the world there would be both something else and
space (locus). But all these [consequences] are false. Therefore, since
it is not possible for the world to be enclosed between a physical center and
[a physical] circumference, the world—of which God is the center and the
circumference— is not understood. And although the world is not infinite, it
cannot be conceived as finite, because it lacks boundaries within which it is
enclosed.[4]
“Therefore, the Earth, which cannot be the center,
cannot be devoid of all motion. … Therefore, just as the Earth is not the
center of the world, so the sphere of fixed stars is not its circumference…..
“And since we can discern motion only in
relation to something fixed, viz., either poles or centers, and since we
presuppose these [poles or centers] when we measure motions, we find that as we
go about conjecturing, we err with regard to all [measurements]. And we are
surprised when we do not find that the stars are in the right position
according to the rules of measurement of the ancients, for we suppose that the
ancients rightly conceived of centers and poles and measures.
“…Neither the sun nor the moon
nor the Earth nor any sphere can by its motion describe a true circle, since
none of these are moved about a fixed [point]. Moreover, it is not the case
that there can be posited a circle so true that a still truer one cannot be
posited. And it is never the case that at
two different times [a star or a sphere] is moved in precisely equal ways or that [on these two occasions its motion] describes equal
approximate-circles—even if the matter does not seem this way to us.”[5]
Here in these
passages Cusa, deriving the universe as a product of a Maximum Creator with a
certain paradoxical relation to the universe, derived principles, which are
seen today, after the work of Johannes Kepler, to be entirely true. The
universe which is infinite with respect to all things is such that it even
coincides with the minimum. And if we are talking about the boundary of the
universe, it is such that the center coincides with the circumference. Since motion never comes to a minimum, there
is no fixed center; not even the sun is completely devoid of motion. Thus the Aristotelian
Ptolemaic model system was exposed as a fraud.[6] This truth would be thoroughly demonstrated by Kepler in refuting the Equant.[7] Cusa moved the Earth out of a fixed
center, and set it into motion, an idea which would later be taken up by
Copernicus. Cusa sets up the paradox that since all motion is derived from the
comparison with something fixed, all astronomical knowledge of his time is
thrown into error, since the platform of observations is itself moving. This would later be taken up by Kepler in
calculating the orbit of the Earth in Chapters 22-30 of the New Astronomy.[8] Cusa also established that since
motion never occurs around a fixed point, there are no perfect Circles.[9] This was left for Kepler to demonstrate in
Chapters 40-60 of the New Astronomy.[10] Likewise the non- circular orbits are constantly adjusting themselves to a
different center, and thus cause the orbits of the bodies to take a different
course. Lastly, Cusa did away with the idea that the there is a limit to the
universe, at the “eighth sphere” of the fixed stars.
Thus a constantly changing universe was established, with no fixed
center. Within such an ‘imprecise’
universe with no place devoid of motion, how could the cause of motion be
determined, as motion was derived from more than simply comparing two objects,
with one at rest? This higher concept
of motion was left untouched until Kepler established the true physical causes
in the New Astronomy in chapters
32-40.[11]
Part II: What is Science?
What therefore is man that he exists within
such a universe? How must mankind approach the challenge of a universe, which,
as Cusa says, is a “contracted” image of the Absolute Maximum, in which
imprecision enters into all considerations of measurement? Therefore, how does the human mind then, proceed
to investigate the causes in such a universe?
In Nicolas of Cusa’s De Docta Ignorantia, he begins by
stating that all things desire to exist in the best manner possible, and use
their judgment so that this desire is not in vain, allowing each being to attain
rest in what they seek. With the power of number, mankind judges the uncertain,
proportionally, by comparing it with the certain. Cusa states an apparent
paradox that arises:
“Both the precise combinations in corporeal things and the congruent
relating of known to unknown surpass human reason to such an extent that
Socrates seemed himself to know nothing except that he did not
know. ..”
If we were created with a desire to seek knowledge and given only these
means of comparative relation, then, a paradox seems to arise. If all we come to know in our seeking is that
we don’t know, weren’t we created in vain?
Rather, we must desire to know that we do not know!
“No! It’s a trap,” an Aristotelian shouts, “don’t you see? This
proves that you can’t know anything about the invisible universe. All you can
do is assume a priori and set up set
of definitions and axioms that follow. Forget about whether the initial axiom
is knowable, it will work!” Somewhere, a baby boomer sighs relief, “Thank
goodness, you alerted me, I thought I was going to have to think to get past
this one. I like beliefs so much better. They just feel right, you know?”
Instead, Cusa
concludes “If we can fully attain unto this knowledge or our ignorance, we will
attain unto learned ignorance. ... The more he knows that he is
unknowing…the more learned he will be.”
Now, after wrestling
with this, ask the question: if we seek to become learned in our ignorance,
what must humans study, to attain the maximum learning of our ignorance?
Cusa proceeds, bringing
us with him to measure the Maximum,
to that very end. But how can you
measure the absolute Maximum? If measuring is done by means of comparative
relations, what can be compared to the absolute Maximum? There is no
comparative relation of the finite to the infinite. Things greater or lesser
partake in finite things, and the maximum does not. The “rule of learned
ignorance”[12] is
that in things greater something can always be greater, in things lesser,
always lesser, thus in comparing two things we never find them to be so equal
that they could not be more equal indefinitely.
Cusa elaborates the paradox which the
intellect faces with such an incomprehensible maximum. Since the maximum is not
greater or lesser, it is both maximally large, and maximally small, or the
minimum, thus the maximum is such that it coincides with the minimum. Since the
maximum is not greater or lesser, it does not allow opposition, there are no
opposites in the maximum, and therefore, he states what appears to be logically
inconsistent: “Thus the Maximum is beyond all affirmation and negation: it is
not, as well as is, all things conceived to be, and is as well as is not, all
things conceived not to be. It is one thing such that it is all things, and all
things such that it is no thing, maximum such that it is minimum.”[13]
But how can such
contradictions be combined? If we are created to seek maximum ignorance, but
such a maximum only creates inconsistencies in our understanding, how can the
human intellect not have been created in vain? Cusa—throwing Aristotle’s maxim “each thing either is or is not” out the
window—stated that infinite truth must therefore be comprehended not directly,
by means comparisons of things greater or lesser, but, rather,
“incomprehensibly comprehended!”[14]
To proceed further
toward our end, Cusa then declares, spinning Aristotle in his grave[15]:
“We must leave behind the things
which, together with their material associations, are attained through the
senses, through the imagination, or through reason-[leave them behind] so that
we may arrive at the most simple and most abstract understanding, where all
things are one, where a line is a triangle, a circle, and a sphere, where
oneness is threeness (and conversely), where accident is substance, where body
is mind (spiritus), where motion is rest, and other such things.”
In conducting an inquiry into unseen
truths, visible images must be used to reflect the unseen as a mirror or
metaphor. However, for the visible image to truly reflect the invisible, there
must be no doubt about the image.[16]
As Cusa said before, the mind
invokes comparative relations of the known to the unknown to come to
knowledge. But all perceptible things
are in a state of continual instability because of the material possibility abounding
in them. For
example, when a geometer uses mathematical figures for measuring things he seeks
not the lines in material, as he cannot draw the same figure twice, but seeks
the line in the mind. For perceptible figures are always capable of greater
precision, being variable and imperfect. Cusa says that the eye sees color as the mind sees its concepts, but the
mind sees more clearly, as insensible things are unchangeable.
As Plato said:
“And do you not also know that
[geometers] further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though
they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness,
pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as
such, and not for the sake of the image of it which they draw?... The very
things which they mold and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in
water, these things they treat in their turn as only images, but what they
really seek is to get sight of those realities which can be seen only by the
mind.”[17]
The
triangle in the mind, which is free of perceptible otherness, is therefore the
triangle which is the truest. Cusa says
the Mind is to the mathematical figures it contains, as forms are to their
images. Then, since mathematical things in the mind are the forms, and thus do
not admit of otherness, the mind could be said to be the form of forms.
The mind views the figures in its own
unchangeability. “But
its unchangeability is its truth. Therefore, where the mind views whatever
[figures] it views: there the truth of it itself and of all the things that it
views is present. Therefore, the truth wherein the mind views all things is the
mind’s form. Hence, in the mind a light of- truth is present; through this
light the mind exists, and in it the mind views itself and all other things.”[18]
But,
since truth is the form of the mind, it is not something greater or lesser, and
thus as it is a Maximum to the mind, it is not seen directly. Cusa likens the
truth to an invisible mirror in the mind. And as is the rule of learned ignorance, that
which is not the maximum can always be a greater or lesser; that which is not
truth can never measure truth so precisely that it couldn’t surpass the former
measure. “Now, the mind’s
power is increased by the mind’s viewing; it is kindled as is a spark when
glowing. And because the mind’s power increases when from potentiality it is
more and more brought to actuality by the light-of-truth, it will never be
depleted, because it will never arrive at that degree at which the light-of- truth
cannot elevate it more highly.”[19]
But wait, since our
desire to know everything about the universe clashes with the Maximum truth
being infinitely distant, then logically wouldn’t the Creator be evil?
In truth, there is
nothing more fun, as Cusa perfectly describes:
“Moreover,
that movement is a supremely delightful movement, because it is a movement
toward the mind’s life and, hence, contains within itself rest. For, in moving,
the mind is not made tired but, rather, is greatly inflamed. And the more
swiftly the mind is moved, the more delightfully it is conveyed by the
light-of-life unto the Mind’s own life.”[20]
Therefore, although
the view of the likes of Norbert Wiener and his information theorist followers
claim that mankind is in a race against entropy, and will never be able to
discover everything fast enough, making them “[S]hip wrecked passengers on a
doomed planet.”[21];
in truth, this paradox of the mind’s inability to comprehend the entire universe,
is not part of an evil design, it is in fact what drives the universe forward. The speculation of mankind is not a sign of
an entropy of the mind, but is the nourishment itself, and in the process of
mankind’s discoveries, the universe develops.[22]
Since
this is the purpose of mankind’s nature, to ascend with the intellect, Nicolas
of Cusa demonstrated that the universe itself is a reflection of this
relationship of the mind of man and the universe as a whole. The comparison for how the mind seeks the truth
in measuring the ‘Maximum Number’ was demonstrated in Cusa’s extensive
treatment of the relationship of the curved and straight, which formed the
basis for all of modern science, and the ascent of which we will no longer
prolong.
Part III: On the Curved and Straight
“As Cusa’s criticism of the error of Archimedes on the
subject of the isoperimetric principle expressed by the circle, echoes the
relevant conception, the cognitive power of the specifically human individual
mind is not a secretion of the living body, but a principle which subsumes the
living body dynamically. This
dynamical principle of human reason, reflects the idea of the image of the Creator.”
-Lyndon
LaRouche, Cusa and Kepler
Nicolas
of Cusa demonstrated a fundamental truth about the nature of the curved and
straight. The mind’s attempt to relate the curved and the straight represents
its capability to measure the universe as a bounding array of Maximum numbers, which
once identified—and distinguished in the same way as the human mind is
distinguished from the Maximum—could be
incomprehensibly comprehended.
In Cusa’s on the Quadrature of the Circle he begins:
“There
are scholars, who allow for the quadrature of the circle. They must necessarily
admit, that circumferences can be equal to the perimeters of polygons, since
the circle is set equal to the rectangle with the radius of the circle as its
smaller and the semi-circumference as its larger side. If the square equal to a
circle could thus be transformed into a rectangle, then one would have the
straight line equal to the circular line. Thus, one would come to the equality
of the perimeters of the circle and the polygon, as is self-evident.”[23]
Cusa states that the central premise
of Archimedes is : since one can have a
greater or a lesser polygonal perimeter, then one can have also an equal
perimeter.
Those who
followed Archimedes thought therefore, says Cusa,
“If
the square that can be given is also not larger or smaller than the circle by
the smallest specifiable fraction of the square or of the circle, they call it
equal. That is to say, they apprehend the concept of equality such that what
exceeds the other or is exceeded by it by no rational—not even the very
smallest—fraction is equal to another.”
But, Cusa says,
there were those who disagreed that where one can give a larger and a smaller,
one can also give an equal. This applies
to the angles which arise in the relations of the circle and polygon. As he
continued:
“There can namely be given an
incidental angle that is greater than a rectilinear, and another incidental
angle smaller than the rectilinear, and nevertheless never one equal to the
rectilinear. Therefore with incommensurable magnitudes this conclusion does not
hold. That is to say, if one could give one incidental angle that is larger
than this rectilinear angle by a rational fraction of the rectilinear, and
another that is smaller than this rectilinear by a rational fraction of the
rectilinear, then one could also give one equal to the perimeter. But since the incidental angle is not
proportional to the rectilinear, it cannot be larger or smaller by a rational
fraction of the rectilinear, thus also never equal. And since between the
area of a circle and a rectilinear enclosed area there can exist no rational
proportion…. Therefore the conclusion is also here not permissible.”[emphasis
added][24]
Cusa
had challenged this already in his De
Docta Ignorantia:“[T]here can never in
any respect be something equal to another, even if at one time one thing is
less than another and at another [time] is greater than this other, it makes
this transition with a certain singularity, so that it never attains precise
equality [with the other]. …And an angle of incidence increases from being
lesser than a right [angle] to being greater [than a right angle] without the
medium of equality.”[25]
The nature
of the incidental angle compared to the rectilinear angle drives the point
home, that if the circle could be converted into the polygon, then each of the
parts of the circle and each of the parts of the rectilinear polygon could be a
part of the other, but a segment of the circle cannot be transformed into a
rectilinear area because of the nature of the incidental angles.
After showing this incommensurability
of the curved and straight angles, Cusa concludes the point:
“If a circle
can be transformed into a square, then it necessarily follows, that its
segments can be transformed into rectilinearly enclosed figures. And since the
latter is impossible, the former, from which it was deduced, must also be impossible.”
Thus, the following
property of the circle arises:
“Just as the incidental angle cannot be
transformed into a rectilinear, so the circle cannot be converted into a
rectilinearly enclosed figure.”
But how close could you get? Cusa
says there is a incommensurability between the two kinds of angles, but what
exactly is it?
Just how close can one get to
precision, and why is absolute precision impossible with the curved and
straight? To demonstrate this Cusa says that it if one uses the contingent
angle—a very small angle—it is possible to give: 1) an incidental angle
smaller than a rectilinear angle by the contingent angle, which is not any
rational fraction of the incidental angle and 2) a rectilinear angle larger
than the incidental angle by a contingent angle which is also not any rational
fraction of the rectilinear.
That is an incidental angle +
contigent angle = rectilinear angle
a
rectilinear – contigent angle = incidental angle
But wait a second—Cusa says the contingent angle “is
not a rational fraction of the incidental or contingent angle.” One cannot add and subtract incommensurable
magnitudes to attain equality.
In
the same way he says, one can give a square that is larger in a perimeter by
the circle, yet not by a rational proportion of the square, and one can give a
smaller circle than a square, yet not by a rational proportion of the circle. Therefore
a smaller and larger square can be given to the circle but never come so close
which is smaller or larger by a rational fraction.
As he said in De Docta Ignorantia, “Similarly,
a square inscribed in a circle passes—with respect to the size of the
circumscribing circle—from being a square which is smaller than the circle to
being a square larger than the circle, without ever arriving at being equal to
the circle.”[26]
He then remarks on what necessarily
follows.
In ‘On
conjectures’ Cusa had identified what the nature of a numbers such as the
circle were: “Hence,
species are as numbers that come together from two opposite directions—[
numbers] that proceed from a minimum which is maximum and from a maximum to
which a minimum is not opposed.” [27]
He also states here in the On the Quadrature of the Circle:
“In
respect to things which admit of a larger and smaller, one does not come to an
absolute maximum…” and since “polygonal
figures are not magnitudes of the same species…” a polygon never becomes small
enough or large enough to equal a circle. “Namely, in comparison to the
polygons, which admit of a larger and smaller, and thereby do not attain to the
circle’s area, the area of a circle is the absolute maximum, just as numerals
do not attain the power of comprehension of unity and multiplicities do not
attain the power of the simple.”
The more angles the inscribed polygon has, the
more similar it is to the circle. However, even if the number of its angles is
increased ad infinitum, the
polygon never becomes equal to the circle unless it is resolved into an
identity with the circle.”
The Characteristic of Learned
Ignorance
All of the
above in this section was the gist of Cusa’s overview as to what the nature of
the problem is. Afterwards, Cusa identifies the degree of incommensurability
that exists when seeking for the isoperimetric circle. It is as though:
although he identified the incommensurability between the different angles, he
had yet to identify the degree of imprecision that exists. What follows
therefore, is Cusa’s elaborate process of setting up incommensurable
proportionals to box in the nature of the species difference.
Isoperimetric
means: equal perimeter. In the Mathematical
Compliment, the idea of isoperimetric takes a broader meaning, in looking
at triangles and squares and other polygons that all have equal perimeter, and
what the relationship of the radius’ would be that circumscribe those figures.
Here, in On the Quadrature of the Circle, Cusa is
looking for the radius of the circle whose perimeter would be equal to the
perimeter of a give triangle which is inscribed in a circle. Where would such a
radius be? What would be its characteristics?
First, he shows that the simple idea
of an equality between the triangle perimeter and the circular perimeter
creates a paradox which yields the defining characteristic of the isoperimetric
radius. This provides the pathway to box in where it must dwell.
To demonstrate the equality of the circular to
the triangular perimeter, he had to show that the “radius must be to the sum of
the sides of the triangle, as the radius of the [isoperimetric] circle is to
the circumference.” But—and here is the
crux—since the radius has no rational
proportion to the circumference, such a radius would not be proportional to the
sides of the triangle, because if the radius is to the circumference, and if
the triangular circumference were equal to the circle, then it would share in
the lack of proportionality with the radius.
The sought
line, the radius of the isoperimetric polygon, cuts the side of the triangle.
But what follows from the above statement is, that since it is not proportional
to the circumference of the polygon, so it would not be proportional to any
part of it, or proportional in square to any part of it. Therefore, in this
diagram, since the radius of the isoperimetric circle we are looking for, dl,
is not proportional to the perimeter of the triangle, then also the line dk—which
would be proportional to dl— would not be proportional to eb, de, or db. Nor
would the line ek, created by dk, be proportional to eb, de, or db
And what
this points to, is an extremely important affirmation by Cusa. Since, as was
shown, no line can be drawn that stands in rational proportion with the sides
of the triangle, no point on eb could be
given precisely that the ‘sought length’ would be drawn to. Thus, any length along eb, which is
in proportion to eb, would not be in proportion to the length sought. And also,
any length which is drawn from d such that it would be in proportion to a
length along eb, would not be the ‘sought length’.
So this gives us the method of
approach to boxing in our isoperimetric radius right? Since the sought line is not proportional to
eb and db, what we are looking for then, must be to find the line which is the most non-proportional to them, and then,
we will have the line which is the least
non-proportional to the ‘sought length”. The length we are looking for
compared to the lengths that are known, those of the triangle, is the minimum
with respect to its degree of knowability. Therefore, we are looking for the
radius which brings us the most ignorance relative to the known triangle!
Where must the cut be? One extends the length that cuts the line, by
the proportion of the line on the side of the triangle—created by the cutting
line—to the whole side of the triangle[see animation] and also the line on the
other side of the cut to the whole side. However, since the line cutting the
line has to be proportional to the one we are looking for, the extension must
also be proportional. But, the line
drawn to the side of the triangle from d can never be exactly proportional to the one sought since the sought length is
not proportional to the sides of the triangle. It cuts it larger or smaller. So
if it extends it by the proportion of the side of the triangle, its extension
can never be exact either. So which extension is least non-proportional to the
one sought?
The fact
that we can find a length that is smaller than the one sought, and one larger
than the one sought, means there should be a length where we can cut the line
such that it is neither larger nor smaller, right? The closest we can come, Cusa
says, is when both extensions are equal to each other and thus the amount by
which the created length is larger or smaller than the sought length is the
smallest it can be, even though it is not the sought length by the amount
smaller or larger but not by a rational fraction; again, because of the
incommensurability between the isoperimetric radius and the perimeter of the
triangle.[28]